But left with no real alternatives to get to the bottom of it, I just decided to read a bunch of the CIA's declassified information from the years around 1949 that involved China, and spoiler alert, none of them say that they installed Mao. On July 22, 1948, the CIA put out a report titled In the report, the situation is described as being not very good. The support for nationalist Chiang Kai-shek, quote, is steadily weakening because of the unsuccessful prosecution of the war under his leadership and his apparent unwillingness and inability to accomplish positive reforms. The report describes increasing instability in the nationalist side of the Chinese Civil War, which was unlikely to be something that we could resolve no matter what we did. The report is not pro-communist or pro-Mao in any way. It says, quote, the prospect for the foreseeable future in China is at best an indefinite and inconclusive prolongation of the Civil War, with the authority of the national government limited to a dwindling area in the central and south China and isolated major cities in north and northeast China. The worst prospect is complete collapse of the national government and its replacement by a Chinese communist controlled regime under Soviet influence, if not under Soviet control, and uncooperative towards the United States, if not openly hostile. So strange that they would describe the communists coming to power as the worst case scenario in a classified document if that's exactly what they were working towards. According to the report's assessment, the U.S. was in a really precarious position. The U.S. had passed a bill providing aid to Chiang Kai-shek, but his government was increasingly ineffective in facing opposition not just from the communists, but also from within. Anti-US sentiment had been growing, not only from the communists, with many thinking that the US was taking a side in a civil matter in the hopes of turning China into a giant colony. Were the U.S. to increase the aid offered to Chiang Kai-shek, that sentiment would almost certainly have grown, and along with it, anti-shek resistance. At the same time, the question of the USSR loomed large. Increased aid for the nationalists could very easily result in the USSR formally and materially supporting the Chinese communists in that civil war, which could get out of hand really, really easily. Considering a lot of these variables, the report points out that, quote, many Chinese view the U.S. aid program as prolonging the agony of rather than resolving the Civil War. That was a sentiment that we couldn't fight, really. There was not much we could do. Chiang Kai-shek was doing a terrible job of running the war, and he was doing a horrible job of inspiring his side with a positive vision of what comes after the war. The CIA assessments and reports for this time are in full acknowledgement of the uphill battle that would be involved in trying to somehow help him win the Civil War, and how even if the U.S. was able to lead him to victory, it would likely not be a good thing, since his government was completely unstable, in all likelihood he wouldn't be able to effectively govern the country. If we were to get involved, it would likely involve a full military commitment, as well as a pretty high level of us forcing reforms on his nationalist government, which would be basically turning China into a U.S. colony. This sort of thing would obviously trigger a backlash from the Soviet Union, who have a strategic interest in their neighbor not being a U.S. puppet state. The issue of the U.S. position and the rise of the Communist Party in China is an infinitely complex one, but I can find no evidence that the CIA put Mao into power.