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Nov. 22, 2022 - Viva & Barnes
11:19:50
Emergencies Act Inquiry Nov. 22, 2022 - Live with Chat!
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Time Text
Because we're going out.
We're going out.
Check one two.
Check one two.
Check when.
Check when.
Check when.
Thank you.
Order allot.
The Public Order Emergency Commission is now in session.
La Commission sur l 'état d 'urgence est maintenant ouverte.
Good morning.
Bonjour.
Commission Council, we're ready to go.
Alors, Antoine Chaudhry pour la Commission.
The Commission's next witness is Minister Marco Menger.
The next witness is the Minister Marco Mandacino.
Bonjour.
Ministre Mendocino, voulez-vous jurer sur un document religieux?
S 'il vous plaît.
Bible, Coran ou la Torah?
For the record, please state your full name.
Votre nom?
Marco Mendicino.
M-A-R-C-O.
M-E-N-D-I-C-I-N-O.
Jurez-vous que le témoignage que vous allez rendre aujourd 'hui sera la vérité, toute la vérité et rien d 'autre que la vérité que Dieu vous soit en aide?
Good morning again.
Alors, So we'll just start with a little housekeeping, which is the entry of your witness summary.
You'll recall sitting for an interview with Commission Council on September 5th of this year?
Yes.
And after that interview, Commission Council prepared a summary of the interview.
Have you seen and reviewed that summary?
I have, yes.
And can you confirm that it's accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief?
Yes.
Okay.
For the record, Mr. Clerk, that's WTS 5054.
No need to pull it up.
So, Mr. Mendocino, I understand you were appointed Minister of Public Safety in October 2021.
Is that right?
That's correct.
Okay.
And can you briefly outline, well, first of all, your background before that, your background in politics and what you did before that?
I was first elected in 2015 and have been serving as the Member of Parliament for Eglinton Lawrence, which is a constituency in North Toronto.
I have been re-elected twice, both in 2019 and in 2021.
And prior to getting into politics, I was a practicing lawyer in Ontario, where I served for about a decade as a federal prosecutor, and then subsequently as a private practitioner, as well as counsel at the Law Society of Ontario.
Okay.
So can you briefly outline, and I really do mean briefly, we have a lot to get through in these.
Two and a bit hours, so we'll do our best to do so.
Your responsibilities as Minister of Public Safety?
Well, this is a position where the job description is in the title.
So my paramount responsibility is to ensure that we maintain public safety.
And the only way that you can do that is to ensure that laws are upheld.
But beyond that, and specifically in the context of this inquiry and in response to the events of last winter, I had a number of responsibilities, including receiving information and sharing information from law enforcement to colleagues within the federal government,
making sure that we were staying in touch and engaging with different levels of government, both provincially and municipally, making sure that we gave advice to the government with regards to the decision to invoke the Emergencies Act and then subsequently to revoke the Emergencies Act.
Being a communicator on behalf of the government to Canadians to keep them apprised of the situation last winter.
And a number of other roles, but those are the core ones.
Okay, and we're going to explore a lot of the details of what you just outlined today.
So we'll start with the time period before the convoy arrived in Ottawa.
So, Mr. Clerk, can I ask you to pull up SSM.nsc.can401790?
So, Mr. Mendocino, to situate you, this is just on January 26th, I believe.
Oh, I'm sorry, if you just scroll down a little bit.
You had asked Commissioner Lucky, I believe, to brief you on the convoy.
Do you recall that?
I do recall that.
By the end of January, there were reports about a massive protest that was mobilizing from across the country.
And so, to be sure that we were...
Again, kept aware of how police were going to respond to that protest.
We asked for briefings.
Okay.
And the next document I'll ask you to pull up, Mr. Clerk, is pb.nsc.can50992.
So these, to situate you again as the documents being pulled up, Minister, are talking points for the briefing on January 26th.
I believe the Commissioner Lucky's talking points.
So they're not yours, but I'm going to take you through them and you can confirm to us whether this was the sort of information that was being provided to you that day.
So 26 before the convoy arrives.
Scroll down, Mr. Clerk, to where you see the goal of...
There we go.
So the goal of the nationwide protest is to disrupt traffic flow and general business of government in the hope that the Canadian government will lift all COVID-19 related restrictions.
Below that...
Although the majority of information indicates organizers are planning a peaceful event, many social media posts suggest some participants may attempt to disrupt government buildings and further cause disruptions throughout the city.
Was that information conveyed to you?
Yes, it was.
Okay, scrolling down again to page two, please.
It is unknown how long the protesters plan to stay in Ottawa.
However, the RCMP has located social media posts indicating some participants may stay around the downtown core until January 31st in hopes to disrupt the House of Commons sitting that day.
So, with that information conveyed to you, and more broadly, can you tell us what your expectation was before the convoy arrived of how long it would or might stay?
That information was conveyed to me and a number of other colleagues at cabinet level, and my immediate reaction was to question the quality of the intelligence about the duration with which this protest was going to occur.
One of the things that struck me was that there were...
Reports about a significant number of vehicles that were coming from across the country.
And it certainly seemed to me that just given the amount of time that it would take to get to Ottawa and other locations in the country where these demonstrations would occur, that there may very well be an intention to stay longer than the short period of time that some of those initial briefings had suggested that they would stay there.
Combined with some of the public statements around the original manifesto, which in my opinion was the spark for the so-called Freedom Convoy, the stated political and ideological objectives within that document to force
And as time went on, we certainly started to probe those questions more once they arrived at the end of January.
Okay, so just to send that up and to make sure I have it right, when you say question the intelligence, you sort of, do you mean question the assessment in the end of the conclusion that this is likely going to be gone by the end of the weekend?
You were concerned that it would stay longer than that?
That's correct.
Okay.
Scrolling down to page three, please, Mr. Clerk.
Let me see.
There we go.
Perfect.
With respect to the threat picture, there has been an increase in online narratives supportive of the convoy among both ideologically motivated networks.
We've heard a lot about ideologically motivated networks in IMVU over the past week or so, as well as in general public discourse.
And then scrolling down a little bit more, the convoy is attracting individuals who are not aligned with any specific ideology or group, but who...
Experience personal hardships such as job loss due to COVID-19 and are upset with provincial or federal government responses as COVID continues to impact daily life.
Open source monitoring has identified associated posts advocating violence and there's potential for anti-government groups to join the demo with violent intentions.
Then it talks about online posts feeding the conspiracy narrative with misinformation and disinformation.
Raising tensions, scrolling down a little bit more please Mr. Clerk.
Open source reports also suggest that police are setting up roadblocks and such reports seem to fuel, no pun intended, some truckers agitation.
A post to the event Facebook group Yes, and if I could just be permitted to expand briefly, because you touched on a few important points, and if I could just ask for the technicians to scroll back up.
So, right under the words on January 22, 2022.
There's a number of bullet points that I just want to shed some additional light on.
So the fact that the convoy was attracting individuals with different grievances was one of the phenomenon around the expressly stated ideological, political, and in some cases, extreme stated objectives of the Freedom Convoy.
This was something that, again, was a recurring theme in our discussions with law enforcement, with the security and intelligence community.
The fact that it was pulling in people with different grievances, not just in relationship to the pandemic, but grievances regarding the government and other democratic institutions.
Similarly, the potential for violence was stated at the outset.
A number of very public statements by individuals like Pat King, who had said that this could end in bullets, or that it would end in bullets, potentially, was a signal of intent.
At least that was my opinion, that certainly not...
I mean, there were many thousands of Canadians who participated in these demonstrations and in the blockade who were there for entirely legitimate and lawful purposes, but some were prepared to become violent.
There's a bullet point there about threats to public figures.
We were concerned about whether or not the blockade might target the Prime Minister, and then, as you will have heard by now...
There were subsequent many threats that were made towards not only elected public figures, but equally law enforcement and representative of the media, which to me, again, signaled that this was a movement that in some cases was prepared to attack our democratic institutions to force change around policies.
Okay, I'll just stop you there and scroll down to the next page, Mr. Clerk, because I think this is, or actually I think it's page six.
This is touching on the point that you just made, Minister Mendocino.
So at the top of that page, it says effective January 11th something for announcements and public functions has been put in place for eight individuals, and it lists off Minister Jairi, Freeland, yourself, a few other ministers, and Dr. Tam.
And without obviously getting into what's behind that Section 37 redaction, is it fair to assume that that means that there was a security risk identified?
That's exactly correct.
And the RCMB had briefed in the early days of the convoy, certainly within the first week, that there needed to be a significant change in the security posture regarding the ministers that are in that paragraph.
And in part, I think that was a response to the heightened degree of posts that were violent in nature.
The overtly criminal threats that were being made against the lives and the security and safety of identifiable public figures.
And so as a result of that, the security detail did change around a number of both me and my colleagues in Cabinet.
Okay.
And last point on this, if we just scroll down a little bit more, you'll see a line that says concerns from Minister LeBlanc specifically.
We'll be hearing from Minister LeBlanc later on today.
It says, And I think that that is worth emphasizing as well, because in addition to the security that was provided to ministers and cabinet, there was a heightened security posture.
Around the Hill and around being able to access Parliament.
And indeed, one of my main concerns was that given, again, some of the stated objectives by some, including the potential to become violent, that we were just returning from winter session.
And the first day of the resumption of Parliament coincided with...
One of the early days in the blockade and subsequent occupation right here in Ottawa.
And I was worried about a significant number of people being able to both ingress and egress from the Hill.
And so there was a heightened security posture so that we could continue to host Parliament or to hold Parliament.
Very important priority that Canadians see that the business of government continue, notwithstanding the blockade and the convoy.
But there were challenges.
And I had many conversations with parliamentarians, disproportionately women, I would point out, who were the recipient of harassment, intimidation, expressions of hate through the convoy.
So that additional security was very much driven by the reality on the ground.
Okay, that was actually my next question.
Whether these concerns were based on identified threats having been identified, I'm going to use that word twice, but by the intelligence services or by law enforcement or whether these were based on what was being seen on social media or based on essentially complaints or worries expressed by members of parliament and the individuals involved.
All of the above.
And so it was a combination of what we were seeing on the ground in the activities of the convoy.
And probably the most aggressive demonstration of their presence was the parking of ultimately hundreds of trucks on Wellington Street, which is one of the main arteries that runs through the parliamentary precinct.
And again, I'll just pause here.
I mean, that...
Visual suggested to me that we were going to be in it for quite some time rather than just the weekend, but I'll come back to that.
I'm sure that the RCMP were taking into account what they were seeing online, what they were hearing from various parliamentarians regarding potential security threats.
And so for all of those reasons, again, security was elevated not only for cabinet, but for parliamentarians and for staff who were working in the parliamentary precinct.
Okay, and we will get to the actual arrival of the convoy, but there's one more document I'd like to pull up before we get there.
So Mr. Clerk, that is SSM.nsc.can401809.
So this, Minister, may go to what you were just expressing about your heightened level of concern.
This is Friday, January 28th at around noon, so this is as the convoy would be starting to roll in.
You send an email to Mike Jones.
Can you tell us who Mike Jones is?
Because his name will come up a few times, I think, this morning.
Mike Jones is my Chief of Staff, and the email that you put up, which is dated Friday, January 28th, at about 5.38.
PM reflects the questions that I intend to put to the table.
So looking at latest estimate on numbers, both in terms of vehicles and people, trying to ascertain whether or not there was any intelligence of individuals who may be on a watch list regarding threats to national security.
The third question that I put in the email there...
Which is written as latest on what-if scenarios.
What I was really, I think, foreshadowing was a discussion around potential contingencies.
Like, what if the convoy doesn't disengage?
What if they don't leave?
And from a very early point, as I had said earlier, had concerns that this was not just going to be a one- or a two-day.
That it was going to last much longer.
And so I wanted to extract from the community, the law enforcement community, the intelligence community, what do we do if that's the case?
How do we make sure that we keep public safety?
And what are the contingencies around that?
Okay.
So just a couple of things.
The first is for the record and for ease of understanding.
You'll see the notation plus four zeros there.
That means that the timestamp is in Greenwich Mean Time, so it's minus five hours.
So that was around 12.30.
And as you say, you're asking, what if scenarios?
What if they don't leave?
What if it lasts beyond Monday?
What if it turns violent?
What if they come before parliamentary residences?
And we know now at this point that what ended up happening as of, I think, January 28th was a group of ministers.
Consisting of yourself, I believe Minister LeBlanc, Minister Blair and Minister Al-Gabra were briefed daily by a variety of officials from PCO and various agencies under public safety.
Would that have been done in response to this request?
I think it was understood.
Early on that we were going to need to take a whole-of-government approach responding to the convoy.
So the initial group that you just highlighted of ministers was eventually expanded, and then ultimately, as I'm sure we'll get into, the Prime Minister convened a meeting of the incident response group, which included a number of others.
But I should highlight the two last points, which are in the email, to Mike Jones, which...
Suggest that at the time, I was also concerned about making sure that we were staying up on threat assessments as well to senators, as well as the governor general, in addition to elected parliamentarians.
And finally, I wanted to get a sense of what outreach was being done to the organizers.
And my thinking there was, let's try to allow for the space for a lawful protest.
Keep it within the boundaries of the law because it is a hallmark of our democracy that people can take opposing different views.
And so I wanted to make sure that there were some lines of communication with the organizers of the convoy from the early days.
Okay.
So we'll just skip a little bit ahead now.
So the convoy arrives.
It doesn't leave on Sunday or Monday as expected.
And then we're into the first week of the protests.
So I'll ask you a few questions about what that first week was like from your perspective.
And with the assistance right now of the following document, PB.CAN 401870, please.
Okay, so Minister Mendicino, this is a text from Mike Jones, who's in the blue.
Well, there's no one else, I think, and it's not blue, but there we go.
Now it's blue.
And the text is to Brian Clough.
Can you tell us who Brian Clough is?
Yes, Brian Clough is the Deputy Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister.
Okay, so just scrolling down a little bit, please, Mr. Clerk, so we can see the text.
So this is Sunday, February 6th, and...
Mr. Jones, Mike Jones writes to Mr. Klaus, so my boss, that would be you?
Yes.
Is pretty amped up.
He's concerned that OPS have lost jurisdiction as there's no control at all over what's happening on Wellington.
Also concerned for PM safety if he is returning to this this week.
What does that mean if he was returning this week?
pausing there.
My recollection is that he was out of Ottawa for some period of time and then would be returning to To Ottawa and to ultimately the House of Commons.
And so I was outlining my concern about his ability to, for him and his staff and the RCMP that work with him to protect him, to get into and out of Parliament.
Because by then, and the date of this text is Sunday, February the 6th, so we're fully now, I think, about a week into the convoy, and this would have been after the first weekend.
And the concerns that I was expressing was that by that first weekend, it was my opinion that it was virtually impossible to enforce the law on Wellington Street.
Given the rampant behaviour, not only the noise that was being made by the excessive honking of horns well into the evening, but some of the early reports, and again, bear in mind, this is Sunday, February 6th.
By then, there were a number of press conferences that the Ottawa Police Service had held expressing serious concerns around the reports of intimidation.
Harassment and violence, if memory serves.
I think there was a press conference where the Ottawa Police Service had indicated that there were reports of firearms that had been brought into the nation's capital.
And subsequently, again, I'm going for memory, but there was at least one arrest that was reported of somebody that was making their way potentially to the convoy where the firearm was seized.
You know, there were...
Efforts, I think, by law enforcement to try and get the situation under control, but they were overwhelmed.
So there were a series of events leading up to the text that Mike Jones had sent to Brian Clow that had led to my concerns being elevated about our ability to restore public safety on Wellington Street in the nation's capital.
Which is the seat of the federal government.
I would also just add that my concerns were not just about Ottawa.
That by then there were already reports as well about borders being blockaded.
And I would just recall for you and for Judge Rouleau that in my job as Minister of Public Safety, I'm not just looking at the nation's capital or the parliamentary precinct.
I'm looking at the entire country.
And so by then a number of...
Critical infrastructure and borders had become either the target of, or in fact, blockades, which had a significant impact on critical supply chains.
So there was a lot that was, I think, I'm interpreting and extracting a little bit exactly from the language, but I think that's what Mike Jones was conveying to Brian Clout.
Okay, so just scroll down a little bit more, Mr. Clerk.
So the next part of the text says he wants to go out.
That would be you want to go out and say that OPS needs to get control over the situation.
And if they need more from OBP, they should make that clear.
But they should get working on removals within the next 24 hours.
And if they aren't going to do it, then we may need to look at other measures.
Let me know if you want to discuss.
So this represents where your thinking is, as you say, at the end of the first week.
So this is Sunday, February 6th, and you've just told us why you've come to this viewpoint.
Can I ask what you meant by we may need to look at other measures at that point?
At that point, I think looking at offering additional resources to local police, and there had been informal requests communicated to me and to my office for additional RCMP services, which we provided on a number of different occasions prior to the invocation of the Act.
So that was certainly one of the other potential measures that we could explore, which was how do we get...
More, you know, boots on the ground to help the Ottawa Police Service.
And let's not forget the Ontario Provincial Police who were the first stop if OPS, the Ottawa Police Service could not restore public safety.
And so that's what I believe I was foreshadowing at the time.
Okay.
Well, we're about to get into some of those resourcing discussions because the next topic we're going to cover is the tripartite meetings.
We've come to know as the tripartites.
So, Mr. Clerk, if you can pull up while I'm talking pb.nsc.can402335.
5. So you mentioned, Minister Menachino, that at this point there had been a number of requests made from the Ottawa police, from various, I think, provinces at this point.
Even there had been an approach from Alberta, but we're not really getting into Alberta right now.
But in any event, around the 7th or 8th of February, I believe.
The seventh decision was made that it would be a good idea to convene the federal, provincial, and municipal governments to discuss the situation in Ottawa and the way forward from there, including the provision of resources, as you mentioned.
There are a lot of issues to cover that come out of the tripartites.
We're going to focus on a few.
A few of those issues are the RCMP resources, the lack of the OPS plan, and there's what seems to be expressed as a...
A lack of engagement from the province of Ontario.
So, I'm going to take you through a few extracts that focus on some of those topics.
So, the document in front of us now is a readout of the February 7th tripartite, and that was the first tripartite meeting.
Is that right?
Yes.
Okay.
Scrolling down, Mr. Clerk, when you see the initials MM.
Okay, MM.
MM is Marco Mendicino, that's you.
Yes.
Okay, Minister Mendocino or Marco Mendocino, one of the two.
So, MM, call last week with Watson was productive.
It is a stressful period for you and Chief.
Feels like things have turned around a bit today.
We have confirmed 250 Mounties have been deputized, supporting local law enforcement.
We have been timely and responsive in putting our response together.
Minister Jones will want to have a discussion with what they can contribute.
Letter addressed to, and scroll down, yeah, there we go, both PM and Premier, we are going to be in touch.
Okay, so from your recollection, Minister, who attended that first tripartite meeting?
Well, from the federal level of government, myself, Minister Blair, our officials, some of our political staff, Mayor Watson, I believe his chief of staff.
I'm trying to recall whether or not there were any officials from the Ontario government not elected or not, but the majority of the participants were the political levels from the City of Ottawa.
The federal government and supporting staff and officials.
Okay, that's fair.
This isn't a memory test anyway.
So, Minister Jones obviously did not attend because you were talking about getting her to attend in this exchange here.
Okay, can we just scroll down again to page two, please?
Keep going a little bit, please, Mr. Clerk.
There we go.
Where it says Watson on tripartite table.
So the discussion before this pertains to RCMP numbers, how many resources are being provided.
There's some frustration expressed throughout this by the Mayor of Ottawa, Mayor Watson, about how many RCMP boots are actually on the ground.
So that's being discussed.
And then we get to Watson on tripartite table.
Has the province agreed to this?
And Minister Blair then says, "Both of us have reached out.
That would be you and I. She wasn't able to join today, unfortunately.
We'll continue to engage, to encourage them to join these talks." And then Mayor Watson expresses an opinion that the province is reluctant to be a part of what's going on, and then expresses some frustration about that.
Would you agree with that characterization of Mayor Watson in that line?
The province was reluctant to be part of what was going on.
I would agree that at that particular point in time that there was a common desire to have Minister Jones or additional representation from Ontario at the tripartite meeting for the purposes of cooperating and coordinating.
The response to the convoy in Ottawa.
Now, I would add that that's not to say that the province was not engaged at all, and I know for instance that Premier Ford had made a number of very strong statements about the state of the convoy, condemning it, saying, you know, it was out of control.
It pronounced very definitively and declaratively that it was time for people to go home, if I recall correctly.
That would have been before this tripartite.
There were other conversations that I was having bilaterally around the tripartite.
So I would say, despite the fact that they were not at that table, there were still conversations with Ontario.
But yes, we would like to have seen them at the tripartite.
There's no doubt about that.
Okay.
And can we just scroll down again, please, Mr. Clerk?
Last point, I think, on this one.
Page three, please, sorry.
There we go, where it says MM again, Wellington.
So MM, Wellington has invoked a lot of images, but the sight of a crane, trucks in front of PMO, PCO are particularly concerning.
Need to know from the chief what the plan is, and chief there is chief slowly, what the plan is to have those vehicles removed.
With appropriate boundaries on operational independence, how is the convoy being broken up and disengaged?
Can I just ask you to speak at this point on what you meant there by appropriate boundaries on operational independence in this context?
Well, that's a very important question because the principle of operational independence has to guide the relationship between police and the elected branch of government.
And again, from my past professional experience as a prosecutor and as a practicing lawyer, I would have been very familiar precisely because I had worked closely with police in a variety of different cases and the need to respect that principle at all times.
So I wanted to be sure that even though we were asking questions of police to provide some detail and some clarity around how they intended to restore public safety, That at all times it was respectful of that principle.
At the same time, I do think it bears emphasizing that police and the elected branch of government do not operate in two silos, and nor should we, that there needs to be a dialogue between both branches to be sure.
That police have the resources that they need, which was one of my core responsibilities in the response to the blockade, as well as potentially additional tools to respond to the unique and unprecedented nature of this convoy, which is something that we ultimately came to.
So I know you may have more questions about operational independence, but I wanted to flag really early on that as we were asking questions, we were mindful of that.
The other thing I would just stress, if I could, is that...
In ultimately forming the opinion that we needed to invoke the Emergencies Act, one of my main concerns was the inability to enforce the law adjacent to critical infrastructure, and that would have included Parliament.
And the nature of the parliamentary precinct is such that Wellington Street falls within the jurisdiction of the Ottawa Police Service.
So I was certainly trying to reconcile in my mind that these are federal, democratic...
But we did not have total jurisdiction over that space.
In other words, it wasn't at the sole or exclusive discretion of the RCMP, which is the Federal Police Service, to go and assert itself on Wellington Street to bring the situation back into control.
So we had to navigate different levels of government, including municipal and provincial, because Ottawa Police Service has that jurisdiction.
As of this moment, and if they did not have the resources to respond to the occupation at that point, including the ability to remove hundreds of large vehicles on Wellington Street, including the ability to remove a crane, which had been parked right adjacent to the Prime Minister's office and the Privy Council office, including the ability to simply enforce the law.
Then they could then next go to, they then, statutorily, under the Ontario Police Services Act, could go to the Ontario government to ask for the Ontario Provincial Police Service to backstop any gaps there.
But I would point out that there is no statutory link beyond that to go from the Ontario Police Service Act to the Emergencies Act.
And I know that's something we're going to come to.
Okay.
There's a lot you've said there, and we'll unpack that slowly but surely.
For the purposes of the discussion we're having right now about the tripartites, would it be fair to say that part of the idea in holding the tripartites would be to sort out the jurisdictional issue?
All of that.
It was really to make sure that all of the key players at all three levels of government were able to navigate around the jurisdictional challenges and complexities, but beyond that, the situation on the ground, which...
By then, as you pointed out in an earlier exhibit and text, it was on the brink of being completely ungovernable, if not already by then.
Okay.
We'll go now to the next tripartite, which is the following day, February 8th.
Mr. Clerk, that's ssm.nsc.can402052.
So, these are notes taken of that tripartite.
Just again, to situate us a bit with the names here, Zita Astrovis, we've heard, is Mr. Blair's Chief of Staff.
Samantha Khalil, can you tell us who that is?
Samantha Khalil works in the Prime Minister's office, and I believe she works in the Issues Department of the Prime Minister's office.
Okay, so this is essentially a readout or notes from that tripartite on the 8th.
Scroll down a little bit, Mr. Clerk.
There we go.
MM, good to be back on these calls.
It's only been a day.
Stay focused on the task at hand.
Received your letter.
And the mayor then says, why no Solgen attendance?
Solgen is Minister Jones?
That's correct.
Okay.
And you say no word back.
So you're conveying there that you attempted to call or attempted to contact Minister Jones and had not heard back at that point?
Yes, that's right.
Okay.
And then the mayor says he's speaking to the premier tomorrow and he will ask that his minister be at the table.
He goes on to talk about a call that he'd had with the prime minister, which we went through in some detail a few weeks ago.
And then Minister Blair chimes in on Ontario involvement and says, I know Marco's been having good conversations with Ontario.
They are worried about being visible.
And then being asked about what the province is doing.
Now, I appreciate that these are Minister Blair's words, not yours, but do you know, do you recall what he was talking about when he said they were worried about being visible?
Well, again, as you pointed out, these are my colleague Minister Blair's words that are being captured in a summary of a readout.
I believe he was referring...
To the fact that at the point in time that we were having these trilateral conversations, that there was a lot of attention that was being placed on both the city of Ottawa as well as the federal government.
And I believe he was conveying a perception that Ontario wasn't at the table at the time.
And so, again, what we really were driving at here, and as I think the summary communicates, was an effort to bring Ontario to the table.
And I had reached out to Minister Jones, had not heard back at that point.
I believe, if memory serves, I was able to get in touch with her shortly after that time.
But it was really a full-court press to try and have everybody at the trilateral table because, as we've discussed, there were operational complexities and jurisdictional complexities.
And to the extent that we could be all aligned, then that would...
Help to restore public safety.
Okay.
And we'll get back to that topic.
I'm going to scroll down and take you to something else I want to ask you about here.
This is, sorry, scroll down a little bit, Mr. Clerk, until you see page three.
Slowly for every action.
Should be a little bit down from there.
There we go.
So just scroll down.
There we go.
Thank you.
Slowly.
So this is Chief Slowly speaking.
And you're asking, what does the trend look like for removal?
Is it slowly going down or is it stop and start?
And Chief Slowly says, for every action we do, there is a counter reaction that can exceed our resources.
We saw that in Coventry.
So he's discussing there the give and take or the reactions and counter reactions in Ottawa specifically.
But he then says, Our public request for 1,800 more people resulted in the activity in Windsor, plus a national call for protesters to drive to Ottawa so they can outnumber even increased police presence.
There are national implications and local implications here.
They are very well organized and able to mobilize people.
So can you tell us, expand a little bit on what you were hearing about that at that time, the level of organization and...
To the extent that you were hearing this and the interconnectedness or not of what was going on across the country.
That is a critically important intervention by Chief Slowly at the time for a couple of reasons.
First, he's flagging as a very serious concern that locally they are outnumbered.
And he says that That it is exceeding their, or he suggests that it is very close to exceeding their current resources, which is why they had asked for some additional help, including from the RCMP, which by then we would have responded to.
There were a couple of installations prior to the invocation of the Act that I think numbered in the hundreds, somewhere between, you know, 200 at the outset and then eventually getting up to about 500 all told.
There were questions about...
Exactly how those resources were being deployed by the RCMP in conjunction with Ottawa Police Service.
But the real important point is he's saying we're outnumbered and we need help.
That's what I took from that intervention.
The other thing that he mentioned in that intervention is Coventry.
And through a number of briefings...
In the lead-up to the invocation of the Emergencies Act, there was a discussion of two different groups that were at play in the blockades.
There was a large group, again, of Canadians who were exercising their lawful right to protest against certain policies by the government.
But then there was another group that had other more extreme objectives that was much more sophisticated and organized.
And it's my recollection that that latter group...
Was interspersed in a number of different locations very tactically, but that there was a concentration of that latter group at Coventry Road that was made up potentially of individuals who had previously served in either the military or in law enforcement.
And that to me raised a concern, a very serious concern, about some of the counter operations that could be run by that group to overwhelm.
Legitimate law enforcement.
And that, I think, is exactly what Chief Slowly is getting at.
If numbers are being reported publicly about how many additional reinforcements are being sent in, then the word could go out to call for more protesters to descend into the nation's capital or, again, quite frankly, to deploy across the country.
Again, I would hasten to add this was not just about Ottawa.
This was about the entire country where we would see the levels of protest go up and go down.
And the time that I thought was most dangerous were typically the weekends.
And that's when there was a surge of people who came and descended into the parliamentary precinct.
And that...
If I read Chief Slowly Wright, it was in part a tactical decision that was being informed by some within the group who had the skills and the experience to overwhelm whatever police resources were available at the time.
Okay, so going back to a few things you said, the first one you mentioned that there were some questions about boots on the ground and how many RCMP offices were being provided.
And we've heard about that, but from your perspective as Minister of Public Safety, what was your understanding of what was going on there and why?
Well, my understanding was that Ottawa Police Service did not have the resources to respond at the time.
And therefore, they were putting out a request for assistance from different levels of government and different levels of law enforcement.
Including the RCMP, and that is one of, and so my response as Minister of Public Safety is, let's get you what you need.
Let's get you the additional boots on the ground.
And in dialogue with the Commissioner of the RCMP, we were responsive to that request on more than one occasion, deploying additional RCMP members to assist to restore public safety here in the nation's capital.
There was also other requests, including in Alberta, but we can come back to that.
Well, before we get to Alberta, when you say let's get you what you need, do you mean let's get you what you need from the RCMP or let's get you what you need from the OPP and then only then from the RCMP?
I wouldn't say that there was necessarily that strict sequencing.
My job as Minister of Public Safety was to be responsive to the requests that were coming in from the City of Ottawa.
Vis-a-vis the Ottawa Police Service.
And so we facilitated those requests.
They were not necessarily subject to the Ontario Provincial Police responding at the time.
I wanted to be as supportive as I could.
I was very much sympathetic to the plight of the residents in Ottawa.
I was very concerned for their safety and their security.
We were beginning to see...
Counter-protests manifesting because I think at that time, residents felt that they had to take matters into their own hands.
That was extremely concerning to me because I thought that it represented a significant risk of more serious violence as a result of frustration and fatigue.
And we were seeing an abundance of expressions of that in reporting and on social media.
I wanted to be as supportive as I could to the City of Ottawa and to the Ottawa Police Service.
And Chief Slowly, I think, rightfully was flagging his concerns about resource capacity and potential counter-operations that were being run by the blockade and the occupation.
So getting back to that last concern about the counter-operations, the action, the reaction, were you concerned then that this could spiral into something where The police resources would actually be overwhelmed and stretched beyond capacity across the country.
Was that the nature of your concern?
Or was it in specific areas, there wouldn't be enough available locally?
Or was it a broader concern than that?
Or was it just the specific instances?
It was a broader concern that was national in scale.
At the end of the day, in my opinion, this was an illegal protest that was national in scale.
Occurred at critical infrastructure, including a number of borders and ports of entry, including at legislative assemblies, including here at the seat of the federal government.
And the initial responses of law enforcement to get the situation back under control were clearly overwhelmed.
And as a result of that...
The consequences were devastating to people, to the economy, to our international relations.
And so at all times, I was assessing not any one of these events in isolation, but rather the situation in its totality.
And when looking at the timing of it and the concurrence of all of these events in the same short, critical period of time, the types of targets where...
The individuals were showing up for the express purposes of creating disruption and undermining public safety.
And the type of tactics that were being used, which was through sheer size and force of people, of vehicles, and behavior, that this was a very singular and unprecedented event.
So being able to assess all of that in its totality was very much part of my job to restore public safety and to maintain it.
Did you have any actual evidence of what Chief Slowly is referring to here, that interconnectedness?
Or was this more, you saw a correlation, or Chief Slowly is here, but you agreed with it, that one action then seems to have a counter-reaction or provoke a response amongst protesters nationwide?
Did that come from evidence, or did that come from essentially observation?
It came from observation, what I was seeing with my own eyes on the ground.
Was that when police tried to enforce the law, they were overwhelmed.
They were swarmed.
There were reports about there being threats made to them as they tried to do their job.
And they were clearly identifiable in uniform, you know, indicating that it was time to go home.
And these were not just interactions.
I mean, they ultimately did lead to hundreds of criminal charges being laid, including assault of a peace officer, which is a very serious offense to be charged with.
This was all a counter-reaction to the reaction of law enforcement to try and restore public safety on the ground.
And it wasn't just in Ottawa.
It was at ports of entry at the Pacific Highway.
In Surrey, in British Columbia, where again, there were very clear statements by Canada Border Service agents as well as local law enforcement there through the RCMP that it was time to go home.
And in the face of those instructions, not only did members, participants double down, I mean, there's a very notorious incident involving a large vehicle that was painted with military fatigues that tried to crash a barrier.
To me, That poses a serious threat of violence.
And I think we'll come to Coutts, Alberta, which was, again, a very and arguably the most egregious risk that coincided with the blockade.
But I was at all times both using the observations that I was making for myself, as well as the advice and the intelligence that I was receiving in my capacity as Minister of Public Safety.
Okay, and we will come there.
But first, I'm going to take you through now to sort of close the loop.
Sorry, you can take this one down, please, Mr. Clerk.
So, can you just pull up quickly, ssm.can.nsc402676?
This is the third and last tripartite, and there's just a couple of things I want to highlight here, Minister.
I'll ask you about, which is...
Here we go.
Let's just scroll down a little bit more.
Thanks.
Latest from RCMP.
Towards the middle of that paragraph, you say, phase has moved beyond inconvenience or disruption.
So this is now February 10th.
They have moved to disrupting the economy.
We are having very intentional conversations with the province about how confident they are around enforcement, the ability to take appropriate action quickly and decisively, whether in Ottawa, Windsor, Sarnia, etc.
Spoke to Minister Jones.
It was a focused conversation and I'm looking forward to hearing back from her on what OPP can do to assist you.
Okay, so I'll take it from that and we'll get back to the conversation with Minister Jones.
Minister Jones was not at the third and last tripartite here.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Okay.
So, thank you, Mr. Clerk.
So, I'm just going to try and put together the chronology of what happened here, and I'll take you back to February 5th.
SSM.CAN407854.
This is a text exchange between you and Minister David Lamedi.
Just scroll down a little bit, please, Mr. Clerk.
I'm not sure what you're referring to.
You say.
You were perfect today.
Thanks.
So were you, buddy.
Then should I?
So the blue is...
A little collegial support at a very stressful time.
Collegial slash bromance.
Okay.
I think he might resent that suggestion.
So were you, buddy.
Should I call Downey?
You've spoken to Sylvia.
Downey, there would be a reference to Doug Downey?
That's correct.
Okay.
Can you tell us who, just for the record, can you tell us who Doug Downey is and why Minister Lametti might be calling him?
He's the Attorney General of Ontario.
He's Minister Lametti's provincial counterpart.
Okay, and so you have spoken to Sylvia, he says, and you say, I have spoken with Sylvia.
You should call Downey.
We need them in the right space to respond to any RFA for OPP assistance.
And then Minister Lametti replies, spoke to Doug Downey, needs slowly to be quick, quick, quick.
Can you tell us why would Minister Lametti be calling Doug Downey about this?
So you're speaking to your counterpart, he's speaking to his, and what capacity would that be?
Well, again, I mean, you're asking me to interpret or infer why Minister Lametti has reached out to Doug Dunney.
The best answer that I can offer is I believe he is reaching out to a provincial counterpart to understand what Ontario's response is to the situation, not only in Ottawa, but elsewhere, including in Windsor at the Ambassador Bridge and by then.
The blockade was causing significant interruption to the economy.
Again, thousands of people were temporarily laid off.
Businesses were impacted in the auto manufacturing sector.
I think he's trying to gain some understanding from the Attorney General of Ontario about perhaps what advice he is offering to the Ontario government.
Again, I'm drawing some inferences here.
I think it's a combination of that, but I think more broadly just to keep lines of communication strong between the federal government and the government of Ontario.
Okay, so you actually asked him to call Downey.
So do you have a recollection of why, or is it essentially what you just told us?
Yeah, no, actually, there it is right there.
Yeah, so I would say that was my thinking at the time, was to try and keep lines of communication open and to be sure that That we had some understanding about, you know, what advice may be provided to the Ontario government.
Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Clerk.
Next document is ONT401141.
So I understand that there was a call that took place between you and Minister Jones on the 7th.
And in that earlier tax exchange, you seem to refer to an earlier call before the 5th.
I don't know if you...
Do you have any recollection of that one?
I'm sorry.
I'm sorry.
Which document am I looking at here?
Sorry, yeah, that's my fault.
The last document, the text exchange with Minister Lametti, you say, I have spoken with Sylvia, and that appears to be on the 5th.
So do you remember a conversation prior to the 5th?
In the context of the blockades, not off the top of my head at this moment.
Well, we know that one happened on the 7th, and this document is Minister Jones's notation of that call.
And she says, so she's talking to you, Marco Medicino, Jim Watson wants an interlocutor.
I think that may mean interlocutor, but I'm not sure.
Wellington will be fast.
And jurisdiction, FTP table to support the city, 1500 OBP 38 Kitchener.
Can you tell, so the interlocutor, is that a reference to an interlocutor?
Was that part of the discussion you were having?
You know, again, if we could have the document just scroll back up to the top.
I just want to...
February the 7th, Jim Watson, Watson.
I agree with you.
I think that...
The word there may be misspelled and is referring to an interlocutor.
And, you know, beyond that, I couldn't say much more about that particular note.
But I did have a conversation with Minister Jones.
Yes, you did.
Pardon me?
Around that time or shortly thereafter.
Okay.
And we're going to get to a report of what was said in that conversation as well.
But before we get there, I want to just go through a little bit the call you subsequently had with Minnesota.
Minister, with Premier Ford, because at this point, so can you take us through that?
Minister Jones doesn't, you have a conversation on the 7th.
Actually, why don't we go there now?
So that conversation is reported in a text exchange.
Can you pull up, Mr. Clerk, ssm.nsc.can403127?
So while that's getting pulled up, this is a text exchange on February 11th between Samantha Kahlil, who you've told us is a PMO staffer, Mike Jones, your chief of staff, and Theta Astrovis.
And so Samantha says, thanks guys, long day.
Okay, so writing here is Mike Jones, your chief of staff.
And, oh no, I'm sorry, this is Sam Kahlil, I think, writing here.
She says, hey, so on trilateral meeting.
Got it wrong again.
It's Zeta writing.
So Ms. Astro says, hey, Salon Trilateral meeting.
Sam, I don't know what you think, but I really think we need Jones at the table.
Perhaps your boss can push again.
Your boss there.
So Mike Jones, he's talking about you.
He says, by Jones, I assume you mean Ontario and can have my boss reach out again.
But the last call got pretty frosty at the end when he was saying we need the province to get back to us with their plan.
Quote, unquote, I don't take edicts from you.
You're not my fucking boss.
Scroll down again.
Yes, obviously not you.
She said that.
Does that accord with your recollection of the conversation you had with Minister Jones?
There was definitely some colorful vernacular towards the end of that call.
Happy to say that both Minister and Jones and I still enjoy a very productive and positive rapport.
But the real thrust of the call was to engage Minister Jones to understand exactly where her thinking and where the Government of Ontario's thinking was at in responding to the requests of Ottawa Police Service to get additional resources.
And more broadly speaking, to restore public safety on the ground.
And, you know, I think certainly by the end of the call, it was quite clear that the inability of law enforcement using existing authorities to restore public safety on the ground was of increasing concern to me.
In my capacity as the Minister of Public Safety, as well as the federal government.
And we wanted to be sure that Ontario was exercising all of its capacity to support not only Ottawa, but other communities as well in this province, including Windsor.
So it was an important engagement.
It was obviously a very stressful time, and I think that we could all be forgiven for some rather blunt language.
I'm sure we've all heard it in various interactions, but having those lines of communications open was critically important at that time.
Okay, so regardless of the language, it's fair to say you were encountering some resistance in obviously coming to the tripartite table, and it was described as a call that didn't go well.
And we know that on the 9th, you spoke directly with Premier Ford.
So we can take that document down, please, and we'll pull up the readout of your call from Premier Ford, which is ssm.can.nsc402832.
How did that call arise?
Did you call Premier Ford?
Did he call you?
Tell us how that happened.
The Premier called me.
And by then, again, it's important to place the timing and the chronology of this call into the broader context.
This would have been February 9th, so we're now beyond a week.
Into the occupation here in the nation's capital and with significant interruptions at critical infrastructure and borders, including at the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor, at the Windsor-Detroit border, which quite clearly is in the province of Ontario.
The Premier called me to, I think, express a few things, and the readout is there on the screen.
But one, I think he was calling to keep lines of communication open with the federal government.
Two, he was indicating to me that his chief public health officer was going to be going out in the very short term to communicate the end of vaccine passports and the end of mandates.
But he also was very supportive and said that he was prepared to stand with the prime minister.
Which I took, again, as a very constructive suggestion to show unity across different levels of government responding to what was then a very urgent state of crisis and emergency.
And having that demonstration of solidarity, I thought, would reassure Ontarians and Canadians.
I also did say to him that I would relay...
What I interpreted to be a bit of a nudge by Premier Ford around the federal government's posture around pandemic policy to the Prime Minister.
More broadly, just the fact that the call had occurred.
And I did take the opportunity to express two really important things.
First, I was really concerned about restoring public safety at critical infrastructure, including the Ambassador Bridge.
And, you know, I also said that I was concerned that even if there was an announcement around a change in pandemic policy, that they may not leave.
I think in the end, that proved to be true.
And then finally, I said that we needed Sylvia, and there I'm referring to Minister Jones at the table, and I'm referring to the tripart table, and I ask that the premier instructor to be there.
Okay.
So I think you've taken us through pretty much all of that.
On the point of stand with the PM, we'll just pull up another document, which is SSM.nsc.can402952.
So this is a text while it's being pulled up to Katie Telford, who's the Prime Minister Chief of Staff.
You send her a text sort of reporting on this call with Premier Ford.
Oh, did I get the wrong document number?
It appears that I did.
Okay, you know what?
I'll just, I'll read it to you.
We can look for the document number in a second.
It says, just got called from Ford.
They're pivoting.
He will announce they're lifting passports, possibly more measures.
Said he would stand with the PM, and then you said, I would relay.
I said the situation at Ambassador Bridge is serious.
It's hurting working families, killing jobs.
So by stand with the PM, you said, I didn't quite catch what you said you thought that meant.
Stand beside the PM and...
My interpretation from Premier Ford saying that to me directly was that he wanted...
To show solidarity with the federal government in responding to this emergency.
And I thought that that was a constructive suggestion because it would reassure Ontarians and Canadians more broadly that different levels of government were working together to restore public safety, to keep people safe, which was my job.
And my request to him to have Minister Jones attend the tripartite was...
An effort to show that alignment at all levels of government, not only from Premier to the Prime Minister, but equally at the ministerial level in the portfolio of public safety.
Because by being at the same table at the same time, we could really troubleshoot issues together, including, again, some of the operational challenges that police were having, again, not only in Ottawa, but right across the province, and equally some of the jurisdictional complexities.
And whether or not there were any other measures or tools that we could offer from the elected side of the government to police if it were necessary.
Okay.
For the record, Mr. Clerk, the document number is ssm.nsc.can402952.
So what I wanted to ask you, Minister Mendicino, was did you sense that that, or was your interpretation that standing with the PM was in any way tied to what you described, I think, as a gentle nudge to ease public health measures?
No, it wasn't.
And again, I think we saw subsequently in the lead-up to the invocation of the Emergencies Act that following the first minister's meeting that the Prime Minister and Premier Ford were very much on the same page about the necessity of having to invoke the Emergencies Act.
And at that point, the government had not yet taken a final decision with regards to...
Okay.
The last point I want to ask you about on all of this is to get your reaction to something we heard from Mr. Mario Di Tommaso when he testified, which was, and I'll paraphrase what he was saying, but essentially part of his thinking or his explanation of why Ontario was reluctant to participate in the tripartites is that And so far as these were a forum to discuss policing resources,
Ontario, governmental officials shouldn't be participating in that because that's a law enforcement matter.
The question of deploying police resources is something for law enforcement, not for governmental officials.
What's your take on that in the context of what we'd raised earlier about the lines of operational dependence of the police?
Yeah, here again, this is a very important question.
First, I can't...
Speak for the Deputy Minister of Public Safety or the Solicitor General in Ontario.
But from where I sat, the Premier of Ontario actually showed very important leadership in the early days of the blockade, going out publicly, saying that this no longer was a lawful protest and that people needed to go home.
Was a signal, I think, to any fair-minded individual who abides by the law that the situation was no longer safe.
I would also point out that, you know, in the context of the discussion around operational independence, and I've obviously given this a fair bit of reflection since the occupation, and I did touch on it a little bit earlier, that there are important boundaries that should not be crossed by elected officials.
And for good reason.
We do want to safeguard against the politicization or making partisan important and independent decisions which are made by law enforcement and the prosecution services around the country so that we can preserve the integrity of the administration of justice and at all times.
We adhere to that principle in the federal government.
That having been said, there does need to be a dialogue, and there is a dialogue between police and the elected branch of government when it comes to providing additional resources and tools.
And I can offer a number of, you know, very concrete examples, not only in the general, but in the specific context.
Of our response to the blockade.
So if I could, when I received a call at the beginning of February from the Premier of Alberta, the then Premier of Alberta, Jason Kenney, one of the concerns that he'd expressed is that he and Alberta did not possess either the resources or the tools to clear the blockade at Coutts, which had mobilized pretty much since the end of January or beginning of February.
And as part of The federal government's response to that situation, I authorized under Article 9.3 of the existing police services agreement between Canada and Albert, the deployment of additional police resources.
That is a very concrete example of how we have customized through convention the relationship between the elected government and the authorities that are exercised through this office, the minister of
I would say, more broadly, there, you know, are other important examples where elected representatives that occupy this office are responsive to the needs of police around tools, you know, be it in, you know...
Responding to either this situation or others.
And obviously, there are the priorities around the foreign deployment of RCMP in different countries, for example, in Ukraine, which are priorities which can be set by the elected branch of government where conventional police forces are deployed.
So I guess my broader point is that both in the specific context of the blockade, but even beyond in the general.
There does need to be a dialogue.
And there was a dialogue between the elected branch of government and the police who were exercising operational independence at every time to ensure that we could get them the additional resources that they need in the parts of the country where they needed it.
And again, I emphasize and stress this was not just an isolated incident, that these events were occurring across the country so that we could restore public safety.
When the RCMP officials testified last week, so Deputy Commissioner Duhame and Commissioner Brenda Leckie testified, there's a few things that came out of their evidence that I want your reaction on.
One of them is that...
I believe Commissioner Luckey said that there were times, or I think it was Deputy Commissioner Duhaime, said that there were times where it may have felt to him like officials may have stepped a little over that line, that line between church and state.
Now, I think they did say specifically, I remember, I recall Commissioner Luckey saying that she never felt pressured by her ministers, you and Minister Blair.
She did say that at some point you sort of had to educate.
Or educated.
And she didn't point to any sort of instance where it was necessary.
But she said, you educated and it fell to you essentially to educate the rest of Cabinet, I think.
It was the February 10th IRG on where that line was and the importance of operational dependence.
Do you recall that?
I do.
And I wanted to be sure that as colleagues around the Cabinet table were...
Expressing the same concerns that I had, that others had, about the ineffectiveness of existing authorities and resources to restore public safety up to that point, and we are approaching now two weeks into the blockade, that nevertheless, we should not violate the principle of operational independence.
Because, again, just situate yourself in our shoes for just a moment.
Our paramount concern is restoring public safety.
By then, there were countless reports of the very dire consequences that had been visited upon Canadians.
But that could never be a license for assuming the roles and the responsibilities of police when it came to making the tactical and operational decisions around how to restore public safety.
So it was important to strike a balance between respecting that principle, but also...
Fulfilling my role specifically in holding the RCMP accountable for their role in restoring public safety and more broadly, the government's role in understanding why it was that despite existing authorities and resources, we could not...
Achieve the goal of getting a law and order back on the ground.
And when I look back now and I ask myself why it was in the perception of the commissioner that she felt that some, not all, were coming up to the line, it is because of the unique and singular nature of this public order emergency.
It was the fact that the scale of this was national.
It was the fact that what sparked this movement in the opinion of the government was an expressly stated political objective that at times was expressed in violent terms that led to the entrenchment of a significant number of individuals to ignore the direction of law enforcement at the risk and at the peril of Canadians.
It was the challenges that we had in government around having the appropriate intelligence tools to understand how those initially stated objectives could pull in people from many different walks of life with different backgrounds and different grievances and coalesce them around something that so significantly and persistently caused significant problems.
And all of that was, I think...
Part of the reason why people were really trying to probe and understand that despite the fact that you had a criminal code, you couldn't use it.
Despite the fact that you had provincial statutes around the Highway Traffic Act, they couldn't be effectively used.
Despite the fact that we had tow trucks, we had many tow trucks, that they could not be deployed to clear the blockades.
And all of that was leading to...
An escalation of the risk and the threat of serious violence as time went on.
And that is why I think that the Commissioner both signaled her concern but also appreciated my intervention that we still had to be respectful of that principle of operational independence.
Okay, so just to go back on that a little bit, I mean, what we've heard over the weeks that we've been here at the Commission...
There's what could be described as quote-unquote pressure all over the record.
So there's a real sense of urgency from politicians and from officials.
We need to do something about this now.
We need to do this quick, quick, quick.
We need to do this has to end, etc., etc.
And how does that not constitute?
Can you explain how that does not constitute pressure on law enforcement to do something to clear up this protest in whatever way they can?
Well, to be clear...
There was pressure on all of us.
I mean, this was an extremely tense situation.
So, I mean, I think that is just a natural reaction to all of the events that were occurring.
But the reason why I'm confident and the reason why I believe Commissioner Lockheed testified that we didn't violate the principle of operational independence is because at no time were we instructing police on how to do their job on the ground.
So at no time were we saying, you must arrest.
You must prosecute these people to the fullest extent.
You must, to the granularity of detail, deploy five people here and 100 people there.
And to prioritize all of these operations, we at all times steered clear of that zone, which would have been a violation of the principle of operational independence.
That's why I think I'm very confident that we didn't cross that boundary.
So the line is, politicians and the government has a role to play in expressing a desire, let's say, or the need to solve a situation, but not in telling the police how to do it?
That's right.
You don't want me as an elected official putting on a badge or a uniform and going out there and doing the job that police are there to do.
That's not my...
That's not my responsibility.
However, it is my responsibility as Minister of Public Safety to be accountable to Canadians when it comes to equipping police with the tools and the resources that they need to restore public safety.
And by then, on February 10th, we did not have public safety in the nation's capital and at other critical infrastructure across the country.
And so because of that, we really wanted to understand Why existing authorities were ineffective at that point, and that was the balance that we struck.
Another issue that we've heard a lot about over the last few weeks is the idea or the notion of, one could put it as negotiating or we could put it as engaging with demonstrators or protesters.
So we've heard that that was an issue that was discussed.
Is there a way to sort of...
End this or to ameliorate this by engaging directly with demonstrators.
There's reference in Sylvia Jones's notes of the February 7th call to having an interlocutor engage with the protesters.
And we've heard a lot about an effort by your Deputy Minister, Deputy Minister Rob Stewart, around the 10th, 11th of February.
To create what's become known as the engagement proposal.
So can you tell us a little bit from your perspective, how those engagement efforts, if I can put it that way, and eventually the engagement proposal came to be and evolved?
Engagement was always an option.
And I had articulated on a number of occasions that law enforcement should be the last resort.
And you saw from one of the exhibits that you had put to me a little bit earlier in my testimony this morning that I had turned my mind right at the very beginning of the briefings that it was important for there to be some engagement with those who were participating in the convoy and the blockade and wanted to be briefed on that by law enforcement, who I thought was the most appropriate actor in this context to be engaging with.
Given that, you know, in my estimation that it was operational and tactical, that didn't mean that I wasn't still having conversations with individuals outside of law enforcement about an engagement proposal, but there was early contemplation and reflection about having an engagement strategy.
I would say beyond that, there were conversations between the Prime Minister and myself about...
Searching for a suitable mediator or interlocutor, someone who would have had the experience to de-escalate and resolve situations that are complex.
And beyond that, by the time we got to the ERG, there was a report that was given by Deputy Minister Stewart about information that he had gleaned from conversations that he was having with the Ontario government and the OPP.
Around the intelligence of what the group was constituted of in terms of adherence to, you know, ideology, the desire to, you know, double down and hold the line and et cetera and all that versus everybody else who might have just been there to express another point of view.
And so as a result of that report that he offered at the ERG, there were taskings that were...
That were listed by the Clerk of the Privy Council at the end of that meeting, one of which was to continue to develop a potential engagement strategy.
And so that's what the Deputy Minister set about to do, and I know that there was some additional work on that front.
Okay, so this is, you knew that this was, you were aware that this was being worked on by your deputy minister?
Yes.
Okay.
mr clerk can we pull up ssm.nsc.can402958 Thank you.
So, Minister, this is a text from you to Katie Telford, the PM's Chief of Staff.
The date of it is February 11th.
It's at 6.49 p.m.
So, just a situation in time.
The ERG happens on February 10th.
There's no ERG, I think, on February 11th.
So, you write to Ms. Telford.
Hey there.
We got some very last-minute and thin paper tonight on an engagement strategy from my DM.
Who apparently socialized it with PCO, RCMP Commissioner and the Ontario government and not me.
We only found out about it during a call tonight I placed to him.
The DM's outreach during the day to the Ontario government on this engagement proposal resulted in the Ontario Deputy Solicitor General sending my DM a draft letter addressed to unnamed protesters proposing engagement, which would be co-signed by Ontario government and an unnamed official from the federal government.
It's unclear whether PCO, RCMP, or Ontario government has given their support to the engagement proposal.
Flagging as a concern and inconsistent with good info flow, I've addressed with him, wanted you to know.
I will be replying to DM and letting him know that there's some redactions, and the last thing you say is, sorry, but had to let you know.
Can you explain to us what you were expressing in this text?
The Deputy Minister had socialized with a different level of government and engagement proposal that I would have wanted to have some input into prior to that.
And, you know, again, admittedly, in this particular moment, everybody is working extremely hard, long hours, trying to quickly...
Fulfill the tasks that had been assigned at the end of the last ERG.
And so I wanted to be sure that we were together thinking through not only the engagement proposal, but also mitigating and thinking through some of the very real and practical considerations that had to be woven into the strategy.
If one was going to be deployed, for example, and I pose some of those questions.
Who are we going to send this to?
Where is it going to take place?
How can we be sure that if we do engage in it, that we can maintain public safety?
Because the situation was extremely volatile and very tense.
And among the concerns were whether or not there was actually any cohesive structure to the occupation at that moment in time.
And so understanding who we were sitting down with was critically important.
Um, I wanted to be sure that Ms. Telford was aware of that because ultimately when we go back to Cabinet, I am responsible and accountable for my department including the Deputy Minister and wanted to be sure that I was equipped to answer any questions from colleagues about What this engagement proposal would look like.
So, you know, I say again, in fairness to everybody, this was an exceedingly difficult and challenging time.
And I know that Deputy Minister Stewart was doing his level best.
To fulfill a task that had been assigned to him after the ERG and was, I think, trying to action it and get some traction at the Ontario level of government.
And we did have a good conversation about that.
And, you know, subsequently, I think as we saw on February 14th, that despite the efforts of the city of Ottawa to engage and engage some of the members of the of the occupation here in Ottawa, that it ultimately unraveled.
Okay, so your concern, if I understand it then, is not with the engagement proposal itself, with the work that was being done.
It's the information flow.
Correct.
And the fact specifically that it had been socialized, as you put it, with the Ontario government without you knowing about it.
At that particular moment in time and just wanted to be sure that I had a line of sight and understood it.
And also that it was part of a broader effort by both me and others from within the government to explore engagement.
And as I pointed out, seeking briefings and information from police right from the beginning about how we were engaging with members of the occupation.
Equally, the conversations that I had with the Prime Minister around finding potentially a mediator.
To de-escalate so we could avoid law enforcement as much as possible.
And, you know, ultimately this engagement proposal as well.
It was all a suite of things that we were doing together to really try to restore public safety as quickly as we could.
I believe Deputy Minister Stewart's evidence was that he hadn't socialized it with Mr. DiTomaso, but with Commissioner Carey.
So, would that change your view at all as to whether that engagement was appropriate?
I'm not sure.
I think the broader concern was just making sure that I could stay up to speed and recognizing, again, the pressures on everybody to go about and complete these taskings.
I just wanted to be sure.
Both me and my staff had an opportunity to contribute to the idea before it got, before it was shared with other, not only other branches of government, but as you pointed out, other branches of law enforcement.
And I wanted to be sure we were really, you know, staying on the same page.
But it was an exceedingly difficult time, in fairness to the Deputy Minister.
Everything was happening very quickly.
There's no doubt about that.
The reason I asked you whether you were concerned about the proposal itself is because one of the bits of evidence we've heard is that Commissioner Luckey and the RCMP may have had some concerns about the proposal in the sense that it may cross the line between church and state.
So again, we're back to this issue of...
Police independence, operational independence, and I'd like you to speak for a moment, if you could, about how the idea, where does political negotiation fall into that piece?
And just for a little, to situate you in background, what we know now is that there were Different lines of potential engagement going on almost simultaneously.
There was an attempt at engagement in Windsor.
There was an attempt on the part of Mayor Watson to corral trucks up onto Wellington Street and get them off the residential streets where they were disturbing.
And then there was the federal government's engagement proposal.
So we have these different lines going at the same time.
And that could arguably at least be put as something that makes it difficult for law enforcement to do their job.
What's your reaction to that?
Yeah, I would agree with you.
I think it was extremely difficult for law enforcement to figure out how to engage in a constructive way with the occupation and the blockades, not only here in Ottawa, but across the
I know from the early days that members of police liaison units, these are individuals within law enforcement who have very specific expertise in engaging with people who protest to sort of set the boundaries of what, just to be sure that everybody can be safe.
Here's what we can all sort of agree to.
And I think that there, as you've heard previously, there was some effort to do that, certainly at the local level here in Ottawa.
But to come back to what I think that the core of your question is, you are absolutely right that it becomes a lot trickier and more complex once elected officials start to penetrate into the terms and the conditions by which...
You negotiate a disengagement of the blockades and the occupation if it involves, let's say, you know, the moving of vehicles, the moving of people, the moving of police officers.
All of that, I would submit, is much more within the operational domain and by extension, independence of police, which was one of the concerns that I had in...
So that was, I think, part of what I was getting at in my text to Ms. Telford was just I wanted to be able to think that through with everybody, and especially if we were going to be sharing it with other levels of law enforcement so that we were respectful of those principles of operational independence as well.
Okay.
I now want to ask you, turning to, we know the engagement proposal didn't go anywhere in the end, and we're...
Chronologically, we're now getting to the crux of events and when the Emergencies Act was actually decided on.
So I know it wasn't decided necessarily on the 13th, but that's the day we're going to talk about.
There's some evidence, and I'll ask you if you know about this first.
So shortly before, we understand there was an IRG meeting the afternoon of the 13th, followed by a meeting of the full cabinet in the evening at 8.30 p.m.
The Commission has seen evidence shortly before that 8.30 meeting.
Commissioner Lucky sent an email.
Let's get the email up.
It is SSM.nsc.can402280.
So this is an email.
The time stamp on it is just shortly before 8 o 'clock once you do the Greenwich Mean time adjustment.
This is your Chief of Staff, Mike Jones, sending this to you and copy to Deputy Minister Stewart.
Evening Minister, responses from the Commissioner below.
And this is, we've seen this already in the inquiry, so I won't go through it at length, but there's a sort of a wish list or these are tools that could be effective.
And then at the very bottom of the email, there.
Commissioner Luckey says, this said, I am of the view that we have not yet exhausted all available tools that are already available through the existing legislation.
There are instances where charges could be laid under existing authorities for various criminal code offences occurring right now in the context of the protest.
The Ontario Provincial Emergencies Act just enacted.
Skip that in the narrative.
We know that happened February 11th.
We'll also help in providing additional deterrent tools to our existing toolbox.
So my first question, Mr. Mendicino, is did you see this before the cabinet meeting?
I don't recall exactly when I would have seen it.
This, as you pointed out, was sent just prior to the commencement of the cabinet meeting.
I will say to you, importantly, that a couple things.
First, the commissioner...
Did not express that opinion to me at any time directly.
And I actually spoke to the commissioner earlier that day on February 13th.
And while she did not at all address that last point that you raised in the email, she did call me and only me.
This was a conversation between just her and I, to be clear, to express her very grave concerns.
About the situation in Coutts.
And she underlined for me that the situation in Coutts involved a hardened cell of individuals who were armed to the teeth with lethal firearms who possessed a willingness to go down with the cause.
The reason why this was such a sensitive conversation was that we had RCMP undercover personnel deployed in the field.
And she was justifiably concerned that there not be any leak of this information because lives literally hung in the balance.
And for me, this represented far and away the most serious and urgent moment in the blockade to this point in time.
And so it also spoke volumes to me about the commissioner's state of mind, which was that we were potentially seeing an escalation of serious violence with the situation in Coutts.
And it certainly, I think, was in the broader context of the preponderance of the advice that we were getting from the commissioner at that time as a result of conversations not only in the ergs about where there were gaps in authorities, in existing authorities to return public safety to the ground.
I could not have drawn any other inference that she was supportive, as she later expressed that she was, of the decision to invoke the Emergencies Act.
This was a singular moment for me.
In my mind.
And it was so urgent that I said to her, well, look, I can't just keep this information to myself at a minimum.
I have to be able to share it with the Prime Minister, which I then subsequently took steps to do.
Shortly thereafter, I reached out to Ms. Telford.
Sorry, just to be clear, which information are you talking about?
About COOTS and about the potential for gun violence and for the loss of life and the fact that there were RCMP personnel that were in the field and all of this occurring literally within hours, not even days, of the invocation to the Emergencies Act.
I was extremely concerned that this had reached a new height.
of both urgency and emergency.
And so I felt I had a responsibility to let, at a minimum, the Prime Minister know and his staff know while respecting the operational sensitivity at the most delicate levels to protect the people on the ground.
And so I did that.
I spoke to Ms. Telford afterwards where I conveyed to her both The best information that I had at the time around Coots and asked her to keep this, to respect, in effect, the commissioner's request that we treat this information with the utmost sensitivity so that we could ensure that we were keeping people safe.
But this was a threshold moment for me.
There's no doubt about it.
And that was on, you had that conversation on the afternoon of the 13th?
That was the same day, yes.
Okay, so just to recap a little bit, you didn't see this email from Commissioner Luckey before the cabinet meeting?
Again, I'm trying very much to reconstruct the sequence of events.
Things moved very, very quickly.
It literally came in inside of a half hour of the commencement.
So I don't want to say definitively I didn't see it.
I was much more preoccupied with the actual direct conversation that I had with Commissioner Luckey earlier that day, where she had imparted to me perhaps the most urgent information to date with regards to the occupation and the blockades, and that was a threshold moment.
Okay, fair enough.
So if you did see it, it didn't register as much as what she said about COOTS, put it that way.
In your recollection, was that information put before Cabinet?
So we know that Commissioner Luckey wasn't called on to speak.
Do you recall this being expressed to Cabinet that evening?
No.
Okay.
And you certainly obviously...
And I wasn't permitted to share, or I was asked not to share the information about Coutts with anyone else except for the Prime Minister, which I did.
Okay.
If you had known this information, and I appreciate you're not entirely sure on whether you saw this information or didn't, would it have changed your mind at all?
I don't think so at that point.
My interactions directly with the commissioner were actually going in the opposite direction.
And certainly the fact that we were on the precipice of engaging in an operation in Coutts where...
People were armed with a significant number of lethal firearms where they possessed body armor, where there was intelligence or information that they...
Had ideologically extremist views and symbolism that was attached to the group that they were prepared to go down with the cause was a very strong signal to me that the commissioner was of a heightened concern around the state of affairs.
And again, it was consistent with the advice that we were getting contemporaneous to the decision of the invocation of the Emergencies Act around tools to address the gaps that existed.
So, you know, the need to deploy...
RCMP officers, the need to procure essential services.
Importantly, the need to declare no-go zones or prohibition of assemblies.
Let me just say on that last point that I wasn't just hearing about that from the RCMP.
The CBSA had briefed Cabinet on at least one occasion for sure, if not more, about their explicit concerns about the lack of their authority and jurisdiction to clear roads.
On the way to the border.
And so, you know, all of those powers were subsequently included in the declaration and the regulations under the Emergencies Act.
Okay, well, let's actually stop there for a moment.
going to go back to what we were talking about but pb.can 1864 please mr clerk So this is a text from John Ossofsky, president of the CBSA, the evening of February 13th.
And he says, the gap, well, you asked, is it possible to direct CBSA officials to take a harder line or a heightened sense of vigilance as far as it goes?
I mean, he writes back, the gap is the fact that there is not an inadmissibility in IRPA.
Immigration, Refugee, and Protection Act for coming to a protest.
We have directed back 29 so far for other reasons as part of our enhanced vigilance.
And you say, right, okay, so nothing we can do to strengthen our position there.
I think our position broadly is that it's an illegal blockade and it goes on.
So that is...
Sorry, go on.
Sorry, scroll down a little bit, please.
If you're blocking a border hurting Canadians, it would warrant a tougher position.
And then you ask, the 29 were sent back because it was believed they had violent intentions, or on what grounds were they sent away?
We don't have the text after that.
But first of all, is this a text conversation that was happening during the Cabinet meeting that evening?
Well, I'd have to go back and take a look at the timestamps.
About 9.23pm, I think.
Could very well have been.
I assume it was.
This is February 13th, right?
That's right.
Yes.
So I would have been trying to really get a clarity of understanding about what the gaps were.
And what the then president of the CBSA is expressing to me is that they need something that they don't have.
And what they don't have at this moment in time is any existing authority to turn away foreign nationals.
Who are attempting to enter into Canada where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that they may want to support what at this point is an illegal blockade.
And so that is, again, an obvious request for some assistance here as a result of a gap in an authority.
And there is a direct line between that gap and the subsequent powers which were included.
Under the Emergencies Act, there is no other way for me to interpret the information that I'm getting from John Ozoski.
It's certainly not to do anything about it.
And subsequently, we did provide that authority, and there were, as my understanding recollects, at least, I think, one or two individuals who were turned away on February 19th by CBSA on the strength of the Emergencies Act authorities that were provided to them.
I think we know it was two, and the answer to the question here is that the 29 were sent back because under enhanced vigilance, because generally speaking, I think because they weren't, they didn't meet the vaccination requirements.
I think your interpretation's right, and I think Mr. Ozowski is...
He's communicating to me that we're working with what we got, but it's not enough.
And we're concerned that we don't have the authority that we need.
And this was in addition to what I think is one of the other significant concerns that CBSA expressed to me and to other cabinet colleagues, which is that they did not have the authority or the jurisdiction to clear the roads leading to the border.
And certainly that...
Limited their capacity to keep the border open and by extension, critical supply chains, food, fuel, health supplies, all the like.
The people in the border communities, and I'm certainly familiar with the community in Windsor as a result of some family relationships, but people got to go about their daily lives.
And this was completely impossible at that time.
And so I think he's expressing two very legitimate gaps.
And so, again, the only interpretation for me is that we need some help here.
And so we endeavored to provide that help to them through the Emergencies Act.
Okay, I'm at the end of my time.
Mr. Commissioner, I just wanted to just clarify, because I think the impression was left, inadvertently or otherwise, that these are the minister's texts as opposed to the chief of staff.
I'm sorry.
You're right.
I apologize for intervening.
No, thank you.
That's helpful.
Mr. Commissioner, I'm at the end, but...
If I can ask for five minutes to ask some concluding questions.
Oh, it's your call when you still have time, so...
Not a lot.
Oh, actually, no, I do have some time.
By my count, you have lots of time.
Actually, you can count better than I am.
Better than I can.
I was thinking of the old time allocation.
Okay.
Something rarely heard in any kind of a proceeding.
No, I have a lot of experience following time.
We're not following it.
So it's just wondering if you wanted the break now or later.
Sure, let's take the break now.
Sir, before we take the break, I just have a quick application.
I apologize, sir.
I think it's important.
I've just met Mr. Alexander Cohen.
He's present in this room.
And, sir, Mr. Cohen, as we have heard throughout this proceeding, has relevant and material evidence.
To this proceedings mandate.
He has very relevant evidence with respect to the inquiry as to the circumstances as to the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
He also has relevant and material information with respect to misinformation of which this Commission has been tasked with exploring beginning with the text messages between himself.
and Mary Liz Power that are already in evidence in building the narrative with respect to the protesters in Ottawa being extremists and thereafter essentially setting out that they are in fact proprietors of Nazi symbolism.
Sir, this commission has been hearing from Can I just interrupt?
What's your application?
I'd like to call him as a witness, sir.
Have you written any...
I didn't expect that we would have the opportunity.
Well, you haven't at the moment.
There's no application.
Well, this is my application, sir.
I'm making it orally.
And I'm asking for the commission to have him testify after the minister.
He has relevant material information.
I'm not going to do this orally right now.
We're given 15 minutes to cross-examine, to elicit relevant material evidence, and we have relevant and material witnesses here.
The Government of Canada has redacted without lawful authority.
All of these statements from these staffers and have suppressed records.
I have no idea at this point where this is going, so I'm going to take the break.
And if you can speak to Commission Council, which I think I've repeated many times, is the way to at least raise the issue.
And then we'll see if they can resolve it or not.
But we have a schedule.
Sir, the schedule is not as important as getting to the truth.
There's no question we want to get at the truth, but you know what?
It's a very complex issue, and it's not all about what you want.
It's about what the Commission needs to do, what the parties want to do, and I'm trying to control a process.
And we have witnesses, we have a schedule, it's been going for a while.
Please speak to Commission Council.
We'll see where we go, and we'll take the morning break.
Sir, I understand, but I just asked for a ruling after the morning break.
Thank you.
So we'll take 15 minutes.
The commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
La commission levé pour 15 minutes.
La commission levé pour 15 minutes.
La commission levé pour 15 minutes.
La commission levé pour 15 minutes.
Thank you.
Order a lot.
The Commission has reconvened, la Commissaire Macron.
Sir, okay, the Commission Council has not completed her presentation.
I understand that, sir, and your Council's advised you that...
No, I know you've directed...
I'm sorry, I'm speaking.
Yes, sir.
The application, if you want to do it, you've been advised it to be done in writing, not in the middle of the presentation.
Sir, we filed two motions in writing at your direction that you've refused to rule on with respect to the redaction of documents from the Government of Canada that has not been ruled on and have been filed for days.
I will take a break while you're asked to leave.
I will return in five minutes if security could deal with the council.
Commission's and resources, the Commission on the V. Commission's and
resources, the Commission on the V. Commission's and
resources, the Commission on the V. No need to stand.
I'm not a judge here.
I'm just a commissioner.
The Commission has reconvened the Commissioner Appla.
Okay.
Thank you.
Commission Council.
Welcome back, Minister.
I want to take you back to something you touched on before the break, and I'd like to get your reaction on.
I asked you whether, if you had seen and absorbed, let's put it that way, Commissioner Luckey's statement that they had not yet exhausted all available tools.
Law enforcement still had tools available.
I asked you whether that would have changed your mind as to the necessity of the Emergencies Act, and you answered no, and you explained that you're concerned about COOTS.
How do you reconcile that position with the notion that the Emergencies Act is a measure of last resort?
Well, first I would say that the absence of having a direct conversation with Commissioner Luckey, and I pointed out the call that we had earlier today, but that wasn't the only one.
There were other meetings at ERGs and daily briefings.
Really was an impediment at that point to have the kind of back and forth exploration of that advice, which she had included in an email to my chief of staff, Mike Jones.
I think the other thing, the other reason why I don't believe it would have substantially changed my views at that point are twofold.
One, it didn't really expand at all on how she...
had come to that point of view so when she talked about a plan there was no elaboration on it and I would point out that for the better part of the two weeks leading up to the to February 13th that there were times where the commissioner and others at those daily calls that we were having were expressing concerns about the absence of a plan with existing So,
at that particular moment in time, it seemed to me as a conclusory statement that was not substantiated with any kind of particular detail.
And the second reason why I don't believe it would have changed, you know, where my thinking was at that particular moment in time was predominantly because of the call earlier that day, which was top of mind.
And as I explained before the morning break, it spoke volumes about what her state of mind was, which was that this was potentially an escalation of violence that could result in there being gun violence and potentially serious injuries or even fatalities to members of law enforcement and Canadians.
One thing I didn't mention was that...
My worry, my real fear, was that had that operation not gone down peacefully, that it might have sparked other gun violence across the country.
And I recall early reports from the Ottawa Police Service that guns had been brought into the national capital region and into...
Potentially into the parliamentary precinct.
And there wasn't a lot of detail around that, I want to be clear, but we were operating with the best information that we had available to us.
So that elevated my concerns.
And so that was where my state of mind was, as opposed to the one bullet point that she had sent to my chief of staff shortly before the cabinet meeting on February 13th.
So you're expressing here a concern that what was going on in Cootes might be going on in other places.
Not evidence of that, but you were nevertheless concerned about it.
On the basis of both previous information and reports publicly available from Ottawa Police Service that firearms had made their way into the capital.
And as well, again, a report about an arrest involving...
Someone who was participating in the convoy here that ultimately resulted in the seizure of a firearm.
So I was worried about the potential chain reaction, that if the operation did not go flawlessly, that it might actually escalate in more violence.
And that's why...
I think she communicated that, you know, very clearly, and rightfully so.
I want to be clear that Commissioner Luckey was entirely appropriate and justified in signaling that this was a, you know, potentially much higher level of concern around the state of affairs.
Okay, so I'll put this to you and you can tell me right or wrong, but are you sort of saying your concern was okay, but what if it gets worse?
My concern was...
That this information was highly sensitive.
It involved a hardened cell.
It involved guns.
It involved ideological symbolism, potentially.
And that if that operation to arrest those individuals did not go efficiently and smoothly and peacefully, that it may have created a chain reaction elsewhere across the country.
Because there were...
Okay, so I should have put my question more clearly, maybe, but with respect to the availability of tools and whether law enforcement had what it needed, are you saying, and you may not be, so I'm asking you, but are you saying that regardless of whether there may have been tools available, there was a concern that the situation would get worse?
Yes, and again, the urgency with which we had that conversation.
The confidentiality around it, the operational sensitivity about it, the jeopardy of having lives at stake, the potential chain reaction of other gun violence across the country on the basis of reports, and the concurrent advice that we were getting about tools that could only be granted in the Emergencies Act because resources were ineffective at restoring public safety, and there were gaps around deploying...
RCMP efficiently.
I mean, you'll recall the swearing-in provisions, the no-go zones, the procuring of tow trucks, all of that was where my state of mind was.
Okay.
And by the way, those were conversations that we did have in person at the ERGs and at the Cabinet table around where those gaps were.
Where the gaps were.
Yes.
So we have heard evidence about gaps that were identified.
We also heard from a number of officials, and we saw in documentation, a lot of hesitancy around the idea of using the Emergency Fact and the possibility that it may inflame tensions, it may make things worse.
There was a lot of, if I could put it this way, doubt around that.
In light of that, and in light also of a lot of discussion that we've had here in the Commission about whether the threshold itself was met under the Emergencies Act, can you go there at this point and explain to us your understanding of why the threshold was met and why it was necessary in light of the hesitancy that had been expressed about the need to invoke it?
Well, you've touched on a few important points in your question, so I'm going to try and unpack the questions that you put to me.
Just first on hesitancy, I would be more inclined to describe it as reluctance, and I think that that instinct was the right one, that this was a statute that was created coming out of the aftermath of the October 1970 crisis and there being real concerns about using Resorting to the War Measures Act and using the military to restore public order,
which is not the mandate or the expertise of the military, a very blunt instrument.
And the creation of the Emergencies Act, which very consciously and deliberately does not make any reference to military powers, but nevertheless affords the government.
Broad scope to respond to public order emergencies.
And just by virtue of its title, you know, if you're into an emergency, this is obviously a very serious situation.
So you don't want to have to use it unless it's necessary.
So that is the right posture, I think, of every government, that this is not a piece of legislation that we should be using in a way that is...
Anything reserved but for the most serious situations.
So that's my answer in regards to the reluctance around it.
You also mentioned in your question that, you know, that this business about there being the concern that if we invoke the Emergencies Act, that it might actually lead to more violence or radicalization, as I believe you heard from Mr. Vigneault and CSIS.
I was very mindful.
But I also, and colleagues at the Cabinet table, also had to weigh the risks of not invoking the Emergencies Act because there were the materialization of counter-protests from individuals, specifically in Ottawa.
Because they were so frustrated at their inability to go to their jobs, take their kids to daycare, get access to emergency medical services, their prescriptions and the like.
I mean, it was utter and total mayhem.
I mean, let's call a spade a spade.
And so that frustration was boiling over.
And my concern, in my capacity, as the Minister for Public Safety, is that if we don't equip police with the additional tools...
And the authorities that they need to specifically address the gaps that they had been consistently briefing us on, then that might lead to more violence.
And so we also had to weigh the risks of not taking the decision to invoke.
And so we weighed in the potential concerns around radicalization, but ultimately we came down on the side of invoking.
Okay.
On this point then, Mr. Clerk, can you pull up SSM.NSC.CAN50290?
Okay.
Excuse me.
So, this is a readout of minutes of the guns and gangs.
Can you situate us, actually, Mr. Mendoncino, and tell us, guns and gangs, what does that refer to, that meeting?
Sorry, this is a document published by?
It's a reading or minutes of a meeting that was held.
Okay, the date of it isn't clear, actually, but we know that it's post-invocation.
Because it refers to the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
It says schedule was changed, guns and gangs instead.
It's a guns and gangs meeting.
And there's a report from you.
M3, I think, refers to you.
That's a notation that's often used to describe you.
MMM3.
Why M3?
Minister Marco Mendicino.
I should have been able to answer that.
Okay.
Bullet number three here.
You're discussing, okay, well, let's go from the bullet number one, update on current state of affairs.
The blockades that started a month ago aiming critical infrastructure had a very significant and negative impact on our security, sovereignty, and integrity at the borders.
We worked very closely with FPT to get a grasp of the risks to public safety and international security.
The important one, which I'll slow down on, is the third one.
We took unprecedented decision to invoke Emergencies Act on the advice we received from many at Branches of enforcement on every level.
What I want to ask you about here is the advice you received from branches of enforcement.
Was that advice to invoke the Emergencies Act specifically?
The advice that we received was around tools that could only be granted through the Emergencies Act.
And yes.
The reason why I say that is that there's an express element of the test that says that you don't get to the threshold unless you've exhausted authorities or unless it can be established that existing authorities are ineffective at restoring public safety.
And for me, that is the operative word because there were authorities that were on the books.
But the fact is that on the basis of what I was seeing, And what I was hearing, that those existing authorities were not sufficiently effective to restore public safety, and that is consistent with the advice that we were getting from various partners within the public safety community, including law enforcement, including CBSA, and other officials, as you've heard.
Okay, so just to recap then, the advice you're talking about is...
The advice that's identifying gaps in tools, not specifically advice to invoke the Emergencies Act, but advice that goes to identifying gaps or tools.
And tools, as you actually saw in the email from Commissioner Luckey on February 13th, that would be invoked in the Emergencies Act.
She used that language in her email to me.
Okay.
Then the very last question, I think I actually am now out of time.
So the last question I want to ask you, Minister Medellino, and your legal background shows and how you unpacked my triple-barreled question last time around.
So this is the last barrel, the third barrel that you didn't get to in your answer, which is the threshold for invoking a public order emergency, as you know, depends on identifying a threat to the security of Canada with reference to the CSIS Act.
We've heard a lot of discussion at the Commission about how that threshold may or may not have been met, and we know that there was no specific threat to the security of Canada assessed by CSIS.
Nevertheless, the government concluded that the threshold was met, presumably, because the Act was invoked.
How, in your view, was that threshold met?
Well, first, let me address the piece about CSIS's conclusion, and I know you've heard some evidence about that.
But I do think it is important to emphasize that they are assessing through their mandate, which is conventionally confined to espionage and foreign interference and potential threats to cybersecurity for the purposes of establishing a legal threshold under that statute, which then leads to potentially obtaining warrants, judicially authorized, so that we can mitigate against those potential security threats.
This was very different.
This was not about isolating a lone wolf or a small group.
Rather, it was about looking at a protest which became illegal at a national scale and completing that exercise.
Also had to take a look at the broader objective and scope of the Emergencies Act, which means looking at Section 2 of that statute, where it talks about the presence of a serious threat or a threat of serious violence so as to exceed the capacity of any province to respond on the basis of authorities that exist.
And so in my judgment, you need to kind of look at both.
And that was precisely the skill set that I was applying in my role as Minister of Public Safety, drawing on my understanding of the law and the principles as they were being applied to the facts that existed on the ground at the time.
And so looking at everything in its totality, we had a situation where for two weeks we had a protest that was national in scale.
That overwhelmed the resources of police and other border officials very deliberately for a protracted period of time, where despite the existence of statutes and resources, and in my view,
as informed by counter-operational tactics that were specifically deployed to stop people from restoring public safety, the extraordinary The fact that all of this was tied to a politically
stated objective.
To overthrow the government if it refused to reverse course on pandemic policy and the challenges that were presented to the security and intelligence community and the broader law enforcement community in understanding what the nature of this protest was and why it was so difficult and challenging to restore public safety all drew me to the conclusion that we met the threshold.
And ultimately, for me, at the end of the day, it worked.
I'm not saying that the Emergencies Act is a perfect instrument, and my sincere hope to the Commission is that there will be some reflection about that.
But it was a measure that was successfully deployed by law enforcement to restore public safety without significant injury or any fatalities at all.
And the fact that as part of the invocation of this Act, that we now have an opportunity to go over...
The circumstances that led to that decision in great forensic detail with witnesses testifying is, I think, an important pillar of our democratic process, which, of course, was one of the things that we were very much concerned with preserving throughout.
So, that is my answer with regards to the threshold and why I think it's important that I'm here today.
Mr. Questioner, those are my questions.
I'll pass the baton.
Okay.
So, now, cross examination start with the convoy organizers, please.
Okay.
Good morning.
Good morning, sir.
My name is Keith Wilson, counsel for the convoy organizers.
I apologize for my voice.
I'm recovering from a cold.
I have a bit of the same.
Thank you, sir.
Sir, we're not in a position to proceed with cross at this time, and there's two reasons.
One is...
The federal government has disclosed over a week ago an extension volume of documents that are highly redacted.
It is obvious from the face of the documents that they don't meet the criteria for lawful redactions.
A motion was made last week for those redactions to be lifted.
The submissions closed on Thursday evening.
We still have no ruling.
A number of days have passed.
For the cross-examination and the discovery of truth process to be valid and effective, the parties require access to the documents.
We don't have that.
So we would appreciate some indication as to when the Commission is actually going to rule on that and hopefully compel the proper disclosure of the records so that cross-examinations can be effective.
I emphasize that these documents are not related to future witnesses.
But present witnesses.
So we're making the process inefficient with all due respect by not allowing the parties to have access to unredacted documents.
Second reason we're not in a position to proceed with our cross-examination at this time with this witness is our lead counsel, Mr. Brendan Miller, who had prepared for the cross.
As you know, sir, has been removed from the room by you when he was raising a motion to find a way around.
The absence of a ruling on the redactions.
So we're just not in a position to proceed on cross, sir.
Okay.
Well, just on your first question, it is expected that the ruling will come out during the lunch hour.
There have been a fair amount of back and forth.
Without going into detail, there's some, let's say...
Innovative type of issues that had to be dealt with.
So that should come out at lunchtime, which I'm happy to, I will do my utmost.
It's going to come out, unfortunately, probably, and not on the record, the website, because it won't be translated, which is one of the issues we have to deal with.
But we will, in light of what you say, we'll issue it in English only for the moment, and it will become, be posted.
When it's bilingual, but I understand that submission.
So that should enable you so we can put off the cross-examinations till after the lunchtime.
In terms of the other problem, that's not something I can deal with.
I'm trying to deal the best I can with the situation, and quite frankly, if the issue had been raised the way you have now...
I would have given the answer I'm giving now.
So what I propose then, since this witness will be here after lunch, we simply delay till after lunch.
If you could endeavor, because I see you have a co-counsel, so you can sort out how that can be done.
That would be appreciated.
Thank you, sir.
Okay, so the next I'll call on the OPP please.
Good afternoon, Minister.
Chris Diana, counsel to the OPP.
Good afternoon.
We received some documents last night that we're all frantically trying to review.
Some of them are quite interesting.
And one of the ones that I'd like to start with, Mr. Clerk, is pb.can.401849.
And this appears to be a text exchange with you and an unidentified person who I'm hoping you'll be able to help us identify.
And if we can go to page 26. All right, so if you could help situate us as to kind of context here.
This appears to be a text with someone.
I believe you're on the left and somebody else is on the right.
If you could scroll down a little bit so that the witnesses have the chance to review it.
Do you know who this text exchange was with?
I believe it's Mike Jones.
And he would be your chief of staff, correct?
Yes.
And someone who you would have been in touch with, obviously, every day that you're closest to contact within your system.
All right.
And so we scroll to the top again to set the time context here.
Monday, February 14th at 1248 a.m.
So very early in the morning, February 14th.
So basically the night of February 13th, we were to look at it that way.
And the context here.
Is that the Ambassador Bridge had just been opened to traffic, I believe, about 30 minutes earlier.
Is that correct?
Yes.
That, of course, with your recollection of when this text exchange took place?
It does.
There were some questions about whether or not it was fully opened and exactly when CBSA would declare that it was officially open.
But on the whole, yes, there were reports that it was opened in the...
Early hours of February the 14th.
Yeah, but I think for clarity, I think the Windsor Police Service Institutional Report identifies 12-12 a.m. on that day.
That sounds about right to me.
All right.
And so you would agree that everything you had heard was that while it was open, there was still a concern about potential volatility, correct?
That's right.
All right.
There were reports of flare-ups, if I'm not mistaken, either on the 13th, but certainly after the 14th as well.
All right.
So I'm interested in the text that says, and I'll read it, following the declaration, we should go to Ambassador.
And inspect the bridge reopening and thank law enforcement and RCMP, assuming things go according to plan.
So I'd like to follow up on what, and this is you texting Mike Jones, correct?
Yes.
Your term following the declaration, I assume you're talking about the Emergency Act declaration?
Yes.
And you would agree the Emergency Act had not yet been invoked at this point, correct?
That's correct.
And in fact, there had not even been consultation with the provinces at this point, correct?
That's, well...
To be clear, the first minister's meeting had not yet occurred, which occurred the next morning.
There were conversations with provincial and territorial counterparts, but it was before the first minister's meeting.
Right.
And I'm not going to go to the document for lack of time, but I think it was made very clear by the prime minister and others that his mind hadn't been made up yet, that the consultation was essentially being done in good faith.
Yes.
Correct?
Yes.
And I wasn't communicating that the decision had been finally taken, but rather the assumption that it...
It may have been.
Not may have been.
Following the declaration, it sounds to me like you're pretty convinced that it was going to be made, regardless of what happened at the consultation.
I won't dispute we were definitely trending very much in that direction, yes.
Okay.
Assuming things go according to plan.
And so, what plan are you referring to here?
Restoring public safety.
And Ambassador Bridge was one of the real flashpoints, as you'll recall, because not only of the impact...
Uh, domestically in Windsor, but Ambassador Bridge was one of the reasons why I was engaged by my American counterpart, Secretary Mayorkas, who had reached out and, uh, was very concerned that it was going to have an impact on two-way trade.
And you will be familiar with this by now, I assume, but at Ambassador Bridge, we do the most significant amount of our, uh, day-to-day land trade.
Uh, so there was a lot at stake in restoring public safety at the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor, Detroit.
Right.
So a cynic might suggest, and We're both lawyers, and there are a number of us in that category.
A cynic might suggest that it appears here you're talking about setting up a photo op in Windsor even before the Emergencies Act is invoked.
I agree with you.
A cynic may suggest that, but that was not my intent.
The point was...
This was a very stressful time, and I wanted to be in a position to reassure Canadians that we were storing public safety right across the country, including in Windsor, Detroit.
And that was an idea that I had proposed at the time to my Chief of Staff.
Okay, so let's read the rest of it.
Your Chief of Staff says, okay, do you know when that will be?
Presumably being the invocation of the Act, correct?
Yes.
Your response, I'm hearing as late as tomorrow morning.
I think it's a powerful visual.
Otherwise, it's just tweets.
So basically what you're saying is, I should go there, get some pictures, get some video, because it sends a better image than just tweeting about it.
Fair?
Well, I think what I'm getting at is that people are anxious and are concerned and want to be confident that we are restoring public safety.
I mean, I would point out that that is not the end of the matter.
And there's some additional back and forth between my chief of staff in law.
All right, so let's go to that then.
The OPP was not impressed with this idea, is that fair to say?
I didn't speak directly with the OPP, but it was expressed to me that law enforcement had concerns about me or any other elected official going.
All right, if we can take up the document ID OPP 4582, and I'm going to be taking you to text messages between Commissioner Karik and Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins on February 14th.
Once that's up, if we can go to page 71. All right, so you can see at the top, it says Dana called, and that would be a reference to Dana early, as you know.
And this is from Chris Harkins.
Dana called.
She is not happy.
The RCMP called, and the Federal Public Safety Minister, and that would be you, correct?
Yes.
Is coming tomorrow for a photo op, tour of the command post, et cetera.
Not appropriate.
Optics are terrible.
Can we stop it?
Commissioner Currie responds a little while later, saying visit is being postponed.
So you could see here that obviously the OPP was not happy with the idea and described it as a photo op.
Yeah, their advice changed my mind.
Thank you.
Part of the reason that they were concerned, of course, and I think you heard this from the RCMP as well, was the potential that it could further inflame the situation if you actually showed up and took pictures.
And I had to balance that against what my initial thought or objective was, which was to...
To be accessible and to assure people that we had restored public safety.
So in the end, I took that very much into consideration and was actually quite deferential and respectful to the advice that we got back from police and chose not to go.
Okay, can we go back to the other document, which is pb.can.1849?
And this is back to your text exchange with Mike Jones.
Thank you.
And page 32. Here it says, RCMP, and this is, I believe, Mike Jones saying, RCMP Commissioner also strongly advising against a trip to Windsor, concerned that it's still quite volatile and things have been inflamed by today's announcement.
Someone drove at an officer again.
I want the visual as well, but with two levels of forces asking us not to, my two cents is that it's not worth the risk of going and something happening in response.
Delane gives us more time to plan, etc.
Scroll down.
Okay, I hear you.
Let's discuss.
So essentially, it was your chief of staff that was saying, look, we've heard from two police services.
Let's not do this.
Yeah, solid advice.
And I took it.
In retrospect, and I raise this because, you know, I think you would agree that sometimes having politicians attend these kinds of sites can have perhaps unintended consequences.
Fair?
Absolutely, yes.
And that in retrospect, you would agree that...
Probably wasn't a good idea to have gone.
Yes, that's why we didn't go.
Yes.
And in my last minute, I'm going to ask you about consultation.
And I've put these questions to other witnesses, but I'm just simply going to ask you or put to you the proposition about consultation with law enforcement.
And the suggestion that I'll put to you is that it's a good idea that when there is consultation with law enforcement on tools, Could that be done in writing for persons of accountability so we can go back and check exactly who said what to whom?
Would you agree that's a good idea?
Totally.
And you would have heard my evidence a little bit earlier this morning where I talked about navigating the principle of operational independence.
I referred to Article 9.3 under police service agreements, which we reach with provinces.
I think we're good to go.
public safety.
One thing I didn't mention, but I do think is really relevant, is that in those police service agreements, it is expressly contemplated under either 9.1 or 9.2 of those agreements, that prior to the deployment of of intra-provincial RCMP resources.
It is the elected provincial minister of public safety who has to form the opinion that there is a state of emergency before they can be deployed.
And it is only if existing RCMP resources within the province are overwhelmed or insufficient to deal with that emergency that you then Take the next step of requesting for the deployment of RCMP resources outside of the province to deal with the situation, which is Article 9.3.
And that is a request that comes to this office.
My point is, I agree with you that there is a protocol there.
The Emergencies Act, unfortunately, does not prescribe that process.
So what we did instead was we did the best that we could.
Having various meetings daily, ultimately in the ERG and the Cabinet meetings where we were soliciting inputs, including, as you saw in the email that I received from Commissioner Luckey the day before, where she very specifically and thoughtfully prescribes tools.
That could only be granted under the Emergencies Act, but I agree that maybe some additional thought ought to be given to this protocol.
Right, and I am out of time, so as I'm leaving, I'm just going to say that we've heard evidence, some ambiguous evidence about conversations within the RCMP, perhaps with others that haven't been written down.
I think you would agree that it would be helpful to have everything clear and ambiguous so there's no room for doubt.
Yes.
Thank you, Minister.
Thank you.
Okay next call on the Ottawa Police Service please.
Good afternoon, Minister.
My name is Jessica Barrow, and I'm one of the counsel to Ottawa Police Service.
Good afternoon.
Prior to the arrival of the convoy, would you agree with me that there was conflicting information about how many protesters may participate in Ottawa, as well as how long they may stay?
I do agree.
And by the way, the range was very broad.
Right.
I mean, I'd heard something in the low thousands, and then it quickly escalated as we got closer to the weekend, upwards of 7,000 or 8,000.
So, yes.
And so that was a real difficulty from a planning perspective at all levels of government and law enforcement.
Is that fair?
Yes.
And in fact, you testified earlier that you were concerned that even the intelligence you were receiving from your team maybe didn't fully capture all of what you were seeing in terms of public narrative.
Is that fair?
I recall that, yes.
And Deputy Minister Stewart testified last week that there was a difficulty amongst the intelligence community at that time in assessing the information that was being received because much of that evidence was open source and there was difficulty ascertaining the credibility of that information.
Would you agree with that?
I would agree with that.
And so again, that's something that all levels of law enforcement would have been grappling with at that time.
I agree.
And so ultimately no one really had a very clear picture in advance of the scope of the event, as well as the behavior of the protesters before it arrived.
Yes, and I think you've heard from a number of individuals, including me, that that posed challenges with regards to assessing the intelligence and the information about who the protest was made up of, how many would participate, how long they would stay, what would be the kind of conduct they would be engaging in.
Could it become violent?
There was a lot of information to have to sift through and assess.
And it was, as you pointed out, at times varying and conflicting.
And so that definitely posed some challenges.
And ultimately, what we did see here in Ottawa, as well as elsewhere in the country, was entirely unprecedented, both in terms of the scope as well as the behavior we ultimately saw from protesters.
Is that correct?
Yes, it is.
I want to move on to the police response once the protesters arrived here in Ottawa.
And we've heard considerable evidence to the effect that when OPS and its partners engaged in ad hoc enforcement actions or ticketing, bylaw enforcement, things like that, it could create dangerous situations for officers.
We heard about swarming, harassment, I think you spoke to earlier.
So you would agree that that type of thing was occurring in Ottawa, correct?
It was.
And I was worried, as I said earlier, that it was the...
The function of some counter-operational advice that was being provided to the block in the occupation.
And it was in addition to police officers, it was public figures.
And we've heard many reports about serious criminal violent threats, including death threats.
I received a death threat.
My family received a death threat throughout the convoy.
It was members of the press who were trying to report on the facts that were occurring on the ground.
There were many, I think, efforts to try to crowd out legitimate law enforcement.
Right, and so that was a real difficulty for law enforcement on the ground, particularly OPS, since that was the bulk of the officers, obviously, at that time, that to be able to engage in any real enforcement was a real challenge as a result of what they were facing in response.
Yes.
And that remained the case until they had sufficient resources, correct?
That's right.
And at that time, they did not have the sufficient resources to really engage in meaningful.
Enforcement in a way that people could maybe see it as meaningful as that fair.
And I would say both Chief Slowly and then Interim Chief Bell both expressed concerns about having sufficient resources in the ground, which is why in my capacity as Minister of Public Safety, I was facilitating additional help with the assistance of the Commissioner of the RCMP by providing those resources.
And when that didn't work, looking at other tools leading up to the Emergencies Act.
So specifically with respect to the resources, you would obviously agree that that messaging coming from both OPS and Chief Slowly was from the very beginning, essentially.
Once it became apparent that these protesters were not leaving, it became equally apparent that there was insufficient resources.
Is that fair?
That came very early on, yes.
And would it be fair to say that any concerns in relation to operational plans or the level of enforcement should not be taken as some kind of suggestion that OPS should have engaged enforcement action without the resources they needed?
Well, that was certainly the subject of discussion that was going on between the RCMP, the OPP, and the OPS as it was reported to me.
It was about making sure that we...
Understood what the plan was and what was needed by the Ottawa Police Service to restore public safety.
And from where I sat, one way in which we could support the formulation and the ultimate implementation of a plan would be to offer additional RCMP resources, and that we did.
Right, and so none of the sort of...
We could call it criticisms about the lack of enforcement or the lack of a plan should be perceived as a suggestion that OPS should have been engaging in enforcement, notwithstanding the fact that they didn't have the resources to do that safely.
I would agree that we shouldn't be sending out any...
Right.
And so, this particular event was singular and unprecedented, as you pointed out earlier, and therefore it did require sufficient and significant resources to restore public safety.
And something you said earlier, and I just want to expand on it if I can, you indicated that it was essentially impossible to police those on Wellington Street.
Do you recall making a statement to that effect?
Yes, I held that view throughout the entirety of the Blackhawks.
And that's because if you compare the sort of lawlessness of the behavior of the protesters as compared to the resources that were there to deal with that situation, there was a disconnect.
Is that fair?
It was disproportionately skewed towards those who were participating in the occupation.
And I believe at times that was a tactical decision.
And when police tried to enforce, you know, they were crowded out, they were swarmed, they were intimidated in some cases, reports of assaults.
So yes, they were overwhelmed.
And so when we talk about the operational plans, and you've touched on it a couple of times, would it be fair to say that the reason the plans were required was to ensure that...
If the resources were provided, there was an understanding by those agencies about how they would be used to safely and productively contribute to an end of the event.
And so it wasn't a question of undermining the actions of OPS.
It was about ensuring collaboration.
Is that fair?
Yes.
And there was never any suggestion that OPS should have engaged in an overall operation to end the event before it had the resources to do that safely.
I think that makes sense.
Okay.
I want to move on and quickly discuss a couple of points referenced in your witness statement in relation to the engagement proposal.
I don't think I need to bring up your witness statement, but I'm happy to if that's necessary.
Deputy Minister Stewart testified that the purpose of the draft engagement proposal was to give protesters in Ottawa a potential exit strategy.
Do you agree with that statement?
To the best of my recollection, yes, that sounds right.
And that view came from Deputy Minister Stewart's conversations with Inspector Bowden, who you may or may not know is an expert from OPP on protester engagement through his PLT work.
Are you aware of that?
Yes, I have some recollection of that.
And he also testified, he being Deputy Minister Stewart, that the proposal had buy-in from both OPP and OPS.
Were you aware of that?
I believe so, yes.
And you testified earlier that you saw it to be your job during this time, or perhaps the job of your department, to ensure that law enforcement had both the resources and the tools they required.
That's correct.
And so in your witness statement, you indicated that there were two issues with respect to why the engagement proposal didn't come to fruition.
The first was questions that were left unanswered about...
The convoy organizers, who they are and who was in charge, and the second related to safety concerns about the person engaged in the proposal.
Do you recall saying that?
Yes, and in addition to that, the logistics of where engagement would occur.
Okay, so I just want to pull up a couple documents in relation to that.
The first is OTT 405318.
The second is OTT 405318.
If we could scroll to the bottom.
So this is an email.
Sorry, up a little so we can see who it's to yet.
Sorry, the email at the bottom of the first page.
Thank you.
Yes, there.
So this is an email from someone at Ottawa Police State, Vicki Nelson, to a number of people, including Deputy Minister Stewart.
And as you can see, it says good morning on behalf of general counsel, please find attached the list of the convoy leaders and their affiliates.
That's on February 7th.
And then if you scroll to the top, it's an email back from Mr. Stewart saying thank you.
And so you would agree with me that there is some level of engagement with OPS to get the information your department needs about those convoy organizers and their affiliates to assist with this proposal.
It would appear so on the basis of that email exchange.
I don't recall being briefed at the time about who those individuals were, or moreover, how those individuals would help to ensure the clearing of the convoy.
But yes, on what you're showing me, it does seem that there is a back and forth between Deputy Minister Stewart and the Ottawa Police Service on who.
Thank you.
I'm just going to bring up one last document.
This one's pb.nsc.can2963.
This one's pb.nsc.can2963.
If we go to the second page right there, we see the first bullet.
Would the signatory of the letter or the person who goes to the meeting be putting themselves at risk?
Is that a big concern?
And this is an email exchange between yourself and Mr. Stewart amongst various other people.
Does this reflect the concern that you're referencing in relation to whether there would be a risk to the person engaging with this proposal?
Sorry, can we just go back up to the top of that document from...
Right, sorry.
Scroll down a bit.
And again.
Thank you.
So...
The way I recall this is that Deputy Minister Stewart is responding to concerns that I had raised with him about the engagement proposal.
Right.
So if we scroll back up to the first page of the document, it looks like we have the answers to those questions.
And if we look at the second bullet, we see the risk to the signatory and government rep at a later date.
Meeting is low, assuming the meeting is virtual.
So again, would you agree that the concern that you've raised has been addressed as a result of a conversation between Deputy Minister Stewart and his OPP expert?
I would say it begun to address the concerns.
I don't think I was wholly satisfied by the answers that I had gotten at that stage.
In particular, I would have explored the assessment that...
That the risk to the signatory and to the government rep was low because I needed to understand exactly where the setup was going to be, how it was going to be undertaken.
And bearing in mind at the time, the situation on the ground was volatile and at times extremely chaotic.
And certainly with a very compromised ability to enforce the law, I really wanted to be satisfied that those questions would be answered.
Because if I went back to Cabinet...
And was asked about the engagement proposal that was being worked up by my deputy minister.
I had to be accountable and I had to be in a position to answer them.
So if the gun to answer some of those questions, I would say not completely.
So you said I would have as though it were hypothetical.
Did you ultimately continue that conversation or was the decision made at this point to kind of stop the process?
No, there was no decision to stop the process.
And there were some ongoing conversations about engagement.
And, you know, ultimately, I mean, this is February 12th, 1225.
The following day, we have an ERG and then a cabinet meeting.
And then the 14th is the day in which it's about a...
About a day and a half after this email exchange, we saw that the efforts of the City of Ottawa were not successful in the engagement proposal, and by then we were into the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
So you would say sort of events overtook and the proposal fell by the wayside.
I would say there was a lot of work that was going on.
And I know that the deputy minister at the time was working very hard to fulfill this task around the engagement proposal.
But we were also, you know, meeting with enforcement officials, meeting with cabinet, meeting with.
And engaging with provincial and territorial colleagues.
And then, yes, the sequence of events that had to be fulfilled prior to taking a decision on the invocation of the Emergencies Act was pressing.
Okay.
Thank you.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Next, counsel for former Chief Slole, please.
Thank you, Minister.
Tom Curry for the former chief.
Good afternoon.
Just on the point that was last raised, were you briefed on the outcome of the effort to try to engage protesters in Windsor by Minister Jones or by the OPP and the letter from Minister Jones?
I recall some information coming to me about...
That engagement and it being similarly unsuccessful.
I recall there being a report about a letter being circulated to individuals who were part of the blockade in Windsor and that my recollection is that it did not gain any traction with them.
And so likewise, here in Ottawa, a lot of the concerns around the cohesive structure.
Thank you.
The issue about whether a negotiated resolution was possible, was that taken eventually to Cabinet and discussed?
It was discussed at definitely one of the ERGs where, as I said earlier today, my deputy at the time had briefed the members of the ERG on the constitution of the individuals that made up the occupation here in Ottawa and the degree to which they were entrenched and dug in and how we might...
And similarly, did you become aware that the mayor of Ottawa had negotiated successfully for the relocation of some of the vehicles away from residential neighbourhoods and that that was thought to represent a possible breakthrough?
I do recall there being discussions between Mayor Watson and I think there was an appointed mediator that he had managed to secure.
But I also remember being very concerned that the vehicles that were clearing out of neighborhoods were actually coming back downtown into the parliamentary precinct.
And that that created a surge of vehicles that were, again, entrenching at the seat of the federal government.
And my concern was that it was actually growing the scale of the occupation here.
And that would have made it even potentially more difficult and challenging to clear.
A couple of things, if I could, just about the resources.
The information that you received about resources...
That's correct.
That the information that you were receiving from the commissioner did not accord with the provision of resources to the OPS?
Yes.
In trilateral meetings with Mayor Watson and in discussions with some of his officials, I think he articulated a concern that perhaps there was a need to look more carefully at the number of, one, the number of RCMP.
That were actually deployed, and two, what their taskings were.
And I know that he sort of underlined that latter part on a couple of occasions, that it wasn't just the numbers, it was what were the RCMP going to be dispatched to do?
And in fairness, those were questions that we did put to Commissioner Luckey at the time, and I think she did her best to answer them.
Right, understood.
And you relied in making, you made very, I won't take you to them in the time I have, but you made various public statements.
In response to questions from the media about what you were doing, what the federal government was doing to help the Ottawa Police Service, and in reliance on the information you had from Commissioner Luckey, you made those statements, including naming the numbers of officers, I think one time 250 or 275, something like that.
Yeah, the reason why we were trying to get the message out was that there were...
I think increasing questions and concerns from the city that they didn't have enough personnel.
And I wanted to communicate that on behalf of the federal government, that we were acting quickly and decisively to respond to those concerns by dispatching RCMP personnel.
And the idea that all you can do in your position, I presume, is rely on those, in this case, the commissioner, to provide you with information to the best of her ability.
And then you can rely on that and convey it.
As it turns out, in this case, you learned that the information that you had and conveyed was not accurate.
Well, I would say a couple things.
One, when the commissioner is briefing me, I take that information, you know, specifically around operations very much into account as we're making decisions about what additional resources we can offer.
I was nevertheless...
Interested to know whether or not we needed to do more to coordinate because the mayor and certain officials were saying it wasn't just about numbers, it was about tasking.
So there was a free-flowing dialogue there.
The issue of whether or not to be public about the numbers was also a concern because the commissioner said...
That she was concerned that if we posted numbers or we published numbers, that that might actually lead to a surge.
And so we had to try to find a balance.
Right.
And just for the...
I'm not going to take it up, but in one of the statements that you made, it's captured at OPS 8365 at page 5. That's just for the record.
I don't need it, Mr. Registrar.
You described, again, based on information that you had from the commissioner, that...
The RCMP had added 275 Mounties in the Ottawa deployment.
And as you pointed out, we learned later, and the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, I think, described it essentially as a mix-up about the numbers, that it wasn't actually that many Mounties.
It was a way of accounting for them that added up shifts and the like.
Did you subsequently become aware that that's how the numbers became, as they said, mixed up?
I was aware that there was an ongoing conversation between the RCMP and the OPS about exactly how many RCMP had been deployed to respond to the occupation and the blockade.
I will say, ultimately, in the lead-up to the invocation, my recollection is we did dispatch about 1,000 RCMP officers.
Yeah.
In the end, it was a massive deployment, which gets to the point you've already touched on.
Chief Slowly has described this as unprecedented and representing a paradigm shift in the way we think about policing public protest.
Do you agree with that?
Yes.
And in terms of the circumstances in which every one of you found yourselves in, all of the participants, and I include the convoy organizers who seem not also to have appreciated how many people were going to...
I was concerned about the fact that for two weeks we could not enforce the law and maintain public safety in the capital and at border communities across the country.
In your communications, in the communications of some of your ministerial colleagues, do you agree that in hindsight, some of the language that was used, even internally, was unhelpful to the cause because it added concerns and doubt about the effectiveness of, for example, the Ottawa Police Service or the Chief in being able to deal with a problem that had overwhelmed their service?
I think with the benefit of reflection, you always look back and ask yourself, could you have expressed a sentiment with more diplomacy?
I mean, we've heard earlier today that there were some rather tense and terse exchanges.
I think it is completely understandable in the moment.
And it wasn't just government and police who were concerned and frustrated.
The people that I was most worried about were Canadians.
And the materialization of counter-protests and just the ability to be able to go about daily lives was my paramount concern.
And the only way we could get life back to normal is if we could uphold the law.
And although you were expressing and Minister Blair expressed, I think, yesterday, and no doubt this has appeared in media because it was found in some of the documents, that he expressed his embarrassment about...
No, and I know how much regard Minister Blair holds for law enforcement.
I mean, he was a member of that community for decades.
So, you know, look, this is a really tough moment for the country.
It was a tough moment for the people who were impacted by the occupation.
And at times, yes, emotions were definitely running high and it was challenging, but ultimately we got the right players at the table to restore public safety.
Can I just ask one last thing, get your help with this, please, Minister.
The issue that you've been asked about in terms of the difference between...
Setting priorities in your role as Minister of Public Safety and interfering with operations.
Do you agree with me that describing for the Commissioner the importance of, for example, the circumstances that the country found itself in with border blockades, having that discussion with the Commissioner doesn't interfere with operational autonomy?
No, I don't think so.
And I think, again, this is an area that is really important to this inquiry, which is to understand where those boundaries are within the context of an emergency.
So it is important that in my job as the Minister of Public Safety, that I am holding the RCMP and other line agencies in the public safety portfolio accountable for doing the job of finding ways to restore public safety.
Exhausting every effort, using statutory authorities which exist, using authorities and resources that exist, and failing that to look and scan at what's left.
And so that is what took us to the Emergencies Act.
But throughout, finding that right balance of ensuring accountability without crossing the boundary is an extremely important part of this exercise.
I agree with that.
At the level both of the federal and provincial ministry, because both have, the commissioner has seen expressions of priorities by the provincial and federal government as to, for example, the blockade at the Ambassador Bridge.
Is that appropriate in your judgment?
Yeah, that's right.
And, you know, I do think that there are some existing conventions that we can look to.
To have an important conversation about what those principles are.
And I mentioned one under the Police Services Agreement where there is the relationship between the elected branch of government and police when it comes to forming the opinion that an emergency exists and then the elected government responding to requests from police to deploy resources and additional tools which may not exist in any other statute.
Including, the Commissioner might think about recommendations for how those priorities can be set so that, for instance, if this occurs, again, an entity or a police service like the Ottawa Police Service isn't caught between the federal and provincial government deciding which is the first port of call, for example.
I think that's a very important question because right now the linkages between municipal to provincial police services is clear.
Through provincial statute, through the respective provincial police services acts.
But there is no direct link following that to federal law enforcement resources.
And that was something that we did have to navigate.
Given the unique circumstances that we found ourselves in, and I do agree with the suggestion that was put to me earlier from a counsel for the Ontario Provincial Police that it may be appropriate to look at developing some protocols around that.
Final thing, in your dealings with Chief Slowly, do you agree that, to your observation, he performed his duties in good faith to the best of his abilities?
I think Chief Slowly did the best that he could in those circumstances, yes.
Thank you, Minister.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Thank you.
Next is the Ottawa Coalition please.
Good morning, Minister.
My name is Paul Champ, and I'm counsel for the Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses.
Hello.
Hi.
I just have some questions for you today.
I'm going to cover just two issues at the time that I have.
Parliamentary staff, many of them are residents of downtown Ottawa, are they not?
Yes.
And obviously their workplace was also right in the middle of this occupation as well.
Yes.
And were you hearing from parliamentary staff who were sometimes concerned about coming to work in the circumstances?
Frequently, yes.
Or we're experiencing other personal impacts due to the convoy occupation?
Yes.
I wonder if I could ask the registrar to pull up a document, pb.can.0001850.
And while he's pulling that up...
Minister, I just want to confirm, Mike Jones, he's your Chief of Staff, is that right?
That's correct.
And I gather that Mr. Jones, he was advising you of information that he received from many sources?
Yes.
Okay, so what I've pulled up here is text messages between Mr. Jones and an Ottawa City Councillor, Matt Luloff.
In blue is Mr. Jones and in grey is Mr. Luloff.
I was wondering if we could just scroll to page two.
Perfect.
And here, you'll see...
In blue, Mr. Jones writes, so maybe not for a public avail, but heard about an incident that's pretty angering.
And Mr. Luloff says, the small woman moved from blocking traffic.
And then Mr. Jones writes, from one of my staff, I won't be coming into the office while Convoy is there, however.
My friend was directly threatened of rape yesterday because she was wearing her mask, and that is super triggering for me as a survivor of sexual assault.
I know Yasser sharing how residents feel.
I gather just...
That's probably Mr. Nakfi, the MP for downtown Ottawa.
But I would be remiss if I didn't share that I don't even feel safe dropping my son off at daycare downtown and kids have not been outside because of fear the educators will be yelled at for wearing a mask.
Understood.
Were you hearing those kinds of stories, Minister?
I was, and as I said, I was hearing them.
Frequently, and I was very concerned about the safety of the people that were working on the Hill.
I mean, I think I testified earlier that I had expressed the view that we may want to consider going completely virtual in Parliament because I was worried about the concentration of people.
The fact that some of the expressions that you have pointed out today were being targeted, again, disproportionately at women.
I was hearing from a lot of staff and from people on my team along the lines of these types of incidents, and that really preoccupied me.
And as you may recall, I mean, there was one day on which we did actually have to shut down Parliament.
I mean, that is only the second time in the history of this country where that has had to occur, and that was entirely because of security concerns.
So this was very serious.
It was.
If you just scroll to the next page, Mr. Sharp.
So we'll see.
Understood.
And then Mr. Jones says, when she reported to police, they told her, quote, well, maybe take your mask out when you're walking outside, so reduce any attention to you.
And Mr. Lowe says.
The city councillor of Ottawa says, yes, I've heard of these incidents too.
So were you hearing about that as well, that Ottawa police sometimes weren't following up on complaints from Ottawa residents?
Well, I don't know why, but I do know that at the time that law enforcement was overwhelmed.
Yeah.
And so...
My interpretation of that was just by the sheer number of incidents, and I think at one point they numbered in the thousands, that it was difficult to investigate or take any kind of appropriate action to hold those who are responsible to account.
But there were hundreds of criminal investigations and charges that were subsequently laid.
Yeah, and indeed, Minister, we've heard a lot of witnesses in this proceeding, including many Ottawa police witnesses, and the thrust of the evidence, as I heard, is just simply capacity.
They were just so overwhelmed.
They didn't have an opportunity.
Okay, thank you.
Just the second issue I wanted to speak to you about, thank you for that, is, of course, as Minister of Public Safety, the RCMP and CSIS both report to you, is that right?
Yes.
And Minister, you were receiving a range of information about the risks and threats from those agencies that were being posed by the Ottawa occupation?
Yes.
And we understand, we've heard other evidence that there were former military and law enforcement members who were participating in and assisting the convoy.
You were hearing that information?
I'd heard those reports, yes.
I gather that was a concern for public safety because those types of individuals would have certain skills and expertise that could present some logistical or greater threats?
Yes, that's correct.
And now you also heard information that former CSIS officers were participating in the protests.
I don't recall off the top of my head, but I, you know, as you pointed out, had the concern generally about individuals who had previously served in the military and law enforcement for sure.
And would really need to jig my memory about whether or not that also included members from the service.
And were you also hearing information that current members of law enforcement or military might be participating in the protests?
Well, there were reports about leaks of information during operations and, you know, And so I do recall there being some concerns about active members being potentially sympathetic.
And do you know, are you aware, Mr., are there any investigations of those issues internally within RCMP or any of the other agencies?
I know that the RCMP certainly...
I wanted to be sure that they were getting to the bottom of any potential security lapses and that those investigations were conducted.
Thank you very much, Minister.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
I know I've still got some time.
Maybe I'll try to roll it over to the next one.
That's to be encouraged.
I may even allow that.
So I think we'll take the lunch break now and come back.
Commissioner, if I may, just a couple of comments before lunch.
Rob Kittredge for the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms.
I just wanted to express, regarding the removal of my friend Mr. Miller this morning, I wanted to express the Justice Centre's position on asking that you make a decision about his return to the room during the lunch break and express our support for his return to the room.
At the earliest convenience.
I'm a big supporter of constructive communication, and I understand that may not have taken place this morning, but I think his clients have a right to representation here, and we'd like to support his ability to cross-examine Mr. Mendocino today.
If you can make that decision at lunch, that would be very much appreciated on our part.
I'm certainly a favor of communication.
I believe that the convoy is still represented, so it's not a question of no representation.
I'm not aware of a request that he returned to the room, but if he requests it, I will consider it.
All right.
Well, thank you very much.
The Commission is enraged us until 2 o'clock.
La Commission est enlevé jusqu'à 14h.
Merci.
Thank you.
Or a lot The Commission is reconvening.
Okay, I think the next up is the government of Alberta, please.
Good afternoon.
Sorry, I'm having an issue.
I'm unable to start my video.
Okay.
Do you want to take a minute or do you want to...
Oh, there you go.
Thank you.
Good afternoon, Minister Mendicino.
My name is Mandy England.
I'm counsel for the Government of Alberta.
Good afternoon.
I'd like to just take you back to something that you said earlier in response to a question from Commission Council.
I believe you said that Premier Kenney expressed to you that he had neither the resources nor the tools to deal with the blockades in Alberta.
And I just wanted to clarify what you meant by tools.
Often in this inquiry, that term has been used to refer to legislative tools or authorities, such as being able to use the criminal code.
And so I was hoping you could clarify what you meant by using that word.
Yeah, that's a fair question.
What I was referring to were conversations that we had at the beginning of February.
Where he had indicated that he needed physical tools and assets to help clear the blockade.
I believe he was expressing a concern that he was having a really hard time getting access to those assets through either the RCMP or through provincial police services.
So he was putting to me the suggestion that we might be able to assist him through military assets.
I'd said to him that although statutorily requests for assistance were still within my office's authorities, that they were in practice being addressed by my colleague, Minister Blair, in the new ministry that was created following the 21 election through the Ministry of Emergency Preparedness.
And I took that conversation and I committed to then Premier Kenney that I would relay it to both Ministers Anand and Blair.
Okay, thank you.
So you meant physical tools as opposed to legislative authority?
At that point, yes, that's correct.
Okay, thank you.
If I could, could I please take you to document SSM.NSC.CAN403069.
And this is a text.
The portion that I will be reading will be a text between Zita Estravas, Mr. Blair's Chief of Staff, with Mike Jones, your Chief of Staff.
And you can see the date as we're scrolling is February the 6th at 8:49 p.m.
And in this text, Ms. Estravas says, "Your DM Mike said the following: Heads up, I have spoken to my Alberta counterpart and flagged that we are likely to decline." The RFA, so Request for Assistance, as you were just mentioning, for CAF equipment and optics and precedent and provincial authorities not fully explored reasons.
She was not surprised, but said Minister McIver would want to call Minister Blair, and Mr. Jones says thanks.
And so I'd just like to break down this text.
The reference to your DM would have been a reference to Deputy Minister Stewart, is that correct?
That's how I read it.
Can I just clarify, though, that you said, Zita Estravis, I note at the top of that text chain that the initials are MJ and SK, and previously we've read text exchanges where SK was Sam Khalil.
So I just thought I would offer that clarification.
I'm not sure if that makes any sense to you.
It makes sense.
And I actually, I should have clarified at the beginning myself, I believe it's a group chat in which all three of them were present.
And so the indication with the document is that this is taken from Mrs. Stravis' phone, and then it indicates at the top of her screen the other two individuals that she's texting with.
Okay.
Does that help clarify?
Yes.
Okay, thank you.
And so would you understand the reference here to Deputy Minister Stewart?
What do you understand here in terms of what that means of the reference to Deputy Minister Stewart having said that your ministry was likely to decline the request for assistance because of optics?
Well, I'm not privy to this exchange, but it seems on the text that what's being indicated is that your DM, and so I agree with you, I infer that that is DM Stewart.
Said the following, and a heads up, that DM Stewart has spoken to, as I interpret it, his Alberta counterpart and flagged that we as in the federal government are likely to decline the request for assistance for CAF equipment and optics and precedent and provincial authorities not fully explored reasons.
Of all of those itemized reasons, the one that I have the least insight to is the optics.
And to be clear, following my conversation with Premier Kenney, I really did delegate that task to Minister Blair and his office.
And just so that we are clear on the dates here, though, this text does predate that conversation with Premier Kenney.
Would that be correct?
This is Sunday, February 6th, the day after the request for assistance was sent.
I have to, again, try to jig my memory.
There may have been a conversation with Premier Kenney before the 6th.
It was certainly at the very beginning of February.
In any case, it actually seems to me to make sense that...
Given the sequence of events, as we've been discussing them this morning, that I spoke to Premier Kenney, indicated that Minister Blair would be the lead on processing the request for assistance.
And this then seems to be the follow-through, if you will, of that exchange with his staff being on the email chain.
The reason why Deputy Minister Stewart is there is that he is both accountable to both me and Minister Blair.
I see.
And so you don't have any insight, then, is what you're saying, into why Deputy Minister Stewart would have communicated to Alberta that a reason for declining the request was optics?
On the optics part, no, I was not privy to that exchange or that conversation at the time.
And did you have a concern about optics?
I had a concern about clearing coots, and I know that Premier Kenney was...
Expressing the impasse that he found himself in and was, I think, engaging me to encourage both Ministers Blair and Anand to strongly consider a request for assistance which would provide him with military assets.
In the context of conversations that I had with Premier Kenney, he'd suggested that his provincial RCMP were saying to him that they had the appropriate...
Equipment to remove the large commercial vehicles that had blockaded Coutts since the beginning of February.
So I think, in essence, what he was conveying to me is, look, I need help.
And one of the ways in which you can help me is by looking very carefully at military assets, which could help to clear the blockade in Kutz.
And he said he had a really hard time getting access to tow trucks that were large enough to acquire.
Okay, thank you.
And in terms of the next reason that's given for declining the request, do you have any insight into why Deputy Minister Stewart might have said it was due to precedent?
Again, I'm extrapolating a little bit here, but I assume one of the concerns that was being weighed in the mix was that if the request for assistance was granted in the case of Alberta, that potentially others would.
And again, I'm inferring a bit here, but the use of military assets is something that is done.
On a very exceptional basis.
So I think there was a concern about potentially opening up the door to other requests to insert the military.
And as you've heard, there was a lot of reluctance and restraint around resorting to military resources and authorities in the context of the blockade and the convoy.
Okay, thank you.
And as noted...
Previously, the text is sent.
The letter of request was February 5th.
This text is sent on February 6th, indicating that there was a conversation at some point between the 5th and the 6th between Deputy Minister Stewart and someone from Alberta.
Would it be fair?
I also note that nowhere on the list of reasons does it say that the request for assistance would be denied because CAF equipment wasn't suitable or they didn't have suitable equipment.
Would it be fair to say that the communication by Deputy Minister Stewart was made before the possible CAF equipment options were fully explored?
I'm afraid I couldn't answer that.
I don't know at that point exactly what Deputy Minister Stewart has said or not said to the province of Alberta.
And again...
Owing to machinery, he would have been reporting the RFA to Minister Blair in conjunction with any dialogue that was going on to Minister Anand.
Okay, thank you.
Had you discussed the suitability of CAF equipment with Minister Anand before the evening of February the 6th?
I know we had an exchange.
I know I flagged for her that Premier Kenney had engaged me to get some assistance and that...
I anticipated that there would be an RFA, a request for assistance that was submitted to us, and I anticipated that it would engage her and her authorities.
So I just wanted to give her a heads up.
But as to precisely what equipment was used, what was suitable to remove or clear the blockade in Coutts, I would have...
Deferred appropriately to her and the CAF's assessment about that in conjunction with Minister Blair's responsibilities and roles around processing requests for assistance that related to CAF.
Okay, thank you very much.
Okay, your time is up, so if you can try and wrap up, please.
Okay, certainly.
I just wanted to confirm very quickly on one quick point.
You're familiar with the report of the Houses of Parliament, the Emergencies Act consultations tabled February 16th, is that right?
Yes.
So I'd like to pull up SSM.CAN.50124 and take you to page 3, please.
And if we could scroll down to the bottom of that page.
Yep, right there.
So we can see that there's a discussion of engagement, and under the first sub-bullet point, the Minister of Public Safety engaged with the Premier of Alberta on February 2nd and 9th, and then with the Premier and the Acting Minister of Justice and Solicitor General on February the 7th.
You also engaged with the Acting Minister of Justice and Solicitor General on February 1st, 5th, and 9th.
Can I confirm with you that in none of those conversations, did you discuss the potential invocation of the Federal Emergencies Act with either Premier Kenney or Acting Minister Savage?
Certainly with Premier Kenney, I can confirm that.
I would also note that it does...
I'll confirm what I had mentioned earlier, which is that he and I had had a conversation on February the 2nd, as I recalled it, which was prior to the February 6th exchange that you had pulled up earlier.
So I do think that that does sit more neatly with the chronology and the sequencing of events as we described.
I would say that my engagements with the then Minister of Justice and Solicitor General, Sonia Savage, It very likely did not include any express references to the Emergencies Act,
but I believe there would have been general references to whether or not existing tools and authorities beyond physical assets were going to be sufficient to restore public safety, and it would have been in the very general nature.
So Minister Savage's evidence, as summarized in our institutional report, is that you did not discuss the Federal Emergencies Act.
Would that be something that you would agree with, or would you dispute that?
Yes.
No, I agree with that, yes.
Okay, thank you.
And I know I'm out of time, and so perhaps I don't have time to take you to this, but there are...
Emails and text exchanges confirming that it was the conversation on February the 7th.
There's a readout and text exchanges with yourself and Minister Blair that it was on that date that you had had the conversation with Premier Kenney about the tow trucks with the agreement to relay it to Minister Blair and Minister Anand.
Would that, you know, jog perhaps your recollection on the chronology of when that conversation might have taken place?
That sounds right.
Okay, thank you very much.
Those are my questions.
Okay, thanks.
Next, if I could call on the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, please.
Good afternoon, Minister.
My name is Cheyenne Arnold Cunningham, and I'm counsel for the Union of BC Indian Chiefs.
We've heard a lot today already on the topic of consultation, so we'd like to ask, did you consult or cooperate with local First Nations or Indigenous groups during the Freedom Convoy situation and or the decision to invoke the Emergencies Act?
I would say that I've had broad and ongoing conversations with representatives and leadership within First Nations and Indigenous communities.
In my role and in my capacity as Minister of Public Safety, I know that in the lead-up to the invocation that a number of colleagues that sit at the table...
Including Ministers Miller and Haidu are in routine and constant engagement with First Nations and Indigenous peoples and the communities.
So there's a broad range of ongoing dialogue that is undertaken by representatives of the Cabinet.
Okay, thank you.
From a public safety viewpoint.
Do you think that it's important during a public order emergency event for Public Safety Canada and police services to engage with First Nations in the local territory?
I do.
So in your mandate letter dated December 2021, you were directed to implement the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which is also known as UNDRIP.
Are you familiar with Bill C-15, which came into force as federal legislation in June 2021 to adopt and implement UNDRIP?
Yes, and I would just add to that that we are leveraging UNDRIP to advance important reforms within the RCMP around First Nations and Indigenous policing.
And so, for example, over the last...
A number of weeks and months in my capacity as Minister of Public Safety, I have been deeply engaged with First Nations and Indigenous and Inuit communities for the purposes of ensuring that there are more Indigenous-led public safety initiatives,
including the creation of Indigenous We are in the process of co-developing legislation that expressly recognizes that Indigenous policing is an essential service so that we can move away from the current First Nations and Indigenous policing program-based approach to one that is more structured and enduring and uses UNDRIP.
And the principles of reconciliation as the anchor for a relationship between the federal government and First Nations and Indigenous policing.
And then the last thing I would point out is that we are currently debating Bill C-20.
Which is before Parliament, which is an act that would create a new Public Complaints and Review Commission, what we are referring to as the PCRC.
And we are, again, very engaged with First Nations and Indigenous communities to ensure that there is representation on that commission so that there can be appropriate civilian review and accountability in the way that we police and uphold the law in Indigenous communities.
Great.
Thank you so much.
I'll actually, I'll jump off the last few points that you made there.
So speaking of Bill C-20 and the work that you're doing there, would you agree then that ensuring Indigenous participation and presence on oversight bodies of the RCMP as either decision makers or complaints investigators would assist in that acceleration of RCMP reform moving forward?
I agree it's essential, and that's one of the things that we talk about in our engagements, and it's one of the reasons why we are co-developing the legislation around the recognition that Indigenous policing is an essential service.
And in order to give life and breath to that principle, it means being at the table together.
Starting from the premise that there needs to be a recognition of the inherent right of Indigenous peoples to chart out their own courses, to implement their own priorities as it relates to public safety, including and leading up to Indigenous police services which are self-governed.
So both in that co-development exercise as well as in Bill C-20, we are very much engaged with First Nations and Indigenous peoples so that...
They are reflected in our institutions, including when it comes to public safety.
What about the CSIS Act?
Are there any plans to ensure modernization of this legislation in alignment with UNDRIP?
Well, the reforms that I'm carrying out in my capacity as Minister of Public Safety has, as part of the overarching mandate given to me by the Prime Minister, the need to adhere to the principles of reconciliation.
And part of that is addressing long, enduring, systemic, structural challenges in the relationship between the federal government and Indigenous peoples that go back to the origins of colonialism.
And that would apply not only to RCMP and CBSA, but right across.
All of my line agencies, including CSIS.
So we are really trying to get at some of those inherent biases which have led to the over-representation of Indigenous peoples interacting with the justice system and using UNDRIP as well to make sure that we reduce and ultimately eliminate those barriers.
Okay, thank you.
In considering all the work that that you're doing to implement UNDRIP and your mandate and Bill C-15 and another piece of your mandate which is to work in partnership with Indigenous peoples to advance their rights considering UNDRIP's implementation,
do you think that there should be then distinct considerations on CSIS and the RCMP and their ability to monitor and respond with enforcement action against non-violent and unarmed First Nations people who engage in activism pertaining to their lawful and distinct rights, even in situations that might be perceived or profiled as being a public order event?
I do.
And that's one of the reasons why it's really important as we implement these reforms that we modernize training to be culturally sensitive of Indigenous language, of Indigenous culture and tradition and Indigenous laws.
And that is something that we are actively doing right now.
And the hope is that by doing so, that we will create a relationship that is based on respect.
On the nation-to-nation principles and values that are informed by UNDRIP.
And again, this is not just with regards to line agencies in my portfolio.
This is work that has to be done right across our government.
Okay, thank you.
And then in thinking about the practice of...
Consultation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples and in the context of responding to a situation like the Freedom Convoy situation or public order emergency events and looking at it in this context of a multi-jurisdictional landscape and First Nations jurisdiction and sovereignty and rights and territories.
How is Public Safety Canada then now going to build in?
Consultation and cooperation in these contexts.
By listening, and that is one of the core principles that I feel very strongly about.
And my department and my officials are in frequent contact, building the relationship on the ground.
I am also traveling with increasing frequency to Indigenous communities across the country to meet in person with.
I recently had the chance to visit with the James Smith Cree Nation following the mass casualty there at the beginning of or at the end of summer, I beg your pardon.
And so that direct personal experience is meant to foster a relationship so that we can move forward with the kinds of reforms that are inspired and governed by.
And by the principles of reconciliation, which have been documented in the Truth and Reconciliation calls to action, the MMIWG calls to justice.
It's a full court press from the federal government to really move forward with those reforms.
But you have to meet with people and you have to respect that inherent right of self-government.
And that inherent right of self-determination.
And that includes when it comes to public safety initiatives.
And I think by doing so, we can break that intergenerational trauma, that endless cycle that has seen a disproportionate number of Indigenous peoples caught up in the criminal justice system, for example.
And so that is work that I am deeply committed to.
Thank you so much for your time today.
Those are all of our questions.
Thank you to the Commissioner as well.
Okay, thank you.
Next, if I could call on the Canadian Constitution Foundation, please.
Commissioner, Minister, my name is Suji Choudhury.
I'm counsel for the CCF.
Minister, I'd like to begin by picking up on a comment.
You made, I believe, during your examination in chief, where you said there's a dialogue between civilian leadership and law enforcement professionals.
And so I want to pick up on that idea in the context of your relationship with Commissioner Luckey.
And in the context of the convoy, I'm wondering if you could just answer a few questions.
Were you getting daily briefings?
Were you in frequent communication with her?
If you could just give us, and I have limited time, so if you could just give us a bit of a window into what your interactions were like with her.
The short answer is yes and yes, and to give you a little bit of detail, we would have been meeting daily on some days, multiple times, through different briefings.
The purpose of those interactions was to have a dialogue so that I could understand from her.
Exactly what law enforcement was doing to restore public safety, and then ultimately in the lead-up to the invocation to seek some advice so that I could then impart some advice to the government around the invocation.
So these were daily and frequent conversations that I was having with the commissioner.
So when the February 7th letter came to you and the Prime Minister from Mayor Watson and Chair Deans requesting a deployment of RCMP officers, I suppose you would have delivered that letter to the Commissioner?
We certainly were in constant contact.
Just to be clear, it wouldn't have necessarily been my personal responsibility to transfer it.
But there was a very clear line of communication about the pressures that the Ottawa Police Service was under to muster the resources that were necessary to restore public safety.
It also would have been clear to Commissioner Lucky some of the information and the feedback that I was getting from the City of Ottawa around numbers and tasking and the like.
And so those conversations and that dialogue would have been occurring.
Yes.
And she was updating you then on her steps to respond to that request for support?
She was.
Mr. Registrar, if you could put up on the screen the following document, and I apologize, it's PBNSCCAN402872-REL.0001.
And Minister, while this is coming up, this is a document that's dated on or about February 10th, and it's a memorandum of agreement between the RCMP and essentially the OPS and the OPSB.
About forced deployments.
Have you seen this document before?
I can't recall if I've seen this document specifically.
I am obviously generally aware of the ongoing arrangements and agreements that were reached.
So if we could go down to page three, please, Mr. Registrar.
If you could go to Clause 2.1.
There you go.
So as you'll see here that...
Article 2.1, Minister, if you could just have a quick look at this.
It says that the RCMP agreed to deploy to Ottawa up to 250 members of the RCMP in a number of different capacities.
And then it suggests later down in that article that provision for over 250 members can be made for subject to mutual agreement.
Yes.
And does this seem familiar to you?
Yes.
And so I just wanted to get a bit of clarification from you, if you're able to.
So when the RCMP was providing support here to the OPS, to the best of your knowledge, would that not include RCMP deployments already, for example, in the parliamentary precinct or out at Rideau Cottage to protect the Prime Minister?
Well, I think that was certainly one of the issues that was raised by Mayor Watson and his staff at the time, which was that some of the numbers that were being reported were inclusive of pre-existing RCMP deployment, for example, in the precinct or for protection.
And so my responsibility at that point in my capacity as Minister of Public Safety was to relay that.
To the Commissioner to get some clarity about exactly how many we had deployed and for what purpose.
And do you recall what information came back to you?
I do.
I have a general recollection that one of the concerns that the Commissioner had expressed at the time was that while RCMP members were being dispatched or deployed to the City of Ottawa that it wasn't clear to her what those taskings would be.
And whether or not or how exactly it would fit into the OPS's operational plan at the time.
And that was the feedback that I was getting.
But what was clear despite that was that we were sending RCMP and that we were open to sending more RCMP to support the City of Ottawa to restore public safety.
So if we could just call up another document, it's OPB401014.
Okay.
And so, Minister Mendocino, I'm not sure if you've seen this.
It's a chart of deployments by different police or law enforcement entities in Ottawa, up to and including the 12th of February.
Have you seen this chart before or something similar to it?
I've not seen this chart.
Sorry, who is the author of this document?
So this is a production by the Ottawa Police Board.
So I'm afraid I can't give you more details about who put this together, but this is an evidence before the committee.
This is a City of Ottawa publication, is what you're saying?
Well, it might be.
It's something that was put into evidence by the Ottawa Police Board.
I can't speak to them, sir, about how they generated it.
Okay, I don't recognize this document.
Okay.
Well, then, look.
Let's soldier on.
So if you look under regular members federal RCMP, yes, Mr. Registrar, thank you, it sort of says at the end of this line that 167 officers were deployed.
And so that, I mean, were you aware of that figure on that day?
Well, setting aside the exact time frame, I am familiar with the initial figure of about 150.
In that range, and again, you've heard previously that there was some ongoing back and forth on exactly how many and when, but that was one figure that had came to me early on in that range.
In that range.
And so, I mean, you'd agree that on his face, it does appear that these numbers are lower than the 250 that are in the agreement I showed you.
Well, I agree that on the face of this document, that that is lower than 250, but again, without knowing more about the...
Authorship or the origins of this document, it is very difficult for me to testify as to its accuracy.
And you're not able to say, and I think I know the answer, sir, but I have to do it for the record, you're not able to say of that 167 how many were at Reno Cottage and on the Promontry Precinct?
I am not.
Minister, I'd like to just turn to another theme, if I could.
And so this morning you made a number of statements.
You said it was virtually impossible to enforce the law in Wellington.
Wellington falls within the jurisdiction of the OPS.
The RCMP could not go and assert itself in Wellington to bring things under control.
Is that fair?
Yes.
Okay.
And so, Minister, were you able to, I know you're very busy, but were you able to review or be briefed on Commissioner Luckey's cross-examination last week?
I don't know that I was briefed.
I may have read some general reports about it in the media.
So my co-counsel went through some issues in respect of those themes with Commissioner Locke, and I just want to take you to what she said, if you wouldn't mind.
And so this is transcript 23, Mr. Registrar, and we're on to page, we're going to begin at page 241.
Thank you.
And Minister, I know you're a member of the Law Society of Ontario, so there'll be a bit of legal questioning here.
Okay.
Great.
So if you can start at line five, super.
Okay.
So my colleague, Mishan Mughanathan, was asking questions of Commissioner Loki, so I just want to take you through some of the back and forth, if I could.
So my colleague says, my co-counsel, okay, so you'll agree that the RCMP officers...
Have the power to enforce the criminal code, for instance, and the commissioner says yes.
Then my co-counsel says right, and they always have the power to enforce the code.
It's just part of what they're allowed to do, and the commissioner says yes.
And then if you could scroll down, Mr. Registrar, my co-counsel says right.
They don't need to be sort of the local police in a jurisdiction.
This is a power they always have.
And the commissioner says yes.
And then my colleague says, right, and there's nothing in the code, for example, that says an RCMP officer can't enforce the criminal code in one particular place.
They can enforce that anywhere in Canada.
And then this, and the commissioner, Luckey, is not sure.
And I'll let you read her response there, sir.
And when you're done, let us know, and I'll go to the next page.
And Commissioner, I know I'm a little bit over time, but I think this is an important point.
It goes to jurisdiction on Wellington.
Mr. Minister, can we go to the next page?
So if we could go to page 242.
Mr. Commissioner, I just do think it is important that the Commissioner's evidence not be put that she wasn't sure, but that she articulated that the power she was describing was if you were to find committing.
Of course.
Of course.
I didn't mean to mislead, so I take my friend's point.
And so, okay, let's go down to my colleague's next question.
So, okay, so just to use sort of a silly example, if we have an RCMP officer that's standing on Wellington Street in Ottawa and they see someone committing an offense under the criminal code, They don't need to call up the OPS to arrest the person.
They could go and arrest the person themselves.
And the commissioner answered yes.
And so we're sort of, we're running, we're past time.
So I just want to ask you, so that we put to the commissioner a number of questions about the scope of RCMP officers under the RCMP Act, particularly Section 18A.
And would you, would you, do you have any reason to think that Commissioner Luckey is incorrect here?
I think she's right in saying that if any peace officer sees that the law is being broken under the criminal code, that they may use their common law authority to effect an arrest.
But because of the important conventions around respecting jurisdiction and recognizing that, and certainly in the province of Ontario, that there are municipal police services that are set up under the...
I hope I'm not going too far in trying to ascertain your line of questioning here, but it would be somewhat chaotic for the RCMP to simply insert themselves unilaterally into Wellington Street and start effecting arrests without coordinating very closely with the OPS and the OPP.
So that is why so much of the energy was around.
Understanding what the operational plan is, notwithstanding that, in theory, yes, this line of questioning is correct.
An RCMP officer could effect an arrest if they saw the law being broken under the criminal code.
Okay, well, Commissioner, I'm well over time, and thank you, Minister Mendocino.
Thank you.
Next is the Democracy Fund, JCCF, please.
Good afternoon, Mr. Commissioner.
Good afternoon, Minister Mendocino.
My name is Antoine Dailly.
I'm Counsel to Citizens for Freedom, representing the protesters in Windsor, Ontario.
I'd just like to take you through two aspects today.
First, some of the considerations that were made by you, Mr. Minister, in considering some of the legal alternatives other than invoking the Emergencies Act to deal with the protest, and also some specific questions about your communications with the Windsor governance structure.
Just for the record, do you remember the mandate letter JCF.0000189?
I don't think we need to pull that up, but that's the mandate letter you received on December 16th of 2021 from Prime Minister Trudeau.
Do you recall that letter?
Yes.
And I think on the fourth page, fifth bullet from the bottom, it mandates you to continue working with the Minister of Health and the Minister of Transport to protect the health and safety of Canadians through safe, responsible, and compassionate management of the border with the United States and other ports of And so I take it that the Minister of Health and Minister of Transport, you work closely together, and that would be Minister Duclos and Minister Al-Gabrak.
Is that correct?
Yes.
And is it also your understanding that Minister Duclos is an economist by formal educational training?
Yes, with an academic background, yes.
And then you're obviously a lawyer by background and former Crown prosecutor.
So with respect to the Freedom Convoy and the protest, would it be fair to say that, you know, a trucker protest, protesting about health mandates with concerns about public safety and border...
border concerns that this group between the three of you as part of your mandate, you were the key ministers involved in dealing with some of the concerns raised by I would say there were a number of ministries that were engaged by the convoy and the blockade.
Not only my colleague ministers Al Gabra and Haidu, but equally as you heard previously.
Minister Blair under Emergency Preparedness, Minister LeBlanc under Intergovernmental Affairs, and many others.
Sorry, just got limited time here.
Yes and no answers where we can and where we need to elaborate just as concisely as possible, please.
If we could pull up a document ID, pb.can.00001868.
And this is from the emails that we received last night.
Do you recall hearing Jason Kenney's position that the trucker vax policy is obviously just dumb political theater?
Was that ever brought to your attention?
Well, I'll wait to see what the document says to refresh my memory.
And sorry.
Who is this text exchanged with or between?
If we could scroll down.
So it should be the third attachment in the sixth email that was received from Mr. Brousseau last night.
There it is.
The trucker vax policy is obviously just dumb political theater.
Calling them Nazis hasn't exactly helped.
Do you recall being informed of Premier Kenney's position on this?
I recall seeing that that was Minister LeBlanc's, looks like a cut and paste of what Premier Kenney had relayed to him.
Okay, and I take it you disagree with Premier Kenney's position?
Yes.
But is it true, though, that the Liberal platform in September of 2021...
Dealt with a mandatory vaccination policy across the entire federal service and on federally regulated transportation.
Yes, we put that to the electorate in the 21 election.
And I believe you had 33% roughly of the popular vote there.
Is that correct?
Well, to the best of my recollection, yes, your number's right on that.
Okay.
And so would you say then that in part this mandate or this must-do activity is rooted at least in part in a political or ideological purpose?
Well, it was part of, I think, two important things.
First, the best available medicine, evidence and science that we got, and it was our belief then, and it continues to be now, that vaccines were the best way out of the pandemic.
And secondly, in the lead up to the 21 election, there was a very, I think, robust debate among...
I'm trying to figure out what specific knowledge you had in dealing with the Minister of Health here.
So, would it be fair to say that under the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, you are given the responsibility of exercising leadership at a national level relating to public safety?
And that the Department of Health has a similar aspect in terms of promotion and preservation of health.
So what I'm trying to get at here is the separation of powers a little bit, because we did have an unprecedented emergency situation with the pandemic in Canada where some of these vaccines were pushed through very quickly.
And so, you know, perhaps by way of analogy, you know, if there's a new peanut that's coming on the market that may have been genetically modified, it would clearly be within the purview of the Ministry of Health to assess the safety of that.
But was there ever a consideration where, let's say, you're now implementing a mandate that results in 90% of Canadians ingest.
Well, first, there was a lot of thoughtful deliberation and research done prior to the decision of launching and implementing a national vaccine strategy.
While there is a common objective between the public safety ministry and health in protecting the health and safety of Canadians, public safety has a different mandate, which includes the law, and there are agencies under my portfolio that are responsible for upholding the law.
Understood.
So, Minister, so there is a little bit of overlap, and some of this overlap could have been discussed through your mandate working with the Minister of Health and Transport.
Is that fair to say?
Well, there were, again, very robust communications within government throughout the pandemic and throughout the convoy, and that includes with Minister LeBlanc, Minister Al-Gabra, Minister Duclos.
Understood.
if we could pull up mr registrar jcf0000183 So this here is the regulatory decision summary published by Health Canada on September 16th of 2021.
I believe this was the second, the purpose of this document was to transition the approval of some of these vaccines from being authorized under an interim order to being authorized under, I believe it is Schedule Division 8 of the Foods and Drugs Act.
So if we could go to page six at the first paragraph there.
It states that an important limitation of the data.
Is the lack of information on the long-term safety and effectiveness of the vaccine?
Were you made aware of this concern?
I recall being privy to conversations where there were discussions about the efficacy of vaccinations and also how there were other considerations.
around the administration of them as part of an overarching health policy to deal with the pandemic.
Sorry, just before you go on, I just want to be clear, I actually don't agree with that.
Which part?
The last part that you said in your question where you asked me if I agree is that it was sped up and rushed.
And you linked it, I think, to the events of the blockade and the convoy, and I disagree with that.
There was a lot of work that was done in the lead-up to the rollout of the national vaccination strategy that predated the convoy.
So if we could look at page 4 of 8, was it ever brought to your attention?
That in terms of the safety of evaluation for adolescents, only 660 adolescents has aged between 12 to 15. Only 660 adolescents that have been followed for two months formed the basis of Health Canada's conclusion that this was safe or effective for this particular age group.
And were you aware that this is one of the concerns that was being brought by the convoy?
I know that in my conversations with Minister Duclos and other colleagues who participated both at the COVID committee as well as broader cabinet, that those conversations were informed by the best available science and data in the lead up to the national vaccination strategy.
Okay, and if we can, one more document here quickly, JCF00008187.
Were you aware that, at least our counterparts in the United States, that when they approved the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine, they stated that they determined that an analysis of spontaneous post-marketing adverse events reported under the FDCA would not be sufficient to assess known serious risks of myocarditis and pericarditis and identify an unexpected serious risk of subclinical myocarditis, and that, in fact, they ordered a battery of tests requiring Pfizer to study adverse effects until...
The question I'm trying to get at, well, were you aware of that, first of all?
I have not seen this document before.
Okay.
And so my question to you is, if you're exercising leadership within the realm of public safety, and you have the statutory power to establish strategic priorities and exercise powers to initiate, recommend, coordinate, implement, or promote policy programs or projects relating to public safety, was there ever any consideration of...
Of initiating a review, perhaps, of some of these safety concerns, because I understand that other countries had limited the use of some of these vaccines for under age 18 or under age 30, and that perhaps by exercising some of those powers leading up to the entrenchment of the convoy or even, you know, as late as...
Just bring it to a question, please.
The 13th.
Did you ever consider ordering...
Or initiating additional tests to satisfy the concerns of some of these protesters?
That would not have been within my mandate.
My mandate was to make sure that we protected public safety through the enforcement of the law.
And this is a commissioned inquiry about the circumstances that led to it.
I'm not saying your question is irrelevant.
I'm saying that would be a question that would be best put to the Minister of Health.
And was there any discussion between you and the Minister of Health about perhaps engaging proactively in some of these additional studies to alleviate some concerns of Canadians?
Well, throughout the circumstances of the blockade and occupation, I was in touch with all of my colleagues in Cabinet, including Minister Duclos.
Okay.
And I understand I'm running out of time here, but just quickly, a couple...
You have run out of time, so you're going to have to focus here.
Understood.
Can we pull up document WN00002295?
I believe these are text messages between you and Mayor Drew Dilkins.
First, I'd like to take a look at page four, and this question was put to Mayor Dilkins earlier.
with respect to opp resources just waiting for mr registrar here Page four.
So, it appears that it's your understanding on February 9th at 7.35pm that Chief Mizuno had not requested any additional police officers from the OPP.
Was that your understanding?
And if so, where did you attain that understanding?
This exchange is about trying to clear up what I think is...
A miscommunication or a misunderstanding between different levels of enforcement and the City of Windsor.
And so what I'm really trying to get to the bottom of there is whether or not additional help had been turned down by the City of Windsor.
But it says, apparently your police chief just told.
So the question is, where did you ascertain that belief or that understanding?
Trying to recall whether or not that was information that I got either directly from Commissioner Lucky or from other sources, off the top of my head, I can't say.
Okay, and lastly, just on page 20 here, last question here, Mr. Commissioner.
So on February 14th at 11.57 a.m., says that to the extent you, so here being Mr. Dilkins, You can be supportive of any additional authorities that gets Windsor the resources you need to keep the bridge open, people safe.
That would be great.
Is it your understanding that Drew Dilkins, Mayor Drew Dilkins, invoked the citywide emergency before or after this text message?
Again, off the top of my head, can't recall.
But I know first that the Ontario government had declared a state of emergency on the Friday before, which would have been...
So I think on the 14th, the City of Windsor declared an emergency by the Mayor, correct?
Yeah, that sounds about right.
But yeah, the Ontario government had declared the Friday before.
Okay, and last one here, where you referenced resources.
Do these resources include money?
He and I and other representatives of the government have had a conversation around potential compensation for losses suffered to businesses and residents.
Arising out of the blockade, yes.
Understood.
Okay.
I'm out of time.
Thank you for the indulgence.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Next, the CCLA please.
Next, the CCLA.
Good afternoon, Minister Mendicino.
My name is Kara Zwiebel.
I am counsel for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
Good afternoon.
I want to ask you about an area that we haven't really talked about, and I'm going to ask for a document to be pulled up, and I have to apologize.
I didn't ask for this document in advance, but I don't think it'll be controversial.
It's just the Emergency Measures Regulation.
It's COM50854.
And I think you've probably given some of the clearest testimony we've heard about this issue of the separation of church and state, the relationship between law enforcement and government.
And I think what you've said is that there needs to be good lines of communication open, but that it's not government's role to direct the police what to do in an operational sense.
Is that accurate?
Yes.
Okay.
Now, in the case of the Emergencies Act and the enactment of these emergency measures regulations, would you agree with me that ultimately what these regulations do is empower law enforcement, give law enforcement more tools in which to exercise their authorities and discretion?
I would agree and just add tools that otherwise don't exist in any of the law.
Right.
And in the case of, we won't pull them up, but the other side of this, the economic measures that were enacted, in that case, it empowered both law enforcement and financial institutions with new powers.
Yes.
Okay.
And would you agree that, although this is a formal way of doing this, By using the extraordinary step of invoking the act, this is a very clear message being sent by government to law enforcement about what the law that needs to be enforced is right now.
In this moment, these are the laws that we need to be enforced, and we need you to enforce them.
I think that's fair, yes.
Okay, thank you.
Now, if we can scroll down a little bit, Mr. Clerk, thank you.
I think it's the second, sorry, third page.
Sorry, next page.
A little bit further.
Okay, so there's a definition of critical infrastructure, and then keep scrolling, please.
So stop right here.
Thank you.
So this is the prohibition on public assembly, and I know you said in examination by commission council, you talked about your concerns about some of the protesters and their links to...
But you also said a few times that there were a large number of people there who were there to exercise their lawful rights to protest.
Is that fair?
Yes, it is.
In fact, I think you said there were thousands who were there for legitimate and lawful purposes.
I mean, that was my lay estimation, but I believe that there were many Canadians who were co-mingled with other elements of the of the occupation and the blockade who were there to express legitimate differences of opinions and views as it related to federal government policy.
Okay, thank you.
Now, I know when the government made the announcement about the use of the Act and what orders would be enacted, it talked about the measures being time-limited because there's an expiration date, so to speak, on the use.
It also talked about the measures being proportional.
Yes.
Would you agree with me that the definition of a public assembly, which is prohibited, and if we can scroll down so you can see the whole thing, maybe we can just make it a bit smaller so that it'll all fit.
Thank you, Mr. Clerk.
So a person can't participate in a public assembly that may reasonably be expected to lead to a breach of the peace by the serious disruption of the movement of persons or goods or the serious interference with trade.
Let's just stop at that one.
You might be aware, as an MP coming from the province of Ontario, that we've had some labour strikes and threats of labour strikes in the last couple of weeks.
Would you agree with me that during the existence of these orders, a strike would likely be contrary?
Well, I do think that we need to be very careful and circumscribed in defining what the powers are.
So the prohibition of public assembly, as it is itemized under the regs, does direct that people can't be part of a public assembly that may be reasonably expected to lead to a breach of the peace by the serious disruption of the movement to persons or goods.
Let me pause there and say that that is directly responsive in part to CBSA's concerns around the lack of authority to clear roads adjacent to critical infrastructure in the form of the border.
And you can draw a straight line to the rationale for that power.
That having been said, in addition to that, the regs still have to comply with the Emergencies Act, which is the parenting statute.
And what that says...
Is that, yes, all of the individual rights that are there around freedom of assembly, including the right to protest, are preserved so long as you do not then cross the boundary into activity which could pose a threat of serious violence.
And that is the delineating limitation to how it is that we both protect charter rights while at the same time giving circumscribed targeted powers to restore public safety.
So you have to read this provision carefully.
Okay.
But I mean, this definition is what law enforcement is going to use when they go out and decide whether someone is in violation of the order.
And this is the document that perhaps a very diligent citizen would look to to find out what is permitted.
It is, but, you know, we count on law enforcement to interpret the law correctly, and as part of the rolling out of these regulations and these circumscribed powers, it would have been part of the plan to implement that there is a respect for the right to lawful assembly.
In any event...
By the time these regs had come into force, certainly it was clear to those who were still there that law enforcement had directed, government officials had directed that this was no longer lawful because it was no longer safe.
Understood.
So I'm not so concerned about whether there was a question that this applied to, for example, Wellington Street.
I'm concerned about whether there was a question about where else this might have applied and the potential that it might have applied to a range of other places.
Would you agree with me that there's nothing in these orders that geographically restricts their scope?
I think by inference, you could say that certainly under sub 2.1 and the subparagraph A, that there are, you know, geographic There is some geographic circumscription there in that there are a limited number of places where you can seriously disrupt the movement of persons or goods or the serious interference with trade.
And I think the border would be one.
Okay.
I want to just move to one other area.
You mentioned in your testimony when you were being questioned by commission counsel, and I think this is the first that we've heard about this, that...
And I think you said it was on the 13th.
This was when Commission Council took you to the email from Commissioner Luckey that laid out sort of the current status of things.
And you talked about a private conversation that you had with Commissioner Luckey where she told you about the situation in Cootes and shared her concerns.
And I think you said that was a threshold moment for you.
So, and I appreciate that that would be a frightening set of circumstances to hear about.
The timeline of events is that we have the IRG on the 13th in the afternoon, and then the Cabinet meeting the evening of the 13th, and then on the morning of the 14th, the First Minister's meeting, and then the Act is in vote.
First of all, there's no Cabinet meeting between the First Minister's meeting and the invocation of the Act.
Is that correct?
That's right.
Okay.
The morning of the 14th, I think you would have learned that the Ambassador Bridge blockade had been cleared and that arrests had been made.
And the police had executed a safe operation in Coutts leading to arrests.
That was true, but I would add that there were reports of flare-ups.
There was an exchange between the mayor and I. There were also public reports following that and some information that we had received in subsequent briefings about the threat of the blockade coming back to the Ambassador Bridge.
I would point out that it was a recurring theme over those two weeks.
Progress was not linear, that it was very much a whack-a-mole kind of dynamic.
And the idea was not only to restore public safety, but to maintain it.
And the objective of invoking the Emergencies Act was to maintain law and order to stop the whack-a-mole.
Understood.
I know you said in your testimony to Commission Council that one of the concerns about Cootes was that it could lead to a chain reaction.
But would you agree with me that that didn't happen?
That when the arrests were made in coups, actually many of the other protesters decided to leave because they actually weren't comfortable being associated with that level of violence.
They had different goals.
And once they learned that that's what was going on, they decided to voluntarily leave.
I agree, and I was relieved.
But I was also dealing with the best information available to me at the time and surveying the landscape.
And being mindful that there were reports of guns and firearms that were present at other locations and not knowing exactly how it was that the operation in Coutts was going to play out at that time and bearing in mind the sensitivities, the fact that the situation was combustible, that the individuals that were involved in Coutts.
We're prepared to go down with a fight that could lead to the loss of life.
That if that had happened and that occurred, it still remains an open question in my mind as to whether or not it would have triggered other events across the country.
And so that's why I, in my mind, it was very much, it was a threshold moment.
Okay.
I understand.
I think I understand what you're saying.
And I just, I know I'm out of time.
I just want to just clarify.
I understand you're saying if that had happened, but would you agree with me that?
The arrests happened in Coots, and that didn't happen.
What happened was that people decided to voluntarily leave Coots, and that situation, at least that particular location, was resolved for the time being.
I think you may be putting it a little optimistically.
I know that after the Coots takedown, that there were still engagements there.
I do agree that...
That things did start to dissipate and disengage in Coutts.
But I also recall that people were still very much dug in in other parts of the country, including here in the nation's capital.
Thank you, Minister.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Next call on the City of Windsor, please.
Mr. Commissioner, if I could just ask if...
I don't know if people still use the expression the division bells are ringing.
Oh, so we need a short break?
Yes, unfortunately the timing won't be precise but it would be timely now to break if we want to do it in between examiners because it appears that otherwise it would be right in the middle of the next examination.
Okay, so we'll take 10 minutes.
Is that all that's needed or is it longer?
We would hope that 10 minutes is all that's needed.
We're just at the end of question period and so...
We'll alert if it'll be any longer than that.
Okay, well, we'll take a 10-minute break.
If it needs to be more, please...
Thanks, Your Honour.
Otherwise, you'd have to watch me vote digitally.
I'm not sure I'd be allowed to do that.
The commission is in recess for 10 minutes.
La commission enlevée pour 10 minutes.
Merci.
Thank you.
Order allowed.
The Commission is being redeemed.
La Commissione le plan.
Okay.
So I guess that...
Where were we at?
Oh, no, but that counts.
I called you already, so the time is...
Commissioner.
Commissioner Alyssa Tompkins for the City of Ottawa.
I'm very sad because the witness, in fact, once taught me cross-examination for a week at intensive trial advocacy, and I was desperately hoping to try out an impeachment on him, but my areas of questioning have all been canvassed, so I'm going to send my time to the City of Windsor, and I just wanted to let her know before she's dead.
I'm going to change my end time.
Can I take a moment, though?
To make a point, tomorrow we have a very full day.
We will have a presentation on the public input.
We have three witnesses, three ministers.
You may have already received the allocation of time.
The allocation of time is arguably brutal.
I won't have much flexibility given the amount of time, so I would...
I would strongly urge that council talk amongst themselves.
If you want to have a longer period of cross-examination with some of the witnesses that are limited to five minutes, try and work out a deal a bit like this one to have a longer period.
Because I know five minutes is hard to make a point in five minutes.
I understand that.
But I mean, we're bound by the time limits we have.
So they're a long list of five-minute people, and some may be willing to coordinate or allow.
So I mention it so that you have time to do it, maybe at the break.
Obviously, totally up to you.
I've had to allocate for essentially everyone who asked, but the allocation is, I recognize, small, and I'm simply signaling that given tomorrow's schedule, it's going to be hard to be...
Flexible.
So thanks for giving me that opportunity, but I think it's important and I'd like you to think about it again.
It's up to you, obviously, but my interest is that people who want to get at an important point with any one of the three witnesses have the time.
Okay.
With that, you have fresh time.
We'll start from zero.
Okay.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Good afternoon.
It's still afternoon, Minister.
My name is Jennifer King.
I am legal counsel to the City of Windsor.
Good afternoon.
Hi.
So yesterday, Minister Blair testified about the responsibility of all three orders of government to communicate and cooperate in responding to an event like the protests earlier this year.
Do you agree with him that that's important?
Yes.
Minister, you and your staff had excellent communication with the City of Windsor, right?
Yes.
Mayor Dilkens texted you immediately after first learning of the potential of the slow roll, the potential of blocking the bridge, when he learned that from the Chief of Police on February the 4th, right?
Yes.
And he kept in regular contact with you throughout?
He did.
And are you aware that once the blockade commenced, Mayor Dilkin's Chief of Staff was in contact with his counterparts at the federal government, including your Chief of Staff, Mike Jones?
Yes.
And, for example, on February 8th, he told Mike Jones that Windsor Police had put in a request through policing channels for policing resources, right?
That's right.
And he specifically told your Chief of Staff that the Chief of Police had asked for public order personnel, right?
I believe that's correct, yes.
So early on, you were aware that Windsor Police Services required resources, specifically public order resources.
Yes, that's my recollection.
And in fact, you assisted in amplifying that message to Commissioner Lucky.
I did.
So Windsor provided you and your ministry with important and timely updates throughout, before, during, and after the blockades.
Yes.
And you use this information from Windsor in your work at the federal level to respond to the blockades?
Yes.
Did the protest this year then reinforce your view of the value of the importance of two-way communication and collaboration between the federal government and border municipalities with respect to the protection of border infrastructure?
It really did, and especially because of the many unique aspects of this particular public order event.
Minister Blair yesterday told us that the police operation in Windsor was a success.
Do you agree?
I think on the whole, yes.
Windsor Police required an influx of policing resources that we just talked about and hard assets to respond to the event.
Yes.
Last week, we heard evidence from Deputy Minister Keenan and Mr. Assovsky, the former president of the CBSA, regarding federal authority over the bridge.
Were you able to listen to that testimony?
I'm afraid I was not, sorry.
Okay.
Well, I reviewed a CBSA document with Mr. Ossofsky, and he confirmed that CBSA officers are not designated to enforce criminal arrest provisions and cannot directly engage in enforcement operations at prohibited public assemblies, even if they're on the bridge.
Do you agree with him?
Well, there were definitely gaps, and there are very specific mandated powers that are afforded to CBSA.
Officers for the purposes of administering other statutes, for example, customs and the like.
But one of the main concerns, there were two main concerns in addition to the one that you've mentioned that he raised with me and with other cabinet colleagues, that was preventing foreign nationals where there were grounds to believe that they may support the blockade or the occupation.
And secondly, the lack of authority to clear The roads leading to the bridge, which I think is very much in relationship to the point that you made.
Well, they didn't have that authority even on the bridge, did they?
There are limitations as to how far they can go.
And certainly, if there are criminal charges or if there's criminal conduct that is occurring on the bridge itself, they would have peace officer authorities to facilitate restoring control.
That's one of the reasons why CBSA officers were ultimately granted the right to hold firearms.
But ultimately, they would pass those investigations on to local police and jurisdictions.
Right.
So, Mr. Ossofsky told us that for any protest activity, even if it was occurring on the Ambassador Bridge or in the plaza, the CBSA would rely on the police of jurisdiction.
There were limitations to the authorities, yes.
Right.
And so it would be Windsor police that would respond?
It depends on which side of the bridge.
So if it was on the Canadian side, then yes, then I would assume he would have reported those to the Windsor police.
Right.
And Mr. Ossofsky confirmed that even after the Emergencies Act was invoked, the new Emergencies Act didn't change these authorities.
And in fact, CBSA officers were directed not to directly engage in enforcement operations at prohibited public assemblies, whether on or off the bridge.
Were you aware of that?
That sounds generally consistent with my recollection, although there were other powers that we did afford under the Emergencies Act that were responsive to the gaps that John Oczewski, as the then president of the CBS, had put in.
Okay.
So, there is significant reliance on Windsor's police force to protect this piece of national infrastructure, right?
Yes.
And therefore, there's a significant reliance on Windsor and its taxpayers to protect this border crossing, since they're ultimately responsible to fund Windsor's police force.
No question about it.
And here on Church Road, which...
It begins where the 401 ends as you're driving west into town, takes you right to the entry to the port of entry that then crosses into Detroit.
So, yes, the people of Windsor very much and the city administration, the police service, very much share the responsibility of maintaining public safety.
Okay, so would you agree with me that the issue of what respective authorities are available to the police of jurisdiction and to federal authorities at a port of entry should be understood and planned in advance so as to avoid any confusion over jurisdiction and roles during an event like this?
I think that's a fair statement, and indeed, during the course of my conversations with Mayor Dilkins at the time, I did foreshadow that we may have to consider how it is that we maintain jurisdiction in the roads leading into the borders, certainly immediately adjacent to, so that the federal government could properly play a role in maintaining those critical supply chains that were compromised and ultimately blocked for extended periods of time, not only in Windsor,
So, yes, I do think that that is an issue that merits conversation.
And this planning should include who's responsible for those resources, right?
I think that it goes hand in glove.
I think if you are going to talk about expanding the jurisdiction of the CBA to, let's say, roads which are otherwise provincial highways, that that is a conversation that has to occur with other levels of government, municipal authorities,
and then if you're going to make any recalibration there, you're going to have to make sure that CBSA have the resources to enforce as well, or at a minimum, engage in some kind of an understanding or an agreement with Different levels of government and enforcement to make sure that we can protect our critical infrastructure, including our borders.
And you'd agree that that plan should also include plans to protect the community that's around that critical infrastructure?
Yes.
So I'll have a couple more questions about planning, but as a bit of an aside, in Windsor, RCMP are not the police of jurisdiction, right?
That's correct.
We heard from Commissioner Lucky last week that the RCMP O Division has a detachment in Windsor.
Are you aware of that?
Yes.
She wasn't sure how many officers are there in Windsor.
Minister Mendicino, do you know how many RCMP officers are in Windsor?
I know that my best recollection is that we deployed approximately 75, I believe, or 100 RCMP officers.
That's my recollection off the top of my head.
I don't know how many are permanently stationed there at O. So, are you aware, Minister Mendicino, that shortly after the successful police operation, Windsor representatives, including Mayor Dilkens and others, started asking all three levels of government to sit down and develop a long-term sustainable framework to protect critical infrastructure?
I don't actually have a specific recollection of that conversation being started, but I wholeheartedly endorse the idea, and I think it's a good initiative.
Okay, so I just want to take a little bit of time on that.
Mr. Clerk, can you please pull up SSM CAN 406251 and scroll to page four.
Hopefully I have the right reference.
Minister, this is a readout of a call that you had with Mayor Dilkens and MP Massey on February the 18th.
I expect this was a busy time for you, as we've already heard.
But you had a call with...
Mayor Dilkens and MP Massey.
Do you recall this call?
Yes.
And so the readout, if you scroll up a little bit, Mr. Clerk, was sent to a number of recipients, including Katie Telford and Brian Clough, and they're of the Prime Minister's office?
Yes.
Okay.
And you can see, you can't see the colour on this, but the summary or the highlights at the top included that MP Massey highlighted the desire for a comprehensive plan with redundancies to prevent this from happening again.
Yes.
Here's an example of a Windsor representative saying right off the bat, we need a plan.
And if you could scroll to page five, in the middle of the page, you'll see some notes of Mayor Dilkin's comments.
And he notes that the current set of Jersey barriers and police support is important, but is incredibly resource intensive and disruptive to the community, both small businesses and the University of Windsor.
And do you agree with him?
I would, and in fact, I visited the community there, including some of the small businesses along Huron Line Church, and the barriers impeded access to them, and that's one of the losses that the community suffered.
So I think Mayor Dilkens was highlighting one of the issues that if they were going to use Jersey barriers to prevent the blockade from forming or reforming, that they then had to also consider what impact that was going to have.
Right, and you'll see that Brian Massey, if you scroll down a little bit, MP Massey indicates that this plan must include how to respond as a community and how to support small business.
So that's consistent with what you just said.
Yes.
Did you take any steps following this meeting to work with Windsor and the province on this plan?
Well, as you pointed out, I...
Maintain frequent contact with Mayor Dawkins, as I do with many municipal counterparts and provincial counterparts.
And we have spoken about the ongoing ways in which we can support Windsor, you know, not only with respect to thoughtful planning around avoiding a similar type of blockade from interrupting not only trade and commerce, but the...
The very strong people-to-people ties.
You have so many families who go back and forth over that bridge every single day.
And this blockade completely interrupted that.
And I was very sympathetic then and remain now to, you know, the trauma and the loss that that caused the residents of Windsor.
But in addition to that, we've had ongoing discussions around how we can compensate them.
Okay.
For the losses during the blockade, I should add.
I'm sorry.
Mr. Clerk, if you could please pull up WIN402240.
I take it you might not have seen this recently, Minister Mendocino, but we have been discussing this letter a bit over the course of this hearing.
I did show this letter to Minister Blair yesterday.
So the Commission has heard that Mayor Dilkens wrote to you, Minister Blair, and former Solicitor General Jones on March the 17th.
Do you recall receiving this letter?
Yes.
Okay.
And he's asked you again to sit down and plan.
What did you do with this letter on receipt?
Well, I would say informally, certainly, I keep strong lines of communication with Mayor Dukins.
We've spoken on many numerous occasions since March 1722 by text.
You know, when I visit the community there, I make a point of trying to check in.
And I would say, you know, there remains a commitment from the federal level of government to action the letter.
Okay.
And so, just taking a few moments to talk about the lessons that we've learned from the protests to better protect border infrastructure and the communities they're in, would you agree with me that planning processes to protect border infrastructure must include municipalities like Windsor?
I think it must include every level of government.
I think it must also include, and that is obviously inclusive of the City of Windsor and other border communities as well.
I also think it should include Obviously, law enforcement and the CBSA, who play an essential role in maintaining the integrity and the security of our borders.
And I think it should also include a number of the other residents and local businesses who are clearly impacted as a result of people and vehicular traffic flow.
Okay.
Now, we spoke earlier about the importance of two-way communications.
What are you doing to ensure collaborative two-way communication between your ministry, which I understand is responsible for critical infrastructure, and municipalities with critical infrastructure in their borders?
Well, one, maintaining direct bilateral contact with my municipal counterparts, including Mayor Dawkins.
I would say, secondly, making sure that as we discuss the lessons to be taken from this, that we get advice from...
So CBSA, as I said earlier, would play a very important role.
And then, you know, building as well into the discussion, essentially, the provinces, including Ontario, so that we are all really focused on how it is that we can insulate ourselves from a similar type of event.
And I think that this particular public order emergency demonstrated what's at stake, especially around a critical A port of entry like Windsor, where you're talking about not only economic impacts, which have a huge, huge knock-on effect, but just the critical supply chains around food, around fuel, around healthcare supplies, that is a vital artery.
Not only for Canada, but equally for the United States, which, as I described earlier, is one of the reasons why Secretary Mayorkas had engaged me in the height of the blockades.
Thank you for your answers.
Okay, next call on the convoy organizers, please.
Thank you, sir.
And just before I start, I apologize for talking over you earlier today.
Okay.
Okay.
Hello.
Good afternoon.
My name is Brendan Miller and I'm counsel for Freedom Corp, which is the entity that represents the protesters that were here in Ottawa in January and February of 2022.
So, sir, you're a lawyer, correct?
Yes.
And before you were a politician, you were a Crown Prosecutor, is that correct?
Yes.
And you worked for Public Prosecution Services Canada, right?
Yes.
And you worked for Public Prosecution Services Canada for a period of 10 years, is that correct?
That's right.
And you prosecuted terrorism cases, right?
I prosecuted terrorism cases as well as other types of cases, including the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and other federal statutes.
So it wasn't just limited to cases involving national security.
There were a broad range of cases that I prosecuted.
And you agree that in prosecuting the terrorism cases, you had to become intimately familiar with national security law, fair to say?
I had to become familiar with the principles around national security, the Anti-Terrorism Act, you know, other statutes that would have implicated national security.
Yes, the CSIS Act would be another act as well.
And so included in your knowledge would be the CSIS Act?
Yes.
And that would also, including your knowledge, be the Canada Evidence Act provisions protecting national security as well as criminal investigation information.
Is that fair?
Sorry, could you just repeat that last question?
Your intimate knowledge and knowledge as a prosecutor in what you were doing, it would also include the provisions in the case law with respect to the Canada Evidence Act provisions protecting national security as well as criminal investigation information.
Yes, it would.
And as a lawyer, of course, before you testified here today in these proceedings, I take it that you knew you needed to be prepared to testify?
Yes.
And in preparing to testify here today, I assume you reviewed many records and as many as possible.
I spent a fair bit of time, yes, reviewing the documents that were prepared for me in anticipation of this testimony.
Right.
And I'm sure you reviewed numerous statements.
That you made in public and to Canadians with respect to the protests in Ottawa, as well as the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
I would have done that, yes.
And with respect to preparing for this hearing, and again, as a lawyer, I take it you probably watched all of the evidence given yesterday by the Director of CSIST and Minister Blair.
Is that fair?
Well, in fact, no, I did not watch the evidence yesterday.
In real time, I would have caught some of the headlines and some of the clips, but I was not watching the evidence yesterday.
During the day, I have a number of engagements even on Mondays.
So yes, I was not able to watch the evidence in real time yesterday.
So yesterday, we had a discussion.
I had questioned the director of CSIS.
And I asked him the following questions.
This is just from the transcript.
And I asked him, are you aware of a company called Enterprise Canada?
And his answer was, not specifically, no.
And then I asked him, and have you identified the individual, the one that is, there was, he was all over the news, the gentleman that was carrying the Nazi flag.
Have you identified him?
And Mr. Vignon responded, said, Mr. Commissioner, as I said before, We, the specific details of our investigation, have been shared, as you know, with the Commission earlier.
I would not be able to go into more specific detail.
Were you aware that he said that?
I was not aware that he said that, and I don't know what you're referring to.
I'm sorry.
Well, now I take it that you know, as a former prosecutor with Public Prosecution Services Canada in the realm of national security law, that the identity of a man carrying a flag in public, I'm sorry, I really don't understand the nature of the question.
Could you repeat it?
So I take it that you know, as a former prosecutor with Public Prosecution Services Canada, in the realm of national security law, that the identity of a man carrying a flag in public who has been photographed in public Is not protected by any form of national security law or other evidential protection.
You know that.
You're suggesting that the identity of an individual is not protected by national security laws?
This is what you're asking?
I'm saying that the identity of an individual whose picture has been taken carrying the Nazi flag in public by...
Someone in the public and posted online, the identity of that person, who he is, is not protected by national security law, is it?
I have no idea if you're talking about a hypothetical or if you're talking about a real example.
I mean, this is a completely abstract question.
Mr. Clerk, if you could bring up the one document, please.
Yep, just for record, it's POE HRF.
I think so.
Yep.
Okay, so this is the individual I'm talking about.
It was all over the news.
And we've been trying to figure out who he is and we think we have.
Now, again, in looking at this picture, it was posted online, it was in the news, everywhere.
And when I asked the director of CSIS about his identity, he didn't say he didn't know.
He invoked national security law.
But I take it, you know, as a former prosecutor with the Public Prosecution Services Canada in the realm of national security law, that the identity of this man carrying the Nazi flag in public, who is photographed in public, is not protected by any form of national security law or other evidential protection.
You know that.
Mr. Commissioner, I have an objection to state with respect to the nature of this questioning.
In my submission, The placing of this photograph again before the witness in light of the evidence given to date is an abuse of the process of the public hearing process and that the purpose of my friend putting this document up on the screen is not a good faith purpose.
It is apparently for the purpose of asserting claims in order to associate them with the credibility of this public hearing process and distract from the fact-finding process that the important work of this inquiry surrounds.
In my submission there needs to be a good faith basis for the questions put to the witnesses and this is a further example of what my friend is seeking to do that is not directed to the fact-finding process of this inquiry respectfully but to injecting this photograph and other documents into the public light so that they may be commented on taking advantage of the privileged forum in which my friend is speaking and making assertions to which witnesses repeatedly have had no I'd
ask to finish my objection, which I'm almost complete.
In my submission, the Commission must respectfully insist that participation be conducted in good faith by those who have been given the right of audience in the form of full party standing and for whom public funding has been recommended for the purposes of enabling their participation to serve the objects of the Commission and their clients' interests.
I object to this line of questioning.
Sir, as you know, we filed an affidavit from an individual who identified this man.
And the man is Mr. Brian Fox, according to that affidavit.
He met him when he was doing...
That photo was taken around the same time.
He talked to him.
He's been identified.
There's an application before this commission.
To call Mr. Fox, as well as to allow our witness, Mr. Sean Folks, to testify.
And it is clear, frankly, from the lack of answer and from the objection, that the witness here needs to answer this question.
And subject to any questions, sir, those are my submissions.
Okay, well, just going back, I think...
I suspect you may be functioning under a misapprehension with respect to the testimony of Mr. Vigneault, but that's a different issue which we can get back to because I think you've misunderstood his answer.
So that's something which maybe could be cleared up.
With respect to the question, I'll let you continue this.
However, the outstanding motion that you've referred to has not been ruled on and the evidence that you're proposing to tender is not in the public record so that is not an appropriate if you like an appropriate representation at this stage so but I'll let you ask the question I have because of the outstanding motion at
the moment right so sir Now, again, I take it, you know, as a former prosecutor with Public Prosecution Services Canada in the realm of national security law, that the identity of that man...
Can I just interrupt you?
If you could just read what the question was to Mr. Vigneault again.
Question, right.
Are you aware of a company called Enterprise Canada?
Mr. Vigneault, not specifically, no.
Question.
And have you identified the individual, the one that is there?
He was all over the news, the gentleman that was carrying the Nazi flag.
Have you identified him yet?
Mr. Commissioner, as I said before, we, the specific details of our investigation have been shared.
You know, with the commission earlier, I would not be able to go into more specific details.
And then I tried to get him to identify that it was the individual, and I was cut off.
Yeah, so I just want to...
My understanding to try and assist is that CSIS will neither confirm or deny that they're investigating that because that's all secret.
So what he's answering there is not a refusal to identify, not a refusal to answer.
It's because their job is to do investigations.
They do not...
Answer those questions.
That's my understanding.
So I just want to clear that up.
So it isn't that Mr. Vigneault was trying to...
No.
Okay.
So I think for the record, that's important and it may assist you.
Now, I don't know if Commission Council wants to add or whether I've misstated it.
Okay.
To assist Mr. Miller and as someone who's encountered over...
About 30 years, similar refusals to answer questions on the basis of national security.
I sympathize with his plight, but it is exactly as you described, Mr. Commissioner, the representative of CSIS or another national security officer is typically saying, "I refuse to admit or deny.
I refuse to acknowledge or disclaim, etc." They're not saying one way or another.
They're just saying that as a matter of national security, they can't take a position on it.
Okay.
And so, if I may ask my question.
Now, I take it that you know as a former prosecutor with Public Prosecution Services Canada in the realm of national security law that the identity of the man that was in the photo carrying a flag in public is a photograph in public and is not protected by any form of national security law or other evidential protection.
You're aware of that?
I have no idea what this photo is.
Who the person depicted in that photo is or any of the other circumstances?
This is the first time I have seen this photo produced.
You're aware and you know that Mr. Brian Fox was the individual who was walking around in downtown Ottawa carrying a Nazi flag on January 29, 2022, don't you?
No.
Now, are you aware that Freedom Corp, and you've already heard, has applied to have Mr. Fox testify?
In the commission here?
Yes.
Is that where the application is?
I am not aware of that.
Okay.
And you're aware of the company Enterprise Group, is that right?
I believe I have heard of it.
Enterprise Canada?
Yes.
And they do work for the Liberal Party of Canada, is that right?
I do not know.
You don't know?
No.
Weren't they working for the Liberal Party of Canada and political staffers and staff in January and February of 2022?
I don't know.
And I take it you know who local Ottawa freelance photographer David Chan is?
No.
You don't know that David Chan was the official photographer for the Prime Minister, Paul Martin?
You didn't know that?
No, I don't know this individual.
And you didn't know that Paul Chan still does freelance work for the Prime Minister?
Prime Minister Trudeau.
Again, I'm...
Okay.
And you're not aware that Mr. Chan was the individual who took the photos of the person carrying the Confederate flag?
You put it as a question.
You're trying to make all kinds of statements that are of no assistance to the Commission or to this witness.
I will just ask, so are you aware that Katie Telford, the Chief of Staff for the Prime Minister, has a relationship with Enterprise Group and their staff?
No, I am not aware.
Okay.
And I just want to talk to you then about your statements.
You had said after and during the invocation, we are listening to law enforcement.
According to law enforcement, we need the Emergencies Act.
You said that, correct?
Yes.
Right.
But law enforcement didn't advise you they needed the Emergencies Act, did they?
Well, I think as you've heard me explain today, I had every reason to believe that law enforcement was supportive.
And requested the Emergencies Act through the tools that could only be granted through that statute.
I've identified the briefings that we received from law enforcement where they identified the gaps in existing authorities and can draw a straight line between the tools that were proposed to us from the RCMP, from the CBSA, to the regulations which then prescribed them, which were then invoked and which were then used to restore public safety.
And you agree that you stated that the Emergencies Act was instrumental in addressing the blockades at ports of entry.
Do you remember saying that?
Yes.
But the Emergencies Act wasn't used to remove any of the protesters in the ports of entry.
You're aware?
Well, I would just clarify, as I said earlier, that, in fact, it's my understanding that CBSA did use...
The Emergencies Act powers to prevent two foreign nationals from entering into Canada.
And that was exercised under the powers that were granted to them.
And that was, again, a direct link to a gap that had been expressed to me and to my colleagues in Cabinet.
And by invoking the Act, we were addressing a gap and what was necessary in the circumstances.
Okay.
And you also said that we got advice from our law enforcement that we met the threshold.
That advice and the decision to invoke it informed by nonpartisan professionals.
Can you agree that no law enforcement ever advised you that the threshold to invoke the Emergencies Act was met?
That never happened, did it?
Well, I'd say two things in response.
One, we did receive advice from law enforcement very specifically with regards to the tools that were then invoked as part of the Emergencies Act.
In fact, as I mentioned earlier today, in the February 13th email that my Chief of Staff received from Commissioner Luckey, that there was an express link that she drew between those tools, which were, again, we were getting briefed on consistently.
And the language of the use of the Emergencies Act.
The second thing that I would say is the Commission has since heard that a number of our nonpartisan, professional, independent public servants, including those who operate in the security and intelligence sphere, did advise that the threshold had been met.
Okay.
And just two last questions arising from now.
Commissioner Lucky, in an email, and it's already in evidence, told you...
And told, well, told your deputy minister, or your chief of staff, actually, that she believed that the emergency act wasn't necessary because they could use the normal laws of Canada to deal with the matter.
My friend's misstating the content of the letter that he's putting to the witness.
Okay.
Can you agree that Commissioner Lucky, and no law enforcement official, a police officer, advised you that the threshold...
To invoke the emergency CESAC was met, meaning that there was reasonable and probable grounds or reasonable grounds of a threat to the security of Canada.
No one from law enforcement specifically said that to you, did they?
Well, in the broad context of my portfolio, I would disagree with that.
And certainly, as you heard from CSIS, the threshold was met in the broader interpretation of the law.
Okay, next to the...
Windsor Police Service, please.
Good afternoon.
Hi there.
Good afternoon.
Heather Patterson for the Windsor Police Service.
Our questions have already been canvassed by the City of Windsor, so we have nothing further.
Okay, thank you.
Thank you.
Next is the government of Saskatchewan, please.
Good afternoon.
My name is Mike Morris.
I'm counsel for the government of Saskatchewan.
Minister, you've had a long day so far.
I don't think you'll be too much longer with me.
That's what you said yesterday.
It didn't turn out that way.
Minister.
Will you agree with me that the RCMP and the Saskatchewan Highway Patrol worked together and worked very well in response to demonstrations in Saskatchewan?
Yes.
Will you agree with me that the federal government was never advised that demonstrations in Saskatchewan could not be dealt with using existing authorities?
I'm sorry, could you repeat the question?
Will you agree with me that the federal government was never advised that demonstrations in Saskatchewan could not be dealt with using existing authorities?
I believe that's accurate, yes.
Okay.
We've heard quite a bit about a cabinet meeting on February 13th, a First Minister's meeting on February 14th.
I'd like to ask you about whether there were some other meetings, however, and in particular whether there was a caucus meeting between the Cabinet meeting on February 13th and the invocation of the Emergencies Act on February 14th.
Was there a caucus meeting?
Between the Cabinet meeting on February 13th and the invocation later on 14th, I believe there was.
And do you know what time that caucus meeting would have occurred?
I want to say in the morning.
I don't have the time exactly off the top of my head.
Would it have occurred before or after the First Minister's meeting, sir?
I really can't recall off the top of my head.
Okay.
Do you recall whether Caucus was advised that the Emergencies Act was going to be invoked that day?
I don't believe that that was the case.
I think that Caucus was being made aware of the circumstances of the convoy, and certainly there was a lot of public speculation at the time about the potential for the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
And there was the call that was scheduled with the First Ministers on that same morning.
Okay.
Was there a meeting with leaders of the official opposition or the opposition leaders that day as well?
Yes, to the best of my recollection.
Okay.
Did you attend that meeting?
I recall attending a meeting with the Prime Minister and other Cabinet colleagues that involved the...
I can't recall exactly what time that would have been.
Do you know whether it would have been in the morning or the afternoon?
Again, I think it was in close conjunction to the First Minister's call.
I don't have the times at my fingertips.
Okay.
Do you recall whether the opposition leaders were advised that the Emergencies Act was going to be invoked that day?
I think there was a signal to the opposition that the government was strongly considering the invocation and was going through the sequence of steps that were necessary in the lead-up to that decision, including consultation with first ministers of the provinces and territories.
Okay.
I want to talk...
Just briefly about the numbers at the Ottawa protests, because it's my understanding they fluctuated greatly, you know, from the weekend to during the week.
Is that fair that there were a lot of people there on the weekends, but not necessarily during the weekdays?
Yes, I would say that was fair.
So, I mean, this is a bit of an assumption, but perhaps people had other things to do during the week, such as going to work.
Would that be your understanding as well?
I think that's a safe assumption, yes.
Okay.
So by the time Monday rolls around then, I assume that the numbers have dwindled out significantly in Ottawa and they don't start to build up again until Friday before the weekend.
Is that fair?
I think that's fair.
Okay.
We know the Emergencies Act was invoked on a Monday.
It was February 14th.
My question is, could an assessment not have been done throughout the week as to whether invocation was necessary, given the numbers would have been limited during the week before the anticipated buildup on the weekend?
Put another way, could you have given the police an opportunity to exercise their operational plan I would say a few things in response.
The assessment of whether or not to invoke the Emergencies Act didn't really take shape until that first incident response group that the Prime Minister convened on February the 10th.
And by then, we were approaching two weeks into the blockade and the convoy across the country.
The realities on the ground, what we were seeing, what we were perceiving in the way of information from law enforcement is precisely what you described in your question, which was progress that was not linear, where at times perhaps there may have been some travel or trade going through borders, but then at other times blockages.
At times there were maybe only a thousand or so individuals here.
In the parliamentary precinct or even less, but then it would surge on the weekends.
And so it was that state of volatility that made it very difficult to not only restore but maintain public safety.
And by then, the government, in my view, in my opinion, had already exercised considerable, I think, reflection and restraint.
In trying to understand why it was that existing law enforcement resources and authorities were not effective at restoring public safety.
That was the backdrop to the very focused discussion that we had around the potential invocation of the Emergencies Act.
Thank you.
Commissioner, I just have one more question.
Am I still under time or over enough that I can ask that one?
Thank you, Commissioner.
Minister, can you tell us when you found out on the 14th that the Prime Minister had made the decision to invoke the Emergencies Act?
Well, it was after the first minister's meeting and it was through a series of conversations with staff and officials.
So it would have been, and again, I can't say exactly what time, but it would have been I believe in the afternoon, early afternoon to mid-afternoon.
Okay.
Thank you, sir.
Okay.
Next is the National Police Federation, please.
Hello, Minister.
My name is Nini Jones.
I'm counsel to the National Police Federation, which is, as I'm sure you well know, the union for RCMP officers employed under the auspices of your ministry.
Good afternoon.
I want to actually just pick up, I want to go back to policing a little bit in a bit more detail and pick up on a theme that you've explored a great deal in your evidence, and that's the sort of barriers.
To the surge capacity of police in responding to the convoy in various locations.
And you know what I mean when I talk about surge capacity, right?
Yes.
Okay.
You agreed with counsel to Mr. Slowly that a recommendation around a protocol for requesting additional police resources was something that would be welcome in terms of that provincial, municipal, federal hierarchy or who to ask first question, right?
Yes.
And you were asked some questions about the barriers created particularly by the Police Services Act in Ontario and swearing in RCMP officers as peace officers so they can function effectively inside Ontario in respect of enforcing the law in various jurisdictions.
And that, I think, is a second barrier.
You'd agree with me?
I would agree that was a challenge when it came to deploying.
It was seen as creating delay once additional RCMP...
We're deployed to then have them sworn in individually in accordance with the local police of jurisdiction to carry out peace officer responsibilities on the ground.
And so the Emergencies Act, again, was directly responsive to a challenge that had been pointed out to us in briefings.
Challenge is probably a better word than barrier, but I think we agree on that.
So can I just take you to a bit of what we see as sort of a third barrier or challenge in response, in respect of the issue of surge capacity?
And that's the question of not authority, which is sort of that authority to enforce the law, but the jurisdictional problems that are created in Ottawa.
And you've talked a lot, both in your witness statement and your evidence today, about this kind of mismatch in jurisdiction in respect of the NCR, the National Capital Region, and the Parliamentary Precinct.
Well, I think what I highlighted earlier was that provincial police services statutes do clearly spell out how municipal police services can turn to The provincial commissioner to backstop any gaps in resources if they are overwhelmed.
And so that part is clearly spelled out.
If I may, you mean the OPP commissioner?
That's correct.
And so the Ontario Police Services Act is helpful in that regard because it can then be very instructive to the local chief of police to turn to his or her counterpart provincially and say, I need help.
And if that is insufficient, I think that's where there is currently a lacuna.
There is a gap.
And so we worked around that gap with daily dialogue and through a lot of collaboration and coordination so that RCMP could be deployed.
I will say, though, it is important to draw a distinction since you represent the membership of the RCMP in the arrangement.
Here in Ontario, where there is a Provincial Police Services Act, and in other provinces where there are police service agreements where, again, and I've been, I think, pretty specific in my references to the articles in those agreements that have a mapped out protocol of steps where you can deploy resources of the RCMP within the province and where that isn't sufficient to then pull RCMP officers from other provinces under Article 9.3.
And I believe that that...
Could be potentially a roadmap for an ongoing discussion about how municipal, provincial, and federal law enforcement authorities can work together to address potential future public order emergencies.
So just to get a little bit granular on that exact point, thank you for that very helpful answer.
In Cootes, for example, or Emerson, or in the Lower Mainland, the RCMP was able to rely on Article 9 powers.
Yes, and in fact, again, I think it bears emphasizing that that was an authority that was exercised by the office that I occupy.
And this is one of the customs by which we have developed the dialogue between elected government and police to respond to extraordinary situations that do require additional resources.
And so, again, just to get a little bit...
A little bit more into the details on this, you know there are about 19,000 RCMP officers across the country.
Give or take?
Sure.
I mean, no one's looking for precise numbers on that front.
We've heard evidence here that there are slightly less than about 1,500 Ottawa Police Service officers.
I believe I recall hearing that evidence, yes.
And we heard evidence from Commissioner Karik that on any given day...
He has about 3,000 uniform officers who are engaged in frontline policing out of his larger total complement.
I recall that.
Okay, so would you agree with me that the RCMP are uniquely positioned in terms of sheer numbers to provide or facilitate providing that surge capacity in public order emergencies like the one that arose in Ottawa during the convoy?
I think by the sheer size of the force that there are Many members that can be deployed, and we do do that.
So I would say, yes, that as a result of the size of the RCMP, they are somewhat unique in their capacity to deploy across the country.
Amazing.
Thank you so much for, I think I am under time?
I can't believe that.
No, no, you're not.
Don't try and pull that.
No, no, no, but you were close, to be fair.
Okay, Government of Canada, please.
Good afternoon, Minister.
My name is Brendan Vinienhuis, and I'm a counsel for the Government of Canada.
Good afternoon.
Could we go please to document COM50951?
I'm showing you a document that's appeared in the Commission database that appears to be a statement from Enterprise Canada regarding comments made by Mr. Miller yesterday and issued on November 21st.
Have you seen a copy of this document before?
I don't believe so.
This is a statement from Enterprise Canada on comments from today's Emergency Act.
You'll see that it indicates denial of what are called absurd and despicable accusations relating to that entity and a gentleman named Brian Fox?
Yes.
Do you have any idea what this statement is talking about?
I mean, save and accept for the exchange that I had earlier today, no.
Thank you.
Next issue, and you can take that down.
From listening to your evidence today, I don't believe it was entirely clear whether you had indicated in your evidence concerning the border officers employed by the CBSA, whether they, in your view...
could exercise or could not exercise the powers of peace officers at or around bridges and other ports of entry if there's criminal activity observed there.
Do you recall clearly?
I believe that if they were in observation of laws being broken, that they could effect an arrest.
But if the arrest involved the criminal code, that they would then call in the police and jurisdiction, wherever they were.
Mr. Ossowski had given some evidence in more particularity about this issue last week, which was to the effect that such officers had no such authority other than with respect to particular offenses that are noted in Section 163.5 of the Customs Act.
Now, to the extent that there is, in fact, any distinction between your understanding and that of Mr. Ossowski, would you defer to that of Mr. Ossowski?
Yes.
All right, the next issue arises from the questions that were asked to you by my friend acting for, I think it was the Democracy Fund.
And he was asking you some questions pertaining to the science behind vaccines and to the premise that COVID-19 vaccines approved by Health Canada and many other health regulatory authorities around the world posed a risk to public safety.
Do you recall being asked about that?
Yes.
And I took it that his questions, as I heard them, were focused particularly on vaccines developed by Western countries, such as the Pfizer, Moderna, and Janssen vaccines for COVID-19?
That's an assumption.
Can we go to SSM.nsc.can401573?
I'm showing you an analytical brief that appears to date to December of 2020 from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And it's entitled Canadian Vaccination Rollout Implications for Possible IMVE.
Yes?
Yes.
If we could go to page two, please.
Do you see that the service in December of 2020 is reporting That adherents of IMVE are using the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to promote disinformation and alternative narratives regarding both the cause of the pandemic and potential societal outcomes.
The service assesses that individuals and groups adopt or promote these conspiracies that best suit their personalized worldviews and range of grievances.
Is that consistent with the information that CSIS reported to you when you became Minister of Public Safety?
Yes.
And if you look at the bullet points that are listed as key anti-vaccination conspiracy narratives, you see that one of them is threats to liberty and freedom, that mass vaccinations constitute government overreach and pose an increasing threat to individual rights, vaccination will be mandatory, and the government will establish internment camps for those who do not adhere to government rules.
Is that information?
Information of that nature consistent with what was related to you by the intelligence service under your remit?
Yes.
And another key anti-vaccination narrative is that vaccine development provision and access, that vaccines have only been tested on animals.
Russian and Chinese vaccines are safer and more effective.
You see that?
Yes.
did you receive information to that effect from the service I can't recall whether or not I received this particular point.
The next key conspiracy narrative is that rejection of the existence of the pandemic and or its severity and the safety of the vaccination, that the vaccine is not needed and causes a multitude of health issues or will contain small microchips placed by the government.
Did you receive that kind of information from CSIS?
Yes.
And lastly, amongst these key narratives is a lack of confidence in government and scientific advice, that governments are corrupt and puppets of big business, that the pandemic was man-made to the financial enrichment of politicians and international corporations.
Were you briefed to similar effect by Assises when you became Public Safety Minister?
Yes.
could we go now please to pb.nsc.can50527 I'm showing you, sir, a special threat advisory.
From the RCMP, and this is dated January the 18th of this year.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And it's a special threat advisory concerning anti-public health order escalation and online violent rhetoric.
Correct.
Would you go down the page to current status?
You see under that heading, sir, the second...
Sentence that the IMCIT has observed an escalation in threatening rhetoric against public officials, including references to assassination, holding Nuremberg Trials 2.0, and conducting civilian arrests of those perceived to be involved in imposing public health rules.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And if you look at the footnote concerning Nuremberg Trials there, it says, Do you recognize that?
Yes.
Did you see that particular idea of Nuremberg code or Nuremberg trials in relation to the events of the convoy?
Yes.
Did you see that, for example, in the Memorandum of Understanding that was promulgated by some of the protesters, such as Mr. Bowder?
I have recollection of that.
If you go to the next page, please.
Do you see it?
The third paragraph presently on the page that starts open source information.
It has at the end of that paragraph, it says the following is a list of some of the demonstrations that have occurred outside the residences of public.
Officials in recent months.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And they include a number of municipal and other chief medical officers or health officials?
I see that.
As well as the Premier of Ontario and the Minister of Education, if you go further down the list.
Yes.
Yes.
Was this information briefed to you by the RCMP or information of this nature ahead of the arrival of the convoy?
Definitely of this nature.
And as you heard me say earlier today, there were significant alterations to security posture to public figures.
That is consistent with the report that you are referring to here as a result of the ideologically extremist rhetoric that was becoming more and is becoming more and more pervasive.
and the concern that that, That rhetoric can lead to violence and the threat of serious violence.
Look to me to SSM.can.nsc402578.
And this will be a readout of a briefing from January the 26th of this year.
If you go to the bottom of the page, of the first page, please, there we go, to the email header.
You see there this note at the bottom, it's from Mary Liz Power to Katie Telford, Jeremy Broadhurst and others, dated January the 26th?
Yes.
And it is a readout concerning trucker convoy and security concerns, right?
Could you go over to the next page, please?
Yes.
Do you see under key points, this is summarizing or discussing the upcoming, at that point, as of January the 25th, the upcoming convoy expected to arrive in Ottawa?
Yes, and I would just emphasize that the key points are all critical infrastructure within and around the parliamentary precinct, besides 24 Sussex, which is obviously very publicly known as the...
Mr. If you could go down the page, please, to the key points.
Do you see that notes at the end of that paragraph, right under the redaction, in the second sentence, that the federal family has already been activated and since last year's insurrection, conducted three readiness exercises in case a similar event were to occur here.
I do.
Was it a concern by January 25th already to look at the potential for the convoy to develop into something similar to what occurred in January 6th in the United States?
I know that that question did surface in one of the early briefings that we were having with the law enforcement and public safety communities.
I know one of my colleagues raised, one of my ministerial colleagues raised the concern that this, that the blockade and the convoy could potentially result in a January 6 type event.
And much of that was connected to the foundation that you've already laid around the increase and the pervasiveness of ideologically extremist rhetoric.
Many of which included the dog whistles, the examples that you've already provided.
So that, I think, is one of the reasons why, at the same time, the RCMP were adjusting security posture for parliamentarians and why there was enhanced security in the parliamentary precinct.
Could we go to pb.nsc.can50996, please?
Could we go to pb.nsc.can50996, please?
Sir, this is another RCMP Special Threat Advisory, this one dating from January the 25th, so that would be three days or so before the convoy was expected to arrive in Ottawa?
Three or four days?
January 28th or 29th?
Yes, that's the description of the convoy.
If you look to the top right of the page, you'll see the date of the dock.
Yes, sorry, there it is.
I see that now.
Yes, that's about three or four days before the arrival.
And if we could just go to the key points, please.
The third key point indicates that the IMCIT assesses that there's been an increase in online narratives supportive of the convoy among both ideologically motivated networks as well as in general public discourse, correct?
Yes.
And it notes the significant amount of financial support that's occurring?
Yes.
Okay, can we go to page two to the heading of convoy participants?
And sir, it appears that the RCMP advised in the threat advisory that it's assessed that this convoy will include ideologically motivated individuals with grievances that are anti-government, anti-authority, and conspiratorial in nature.
That individuals with racially motivated and ethno-nationalist views may also be attracted to this event, though the purpose of the event is not rooted in these specific grievances.
Do you recall being briefed to that effect?
There was definitely discussion about the intelligence around what the potential makeup of the convoy and the blockade would be.
And as I discussed earlier in my testimony, those sentiments, anti-government, anti-authority, were definitely, they were dynamics that we were alive to in trying to understand not only the objective,
Which was expressly stated at the outset in the manifesto, but the degree to which the blockade and the occupation would resist law enforcement and become entrenched.
And just one more reference in this document.
It says at the end of that paragraph, rhetoric observed online in various networks known for more extreme content have made references to the January 6, 2021 events at the U.S. Capitol.
when discussing the convoy to Ottawa.
Were you aware of those kinds of communications being on the radar of law enforcement?
Yes.
Right, thank you.
I'd like to go now just to a couple of texts.
The first being pb.can401843.
This will be an exchange with Brian Clough.
Yes.
I am, yes.
It will be page two once the documents are open.
I apologize that we'll need to zoom in to be able to make any sense of this image.
Thank you.
Thank you.
If you could scroll down, please.
Continue to scroll down to the next image.
All right, there we go.
Do you see there that you send to Mr. Clough on January 29th?
And if you can go down, you can see the text that actually follows the image.
It is a text from a gentleman named Randy Haley, or sorry, a tweet.
From a gentleman named Randy Hillier.
Are you familiar with him?
Yes.
And I believe he's complaining that the police have restricted access to Parliament Hill.
And he goes on to say, well, sorry, he indicates that the PPS are restricting access to Parliament Hill.
Do you see that?
Yes.
Was Mr. Haley or later arrested on nine charges, including counselling the Commission of Indictable Offences and Mischief in relation to the convoy events?
I can't speak to the exact nature of the charges, but I do recall he was arrested, yes.
If you could go down, actually, if you can go to pb.can.401847.
And on page one, this is the same item here.
Do you see Mr. Hillier here is calling publicly on the PPS to completely open Parliament Hill, or we might have to open it up for ourselves?
Not only do I remember the tweet, I remember some of the reporting around that time, and I was, again, extremely concerned that by sheer size of the crowd, that they would try to impose themselves on the PPS.
And if memory serves...
There were a couple of what I would describe as brushes with law enforcement on the Hill, where PPS was there on the stairs trying to, I think, urge calm and to hold back from allowing the crowds to walk up towards center block.
And I think actually this may have been closer to west block.
The PPS officer was completely overwhelmed.
And the concern, the very real concern that I had at the time was that that could immediately spill over into serious violence that would jeopardize the safety of everybody involved.
And the former parliamentarian in question, Randy Hillier, was I think...
Clearly trying to provoke and incite people to follow him up the hill.
Can we just go back for a moment to pb.can.40's 1843, which is the last thing we've looked at.
Hello, everyone.
How'd that sexbot get back in the house?
Block user.
Okay, tell me if you can hear me and see me.
I'm waiting for the car.
There we go.
You see there, this is on January the 29th.
I can only do this through a tweet reporting on a statement by former President Donald Trump indicating we want those Canadian truckers to know that we are with them all the way.
Yes.
Were you aware of those kinds of statements from U.S. former and current politicians in support of the convoy?
Yes.
Thank you.
Your Honor, I just have really two more questions on a text about Commissioner Lucky, if I may have an indulgence for two more minutes.
Okay.
Can we go to pb.can.401842?
Ah.
It'll be page 10. Sand angel.
I'm not at the beach.
I'm at a car dealership.
Is this an exchange of text between you and the clerk, Ms. Charette?
Yes.
Can we go to page 10, please?
All right.
I'm showing you a text from February 16. Who does Mendocino look like as an actor?
That you indicate below the redaction.
Speaking with Brenda now, is that referring to Commissioner Lucky?
Yes.
The most substantive brief on the Ottawa enforcement plan to date, she says, She is confident this week it will not look like the last few weekends, right?
Yes.
Were you encouraged by Commissioner Luckey's briefing after the invocation of the Emergencies Act?
I was.
There were more details forthcoming once the invocation of the Emergencies Act was invoked around exactly how a number of law enforcement were going to coordinate.
You know, there were details around soft tech and hard tech and how it was all going to be sequenced.
And that information, I think, was reassuring that we were going to, hopefully, with the skills of law enforcement, restore and maintain public safety.
Was it evident that she may have been walking a very challenging line?
In reporting enough to you in Cabinet to ensure you are fully informed without providing inappropriate...
The internet's going to need to do some research on that.
Yes.
And lastly, let me just ask, you had indicated in your evidence you weren't sure if it would have made a difference if you had seen, you couldn't recall, but if you had seen the note in her email that indicated, that having been said, I am of the view we have not exhausted all available tools.
Do you remember giving that evidence?
Yes, I do.
Was it possible, in your view, at that point in time, February the 14th, February the 13th, both to recognize that not every imaginable tool had been exhausted, but also recognize that there were insufficient police resources available to use those tools with the protests remaining at that size in number of locations across the country?
I suppose that was possible, but, you know, I come back to and stress what I said earlier, which is that the most important conversation that I had that day was the call that I got from Commissioner Lucky around the situation in Coots.
And, you know, the urgency and degree to which things really hung in the balance at that moment is what shed light on her state, of mine, and it certainly informed the opinions and the advice that I shared with the government thereafter.
Thank you.
Miller came back.
He did the cross.
I watched that.
Got a couple of good clips from the cross.
Any re-examination?
No question.
No re-examination.
What is this?
So no re-examination.
It's Bastuba Vandenberg co-counsel for Freedom Corp and protesters.
Yes.
There's been an unredacted document shared to the parties by Council for Government of Canada at 4pm.
to your decision earlier today.
It's the document SSM.CAN.407721.
We advise that the Commission Council should look at it as it is relevant and material to this witness.
In particular, Jody Thomas, the National Security and Intelligence Advisor, It states in that document that there is no national security threat pursuant to Section 2 of the CSIS Act.
Okay, well, she's saying this for the public consumption now, but because the Rouleau is going to get that document, it was put to him that it had been concluded by CSIS that there was no threat pursuant to Section 2 of the CSIS Act.
Mr. Commissioner?
Yeah, I guess maybe just have the document.
Doesn't that resolve things?
If we can have the doc ID number.
The ID number is SSM.can.407721.
.can.0000721.
So there's only people internally complaining they haven't met the required threshold to invoke the emergency.
But what do they know?
The timing of the disclosure is not available in the party database right now.
They redacted that part of it.
Just details.
By the way, it's official.
Brendan Miller is amazing.
So I do have a copy and I'll put it up on the screen shortly.
Okay, let's read this then.
Let's read it.
Can we scroll down a little bit, please?
A little bit more, please.
Tree Top Homestead, it wasn't...
It was submitted redacted.
That's my card.
Alright people, I think I might be heading out of here.
Good.
Back tire looks like it's working.
Peeps.
I'll be following in the chat in a few seconds.
I suppose the question would be, Minister, were you aware that it had been concluded that Section 2 of the CSIS Act was not met?
Were you aware?
What is the date of this note?
What difference does it make?
Were you aware that you were told?
It says it's before the speech Monday morning, which is the date that they announced the invocation.
That might assist.
Okay.
Yes, I was aware that CSIS had concluded that Section 2, under the CSIS Act, was not met.
I was aware of that fact.
Thank you.
Well, I'm going to have to clip that and share that on social media.
I only have one question, and it's probably already been answered, but I just want to explore it just a bit more.
And this is about the...
Brian Fox.
It's been called the line between the police...
I'm going to check out.
I'll see you guys soon.
...the politicians or the board or whatever.
I try and ask you something more specific.
Let us say that there were two protests, one going on in Ottawa and one at the border in Windsor.
Would it be appropriate for either you in respect of the RCMP or the Solicitor General in Ontario to advise the Superintendent?
The Commissioner, rather, that the government's priority would be Windsor.
However, it's totally up to them, obviously, to decide and to deploy resources in accordance with what they're prepared to do.
Would that be?
And I'll give you a spoiler alert.
Minister Blair thought that would be inappropriate.
And so as...
I think you mentioned we should be, this commission should be looking at that relationship.
I want to hear your view.
I appreciate the spoiler, given the witness who testified who has an abundance of police experience under his belt.
But I would say this is precisely the type of question that really ought to be explored through the ongoing deliberations of this commission.
I suppose, Your Honor, I would impart a few principles to you as you are trying to think through exactly where to delineate the boundaries.
One is, as I said, we don't want elected politicians to go behind the veil and politicize the constituent elements of the traditional administration of justice.
Exactly what kinds of investigations are being conducted, who lays charges, whether or not those charges proceed to trial, whether or not there are any sanctions or remedies that flow from that.
That is all properly within either the independent discretion of police or the Crown.
And I believe that those should be protected as sacrosanct, sacrosanct as part of our democracy.
On the other hand, police and the elected government do not operate as two solitudes.
That there does have to be an ongoing channel of communication around how it is that we support one another in maintaining public safety.
And there are some customs that have developed over time in how we strike that balance.
One is, as you mentioned, I hope I've been able to demonstrate today through the authorities that are exercised by the office that I occupy in ensuring accountability, in pressing for questions and obtaining information so that we can be sure that law enforcement have all of the tools that they need and the resources that they need to maintain public safety and where they don't.
To give those things that they don't have to them so that they can restore it and then maintain it.
And that is something that I did in the course of the blockades and the occupation in the case of Alberta, where...
Yeah, we've heard that.
Yeah.
So then I think that the question then becomes, you know, how far can elected governments go in identifying priorities?
And I think it will depend very much on the circumstances, but one...
Again, I think established threshold that already exists by convention under the police service agreements that we have is that provincial ministers of justice are able to form the opinion of where an emergency exists.
And why is that important?
Because once that opinion has been formed, then resources can be deployed.
I think that that is a principle that might be potentially expanded or that could be explored.
On a national scale, because then there might be a way to stitch together the way law enforcements operate and cooperate at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels.
I do think, though, as you consider that question, that you also have to, I think, take an inventory and a landscape of the big gap that exists right now between Provincial Police Services Acts and the Emergencies Act.
And the Emergencies Act does afford the elected government a fair bit of scope and latitude.
But what we did here was rather than just divine those tools, we looked to law enforcement to identify where those gaps existed and then use that to fill them in with the regulations under the Emergencies Act to address the situation at hand.
It will be very much driven by the particular circumstances of each case.
So coming back to your hypothetical.
I think it is possible, and it doesn't have to be even in Ontario, but let's assume your hypothetical was in Alberta.
It is open to the Minister of, the Solicitor General there, the Minister of Public Safety in Alberta, to determine which of those two may constitute an emergency or not.
And by exercising that discretion, then open the door to granting the requests of assistance to deploy additional resources and to make that...
who can then operationalize where to go first based on where the emergency is at.
So I hope that's helpful.
Yeah, but you've dodged my question, which, and if you don't want to answer it, that's fine given the spoiler alert I gave you.
But I am literally very interested, obviously, in what you gave me as answer, which is helpful.
Right.
But I am curious about something as...
Clear as that question I asked.
And if you really don't have a view, that's fine.
Well, again, I mean, I want to be as responsive as I possibly can be, and we are working with the hypothetical.
But I guess the dilemma would be if both events were absolutely identical, would it be appropriate for the elected government to sort of pick?
And I'm inclined to agree with Minister Blair that that's not the kind of choice or dilemma you want.
On the other hand, if they're not completely identical and there is a threshold question as to whether or not one poses an emergency as opposed to the other, then I think on the basis of some conventions that already exist under the police services agreement, it may be appropriate for elected government to say, no, there is an emergency here.
And that then opens the door to deploying police services.
But I think going beyond that, for example, the number of police officers, precisely the type of equipment that is used, all of the other things that I've already outlined to you, elected governments should steer wide clear of that, and for good reason.
I think there is a slippery slope there that would be very difficult to escape from if we went down that path.
Okay, well thank you very much.
I have no further questions.
I do appreciate you coming to testify and to being patient as we went a little bit over time.
So thank you.
Thank you.
So we're now going to go to our second witness.
I probably should take about five minutes while we change the witness and get organized.
So we'll take a five minute break.
Thank you.
The commission is in recess for five minutes.
La commissione on the BIPO segment.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Order alert.
The Commission has reconvened.
Okay.
We have another witness.
Good afternoon, I'll see you again Mr. Commissioner.
For the Commission, our next witness is Minister Dominique Leblanc.
Minister Leblanc, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
Je m 'en jure sur un document religieux, s 'il vous plaît.
On a la Bible, le Coran ou le Torah disponible?
the Bible, s'il vous plaît.
Oui.
Pour la fin du procès verbal, s'il vous plaît, indiquez et ensuite éperivez votre nom.
Please spell out your name completely, Dominique LeBlanc, D-O-M-I-N-C, L-A-B, capital B, L-A-N-C.
Do you swear that the testimony you will be given before this commission was the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
So help your God, I so swear.
Good afternoon, Minister.
Good evening.
Good evening, exactly, almost.
Before we start, you can answer in French if you wish.
I might nonetheless ask the questions in English, but you answer in the language of your choice.
I will be answering mainly in English, but there might be times when I slip into French.
Same thing for me.
We'll start with a little housekeeping then.
You'll recall Minister LeBlanc having sat for an interview with Commission Council on September 9th?
Yes, I do in Vancouver.
Yes, that's right.
And following that interview, Commission Council prepared a summary of that interview, and you reviewed that summary?
Yes, I did.
And you can confirm that it's accurate?
It is.
Okay, perfect.
Sorry, just any time you're nodding or...
Understood.
It's better for your record.
Perfect.
So for the record, Mr. Clerk, that's WTS 5073.
No need to call it up.
Minister LeBlanc, obviously you are the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, and I'll just ask you to start off by describing very briefly what that entails.
What is the role of the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, generally speaking?
So I would probably be the Prime Minister's representative, principal representative, in terms of his ongoing relationships with provinces and territories.
So it can cover a number of different federal, provincial issues.
I would normally be present when the Prime Minister meets other First Ministers.
I'm supported by the Privy Council Office, which is the Prime Minister's department.
And we would attempt to coordinate across the government of Canada, as best as is possible, the federal government's relationship with provinces and territories.
Many of the federal legislative measures or policy measures necessarily...
Involve relationships with provinces.
So that would be their principal function, I would assume, for the government.
Okay.
And the Commission hasn't called as witnesses anyone from the Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat.
So could you just spend a moment explaining how that works, how you're supported within PCOS as opposed to by an external line department?
That's right.
So there's a Deputy Minister, Michael Vandergrift, who...
Supports me in the intergovernmental affairs role at Privy Council.
He has a small group of people that support him and me as well.
And they would have ongoing relationships at the senior officials level with their counterparts in different provinces and territories.
And perhaps the unique role of an intergovernmental affairs minister is, I think with the exception of the province of Quebec, many premiers have kept for themselves.
The role of being intergovernmental affairs minister in their province or territory.
So my counterparts in many cases are the premiers, as I say, with the exception of the province of Quebec.
So you're not dealing with another minister, you're dealing with the premier?
Right, in his or her capacity as intergovernmental affairs minister.
Okay, thank you.
That's helpful.
Okay, well, as you know, we're here today to talk about the events that led to the emergencies inquiry, and we have about an hour and change to do so.
So we'll take it pretty quickly.
But to start off, can you give us an overview of what your involvement was, essentially?
What role did you play in the federal government's response to the events of late January, early February?
I was invited by the Privy Council office to, I think, what was one of, if not the first meetings.
It was originally a sort of an ad hoc or informal briefing of a small group of ministers on the preparations for the arrival of the convoy.
It was before the first weekend of the convoy arrival in Ottawa, and Privy Council Office decided to bring a small group of ministers together to bring us up to date on the preparations, including...
I also sit on the Board of Internal Economy of the House of Commons as one of two ministers that has a role in terms of the security of the parliamentary precinct as well, which was obviously the initial target that people identified on that first weekend.
And then I was included in most of, if not all of the subsequent meetings of the security and safety and emergencies committee of cabinet.
And then ultimately it, Became the incident response group chaired by the Prime Minister.
So I was included in most, if not all, of those briefings for ministers.
And during that period, I would have ongoing discussions both with my Cabinet colleagues that had line responsibilities for a number of these elements.
Mr. Mendicino, who you saw earlier today, but the transport minister, for example.
In some cases, the Justice Minister.
So I would talk to my own Cabinet colleagues, principally to ensure that they were engaging with their provincial or territorial counterparts as much as was appropriate in the particular context of whatever issue was before the Cabinet.
And in some cases, I spoke to Premiers directly as well.
Okay, so...
I think you probably answered this question then, but as you mentioned, that initial group of ministers consisted of, I think, public safety, so Mr. Medicino, Minister Blair, emergency preparedness, Minister Alcabra, transport, and then you as in your capacity as intergovernmental affairs minister, or was your role sort of a within-government coordination role?
I wouldn't have described it as a sort of coordination within the government more generally, other than perhaps in terms of the relationship between our government and provinces and territories.
The Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister's National Security and Intelligence Advisor were participating in those meetings.
They have sort of horizontally across the government because of their role at Privy Council Office, some of that responsibility with respect to other line departments.
But I would often encourage my cabinet colleagues to ensure that...
They're maintaining active and open conversations with their provincial or territorial counterparts as the circumstances evolved into various parts of the country in the days that followed that initial weekend.
Okay.
Mr. Clerk, can I ask you to pull up SSM.can50293?
So, Minister LeBlanc, this is a document that summarizes the engagements you had with...
Various provincial counterparts.
And you'll see it starts on February 10th.
We're not going to go through it right now.
We are going to go through it.
We'll become very familiar with it by the end of this examination.
But at this point, I'm just going to sort of highlight the fact that these engagements really started on February 10th.
So the convoy arrives on January 28th, 29th, and your engagements specifically start on the 10th.
So the role you were playing, if I understand it, prior to the 10th is essentially facilitating or encouraging these communications between your colleagues and their various counterparts in other provinces.
That's accurate.
I would not have been engaged in a very active way with first ministers before that date you see on February 10th.
Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Clerk.
You can pull that one down and pull the following one up.
SSM.CAN406594.
So, Minister LeBlanc, given the short time we have, we're skipping a lot of narrative and going to some pretty specific questions that affect your participation and your role in all of this.
So, you'll just have to bear with me in that.
So this is an email, and just scroll down a little bit, Mr. Clerk, that you received from Ralph Goodale on February 6th.
And I take it you're familiar in your call, this email?
Oh, absolutely.
I had been asked to talk to Mr. Goodale, and I, I think, prepared that email after my conversation with him.
Okay, so that was my first question.
How did it come about?
So you were asked to speak to him.
I think this email is him emailing you.
Following my conversation with him.
Following your conversation with him.
Okay, so maybe we'll start with your conversation with him then.
Can you tell us about that conversation?
Sure.
So Mr. Goodale has been a friend of mine and somebody that I worked with, obviously, for a long time.
He was a public safety minister himself for the first four years of our government.
He's from the province of Saskatchewan, which is unique in terms of his parliamentary experience in our government.
And he had a very broad perspective.
He himself is a lawyer.
And it was suggested to me that it might be interesting to see how he, from his current position as Canada's High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, but still very much following domestic events clearly, to see what he's thinking and what are his views.
on the situation as it was evolving in that week of February 5th and 6th.
So I had sent him an email and said, can I speak to you at the end end of the day and set up a phone conversation and had a lengthy conversation with him.
And is the content of that conversation more or less reflected in the email that we're about to read out?
Or is there anything that you want to say about it before we do?
No, his email to me, which you see, as I say, followed that telephone conversation.
And it largely...
That summarizes what he had said to me in the telephone conversation.
Okay, I can appreciate that it was probably a lengthier conversation than what we see here, but we'll just read the summary in the email.
So, he's sending this to you, and he says, See this tweet from Mayor Tory.
The point is clear.
Toronto and many other cities handled this municipal policing problem in a professional and competent manner.
Granted, the volume of the protest in Ottawa was greater and came without as much warning.
But the City of Ottawa and the OPS have proven themselves incapable of grappling with this problem.
And it is now the duty of the responsible senior authority, i.e.
the Public Safety Minister of Ontario, under provincial policing legislation, emphasizing the Shawty Capitals, to rectify that problem, including taking control.
I think it's taking, not talking, if and as necessary.
There should not be an unconstitutional leap to pin this on the feds or the RCMP.
Federally, under mutual assistance agreements, we can slash should provide resources and personnel as requested, but the authority and responsibility rests with the municipality and the province.
To this point, they've failed to deliver safety and security to the inhabitants of Ottawa, and those innocent inhabitants include many parts of the Government of Canada.
Scrolling down, please, Mr. Clerk.
It remains essential to delve deeply into the true genesis of this demonstration and who is controlling and directing it.
Stephanie Carvin, I believe is an academic, suggests that it is the work of organized, violent, right-wing extremists.
It may even have U.S. roots.
She could be correct.
Our intelligence and national security experts must absolutely get to the bottom of this horrific set of events and prepare for the next one.
Mr. Goodell is expressing a few things in this email, but one thing that comes out clearly is that he sees a policing problem and views a solution as municipal and provincial with a federal overlay.
Is that fair to say?
Yes, that would have reflected my conversation on the phone with him, and it's certainly faithful to, I think, what he expressed in that email.
Okay.
And what was your take on that at that point, or your reaction to that conversation?
As I said, I think one of the benefits for me in terms of having that conversation with him was his four years of experience as our public safety minister.
And I thought he put in a very concise way that I may not have appreciated until that conversation with him, the sort of escalating orders of government that have to respond to these situations.
We had seen, obviously, a pretty significant failure of municipal authorities in Ottawa in those weeks that preceded this.
And I thought his insights into the responsibility of different orders of government and not, perhaps because it was the nation's capital, there was a great deal of confusion, certainly in the public conversation, about what's the government of Canada doing about Wellington Street.
But after my conversation with him and having read his subsequent email, I thought he put in a rather concise way his view, his opinion as to the roles of different orders of government.
Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Clerk.
You can take that one down now.
So one thing we spent a lot of time talking about this morning with Minister Mendicino, so we won't spend a ton of time on it this afternoon or evening, but is...
Engagement with Ontario, specifically, and Ontario's role in responding to these events.
So, as I said, the Commission has heard a lot of evidence about Ontario's role over the past five weeks and attempts to essentially draw Ontario into the conversation, into tripartite meetings, into being part of the solution.
And it seems that, I'll just try and summarize this, Ontario's position at first may have been, as you sort of just articulated, well, it's Parliament.
It's a federal vaccine mandate, and it's happening at Parliament, so this is really a federal problem.
Is that a fair characterization, do you think, of what Ontario's initial attitude was?
I'm not sure.
I can't speak for the government of Ontario or what Premier Ford or his ministers were thinking.
But as I said, in the initial arrival of the convoy in Ottawa, the focus was on the nation's capital.
As we know, it quickly spread to other cities and other parts of the country, not just in the province of Ontario.
But we did, as a national government, and my colleagues, I know the Transport Minister, Mr. Mendicino himself, and senior officials of our government, deputy ministers, I think?
if every possible provincial regulatory or legislative authority was being brought to bear to try and resolve ultimately not only Ottawa, of course, but Windsor and other places.
So I think Our government, and I remember those conversations from the Incident Response Group meetings or the Cabinet Security and Safety Committee, there was an ongoing and active effort, both at the level of ministers but senior officials supporting them,
to reach out to provincial jurisdictions where they were seeing some of the sort of sympathy or knock-on effects of the Ottawa occupation to make sure that every available authority...
Was being brought to bear to bring these illegal events to a conclusion.
And I suppose the response that the federal government would have gotten would be varying degrees of success, if we can put it that way.
Yeah, I think that, and obviously the inability across the country to use existing provincial and municipal authorities was one of the constant discussions.
Before our government, as we led up to the ultimate decision to invoke the Emergencies Act, but I remember from the very beginning an effort to educate ourselves as a government, and Mr. Goodell's email to some extent speaks to that, in terms of the different jurisdictional roles of orders of government.
But we quickly understood the importance of collaborating and ensuring That municipal and provincial authorities were very much working with federal agencies that could provide support, and there are a number of federal agencies that were working with their counterparts, of course, but to really use every available remedy to bring these very damaging illegal occupations or blockades to an end.
And we know that on February 10th, you had a call with Premier Ford.
Can you tell us about that call, how it came about?
And before you even start, I'll pull up the document for your benefit.
There's a readout of it at ssm.nsc.can50256.
Thank you.
So just situating in time, this would be the Ambassador Bridge blockade is in full swing.
February 10th is the date of the first IRG, so we're fairly advanced in the events of the time period we're looking at.
And is that the right document?
Okay.
Yeah, there we go.
Readout of Minister LeBlanc's call with Doug Fortunet.
Okay, so what can you tell us about the call that you had with Premier Ford?
So it was on the evening of February 10th.
I remember, as you said, it was following...
That incident response group meeting, I left Ottawa to fly home to Moncton, New Runswick, and I had been asked to talk to Premier Ford specifically around what we thought were some authorities the province had in the transportation sector around trucking licenses, permits, insurance certificates.
I'm certainly not an expert on the precise regulatory authorities around provincial transportation.
But there was a belief that the province of Ontario may have a series of instruments or authorities that perhaps hadn't been brought to bear, whether it was in Windsor or in Ottawa.
So it was suggested that I could perhaps reach out to Premier Ford.
I have a very constructive and cordial relationship with the Premier of Ontario.
I texted him to say I was leaving for New Brunswick and would like to chat to him that evening if possible and would be at home in two hours in Moncton.
And he told me to call him when I landed, and I remember being at home.
It was about 10.30 or 11 in the evening in New Brunswick.
He was still at his office at Queen's Park in Toronto.
I said I was calling him to talk about what we thought were some additional authorities that the government of Ontario may have that could be brought to bear with the circumstance in Windsor and obviously in Ottawa.
And he immediately went to the process that his government was going through, which ultimately led to their declaration of an emergency order the following day.
So the conversation quickly evolved into what Premier Ford was planning to do the following day.
And frankly, it went well beyond what we were hoping in terms of some trucking or transportation issues.
He was very much focused on...
He talked to me about conversations he'd had with the governor of Michigan, the chief executives of some of the big auto companies, representatives of some of the big unions.
He was extremely focused on the severe economic damage to Ontario and to the country.
He was focused on the reputational damage that this means in terms of foreign...
Investment into our country and he was very focused on the public safety concerns and the threats of real violence that people were still continuing to advance in Ottawa and in Windsor.
So the conversation, he was quite candid with me about his desire to have the Ontario Provincial Police take a greater role in the Windsor context and also in Ottawa.
He talked about his frustration.
That the situation in Ottawa had not been resolved and his government was very involved and committed to stepping up, including with the Government of Canada, to do what we needed to bring this to a conclusion across the province of Ontario.
And I offered, obviously, as had my Cabinet colleagues, to provide any federal resources, policing resources, regulatory authorities that the Government of Canada may have to support.
The plan that he outlined to me in that conversation.
And the next day he had a news conference which laid out most of what he told me on that evening conversation.
Okay.
Just before we leave the readout, Mr. Globe, can you scroll down a little bit?
There's just one thing I want to ask you about.
Minister LeBlanc informed him, so informed Premier Ford, that the Americans will make it clear that anyone convicted...
We'll be barred from entering the United States.
Can you tell us what that was about and what did or did not happen with that?
So in terms of what happened afterwards, I probably wouldn't have precise information, but whether it was the Canadian Border Services Agency or the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, who had been having conversations with her counterparts in the White House, Jodie Thomas had been briefing.
The incident response group and a number of ministers around the real concerns the Americans had.
I know my colleague, the transport minister, who I think you'll see tomorrow, had spoken to his counterpart, the Secretary of Transportation in the United States.
So in those meetings, the Americans, we were told by our colleagues or senior officials who had conversations with senior American authorities.
Including, as I say, our transport minister who spoke to his American counterpart, that they were prepared to do whatever they could to support our efforts to bring this illegal activity, these border blockades to an end.
And my understanding, and if I said that to the Premier, it's because somebody would have told us that the American authorities were prepared to help us if there were convictions of some of these truck drivers, for example.
they would look at what authorities they had in the United States to bar them from entering the United States.
Okay, and ministers taking you back the Minister Al Ghabra's counterpart would be Secretary Buttigieg?
Exactly.
Okay, and we'll hear about that tomorrow, I think.
Thank you, Mr. Clerk.
take that one down and pull up ssm.nsc.can402947.
So, Minister, this is, as it's being pulled up.
I think shortly after that call you reported on it to the PMO and so this is your text where you're conveying The Premier Ford's position and spoke to Ford.
He's going gangbusters on truckers tomorrow, using emergency order, fines, seizing trucks, arrests, suspension of licenses.
He's hot to hammer them at a presser tomorrow at 10 a.m.
Sorry.
You will introduce legislation to make sure this can't happen again and wants us to work on plan together to secure border slash critical infrastructure going forward.
You will then do a presser on Monday to diminish public health measures, but tomorrow is hard on enforcing against blockades.
Response comes excellent.
So, is it fair to say that at this point, whatever happened leading up to this, Premier Ford and the federal government are aligned on an approach?
Oh, very much so.
And that, I think, probably was a message I would have sent to the Prime Minister's office.
Following that conversation that evening on the 10th of February, and it's certainly faithful to my recollection of that conversation.
What I would do is, as I would talk to or exchange messages with the premiers, I would often ensure that Michael Vandergriff, the senior official at Privy Council Office, had a readout of the substance of those calls that he could then circulate as well.
But that would have been a message I would have sent to the Prime Minister's office.
And I certainly agree with your characterization.
That evening, I finished the conversation with Premier Ford, very reassured that the governments were going to work together to bring this to a conclusion, not just in Windsor, but obviously in Ottawa.
And I would think the 10 or 12 days that followed were a proof point that that was the case.
So both of you are going gangbusters?
Hot to hammer at a presser.
I think...
The context was very much a frustration that what we had seen in Ottawa was now dragging into the third weekend.
The border blockages, as I said, at the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor were having huge economic and reputational damage to our country.
And there was an enormous sense of frustration, I think, in both governments.
That we needed to bring these illegal blockades and occupations to a safe and proper conclusion.
And the two weeks prior to this conversation weren't giving any of us a great deal of assurance that that was the outcome that we were going to quickly achieve.
Fair enough.
I was defining going gangbusters as being committed to finding a solution.
And that was absolutely the case.
Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Clerk.
Can you pull up?
SSM.CAN50293.
So we'll leave Ontario now and move to Alberta.
So the next on the list here, February 11. Premier Kenney communicated with Minister LeBlanc to express concerns that the provinces have been left with the enforcement challenge and that there has been no response to the request for the CAF, that's Canadian Armed Forces, to help with tow trucks.
And in our interview, you clarified that that message was conveyed by text.
And Mr. Clerk, now if you can pull up PB.Can401868.
Not particularly legible, but Minister LeBlanc, maybe you can confirm that this is the text exchange to which you were referring.
Scroll down one page, please, Mr. Clerk.
There we go.
So this one reads, this is from you to a chat with Minister Algabra and Minister Mandicino.
And so you're reporting, I got these two messages from Jason Kenney last night.
Your guy has really screwed the pooch.
This, technical term, this trucker vax policy is obviously just dumb political theater.
Calling them all Nazis hasn't exactly helped.
And now the provinces are holding the bag on enforcement.
I can't get any heavy equipment from private vendors to move these freaking trucks off the border because the crazies are making death threats.
And you guys turned down our request for army equipment to help us.
Because apparently the government of...
Scroll down, please.
Canada doesn't really care about the international border being closed.
Pensive emoji.
But don't worry, the RCMP commander in Alberta just told me proudly that he's secured some psychologists to do a profile assessment on the protesters.
I said, that's great news, Deputy Commissioner.
Do any of them know how to drive a tow truck?
Jay.
To which Minister Al-Ghabra replies, speaking of bonkers, and you reply totally.
So is that the text exchange that's reported in the summary of engagements?
Yes, it is.
Okay.
So we're just going to pick apart and understand if this is the second time this text has arisen today.
So I just want to pick apart a few statements made there.
First of all, when he says your guy has really screwed the pooch, is he referring to the Prime Minister or who's that a reference to?
I didn't ask him.
I didn't reply and ask him exactly which guy he was referring to.
So I don't think I could speak for Premier Kenney when he sent that message.
Okay.
What was your reaction broadly to these texts?
I had developed as a member of parliament a cordial and rather amicable relationship with Premier Kenney.
We had kept in touch on a whole range of issues.
So we had a sort of an ongoing conversation on a whole bunch of issues.
When I was in Alberta, I would see him.
From time to time.
I knew, and I think we saw Mr. Mendicino talk about that today, that the government of Alberta had considerable concerns around the ability to get tow trucks with respect to the blockage at the border crossing in Kootz, Alberta.
And I knew, again, from probably Bill Blair or Marco at incident response group meetings that the government of Alberta...
Was seeking potentially some military assets to help heavy military tow trucks to move some of these trucks from the border blockage in Coots.
So this text message was the Premier emphatically expressing his frustration, which I think he had shared with other colleagues, including Marco Mendicino.
Okay.
Thanks, Mr. Clerk.
take that one down and pull up ssm.can 50293 again Okay, so we've been now through Ontario and we've been with Alberta and the remainder of this document, Minister reports on various other engagements you had with provincial premiers.
All around the time, February 12th through 15th.
So it's February 12th onwards.
And with the assistance, feel free to keep it up.
Can you tell us about the various conversations you were having and what you were hearing?
Sure.
So you'll see, I think it was the Saturday, February 12th.
That was the weekend we were having, I think, daily, almost daily incident response group meetings that the Prime Minister was chairing in which I was participating.
The situation from our perspective was becoming more and more alarming.
There were a lot of public discussions of potential pop-up blockades or demonstrations.
And I'm going by memory, but a number of provincial legislatures saw demonstrations.
There were some in Toronto, some in Quebec City.
A number of provincial capitals.
There was public discussion of a number of potential border crossings being targeted as well.
There was some discussion about a border crossing in Woodstock, New Brunswick with the state of Maine in my home province.
There were concerns around the Pacific Gateway border crossing in British Columbia.
I know one of the discussions, again, that was reported in the media or certainly in social media was a potential...
Sort of sympathy protest at the ferry terminal in North Sydney, which is the main supply route for the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, for the island of Newfoundland.
So on that Saturday, I wanted to reach out principally to a group of premiers in Atlantic Canada and Premier Horgan in British Columbia, who were seeing some of this activity and sympathy to the occupation that was taking place in Ottawa.
I wanted to offer those premiers again, as they knew from their conversations between their senior officials, but I wanted them to hear from me that the Government of Canada was absolutely ready in as much as we could to provide any support that they thought would be useful.
The RCMP in many of those provinces are also the contract police authority, and some of the premiers had said to me that they were receiving updates from the divisional commanders of the RCMP in their capacity.
As the contract police of jurisdiction in those provinces.
I remember Premier Fury telling me of his real concern around a potential blockage at the ferry terminal in North Sydney.
He's a doctor by profession and told me that on that ferry, many medical supplies, drugs, medical equipment is essentially transmitted to Port Abasque in Newfoundland.
And then distributed around the province.
And if ever there was a blockage of access to that ferry terminal, it's much more than fresh fruits and vegetables in grocery stores in Newfoundland, but it represented a real threat to public safety and security in his province.
So I wanted them to know that we were monitoring those situations.
We were receiving updates from senior federal officials.
In the law enforcement community, in the intelligence community, and that if they had any concerns, they could reach out to me.
That was the nature of those conversations.
And on the Sunday, on February 13th, Premier Horgan, I'm assuming if it was, I would have sent those messages and followed up on the Saturday, the 12th, but if it shows up on the 13th, it's because Premier Horgan probably replied to me on the Sunday, the 13th, to talk to me about some of the concerns we were seeing in the media around the Pacific.
Gateway border crossing.
Okay.
And in any of those conversations, did the notion of invoking emergency legislation come up, either provincial or federal?
No, not in those conversations.
It was the conversation with Premier Ford on the 10th where he spoke about the provincial emergency orders.
But in those subsequent conversations on that weekend, no, I did not discuss with them the issue of a Federal Emergencies Act invocation.
Okay, and we know that Premier Ford did, in fact, invoke Ontario's emergency legislation on February 11th.
So you mentioned that Premier Fury was expressing a concern about, and if I can put it this way, there was no identified sort of threat to the supply chain, but he was concerned that what was happening might spread and affect the supply chain in Newfoundland.
Is that right?
That's right.
And it was discussed in the public space.
If it was Atlantic media, the Nova Scotia media is what in many cases is followed in the neighboring province of New Brunswick.
So I was seeing in public discussions the risk or the threat or the discussion of potential attempts to block.
Access to the North Sydney Ferry Terminal, the Marine Atlantic Ferry.
And it reminded me of the vulnerability of half a million Canadians on the island of Newfoundland and Labrador in terms of what is their main supply route for things as important as medicines, medical equipment and so on.
And that was the concern the Premier had expressed to me and sort of saying that he wanted to be reassured that the Government of Canada Was ready should that materialize to do everything we had to do to ensure that his province wouldn't be held hostage in some kind of circumstance there.
And you told him that the federal government would do whatever it could?
Of course.
And my conversations with his Atlantic First Minister's counterparts was exactly in that sense.
I remember Premier Higgs, as I said, there's a border crossing.
That was the subject of some discussion in Woodstock, New Brunswick.
There were protests, I think, in the city.
I'm going by memory, in Halifax.
And of course, Premier King, that Confederation Bridge to Prince Edward Island is obviously a critical supply route for that province as well.
That's not far from where I live, that bridge.
It's a two-lane bridge, and it wouldn't...
Theoretically take much to create a lot of confusion and accessing that bridge.
So there was a heightened concern that I was hearing, both publicly, but from first ministers, from premiers, about what I think they were seeing what was happening in Windsor, principally, but other points as well.
And they were sharing their concerns with us.
Whereas Premier Horgan in BC, if you'll see that middle sort of bullet there, February 13th, he sort of seems to be conveying that from his perspective, things are pretty under control in BC.
Is that fair?
Absolutely.
Thank you, Mr. Clerk.
can take that one down.
So, again, we're going to skip pretty quickly in the narrative here, given time constraints.
But so those consultations, most of the ones we've discussed, were the weekend of February 12th and 13th.
We know now essentially the chronology of what happened on February 13th.
So the IRG meeting in the afternoon leading to a cabinet meeting in the evening.
And the outcome of that cabinet meeting has been described to us by the clerk as the decision was to...
Call a first minister's meeting to discuss the potential invocation of the Emergencies Act.
Is that fair?
Yes.
That cabinet meeting, both at the IRG Incident Response Group meeting the Prime Minister chaired earlier in that day on the 13th and the cabinet meeting, which was quite late in that Sunday evening, the Prime Minister made it very clear to ministers that he had not come to a decision.
He was very...
Clear that he had not come to a conclusion around invoking the Emergencies Act, that he was going to hear from premiers the following day.
But the discussion was amongst ministers in terms of what are the steps that are necessary to bring these illegal occupations and blockades to an end and to restore some sense of public confidence because even if particular...
Activities or blockades were perhaps being resolved.
Ottawa certainly wasn't.
But there was a concern, as I said, about a spreading effect or what would be the knock-on effect.
So he listened to ministers.
We were briefed by the senior officials responsible for a number of federal law enforcement agencies, the National Security Advisor, for example.
The Commissioner of the RCMP, the Canadian Board of Services, some of the officials I'm sure you've interviewed, would have described to ministers their sense of the evolving situation, and then the Prime Minister would have heard from ministers in terms of their views on what was necessary to resolve this.
Okay, and you'll be glad to know that given your role as Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, I'm going to be focusing on that as opposed to going through all of the inputs that were received before Cabinet that night.
So, Mr. Clerk, can you then pull up, please?
man six zeros 48. So, Minister LeBlanc, we understand the Cabinet meeting took place around 8:30 the night of the 13th.
And the document we're about to pull up is the email invitation that was sent about the First Minister's meeting.
And I think it was sent, we see the timestamp.
It works out to 10.46 p.m. Eastern Standard Time.
We have to do the conversion for time there.
Sorry, scroll down a little bit, please, Mr. Clerk.
It says, colleagues, the Prime Minister will convene an urgent First Minister's call.
The call will take place on February 14th at 10.15.
Dial in info to follow.
Please confirm your Premier's availability.
I apologize for the short notice.
Michael.
Michael being Michael Vandegrift, the Deputy Secretary of...
Deputy Minister, I'm sorry, of Intergovernmental Affairs.
That's right.
And I remember discussing with him that evening after...
He sent that after the Cabinet meeting had concluded at 10.30 or 10.45 that evening.
Okay.
What's sort of conspicuous by its absence in that email is any mention of the Emergencies Act, any mention of why the First Minister's meeting is being convened.
Can you tell us why that would be?
So, we obviously had a significant concern about potential leaks in the public domain about the subject of that First Minister's meeting.
I had no doubt that had we said we're convening this First Minister's conversation on the Emergencies Act, everybody on their morning radio shows would have heard that the Prime Minister has a meeting with the premiers to discuss the Emergencies Act.
And we've heard from law enforcement officials in our own government, and I've taken note of a number of witnesses before your commission, about the potential of an incendiary reaction to the invocation.
So we thought that it would have been, Irresponsible to risk that going out into the public space before the First Ministers had had an opportunity, absent from everybody's early morning radio shows, to talk to the Prime Minister about that issue.
So there were two reasons probably why Mr. Vandergrift didn't put a subject line.
One was to minimize the inevitable leak to media or in the public space.
We had a lot of experience with First Minister's meetings in the COVID context, and very rarely were those discussions not in some extent reflected in public comments.
So that was a concern.
But also I think there was a desire from the Privy Council Office to, as much as was possible, to allow First Ministers to have that conversation with the Prime Minister at 10.15.
On the 14th, absent, as I said, the public discourse that would have inevitably followed about should we, will we, did the government decide, that as much as possible would have been counterproductive to an open and frank discussion amongst First Ministers.
And one thing Madame Truin said on this point when she testified on Friday was her words, I believe, were they knew that from the moment the government starts talking publicly about invoking the Emergencies Act, the timeline to take a decision is very short.
So does that reflect what you're discussing right now?
It was kept quiet because once it's out there, who knows what happens?
That was very much a concern the government had.
She reflected, I think, what was a concern of some of the advice we were getting from senior officials in the law enforcement and intelligence apparatus of the Government of Canada.
But we've seen subsequently, we've seen subsequently, premiers who had expressed in that meeting concerns around the public effect of a discussion of a potential invocation.
The shortest period of time between the public discussion around should the government or will the government proceed to an invocation of the Emergency Act, the shorter period of time would perhaps be conducive with the public safety imperative of making that decision in a way that was responsible.
I think in the end it clocked in as under 24 hours, so that was mission accomplished.
Yeah, and obviously...
Some people would have said that we should have had an open and extensive public conversation around these issues.
In the particular context of the illegal activities that were taking place and the real threat to the safety of Canadians, we as a government concluded that a prolonged and public conversation of this would not be conducive to a safe and efficient and effective ending.
Of these illegal blockades and occupations.
Understood.
And because you mentioned it, the various first ministers' conversations or calls, rather, that were had around COVID back in, I think, probably March 2020, around then, is something that's arisen sort of tangentially in passing a couple of times in testimony before the commission.
So I'll just ask you to also address it tangentially in passing.
Can you tell us a little bit about how those meetings were convened and how they proceeded and what they were about?
Because obviously, we know that those meetings touched in part on whether emergency legislation would be appropriate in that context.
Absolutely.
So, obviously, in the context of the pandemic, federal-provincial cooperation on public health measures, on things as important as vaccine procurements, vaccine distributions.
Border measures.
The Government of Canada has responsibility, obviously, for international borders.
So there was a very effective, I would argue, an extensive federal-provincial collaboration around the fight against COVID.
That was one of, I think, our country's successes in terms of managing our federation.
That required, in some cases, weekly or bi-weekly calls the Prime Minister would convene with First Ministers.
I would participate in most, if not all, of those calls, usually as an observer.
But the Prime Minister wanted to coordinate as much as possible the various public health measures.
Dr. Tan would provide updates.
So that was an ongoing discussion.
At one point, there was a discussion, I don't remember, but I think it was in 2020, in the first months, potentially, of the pandemic, around could the Emergencies Act be...
An instrument that would be helpful in our collective fight against COVID.
And I think my colleague David Lometty consulted some of his provincial and territorial counterparts, or not some of, consulted provincial and territorial counterparts.
There was a process, and the government concluded that at that moment, there was never a conclusion that we would never or could never perhaps have recourse to the Emergencies Act.
Around the COVID measures, but certainly we concluded, having had that conversation with premiers and public health experts, that it wouldn't have been a particularly advisable tool at that particular moment.
But that was not an active part of the First Minister's conversations around the COVID measures.
It probably came up once or twice, but to say it was a source of significant discussion at the First Minister's level, I think, might...
It might not be an accurate representation, but it certainly had come up.
Okay, that's perfect.
And certainly, before this first minister's call, the idea of invoking the Emergencies Act in the context of the Freedom Convoy had not come up in conversations with any premiers.
Absolutely.
Okay.
That's accurate.
How am I doing for time?
I completely neglected to write down when I started.
You have lots of time left.
You have about, I think, about 20, 30 minutes.
Perfect.
Okay, so then I want to take you, Minister, to the chronology of February 14th.
And I'll ask Mr. Clerk to pull up now OPS 3-0's 14-56.
No, sorry, 14566.
So this is just a little chronological point that we'd like to clear up, because if you scroll down here, and just to let you know what these are, these are, I think they're probably scribe notes of a police meeting.
So I think the participants were Commissioner Luckey, Commissioner Karik, and Chief Slowly, if I'm not mistaken.
Scroll down a little.
Oh, actually, you've got it.
Thank you, Mr. Clerk.
So if you see the last bullet point there, this is a meeting that takes place at 10 o 'clock in the morning on February 14th.
What's recorded about what Commissioner Lucky says is Lucky did not get Prime Minister briefed on the plan.
The plan here being the Ottawa police plan to resolve the situation in Ottawa.
And then Prime Minister will be enacting the Emergency Measures Act.
So if I take your evidence and...
No, it had not been decided at 10 o 'clock in the morning on the 14th, that the Prime Minister would invoke the Emergencies Act?
No, it had not been decided at all.
I don't know why the Commissioner would have said that.
The Prime Minister began the meeting with the Premiers at 15 minutes after she said that by saying he had not come to a decision whatsoever.
The Clerk had not moved the decision memo to him.
That is not an accurate representation whatsoever from my perspective of when the government made the decision.
Okay, and to be fair, these are notes of a meeting, so it's not necessarily what Commissioner Luckey said, but it's what's written down about what she said.
Right, and I'm seeing this for the first time here.
Okay, but in any event, that does not accord with your recollection of the chronology?
No, that does not reflect at all my understanding and my...
Personal involvement with those decisions on that day on the 14th.
Okay, thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Clerk.
You can take that one down.
And can you pull up SSM.nsc.can50625?
This is the readout, Minister LeBlanc, of the First Minister's meeting itself.
So with the assistance of this, I'd like you to just walk us through it.
How did that meeting unfold?
How did it take place?
Obviously not every detail, but what were the various opinions being conveyed, being expressed, and how were they received?
So I obviously have familiarized myself with this.
Summary of that conversation, and I participated, of course, in that meeting.
I made a brief intervention at the front end of that conversation.
The Prime Minister began by stressing that he had not come to a decision on whether we should invoke the Federal Emergencies Act.
He spoke at length in terms of These measures would not supplant existing provincial authorities.
I think later in the conversation there was some discussion about whether command structures of provincial police authorities would change.
The Prime Minister wanted to, at the front end of the meeting, make it very clear that these were designed to be complementary measures that provincial and municipal law enforcement authorities could use when they thought they were needed.
He was very clear that it should be a proportionate series of measures, proportionate to the real public order emergency that the government was seeing, to the threat to the safety and security of Canadians.
And he also made it clear to the premiers at the front end that nothing in the invocation of the Emergencies Act would take away the charter protections that Canadians enjoyed.
And that this could be done in a way that was compliant with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Okay.
Mr. Clerk, can you scroll down to the next page, please?
We're just going to go through a few of the views that appear to have been expressed by various participants on the call.
So, Premier Horgan sees the...
He says the approach sounds measured and practical, we're as susceptible as anyone across the country, but then he says only concern is that these measures would be implemented by the RCMP, which are already fully taxed, and then concern about emboldening those losing public support.
People are exhausted but have taken three shots, worry that too heavy a hand may embolden others, but then he says in the end would support this at this stage.
Can you explain to us, in your words, essentially, what Premier Horgan was conveying to you at the meeting?
So my recollection of his intervention, the Prime Minister started on the West Coast and went across the country.
Sometimes he started in Newfoundland and Labrador.
This time he started in British Columbia.
And Premier Horgan reflected or offered a concern that was shared by a number of Premiers during that conversation around The potential risk of inflaming or emboldening some of the actors that were already entrenched at various blockades or in the City of Ottawa.
He talked about the importance of the proportionality of it, that the measures have to be targeted to the specific threat, but the measures would need to be tailored to bring it to a successful and safe conclusion as quickly as possible.
A number of premiers, I think Premier Horgan, it's not reflected in these notes, but a number of premiers expressed their concern for what they saw was happening in the city of Ottawa.
That clearly was a source of a lot of national attention.
But Premier Horgan, we took Premier Horgan's support to be very important because his province had not been immune from some activity, including some threats to the Pacific border crossing with Washington State.
Scrolling down a little bit more, Mr. Clerk, until we get to...
Premier Cochran says, at the very last bullet there, would support emergency measures, but would ask for further consultation if decide to bring in the Army.
Where does that reference to bringing in the Army come from?
Is that something that was discussed actively at the meeting?
No, it wasn't discussed.
By my recollection, until she raised it, one of the confusions that I worried about, and it's reflected in the interview summaries of our conversation in Vancouver, because this was the first time the Emergencies Act was potentially going to be invoked, many people went back to the 1970s context, where the legislation had a different name, and some of the enforcement was not done by civilian police officers, or some of the physical security presence, I think is a better way to say it, was not only done by...
So, Premier Cochran raised it and the Prime Minister, I think, later on in the meeting made it very clear that having military personnel deployed in an enforcement or security context on the streets in Canada was an absolute last resort and it was not being contemplated whatsoever in any of the conversations we had in terms of what might be the measures in a potential declaration.
So he very quickly, I think, tried to clear up Premier Cochran's misunderstanding about the role of the military.
It was not being considered, and it wasn't a context that the government was looking at.
And since you raised it, actually, let me ask you this.
The misperception between the Emergencies Act and its predecessor, the War Measures Act, is that something you were picking up a lot over these?
I think so, because this was a unique moment heretofore in Canada where the successor legislation was potentially going to be invoked for a public order emergency.
The criteria were different.
The protection of the Charter, of course, wasn't present in 1970.
So the juridical and constitutional context was different.
That's why a previous Parliament There is no doubt that in Quebec,
the comments made by Premier Legault during his interventions letter in the notes you have was, and I think that's my impression, and I did share this with Minister Lebel of Quebec after the discussion.
With premiers that this was definitely not the same context, that there was no federal authority that would supersede a municipal or provincial authority, especially concerning police forces.
There was still some confusion, I would say deep confusion, concerning the application of the act.
And I felt that it was important to reassure the premier of Quebec.
but the other premiers Well, let's go there and see and check for ourselves.
This is on page.
So, Premier Legault here says this is in English, but it's so translated, I imagine.
But in Quebec, we are...
We're preoccupied by the situation in Ottawa.
It is unacceptable.
We have to do what needs to be done, support for it 100%.
What is important to say is that we don't have this type of problem in Quebec.
The SQ, Securities of Quebec, has been able to control the situation so far.
We have to be very cautious about moves to inflame.
We don't want the Emergencies Act to apply in Quebec.
The Emergencies Act must only apply to provinces in agreement with the application of the Act.
We don't need it and we don't want it.
So are those the remarks that you were referring to?
That was in keeping with the comments that I remember Premier Legault making back then, during those discussions.
I believe that the Prime Minister reassured Premier Legault, and I did the same thing with his Minister of Relations with Canada, Madame Lebel, after the meeting with Premiers, that a potential proclamation would not supersede the existing authorities in Quebec or elsewhere in Canada, and that the RCMP would not assume police duties in Quebec that didn't exist before the proclamation.
In my case, I also discussed with Madame Lebel after our meeting about the situation in Gatineau.
And in the end, I think the Gatineau police force and the Quebec police force did help on the basis of the pre-existing agreement between provinces to share resources in case of need.
The premier talked about the Lacolle international border.
And the possibility of discussions, the fact that there were possibly discussions about a blockade there.
By the way, we were in agreement with Premier Legault that the situation in Quebec, be it in Quebec City or in Montreal, was well under control by the provincial and municipal authorities.
They didn't have to deal with the difficult situation that was now firmly in place in Ottawa.
This was intended to reassure the Premier of Quebec that we were not about to interfere in their provincial jurisdiction, but rather that we wanted to offer them other web tools if they were needed.
We also explained that the economic measures that were one of the key reasons, I think, In the decision to invoke the Emergency Measures Act, because without that, the financial measures wouldn't have been possible.
Quebec could find itself in a situation where police forces could identify a bank account or some other financial transaction in the province of Quebec.
That might have to be frozen or investigated.
So it was mostly the economic aspects.
That could have happened in the province of Quebec, but that was hypothetical at that point.
The fact is, I shared this with Madame Lebel to try to help everybody understand a totally new situation that we were facing across all levels of government.
In fact, that is my next question, because the opinion expressed here by Premier Legault was equally expressed by others.
If I may say so.
Why in our province?
You may be having a problem in Ottawa.
You may be having a problem in Ambassador Bridge, but we're not having a problem in, say, Saskatchewan or Manitoba.
That was a view expressed by several provinces.
And so, was any serious thought given to an approach to the Emergencies Act that would be targeted in the sense of where the measures would apply?
Sure.
The government considered one option under the Act, and I...
I don't have a complete juridical sense of the different interoperability of different sections of the Emergencies Act, but there is a possibility to invoke it in a geographically specific context.
That was determined not to be the appropriate course of action, I think for two reasons.
First of all, the concern about the financial measures which we believed and which law enforcement...
Senior officials of the finance department believed might be one of the most effective ways to bring this illegal occupation and these blockades to an end is to choke off the very real supply of money that they were generating in ways that hadn't been contemplated perhaps when some of this legislation was drafted.
So that instrument was seen as one of the effective, and it, in my view, turned out to be quite effective.
In dissuading other protest activities and bringing to a conclusion, particularly the context in Ottawa.
So there was the requirement for a national application of the Act to ensure that those economic and financial measures, if you're a trucker from New Brunswick that's parked on Wellington Street and your bank account is at Les Caisses Populaires Unies.
In Karaket, New Brunswick, you shouldn't be able to evade the financial measures that were necessary, in our view, to bring this to a conclusion.
And the other very compelling reason, from our perspective, to have a national application was because the situation was very dynamic, and it was very fluid.
And it wasn't clear that if the Ambassador Bridge had been and was in the process of being cleared, It wasn't clear that these people wouldn't come back.
It wasn't clear that they wouldn't show up in another jurisdiction.
There were still threats identified in other provinces.
So we thought that the national application, in the event that there was a sympathy or pop-up blockade that was illegal, it would give the law enforcement authorities in those jurisdictions those instruments.
But it also had a dissuasive effect.
It would have allowed enforcement authorities to designate critical infrastructure to prevent people from bringing children into an illegal protest or illegal occupation.
So we think that it had a dissuasive effect in terms of spreading the serious and illegal occupation in Ottawa to other jurisdictions across the country.
So it's really those two.
Those two branches or those two aims, one, the application of the financial measures cutting off funding, and two, the preventative or dissuasive effect that, in the government's view, meant that the Act had to apply nationally if it was going to be effective.
That's right.
Maybe the second one might be sort of 2A and 2B.
There was a dissuasive element, but there was also the preventative element of giving those jurisdictions those tools should they suddenly arise that...
The ferry terminal to Newfoundland was blocked.
We wouldn't have to re-invoke some special measure to allow the authorities in the province of Nova Scotia to have the measures to designate a critical piece of infrastructure and to render illegal an activity that was designed to disrupt the peace.
Okay, thank you.
You can take that document down now, Mr. Clerk, and pull up briefly, ssm.nsc.can403224.
And you can scroll down to page three, please.
So, Minister LeBlanc, as you know, the consultation with the provinces is part and parcel of the Emergencies Act under Section 25. It's an obligation that must be fulfilled.
Before the Act can be invoked.
So this is what we're looking at right now is the decision note prepared by the Clerk of the Privy Council delivered to the Prime Minister on February 14th.
And at the bottom of the page here, she talks about the consultation requirement and she says, on February 14th, 2022, you convened a First Minister's meeting to discuss with the Premiers, seek their views on this scenario and the measures being explored.
You can scroll down a bit because we know essentially what was said during the meeting.
She summarizes the various opinions that were expressed, and then she says, this first minister's meeting will meet the requirements for consultation with the provinces under the Emergencies Act, and then follows that with a letter.
So I suppose the question to put would be, so this was a...
One First Minister's meeting, and I think it lasted about an hour or something like that, if that's correct.
If this meets the consultation requirement, is there anything that wouldn't?
Well, we believe that that meeting was an essential part, as you noted, in terms of the decision to invoke the act.
The Prime Minister had not made up his mind whatsoever before that conversation.
A number of discussions between my cabinet colleagues and their counterparts in the provinces and territories, between senior officials of our government in multilateral fora, and in some cases bilaterally, with provincial and territorial officials,
informed our government's conclusion that existing provincial municipal authorities We're going to be inadequate to bring this to a safe and expeditious conclusion.
So this one meeting was the moment where the Prime Minister shared his views on the potential invocation of the Emergencies Act.
But as I said, there were ongoing and active bilateral and multilateral conversations at almost every level of our government that were necessary inputs into the government's decision to proceed to the Emergencies Act The source of final authority or the last resort in terms of concluding this serious threat to Canadian safety and security.
Okay.
Mr. Clerk, can you take that one down now and pull up SSM.CAN 50124?
So this is the report to Parliament on the consultations, which I assume you're quite familiar with, Mr. LeBlanc.
And it goes to the point you were just making, I believe, which is...
Sorry, scroll down a bit, please, Mr. Clerk, so we can just see what goes.
So the first thing that's listed here is the background and then a subheading that says engagement.
And over the next few pages, we're not going to go through it all.
A lot of it we've heard about over the last few weeks, but scroll down.
It describes the various engagements that were had at both the political and officials' level over the course of the convoy events.
Sorry, Mr. Clerk, can you just keep scrolling for a little bit?
Scroll down.
We see Prime Minister speaking to the Premier.
Scroll down again.
Scroll down again.
Keep scrolling.
Keep scrolling.
And then we see on page, I've lost count.
Consultations on the Emergencies Act with the First Ministers, and this describes the actual consultation with the First Ministers that we've just gone through.
So if I take what you're saying and if I'm not putting it fairly, then please correct me.
But the consultation requirement was fulfilled in the clerk's advice and in your view by the first minister's meeting at which the premiers were directly consulted about their views on the Emergencies Act.
But that was also in some senses informed by discussions.
that had been had broadly around the topic of how to resolve this problem prior to that.
There was a very deep and pervasive effort on our government's part to engage with.
Provincial officials and ministers, in some cases municipal authorities, particularly to canvas that very issue of are we missing some provincial regulatory authority, some municipal authority that may assist in concluding some of the illegal blockades or occupations, but also get ahead of some of the discussion of other potential flare-ups.
We viewed the consultation as much more than one particular meeting, if you will.
That was the conclusion of the consultative effort.
But as I said, many ministers and senior officials of our government had been engaged for many weeks with provincial and territorial officials on what collectively we needed to do to manage a situation that was becoming increasingly alarming, was spreading geographically.
The risk of violence or public disorder was growing, not diminishing in some cases.
So the trend lines were all worrisome, and that was part of the ongoing discussion.
The First Minister's meeting was the formal moment where the Prime Minister heard from all the Premiers.
I think it might be instructive.
As I said, he started on the West Coast and went to the East Coast with a...
He did not cut anyone off.
There were, unlike your questioning and the commissioner's rules on time limits, there were no time limits on that conversation.
He would have stayed on that call for as long as any premier wanted to talk.
He cut nobody off.
He answered some questions as premiers would ask them, sometimes ministers, David Lamedi in particular.
So every Premier on that call had an unlimited opportunity to share his or her views with the Prime Minister and some ministers, and at the end he asked if anybody had anything else to add, before he concluded by saying he had not made a decision, and that he would reflect on what he'd heard, and the Governor and Council process was engaged later that day.
Thank you.
That's helpful.
And that actually, Minister, brings us to the end of the questions that I have for you.
But before I sit down, I will ask you, is there anything else you'd like to add?
No, thank you.
It's been a privilege to answer your questions, and it's an opportunity for me that I've never had as a lawyer to participate in something like this.
So thank you very much.
I'm sure those are my questions.
Okay, so now we go to the next phase.
Do you want a break before we do that, or just press on?
Mr. Commissioner, you've been at this longer today than I have, so if you're prepared to go on, I am too, but it's entirely up to you.
No problem.
We're used to long days here.
Okay, convoy organizers, please.
Good evening, Mr. Commissioner, Bathsheba, Vandenberg, co-counsel for Freedom Corps and protesters.
We have no questions for Minister LeBlanc.
However, we would like to give five minutes of our time to the City of Windsor and ten minutes to Justice Centre and Democracy Fund.
Thank you.
That's a very good development.
Okay.
So, just so I get that right, five minutes to Windsor and ten minutes to the Democracy Fund, JCCF.
That's right?
Okay.
So, next is the Government of Saskatchewan, please.
Good evening, Minister.
My name is Mike Morris, and I'm counsel for the government of Saskatchewan.
Good evening.
I'm just going to advise, I'm better in English than I am in French, and my translation's not working, so it will probably work better if we can speak in English when possible, okay?
Happy to do so.
My mother was an Anglophone and my father a Francophone, so I'm happy to have our exchange in English.
Okay.
Minister, I understand that the Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat is contained within the Privy Council office, correct?
That's right.
And Michael Vandergrift is the DM of Intergovernmental Affairs, correct?
Yes, that's right.
And I understand he was the DM in January and February of this year as well.
Is that correct?
Yes, it is.
Okay.
And there is an FPT, Intergovernmental Affairs Group, correct?
There is.
He has an ongoing dialogue with his counterparts in provinces and territories as well.
I expect that group was very active in January and February of this year, particularly with respect to attempting to coordinate COVID-related responses.
Is that fair?
That's fair.
That group was very busy, as I mentioned earlier, and are now Necessary and I would think quite effective inter-federal provincial dialogue around the COVID measures.
But there were also, in the COVID context, Dr. Tam had her counterparts, the chief public health officers.
There were groups of health ministers.
So the COVID context was much more than intergovernmental affairs.
But they would have played, to your point, an active role in assisting.
The Privy Council group that works with me, and Mr. Vandergrift in particular, would have played an active role in supporting other federal agencies and officials in their relationships with provincial and territorial counterparts.
Okay.
But in spite of that, this particular group that DM Vandergrift led didn't meet with respect to the Emergencies Act until after it was invoked, correct?
That's right.
And for the reasons I shared with your colleague, the Commission Council, we thought that if the government was ultimately going to conclude that that was the last resort to bring these illegal occupations and protests and blockades to an end, it was not conducive to have that conversation in a public context.
And the fewer meetings where that issue was raised...
Increase the likelihood that we would be able to have that conversation in an appropriate way at the appropriate moment and not have it in the public space for days and weeks ahead of time.
Right.
And I'm just going to quote from the interview summary for what DM Vandergrift said.
Expect this is exactly as you related it.
DM Vandergrift explained that the reason for this was to avoid a leak of the subject matter such that premiers could express their views at the meeting without creating a public expectation around it.
That sounds like it accords with what you've just explained, correct?
Absolutely, yes, that's correct.
Okay, but you would agree with me that the provincial governments would have been better able to prepare for the meeting if they knew what it was going to be about beforehand, would you not?
From my participation in that meeting, none of the First Ministers appeared unprepared.
And frankly, when the Prime Minister explained the reason for his convening the meeting, none of them expressed surprise.
So I didn't detect a level of unpreparedness or surprise in that meeting at all.
Okay.
We heard a little bit from Ms. Durain, Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council last week, and in her view, once it became known that the government, the federal government, was considering using the Emergencies Act, a decision would need to be made very quickly about whether to invoke it or not.
Did you share that view as well?
Yes, I shared that view, and I think that view was widely shared in our government.
As I said, a protracted public discussion.
Discussion would not have been conducive to an effective use of the Act, an effective invocation.
And a number of people offered the view that there was a risk of an inflammatory effect, including the government you represent.
So long, protracted public conversation perhaps wouldn't have been effective there either.
Well, actually CSIS offered that view as well, didn't they?
That's right.
And the government considered that view, absolutely.
Okay.
But you're certainly aware that on February 13th, Minister Blair did, well, I'm aware of two interviews, one with Rosemary Barton and one with Mercedes Stevenson, where he indicated to those people, national media, that the federal government was considering invoking the Emergencies Act.
You're aware of that, correct?
I remember those interviews that Sunday.
It was that...
The journalists were asking, is the government considering every possible option?
I'll remind you, it was the third weekend that the City of Ottawa was paralyzed in a way that was, in our view, a significant and serious risk to public safety and security.
And Mr. Blair was saying that any responsible government would, at this point in...
That emergency, look at every available option to bring this to a successful and safe conclusion.
Thank you.
I'm going to ask the Clerk to pull up a document.
It's SSMCAN402370.
And just so you know, Minister, this document is listed as FMM Feb 14 Q&A, so I assume it's Q&As that were prepared for the first Minister's meeting.
Were you aware that such things were prepared?
Some of those things are prepared regularly for various meetings.
I don't remember seeing this document certainly before the meeting.
I looked at it in some of the documents that might have been sent by the Commission.
I certainly didn't see this document before the First Minister's meeting.
Okay.
Do you have any reason to believe that it wasn't prepared for the First Minister's meeting?
No, but I can't speak to which documents were prepared by which officials.
I don't have a full recollection of what documents were circulated, but if you tell me that that was a Privy Council or federal government document that was circulated, I'm prepared to take your word for it, but I can't speak to it personally.
Okay.
And I just want you to take a look at the first two questions on this Q&A.
The first one is, why did you wait so long to act?
And the second is, when will this come into effect?
Will you agree with me that these Q&As appear to have been drafted as if the decision to invoke the act had already been made by the time of the First Minister's meeting?
No.
I can tell you without hesitation that the decision had not been made.
If some communications official is preparing documents for other officials or for political offices, they say, I don't know who prepared these documents or where they were circulated, but there are a series of documents that are prepared for various hypothetical scenarios in the government as part of the routine course of business.
So I would not agree with the characterization that that speaks to a decision made.
Okay.
Or perhaps whoever drafted it may have been mistaken.
Is that your view then?
No.
Maybe they were.
I wouldn't have said it that way until you did.
Maybe they were.
But as I say, this is a normal course of business for communications officials in the Government of Canada.
That decision was clearly before the Cabinet.
The Cabinet had been the incident response group and the Cabinet had been considering This second track process for a few days.
I don't know when this document was produced even.
But as that decision was being considered, it would have been normal for communications officials to prepare documents in contemplation of a decision.
But it does not confirm a decision.
That would not be accurate.
Okay.
Sir, Commission Council took you to some of the things that were said during the First Minister's meeting.
I would like to address some of the things that weren't said during the call.
Will you agree with me that there was no discussion about there being an approved operational plan to clear the protest in Ottawa?
That was a discussion that I remember at a number of incident response group meetings.
But not at the first minister's meeting.
That's what I'm interested in, sir.
I don't remember the first minister's getting into operational policing details in the City of Ottawa.
No, I don't.
Okay.
And will you agree with me that at that FMM meeting, the federal government did not advise that no police services said they needed additional authorities?
Again, the Prime Minister convened that meeting to hear from Premiers.
We didn't provide them with detailed briefings on what police authorities had told our Cabinet.
Okay.
Will you agree with me that there was no discussion of the specific measures that would be included in the Emergency Economic Measures Order?
I want to see the document again that your colleague, the Commission Council, brought out in terms of the First Minister's meeting.
I do know at the very front end of it, my colleague David Lometty explained six areas where the government was considering as potential sources of emergency authorities in the declaration, in a potential declaration.
But I don't remember the detail that he would have given on particular financial measures.
I do know that that was shared with premiers as one of the potential sources of authorities in this declaration.
Okay, I think your counsel can probably take it up with you because they have some time at the end.
I have limited time, unfortunately.
But would you agree with me that there was no discussion, for example, of how credit unions may be affected by the order?
Or how insurers might be affected by the order.
No acknowledgement that there are provincial crown corporations that provide motor vehicle insurance that could be affected by the order.
Will you agree with me on those points?
Again, I don't remember the specifics of which financial institutions would or would not be affected, but I do know we shared with First Ministers The very clear option that should there be an invocation of the Emergencies Act,
one of the authorities that we would purport to invoke would be a way to immobilize some of the very real financing, which was fueling, and no pun intended because a lot of it was spent on fuel, I think, was fueling the illegal occupation in the City of Ottawa.
I think I can probably help out a little bit.
The document that Commission Council showed you was prepared by the Government of Canada.
So I just want you to confirm that you have no reason to believe that it was inaccurate in terms of what it put in or left out in terms of the summary, do you?
I'm not trying to be difficult, but the Commission Council put a number of government documents before me.
If you're talking about the one at the end where your colleague went through various premiers' comments at the first ministers' meeting, that was an accurate description, as I remember that particular conversation at 10.15 on the 14th with the premiers.
And you'll agree with me that several of the premiers, including Premier Moe, expressed concern that invoking the act could inflame circumstances.
Yes, that's accurate.
And in fact, that was similar to a concern that had been raised by CSIS, correct?
That's also correct, yes.
And several of the premiers indicated that demonstrations were being adequately handled with existing authorities, including Premier Mo.
Is that fair?
That's fair.
Several also indicated concerns in their own jurisdictions, and the Premier of Ontario, as I'm sure you've noted, identified very real gaps.
I also thought it was interesting the number of premiers that spoke of the challenge of getting tow trucks to clear if it was in Coutts, Alberta, or if it was, Sir, do you know when the caucus meeting was held on February 14th?
by recollection I think it was a Half an hour or 45-minute call earlier in that morning as I've thought about this.
I didn't keep notes.
I listened to that meeting.
By memory, it would have been maybe 9 o 'clock on the morning of the 14th.
Okay, so it would have been before the first minister's meeting then?
Again, subject to somebody correcting me, that would be my best recollection, yes.
We know that the Prime Minister did a press conference at 4.30 p.m. on the 14th where he announced that the Emergencies Act was being invoked.
Did Cabinet receive any notice that the Prime Minister had made that decision before 4.30 p.m.?
The way the Prime Minister did not convene another Cabinet meeting after the one on the Sunday evening...
A number of ministers with operational responsibilities, of course, would have been involved in some of the drafting necessary for the governor in council process, which was engaged after the first minister's meeting and after the prime minister received the decision memo forwarded to him by the clerk of the Privy Council.
But there was no formal cabinet notification.
That took place once the Prime Minister had come to his decision after the First Minister's meeting, and the Governor and Council process was engaged, which led to the Order and Council being issued.
You're well over your time.
I've given you, in fact, an extra five minutes, so please, if you could wrap up.
One last question, Commissioner.
Minister, how and when did you find out that the Prime Minister had made his decision to invoke the Act?
I was probably consulted during that afternoon, whether it was around the media, the news conference the Prime Minister had at the end of the day, and the governor and council process had been engaged.
So I was probably notified by somebody in his office that this was a decision.
As we move towards the end of the afternoon and we were getting ready for what would have been the public announcement.
Thank you, Minister.
I appreciate you answering my questions today.
Thank you.
Okay, thank you.
Next, if I can call on the Canadian Constitution Foundation, please.
Minister Lalonde, my name is Sujit Choudhury.
I'm counsel for the Canadian Constitution Foundation.
Good evening.
Good evening.
I'd like to pick up on a theme that was being developed by my friend from the government of Saskatchewan.
And so the theme I would submit to you is this, that as you know, the Emergencies Act has a number of requirements that has to be met.
That's right.
And so it's one of the questions that we're trying to get at is whether at the first minister's meeting, the prime minister and other members of the cabinet in attendance effectively communicated to the first ministers why they felt those requirements had been met.
So my...
My friend just asked you questions about the availability of other legal options, the so-called policing plan, correct?
The policing plan you're referring to the City of Ottawa policing plan?
Well, or what Commissioner Lokey has put into evidence that there was, in fact, by the 14th, a policing plan available or ready to be triggered.
But my friend, I believe, asked you whether that plan was put to the First Ministers, and you weren't sure if it had been or not.
But again, I'd want to see the document.
One of the major concerns that the government had is the lack of effective policing plan, particularly in Ottawa, to some extent in Windsor.
These things had dragged on now for two and three weeks.
The policing authorities were not advancing a plan or, more importantly, implementing a plan that would bring these to a conclusion.
But the First Minister's meeting didn't discuss operational details of policing plans.
What I'd like to do is pick up on another limb of the legal test for whether a public order emergency can be declared, which is whether there's a threat to national security.
And you're aware of that, correct?
Yes.
And so you're aware...
That under Section 16 of the Emergencies Act, the Governor and Council can only declare a public order emergency if there's a threat to national security.
Yes, and we concluded there was.
You did.
And did you provide any type of documentation or explanation to the First Ministers as to the basis for your conclusion that there was a threat to national security?
Again, in terms of documentary evidence or documentary exchanges, I wasn't privy to those.
I do know that deputy ministers of public safety were sharing information, the commissioner of the RCMP, obviously, with various police leaders in other jurisdictions.
So there was an ongoing and active exchange of information, as is entirely appropriate, between federal and provincial law enforcement officials.
But in terms of whether that particular policing information was shared at the First Minister's table, it was not.
So, Minister, I'd put to you this, that for the consultation requirement to have some substance to it, the federal government is under a duty, I'd ask you, to be as transparent as possible with the First Ministers on that call.
About why it is taking the exceptional step of triggering the Emergencies Act, correct?
Why we were considering taking the exceptional step.
And as I explained to your colleague, the Commission Council, those reflections, those considerations were informed by more than three weeks of active exchanges.
between the government of Canada and provincial and territorial counterparts.
So I don't think is an accurate description.
And I know many of the premiers, because they told me, were also being briefed on an active and ongoing basis, in some cases by RCMP commanders in their particular provinces, because the divisional commanders of the RCMP are, of course, contract...
And they were having ongoing and active discussions with public safety ministers in those provinces.
And in the case of Premier Kenney, he was clearly being updated in considerable detail by the police commanders in the province of Alberta.
But Minister LeBlanc, I believe you understand that at this point, according to the evidence that we've heard, In the commission, there were two potential sorts of threat assessments at the centre presented in the Privy Council office.
The first you're probably aware of is Director Vigneault's assessment, correct?
And he had assumed, he concluded there was no threat to national security for the purposes of the CSIS Act.
And that's a very significant, yes, for the purposes of the CSIS Act.
And I think it's important that there not be confusion.
Around which particular section of what act he was referring to.
But as you probably know, last week, the NSIA, Ms. Thomas testified that in her view, there was a threat to national security under the Emergencies Act, correct?
Yes.
But was her view shared with the first ministers on that call, so that the consultation was more than just providing them with notice?
Well, I don't share your view that the consultation was providing them with notice.
The National Security Advisor wasn't briefing the First Ministers on that call.
She would regularly update the Cabinet and the Incident Response Group.
We benefited from her analysis and that of Director Vigneault as well.
But I'm not quibbling with you.
The purpose of that consultation was not to have a legal discussion with First Ministers.
On the test that the governor and council was going to apply when and if we made the decision.
My colleague David Lamedi will be here tomorrow.
He'll be able, I'm sure, to speak directly to the legal test that the government was using and concluded when the governor and council made the decision.
We consulted carefully and listened very carefully to what First Minister said at that meeting and in a series of previous...
But just to be clear, at the first minister's meeting, you don't recall if a detailed threat assessment was provided to the premiers?
Again, first of all, that would not have been a secure forum.
A telephone conference call is not normally where senior intelligence officials would share detailed threat assessments.
So that particular venue would not have been possible or appropriate.
But the way that information was shared with provinces and territories is through the ongoing and secure communications between law enforcement officials of the Government of Canada.
And those premiers, many of them would talk to us about it, were being updated by their own deputy ministers of public safety or deputy solicitors general in some provinces or senior police leadership in their province that had the benefit of an open...
exchange in a secure context with the Canadian intelligence and law enforcement officials that were briefing the government of Canada.
Minister, I have a couple of minutes left.
I want to take you to a different issue, if I may.
It's about your conversations with the government of Quebec and the reservations expressed by Premier Legault and then your subsequent phone call with Minister Lebel.
And if I understood you correctly...
It was your position that the economic emergency measures that were taken had to apply nationally.
Correct?
Yes.
I told Minister Lebel after the discussion with the premiers that for the economic measures to be effective, they had to be applied nationally.
Because if somebody had a bank account...
For instance, at the Caisse Populaire in Quebec or at the National Bank, that would not be actually out of reach from the measures that we'll take.
But the same rationale does not apply to the non-economic measures, does it?
Well, it does in the sense that they were preventative.
We thought it was important, as I said to your colleague earlier, It wasn't clear that this problem was going to go away or that the people occupying the bridge in Windsor, Ontario, weren't going to displace themselves somewhere else.
There was an active discussion about risks to other critical infrastructure.
So we thought that the national application of those measures, in the case it ultimately was necessary, would have given the local law enforcement authorities the tools, for example, that the City of Ottawa...
And the Ontario Provincial Police and the RCMP use so effectively to bring the occupation in Ottawa to a conclusion.
Mr. Le Bon, let me end with this question then.
But wouldn't it have been an alternative to have offered those non-economic measures to those provinces that wanted them and to enable them to opt in as they wished to?
So those provinces who needed and wanted those powers could have gotten them right away, and those that maybe needed them later could have opted in if they needed them.
That wasn't considered as a responsible or realistic option, because by enabling all of the local enforcement, law enforcement, and provincial police authorities to have recourse to those powers, should they, in their judgment,
determine they were necessary, was a more effective and comprehensive way to provide the deterrent effect to not have a particular group of illegal occupiers in one spot displace themselves somewhere else.
So we didn't think we should be having governor and council processes every day following that decision.
The more effective and responsible way was to enable those authorities in the other jurisdictions to have recourse to that, should they in their judgment decide it was necessary.
Thank you, sir.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Next is the Democracy Fund, JCCF.
Good afternoon, Minister.
Good evening.
Yes, good evening.
I'm Hatem Kheer, Counsel for the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms.
So, the first document I'd like to take you to is the one that we've been talking about for a bit now.
It's SSM NSC CAN 50625 REL 301.
And so while that's being pulled up, this is the document relating to the First Minister's conference call, as it says right there.
And if we could please go to page two.
Yes, there we're...
Do you see?
Under Premier Horgan's third point, he said that local law enforcement was able to manage.
Do you see that?
Yes.
Okay, and if we could please go to page three, if we can go to Premier Kenny's comments.
So at the top of his first point, do you see there where he said that 15 days ago they had 1,000 trucks doing a rolling protest, but then 900 went home?
It was reduced to 100 hardcore who stayed behind.
And then just a little bit beyond that, he says they're down to a group of 40 for the past several days.
Do you see that?
Yes, I do.
And then do you also see where between the redactions, Premier Horgan informed the ministers at the meeting that they have procured on market for equipment.
and have drivers in place, so unless an unexpected surprise should open Cootes Border Crossing today.
Okay.
Do you see that?
Yes, I see that.
Okay, and then lastly, with respect to Premier Kenney, under the redactions, if we can just scroll down a little bit, it seems that Premier Kenney informed the First Minister's meeting that at a previous meeting he had asked...
The federal government to stop the vaccine mandate for truckers.
He said he doesn't understand the public health rationale given the level of transmission.
Truckers are isolated in cabs, do rapid tests.
And that, quote, or he said he, quote, thought it was an unnecessary provocation, end quote.
Premier, can you inform the First Minister's meeting of that?
Yes.
As I said, this is, in my view, an accurate summary of that meeting.
Okay, and then just proceeding on to page 5, Premier Stephenson for Manitoba, under her second point, informed the government that the RCMP were confident that they had the tools in place under provincial law needed at the Emerson border crossing, and they were finalizing plans to open the border, correct?
Yep, that's what it says.
Okay, so all those premiers had informed the federal government that further powers were not needed then in their provinces.
That was their view during that meeting, yes.
Okay, thank you.
I'm going to change course a little bit here.
If we can please pull up SSM CAN 6094 REL 301.
And while that's coming up, we've already heard about how you had a discussion with Premier Ford on February 10th, correct?
Yes.
Okay.
So if we can please just scroll down to the second email in the chain, which I take it was chronologically the first email.
This is a readout of that conversation that you had with Premier Ford?
Yes, that's a summary that my...
Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Michael Vandergrift, would have circulated to colleagues across the government that you see noted at the top of that email.
Okay, and Mr. Clerk, can we please scroll down to the second page?
I want to take...
The final paragraph in the summary.
So it says there that the Premier had informed you that on the following Monday, which I take it would be February 14th, he will be announcing plans to relax public health measures.
And he said in his view, quote, the public is at a breaking point, end quote.
And then he refers to other jurisdictions taking these steps.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And I take it that accords with your recollection of the call?
Yes.
Okay.
Now, he refers to other jurisdictions taking steps.
Was it your understanding that he was referring to Alberta, who had announced that they were implementing an accelerated removal of COVID restrictions on February 8th?
To be honest, I don't want to mislead you.
I would not be...
Able to say which jurisdiction he was referring to.
He may have been talking, obviously, to other provincial premiers and his officials would have been.
They speak actively amongst themselves, as would Dr. Moore, who was his chief public health officer with their counterparts.
So I can't purport to remember the sequence of which jurisdiction was enacting or altering which particular measures.
Okay, so given that they're all talking amongst themselves, you might have actually even been referring to Manitoba, which made a similar announcement the following day, or Saskatchewan, which made an announcement on the same day Premier Ford had made that plan, right?
Again, I'm taking your word for it.
I don't remember the sequence of which province changed what public health posture within their own jurisdiction, but I take your word for it if you have a sequence of provincial public health measures.
Okay, I want to hone in on one point that Premier Ford raised there.
He referred to the public being at its breaking point.
Would you agree that the Freedom Convoy protest was one expression of that sentiment?
I would think that certainly in the initial days of the convoy, that attracted a great deal of that sentiment.
And our government has acknowledged.
The difficulty that COVID represented for millions of Canadians.
We, the Prime Minister, ministers have acknowledged that this has been extremely difficult on many Canadians, on sectors of the economy.
We all know the list of very difficult circumstances that the pandemic brought.
So we acknowledge that.
And certainly, as the convoy was taking form, and the first day that...
We saw on Parliament Hill, there were probably a number of lawful protesters that came to express that sentiment.
That wasn't the case as the thing dragged on and as it evolved, but in the initial steps, I think that might be a fair characterization that some of the people participating in some of the convoy activities fit in that category.
Clearly, some didn't.
But you'd agree as a general principle that Generally, the goal of protesters is to be heard by their government on an issue that concerns them.
I'm not sure I generalize that across protest movements around the world or across the country.
I can't speak to why particular protest movements are formed.
One protests because one wants to bring public attention to a particular issue or bring a certain public policy or governmental policy.
Well, you'd agree that that ability to protest is one of the reasons it's protected in our charter is because it's important to that democratic process.
It's the voice of, you know, it's one of the ways that people can have a voice.
Absolutely.
Lawful and peaceful protest is an essential part of any democracy.
And as you said, it's protected.
So you'd agree that the provinces then that were responding to these protests by lifting their restrictions would be an example of protesters being successfully heard, right?
No, I wouldn't speak for why provincial health authorities made those decisions.
I have noted on a number of occasions that Premier Ford, in the case of Ontario, referred to following the medical advice from Dr. Moore, his chief public health officer.
And other scientists.
So no, I wouldn't purport to say, and I certainly don't purport to speak for premiers or their health ministers or their chief public health officers.
They can explain why they made particular decisions with respect to their public health measures.
But to say that it is in response to a protest, I think is a pretty simplistic analysis that may not be borne out by what a number of them have said publicly.
What they've said publicly, but if we look at Premier Ford's comments in this call, I grant you, he says he has the support of Dr. Moore, but he says that the public is at a breaking point, and so he's going to put in a more aggressive schedule in Ontario.
You didn't take him to be referring to taking action in response to the protest?
No, because in that same conversation, he talked about his extreme frustration with the protests and the illegal blockades.
And the serious multi-billion dollar damage it was doing to the economy of Ontario.
He shared with me the conversations he had with the Governor of Michigan.
He shared with me the conversations with union leaders, business leaders about the investment climate that this was sending for Ontario.
He spoke to me about the very real risk of violence in Ottawa, the illegal occupation of Ottawa.
He was not crediting the illegal occupation or blockades with his decision to adjust public health measures.
And in fact, he referred to his chief public health officer in that context as well.
He wasn't crediting that decision, but it doesn't mean it wasn't motivating it, right?
Premier Ford is quite an articulate political leader.
I can't speak for why he made particular decisions within the sovereign jurisdiction.
Of the government of Ontario.
But my frequent conversations with him would lead me to believe that the decisions that he made on the appropriate public health measures.
And Ontario was one of the jurisdictions in the country that had at various times amongst the most severe measures.
So his government had taken very difficult and very real steps in the fight against the coronavirus, which...
We thought were very conducive to trying to protect as many citizens of his province as possible.
So his leadership with respect to public health measures, from my conversations with him, was not motivated by the illegal blockade that was causing such harm to the economy of Ontario in Windsor or the completely unacceptable illegal occupation of the City of Ottawa.
Well, let's turn our attention to a different premier.
I'm going to ask that we pull up PB CAN, four zeros, 1846.
You've already seen this, I believe, or at least a different version of this document.
And Mr. Clerk, if we can please go to the last page, we're going to have to zoom in on the second screenshot.
Perhaps if we can even just zoom in a little bit more, it's okay if the bottom gets cut off.
Okay.
So, apologies for the quality of the screenshot.
This is how we received it.
But do you see there at the top, it says the date, Friday, February 11th?
I do.
Okay.
And then it says there, Dominic, I take it that this was, I think actually it was already in response to Commission Council.
This is a message that you sent.
Yeah, I had sort of copy-pasted a text message that I had received.
I'm guessing if it was 7.47 in the morning, I might have received it overnight from Premier Kenney, and I was forwarding it, I think, to my colleagues.
Okay, so the message from Premier Kenney that you were forwarding, which has already been referred to, is that he said the trucker vax policy is obviously just dumb political theater.
Calling them Nazis hasn't exactly helped, right?
Those were his words and his message to me.
Now, my question for you, Minister, is was this sentiment ever relayed to Cabinet as a whole?
I was updating my Cabinet colleagues at the Incident Response Group.
On various discussions with premiers, I would have forwarded that to, I think, I can't see the topic, but I remember it was Minister Al-Gabra, I think Omar, and probably Marco Mendicino.
But I was updating my cabinet colleagues on those interactions.
But so too was Dr. Tam, who was talking to her chief public health officer counterparts.
The sharing of information around the views of provincial governments was much broader than my summarizing for cabinet colleagues various conversations that I may have had with premiers.
Given, and you know, we did see that Premier Kenny raised a similar statement, though perhaps a different language at the first minister's meeting.
Did the government consider lifting restrictions as a way to hear what the protesters were asking for?
No, the decisions that we made on public health measures were informed by public health advice from doctors and from scientists.
That was always the focal point of our decision-making as a government with respect to these public health measures.
I put it to you that Premier Kenney was right and that the Removal of the exemption for truckers that led to this whole protest in the first place was just a political tactic.
Well, it won't surprise you that I don't share that view.
And I would also remind you that the United States had a vaccine mandate with respect to truckers that the government of Canada was not able to lift.
So there was also a lot of confusion around whether, if ultimately based on medical and scientific advice, we determined that that particular mandate was no longer necessary.
If the United States government hadn't lifted that particular measure, it wouldn't have changed much for truckers trying to cross that particular international.
Well, what about referring to the protesters as Nazis?
I put it to you that that was also a political tactic.
Again, I don't share that view.
I didn't agree with the characterization of Premier Kenney.
I shared his message with colleagues of mine.
Those are all the questions I have.
Thank you.
And I believe there's some time left over so I can pay back yesterday's indulgence with interest.
Okay, thank you.
So next is the CCLA, please.
I'm not sure what's going on.
Those words we've heard so many times, Commissioner, you must be on mute.
Yeah, no, not on mute.
I think she was here this morning, earlier.
Maybe she didn't realize she had time.
Or you were so clear that she has no questions.
Okay, well...
We'll move to the City of Windsor instead.
And maybe Commission Council can...
I'll do that.
Thank you.
Good evening, Minister LeBlanc.
My name is Graham Reader.
I'm Council for the City of Ottawa.
Good evening.
I want to start off by clearing up some comments you made to my friend for the Canadian Constitutional Foundation.
About the police operations in Windsor.
It was not the case that there was no plan in Windsor, nor did it take weeks to resolve.
The evidence before the commission is that the blockade in Windsor began on February 7th.
A preliminary plan was in place.
Windsor police quickly requested public order resources from the OPP and other policing partners.
These resources quickly arrived and the plan was further developed.
One integrated command was set up on the 10th.
The plan was actioned on the 12th and 13th, at which point the blockade in Windsor was cleared less than a week after it was established.
Just so you misspoke when you suggested the blockade in Windsor had been going on for weeks and there was no plan.
Just wanted to clear that up.
Thanks.
Is there a question at the end of that?
No, there was not.
It's an odd way to carry out it.
Cross-examination.
I'm happy to ask if that accords with your understanding, Mr. Blanc.
My understanding is that the economic and social disruption in Windsor was enormous and it had gone on for many days and was a source of international concern at the highest levels in the American administration.
We were obviously glad that it was resolved in the way it was resolved.
But to have an international border crossing that cost billions of dollars to the Canadian economy and led to considerable reputational damage for Canada as an investment opportunity, we wouldn't describe as a very successful effort.
But I certainly share your view that when it was resolved peacefully, it was a very important moment for the country.
I'll ask Mr. Clerk to bring up SSMCAN0003117.
This is a letter from the Prime Minister to Premiers sent after the First Minister's meeting on February the 14th.
And if we can go to page three under point six.
The letter reads, our government recognizes the importance of coordinating with provinces, territories, and municipalities to ensure the safety and security of Canadians.
Do you agree with the Prime Minister here?
Yes, and he was very clear in the First Minister's meeting and in various discussions across our government that that was the case.
Thank you.
Minister Blair and Minister Mendocino both told this commission that there's a responsibility for all three orders of government to communicate and cooperate when responding to an event like the protests earlier this year.
Do you agree with them?
Yes.
And we heard from Minister Mendocino today that timely two-way communication between his ministry and the City of Windsor was important in his work.
At the federal level to respond to the blockade of the Ambassador Bridge.
I'll ask Mr. Clerk to bring up SSMCAN00002253.
Although I understand you did not communicate directly with Windsor, were you aware that your senior advisor, Meredith Kaplan-Jameson, communicated with Windsor's Mayor's Chief of Staff, Mr. Telczewski, during the blockade of the bridge?
Yes, I know that People who work in my office were speaking with officials at the City of Windsor and in the Government of Ontario.
And I know that my colleague, and he, I'm sure, spoke about it today, but Marco Mendicino spoke, I believe, with the Mayor of the City of Windsor as well on a number of occasions.
Ms. Kaplan-Jameson spoke with Mr. Teliszewski the morning of February 8th, the morning after the blockade started in Windsor.
She relied on the, and Ms. Kaplan-Jameson relied on that information she received from Mr. Teleczewski in this briefing note to you on that same day.
She talks about Mr. Teleczewski, if we can slowly scroll through to give the minister a chance to see the briefing note.
She talks about Mr. Teleczewski's download and highlights information that she characterized.
Characterizes the makeup of the convoy in Windsor, the situation on the ground, the city's key concerns, what next steps the city had already taken, and what the city's next steps were.
Are you aware that Mr. Taliszewski continued to share information with Ms. Kaplan-Jameson throughout the blockade?
I can't speak to the number of specific times or the dates when they would have spoken, but I know that she had told me that she had an ongoing discussion.
With some officials in Windsor, and I know she was sharing that with colleagues in other offices as well, I assume, Mr. Mendicino's office and others.
And further to that, Ms. Kaplan-Jameson asked her counterparts in other ministries to invite her to meetings with Ontario counterparts, including municipalities.
Is that right?
Does that accord with your...
That would be a normal part of her responsibilities in my office, yes.
And you're familiar with the report to the Houses of Parliament regarding the Emergency Act consultations?
The report that was tabled per the legislation, yes.
That's right.
So let's pull it up.
PB CAN 00001159.
So the report includes details on the federal government's engagement with the provinces, territories, and municipalities, and law enforcement.
On the first page under Engagement, is it right that it includes details of the federal engagement with the City of Ottawa?
Yes, I had read that as part of what was a table in Parliament.
It also describes regular engagement with municipal and provincial officials concerning the Ambassador Bridge, including, just to list them out for you, communication between the Prime Minister and the Mayor of Windsor.
Between the Minister of Transport and the Mayor of Windsor, the Office of the President of the Queen's Privy Council in the City of Windsor, the Minister of Emergency Preparedness in the City of Windsor, the Office of the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities, and I believe that's your office, and the City of Windsor.
Is that an accurate summary?
Yes, I believe that to be accurate of the various communications that were taking place.
Now, would you agree that this regular communication with municipal officials was vital to the work of the federal government in responding to the blockades?
It was, and my colleagues with operational responsibilities, my own role in the intergovernmental space is not obviously operational the way it would be the public safety minister or the transport minister, but provincial and municipal partners were obviously critical in managing this circumstance.
We're always conscious that municipalities operate constitutionally as creatures of provincial legislation.
It's not a constitutional order of government.
But they have such an important responsibility in managing these public order emergencies that necessarily their officials, their law enforcement officials and so on, have open and active conversations, I think, with provincial and certainly federal officials.
And that's in everybody's interest in trying to bring the maximum amount of pressure to bear on ending these illegal circumstances in the most efficient and safest way possible.
And this engagement with municipal governments was important enough to the decision to invoke the Emergencies Act that the government included it in the consultation report.
Is that right?
Yes, because it was part of our government's conclusion.
That existing provincial and municipal authorities and resources were not going to be adequate to bring these illegal events to a conclusion.
And that's why the Emergencies Act, which is necessarily the last resort in this decision-making process, in our view became necessary.
So to inform ourselves, we had active and ongoing conversations as a national government with these municipal and provincial authorities because everybody was trying to use every existing tool, authority, resource to bring these to a safe and appropriate conclusion.
So for us to conclude that it wasn't likely going to work and that it was necessary ultimately for the governor and council to proceed to invocation.
Would you agree with me that it's apparent from the protests and the collaborative relationship and two-way communication between the federal government and impacted municipalities that that communication is critical in responding to a multi-jurisdictional event like the ones we experienced earlier this year?
Yes.
And would you agree that the federal government cannot always rely on their provincial Again, I want to be careful.
As the Intergovernmental Affairs Minister, I'm conscious of the constitutional orders of government.
You're a lawyer, you'll understand that as well.
Some provinces are very jealous of the Government of Canada having, in some contexts, direct relationships with their municipalities.
That's not the case in every jurisdiction.
And happily, that was not the case with respect to this.
This collective effort, not joint effort, from the different orders of government, as you noted, to try and manage this national public safety emergency.
And the direct communication that you alluded to there, is that particularly important, which in the case, for example, with the Ambassador Bridge, if an event is related to federal critical infrastructure and the borders within a municipality?
Yes, and that was one of the challenges with respect to those international border crossings, which clearly are critical economic infrastructure for the country.
The fact that this international border crossing could so effectively be blockaded, largely in the municipal streets of the city of Windsor.
One of the challenges was the bridge itself may have a different jurisdictional scope, but access to an international border crossing, in this case, is properly in the municipal streets of the city you represent.
So that is exactly why it was important for us to have the appropriate situational awareness as we contemplated what would be the appropriate tools that might assist municipal and provincial authorities in bringing this to a conclusion.
I understand.
I'm at the end of my time.
If I could just ask one final question.
What are you doing to ensure this cooperation and communication happens, particularly if, for example, a provincial partner isn't engaging in the way you would like?
I, as the infrastructure minister, another portfolio that I have responsibility for, have ongoing and active discussions with provinces and municipalities in terms of infrastructure programs.
So, across the Government of Canada, there are active discussions with municipalities in many different areas of public policy.
And in something as important as the effective enforcement of measures necessary to bring illegal, very dangerous and damaging illegal activities to an end, we'll continue to work with all the partners necessary to do this.
And as I said, from our perspective, the provincial governments understood that the three orders of government had to be involved for this to be effective.
And in the vast majority of cases, that was the cooperation that was successfully being used.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Thank you, Minister LeBlanc.
Those are all my questions.
Thank you.
Okay, next to the City of Ottawa, please.
Good evening, Minister LeBlanc.
My name is Alyssa Tompkins.
I'm one of the council representing the City of Ottawa.
I just have a couple questions for you this evening.
So I'm going to follow up on a document that Commission Council took you, the email from Ralph Goodell.
So if we could bring that up, it's ssm.can.00006594.
And if we can just scroll down.
So it's really the last sentence of the first paragraph, but we'll start one sentence prior.
Granted, the volume of the protests in Ottawa was greater and came without as much warning, but the city of Ottawa and the OPS have proven themselves incapable of grappling with this problem.
And I get that's not your statement, it's his, I'm going to park it.
But it's the last sentence.
And it is now the duty of the responsible senior authority, i.e.
the Public Safety Minister of Ontario, under provincial policing legislation, to rectify that problem, including taking control if and as necessary.
So the follow-up question I had was, and my understanding is the Public Safety Minister of Ontario is in fact the Solicitor General.
Is that your understanding as well?
Again, I can't speak for Mr. Goodale, but that was how I would have interpreted that as well.
He was our federal public safety minister, and his counterpart would have properly been the Solicitor General of Ontario.
So I assumed, like you, that that's what he was referring to.
Now, all I want to know is, are you aware if anyone from the federal government followed up with Ontario to see if, in fact, they were going to discharge the duty?
That Mr. Goodell is talking about here.
So I can't speak.
I'm not an expert on the statutory application of provincial legislation in Ontario and what those authorities might be under the Ontario Police Services Act.
So I have no ability.
I received this email from the now High Commissioner of Canada to the United Kingdom.
But a former public safety minister, as I said to your colleague, the Commission Council.
So it was not as a result of Mr. Goodale's email to me, but I think it's accurate to say that there was an ongoing and active discussion between many senior officials of our government, many of my cabinet colleagues, the transport minister, the public safety minister, whom you heard from today.
With their Ontario counterparts to explore every necessary and possible option to bring these illegal occupations and blockades to a safe and successful conclusion.
But what are the precise mechanics in the policing context?
I can't speak to that.
Perhaps Mr. Mendicino did earlier today or maybe David Lamedi can tomorrow.
No, and I wasn't intending to ask you about that.
I was just asking if you were aware of any interactions by your colleagues or by yourself with Ontario along this line.
So, yes, I know there was, as I say, a very active and ongoing discussion at many levels of our government.
One conversation that we discussed earlier with your colleagues that I had with Premier Ford on the night of February 10th, His concern around some of the challenges in municipal policing in the City of Ottawa.
He spoke to me about the role that he thought the OPP was increasingly going to be playing in support of the necessary public safety measures to clear the City of Ottawa.
And obviously on that evening the circumstance in Windsor had not been resolved.
So Premier Ford spoke to me about I do know that there was a very real desire from the Premier,
and that view was shared by some of my Cabinet colleagues in the updates they would give to the incident response group meetings.
Because, as I say, these discussions, if it was Commissioner Luckey, if it was a National Security Advisor, Intelligence Advisor, the Prime Minister, there were many and multiple discussions, particularly with the province of Ontario, but not exclusively, around all of these measures, including the appropriate sharing of police resources, to try and bring these to a conclusion.
Okay, that's helpful and that's all I have.
Thank you, Minister.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Next, counsel for former chief, slowly.
Good evening, Minister.
Rebecca Jones for former Chief Slowly.
If we can actually pull up the same document, SSMCAN6594.
And Minister, you testified, this is the document that was just up, so as we're pulling it up.
You testified that you appreciated Mr. Goodales, based on his experience, his insights into the roles of the different orders of government, right, when you got this email?
Yes, and him having held the public safety portfolio in our government, I thought might have given him an insight that other colleagues would not have had.
Fair enough.
And I just want to ask you about a few other comments in this email that I...
I think you'll agree with me are insights he shared that you did not agree with.
So if we can start in the very first paragraph, there's a reference to a tweet by Mayor Tory, and then there's a reference to it being the situation being a municipal policing problem.
And I take it that as a minister in a government that has repeatedly referred to this as a national security crisis.
You did not agree that this was a municipal policing problem in Ottawa.
He was talking about Toronto and other cities, and I'm thinking off the top of my head of Quebec City.
I'm thinking of Fredericton New Brunswick or perhaps Toronto, where, and again, I'm going not by some operational experience I have or briefings on how this worked.
But if I go on the coverage of the events at the New Brunswick Legislature, the Fredericton Police appeared to have handled that successfully.
Certainly the Quebec City Police with the Silted Quebec were seen to have handled it very effectively.
And I also remember the City of Toronto, the very real concerns around some potential blockages at the Legislature at Queen's Park in Toronto.
But as we know, that University Avenue is a critical access to many of the country's best hospitals.
So those kind of conversations or potential protests attracted certainly our attention as a national government.
And again, without having been briefed on the operational command of which police force did what, to the observer, and Mr. Goodale was observing this from...
I would agree with his assessment that in Toronto, it looked like the Toronto police had effectively handled that situation.
But what was the role of other police forces?
I can't speak to that.
Right.
You can't speak to whether you can compare the experience in Toronto to the experience in Ottawa, for example.
Well, clearly you can't because the experience in Toronto was effectively resolved and didn't lead to a three-week illegal occupation.
So, yeah, I would agree with you.
Right.
Well, I mean, there are other differences, right, that we see even in Mr. Goodale's email.
He refers to the volume of the protest in Ottawa and the amount of notice.
Correct?
Yes, I would agree the volume, but it wasn't a surprise that that convoy arrived in the city of Ottawa.
There was considerable notice.
In fact, people were filming across the country, the trucks rolling towards the city.
So Minister, I'm going to return to my question.
Is it your evidence that what happened in the city of Ottawa was a municipal policing problem?
That it was not a national problem?
Not at all.
That's not my evidence.
That's what Mr. Goodale's email would purport to identify.
Right.
So let me just go back to my question.
My question was, I wanted to know what part of his email you disagreed with.
You disagree that what was happening in Ottawa was a municipal policing problem.
Because you say, and we all know, that it was a national problem that was happening in Ottawa, right?
It certainly became a national problem when the capital city was paralyzed and occupied illegally for three weeks.
There was an element in the City of Ottawa, of course, around Parliament Hill and the role of the Parliamentary Protective Service.
As I said to your colleague, I have sat for a number of years on the Board of Internal Economy of the House of Commons.
The statute requires two ministers to be members.
I sit there where we talk about parliamentary security.
But I wouldn't purport to say that the public order emergency in the City of Ottawa was a municipal problem.
If you're asking me to agree with that, I think it was a national problem.
And all three orders of government had to play an effective role in bringing it to a conclusion.
Right.
Thank you.
And one more point that I hope we can agree on, this one as well, which is...
But to the extent that Mr. Goodell said that the City of Ottawa and the OPS had proven themselves incapable of grappling with the problem, you didn't agree, I take it, with any suggestion that the City of Ottawa and the OPS had, through any fault of their own, proven themselves incapable, but only that the situation was not at that time being resolved.
Is that fair?
I don't have any experience in police operations, so what is the appropriate police response in a particular public order emergency is not something that I feel comfortable saying.
If you're asking if the Ottawa Police Service was overwhelmed and was unable in the front end of this occupation to take control and resolve the situation, that to an observer across the country.
I think might be a conclusion.
But I do agree with your analysis that as the thing became more entrenched, as it attracted perhaps different actors from the initial weekend, as it became a flashpoint and a rallying point for different participants, the level of the public order emergency became much greater than in those initial days that people...
May have estimated, perhaps with the advantage of hindsight, incorrectly.
Thank you.
No further questions.
Thank you.
Government of Alberta, please.
Good evening, Minister.
My name is Stephanie Bowes.
I am Council for the Province of Alberta.
I just have one area that I'd like to ask you questions on, and that is on your communication with the Premier of Alberta back in February of 2022.
And I'll start by asking the clerk to please pull up a summary of your witness interview.
The document is WTS 6073.
And then if the clerk could please scroll to page four.
We'll just have this up in case you need to refresh your memory, Minister.
Now, you were asked by Commission Council and by other council about a text message that you shared that you were sent by Premier Kennedy.
That wasn't the only text message or communication that you had with Premier Kenney, is that correct?
That's the one that I remembered and I discussed in my interview with the Commission Council because he was referring to the potential use of military heavy lift tow trucks.
It's possible that Premier Kenney, as we saw earlier in a text message that I had shared, With my cabinet colleagues, he had expressed some frustration in terms of the response of some of the RCMP officers with respect to the situation in Coutts.
And just in your witness summary, you indicate that you were called telling Premier Kenney that there was a formal process for RFAs that you were not involved in, but that you would speak to Minister Blair or Minister Annand.
Do you recall that conversation with Premier Kenney?
Yes, it would have been an exchange of text messages, and yes, I do recall that.
Mr. Kenney, of course, was himself a Minister of National Defence, so he would have had more than other premiers perhaps an insight into that whole request for assistance process.
And at that time, were you aware that the province of Alberta had, in fact, submitted an RFA on February 5th?
I was not until Premier Kenney indicated to me that they had submitted it.
No, I was not.
That was being dealt with by my colleagues, Bill Blair, and obviously the Minister of National Defence herself was involved.
But I was not, I would not normally be involved unless I was briefed in a meeting, an incident response group meeting, in terms of that RFA process.
Okay, so it's fair to say that in your ministerial role, you don't typically handle RFAs, correct?
That's correct.
As I say, I would have been in meetings where my colleagues would have said, we've received or we're expecting to receive.
These things are rarely surprises.
They're worked on between officials.
When the formal request for assistance arrives, there has in the vast majority of cases, and most of these things you'll appreciate.
There has been a massive increase in those requests for assistance in the COVID context.
Yes, we heard evidence about that.
Yeah, so the process is well-worn and well-known to provincial emergency measures organizations.
There's nothing mysterious about this to provincial authorities.
Right, and in indicating that you would speak to either Minister Blair or Minister Anand, do you recall if you did speak to either of those two ministers?
Yeah, I would have, as you saw, I had forwarded a text message to the transport minister and the public safety minister, but I would have said to, certainly to Bill Blair, when he was at the incident response group meetings I was at, that Premier Kenney had reached out to me with respect to the potential use of military heavy lift tow trucks.
All right, and that limited your involvement there to the RFA, correct?
Yes, that's correct.
Okay.
And then just one other question.
At no point in time prior to the invocation of the Emergencies Act did you discuss with the Premier or any other official from Alberta the potential use of the Emergencies Act.
Is that correct?
I have no recollection whatsoever of having raised that with any of them before we had that First Minister's call that we discussed earlier this evening.
All right.
Thank you, Minister.
Those are my only questions this evening.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Do we have any news from the CCLA?
Yes, Mr. Commissioner.
They've confirmed that they either did not request time or if they did, they're not proceeding with it.
If there is a party that requested time and has not been called, now would be the time to do it in case there was an issue with the sheet.
It's dangerous to say that there is...
Ten minutes sitting out there.
I'm not necessarily endorsing that.
I'm just saying it's a possibility.
To be fair, that is true.
If somebody, if there is a bureaucratic error on our part, which wouldn't be the first to speak now or forever hold your peace.
Okay, that's great.
So, call on the Government of Canada, please.
Good evening.
Robert McKinnon for the Government of Canada.
I just want to take you to a couple of documents that my friends have taken you to already.
So the first one would be the readout with Premier Ford and that's ssm.can.severalzeros94.
I think it's seven zeros.
And in this particular, well, we can go to the second page for this, but in this call with Premier Ford on February 10th, Late in the evening, the email sent at 10:52, so I assume that the call was shortly before that.
Is that to your best?
Yes, and that would have been 10:52 p.m. in Ottawa, which was almost midnight in New Brunswick, where I was when that call had taken place.
Okay.
And I would have, my practice was to, after a call, certainly of that significance.
To immediately provide my Deputy Minister at Privy Council for Intergovernmental Affairs, Mr. Vandergrift, with a summary of the call and he would circulate that to his counterparts as appropriate in the Government of Canada.
Right.
And in this call, he's letting you know about Ontario about to issue an order under the Emergency Act?
Yes, the Premier had told me that they were finalizing those measures and he was announcing them the next day.
And you had mentioned that you had had discussions with Ontario concerning options to deal with the situation.
Is that correct?
Yes.
The initial part of the conversation and the purported reason why I texted Premier Ford to ask if I could speak with him when I got home in New Brunswick was to explore what we thought were Particularly in the transportation sector,
but not exclusively, options that perhaps non-emergency act options, obviously, that might be brought to bear in the context of Windsor and in Ottawa.
So this was part of an ongoing effort at every level of our government, not only with Ontario, but the example you're using was with Ontario, to ensure that we have used every available And that was late.
At the end of the day, on February 10th even, you were looking at these options apart from the Emergencies Act and talking to provinces.
Is that correct?
That's absolutely correct.
And as I say, I know there had been that day a discussion around some...
But we thought were provincial transportation department authorities that may be helpful in the trucking context.
And that was the original reason why I reached out to Premier Ford.
And as I say, the conversation was quickly overwhelmed by his explaining to me the decisions that his government was in the process of implementing, which led to their invocation of their own measures the next morning.
In fact, if you look at the second last paragraph, second sentence, it says Minister LeBlanc said that the RCMP is ready to provide whatever resources are needed as long as there's a good plan in place.
That is absolutely accurate.
One of the things that struck me at the various incident response group meetings and in briefings from particularly Commissioner Lucky, but not exclusively the Commissioner, Because other federal law enforcement officials were providing updates, the head of the Canadian Border Services Agency, the director of CSIS and others.
But police authorities, particularly in our case, the RCMP, the commissioner of the RCMP, were very concerned about their counterparts in municipal or provincial police organizations having the appropriate operational plan in place.
That would enable the RCMP to then affect additional resources in a safe and effective way.
So that was a subject that Commissioner Luckey brought up often with the Incident Response Group and in various other briefings that I was a party to before the Incident Response Group was stood up by the Prime Minister.
And there's no mention in this email of any reference to the Emergencies Act, the Federal Emergencies Act, only the Ontario one.
Is that correct?
That's right, and I did not discuss with the Premier at all the potential invocation federally.
We were still canvassing, and you would have seen that in some of the incident response group minutes.
The first track, track one, was still very much on that evening the focus of our efforts.
Because we recognized that the Emergencies Act, ultimately, if that was the decision, was a decision of last resort.
So we were very much actively in pursuit of existing provincial and municipal authorities and federal support that would help them execute those authorities in the most safe and effective way.
When did you, I'm talking about Cabinet, first consider the use of Emergencies Act?
The first time I remember a discussion about the potential invocation or the necessary analysis that might lead the government to conclude that that was the necessary step of last resort was at a meeting earlier in the evening on the 10th of February in Ottawa, an incident response group meeting.
And as I say, the briefing by officials.
It was framed in the context of Track 1, which we had been pursuing since the very beginning of this public order emergency.
And Track 2 then became an option or a source of discussion for the government as an option if Track 1, which was the existing authorities, municipal, federal, and provincial.
Continued to prove ineffective in resolving these illegal blockades and occupations.
So it was earlier that day then, you said February 10th, that Cabinet first considered.
There was an IRG meeting that day.
Are you referring to that IRG meeting?
Yes, and I want to be careful.
Considered...
I'm not sure that would be the way I...
That's the first time Cabinet...
It was briefed by senior officials that they were beginning to look at, and subsequently over the meetings the next day and on the weekend, that became part of the conversation.
The first time it was raised as an option before the government, the invocation was as the second and last resort track, if you will, was on that evening of the 10th of February.
At the Incident Response Group meeting, you're correct.
Right.
We know that there's a chart at the back of the February 12th minutes listing Track 1 and Track 2 options.
Do you recall that?
Yes, and I would recall that conversation at that meeting as well.
I think that was the Saturday.
I was physically in Ottawa during those days, and I remember that Saturday meeting.
So would you use the word consider in that context on the 12th for that meeting?
Yes, the cabinet was being briefed by officials and I assume the Minister of Justice.
I'm going by memory.
I don't have the minutes in front of me.
But cabinet colleagues and senior officials were explaining to the government.
To the incident response group meeting in that case, what might be the steps necessary and the potential authorities that could be contained should the government decide to proceed to an invocation of the Emergency Act.
Okay, thank you.
Another document my friends took you to, and you made reference to, so I just want to make sure I'm highlighting an area that you referenced in your answer.
It's ssm.nsc.can.00625.
It's the First Minister's conference call.
And the first page, you made reference and answer to my friend who didn't have this up at the time.
You mentioned the first part that certain measures were listed and he was asking you about certain measures.
And you said you thought you recalled it in the first part, and I'll stop there.
If you look at Minister Lamedi, and you mentioned six measures, if you look on the fourth line, it says he highlighted six areas where measures can be taken.
Do you see that?
Yes.
Are those the measures that you are referring to when you answered a question earlier?
Yes, I was.
All right.
And in there...
It has six.
I won't read them all out, but it does have a measure that authorizing or directing financial institutions to render essential services to relieve the impact of blockades.
Do you see that?
Yes, I do.
My friend asked you for more specificity, but the measure is referred to in there.
Is that correct?
The measure is referred to, and again, going by memory, my colleague David Lometty.
I would have explained that one of the concerns we have is the financial support, which was very considerable to these illegal blockades and occupations.
And these economic measures were only available should the government decide to invoke the Emergencies Act.
And that was, I think it was your colleague representing one of the provincial governments, that was exactly, I'm going by memory.
It's getting late, but it's not as late for some of you who've been here all day.
But that was exactly what I was referring to.
It is accurate to say that Mr. Lamedi told First Ministers that there were these economic measures that financial institutions could take to effectively cut off funding of these illegal activities.
All right.
On the second page, my friend referred to...
Some premiers referencing the risk of further inflaming the situation.
Do you recall that?
Yes.
And if you look at the response of Premier Horgan, the PM's response, that premier endorsed the invocation, but recognized afterwards, the PM says we would be as proportional and measured as possible.
Recognize the risk of further inflaming.
Also, I have to show firmness that comes with this.
Do you see that?
Yes.
So, had Cabinet recognized this risk that it could inflame the situation?
There was a reference to a CSIS document the day earlier by one of my friends.
Inflaming the situation, although in that sense, CSIS was referring to the radicalization element.
Did you have a comment on recognizing the risk and taking account of any concerns that the premiers had in that area?
So the Prime Minister, in the course of that conversation with First Ministers, acknowledged that the Government of Canada recognized this risk.
But that was also part of the discussions we had at the incident response group meetings when we would have received updates from the various federal intelligence and law enforcement officials that were updating those groups of the group of ministers constituted at these various moments.
So it is accurate, I think, Mr. McKinnon, to say that the government of Canada and certainly the cabinet considered Okay.
That was part of the deliberative process that the government considered when we came to the decision that the circumstances were such that it warranted this measure of last resort.
okay And...
On the third page of this same document, there's a reference under Premier Kenney at the end.
It's Premier Kenney.
We go a little, about two-thirds of the way down, yes.
Yeah, that's the last sentence.
There's the last line that says, "Don't quibble using emergencies act, but there are other ways to reduce passions of people." Do you know what that is a reference to?
That was a reference, and I remember listening carefully to that conference call, to that First Minister's meeting.
I do remember the Premier of Alberta, then Premier Kenney, saying that he didn't quibble with using the Emergencies Act, but his focus had been on some of the risks, the public safety risks that were...
Very real in Coutts.
He had shared with me his concern about the very high potential for violence in Coutts.
But I do remember being surprised that the Premier of Alberta did use the phrase that's accurately reflected in that readout of the conversation.
All right.
And my last reference in this document is page 10. Page six, sorry.
There were six premiers and territorial leaders who had endorsed the invocation in this meeting, it appears by my account, one of them being Premier Ford.
And in this statement from Premier Ford, he says, I'm looking.
So it's where it's in a bullet point third from the last.
Province does not have tow trucks.
Have to negotiate with tow truck drivers.
That will change in the future.
We'll ensure that OPP have tow trucks.
Embarrassing that we can't get the use of tow trucks.
You see that?
I do.
And was that communicated by Premier Ford at this meeting?
It very much was.
View was shared, as we've heard previously, by Premier Kenney.
Premier Ford had talked to me about that.
I think we were all surprised at the extent to which commercial tow truck drivers were reluctant, were intimidated.
What the circumstance was, I don't know.
I can't speak to that.
But the lawful authorities, in this case in Ontario, were not able to procure...
A sufficient access to these heavy lift tow trucks to remove some of these large trucks that would have been blocking either the city streets of Ottawa or the bridge in Windsor, or in the case of Alberta, the Coutts-Alberta border crossing.
And one of the reasons why ultimately the Governor and Council, the Cabinet, concluded that the Emergencies Act was a necessary and proportionate use.
of last resort was because it enabled in the emergency act authorities to give local enforcement authorities the ability to compel tow truck operators or tow trucks.
I may not be using the precise words, but this was seen as part of the solution to bring these blockades to a conclusion.
It was not tenable to say we can't enforce municipal bylaws, criminal code bylaws, because we can't find somebody to tow a truck away from a critical piece of infrastructure as important as the Ambassador Bridge.
That seemed untenable, but Premier Ford correctly identified that as a real operational problem, which we view the Emergencies Act as being ultimately able to provide some relief.
And that was on February 14th?
Absolutely.
This discussion was at the First Minister's call on the 14th.
Okay.
My friends also took you to your witness statement, WTS number 073.
at the very last page.
I just want to ask you a question about revocation.
So, in your last paragraph, you described the revocation aspect.
And in the last sentence, it says he noted that the Prime Minister was insistent both at Cabinet meetings and in public that the measures would be very time-limited and would be revoked as soon as the situation permitted.
Is that still a fair statement?
It is.
The Prime Minister, when we began to consider the potential invocation of the Emergencies Act at the Incident Response Group meetings, was very insistent that it be time-limited and that it not be used longer than was minimally necessary.
All right, and I just have a couple more points to respond to questions my friends have asked.
The Council for the Democracy Fund mentioned On February 8th, that Premier Kenney had announced accelerated stages to remove all COVID-19 measures.
Do you recall that being referenced, the February 8th?
I do.
Okay.
And that on that very day, the first step was to remove the vaccine passport removal.
Correct.
And.
Was there a dispersal as a result of that announcement of health care measures of protesters at Coutts in the next few days?
That, I'm taking your word for it, Mr. McKinnon, that decision of the government of Alberta was on the 8th of February?
Of 8th, yes.
No, the Coutts illegal blockade continued for a number of days after that, and in fact...
There were sites, I remember, on the route, on the access to the particular Coutts border crossing that were increasingly becoming the source, a magnet for other activities.
So to pretend that the vaccine passports to go to a restaurant in Alberta resolved the Coutts border crossing would not be an accurate view, in my opinion, of the chronology of those events.
Okay.
There is another point that was raised.
About the Windsor Block 8 and the fact that it had been cleared.
Are you aware, if I could just pull up this document, it's WIN 50932.
Are you aware of the injunction at Windsor?
I was aware.
At our incident response group meetings, officials were briefing us and that was very much in the public domain and in public media about the injunctive relief that was being sought by authorities in Windsor.
Could you go to page 8, paragraph 47?
That's it.
That's right.
About the notion that all was fine at Windsor, if you just look at the top paragraph there.
It mentions that the court decision says that there is a risk that there could continue to be, based on uncontroverted evidence, a return of protesters, so it was necessary to continue.
So was the Emergencies Act, to your knowledge, a deterrent that was useful for this state?
In my view, yes.
And I think I tried to express to one of your colleagues that if a particular, in the case of the Windsor blockade, it was, as I've said before, extremely damaging economically.
It was high risk of public safety concerns.
All of that, in our view, was true.
But once it was dispersed, it wasn't clear where those people had gone or where they may show up next.
So in order to keep that particular border crossing open, there was a level of very significant and sustained police presence required.
The injunctive relief, as you noted, continued.
There was an issue of potentially spreading too thin police resources.
So in our view, The Emergencies Act had a dissuasive and deterrent effect that may make it possible for other particular pieces of critical infrastructure or other municipal streets not to be affected in this way once people understood the financial measures.
And the local law enforcement authorities had these additional tools to designate certain areas.
And your colleagues have spoken about this earlier.
As a way to manage potential pop-up or sympathy protests.
So, simply because the bridge had been reopened, did not remove, in our view, the risk of a recurrence, and the heavy police presence that remained, I think was perhaps a confirmation of that concern.
My last question, my very last question is, because it has to do with the deterrent effect.
I hope my question isn't in that same vein have that effect.
Maybe my answer needs to be briefer.
This can be brief.
I won't take you to it unless it's necessary.
In the IRG of February 23rd, there's a reference to the use of pamphlets in Manitoba at the Winnipeg legislature that contained measures that were used, that were handed out to protesters.
In order to help deter them from coming.
Are you aware of that from the IRG from February 23rd?
Yes, we took note of the certain irony that the province of Manitoba said over and over again that this wasn't necessary and need not apply on the territory of Manitoba.
But the Winnipeg Police Force thought that those measures that would have been available to them, had they been needed, We're of sufficient importance that they should use them in a pamphlet that they were giving to demonstrators who I think were in front of the Manitoba legislature.
I think it's on Broadway Avenue.
But that was a source of real concern, and the Winnipeg police thought that those additional authorities were significant enough that they may be used to perhaps dissuade some of those protesters from entrenching in front of the Manitoba legislature like we saw in...
Thank you, and thank you for your indulgence, sir.
Okay, so any reply?
No re-examination, Commissioner.
Okay, well, then I think you're now free to have supper.
Well, I don't look like someone who's missed lots of meals.
Yes, but still, maybe you could have a glass of wine to celebrate the end of your testimony.
Yes, I could even go and smoke a cigar with my colleague, Mr. Mendicino.
Thank you so much, Mr. Commissioner.
Thank you for appearing and for testifying, and thank you as well for having accommodated us up to this hour.
I really appreciated this occasion and your work as well.
Thank you.
We're adjourning until 9.30 tomorrow morning.
Longer than today, so...
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