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Nov. 24, 2020 - The Truth Central - Dr. Jerome Corsi
45:25
Dr Corsi SPECIAL BROADCAST 11-24-20: 2020 Election and Voter Fraud Exposed
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♪♪♪ ♪♪♪
I'm Dr. Jerome Corsi and I'm here with my producer, Craig, and we're going to look at a presentation here that is being presented by Russell Ramsland.
And Russell's been working on the, basically the Dominion system and how it works.
And we're going to have, this will be a technical presentation, various people listening.
And Russell, I'm just going to turn it over to you to get started with the first slide.
Go ahead and explain it, and then we will ask your questions as you go along.
So, Russell, you're in control.
Why don't you start?
Great.
Well, thank you very much, Dr. Corsi.
First off, don't think voting system, think casino.
In casinos, the house always wins.
And how does that happen?
Well, all of the slot machines are connected to a central computer that keeps track of how the casino is actually doing.
And the casino operator monitors it, and he changes the odds of winning on the fly.
So that at the end of the night, you're guaranteed that the casino wins.
That's how they fund all those beautiful hotels and entertainment and cheap food.
is because you're paying for it one way or another.
The casino operator can belong to the casino or in fact could hack into the casino system and change the odds themselves on the fly.
So welcome to the American electronic voter system.
The Democrat party is the casino operator and the American voter is the player who will, by design, lose.
Uh, we just witnessed this in this election.
Trump was clearly on his way to victory on election night, and then several key states shut down and altered the odds in the system, and then suddenly Trump was behind.
If you want proof that this is possible, we did an investigation at the Matt Bevin race in Kentucky.
We were called and talked to the Bevin campaign in August of 2019, and we said, we think your race has been targeted.
We gave them reasons why.
And they said, now we think we're fine.
Get back in your black helicopter and fly home.
And we said, all right.
Election night, 1130, my phone began to blow up.
They said, how fast can you have a team on the ground here?
And we went to Kentucky.
We captured all five hours of CNN's coverage that night, and we wrote a little Python script to track what was going on on the screen, and this was one of the things we captured.
Now let me explain what you're looking at, and this is going to make more sense to you here in just a little bit, but this right here in the gold is a feed from a company called Clarity Elections and this company is owned by Seidel.
Seidel is a Barcelona, Spain company and the feed right here is actually coming from a server in Frankfurt, Germany.
So they're the last people that actually own and control your vote and can change it and vote it however they want.
So this is the feed and what you're seeing down here is a little banner that CNN generates as a result of the updates that come through on this feed.
So it's late at night, 95% of the votes are in, Anderson Cooper's the last show, and we're going to run through this real quick and then I'm going to tell you what you missed.
Actually, I'm going to show you what you missed.
Now watch this little goal.
And when the slide gets to around here, you're going to see a very quick update.
And then this guy's face is going to fill the screen.
So this will take just a second.
Here we go.
So he's chatting along.
Watch the goal.
Boom!
There's the update.
Now this guy fills the screen.
Okay, now let me show you what you missed.
We're going to drag it back slide by slide.
To before the update.
So now let me just point out Beshear 673948.
Beshear 673948.
Bevan 662235.
662235.
These are going to update in just a second and we're going to compare them with the numbers down in the banner that won't have had a chance to update yet.
So here comes the update.
Boom!
Here we are.
Andy Beshear now has 674,508.
He did have 673,948.
has 674,508.
He did have 673,948.
And for those math geniuses out there, you will realize that Andy Beshear has just picked up
560 votes.
Matt Bevin, on the other hand, has 661,000 votes.
And down below, he had 662 a minute ago.
And if you actually do the math, you will find that Matt Bevin loses 560 votes at the exact same second that Andy McHugh gets 560 votes.
You have seen the database be switched in front of your very eyes.
How does all this happen and what did we find?
We did about a 12 to 14 month very in-depth look at the entire voting system and what we found shocked us.
But this really all started out in 2002 with the HAVA Act, the so-called Help Americans Vote Act.
It probably should have been called Turn the American Elections into a Casino Act.
But the point is that when we started running electronic elections, the private companies with private shareholders under contract to counties really came in to run our elections.
And these companies have virtually no transparency or supervision.
The election system infrastructure is very complex.
It's a patchwork.
In some cases, every single county is a little different in terms of the collection of equipment and the software and the companies that provide different pieces of the software.
It's a real patchwork.
But what is true is that all of it is absolutely, completely connected to the internet at all times, and the idea that it's air-gapped is a myth.
I wish people would quit repeating that.
It's sort of the Emperor's New Clothes of our time.
The voting company's own manuals will show you that it's completely connected to the internet.
We have read every one of them.
Some of these companies conduct elections all over the world, which means that they're effectively in a position to control some of the outcomes all over the world.
As we mentioned a minute ago, some of the companies are foreign owned.
In the case of Clarity Elections, which is a U.S.
company, it was purchased in 2012 by Seidel, a Barcelona, Spain company.
And the servers are in Frankfurt, Germany, and they count votes in 28 states, including every single one of what is currently the battleground states in this election.
You should know there are no security standards similar to NIST for election software.
Originally those were supposed to be there under EAC 2.0, but EAC 2.0 was never written, and so now when you see that an election system complies with all applicable standards, that's a joke.
Most SOS offices fail to really understand their own system.
They fail to understand the extent and the vulnerabilities with their system, and so they grant waivers to state law and the voting code to various counties or election companies.
In some cases, it's kind of hard to tell whether they simply fail to grasp it or they're really more interested in being complicit.
A perfect example of that is what's going on right now in Massachusetts Where what are called ballot images, and we're going to talk about those later, ballot images are not being retained even though according to federal law they have to be.
Anyway, our investigation revealed that at least a dozen or more entry points exist.
Casino hardware and software where operators can come in and start changing the rules on the fly.
Or in the case of the voting system, you can change votes and you can even get rid of the audit trails if you want.
Or in some cases, those audit trails don't even exist.
And the point of that is, it has to be caught in real time.
We've been talking about this for over a year to anyone who will listen.
Simply going back after the fact and doing forensics is very, very difficult because you can change the votes and then you can change the audit trail.
So it's pretty easy to go in actually and change votes undetected.
How did we get started in this?
Well, we're a commercial company.
We don't normally do this, but some people, some activists in the 2018 general election in Dallas brought the computer logs from the Dallas Central County in to us to look at because they were really concerned at what they saw.
We got looking at it and all my cyber guys went crazy.
Now, just to clarify, Bogus voter rolls and bogus voters and polling station equipment being hacked or defectively designed, all of those are true.
They're huge issues in this election.
But that's what we call voter fraud.
What we're gonna talk about today is what we call election fraud.
And election fraud is when the central counting tabulation server gets your vote, and then somehow it goes to a remote computing capability, or not so remote, And it compiles and redistributes the vote in one form or fashion.
That is what we call election fraud.
And that's really going to be the main focus.
Although because of this election, we are going to get into some voter fraud discussion.
If you don't believe it, all you got to do is go read, for instance, Dominion's manual.
It will tell the operator how to manually enter the votes that the operator wants to be in any race.
It will tell you exactly how to fill out any blank ballots that are in the system.
And it can multiply the vote by a factor such as 1.6 or even 0.5.
So, it's incredible.
How bad the security on these systems are.
And this is pretty much universal because most of the software is designed along the same skeletal framework.
Well, when these people brought the logs in, what did we actually see that worried us so much?
Well, we started seeing all of these error messages, and I mean hundreds if not thousands of them, throughout the log.
And so the first thing we did, because we're a private company and we don't have all the money in the world, we said, look, let's compare this to something and see if there's really tampering going on.
And so we picked Bexar County, which is San Antonio here in Texas, because it's the bluest of the blue.
And we said look if there's any tampering going on there's not going to be a lot because they're going to get what they want.
The only race they might play in would be the Ted Cruz Beto Aurora.
And the good news is they're about the same size and the better news is ES&S election management system is used in both cases.
So let's just look at a few of these error logs.
Votes exceed ballots.
Now what you need to know is that when early voting was over on Friday, they immediately were counting votes.
And by the way, through early voting, it was 67% of the entire election.
Throughout the logs, the first thing that happens is they download the votes on, in those days it was on a flash memory card, now we're using thumb drives and the new equipment.
But it was a flash memory card.
They downloaded it from the precincts, and on the 3rd, the night of the 3rd, they started looking at all the data.
Well, by the 4th, this is before the election, by the way, the general election, which was the 7th.
On the 4th, we start seeing that they are erasing the entire database and reloading the votes from somewhere else.
So you begin to see these votes exceed ballots error messages.
This means that the system is now loading, somehow or another, more votes than the ballots that were cast.
And we see that error message hundreds and hundreds, in fact 1,027 times, on the 5th and even the 6th, the morning of the election itself, and then on into the 7th.
It was interesting Because 1027 occurrences of that error message, there may be 5, 10, 15, 50, 100 votes that appear each time that error message appears.
So 1027 can represent a lot of votes.
We also saw, right after they started counting the early votes and before the election, two hard database resets.
This is a complete start over.
And what we saw is that they were reloading these votes from someplace other than a flash memory card.
That was this error message.
It didn't appear.
Neither one of those appeared in San Antonio, just as we suspected.
Precinct already updated.
Now we're on to the day of the election.
And so on election day and on into the early part of the next morning, we saw 160 times the error message, you've already updated the precinct, and the operator said, I don't care, update it anyway.
That's the same message, by the way, that he gave on vote succeed ballots.
Now, if you read ES&S's manual, it will tell you that at that point he's supposed to suspend the election, but he didn't.
He just said, no problem, Get on with it.
And then we saw entire precincts replaced on Election Day that night.
96 times we saw an entire precinct that already had votes get replaced.
Now, we did see a little bit of that in San Antonio, but we did expect that because, as I said, the Beto O'Rourke-Ted Cruz race.
And then When the boats get reloaded, you see this collect audit data from a compact flag.
We saw that on the 5th and the morning of the 6th, four times in that period of time.
We only saw it once in San Antonio.
So clearly there was something very, very wrong going on in Dallas, Texas.
Being a private company, we decided we had to do this as economically as possible, and so the first thing we did was to research all existing reports that were out there, and we started with the Everest report that was done in December of 07.
It's a big, thick report.
It's about, oh, I don't know, inch and a half thick.
Guys like Harry Herste and Aldeman and Matt Blaze, those were all contributors to it.
And in it, they go through every single voting system and basically just riddle them with problems.
We also took advantage of a couple of C-SPAN panels, Cybersecurity and the U.S.
Voting Systems.
Those were back in 2016.
Those were very technical panels.
We looked at the ESMS security test report on ElectionWare.
That was an 8-28-17 report.
That was a third-party report.
We recently read Matt Blaise's testimony, which was very good, and we read a whole bunch of other stuff.
We worked with Securiosa.
We looked at some, well, we just read a lot of stuff.
Then we decided to go and along the way spot test some of the vulnerabilities to see if they had been fixed.
And what we found is that actually almost none of the vulnerabilities have actually been fixed.
So they've been around for a long time.
We read the voter company manuals, and we examined the source code.
We were able to find the source code for most of these companies, either on the dark web or other places, and we examined the source code, and that's how we knew that, in fact, they're all very similar to each other.
Well, actually, Hart is the one that is most dissimilar.
We traced the entire boat trail.
This was kind of interesting.
We didn't realize all the places your boats go and where they're stored, controlled, and reported.
The most interesting one was Clarity, as we've already discussed, Barcelona, and it has its servers in Frankfurt, and right now we don't even know for sure who owns CIDL.
And the reason we don't is that in May 23rd of this year CIDL entered bankruptcy under circumstances that are extremely dubious, but they did.
And we kind of think it was really sort of to launder the trail.
And then we did a lot of examining and testing of what are called ballot marking devices.
And I don't think I have those on this PowerPoint, but I'll bring up another one and show you how that works.
Now, back here I cited this report, and just to give you an idea about how vulnerable all these systems really are, this comes directly from that report.
So that if you look at the ElectionWare servers, there were 17 critical vulnerabilities and 49 important vulnerabilities, and we found that most of them were already still there.
The clients, the ElectionWare clients, there were 24 critical vulnerabilities, 51 important ones, and most of them were still there.
Now, recently, we've been talking about this for about six or eight months, so certainly between this and a tip-off that ES&S got from the Texas Attorney General's office, Uh, they've known that people were looking at them.
So recently they moved this, uh, into, uh, the cloud behind Cloudflare.
The problem is you can still get into all these vulnerabilities because you just go through their FTP site called ESSvotes.com and you're into the same situation.
And recently with the BIG-IP report vulnerability that was reported, this got worse, particularly in the case of ES&S because that is their platform and we found it hasn't been patched.
So we said, oh wow, we're really gonna have to get into this.
So we did, and we have over literally about 24 months now spent almost a million dollars of our own internal resources following this.
We looked at ES&S, we looked at Dominion, we looked at 10X, Hart, Demtek, and SGO Smartmatic.
Demtek is actually little more than a fake shell company for SGO Smartmatic.
In fact, their registered office doesn't actually even exist.
And they count boats mostly in Virginia.
92% of the market was represented by these at the time we did it.
And what we found initially was sort of interesting.
The voting company's public-facing sites, we simply revealed their hidden files to see what was there.
And by the way, this isn't hacking.
This is anyone can do this.
We then were shocked to find that in front of every critical file, they were posting the administrator names and passwords.
They're in the open, in a file, right before the file that you might want to open.
So they give you the front door key and say insert it right here in this lock if you'd like to get in.
I can tell you by the way that 10x operates on only one password.
Pink.
That's all you need to get in to any file in 10x.
ESNS has two.
One of them is super123.
That's an old NSA password.
And then the other one is, uh, I think it's green 137, as I recall.
Now, since we've been talking about it, you know, in the last week or two, they may have changed that because there's been some real air time now.
Uh, we saw the voter registration list by precinct worldwide that these guys all do.
We saw all previous vote uploads.
We saw the source code.
Uh, we found that the source code was so porous that between the operators, uh, and outside players, you could change votes utterly undetected with no audit trail in the case of Hart or erasable or changeable audit trails in the case of ES&S and Dominion.
We got access to all of the company's entire AWS databases through their S3 bucket vulnerabilities.
And there's a bunch of them.
We can see all the ballots.
We actually saw the Dallas ballot before Dallas did.
And we got access to all this counting and tallying functions.
And that was really important because as you're going to see, I think I still have them on this.
If not, I'll unhide them.
We found that in Kentucky, Depending on what order you query the database, you will change who wins.
Obviously, some malicious code has been put into some of the counting and tallying functions.
But in short, my guys found they could make any candidate win or lose by directly altering the votes at the server database level for almost any election that most companies conduct worldwide.
The way they broke the news to me is they walked in my office one day and said, uh, Russ, who would you like to be the next premier of Indonesia?
I said, what?
They said, who would you like to be?
I said, I heard you.
They said, well, the election's in three weeks and within our four walls right here, if you'd like, we can elect Donald Duck to be the next premier of Indonesia.
I said, let's not.
So first off, it's a myth that the entire back end of this thing isn't connected to the internet.
This happens to be the trace map for Dallas in 2018.
This is dallascountyvotes.org, and these are all the servers all over the world that it connects to and how it connects to them with the IP addresses.
So it connects to Clarity, it connects to the AWS cloud, like we said, all over the place.
Okay, so this is not disconnected from the internet.
We found all sorts of vulnerabilities.
For instance, every site, like Dallas County Votes, should have its own SSL.
Well, we said, okay, fine, let's just look at that.
So we went and we looked up the SSL that Dallas County Votes had, and guess what?
All of these sites share the exact same SSL.
We'll just look at this little bunch right here and you'll see number 21, Dallas County Votes, and we have Coffey County, and we have Miramar, Florida, Madison County, Virginia.
We have everybody!
To put this into simpler context, this is the same as if you and everybody for 10 blocks in any direction around you is sharing the exact same front door key.
And like that, my guys love it because if they break into any site, find any vulnerability in any site, and they find them in all of them, but if they just found one in one site, they can then go laterally into all the others.
So what does the system really look like?
What does the casino really look like?
Well, this would be the slot machine.
This is where you and I vote.
And we'll come back to that.
But your vote, one way or another, gets transported to Central County.
Sometimes it'll come on a flash memory card, sometimes it'll come on a thumb drive.
Now a lot of times it's wireless, despite the fact, over the internet, despite the fact they say it's not.
It can be on a modem line.
And here at Central County, they've got the poll books, the voter rolls, they have databases, they have tabulation software we talked about, and they have reporting software.
And they have two databases, the unofficial one and the official one.
And this is what gives rise, these two databases, is what gives rise to this air gap myth.
Let's kind of walk through this though, so you'll understand.
All of this stuff is online, depending on who they deal with, to one of these four companies.
We're mostly interested in this discussion with Clarity, which is Tampa, Florida, but it's owned by Seidel in Barcelona.
These are the guys that their election night reporting software reports for 28 states.
And all these guys store their stuff in the cloud.
In the case of CIDL and Clarity, it's in Frankfurt, Germany.
And then on election night, even though this is always being updated in real time for whatever's happening here and here, On election night, they go through Associated Press or Decision Desk HQ and the media gets it.
This was that gold display coming through here that we saw on the CNN video.
Now, all of this is done nowadays either by a vote counting company like ES&S or HARD or SGO, Smartmatic, blah, blah, blah.
Or it's done by a mid-level company like in the case of Kentucky, A company called HART actually conducts a lot of their elections using HART equipment.
But these are the EMS, the election management systems.
Let's go through it.
The first thing you need to know is the official database and the unofficial database sit behind the same firewall.
So our guys can go from one to the other.
If our guys go in here, and work their way back, or they go in here and work their way back, or there's other ways.
Anything change they can make here, they can get here.
So you need to know that.
That's the air gap myth.
We found that we could go and change votes here.
We found that we could change the tabulation software and change votes.
We found that we could actually get into the unofficial database and change votes.
And all of this stuff, by the way, if you want to see, I have.
Some of it you'll see today, but if you don't see one particular arrow and you want to see an example of how you do that or what it is, I've got them all.
You can change what goes on and goes out of the software at the voting company.
And they can change it, or you can change it.
And then, of course, if you change it here, eventually, for each election, it gets uploaded here, and then it gets uploaded here to the equipment.
Same thing as you can do it here at the mid-level companies, and the same progression.
If you want to change it here, it'll then download and change here, and download and change here.
For instance, if you wanted to change the tabulation software, you could go in and change it at this level and download it.
You could change it at this level and download it.
Or you can go right in here and change it right down to the county level.
You can also change it on Clarity's own databases.
Those are vulnerable as well.
And of course, if you change the votes here, you can then backload them here assuming you have all the credentials you need to get into this county system.
And in fact, you can, as you will see in a minute, because I'm going to show you that right here, there is malicious code that allows them to harvest all of the administrator passwords, etc, right here.
So if you want to change it here, you can now backload it here, or you can backload it here.
At some point or another, you're going to sync all this up so that it all agrees.
I told you that CIDL was harvesting the credentials of the county.
This is actually a screenshot of some of the source code.
Uh, called QSNAC.
And it runs on a particular piece of hardware that is located roughly in what's an area of the whole CIDL system that's called CIDL staging.
And this malware you can see because this is the indicator that it's there.
What does it do?
Well, it's a CGI password logger.
It's also a credential scraper.
It also provides an SSH backdoor, which means a cyber actor using this can execute arbitrary code on a device.
And it can exfiltrate files and reload files if you want to.
It has web shell functionality, so you can do it from anywhere in the world.
And most interestingly, it has persistence and mitigation.
What makes this really an interesting vulnerability, a piece of malware, is that there was a patch for it, but the malware itself was designed to deflect the patch elsewhere.
So you might think you've loaded the patch, but you didn't.
You just went in and it got deflected somewhere else.
The only way to really get rid of this is to do a full factory reset with the patch.
We keep talking about Frankfurt, Germany.
How do we know?
Well, it's really not very hard.
You can do it yourself.
Actually, you can no longer do it yourself as of this morning.
And we're going to talk about this.
But if you had gone into sidle.com and you'd done either what's called an NS lookup or a host lookup, you would see that this is the IP address.
And 52 happens to be Germany, so right away you're tipped off something interesting is going on.
If you do an NS lookup on this, i.e.
that, you'll get this.
It's in the EU.
You can also take this and do what's called a GeoIP lookup, and it'll tell you that it is in Frankfurt.
So you know that it's in Frankfurt.
And there it is on the It's an Amazon server there.
And those are all the ranges of the IPs within the server.
Now, actually, I'm going to talk about this a little more.
And I'm going to be a little careful.
But there was information that was conveyed to the highest levels on Sunday.
this week about looking at some of the comms in and out.
For those of you who may read German on Twitter, you would know that on Monday there was lots of Twitter reports about how the U.S.
Army had suddenly showed up in Frankfurt, Germany and confiscated Seidel servers.
That makes me very nervous.
And this morning, all of the raw data is being erased.
So somebody is extremely interested in covering their trail.
If you go out to admin, at ENR Clarity Elections, you will find the message,
ballot data no longer exists.
Why don't we get in and look at the map, Bevan Briggs?
We got in and we looked at it because one, we told them they were going to be targeted and they didn't believe it.
And then they found out they were.
This was what happened.
There were 1,428,000 votes cast, and these are the margins by which people won.
This guy won.
This Republican won by 221,000.
This Republican won by 204,000.
All Republicans, all at the top of the ticket, except Matt Bevin, the governor, who loses by 5,000 votes.
If that seems similar to what you've seen in North Carolina, Or now in the United States of America for the presidency, it should feel very familiar.
We think now this was a dress rehearsal.
It was a dress rehearsal in a number of ways.
Not only was it a cyber dress rehearsal, we think, but it was also a dress rehearsal on whether enough Republicans would abandon Matt Bevin, being afraid to be called a sore loser, and Whether enough media could reinforce that message to kill the fight.
And that's exactly what happened.
That's why no matter how much evidence and proof we found, nothing was going to happen.
We went to Kentucky and we said, guys, your first problem which we wanted you to know about but you didn't want to hear about Is that your stuff is all over in Frankfurt, Germany?
I said, no, it's not.
I said, okay, fine.
Go over to that laptop or desktop there and bring up the Kentucky State Board of Elections website.
So they did.
This is sort of what you see.
And I said, punch on the button for unofficial results.
So they did.
Now it looks like you're still on their website, doesn't it?
Look where you really are.
You're on enr.clarityelections.com, Kentucky.
You are in Frankfurt, Germany.
And if you scroll down to the bottom of that page, it's Seidel U.S.
That's the U.S.
subsidiary of Seidel Barcelona.
By the way, Seidel Barcelona runs Dallas County website now.
I told you that the tabulation software could be played with, and this was one of the ways we found it.
We did a query, and you see we're in Jefferson County, Kentucky.
It's the 2019 general election.
And I did a query, straight party ticket votes and refined by the governor's race.
And I start scanning down there and I run into undervotes.
And I went, wow, how can you have undervotes in a straight party ticket deal?
I wonder.
Well, turns out in Kentucky you can.
But I didn't know it at that point.
And by the way, I found it in a lot of precincts.
This just happens to be the one I picked for the example.
So I kept looking and looking and trying to figure out undervotes and where they were appearing and why.
And I didn't have anybody to ask, so I had to play with it for a while.
And finally, I decided, man, I better check my work and make sure that I really saw what I thought I saw.
So I queried it again.
But I made a mistake.
Or not?
Okay, so here's what happened.
It should have given me the exact same result.
I just reversed the order that I asked, but I was asking for the exact same information.
Should have been the same.
And in fact, if you look, this is my example, but there were a whole bunch of them like this.
You look at the same precinct, and you get the same number of ballots, of course, because you're asking the same question.
But all the undervotes have gone away.
Eight of them have been added to Andy Beshear's eight here.
So now you've got 16 going and 20% of the Republican votes have been harvested and added in.
So that the Republican now only has four votes.
There are no under votes and Andy Beshear has all 17.
If you know the order to query, you'll change who wins.
So what are we doing?
Well, for about a year, year and a half, we really tried not to go public with what we were finding because we wanted to get law enforcement to look at this.
We've been to the FBI twice, both times they could not be less interesting.
Of course, I have to tell you that Peter Strzok's lieutenant runs the FBI in Dallas now, so maybe we should have expected that.
We tried to get a one-on-one with Attorney General Barr, and in fact, on Friday, August 2nd of 2019, we were successful in talking directly with the AG and setting an appointment to come in the following Monday in Washington at 5.30 and visit with him.
Five minutes after he agreed to that, his chief of staff called and said, you can't just come in and talk to the attorney general.
You have to go through channels.
And we said, well, with all due respect, Erin Neely Cox is the federal prosecutor here.
I mean, the federal, the U.S.
attorney here wants to be a judge and she doesn't want to touch this.
And we've already been to the FBI twice.
He said, no, they'll pay attention.
You need to do this.
So we went to the FBI again, because Aaron Neely Cox didn't want to see this.
And sure enough, they wouldn't let us bring in any laptops as usual.
They wouldn't let us bring any phones, nothing electronic.
We went in, we had a nice conversation for about 45 minutes.
And we said, and they kept going, well, show us your proof.
And we said, well, guys, you won't let us bring a laptop in.
Why don't you come to our shop?
We're right down the street.
Here's our cards.
We want to show you.
We want you to spend time with us.
That was July of 2019.
And we're still waiting for the phone call.
We tried to get DHS to take a look.
We tried to get CISA to take a look.
We did get some people who were very interested and they talked to Senator Ron Johnson and said this really probably needs to look like a criminal referral to the DHS.
I mean, to the Department of Justice.
And Johnson said, well, let's look at it.
So we had two investigators look at all of our stuff.
Not all of it, but look at enough of it.
80 slides worth.
And they were horrified and said, well, we need to get some people involved.
So, uh, the next thing I knew we were supposed to brief CISA.
Um, it took a couple of weeks to set that meeting up, uh, remotely.
And, uh, we said, you need to plan on at least an hour and a half, probably two hours with the questions you're going to have.
And they said, okay, great.
The day came and they were 10 minutes late joining and they couldn't work Go to meeting.
So they just all joined by phone.
And we said, well, you can't see the screen by phone.
And they said, well, we only have 15 minutes anyway.
That was the meeting with CISA.
I could go on and on.
Well, we finally decided, you know what?
We got to start going public.
So we finally started going public.
We did have a good meeting with seven members of the Freedom Caucus in July.
We had them for two hours at an off-site location.
We showed them probably close to 80 slides.
They were horrified.
They ended up saying, well, we need to get a hold of the folks in the White House.
They took a draft executive order in.
They were essentially told, don't worry.
We got this.
So at that point, we said, well, maybe they got it.
Maybe they don't.
We sure would like to know for sure, but no, don't worry.
We got this.
Okay.
Later on, a cabinet member went in and about three weeks ago, four weeks ago, and said, what about all this stuff?
And he too was told, don't worry.
We got this.
In the meantime, some people had gotten interested, and they introduced us to some field-level folks in DHS in Austin.
And the field-level folks took about an hour and a half briefing on remote, and were so horrified, they said, we're coming to see you.
It was a Friday.
And they were here the following Tuesday, and they spent about 11 hours with us.
At the end of that time, after all the questions, after all the stuff, they said, okay, look, we need a lot of this stuff.
So we gave them all our stuff, about 600 gig of stuff, and they took it back with them to Austin.
And they then got three cyber firms that they contract in.
Most of them all, I'm sure, have TS or clearances.
And they all looked at it and they came back to the DHS and they told them the exact same thing.
The debt is real.
It's right.
It's horrifying.
How is this going on?
So we then went back and forth to Austin about four times in the next two weeks until, uh, and they brought in a local CISA guy and They became completely, totally convinced that everything I'm showing you is right.
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