All Episodes
Previous Next
Oct. 28, 2022 - Viva & Barnes
01:18:27
Emergencies Act Inquiry WITH CHAT - Friday, October 28, 2022
| Copy link to current segment

Time Text
Order alert.
The Public Order Emergency Commission is now in session.
Good morning.
Good morning.
Okay.
I gather we have a new witness.
Okay, I think we're ready to go ahead then.
We are.
How?
The Commission calls the former chief Peter Slowley.
Sir, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
Religious document, please.
We have the Bible, the Quran, or the Torah available.
I'll take the Bible, please.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
Peter John Michael Sloely.
S-L-O-L-Y.
Do you swear that the evidence to be given by you to this commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth to help you God?
I do so swear.
Thank you.
Good morning, Commissioner.
Good morning, sir.
Okay, go ahead.
It's Frank Au, Senior Counsel for the Commission.
Morning, Frank.
Morning, Mr. Slowly.
You were the Chief of the Ottawa Police Service between 2019 until mid-February 2022.
That's correct, sir.
You served also at the Toronto Police Service for 28 years.
That's correct.
Well, just 27 and change, but thank you.
You rose through the ranks from being a constable in 1988 to deputy chief in 2009.
That's correct.
You left the service in 2016.
Yes, I did.
And then you spent some time in the private sector.
That's correct.
Now, I understand that when you first joined the Toronto Police Service, there were relatively few members who...
Had a university degree who were new recruits.
Yeah, that's correct.
But you had a BA in Sociology from McMaster University.
That's correct.
And later you got an MBA from York University.
Yes, I did.
Now you were trained in the Incident Command System.
Yes, I was.
And tell us more about your training.
I received Incident Command System training from 100 to 400 levels.
I received additional training here in Ottawa.
I consider it 500 level.
Essentially, it's a district operations commander, which allows you to command a multi-site major incident over a protracted period of time.
So I had designations up to, I don't know if it's the right terminology, but a 500 level.
And I had practical experience at every one of those levels in terms of being part of incident command.
So either being an incident commander, what is now known as an event commander, major event commander, or major incident commander.
Through to a district operations commander, mostly in my time in the Toronto Police Service and also during my two tours of duty in the United Nations Peacekeeping and Mission.
Now, you also had training and experience with the public order units.
That's correct, sir.
Tell us about that.
Again, I received public order unit training both through the Toronto Police Service.
It's a little bit fuzzy now because this is going back to the early 2000s, but there was also a provincial standard training course that took place.
Out in a rural community that I can't remember.
And then there was national training sessions that we did from British Columbia across the country.
You also mentioned just earlier that you spent some time on a United Nations peacekeeping mission.
Yes.
Tell us about that.
I was fortunate enough to have been selected by then Chief Fantino to represent the Toronto Police Service.
I think at that time I was the first senior officer for the municipal police service to be part of a...
UN peacekeeping mission that had been organized through the RCMP.
I was deployed to Pristina in August of 2001 and completed two tours coming back home in 2002.
I was the Canadian contingent commander.
This was a mission where the police of jurisdiction actually had full powers of policing, including use of force detention, while building up a local...
Kosovo Police Service.
It was also during 9-1-1 and a very significant and complicated and volatile zone.
When you attended an interview with us and my commission colleagues, you described that experience as the best professional and personal experience you've ever had.
Why was that?
I just tested and stressed and challenged and grew me in literally every single way possible, physically, mentally, emotionally.
I'm a very spiritual person.
It allowed me to see parts of the world I don't think I'll ever get back to see again and to be involved in a unique, challenging and often tragic set of circumstances, but one that opened my eyes to the conditions globally.
I had a chance to work with 53 different police services from around the world, and so that was also an opportunity to learn the good, the bad, and the indifferent of progressive policing at the turn of the century.
If I could just interrupt briefly, this is being translated and there's sign language.
A little bit fast on the output, if you could try and...
Thank you, sir.
Probably a little bit of nervous energy in there, but thank you.
I'll try to slow down.
That's quite understandable.
Now, speaking of interviews, you attended four interviews with me and my commission colleagues between August and early October.
You're very generous with us.
With your time, and after those interviews, we summarized the contents of those interviews, and you've had an opportunity to review the summary.
Is that correct?
Yes, sir.
I want to show you a copy on the screen.
The final version of the summary is WTS 6040.
Now, is this the version that you approved?
I trust it is, sir.
Okay.
Is there any correction that you'd like to make to this summary?
No, thank you.
So this will be adopted and be an exhibit.
Now, the reason that we're here today are the events in January and February of this year leading to the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
As the Chief of Police in Ottawa, at that time, you're uniquely positioned to give us a perspective and to help us understand.
But to really understand, I think we need to go back further to when you started with the Ottawa Police Service.
Tell us about the circumstances of the Ottawa Police Service in which you found yourself.
Well, when I was being recruited for the position, it was very clear to me through the recruiter on behalf of the board that through their consultative process with service members and community members that the Ottawa Police Service needed to be significantly changed.
Operationally, administratively, from an HR standpoint, the usual sort of change processes that large organizations require on a regular basis, but very specifically culturally.
In Turney, there was a culture.
That was less welcoming, less inclusive, less diverse, less equitable, and that had impacts on things like workplace harassment, member morale.
Externally, that translated into a real or perceived level of trust in the broader community, but specifically in racialized and marginalized communities, that the service wasn't, in some cases, appropriate enough, and that there was a declining level of trust and confidence.
Any one of those things would have been a major change agenda for any external chief coming in.
All of those combined required a significant effort of change management and change leadership that I was asked on behalf of the board as the incoming chief to deliver over the course of my five-year contract.
If I could call up your CV, the document ID number is COM50759.
We can go to page two.
Scroll down.
So you see under Ottawa Police Service 2019 to 2022, we talked about how you were given a major culture organization change mandate, and that's something you just outlined for us.
Tell us about some of the challenges you face once you took the post.
I'm not sure the Commission has all the time in the world for that list, but I mean, I think the most simple thing to say is any effort of change is going to be difficult, particularly in a large organization.
In this case, I believe the Ottawa Police Service is over a century old.
And these were long-standing structural deficit issues.
Needed investment in recruiting through staff development training.
Leadership development in particular was something that repeatedly our membership identified and external auditors identified.
And those things just don't – that's not a light switch you can turn on and off.
That's something that you have to build and grow and almost organically move through the organization.
Operationally, while they were excellent in some ways, I just want to be clear, Commissioner, the Ottawa Police Service, and one of the reasons why I came here.
Had a reputation, deservedly so, of being one of the best operational police services.
We've heard about their expertise in planning.
Their ability through missing persons investigations was second to none.
They had really advanced, in some cases, advanced HR systems that were to be seen as a best practice.
So this is not a deficit across the board, but there were significant deficits in very specific areas that was contributing to some of the cultural and morale issues.
My attempt in the first three months was really to go around on a listening process in small groups, large groups, internally and externally to identify those areas.
Bring a command team that was, even in the early days, a struggle.
There were significant challenges at the command team level, but people were leaning in and doing their best.
I would say, though, that the challenges really came in in March of 2020.
Three significant events.
The suspension of one of my two deputy chiefs.
The culmination of a significant internal criminal corruption investigation where three of my officers were arrested after an extensive joint RCMP Ottawa Police Service investigation.
And of course, the declaration of the global pandemic.
Two months later, the death and murder of George Floyd.
The Black Lives movement and the defund movement.
I think that signaled the start not just here in Ottawa, but across police services in North America, I suggest around the world, as a significant change in the level of public trust and confidence in policing and the broader justice system.
It certainly had material impacts in police services here in Ottawa.
The defund movement put significant pressure on our board and our council to adjust the policing budget in regards to size and to change police service delivery in terms of integration.
And these were real challenges on top of the significant challenge of change mandate that the board had explicitly and expressly given to me as the incoming chief.
Now, you identified a few challenges that are not unique to the Ottawa Police Service, such as the pandemic, such as the defund movement and so on.
What about within the organization?
You talked about earlier challenges involving the command team.
Tell us more about that.
Well, the command structure, I believe to this day, but I might be wrong, is the chief of police, two deputy chiefs, and a chief administration officer.
Within my first three months in the position, I lost one of those deputy chiefs to a suspension.
That then required me to...
Accelerate a succession plan that truly wasn't ready for acceleration, and bring in a series of three-month assignments to the rank of the superintendent.
I had two very experienced senior officers at that time.
Both superintendents had a lot of experience, and so I rotated them for the first year.
But within that year, both of them retired.
And after that, the rotation went further into the superintendent ranks.
Some were really good fits.
Some struggled.
But it was a very suboptimal situation.
In 2021, in the early part of the year, the board made a decision to end the contract of my chief administration officer.
That then required me to look at my command level, and the only person that I could put into that position was Deputy Chief Bell.
So essentially for almost the full year leading up to the events of the convoy.
I had one full-time deputy chief who was in a civilian position as a chief administration officer, and I was rotating two, for the most part, two uniform superintendents through the deputy chief process.
Again, full respect to those individuals.
They stepped up, in some cases volunteered.
When I asked, they stepped up, and they did their very best in very, very difficult circumstances.
Probably the most difficult time in Ottawa police history and in policing across Canada.
And so I have nothing but praise and thanks for them.
But it was a suboptimal situation that everyone was struggling to make the best of.
Now, did that happen in 2021?
Well, the suspension of Deputy Chief Jaswal was in 2020.
The subsequent retirements of my two most senior superintendents happened over the course of 2020 into 2021.
The separation of the chief administration officer was in early 2021.
So for the majority of 2021, that circumstance of Deputy Chief Bell being in an administrative function and two superintendents operating in the uniform functions was the situation that I was managing with.
So at the most senior executive level you were having Rotating staff, so to speak.
What impact did that have on the rest of the organization at that time?
As a cascading impact on down the way, as you move any officer from one level to the next on a temporary position, not a permanent promotion, you then affect the next level and the next level.
I remember once in Toronto, someone said every time we promote a new chief, we have to change out seven positions below.
I don't know if it's the exact calculation, but that's the ripple effect.
Not only destabilizes the executive level, it destabilizes to a degree the other parts.
There are always benefits.
I mean, people are given stretch opportunities or given leadership opportunities earlier than they maybe normally would have.
And again, some rise amazingly to that.
Others do an excellent good job and others struggle.
But it does create churn in the organization that was already in churn based on all the changes that were mandated by the board and the massive external churn by the factors such as the death of George Floyd and the global pandemic.
There's another factor that for me as a newcomer to the city, as an outsider chief, I think we can all remember in the early days of the pandemic, the lockdown and the requirement not to meet in public was significant.
One of the most important ways that any leader can get to know their own members and the community or the clients that they serve is to meet in person.
So much is lost on Zoom.
Emails and text messages never cover it, as we've seen in testimony here.
But I lost that opportunity three months into my mandate to actually sit down with my members in the cafeteria and have a cup of coffee with them, to have small group focus group meetings, which I did extensively in my first three months.
And even when we could get together, we were masked up, so we couldn't see facial expressions.
And we were spaced out across a big gymnasium, so we couldn't really communicate.
We had to literally shout at each other.
I think all of that, unfortunately, meant that we couldn't build the level of cohesion internally or externally during a very critical, contentious period of time, a sustained critical and contentious period of time.
But we did our best.
We've heard from other witnesses that, notwithstanding the OPS, Excellent reputation in the past for planning for and responding to large-scale events.
The pandemic itself has caused a lot of changeover and depletion of expertise.
Tell us more about that situation.
I think it's actually been well articulated.
I will only add in Mark Ford, who his father was a former chief of police here, an excellent...
Chief of Police, Mark, was an excellent leader.
He was one of those first two superintendents I brought in on rotation, along with Joan McKenna.
Mark actually was the most experienced incident commander and one of the most experienced critical incident commanders.
Unfortunately, he retired some six or seven months before the events that we're going to be substantially focusing on.
So that would be one example of many where we had people who had, you know, gone past their pensionable time, had given their lifeblood literally.
To the organization and to the profession of policing and had made a decision, as many executives in many different parts of civil society did, to take their well-earned retirement and go on with their life, with their health intact.
We celebrated his departure, but he was missing from our team and we really needed our best people to be in the best places possible.
Now you told us earlier that you came in.
To the Ottawa Police Service and you were given a change mandate.
How was that mandate perceived when you're about two years into your job?
Well, there's probably a not polite saying about police officers.
I suspect it applies to everybody.
There's two things that every cop hates.
The way things are and change.
So it's going to be difficult no matter what.
Nobody wanted...
Things to remain the way they were, and everyone was fearful of change to varying degrees across the full human spectrum, of course.
And this wasn't just a tinker around the edge change mandate.
It was to go right to the heart of the culture and to the most difficult parts of that culture, the darker part of that culture, things like systemic racism, systemic misogyny, the trust factor between police and the broader community, but very specifically the racialized and marginalized Indigenous communities here in Ottawa.
And those were the most contentious topics in policing for my entire career going back to 1988 in Toronto.
Any chief of police or any command team that took on any one of those issues was going to be taking on a major, major challenge.
Taking them on in the middle of a global pandemic, in the middle of the Black Lives Matter movement and the defund, abolish police movements just made it that much more complicated.
But it was still necessary.
It still had to get done.
Not because it was my mandate.
It was just the right thing to do for policing.
It's what our members actually wanted.
And it certainly is what the community wanted.
So if I take your mind back to January, early January of 2022, before the Freedom Convoy event arising mid-January, how would you summarize the state that the Ottawa Police Service was in?
Committed to the direction.
Worried and tired from the effort to have traveled as far as they did.
And what was the level of trust among the different members within the service and their trust for the leadership?
I don't think I could answer that in any great specificity.
Clearly, there was a range.
I don't know which one of the witnesses presented.
I think it was...
Inspector Baudin from the OPP that talked about the range of crowd dynamics.
Human nature is human nature, so no matter what organization you're in, you're going to get some 5% that will adopt everything that's said without questioning, 5% that will resist mightily anything that is said with all sorts of questioning, and then some range in between of people that will move if they're incentivized or if they feel there's a sufficient...
Altruistic value around it.
I think those crowd dynamics play out in any crowd group, including the group in this room here today.
Now, with that context, let's talk about the beginning of the Freedom Convoy events.
When did you first learn about the Freedom Convoy?
My recollection, sir, was a February 13th Hendon report.
February?
Sorry, January 13th.
You may need to check me on dates a little bit.
I believe that was a report that came into my inbox for whatever reason that day, and it was an extremely busy period.
We were still dealing with a multiple death explosion in our city that killed some four or five people.
But I did have a chance to glance through the report.
Certainly there was enough information for me to know that this could be a significant event in the near term.
My recollection is that I forwarded that email to Deputy Chief Bell and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson.
I understand that there hasn't been an email to show that, but that was my recollection.
But irregardless, somewhere on or around February 13th, there was a direction to Deputy Chief Bell to commence an intelligence review of all the circumstances around what was being purported to be a convoy coming to our city and to lead the over...
To oversee the work of developing an intelligence threat risk assessment that would then inform Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's assignment to develop the operational plan for the event, informed by the intelligence threat risk assessment.
Now, we've heard from the evidence of your deputies that after you became the Chief of the Ottawa Police Service, one of your priorities was to ensure that operations were intelligence-led.
Can you tell us more about why that was important to you?
Thank you very much.
Just to take a step back, all operations, not just emergency preparedness and incident command or critical incident, but all of our operations, from traffic management, order management, crime management, that we should be intelligence-led.
Information, best practices, evidence-based best practices should inform, for the most part, our systems, our policies, our procedures.
Our practices and the evaluation of the outputs and outcomes that came from that.
So that was an overarching theme.
How it applied within incident command, incident command systems, emergency preparedness was again, a weather report that says there's going to be rain tomorrow.
Well, let's try to validate that to a greater degree.
Is it going to be raining in a city this large?
Is it going to be raining and flooding in one part or is it across the entire city?
Because that will then assess the amount of resources we need and the sequence of events we need to apply.
That's an analogy that's not meant as an actual example.
So intelligence led as much as possible.
Understand the nature of the context of the situation.
The factors involved, the nature of the threat, the risk of the threat, the likelihood of it actually taking place, and the resources necessary to mitigate in the first instance and respond to at the back end.
And then to recover from, the recovery period, which I suggest is this is still a recovery period, Commissioner, for the City of Ottawa and the Country of Canada.
Does that answer your question, sir?
Yes.
And my next question is, to what extent were you satisfied that that was in fact the case at the OPS on or around?
Thank you.
I believe in evidence, Interim Chief Bell did reference his own views on the advancements that we had made, particularly in the previous year, and he's absolutely correct, that we made significant advancements around our intelligence-led approach to our broader operations, crime, traffic, order management.
Order management as a subset includes critical incident command and incident command system.
We had made significant strides in...
Making sure our information section and our intelligence section were lined up with our operational sections and that we had sufficient crime analysis, administrative analysis to execute and continuously improve on those processes.
We did not specifically take on intelligence-led threat risk assessments as a very specific product.
Our priorities at that time were crime traffic order management.
Was not at the same level.
I think in 2021 we had our a very high level of gun and gang related shootings and so crime traffic was the number one issue in the community always is no matter what jurisdiction.
So those were really our one and two priorities and order management was probably at the third level because we actually had up until that point a very good record.
A very good record of planning and implementing plans and successfully ending a range of demonstrations.
But we had made progress.
I did make it very explicit, particularly, this one I'm not 100% sure on, but particularly around the events in mid-2020, when we started to see large events coming into the city, Wet'suwet 'en, Black Lives Matter in June.
Justice for Abdi in the fall.
These are complex, volatile, political trust factor events that were contentious and could have gone a thousand different directions.
I was very, very strong at that point on the intelligence threat risk assessment driving the operational plan.
And in that period, I think we did make some significant moves forward around how the Intel TRA threat assessment.
Supported, enabled, enlightened the operational planning.
Right.
Now, you mentioned that the first hand-in report you read about the Freedom Convoy was on January 13th?
That's my recollection, sir.
And so I take it that you read it?
Yes.
I can't say I read every single line.
It was probably more of a skim-through read, but I did read it.
Yes, sir.
And what was your reaction upon reading it?
This is potentially going to be a significant event, and we probably need to get some people...
Working on the intel side and starting at least to put the framework of a plan in place.
Was that why you forwarded it to the deputies?
That was my recollection of forwarding it, but that's certainly why I assigned Deputy Chief Bell to lead the overseeing of the intelligence threat risk consensus and assigned.
Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson for the operational plan.
By the way, those were their functional areas of responsibility.
Deputy Chief Belligan, I think, has testified that intelligence was one of his directorates and that the planning section was one of the directorates that Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson had just inherited.
She had just started as the Acting Deputy Chief in January 2022.
And you expected the two of them to coordinate the information or intelligence that the intelligence unit received?
Incorporate that intelligence in the planning process.
Yes, sir.
Did you receive regular updates from your deputies?
Yes, I did, sir.
How often?
After that first week, that February 13th week, we may have raised it in discussion.
I had a regular nine o 'clock command meeting and whatever the deputies would lead their respective areas of command and talk about major projects, things that...
Should come to my level.
I have a general recollection that we would have discussed it at least once or twice during that first week period.
Coming into the second week, the week leading up to the weekend of January, I just remind myself to slow down a little bit, coming up to the week end of January 28th, 29th and 30th.
I recall that being almost on a daily basis and I think towards the end of that week or middle to the end of that week, we had my nine o 'clock meeting and then a separate Command briefing on the intelligence and planning around the convoy events.
When you refer to that week, were you referring to the week before the weekend arrival of the convoy?
Yes.
Going into that first weekend before the weekend of the arrival and then through that Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday.
Right.
And what did you learn as a result of these regular briefings about the nature?
of the convoy that was about to arrive?
My early impressions was there was, to some degree, some doubt as to whether or not this was actually going to materialize.
Sorry, whether it was going to materialize.
Whether this series of convoys was focused, I think, mainly in the British Columbia area, but whether or not it was actually going to materialize.
Clearly, as the days went on and Hendon reports came in, mainstream media, social media started to follow it more.
There was certainly a sense that, no, there's going to be something that comes from as far away as St. John's, Newfoundland and from Vancouver, British Columbia, and other parts in Ontario itself.
The briefings that I was getting was that those two areas were working together.
Our intelligence group were connected in with all of our policing partners, municipally, provincially, and federally.
The Ottawa Police Service Intersect Program had been engaged early around information sharing, intelligence gathering, operational planning, confliction, deconfliction and coordination.
All of those things were sort of standard for any major event that had occurred under my tenure as a Chief of Police and had been well established going back some 15 years under previous Chiefs of Police.
So there was nothing out of the ordinary, certainly things from a process standpoint.
I saw what I expected to be the level of communication coordination internally, communication coordination with our key partners in the national capital region, and even more broadly, given the national scope of what was unfolding, that we were engaged with a range of other police services across the country.
Now in that week leading up to the arrival of the convoy, what was your understanding as to the duration of the event?
Again, all of the reports, the briefings that I was receiving through my chain of command was that this was going to be a weekend event, some arriving the Thursday, more arriving the Friday, the bulk arriving for planned or at least scheduled events on the Saturday and the Sunday, that there might be some remnant that would stay behind, but that remnant would be similar to...
Other demonstrations that had come through where people stayed in the national capital region for a variety of reasons, but in some cases setting up small tent cities that would at some point over the subsequent days, weeks, and in some cases months, would be gradually through a measured approach with multi-agency involvement from NCR and the city.
They would be eventually moved either to a better location or moved back to wherever they had originally come from.
Now, during that period, did you continue to receive regular hand-in reports?
I was on the mailing distribution, so it came into my inbox.
I could also see there were other Ottawa Police Service members on the distribution, and by that point, I had explicitly asked and had been told.
That members within Deputy Chief Bell's Command and Intelligence Directorate were receiving Hendon reports, were involved in Hendon-related briefings, and that those reports were informing the intersect discussions of threat risk assessment.
Did you continue to read the Hendon reports when they landed in your inbox?
Not every day, sir.
If I had the ability, I would, again, usually skim through a document.
I do recall sort of in the middle to the back end of that week on a daily basis doing a deeper, more full.
Read.
But at that point, anything that was coming in, including emails from private citizens about this, I would try to skim read.
And if there was something relevant, I would usually just forward the email over into Deputy Chief Bell's command and copy in his intelligence directorate commanders to make sure that they had the information and they could correlate that into their larger threat risk assessment.
Now, you spoke about your understanding.
During that period, that it was going to be a two-day or weekend event.
Was that understanding based on the executive briefings that you got or a combination of that, as well as other sources, including the hand-in reports that you did receive or read?
Yeah, the latter.
The sum total of everything that I was reading or being briefed on, that was the, on balance, the assessment.
And the totality of information or...
Intelligence that you got did not change your view at the time that it was going to be a two-day or weekend event?
That's correct, sir.
And what was the nature of your role as the chief at that time as compared to the two deputies who were assisting you?
So let me be more specific.
In terms of the collection...
Or the analysis or the dissemination of the intelligence within the OPS for the purpose of planning a response.
What were the respective roles of you as chief as compared to the two deputy chiefs who were assisting you?
Every chief of police or commissioner is accountable and responsible for everything in the organization.
But I had delegated, specifically delegated those responsibilities to the two individuals, Deputy Chief Bell and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, to oversee and ensure that there was an appropriate level of threat risk assessment and forming an appropriate level operational plan.
Would it be appropriate for you to ask questions, for instance, when you received additional information?
Absolutely.
On any issue, whether it was an HR matter or a professional standards investigation, if at any point there was a data point or a context issue.
Something that didn't seem to make sense.
I would always ask a question just to make sure that I understood the circumstances that they were dealing with.
And if appropriate, I could provide advice or direction as required.
And did you direct Deputy Chief Bell to conduct or have someone conduct a threat risk assessment?
That's entirely the direction that he had.
That was his responsibility.
Was that something ordinarily done in response to this kind of event?
Was that something particular to this situation?
I want to be clear about something.
Deputy Chief Bell himself wasn't to sit down at his desk and conduct a threat risk assessment, but through the resources and the directorates that he oversaw to oversee that there was an appropriate threat risk assessment.
Yes, that was his direction, sir.
But was it an ordinary...
Process for a threat risk assessment to be conducted in response to any major event?
Yes, that was that was a best practice that I had learned and developed over the course of my tenure in Toronto and other areas.
It was something that was to some degree already significant degree already in place here in Ottawa, but I wanted it at the highest level possible.
And I think Deputy Chief Ferguson, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson gave that In her testimony that that was a clear expectation that I had made coming in.
Now we've heard from Deputy Chief Bell that in this case a threat risk assessment was in fact conducted.
So if I could take you to the document.
OPS 403073.
Actually, this is not the threat assessment, but this is an email you wrote after reading the threat assessment.
Do you recall having read the threat assessment that was prepared?
I've seen a document in disclosure that is titled threat assessment.
I don't recall receiving and reading that document.
I did read the threat assessment that was embedded in the...
Pre-arrival operational plan that I received on January 28th.
Right.
So now this one, this email chain, the part that was sent by you was dated January 26th.
So if we go, so you see that, actually, if we go down further to see the origin of the chain.
So not so, not so far.
Do you remember receiving an email from a concerned citizen about the potential violence of the upcoming event?
And if we scroll up, you forwarded this email to your deputies and you outlined the concern.
If we scroll down to the next page, you describe what the concern was.
And then you said, yes, get our briefing note as of last night.
It says that there is no intelligence to indicate that this demo strain will be violent.
And you issue this guidance.
Please review all available information, intel, incidents, and ensure we have the most accurate threat assessment and the most appropriate operations plan for the event.
Now, it's not entirely clear from this email whether or not you've read a threat assessment, but you were certainly aware that there was one.
Yeah, what I'm referring to, I believe, is just a briefing note.
I don't know what that would have been in the form of.
It could have been an email that was sent around before last night that said there was no intelligence to indicate this was going to be violent.
But it wasn't the threat risk assessment document in any of its versions that I was referring to.
I see.
And I laid out a series of, I guess it's four points here, of...
Data that had come into my awareness over the course of the night into the morning, including the email that I forwarded, that would suggest opposite.
So it was, again, just a reminder.
There's contradictory information.
Just make sure that that is incorporated into the overall risk assessment, and that is as optimal as it can be, so that the plan can be as optimal as it can be.
Now, so this is dated January 26th.
I want to show you...
An intelligence assessment conducted by Sergeant Chris Keyes on January 25th.
And perhaps you can take a look and let us know if you had reviewed that document.
The document number is OPS 403086.
In the production we received, we've seen a couple of different versions.
I assume that the assessment was updated as...
The week unfolded, but this is version one.
Does this ring any bell?
It's the first time I'm seeing the document, sir.
Okay.
If I could take you to page five.
So the third bullet.
The author says that in six years of working large demonstration events from the intelligence point of view, the writer has never seen such widespread community action, which means three things for planners.
First, the event is likely going to be bigger in crowd size than any demo in recent history, possibly on par with Canada Day events, but more destructive.
Second, there is significant popular support for this event on a scale not seen in recent years.
This means the protest groups have access to larger protester pools than they have ever had access to, which means there will be likely widespread disorganization and confusion.
Third, local area bandwidth for cellular mobile devices will be impacted significantly, causing communications issues for both the police and the event organizers.
Planners should be ready to have police radios on hand to avoid clogged cellular networks.
This is an example of the intelligence unit providing relevant intelligence to guide the planning of the events, right?
Yes, sir.
So it's an example of how it's supposed to be done.
But there are suggestions here that this event is, unlike some of the other recent events, there are signals here.
Do you agree that it may be unprecedented?
At this point, I wouldn't say unprecedented.
I think he's actually, Sergeant Chris Keeves, is one of our best intelligence operators.
I had a chance to interact with him quite a bit when I was at the police service.
I think he actually uses some very important language here that caveats his comments.
He talks about recent years, not ever, and he does that several times in here.
What he's describing is very accurate.
We are seeing generally in protests, I'd suggest, over the last...
15 years in the age of social media, a greater level of mobilization, and increasingly in the last decade, a greater level of a variety of funding and logistical support.
This email took me back to Idle No More, the, oh my gosh, my memory's failing a little bit, Commissioner, sorry, but the Occupy movement.
Where these sort of sentiments, crowd size, crowd dynamics, logistics, mobilization, larger, disaffected populations, polarized populations that would give direct or indirect support, would directly protest or indirectly protest.
I'm slowing myself down a little bit here.
These were elements that we had seen.
What Sergeant Chris Keyes is saying in here, my interpretation of it, is that the planners need to be where this is likely going to be bigger than recent events.
He didn't give a timeframe.
Is that two years?
Is that 10 years?
And so we need to be cognizant of it.
So it's a good alarm bell, but it's not a five alarm that he's ringing right now.
It's a warning for potential trouble.
A very healthy warning.
And the last line that was voted in the last paragraph, as a result, law enforcement is being met with numbers of people beyond the norm.
That's what you're saying, a larger crowd size.
What would you expect your deputies to do with this kind of warning?
Well, first of all, the deputies would ensure that this information is being shared amongst the planners, as was directed from an intelligence operator over to the planners.
I would want to know that they had sufficient systems in place, that when a briefing note like this was produced, that it would go from the intelligence directorate to the planning team, and that it would be, again, used in real time as they were developing the plan in real time.
And these are real-time systems.
One first and then the other.
In real time, information is coming in.
Very fluid, very fast-moving, very complex situation.
My sense from the briefings that I was getting was that that process was in place and it was functioning sufficiently.
Would you expect your deputies to brief up and give you the warning?
On a specific level like this, no.
Okay, so let's go to another document.
Now, first of all, let me ask you, since you were reading the Hendon report, do you recall if there's any Hendon report that you could identify that would suggest that it was a weekend event as opposed to prolonged events involving week or month?
I saw Hendon reports that had elements of both, sir.
Again, elements of both.
In the totality of all of the Hendon reports that were specifically prepared on the topic of the convoy events prior to the arrival of the events themselves, I would literally have to go back through them all.
And I think you and I have talked about this in previous interviews.
A line in one report, unless you've read the entire report, can be misleading.
One report, unless you've read all the reports, could be misleading.
So it's the totality of the information, and even then, the Hennon reports, as excellent as they were.
And Commissioner, I want to be clear.
I've expressed my gratitude to Commissioner Karik on multiple occasions, even after my resignation, about the quality of the intelligence support that we received from the OPP, and specifically around the quality of the Hennon reports.
But in the totality, sir, I do not recall, and to this day, even with the benefit of hindsight, I do not have any clear impression.
Or saw any clear conclusions that we were going to have anything more than what I was being briefed on by my team.
This was going to be a Thursday, Friday, mainly Saturday, Sunday event with the potential for a smaller group to remain behind, but in numbers that we had managed previously.
Let me show you one example from the January 25th hand-in report and see how you may interpret this report.
OPP 401108.
Thank you.
We go to page three, please.
Go down.
So do you see the section?
This starts with intelligence gaps.
First of all, what do you understand intelligence gaps to mean?
Known unknowns.
They know they need some information, but they do not have the information and therefore can't validate the other parts of the assessment and that there needs to be some effort to acquire that information and convert it into intelligence sufficient to close one or all of the gaps.
So if we look at the first few bullets, First of all, participant numbers, online indicators are unreliable.
So this is a known unknown.
They knew that they needed the number, but they knew that they didn't have the number.
Is that right?
That's how I interpret it, sir.
And then the next two bullets have references to specific dates.
Nature of activities in Ottawa by advanced convoy participants, January 28th, January 29th.
So when these days are referenced in these reports, what do you take them to mean?
That we're going to have two days of activities.
That they don't know what those activities will be on those two days.
That's right.
They don't know what may happen on those days.
Could we infer from this bullet that things were only going to happen on these two days?
No.
What about the third bullet?
Events possibly scheduled at Parliament Hill on the 30th of January.
The same, right?
Yes, sir.
So we know from this that the police didn't really know what would happen on that date, but we cannot infer from this bullet that these are the only dates when things would happen.
You're absolutely right.
In the larger context of all the intelligence information, sorry, what was the date of this report again?
25th.
Of January.
I'm certain that by the 25th of January, we were into the cycle of briefings where this is a three, four-day event, mainly the Saturday, Sunday.
So even at the point where these known unknowns were being listed, while we couldn't tell you what the agenda of the activities were going to be, there would be some activities.
There would be people demonstrating in the city.
It would involve some level of vehicular traffic, likely involving large trucks.
But you're right.
None of the information in these known unknowns fills in hour by hour or block by block of time as to what exactly will be taking place.
Right.
So this is January 25th.
And then on the 27th, as we get closer to the first weekend arrival, you attended a meeting with your command team as well as the legal services.
If I could take you to document number OPS 3014559.
At page one, please.
So if we scroll down slightly, do you see the last bullet?
So first of all, the bullet that says chief questions, it sounds like at this meeting, you asked some questions in the fourth sub bullet.
Interdict tow truck equipment prior to it being used against us.
Heavy equipment within convoy to take down barriers.
A level of pre-planning we don't normally see.
Concern, they have this for something that is supposed to be lawful.
Is it fair to say that by this date, you had some concern for, given the presence or anticipated Presence of the heavy equipment when it was supposed to be something lawful.
You were questioning why are these equipments there?
Yeah, that actually almost reflects, I want to say word by word, but certainly the sentiment of some of the intelligence that was in the Hendon reports.
I can't remember the date of that.
I do believe, and again, I stand to be corrected, Commissioner.
Evidence in chief was led by interim chief Bell that talked about the heavy equipment.
There were efforts made to interdict, to prevent that from coming in, or at least mitigate it.
And I believe he said that this is not information I had as a time of chief, so I'm relying on Interim Chief Bell's testimony, that in fact much of that heavy equipment did not make it into the downtown core.
and he described differently some of the equipment that did make it down there than what has been reported on previously in media.
So as the chief, you had the, The strategic oversight, so to speak, and you were asking appropriate questions to ensure that those deputies who were reporting to you were doing their job when this kind of concerns arise.
Am I correct?
Absolutely.
I mean, it could be as simple as, I think, a term that other people have given testimony on.
You just need to kick the tires on different parts.
Just make sure you ask questions at different levels, strategic, operational, and yes, sometimes tactical.
To make sure that they're aware of it, and they have put some effort into it, and there's a reasonable approach to how they're going to address it.
Now, we also understand from the testimony of Inspector Lucas that there was a potential that the OPS would be overwhelmed during the weekend of January 29th and 30th.
I can take you to the transcript, but it was in evidence.
So I guess my question to you is this.
If there are these warning signs, and as we progress towards the weekend, these warning signals get stronger and stronger, shouldn't the OPS have known what was coming?
To answer your question, no.
If you're asking, and I don't want to interpret wrongly your question, so if I go in the wrong direction, please pull me back.
As the signals became stronger and stronger, what I would expect is, first, I would know the signals were getting stronger.
And clearly we did.
Secondly, that whether I asked about it or someone offered it, that we would have a constructive discussion around mitigation for those signals.
I can tell you I think it was, well, I can tell you, I think it was the Wednesday that I received my first formal request through Acting Deputy Ferguson to reach out to fellow chiefs of police and request additional resources.
If I'm wrong on the date, Commissioner, I'll stand corrected, but middle of the week, I reached out to London Police Service, York, I believe, Toronto, asking for general resource officers, but particularly public order officers.
It's my recollection, again, I stand to be corrected, that...
Around this date or on this date, I had another request to reach out for more public order.
I believe in Commissioner Creek's testimony that he was aware of that request.
He had two public order units that were sent to Ottawa.
I don't believe they were under our ICS control, but they were in the Ottawa area and available.
So that is what I would call Inspector Lucas signaling we might be overwhelmed by the numbers.
We'll need to bolster our abilities to not be overwhelmed, particularly that would be public order assets, and I had a specific request to get more public order assets, and I made that request in this case to Commissioner Karik, and thankfully, as he did, provided those resources as quickly as he could.
Now, we heard from Superintendent Bernier when he testified at the commission that after he read the January 27th hand-in report, he told Superintendent Drummond, About this bizarre disconnect between the Hendon Intelligence and the OPS preparation.
Do you think that there was a bizarre disconnect?
First of all, while I have the greatest respect for Inspector Bernier, he was not involved directly in the planning or the intelligence risk assessment.
Police services and organizations are wonderful places.
Everyone has an opinion.
The briefings that I was getting from the commanders that had been assigned to the task, the people that they had assigned through their responsibilities to produce the information, some of which is displayed on the screen here, did not indicate that there was a bizarre disconnection.
And do you think your deputies were doing the best they could?
I think they were, yes sir.
And knowing what we know now and reflecting back on the way That the OPS handled or apply the intelligence they got.
What lessons, if any, should we learn from that?
Thank you.
An important question, Commissioner.
Frank, if I'm going deviating too far, please pull me back.
▲
Export Selection