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Nov. 21, 2022 - Viva & Barnes
10:53:55
THE FINAL WEEK! Emergencies Act Inquiry LIVE with Chat!
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Time Text
Order I love.
The Public Order Emergency Commission is now in session.
La Commission sur l 'état d 'urgence est maintenant ouvert.
Good morning.
Bonjour.
Okay, so this morning we have a panel of witnesses.
Who's on for the commission?
Good morning, Mr. Commissioner.
Gordon Cameron for Commission Council.
And this morning we have a panel of three witnesses, combined two from CSIS and one from ITAC.
If they could come forward and we'll have them sworn.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Mr. Vignon, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
I will affirm.
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
David Vignon, D-A-V-I-D-V-I-G-N-E-A-U-L-T.
Do you solemnly affirm that the evidence to be given by you to this commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
I do.
Thank you.
Ms. Tessier, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
I will affirm.
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
It's Michel Tessier, M-I-C-H-E-L-L-E-T-E-S-S-I-E-R.
Do you solemnly affirm that the evidence to be given by you to this commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
I do.
Thank you.
Ms. Chayet, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
I will affirm.
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
marie-hélène chaillé m a r i e h e l e l e c h a y e r affirmez vous seulement que le témoignage que vous avez Do you solemnly swear that we shall speak the truth and nothing but the truth of the Commission?
I do.
Good morning and this is now our third opportunity to see each other and go through the evidence that you'll be Giving to the Commission this morning.
And what I'd like to do is begin with a little bit of housekeeping.
I'll remind, Mr. Commissioner, I'll remind parties through you that we have already had the interview summary of these three witnesses adopted during the closed session, which took place on November 5th.
We also had the Confidential and public versions of the institutional report adopted during that session.
But the one item that has not yet been adopted is the summary that was posted yesterday of the closed session.
And so, witnesses, I would ask you each in turn to confirm that you reviewed that summary for accuracy and adopted as part of the evidence of CSIS and ITAC before the Commission today.
Can you each confirm that?
Yes.
Yes.
Thank you.
And now to begin, for those to whom each of you is not already familiar to the public, if I could ask you, Mr. Vignon, to begin by describing your role and function within CSIS.
Yes.
So I've been appointed the director of CSIS in June 2017.
In those functions, I have the full responsibility and authority over the organization.
And I am supported by a group of senior executives, including Madame Tessy here with me today.
And I can go into further details about the mandate of the organization now or later.
Let me, if I could, ask.
I'd like the Clerk to call up just on that point because you've set out your mandate in your institutional report.
Mr. Clerk, could you pull up DOJ.IR701?
I'm inferring from the number of this document that CSIS was the first federal government institution to get its institutional report filed.
Witnesses, if we go to the second page, Mr. Clerk, if you could scroll down just to the top, exactly there, thank you.
And we see in the second sentence there, and I'll read it, and you can follow along with me, Mr. Vignon, CSIS's core mandate is to investigate threats to the security of Canada and advise the Government of Canada on such threats.
See that there?
Yep.
And you confirm that is the core mandate of CSIS?
Yes, it is.
Okay, thank you.
Now, Ms. Tessier, you are the Deputy Director of Operations at CSIS, correct?
That's correct.
And can you describe your role in that position?
Certainly.
I'm responsible for the overall management of service operational activities and the governance of those activities.
The way we've found it convenient to describe it to those who aren't familiar with the bureaucracy of the service is to describe you as the most senior intelligence officer in the service.
Is that a fair description?
That's correct.
Thank you.
Ms. Shaya, you're with ITAC.
Could you tell us what your role is there?
In general terms, what ITAC is?
We'll go into a little more detail later, but just for introductory purposes.
Yes, certainly.
I am the Executive Director of ITAC.
I've been in that position since September 2021.
ITAC is an organization that was created in 2004 out of the National Security Policy to independently produce threat assessment using a broad range of intelligence and information, both at the unclassified and classified level.
We have three main lines of operations.
The first one is to assess and recommend the national terrorism threat level for Canada.
The second one is to report and assess terrorism-related events, trends and threats.
And the last one is to assess and set terrorism threat level for a Canadian threat worldwide.
Thank you.
Can you describe, in general terms, the relationship between ITAC and CSIS?
Yes, so ITAC is co-located with CSIS headquarters, and we operate under the CSIS Act.
And so I do have a reporting relationship to the director of the service, and my organization works very closely with CSIS partners.
We have access to the intelligence that is collected by the service, and we assess it independently.
Thank you.
You used a phrase there, and I'll just take you to the words that are used in your materials, which is that ITAC operates under the authorities of the CSIS Act.
Now, we don't see ITAC mentioned in the CSIS Act, am I correct there?
That's correct.
So, can you explain for the Commissioner why you would characterize ITAC as operating under the authorities of the CSIS Act?
Yes, of course.
So, as I mentioned, ITAC was created in 2004, so after the CSIS Act was enacted.
And when it was created, after...
The 9 /11 incident, basically, to avoid silos in intelligence assessment.
And when it was created, it was decided by the government at the time to put it under the CSIS Act.
So all the founding documents, the founding documentation of the center stipulates that it operates under the CSIS Act.
So the institution put itself under the authority of the CSIS Act, even though it's not mentioned there?
The government of the day decided to put it under the CSIS Act.
Nice move.
When you say ITAC is responsible for determining the national terrorism threat level, Can you explain how those determinations are made?
Yes, actually, ITAC is responsible to recommend the national terrorism threat level.
The director of the service sets the level.
Thank you.
Why don't you describe exactly that, the input you have and then the role that the director plays in that?
Yes.
So we use a very rigorous methodology to do that.
So our analysts are trained to look at a number of indicators.
To come up with a recommendation.
So the methodology uses both qualitative indicators and quantitative indicators.
We look at all available intelligence.
We consult with many security partners and we specifically do an assessment of threat actors' intent, capabilities and opportunities to conduct an act of terrorism.
Very important to point out that the assessment is specifically On the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Canada.
So once we've done all this work, those consultations, this analysis, we do it at least three times a year or more often is required.
When I'm satisfied with the assessment, we present it to the director who then decides whether or not he takes the recommendation on the proposed level.
And just before we go over to you, Mr. Vigneault, as to your role in this, perhaps, Madam Shaya, you could explain whether there is any relationship between the definition we've seen a lot of in this hearing, that is the two-sub-C definition of threat to the security of Canada, and the conclusion you and your organization reach on the national terrorism threat level.
Yes, of course.
So as you very well know, the 2C unlocks investigative powers for the service, right?
ITAC is not a collecting agency.
We do not collect intelligence.
We assess already collected intelligence.
And so the intelligence that the service collects under 2C, this is the intelligence that we assess along with other informations or consultations with partners.
To come up with the recommendation of threat level.
If I understand what you're saying, the recommendation that you make as to a threat level isn't a recommendation that a 2C threat has been found.
These are independent concepts.
Yes.
Thank you.
Now over to you, Mr. Vigneault.
When you receive the recommendation from ITAC, what's your role?
So, of course, after reviewing carefully the material, I need to satisfy myself that I concur with the analysis.
And I can, you know, agree or disagree with the recommendation to set the threat level.
And so I do that, as Madame Chahi described, regularly during the year or as required if there is a specific incident that, you know, happens.
In between those set time periods.
And tell me, is this sometimes a subject of dialogue between CSIS and ITAC where you receive a threat-level recommendation and perhaps ask for more information or query the conclusion?
Give other feedback.
The way it works is that it could be a combination of, you know, regular dialogue.
And so while the assessment is being made, you know, Madame Cheyenne and I will have part of different meetings.
We'll discuss terrorism issues in Canada and abroad.
And so our common understanding will be formed through those discussions.
And it happens also that, you know, when I receive the formal material, I will ask you to sit down with the executive director of ITAC.
To formally question some elements to make sure that I understand exactly what's the basis of the analysis and make sure that I'm comfortable with such analysis.
And then I'm in the position to make the determination of the threat level.
Thank you.
Now, witnesses, we are going to go through an exercise that we've colloquially, we at Commission Council have colloquially called CSIS 101.
Similar to some of the questions you got asked in your interview and in the closed session, probably, Madame Tessier, these are mostly for you.
This is your working, the concepts you work with every day, but other witnesses, please feel free to add or qualify as you think appropriate.
And these questions Witnesses will be about your core mandate.
So soon we will come to call your Section 12 mandate, but your mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada.
And so let's start with Section 12. And Mr. Clerk, if you could call, well, you might already have it on hand.
It's the same document, the DOJ.IR.
Seven, zero is one.
And page two, you have, in the second paragraph that begins pursuant, an extract from section 12, which I'll just read for the transcript.
The first part is a lead-in, and I'll mention when the quotation starts.
And here the extract from the Act begins, shall collect by investigation or otherwise to the extent that it is strictly necessary and analyze and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada and in relation thereto shall report to and advise the Government of Canada.
Perhaps I'll put it over to you, Ms. Tessier, to describe the function that Section 12 serves in the core mandate work of CSIS.
Certainly.
Thank you for the question.
It is really what defines what our mandate is, as you mentioned, in terms of opening investigation, collecting information, and reporting to the Government of Canada.
The intelligence cycle is such that the Government of Canada issues intelligence requirements to the Security and Intelligence.
And we'll probably come back to this as we're discussing some of the other definitions, but...
Is it fair to say that if we go to the second line there and the words information and intelligence respecting activities, that activities is a central concept in Section 12 and in your mandate?
Absolutely.
And of course, it's related to Section 2 of the Act, which describes the threats.
Yes, Section 2. Particularizes the types of activities that could form threats, but in particular you're not investigating ideas, you're investigating activities, right?
You're investigating when perhaps ideas motivate people to action.
That's correct.
The standard which we've already seen talked about a fair bit in the hearing to date is in the third line there, that is to conduct an investigation, to have the authority to investigate these activities.
The grounds of proof are described there as reasonable grounds.
Activities that may, on reasonable grounds, be suspected of constituting threats.
So sometimes shortened to reasonable grounds to suspect.
And that's the basic threshold that decides, I'm going to put it in my terms, when you go from being a sponge, just absorbing information and monitoring situations, to actively collecting and investigating a target.
Is that a fair description?
Yes, it is the threshold that we must meet before initiating an investigation.
Thank you.
Mr. Clerk, could we go over to page six of this same document?
And at about three-quarters of the way down that page, there's the heading Targeting Authority.
And the first sentence describes a standard for your operations.
It's the second paragraph that I want to focus on for a minute here.
And this is, if you were to ask the question, activities of whom or activities of what is it that you're investigating?
And so you would use the expression, if I can ask you to confirm this to make sure I've got it correct.
Ms. Tessier, the activities of an individual, a group of persons, or an organization.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
And to follow through with the definition we've just worked with, whose activities are reasonably suspected of constituting a threat.
And then this is expanded in the second sentence of this same paragraph, which I'll read.
CSIS may also target issues.
Or events to allow for an investigation of activities which are reasonably suspected of constituting a threat to the security of Canada that arise because of or are related to the issue or event.
And then parenthetically, you give the example of threats to Vancouver 2010 Olympics.
Perhaps you could, the example, threats to Vancouver 2010 Olympics is helpful.
Perhaps you could help us flesh out the concept of targeting issues or events with another example of an issue or event that might have come under the service's attention for the purposes of an investigation of a threat.
Certainly.
Type of targeting levels normally used when there's what we call a special event, where you can have high-profile individuals attend, such as politicians or the like, who could be victims of a variety of threats.
So it allows us when we don't have a specific, I'll call it an aligned threat.
To be able to investigate leads that may come out as a result of that event being held and any potential threat to that event, to spectators, to the individuals attending, high profile personalities, that type of issue.
And do you have an example of when an issue might be something that is constituting a threat?
To be clear, it's not the actual event or issue that is the threat.
It's the ability to investigate activities that because that event is being held, there could be a threat that comes as a result of that.
So it's not the issue or event itself.
Thank you.
I got lazy there in my description.
What you're talking about is an issue or an event.
In relation to which there could be activities that themselves constitute the threat, correct?
That's correct.
And so if I can take you back to the question, is there an example that comes to mind of where an issue might give rise to activities that constitute a threat?
As I mentioned, several high-profile issues where there's a gathering of personalities such as a G7, G20 event, the Olympic Games, significant...
Events that could attract threat actors to target that event.
In this context, could an issue be an ideology like Islamic terrorism?
That would be, if that falls within the activities of a threat to terrorism does, of course, under 2C, then that would be its own, wouldn't necessarily be a more general.
issue-based event that would fall squarely under 2c of the thesis act.
Okay and uh...
If I follow this correctly, looking at the listings in paragraph 2, we could have an individual, a group of persons, or an organization, any of those could be involved in activities.
Or the target could be issues or events that allow for an investigation of activities that are suspected of constituting a threat because of or related to the issue or event.
So it can be a permutation of those three categories of targets on their own or in conjunction with an issue or event.
That's correct.
Let's get to that more refined level of description of the threat activities and a good place to find that.
Mr. Clerk, if you can go back to page two, we'll see in the footnote to page two, the extract of section two of the CSIS Act.
And just to help put this in context, Section 2 of the CSIS Act is the section that contains a long list of definitions, one of which is threats to the security of Canada, correct?
That's correct.
I say that because sometimes we talk almost exclusively about Section 2 as if threats is all it is, but when we say 2C, we actually mean the threat, the definition of threat to the security of Canada that is the third of the...
Subcategories of threats to the security of Canada, correct?
That's correct.
And is it fair to say that for the purposes we are talking about in relation to the convoy, the blockades, the protests in January and February of this year, that certainly the concentration...
And ultimately, I think the exclusive area of interest for potential threats or for investigation of threats would be 2C.
Is that right?
That's right.
Okay.
And I'll just read that out again so it appears in the transcript.
Activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political...
Religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state.
And so that we don't have to keep repeating that, in your community, you often refer to threat-related activities as a compact way of describing 2C?
We often refer to it as terrorism, but yeah, threat-related activities related to terrorism.
Other phrases I've seen are...
Threats of serious violence.
And we all built into that.
We know it has to be all of those other words, including ideologically motivated, etc.
But if you hear me use that expression, threats of serious violence or activities directed towards serious violence, you'll know that I'm talking about a 2C threat.
Can we agree on that?
I would be careful on that because there could be criminal activity that is serious violence, a murder, a homicide, that is not related to the security of Canada.
So I would just want to be clear that it has to relate to, as you pointed out, the various components of 2C.
So you might want me to always add the words for the purpose of achieving a political, religious, or ideological objective at the end?
I think if you refer to the CSIS Act and 2C, the CSIS Act I think will be.
2C will know what you mean.
Okay.
Now, assuming you meet your reasonable grounds to suspect threshold under Section 12, then depending on the urgency and seriousness of the threat and the resources you have available, you could decide to open an investigation.
And then you have to decide what investigative tools you're going to use to pursue that investigation, correct?
That's correct.
And where I'm going to take you here is that there are certain investigative tools you can use having only that reasonable grounds to suspect as the standard of certainty you have.
That is, generally speaking, we'll call them the less intrusive investigative tools, correct?
Correct.
Surveillance, collecting information from open sources, basically building a file, but not going so far into the level of intrusiveness that you would actually need a warrant, correct?
If it's only reasonable ground suspect, that's correct.
Right.
And then...
If the circumstances, which might be the seriousness of the threat or the difficulty you have in collecting information on it, so indicated appropriate, you might then apply to a court to get more intrusive, to get authorities, judicially granted authorities, for more intrusive investigative techniques, right?
Yes, once we go...
Past the threshold of reasonable grounds to believe.
At that point, yes, we can apply for a federal court warrant.
Right.
I'm going to try to break that up into smaller pieces and suggest that what you realize is that you need more investigative authorities than you have without a warrant.
And then you...
See if you have reasonable grounds to believe that there is a threat to the security of Canada because you know you are going to have to satisfy a judge on that point before you will get the warrant, right?
That's correct.
And the reason I want to break it out there is I think you'll agree if we can make this observation that the higher evidentiary threshold of reasonable grounds to believe there's a threat to the security of Canada.
Standard of certainty has to do with the fact that you are using more intrusive techniques.
You always had the authority to investigate once you passed the reasonable grounds to suspect threshold, correct?
Yes.
So the higher threshold of reasonable grounds to believe isn't what gives you the authority to investigate, it's what gives you the authority to use more intrusive investigative techniques.
Yes, that's correct.
Thank you.
And in terms of resources, another factor that I would expect to play into this analysis you do is that you've only got so many intelligence officers, you've got a lot of information coming in, so there's some proportionality and triaging,
et cetera, that you do when you decide which threats that do plausibly meet the reasonable grounds to suspect threshold you're actually going to devote your resources to and how much resources you'll devote.
Yes, and of course, it's always dictated by the nature of the threat, the gravity, because we can go very quickly into reasonable grounds to believe, of course, depending on the nature of the information we receive at that time.
Okay, now, on that point, I'd like to make...
Or ask you to make an observation that we've seen in your interview summary, and it's come out in the materials that the parties have already seen.
And it has to do with the allocation of its counterterrorism resources that the service has devoted to, and here we're going to introduce the acronym, I think almost everybody knows what it means now, but MVE, Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism.
And so, can you tell the Commissioner, relatively speaking, of all of the resources of the service that are devoted to counterterrorism operations, what proportion of those resources are devoted to dealing with the IMVE threat?
Approximately 50%.
And how does that relate, say, to the proportion, and I'm just going to ask you to...
Make a rough approximation here, that would have applied 10 years ago, say?
It's a significant increase.
Maybe not from 10 years ago, but from certainly, yes, I think when we look at events that have occurred in Canada, with, as an example, Alexandre Bissonnette, Quebec City mosque shooting, Alex Manassian, and...
The unfortunate event in Toronto where he ran over a number of individuals.
When we see an increase in those types of activities, we obviously proportionately place our resource to investigate what we see as a very significant and growing threat.
Okay, so even with and to the extent there are still threats out there from organized terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda or other groups that...
Took so many of your resources back around the turn of the century.
You are now devoting either half or more than half of your resources exclusively to responding to the IMVE threat.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Thank you.
Now, at that point, I'm going to ask Ms. Kahn to come up and...
expand some more on that threat and the way that the service has handled it, and then I'll come back afterwards with some questions that follow on that.
Good morning.
It's good to see you again.
Good morning, Mr. Commissioner.
For the record, I'm Nassar Khan, Commissioned Counsel.
I think my questions are probably best placed to you, Ms. Tessier, but as Mr. Cameron said, please, if the other panelists feel able, jump in where you feel it's appropriate.
So I would like to go through the IMVE framework that the service has adopted with you.
And I understand that...
This terminology and this framework is something that the service has adopted as a policy framework in recent years.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Okay.
So I'm going to pull up a placemat, which I think you're no doubt familiar with.
It's COM50946.
And while that's coming up, perhaps you've touched on this already a bit, Ms. Tessier, but perhaps you can explain.
uh what led to the adoption of this terminology in this framework Thank you.
I will say at the outset that ideologically motivated by extremism is very difficult to define when it meets a thesis threshold, when it meets the threshold of terrorism.
And that is something that...
We share internationally when we're talking with our partners because it is a complex threat.
We adopted that term because of the complexity and the number of ideologies that can fit into it.
We didn't want to get into right wing, left wing.
That can mean different things to different people.
It could be just a legitimate viewpoint.
And so we wanted to highlight the various...
I'll call them steps or criteria is a better word, that would bring CSIS's investigations into the fore.
So we want it to be audiologically motivated.
So it's not just a personal grievance.
It is something somebody fundamentally believes in.
And they want a societal change.
So they want to change.
They really believe in this extreme vision of changing society.
And then, of course, serious violence, death, they are looking to kill.
Right.
And so I understand you're referring to the four criteria that are set out in this placemat there.
So we see willingness to kill, attempting to affect societal change, ideological influence, and serious violence.
So these are the criteria that would...
That would lead the service to determine that there is a threat under 2C in particular.
Is that right?
That's right.
It's not an exact science.
And I think it's important to realize that given the nature of this type of threat, we do try to develop this criteria.
And as a matter of fact, many of our international allies have adopted the same vocabulary because we know it's challenging.
So we try to narrow it to those criteria in order for CSIS to begin its investigations.
Okay, so perhaps we can walk through the criteria in turn.
So I'll just note, actually before we go there, a threat actor in this scenario is not somebody that the service is investigating.
Is that correct?
Sorry, I don't think I understand your question.
So in order for somebody to move from being an actor into a target...
Right.
They would have to meet these three criteria, is that correct?
Yes, that's correct.
And an actor doesn't necessarily need to be a person or an individual, is that correct?
Well, normally it could be a group, it could be an organization.
And could that include cells or platforms or networks more broadly?
I'm not sure.
Cells, of course, are composed of individuals.
I mean, ultimately, you're dealing with individuals, even if it's a group, an organization, they're composed of individuals.
Okay.
So perhaps let's go to the first criteria, willingness to kill or inspire others to kill.
So what would be sufficient to meet that criteria?
Our information indicating that somebody is seriously...
Communicated that they want to commit murder, that they're requiring arms, but it could also mean damaging property in such a way that could lead to somebody being killed, even if that wasn't the initial intent.
It could also be inciting individuals to violence, because oftentimes it is the consumers of that type of propaganda who could be the ones who become radicalized and commit thee.
Right.
So I want to pick up on something you just said there.
You said it could be destruction to property as well if it leads to loss of life.
Is that a fair characterization?
Yes.
So there has to be the potential for loss of life.
Yes.
So we zoom in to this placemat on to scenario three there.
This is a scenario in which presumably there's a threat to one of Canada's 10 critical infrastructure sectors.
And loss of life isn't an objective, per se, but it's a possible outcome, and that's what would trigger this criteria.
Yes, that's correct.
So, if we just scroll to the next page, please, Mr. Clerk.
So, I think there's a definition up there about serious violence.
And if we just zoom in a little bit more and scroll to the right.
Serious violence in relation to the 10 Government of Canada critical infrastructure sectors is defined as a threat actor who willfully destroys or damages property if such actions could endanger a person's life.
And that's what we were just referring to, correct?
That's correct.
So, for example, a willingness to engage in just pure destruction of property if all the other criteria are met wouldn't be sufficient to bring somebody up to the level of being a target.
Is that correct?
Yeah, not necessary, but yes.
Okay, and so would an example of this be somebody, for instance, who might want to tear down a statue for an ideological purpose and for a desire to affect societal change, but because the potential of loss of life isn't made out, they wouldn't rise to the level of being a threat.
Is that correct?
That's a fair statement, yes.
Okay.
And how might an actor demonstrate a willingness to kill or to inspire others to kill?
So you mentioned inciting violence.
Would that be posting things online?
It could include posting things online.
Sometimes it's more covert than that, but it could, yes.
Okay, and would passive engagement or consumption of that content indicate a willingness to kill?
I'm not sure I understand what you mean by passive engagement.
Perhaps somebody who's engaging with violent content online.
Right.
Just looking at it, reading it, browsing it.
Would that be sufficient to meet this criteria?
No, not at all.
Okay.
So we'll turn to the next criteria, which is the desire to attempt societal change.
If we can just zoom out, Mr. Clerk.
And just go back up to the top page, please.
So, can you expand on what might meet this criteria, attempting to affect societal change?
Absolutely.
When we look at the IMV movement, because that's what it is, it's composition of movements, many members believe in what they call accelerationalism, which is a belief that society needs to change.
If we take white supremacists as an example, our anti-immigration individuals who believe that their society is at risk either of immigration, of government intervention, of anything they see, they feel that society is at risk and that there's going to be a civil war.
So they believe they must take violent action.
To speed up that societal change and to put society back in their vision is the way it should be.
So that's an example of societal change where they really adhere to this accelerationist mindset, if you will.
And so would somebody who's protesting meet the criteria for attempting to affect societal change?
Not necessarily.
I would just want to highlight that CSIS cannot, by its law, investigate lawful protest or dissent, unless it's related to one of the threats to security of Canada.
Right, and so protest alone.
Protest alone wouldn't be sufficient to meet this criteria.
No, it would not.
Okay.
And so turning to the third criteria there, ideological influence, you've touched on this already in using the word movements.
So I see in the top left corner of that placemat, if we zoom in just in the bubble that says ideologically motivated, I see there are four, I think, broad movements that the service has identified as falling under this category.
Can you speak to them, please?
Certainly.
There's xenophobic violence, as I mentioned earlier, anti-authority violence, so anti-government, gender-driven violence, and what we call other grievance that could be extreme environmental groups or animal rights-type anti-abortion.
I mean, the extreme violent movements.
It's meant to capture that type of ideology.
So why does the service use the lens of movements and not discrete groups?
If we look at terrorism as we're traditionally used to looking at it, we've very much been focused on groups.
And those groups, I'll use Al-Qaeda as an example, very much...
A command and control structure where you had to be vetted and you had to really be accepted as a member of the group and very tightly held and you had to go to training camps and the like to be considered a member of Al-Qaeda.
While there are groups in the IMVE space, they're not as defined in the same way.
They don't necessarily have command and control.
And it's really a movement of individuals of sometimes various elements of these ideologies and networks of individuals is a Better way of describing it than actual strict groups, as what we've seen in the past.
Right.
And so these are broad categories, broad networks, and participation in any one of them, of course, isn't alone on its own because you've got the other criteria there.
Yes, that's right.
And we've seen, I've given a couple of examples, but we've seen cases where individuals, they don't belong to any group, but they adhere or they're influenced by these movements and they decide to act and commit terrorist attacks.
So can you just explain to the Commission what the anti-public health measures movement is?
Anti-public health came out, of course, as a result of the pandemic and individuals who felt that government was overreaching by their health regulations in terms of wearing a mask or the vaccinations or what have you.
And that would fall under which of these categories?
Well, it's not an issue or a movement that the service investigated.
However, we have seen some of our subjects of investigation in the IMVE space exploit that type of a movement.
If they're anti-authority, if that's the ideology that they subscribe to, and they see government intervention, then they can exploit that to justify their ideology and say, you know, yet again, government is overreaching.
That type of an example.
In and of itself, anti-public health is not of concern to ceases.
Right.
And so what would be that anchor that brings it into the purview of the service?
Again, it would be more the individuals who exploit that type of a movement to recruit individuals, to bring them more towards the extreme view of anti-authority, ideology, wanting to use violence, serious violence, to kill, to bring changes.
Right.
And so that reference to serious violence is effectively what brings you back to 2C.
Yes.
And you mentioned another word there, Ms. Tessie, accelerationism.
Can you expand on what that is?
As I mentioned, and I'm not the security expert on this, but as I mentioned, it is a view that they have to accelerate the change of society because they're not satisfied with...
Right now, as I mentioned, they could be xenophobic, they could be anti-authority, and they feel the only way to make a change is not using the democratic process and voting, but rather to use serious violence to kill, to bring about that change, because it's not happening in the current state of affairs.
Right.
And so I understand from your institutional report and from your witness summaries that the service has seen a rise in...
Anti-public health measures content online.
Is that fair?
I'd say what we've seen a rise of is anti-authority rhetoric, violent rhetoric, and threats against public officials.
Certainly there was a rise when the public health measures were put into place, but when those were loosened, then of course the rhetoric towards that particular issue went down.
But what has increased is threats against public officials.
And has that posed a challenge at all for the service?
It's certainly of concern to the service.
So how does the service go about distinguishing between credible threats of violence and something that might just be a social media post that expresses anti-authority views?
We take various measures.
First of all, the service doesn't...
Monitor all social media.
I don't think we'd want our intelligence services to be monitoring everybody's social media.
So it's very focused where we believe there are threats being communicated, if you will, or that are related to our mandate.
But we use all our methodologies.
Again, if we feel that we have sufficient information to begin an investigation, then we'll use the techniques and our methodologies, such as surveillance or what have you, that'll enable us to investigate that threat further.
But it is always a challenge to know when somebody's going to move from the online space to the physical space.
That's obviously of great concern.
And as I mentioned earlier, it's often not necessarily the person posting the rhetoric, but the person consuming it who can decide to become radicalized and then...
Right.
So, please.
I was just also, just to reinforce something that Miss Tissi mentioned.
So, it's not always the people making the threat that we're most concerned about.
It's the people who will consume that rhetoric and be triggered and mobilized to violence.
And to also answer another of your questions, to how we evaluate the threats.
At ITAC, we look at this fairly closely.
And we apply the same type of methodology that we use for the terrorism threat level, which is to look at the threat actors, their intent, their capability, and their opportunities.
And so our analysts are trained, they have very detailed tradecraft, to learn to evaluate the intent based on a message.
A message that says, I wish that person would get killed, is really not the same as a message that says...
I really dislike this person.
I just acquired a gun and I'm going to shoot the person.
So I'm exaggerating.
But it's just to give you the idea of how we actually look at those threats and look at them very closely with that tradecraft and that methodology in mind.
Right.
And this tradecraft that ITAC applies would be, or the methodology, is distinct from these three or four criteria that the service is applying.
Is that correct?
No, not entirely, because when we fall under the CCS Act, so we look at the potential for terrorism.
And so in that case, we don't look at just any serious violence.
And so it needs to be motivated by our ideology.
It needs to be done in the purpose of leading to a societal change.
So in that sense, it's not completely different.
It's just that we use it differently.
We don't use it to determine whether or not we can collect on people since we don't collect intelligence.
Okay, thank you.
So I'm going to ask you to define two big concepts, and so I'll pose this question to the whole panel.
One thing that the service is struggling with, as I understand, is dealing with misinformation and disinformation as it navigates the challenges of determining between assessing credible threats online and online rhetoric.
So can you explain to the Commission what...
Misinformation and disinformation might mean and how that impacts your work in determining threats under Section 2C?
Certainly, I can answer that.
My colleagues can certainly add any comments they like.
Misinformation tends to be erroneous information that continues to be sent online, communicated online, not necessarily knowing that the information is erroneous.
Disinformation is purposely spreading false information, if that helps at all.
I think that's the purpose here.
I think it's the best definition, unless you want to elaborate more, but I totally agree with what was said here.
So where would engaging with misinformation or disinformation fall on these criteria?
Sorry, can we just zoom out a little bit more, Mr. Clerk?
Maybe I will...
Essentially on this one, I think it's not just a question of misinformation, disinformation, because that is in and of itself not something that, you know, we need to be aware of it, conscious of it, but it's not something that we need to determine ourselves.
It's more looking back to the intent and the capabilities of the individual.
Unfortunately, social media, internet is full of information that is misleading, that could be misinformation, as Miss Stacy described, could be also purposefully misleading, so that would be disinformation.
So I think, you know, we're more interested in understanding that dynamic.
And then apply that understanding to our analysis of specific activities, specific individuals.
So I think that would be a better description of how we the service would be conscious and aware and apply those principles.
Right, so you're aware of the fact that there are things circulating online that might not be violent rhetoric or that might not reflect a desire to engage in violence, but you've got to keep a general awareness of that.
Is that fair to say?
Yeah, because what we have seen, unfortunately, a number of the individuals who have perpetrated the act of terrorism...
In Canada, we've had, you know, since 2014, we have 25 people who have been killed in terrorist activities, by people who were motivated by violent extremist ideologies.
And so when you dissect, deconstruct their motivation, often because they left manifestos or writings behind and so on.
You see a conflation of different issues.
It could be an xenophobic ideology.
And then when you start to look at the material and the understanding, you realize that there is a lot of misinformation and disinformation that is weaved into their writings or their understanding that creates that belief for these individuals that they must act.
So that's why we see cis will need to have that kind of awareness.
Not because we will be interested in every misinformation, disinformation that exists, but that reality informs the threat related activity that we must investigate.
Thank you.
I'd like to shift gears now so we can just take that document down, Mr. Clark, thank you, and talk to you about the...
Services, activities in respect of the convoy in particular.
So as I understand it, the service was aware or had pre-existing targets and came to learn of the convoy through that activity.
Is that fair?
Sorry, we became aware of the convoy.
Yes, of course.
Right.
And so the service had pre-existing targets who might have been involved?
Yes, we had pre-existing targets in the INVE space, to be clear.
And was the service at any point, sorry, was the service at any point investigating the protest itself?
So maybe if I can step back a little bit, just to make sure that we provide the commission with the best possible overview.
We, of course, have been, you know...
We're generally aware of what's happening in our country.
We have seen the tension that was created by reticence or a different perspective on public health measures.
We saw, of course, in mid-January when the government mandate that will apply to truckers was being discussed and was about to take effect.
We saw this kind of increasing volatility and intensity of opposing those measures.
We kept a general awareness of that.
We saw some subject of investigation of CSIS, so the individuals who were already meeting the thresholds that Ms. Stacia described earlier, started to get interested in the discussion and discussing potential...
Ways of engaging.
And so, at that point, we started to engage more resources, both in our headquarters in terms of analytical understanding, but also across the region.
An intelligence organization that has offices across the country and across the world.
So we started to engage our regional offices in Canada and some stations abroad to better understand the dynamic.
And so that evolution or the intensity of our work followed the events of January and February.
Right, but the service was...
Was not investigating the anti-public health measures movement broadly, for example, and it certainly wasn't investigating the...
The convoy itself as a discrete topic, right?
As was mentioned earlier, we are prevented by law to investigate protests and lawful dissent.
We're not investigating the convoy itself.
Our interest is to understand how that dynamic is potentially influencing individuals, individuals that were known already to CSIS.
And others potentially to radicalize further and engage in potential threat-related activity.
So we were not investigating the convoy.
Right.
And so the service's focus remained at all times on its targets and their participation or their involvement as it may be in those protests.
I would maybe clarify, Commissioner, I would say that, you know, we were, of course, you know, focusing on our subject of investigations, but also the dynamic of such events is that you have people, sometimes it can refer to alarm wolves or individuals who might be further radicalized by the protest.
And so our work was to engage with our federal partners, with law enforcement at the federal, provincial, municipal level.
In Ottawa and across the country to understand how potentially what was happening in the protest world, if I can put it this way, could have an influence on individuals who may, those who were known already to us are subject to investigations, or others who could be radicalized.
So it was essentially a two-fold analysis.
Making sure we understood what our subject investigations were doing, associating with and so on, but also understanding who were others who could potentially radicalize, who could potentially start to recruit and meet others to further threat-related activity.
Our focus is one that we maintain from the beginning to the end, and to a large extent that's what we continue to do, is we always make sure that we don't have tunnel vision in our analysis, is that we challenge ourselves on an ongoing basis to make sure that our perspective of threat-related activity is not just linear and doesn't change.
We were on an ongoing basis because of that exchange of information with other organizations, challenging ourselves to make sure do we really understand well the dynamic here and how does this apply to the CSIS Act and how our intelligence professionals are executing?
Right.
So would it be fair to say CSIS was looking at the protests in conjunction with its targets as the Section 2C definition allows?
Yes, our targets, but also looking at the broader perspective to see if others would eventually engage in such activity that they could become subject of investigations.
So looking for potential threats.
Yes.
Okay.
I would like to pull up a document, TSNSC CAN 50165.
So I'll take you through a few briefs that the service prepared in the course of the protests, and we can discuss them.
So do you recognize this document, Mr. Vino?
Yes.
Can you explain to us what it is?
As per the title, these are notes that were prepared for a senior executive in the organization, Ms. Desir, myself, to brief outside partners in this case would be Minister Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety, who I report to as Director of CSIS.
So this would have been a ministerial briefing that you would have provided, is that right?
Yeah, I think we can describe it.
Right.
And so this is January 27th, around the time of the first ADM NSOps meeting.
Is that fair?
Yeah, those dates are accurate, yeah.
Okay.
So I just want to go through the content.
We can scroll down a bit.
We have sort of the very first assessment prepared by the service, I think, of the Freedom Convoy.
And so there's a bullet there that says CSIS is investigating IMVE activities and monitoring IMVE social media content.
There has been online commentary calling for violence and storming parliament hill buildings.
And then the next bullet, CSIS is tracking engagement of its targets in relation to the convoy.
Over the coming days, CSIS will be monitoring the involvement of these targets and other persons of interest, in particular for any indications of mobilization to violence.
So what do those two bullets mean there?
What does CSIS will be monitoring the involvement of these targets and other persons of interest, in particular for indications of mobilization to violence, mean?
So I think as we were just describing in the previous exchange is that we had already an awareness of a number of individuals in Canada who were engaged in activities that met our threshold for 2C investigations.
And so we were aware that some of these individuals were interested in paying a lot of close interest to the convoy and trying to understand What it meant, saw potential opportunities.
And so we were looking at those individuals.
So these are the known actors, if you want.
Our work as well is to make sure, as I mentioned, that we don't have tunnel vision, that we just don't look at what we know, but also in this context of other people who might be influenced by the events, by some specific decision, by the government, some specific radical rhetoric online to say it is my time, I need to do something
So our professionals at CSIS and in ITAC are trained to really understand well the distinctions we're talking about, about 2C and so on.
About what is lawful dissent and protest versus what are activities that could be potentially, you know, threat-related activity under the CESIS Act.
So this is a description of that, at a high level, of that type of work that was ongoing during that period.
So is the assessment there that there's a possibility of a lone actor threat?
Is that it?
Yes, essentially at that point, you know, late January, we're looking at such an activity because based on, again, the experience of our professionals, we have seen individuals who seize opportunities.
To engage in those acts, either because they had previous beliefs or because they are in events or activities or what they might read or consume in terms of information is radicalizing them extremely quickly.
So, a person that's not known to the service, but that could be mobilized.
So, at the bottom there, we see the bullet.
CSIS is unaware at this time of any tangible plots or plans of serious violence.
And so, at this stage, there's no risk of a threat materializing.
I would not necessarily say there's no risk.
It's just that we're not aware of it.
And so, I think, you know, it is a...
I think Mr. C.A. used the expression earlier, it's not an exact science.
And what I think is very important to remember in this event and other events of the sort that we've seen in the US and other democracies is that there could be a very quick turn of events.
There could be very quick radicalization or shift in the dynamic of these.
So at that point, we did not see.
So the 27th, when the report was written, we were not seeing any tangible plots of violence.
But that's not to say that there was no risk, and that's why we were, as I said earlier, engaging all necessary resources in Ottawa and across the country to understand what was happening.
Okay, so we'll go to the next brief, which is TS NSC CAN 00150166.
So, do you recognize this document?
Yes, I do.
And can you explain to us what it is?
Yes.
This is, as the title explains, an analytical brief.
So, it's prepared by senior intelligence analysts within CSIS to try to contextualize, provide an assessment of some information or facts that may appear.
And it's to use their expert knowledge and apply analytical tradecraft to take facts and events and try to make some sense out of them so that we have an understanding within the service and ITAC of what this means.
And this distribution here also means that it would have been shared more broadly across government.
So it's to have CSIS.
You know, share our analysis with other members of the government about a specific event.
Who would you have been sharing this brief with?
This would have been shared actually at this level of classification.
It would have been shared very broadly across government, federal government.
So we're talking, you know, most departments across the federal government and many individuals within each department.
And specifically, that would have been for sure.
The analytical intelligence branches of the key government departments involved in the monitoring of the activities of the Freedom Convoy and associated demonstrations.
And would it have been shared with PCO?
Absolutely.
Thank you.
If we scroll down to page three here, I think we see the assessment here.
Aside from individuals who specifically identify themselves as part of the convoy group, the service is unaware of the presence of IMVE groups at this weekend's protest.
Then if we scroll down.
All the way.
Amen.
The presence of racist and bigoted flags appear to have been brought by individuals who would like others to believe that their cause or belief is far greater and more organized than it actually is.
CSIS assesses that these flags were not part of a broader group initiative.
So this is February 2nd, and the service is still reporting there isn't a threat under Section 2C arising from the protests itself.
Is that fair to say?
I'm not sure that this is...
I think the purpose of this was more to, again, use the expertise of CSIS IMV analysts to try to share with other groups, individuals, organizations that may not be as familiar as CSIS is on these issues.
To say that, you know, we have seen in the past, you know, people waving flags at different demonstrations.
And when you do the analysis, it's not to say that, you know, there were a large number of people associated with those flags.
It could be here.
It is essentially there was a number of commentary made in the media and other places.
That trying to draw an inference between if there is such a flag that means there are lots of people associated with this cause.
This was to use the best analysis possible from our intelligence experts to contextualize that information, to try to make sense for people who are not experts of what we saw and how we analyzed this event.
Right, so at this stage we're seeing indicators or symbols at the protests that might...
Lead one to believe that there are extremist groups involved in the protest and the service is saying that's not necessarily the case.
It's not to say that it's not the case, but it's to be more nuanced in the analysis because this is very complex and people who are not experts may draw conclusions.
And our attempt with these types of reports is to say, based on our analysis, based on the information we have, based on all of the knowledge that we have, this is the context in how we are interpreting this.
It doesn't mean that CSIS is right, but I think it's very important for us to share that analysis with others.
Okay.
So I'll take you to the last brief, and that's TSNSC CAN 00150211, please.
Okay, so if we can just zoom out a bit so we can see the entire page, please.
So I believe this brief is dated February 10th.
Are you familiar with this document?
Yes.
I don't see the date on it.
I think it's just at the bottom of the page there.
Okay.
So this is...
This is a brief, again, on the protest.
If we just look at the title, it says Anti-Public Health Measures Movement Grievances and the Freedom Convoy 2022.
So if we scroll to the bottom of page two, we have the outlook prepared by the service.
Sorry if we scroll up a bit as well.
So we see there just before the redaction, no formal organized plot of violence has been identified.
CSIS assesses that the Freedom Convoy 2022 is of interest to various subjects of investigation, especially those who hold anti-mandate or broader anti-government views.
And then just underneath Outlook there, CSIS will continue to monitor the involvement of IMVEs within the Freedom Convoy 2022.
In order to better understand the public health measures movement.
So what is the assessment being shared here?
So essentially, the first line above the outlook you mentioned is that at that point, CSIS assessment was that we did not see specific actions being taken that would characterize a threat to the security of Canada.
Okay.
And so the last question that I'll pose to you before I turn it back over to Mr. Cameron is, you know, we've heard, the Commission has heard evidence about the distinction between lawful and unlawful protests.
So in this period between January 27th up to February 10th, you know, the...
You might have even formed the view, just as a personal opinion, that the protests might have gone from being a lawful one to an unlawful one.
Would that have had any bearing on your assessments or on your work?
No, because it's not the criteria we'd be looking at, per se.
It has, again, related to violence.
So we're very, again, going back very closely to the 2C definition we've talked about earlier.
So a declaration of an event that is unlawful.
For example, you know, you can have a permit for a demonstration and then, you know, there's too many people, therefore your demonstration is outside the bounds of the permit.
It could be unlawful, but that would not engage us.
So the unlawfulness in and of itself alone is not just a criteria that would be determinative for CSIS.
Can I add something?
And it's the last line on page two here, if I can read it.
Further, CSIS will also continue to follow the evolving and dynamic situation surrounding the country.
The convoy to identify any national security concerns.
That is really important to underline, is that this was a very fluid, volatile environment, and we were constantly doing our assessments.
So every day we were re-looking at our information, our investigations, to ensure that we were up to date on our assessments.
So I just want to underline that sometimes it's a snapshot in time, that date.
Particular brief was written, but that we were also very aware that this was very much a fluid situation.
Thank you.
What I'm going to do is pick up now with following on that helpful information you were able to give us about the IMVE space and how it fit in with your observations of the convoy and protest and blockade activities.
I just want to run through and this will all sound familiar and indeed...
Parties who've had a chance to read the summary of the closed session.
This will be a...
Similar to a series of questions that you answered there, leading up to some context that I want to bring to the questions that follow.
So what I'm going to do is just ask you about your involvement in the government and other law enforcement, sorry, not other law enforcement, in the government, in the law enforcement and other intelligence communities as you were all watching.
The protests and the blockades, et cetera, evolve.
So first of all, as the materials indicate, I think you'll agree that CSIS attended, had a representative attending and participating in the ADM NS Ops meetings.
And I think we know that acronym now, so I won't bother spelling it out.
Can you confirm that?
Yes.
Yes.
And CSIS representative attended the DMOC meetings in relation to the convoy and blockade events?
Yes.
And you had regular interaction with the NSIA about the convoy and blockade events?
Yes.
And you were a member when it was formed of the combined intelligence group that was set up so that all the intelligence collected by the various law enforcement and intelligence agencies could be shared.
Among the parties involved in the convoy and blockade events?
Yes.
And CSIS was a member or at least had a representative at Intersect meetings that a broader group of law enforcement and first responder personnel involved in major events such as the convoy posed for Ottawa?
Yes.
And indeed, if we step back to before the The actual formation of the Combined Intelligence Group, it looks from the documentation that CSIS was receiving intelligence such as the Hendon reports that were generated by the OPP and other information that once they became involved, the OPS was also generating with respect to intelligence on the convoy?
Yes.
And if we could call up the, again, Mr. Clerk, please.
The information, sorry, the institutional report, all seven zeros, one, and go to page 13. At about halfway down.
Now, here's, I think, exactly where we were picking up, Ms. Tessier, with your comment about the dynamic nature of the...
Events that were unfolding in front of you and putting it in context of what I was just describing about your many-faceted interrelations with the intelligence and law enforcement community.
it says here, CSIS continually monitored streams of intelligence and shared information with domestic and foreign partners, including through the One Vision processes with the RCMP and police of jurisdiction to assess threats of serious violence in relation to the convoy.
And here I'm going to ask you to remember and see if you can provide for me in this open forum that your classified institutional report contained an...
Actual itemization of all of the agencies, and I don't need you to be more specific than you want to be, but it was tens or dozens of agencies that you were collecting and sharing information with, correct?
Yes, that's correct.
We have, as was mentioned earlier, we have offices throughout Canada and we deal with police of jurisdiction at all levels.
Right.
So to the extent that there was intelligence or information available in relation to potential threats to the security of Canada as defined in the CSIS Act, it was received and considered by the service.
Yes, that's accurate.
Thank you.
Now, if we can look at where you were...
Giving input.
We looked at where you were getting and sharing intelligence, where you were giving input to government.
If we go to page 13 again, just a little bit higher, or I guess immediately above where we just were, cabinet meetings.
You and, was that Mr. Vignon, you were attending mostly to the SSE and the IRG meetings?
Most of them, Mr. C, attended a couple as well.
Thank you.
Where your role was, and I am...
Quoting here at the end of the paragraph to provide updates on national security threats that may arise and answer questions.
So that was your role at those cabinet meetings?
Yes.
Now, if we can go to Mr. Clerk, the witness summary, which is the interview summary, which is WTS six zeros.
Six zero.
Sixty.
So six zeros and then 60. And thank you.
If you can go to page five.
About two-thirds of the way down.
And this is, just to situate you, this is a paragraph from the summary of the interview we had when we were meeting with you earlier in the year.
And it reads in the first paragraph under the word, under the heading Intelligence, Mr. Vignon stated that at no point did the service assess that the protests in Ottawa or elsewhere Then there's a parenthetical definition of what that refers to.
Constituted a threat to the security of Canada as defined by Section 2 of the CSIS Act and that CSIS cannot investigate activity constituting lawful protest.
And I'm going to ask you to hold these thoughts in your mind, but I'll just, on that point, you recollect telling us that during the interview, Mr. Pignot?
Yes, I do.
Yes, and if we go to page 8 of the same document about halfway down, under the heading "Recommendation to Cabinet,"the first line there is "Mr.
Vigneault learned..." But the EA, which would be the Emergencies Act, referenced the threat definition set out in Section 2 of the CSIS Act once the federal government began to seriously consider invoking the Emergencies Act.
And then there's the parenthetical date bracket there between the 10th and 13th of February.
And then...
You've requested that the service prepare a threat assessment on the risks associated with the invocation of the Act.
And then the last sentence is the one I was going to link to the earlier one you made, which is, he felt an obligation to clearly convey the service's position that there did not exist a threat to the security of Canada as defined by the service's legal mandate.
And again, you recollect us telling us that during the interview?
Yes.
And your legal mandate, as we saw it, I don't think we need to call it up because you can probably recite it from heart and thus recognize it when I put it to you.
That legal mandate that you're describing when you say as defined by the service's legal mandate is to investigate threats to the security of Canada and advise the government of Canada on such threats, correct?
Yes.
If we can go now to Mr. Clerk, WTS 6079.
This is the public summary of the closed session we had on November 5th.
And the bottom of page five of that...
And I'll read there.
Mr. Vigneault explained that the advice and the assessments they would be giving to government is taken in conjunction by the decision maker with all of the other different pieces of analysis for the decision.
Mr. Clerk, if you can scroll down to follow with me.
Different pieces of analysis for the decision maker to make a determination in the end if this is a threat to national security or not.
When CSIS looks at national security, in this case, their assessment was that this was not a threat to national security within the confines of the CSIS Act.
And do you remember saying that, Mr. Vigneault?
Yes.
And then, sticking with you, Mr. Vigneault, for one more, over at the top of page six, sorry, the bottom of page six, over to the top of seven.
Mr. Vigneault confirmed a statement from the Commission's interview with CSIS, and you might recognize this as the one we started out with, the interview with CSIS and ITAC, to the effect that at no point did the Service assess that the protests in Ottawa or elsewhere, defined as the Freedom Convoy, constituted a threat to the security of Canada under Section 2 of the CSIS Act, and that CSIS cannot investigate activity constituting lawful protests.
Unless conducted in conjunction with a threat-related activity.
And then you conclude that paragraph.
Mr. Vigneault confirmed that to the extent that he was able to give input on this topic at cabinet and IRG meetings, this was the view he expressed.
And again, do you recall making those statements?
Yes.
Now over to you, Ms. Tessier.
At the top of page 10 of the open summary, sorry, the public summary of the closed session, we have your description, and I'll read it out.
Ms. Tessier explained that the service's determination that the convoy and related protests did not constitute a threat to the security of Canada was not made by a singular analyst or executive.
Rather, Strategic analysts provided multiple assessments throughout the relevant period, which were approved at higher levels before they were disseminated.
Mr. Vigneault explained that the assessment process is not a binary one, but an ongoing dynamic consideration of whether the information collected Was rising to the level of a threat to national security.
So, I think, Ms. Tessier, you can agree with both the first and second part of that statement.
That is, you can agree with Ms. DuVignot because that's your point about the dynamic nature of the assessment, correct?
That's correct.
And, Ms. DuVignot, you remember adding that to Ms. Tessier's thought there?
Yes.
Okay.
Now, I'd like to take you to page 8 of the open summary.
Sorry, the public summary of the closed session.
And moving to the bottom of that page, the advice to cabinet heading, and here in the open...
Sorry, Mr. Clerk, I've confused you.
Just for a second, if I could ask you to go to the very top just so we can situate ourselves.
Here we've started in the closed ex parte session the examination by...
Council for the Government of Canada.
So, if you can scroll back down to the bottom again.
And here, Mr. Vigneault, I will read the paragraph that the preceding paragraphs are leading up to.
The preceding ones I've cited to you.
Mr. Vigneault stated that at the end of the February 13th IRG meeting, Following the discussion of the Emergencies Act, he was asked by the Prime Minister to provide an opinion as to whether he supported the invocation of the Emergency Act.
Mr. Vigneault explained that based on both his understanding that the Emergencies Act definition of threat to the security of Canada was broader than the CSIS Act, as well as based on his opinion of everything he had seen to that point, he advised the Prime Minister of his belief that it was indeed required to invoke the Act.
And again, you remember saying that during the closed session?
Yes.
And if I can just break that out a bit, if I understand what you're saying there, you have an understanding.
And.
We might find out later in the week where you got that understanding, but I'll let you keep that as a mystery for now.
You had an understanding that the Emergencies Act definition of threats to security of Canada was broader than the CSIS Act definition, correct?
Yes, and maybe if you allow me, Commissioner, just want to...
Go back to the first element that you took me through, Mr. Cameron, which was that when I learned that the Emergencies Act was to be invoked, I informed myself.
So this, I think, is the crux of the issue.
So as Director of CSIS, we are very familiar.
My colleague and I, we know the Act fairly well, the CSIS Act.
I was not familiar with the details of the Emergencies Act.
So when that was first brought up, the fact that the Emergencies Act was using the same words as the CSIS Act to define the threat, so imported into the Emergencies Act, I needed to understand for myself and for the course of this, what was the implication of that?
And that's when I was assured that there was a separate understanding.
You know, the confines of the CSIS Act, the same words based on legal interpretation, jurisprudence, federal court rulings, and so on.
There was a very clear understanding of what those words meant in the confines of the CSIS Act.
Reassured by is that there was, you know, in the context of the Emergencies Act, there was to be a separate interpretation based on the confines of that act.
And that was, you know, instrumental starting on the tent, I believe, when we discussed that to make sure that we understand, you know, and how we would be not informing, but, you know, using the words very carefully.
And very much specified, you know, when we were providing advice and information, it was based on the CSIS Act definition.
So I just wanted to maybe contextualize this a little bit.
Thanks for that.
Thank you for that elaboration.
Now, if we can go back to that sentence at the bottom of page 8, I understand, I think the words do speak for themselves, but I want to make sure I understand your sense of them.
that based on your understanding that the Emergencies Act definition of that to the Security of Canada was broader than the CSIS Act, then it says as well as based on his opinion of everything So, if I'm understanding the way you've put those two together, that if you take a broader definition and then look more broadly, you come up with the advice you gave to the Prime Minister of your belief that it was required to invoke the Act.
Yes, that's exactly it.
Thank you.
Now, I want to sort of insert a parenthesis or come back to an observation.
Mr. Clerk, can you call up SSM NSC CAN 50216?
These are IRG meeting minutes for the February 13th meeting.
And at page 12, we'll find the report to government that you commissioned, Mr. Vigneault, when you learned that the government was considering the invocation of the Act.
And you've mentioned elsewhere in your evidence, I think it's now well understood by the Commission and the parties, that as you...
Learned that the government was considering the invocation of the Emergencies Act, a concern that you had because of your understanding of the IMVE space, and feel free to join in, Ms. Tessier, if you want to add here.
The concern was that the invocation of the Act actually had the potential to, I think the word inflame is used, but to raise the temperature and actually increase the risk of a threat of serious violence.
Is that right?
Yes, it is.
And this is really when, you know, we feel that it is our responsibility.
A little bit like when Ms. Khan walked me through another assessment in relation to the flags.
We have experts, we have people inside the organizations that, you know, really well understand those dynamics.
And in this context was to make sure that the government...
Yes, within the confine of the reflection on the invocation of the Emergencies Act, but also more broadly about what is happening in the country and how could the dynamic change.
We felt it was important that we took that expertise within the service and we shared that more broadly with partners, with the government, so that everybody had that understanding that we had at the service.
So it is within that spirit.
So both in the context of the Emergencies Act, but also in the context of what we see, what we potentially see in Canada.
Right.
So if I understand the purpose of this report, it was to alert the government to a potential movement in the threat environment.
And by that, I'll tell you what I'm trying to get at.
You weren't by...
Offering this assessment or deciding to do the assessment, concluding that the government itself was, by invoking the Act, engaging in activities that posed a threat to the security of Canada?
No, absolutely not.
It was really much, you know, again, based on the expertise and understanding of the IMV milieu, is to see how some of these elements can be interpreted.
And Ms. Conner asked us earlier about disinformation, misinformation, and that would be a good example of how some objective decision.
Could be misconstrued deliberately or not?
And what is the impact on potential threat activity in Canada?
So that really was the spirit in which we produced that document.
Right.
And this document, perhaps also in the spirit of things we see in your annual reports or some of your reports to Parliament, CISA sometimes repairs.
It prepares reports to government related to threats to the security of Canada that aren't actually premised on the commencement of an investigation based on reasonable grounds that the activity poses a threat, but it's simply advice to the government, a report to the government on threat-related issues, correct?
Yes.
Essentially, it's to use the expertise, the knowledge, and to...
Try to bring a level of understanding or bring a light into very complex dynamic issues that are, in the case of IMVE, fast evolving in our country.
So we try to bring that level of understanding.
Yes.
Okay.
And if we can go back then, Mr. Clerk, to the public summary, that's WTS 6079.
just wrap up the chronology and indeed this examination by going to page seven of that summary.
We're now at the stage where the act has been invoked and the point I understand you to be making in the paragraph that begins, Mr. Vignon explained.
The point being that after revocation, you continued to provide input, both to partner agencies and to Cabinet through the IRG, about the evolution of the protests, the blockades, etc., the convoy.
So you're continuing to give input proactively, but you weren't actually asked the question, should we revoke the Act?
No, we were not.
Thank you.
And with that, Mr. Commissioner, I will conclude a few minutes early.
Okay.
Well, that's great.
A little shorter is appreciated.
I think we'll take the morning break and come back in 15 minutes to start with the various cross-examinations.
The commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
La commission enlevée pour 15 minutes.
Order aloud.
The Commission is reconvened.
La Commissione apprend.
Okay.
Oh, okay.
Ms. Convoy Organizers.
Okay.
Go ahead.
Before I begin, I'd just like to ask leave to use a certain document.
I believe your counsel's been advised of this.
I've put together an examination aid for the purpose to save time.
The documents in the examination aid I will be tendering into evidence.
However, not the examination aid itself.
The purpose of the examination aid is so that I don't have to wait to go through each and every document one by one by one and waste the 15 minutes I have.
I've compiled the records into a Word and PDF document that I'm referring to with the footnotes of each and every one that have been assigned.
The numbers in the database system, and I would like leave to be able to refer to that document while I'm doing my examination, sir.
Okay, and it's just a compilation of documents without comments and no comments and the full document is there?
It's not an extract?
For the most part, I had to, because I am somewhat inept when it comes to using Microsoft Word, I had to take screenshots of a couple in order to Actually put them in, but they are in in full.
So it's the full document.
So it's basically a compilation of a series of documents without comment.
Correct.
Okay.
Robert McKinnon, Government of Canada.
My friend is looking to put in, it looks like, parts of an affidavit attachments or affidavit itself as part of this.
If it's just a document that has an ID number already on it, If that's it, that's fine.
So as long as it's not just an excerpt of an affidavit that's been filed in this proceeding or the motion itself, not argument.
It's just the document.
As long as there's no commentary.
No, it's just there is a couple of things summarizing the facts.
If we want, I can delete every single one of them.
We have no objection to a document that's been filed in relativity, but as the Commission knows, this is still being in play for a response to the motion, so it would be improper to have comments associated with that motion put as part of the document.
As long as it's just the document itself with nothing more, that's fine.
And what we can do, sir, is that if my friend He has the document.
If there's issues as they arise, before I move to the next page of each one, I will check with my friend to make sure that he feels it's fair.
So, but, okay, and you don't, I'm just, I'm a bit confused.
I thought you said there was, there were no comments, it was just documents.
It was documents, but I state...
The fact in the document before putting...
It's not anything other than the fact, but as I said, I can delete that if the court would like, and if you give me five minutes before I start, I'll delete all of that and just send the documents with the date if that works for the court or for the commission.
So, Mr. Commissioner, I'm just reviewing the document, and without avoiding any debates about what commentary is, there are statements before some of the documents that aren't necessarily...
Reflective of the documents, for instance, this is the first time this photograph appeared.
So, again, not getting into what commentary is, Commission Council does have concern about that sort of statement being put in this format.
I think Commission Council's view is the documents themselves.
If they can be organized in a fashion where it's just reflecting what's in the document, that's fine.
I can do that, sir.
If I can have simply two minutes, I think.
Do that and send it around to everybody, and it'll just have the date at the top.
Okay, well, I think that's preferable, and as I understand it, there's no objection if that's what's done, because obviously if it speeds up things, we're very much into that.
Yes.
So what I'd suggest is why don't you stand down, and we'll go to the next cross-examiner, the OPP, and we can, assuming you've put it together, let me know, and we can reschedule you.
Good morning.
My name is Chris Diana.
I'm counsel to the OPP.
And I have some questions that I may be asking all of you at some point for your thoughts.
The area that I'd like to start with is about information flow.
So, Mr. Vigneault, maybe I'll start with you as the head of CESAs because you can speak to your role in advising kind of up the line.
But as I understand it, and my friend is taking you through the definition of CSIS, but the mandate of CSIS is to investigate threats to the security of Canada.
Is that correct?
Is your mic on?
Can you try again?
Okay.
Yes.
Sorry, I didn't hear you, that's all.
And part of your role is to share the appropriate information with senior decision-makers in the federal public service, including the National Security Advisor.
And Minister of Public Safety, is that correct?
That's accurate, but it's also broader than that.
We also share information with many other partners, but on the federal level, that would be accurate.
Yes.
And that's how it works.
We know in the federal sphere, there are a number of law enforcement-type relationships that would work in a similar way, and that they'll collect information and they'll share it with senior-level decision-makers.
Is that correct?
Yes.
So such as CBSA, RCMP, and there are a number of others.
Yes.
And obviously, you would agree that it's crucial that those senior-level decision-makers have all the information they need to make informed decisions.
Yes, I would say that that's what we endeavor to do, to make sure that all relevant information is available to decision-makers.
And so when we're thinking about information flow and we think about things that can go wrong, In that process, there are a couple of things, a number of things, but a couple of kind of main things that can go wrong in terms of what you do in advising decision makers.
The first may be that CSIS may fail to identify certain information on potential national security threats.
In other words, you might just miss on the intelligence side.
Yes, I believe I testified earlier to say that what we advise on is what we're aware of, and we endeavor to make sure that we are fulfilling our investigations to the extreme degrees, but we will never have the hubris to say that we know everything.
And of course, if you don't know, you can't advise, right?
Yes.
Second, the information may be available, but it may not be properly communicated up the chain.
That could happen, right?
I think maybe taking a second to speak to that is that there are different levels.
Ms. Tessier's role, my role, are somewhat different and we have people involved at the operational level and at the regional level.
So I think it's clear that there is a lot of information that is accumulated and there is a process of analysis and distillation of that information when it comes to our level.
And it's a human process.
So you might have some information that may come into certain offices, regional offices, and then it has to go up and then it be reviewed and go up again from your level to senior decision maker.
And whether it be by inadvertence or maybe not realizing its significance, there's always a possibility that something important may be missed.
Correct?
I would say, as a general statement, it is a possibility everywhere, not more specifically at CSIS or in intelligence, but I would say, yes, it's an accurate reality when human beings are involved.
That's right.
And that's for kind of all federal law enforcement type agencies, right?
I would say I would not want to speak to other law enforcement agencies, but, you know, from the CSIS point of view, I would say that's an accurate description of a theoretical issue, yes.
And obviously, sometimes you may not be aware, when I say you, it could be CSIS, it could be another law enforcement agency, may not be aware of the potential significance of a certain fact, and it may just be missed.
I think it's, again, you know, the same vein, I would say that's accurate, yes.
Okay, I would like to ask about Project Hendon briefly.
Maybe, Ms. Tessier, because you were kind of the lead on the actual intelligence side, as I understand it, the operational side, we do have evidence, of course, that CSIS did receive pending reports that went to a number of recipients.
That's correct?
Yes.
And, of course, your interest in these reports would relate to the mandate of CSIS.
You would be reviewing them with the CSIS mandate in mind.
Is that fair?
What we do with all information we receive is always assess it in terms of the relevance to our mandate.
Right.
And presumably other federal law enforcement agencies would be looking at those reports in relation to their own respective mandates.
Fair?
I can't speak to what other agencies would have done with the report, no.
And I believe in the witness summary it was stated that it was unknown if the information in Henning reports was actually used in reporting.
Can you confirm whether that information was in?
Yes.
I think the witness, the interview process, I think that's an accurate statement, but I think in summary of the information that was provided later on, we confirmed that indeed CSIS was receiving end-in reports.
It's just that Ms. Tissi and I had never heard that nomenclature, but it was shared with, I know for a fact, with our regional people in Toronto, in our regional office in Toronto.
And important information would have been communicated by those regional people up to your level, correct?
Yes.
Now, according to OPP Superintendent Pat Morrison, I don't know if you heard his evidence some time ago, but he testified that the OPP works very closely with CSIS.
Is that fair?
Absolutely.
In particular, I think the Provincial Anti-Terrorism Section works closely with CSIS?
Yes, it does.
And OBP is also embedded with INSET, the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team?
Yes.
And you would agree the OBP is a valuable law enforcement partner?
Absolutely.
And that, well, the Hendon, Project Hendon and the reports were a new product, but they still provided a valuable source of information, correct?
I would imagine so.
I've not seen the reports directly myself.
I also want to ask about the concept of information silos, which is always, I think, somewhat of a challenge.
It's an obvious proposition, of course, that different federal agencies have different mandates.
We've looked at that for.
One of the concerns, potentially, in the federal sphere is that one agency may not know or have access to information from another agency.
Is that fair?
It's fair, but I would, for the Commission's sake, I would say that...
Collectively, individually, as organizations, we have learned a lot of lessons over the years.
And to make sure that we move away from the risk of information being siloed.
As was introduced in evidence today, CSIS and other organizations were part of groups like EDM and SOPS, the Combined Intelligence Group, Intersect, NSET, as you mentioned.
And so these are processes put in place to ensure that we reduce the risk to the maximum possible that there will be information siloed.
And so efforts have been made to get around the silo issue.
And you would agree that one of the best ways to get around is to ensure a broad distribution of intelligence.
Fair?
I would say that to a broad dissemination of the information to people who need to know, because when you have, and the complex context and the concept of need to know is important, but it's in a case like this, and I think, you know, as we've seen, and we may speak to that later, CSIS took a very...
Open approach to share a lot of our information with the maximum people possible.
So those who need to know specific details, we endeavour to share those details with them.
But the same thing with criminal investigations and national security investigations.
You just need to make sure to maintain the integrity of those investigations.
The two concepts of sharing as much information as possible while making sure that those who need to know have the same information.
And that's what our experts are doing on a day-to-day basis, on an ongoing basis.
Because we don't want the third-party rule to kind of get in the way of broad information sharing, correct?
Well, in the case specifically of when we talk about intelligence, there is a concept.
Call intelligence and evidence, which means that if you were to use information collected by CSIS, for example, on intelligence basis, share with law enforcement, there is a process of inerring complexity for law enforcement and eventually...
Crown prosecutors to use that information in open court.
So there are a number of rules that have been put in place, having learned over time what the pitfalls were.
And Ms. Stacey referred to earlier as the One Vision process, which is an elaborate process that has been put in place between the RCMP and CSIS to make sure that we are sharing all of the information relevant in the right way to enable law enforcement.
If I could address third-party rule, the service respects third-party rule, and the procedure is to request of that third-party any sharing that we think would be useful.
So we don't just share third-party information.
We always ask for permission to do so.
Right.
And so as far as Project Tendon is concerned, and you may not be aware, but it had a very broad distribution list that went to all federal law enforcement-related agencies, and that works to break down silos.
Fair?
I don't have personal knowledge of that, so I need to speak to that.
All right, and final topic is on social media.
We've heard a lot in this inquiry about social media.
Anyone can go and fire up the Twitter machine, and you can find lots of vile content and threats and things of that nature on social media.
Fair?
Yes.
And I believe it was mentioned in your witness summary that it's very difficult to assess the intent and impact of violent online rhetoric.
That's fair?
That's fair.
You would agree that useful intelligence requires a lot more than simply scrolling through Twitter, right?
Yes, it's much more complex than that.
And Ms. Chair, you spoke about this in your evidence not that long ago, that it really requires a trained analyst to review what's there on social media and pass it through an appropriate intelligent lens, tradecraft, as you put it, before you can have a useful product.
Is that fair?
Yes, when it falls within our mandate to look at a specific threat on social media, our analysts who are especially trained will take a look with that tradecraft in mind.
And that is, in fact, what OPP did with Project Hendon, correct?
They took information and they passed it through their lens and then produced it out to its partner agencies.
I don't recall the exact reports, so I wouldn't be able to say yes or no to that question.
Okay, my last question, Commissioner.
I know I'm probably up against the clock.
And the point I'm trying to make here is that analyzing social media to identify risks is something that should be done by subject matter experts or those trained to do so.
Is that fair?
I would say that depending on what the purpose of looking at social media is, but if the purpose is to enlighten CSIS, for example, in our mandate, absolutely.
And they are another level of complexity of who should have the authority, who should have the mandate to look more broadly at social media.
I think it's something that we testified in our...
Ex parte earring as well as an interview summary.
There are some challenges with social media analysis in Canada.
Sure, but from an intelligence perspective, you need an analyst to really give you proper intelligence.
Yes.
Thank you.
Okay, thank you.
So are the convoy organizers organized or should I move on to someone else?
Okay, so there's organization yet to be done.
the Ottawa Coalition, please.
Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
For the record, Paul Champ, counsel for the Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses.
Thank you for coming today, panel.
I just want to ask a question, I guess, Ms. Tessier, perhaps.
There's a statement in one of the documents, and you've testified, that the protest, the convoy protest, at no time posed a threat to Canada's national security.
But at the same time, isn't it true, CSIS-advised Cabinet, that invoking the Emergencies Act itself could further inflame extreme anti-government rhetoric?
Is that not the case?
I'm not sure which document you're referring to in the first statement that CSIS said at no time did the protest.
Is there a document I could look at?
I apologize.
Maybe it was Mr. Dignot, the director.
That was the advice you provided to Cabinet, was it not, sir?
Yeah, I believe that the statement I made was related to that the analysis continued to be that there was no threat to the security of Canada.
That's the concept that we'll be normally using in our vernacular.
Yeah, by Security of Canada, we're talking about 2C, violence associated with ideologically motivated objectives, right?
Yes, very much within the confine of the CSIS Act.
But Mr. Avino, if there was a concern that, and it was also your advice, that invoking the Emergencies Act could further inflame that kind of rhetoric, correct?
It was our advice, our assessment, I would say more than our advice, our assessment was that given everything that we know about the dynamic nature of IMV milieu, but yes, some individuals might seize on such a government measure to further inflame the rhetoric and potentially push them to act violently.
Yes.
So there was a concern.
That's what I was kind of getting at, is that if the situation or some of the rhetoric was so volatile and extreme that invoking the emergencies that could lead to some kind of violent reaction, was that not a concern?
It's absolute concern.
And if I may add, Mr. Champ, I would say that the fact that from early in January to throughout the period in question, we mobilized our headquarters and our regional offices because we were concerned about the situation.
Absolutely.
So I think there are different aspects of how we are segmenting this information that I think is important here.
Yes.
And so here's a question from Ms. Tessier.
I want to understand, there were some subjects of investigation present at the convoy process, correct?
That's correct, yes.
So just so we're clear, these were individuals for which CSIS had obtained targeting authority?
Yes.
And CSIS had obtained those targeting authorities prior to the protest.
So there were individuals who were of concern prior to the Freedom Convoy protest.
And so that means that CSIS had reasonable grounds to suspect that these individuals could engage in threat-related activity.
That's correct.
And we also know that there were many violent threats against public officials in Ottawa.
CSIS was aware of that?
Yes.
Not only federal officials, but also municipal officials?
I don't recall who exactly, but I do know overall there were threats and there continue to be increasing threats, as I mentioned earlier today, against elected officials.
Right.
The mayor testified that there was an individual coming from New Brunswick who was arrested who had apparently firearms in his truck.
We also heard evidence from a city council, Mathieu Fleury, who had to leave with his family from his home because...
People were coming to his house.
Was CSIS following those kinds of threats against municipal officials?
As I mentioned earlier, we maintained our focus was on our subject of investigation, of course, but naturally we worked very closely with our law enforcement partners, shared information, and continued to assess the situation as it related to our mandate.
And as I described earlier in terms of how we...
But Ms. Tessia, just to be clear, if someone's making a threat against a public government official, whether it's federal or municipal or provincial...
Isn't that inherently falling under 2C?
If someone's threatening a public official because they want some type of different political decision or policy choice, isn't that inherently falling under 2C?
As I mentioned earlier today, we've developed criteria in order to invoke 2C under the IMBE threat because there are criminal investigations that take place, there are public order incidents that take place that are not CSIS's mandate to investigate.
If I may add, Mr. Commissioner, I would just say that, as was described by Ms. Stacey and myself earlier, we're participating in all of these different groups, including Intersect and the Combined Intelligence Group.
Where we would be sharing information ourselves, our information, but also receiving information from other law enforcement.
In this specific case, this is where you may have public safety issues versus a threat to the security of Canada that might be in the same kind of dynamic environment and that this is where, by being at the same table and exchanging that information, we inform ourselves.
The second point is that this was a very dynamic threat assessment that we're doing throughout this period.
So by all means, if we had seen specific information about individuals wanting to engage in a way...
Often, you know, that flash will be more of a police investigation because of the specific threat that will be criminal nature, as opposed to an individual that might want to engage in a terrorist activity.
These are not perfectly, you know, black and white issues, and this is why we are working to exchange information very dynamically.
But, Mr. Vino, let's just be clear that if someone's making a threat against a public official because they're trying to influence that public official...
That inherently falls under 2C, does it not?
Now, it may be that you don't view the threat as credible, but if it was a credible threat, it would inherently fall under 2C, would it not?
I think that if you...
That's why we've took a lot of pain to...
Inside the service and working with partners to better understand how the IMV phenomenon was interacting with the CSIS Act.
And Ms. Khan walked us through, you know, earlier, you know, a description of how we go through the process of understanding this, what will be the sphere of CSIS responsibility, what will be the sphere of the law enforcement responsibility.
And that's why I'm saying is that this is not black and white, it's dynamic, and this is why people talk to each other on an ongoing basis.
Sir, please.
Normally, I'd like to give witnesses full-time to answer, but I only have a limited time.
I'm just trying to get an answer because I believe I've asked it a few times here.
If someone is threatening a public official because they want to influence that public official to take some policy choice, does that not inherently fall under 2C, yes or no?
Each case is looked on a case-by-case basis, and it would not be a default proposition.
So if someone's threatening to kill a mayor or a premier because they want them to drop a public health measure, that does not necessarily fall under 2Cs.
Is that your testimony, sir?
Yes, it is.
Sorry, Mr. Commissioner, I can just add, I think as we've walked through, there are a number of other criteria that are necessary to be the CSIS Act.
There is, you know, the testimony that Ms. Stacey gave responding to Ms. Kahn's questions about that placement earlier, I think is how we are understanding and how we are exercising our authority.
So I understand, Mr. Champ, you're looking for something specific, but...
This is, we've described very well, I think, the process by which we're looking at these issues.
And it's not because someone would only write online that they want to kill someone, that it will automatically be a...
Yes, sir, I understand that.
And we're reading a lot of time just to get an easy answer to what I thought was an easy question.
I thought your response was going to be, with all due respect, that yes, a threat to a public official to influence that public official would fall into 2C.
But in most cases, we have not viewed these threats as credible or valid because, you know, it's just online.
I think in one of the CCS documents I saw shitposting or something like that.
But if you viewed a threat to a public official as credible, would it not fall under 2C?
If we have, and we have done that in the past...
Could I get a yes or no answers, please, sir?
You already answered it.
Okay, fine, I'll move on.
Thank you.
So, now, did CSIS look into any of those threats in the context of the convoy protest, any nexus to the convoy protest?
Since, probably since the mid-January until, you know, and we continue to today, we continue to look at specific information in context of IMVE actions, blockades and Freedom Convoy.
So we have done that very intensely throughout that period.
So you did look at those threats, and did any of those threats to public officials emanate from anyone with the nexus, with the convoy protests?
I think it's, Mr. Commissioner, it's hard to speak at large about in generic threats.
I just provided an answer to the question to Mr. Champ about the threat to public officials.
And so if you have a specific threat, unfortunately, we've provided very detailed testimony to...
So, is your answer to me, then, that you may or may not have investigated those threats to public officials with individuals, with threats emanating from individuals with the nexus of the combat protests, but you can't tell us because of Section 38?
No, what I'm saying, Mr. Champ, is that we have, we've described how we have, you know, how we are assessing the information that comes to us in the context of IMVE.
We've walked through the 2C analysis earlier, and that is, that analysis, that expertise, combined with new information that will come to the attention of CSIS in whatever form, you know, exchange of information, that's essentially what we would be doing on an ongoing basis.
I cannot be more specific than that.
So I'm done with my time, sir, but I just want to make sure I understand because I apologize.
I've heard your answer a couple of times and perhaps I'm missing it.
Is that, yes, CSIS did look into those individuals or you cannot tell us.
I did not say that, Mr. Champ.
You know, what I'm saying is that we have been looking at information that came to our attention through different venues, different platforms throughout the investigation, and that includes the information, the like you mentioned, but I cannot be more specific than that.
So that's yes?
No, I will stand by the answer I just provided, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Okay.
Thank you.
Thank you.
More complicated than you thought?
Okay, well, let's go to the Democracy Fund, JCCF.
I'm Hattam Kier, Counsel for the Justice Center for Constitutional Freedoms.
So to begin, Ms. Chayet, the national terrorist threat level has been at medium since October 2014, right?
Yes, correct.
Okay, and it didn't change during the protests?
You know, the threat level has five different levels, and they're fairly broad bands, and so the threat level fluctuates within the medium band, so it fluctuated during the...
The convoy.
But it never left medium?
No.
Okay, thank you.
Mr. Vigneault, the CSIS Act is the home statute of your organization.
So is it fair to say that CSIS has expertise in applying the statute?
Yes, I would say that.
Okay.
So Section 12 requires that CSIS investigate wherever there are reasonable grounds to suspect there's a threat to the security of Canada as defined in Section 2, right?
Yes.
Okay, and so that just requires, it doesn't require certainty, it doesn't require reasonable grounds to believe, it's reasonable, it's just reasonable suspicion, right?
To initiate investigations, yes.
Yeah, okay.
And that's an assessment that CSIS does day in and day out?
Yes.
Okay.
Now, as someone whose father was monitored by your organization for over 10 years until it was determined an investigation wasn't actually necessary, my personal experience is that it seems that your organization is very thorough.
Is that a fair assessment that CSIS is rigorous in executing its duties?
I'm not sure the context of the premise of your question, but I would say that we try to be thorough in what we do, yes.
Right, because, I mean, a big reason that your agency's members have to be thorough is that if CSIS incorrectly determines something is not a threat and then chooses not to investigate, that could lead to harms down the road, right?
I would say that investigating threats to the security of Canada is a very complex issue.
Missing signs, missing information, and having incorrect assessment is indeed something that we are very careful about.
And as a learning organization, we try to make sure that we learn from the past and that we are trying to come with the best possible assessment on an ongoing basis.
Right.
So you said something earlier, and I was just trying to write it down as you said it, but something to the effect that CSIS mobilized whatever resources it could in order to try and understand the Freedom Convoy protest.
Is that right?
Something similar to that, I would say.
It's accurate, yes.
Okay, so you've talked a bit about the potential for a lone wolf threat.
Now, am I correct in thinking that that's not based off of particular intelligence?
It's more of a conclusion from general principles about this kind of an event?
This is based on expert analysis by CSIS, by ITAC and other organizations.
To understand the dynamic environment and where violent rhetoric can push individuals to act.
And unfortunately, we've seen a number of people who were not on the radar of anyone who were consuming this type of information and indeed, you know, a committed act of terrorism or extreme violence.
So we are, unfortunately, it is a very...
Complex, dynamic environment, and we have to be careful about people who would be very quickly moved from just being a recipient and consumer of information to someone who would radicalize to violence.
Okay, so you were just asked questions about the potential that people were present at the protests that CSIS was already monitoring, but basically your organization was keeping tabs on them, right?
So, as we've said in our public testimony, we already had subject of investigations who we assessed were interested in the protest.
We used different techniques to assure ourselves of their activities.
And we also continue to look for other individuals that might be recruited or might be approached or might want to radicalize throughout the events in question, obviously respecting the mandate of CSIS.
Okay, now, but just to go back to the general point, the idea is that this is a large gathering.
It could be used as an opportunity by someone to commit to engage in some sort of a threat.
That kind of threat is present at other big events like a G7 protest, right?
Actually, unfortunately, with the dynamic of what we see IMVE, the threat is persistent.
This is why the national terrorism threat level is set at medium.
It means that, you know, today here in Canada, there are individuals with the capability and intention to engage in an act of terrorism.
And so I would say, yes, those larger events, but also more broadly, it is a dynamic that exists throughout our society, irrespective of those large events as well.
And what I would add to that is, as I testified earlier today, part of the ideology in IMVE is anti-authority.
So they exploit that type of feeling amongst people for their own, to try to recruit people to a more extremist ideology, their own more extreme ideology.
Okay, thank you.
I was also just going to add, if I may very quickly, that one of the challenges of studying IMV-related threats is that what mobilizes someone to violence can be very, very personal.
The triggers are very personal.
Part of the assessment, the complexity, is to try to understand what might bring someone to mobilize to violence.
And that reason, that trigger, can be very different from people.
It depends on their very personal experience and different grievances.
So it's very hard to say that type of event might trigger that kind of violent extremism reaction.
It depends for everybody.
Okay, thank you.
Mr. Clerk, if we could please pull up COM50935, and if you can go to the eighth page in the file.
There's a three at the bottom, though.
That's how it's numbered.
While that's being pulled up, we've heard a bit about how the definition for threats to the security of Canada doesn't include...
It doesn't include protest.
Am I right in thinking that the basic idea here is that if there's a protest where one of the four factors aren't present, you don't investigate, and if there's a protest where the four factors are present, you would investigate, right?
I think the CSIS Act is pretty clear.
If we look at the document, the paragraph under D, under 2D, does not include lawful advocacy, protest, or dissent unless carried on in conjunction with any of the activities cited above.
Right, so the fact that it's a protest isn't a barrier to an investigation if one of these things is present.
I would say, generally speaking, the service stays away from investigating protests.
We recognize it's a democratic right in Canada, so we don't investigate protests.
What this means is if, an example perhaps I can give, if we had information that a terrorist group was going to pretend to use an event...
In order to conduct a terrorist activity, well, of course, that would be of interest to cease.
But we are very, very conscious and aware of balancing the rights of individuals in a democracy like Canada with our own mandate and our more intrusive techniques.
Okay, Mr. Vigneault, so looking, let's look at, we can look at A first.
Based on the services assessment, there was no espionage or sabotage associated with the protest, correct?
That's correct.
So, the 2A definition wasn't met?
No.
Okay.
And there was no foreign interference?
We have, I think it's in our testimony that we have said that we investigated foreign interference in relation to the event, including foreign funding, and we do not see these activities amounting to a threat to Secure of Canada.
So, 2B wasn't met?
Yeah.
Thank you.
And there wasn't any serious violence associated with the protests?
I would not say that.
Or a credible threat of serious violence?
That's not what we're looking at.
We're looking at how these events or individuals might engage in activities that meet our threshold.
This is where I was answering questions earlier about the distinction between what...
What law enforcement would be doing in terms of serious violence versus what we would do as CSIS under the confine of the CSIS Act.
Okay, I'll be more specific then.
There were no activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious, or ideological objective within Canada, correct?
Yes, and we've testified to that earlier.
So 2C was not met.
2C was not met.
Okay.
Just quickly, there was no credible threat to overthrowing our established system of government?
I can say that we have not investigated under 2D.
Okay, thank you.
So not only was there no Section 2 threat present, but there wasn't even reasonable grounds to suspect a Section 2 threat was present.
Well, we are on the record to say that we already had individuals who had met the 2C threshold.
You know, that were subjective investigations that were involved, and so we had legitimate grounds to be looking at what was happening.
As we've said, based on our expertise, we have seen, unfortunately, Events like that where individuals were radicalized and mobilized to violence extremely quickly.
So that's why we continue to expand those resources throughout those events to make sure that we, again, did not miss something.
If I could just have an indulgence to sort of hit the last point I've been working up to, I'll try to be very quick.
Yeah, although you could have skipped A, B, C, D, it's been testified too many times that it wasn't met, but go ahead.
Okay, thank you, Commissioner.
So, sorry, that threat that you're speaking about is with respect to individuals, but the protest itself did not pose a Section 2 threat to the security of Canada.
What we've testified to is that we did not make a determination at the event itself.
And I think it's part of our testimony, yes.
Okay, and yet you still advise the Prime Minister to invoke the Emergencies Act?
Yes, I did.
And you did that not because you thought that the protest posed a threat to the security of Canada as defined in Section 2 of the CSIS Act, but because you were reassured that threat to the security of Canada had a different meaning in the context of the Emergencies Act.
I think my testimony was in part that, but it was also based on all of the other information that I became aware of during all of the interdepartmental meetings and cabinet meetings I participated in.
That opinion was provided, if you want, as a national security advisor as opposed to the director of CSIS specifically.
Okay, and when you say that information that you had received, you're referring to your earlier comment that you were reassured that that definition had a broader meaning under the Emergencies Act?
I was referring to that, but also more specifically to other events in Canada, events in Ottawa that convinced me to say that the powers under the Act would be necessary.
Okay, so just my final question.
The very last question.
This determination, then, that the Emergencies Act standard is a—the definition is broader under the Emergencies Act than with respect to under the CSIS Act.
That was not the product of you reading the Emergencies Act and developing your own assessment.
That was something—that was advice that you had received?
That's correct.
Okay.
Thank you very much, and thank you for the indulgence, Mr. Commissioner.
Thank you.
UCLA, please.
Good morning.
My name is Kara Zwiebel.
I am counsel for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
I just maybe want to pick up where my friend just left off.
And maybe we could pull up the summary of the public, the public version of the summary of the hearing that took place, the in-camera hearing, which is WTS 6079, please.
and And I think it's page 8 that we want to go to.
Thank you, Mr. Cook.
And you can just scroll down to the bottom.
So this statement, Mr. Vigneault, and I'm going to direct my questions to you, but if your colleagues have things they'd like to add, please do.
This statement that...
Your understanding that the Emergencies Act definition of threat to the security of Canada was broader than the CSIS Act.
Where did you get that understanding?
I know Mr. Cameron said maybe we'd hear about it later, but I'd like to hear about it now.
So, I asked for legal interpretation.
Okay.
You asked the Department of Justice?
I did.
Okay.
Thank you.
Now, I just want to, if we can scroll down a little bit more.
This is maybe a grammar or a language point that I just want to understand.
It says he advised the Prime Minister of his belief that it was indeed required to invoke the act.
Is that it referring to the government, that the government was required to invoke the act, or that the Prime Minister, or...
I'm not sure.
Okay, but your view was that based on this broader understanding of threats to the security of Canada, the act should be invoked.
Yes.
Okay, so I just want to go through, and Mr. Cameron went through some of the timeline here.
You had an interview with Commission Council on, I believe it was August 29th, and in that interview, you noted that you had...
Only learned that the Emergencies Act referred to the CSIS definition of threats to the security of Canada when the government started to explore the possibility of invoking the Act.
Is that right?
Yes, exactly.
Okay.
And then Commission Council prepared a summary of that meeting, that interview with you and your colleagues.
We've seen that and that was produced earlier.
And then you had this in-camera proceeding that took place.
And I understand that, again, you confirmed that it was CSIS's view that the definition of threats to security of Canada in the CSIS Act was not met during the convoy?
Yes.
Okay.
And then under examination from the Government of Canada, this information that you advised the Prime Minister of your view.
That the act should be invoked was disclosed for the first time.
Is that right?
Yes, I believe it is, yeah.
So you said in your initial witness statement that you felt it was important to communicate at the IRG and to Cabinet that under CSIS's analysis, there wasn't a Section 2 threat.
What I wanted to be very clear, Mr. Commissioner, is that...
Because it was a very dynamic environment, a lot of moving parts, as we say.
And I wanted people to be clear about how CSIS we were analyzing the situation.
And so people were talking about using different words in the media, everywhere, and we just wanted to bring a level of clarity.
So that's why we said our assessment was very dynamic and we continued to assess.
Throughout that period, we wanted to make sure that people did not misinterpret, based on everything that was being mentioned, that CSIS, we saw a threat to national security based on our act.
So that was the purpose of us being very deliberate about that approach.
Okay.
I guess, I mean, you understand that one of the purposes of this commission is to assess whether the act was properly invoked.
Sorry, can you just answer audibly?
Yes.
Thank you.
I guess I'm wondering why you didn't think it was relevant when you met with Commission Council in August to note that you had, in fact, advised the Prime Minister that you believed the act should be invoked.
I think there are probably two reasons.
I would say one is that, very simply, the question was not asked.
And so just, you know, when you go through the dynamic process of the interview, so it was not specifically asked.
But there was also at that point, you know, a lack of clarity in my head about what was still a cabinet confidence and what I was able to say as a participant in cabinet meetings.
So that was further clarified throughout that period.
And that's why I think, again, you mentioned the nature of this commission.
As a senior official in government, you know, we're never allowed to speak about cabinet confidences.
We're never allowed in the case of CSIS to produce, you know, a number of the information that has been, you know, put in front of the, in public for commission and for Canadians to see normally that will not be public.
So we just needed to ascertain, you know, what were the limits of what we're able to do.
And when I was, it was clarified with me that indeed I was able to speak to that, I did.
Okay, but when you met with Commission Council in August, you felt that, you didn't feel that Cabinet confidence prevented you from advising, that you had advised Cabinet and the IRG that you did not believe there was a threat within the meaning of the CSIS Act?
That had been clarified with me, yes.
Okay.
Because I would put to you that those two pieces of information are really...
Two sides of the same coin, that if one is not subject to cabinet confidentiality, the other one also would not be.
I understand that analysis, but I would say that the...
Just refer back to what I said.
We never discussed cabinet confidences and the information, the way that the information was communicated to witnesses in terms of what would be possible to disclose and not in terms of cabinet confidences just became clearer with the passage of time between August and our ex-party interview.
Okay, thank you.
I don't know if you had an opportunity to...
Review the testimony given by Ms. Thomas, the National Security and Intelligence Advisor.
I briefly saw some of the key extract, yes.
Okay.
So one of the things that Ms. Thomas said was that the CSIS definition of threats to the security of Canada is quite narrow.
Do you agree with that, that it's a narrow definition?
I would say that this...
The CSIS Act was enacted in 1984 and I think that the world has evolved considerably since then and that looking at the threat environment today is indeed, you know, requires probably a new look, modernizing, you know, a view of this.
That's one thing.
And the second thing is that we also, through jurisprudence, through federal court rulings, commission of inquiries, and review bodies who have access to all of our information, that understanding of the act was very much more clarified.
With a lot of specificity, if you want, in many aspects.
And so between, you know, experts at CSIS and the OJ Council, I think, you know, there is a very specific interpretation of the Act, which is, in this specific case of the Commission, different than the Emergencies Act.
Okay.
So, I mean, you understand, of course, why, and I think you've alluded to this in other statements that you've made here today.
Witness statement that there should be a high threshold before our intelligence services start surveilling or targeting Canadians.
Would you agree with that?
Yes, I do agree.
Okay.
The holding or expressing of unpopular political views should not be enough to engage CSIS's mandate?
Absolutely not, and I would say that there is an expression that we use which is awful but lawful.
And that means that some of the opinions expressed verbally or online, you know, are not by default, even if they can be extremely violent, are not by default something that, you know, would allow or necessitate ceases to investigate.
Okay.
And do you understand why?
Now, I know you take the view that the definition in the Emergencies Act is broader, but would you agree that the The threshold to invoke the use of the Emergencies Act should also be a high one.
I would say that with anything, any exercise of power by the state, there is a high threshold.
I'm not a legal expert to say what should be the threshold of the Emergencies Act.
Okay, but you understand that the Emergencies Act allows the government to rule by executive order for a period of time?
I do.
Okay.
And that the public order emergency section of the Emergencies Act allows those orders to let the government assume control of public utilities, for example.
Yes.
And it allows the government to direct individuals to render certain services, like was done in this case with the tow trucks.
That's my understanding, but again, I do not want to give the Commission the impression that I'm an expert on the Emergencies Act.
Okay.
And you understand that it can prohibit travel to, from, or within any specified area?
That's one of the things that the Public Order Emergency Section allows?
I would say yes, with the same caveat I've just provided.
Okay.
Okay, you're now out of time.
Thank you.
Just one last question.
The placemat that you were taken to by Ms. Kahn.
That talked about the IMVE, the nature of ideologically motivated violent extremism.
Two of those sort of elements were willingness to kill or willingness to engage in serious violence.
Would you agree with me that without those two elements, you just have people who care a lot about something and want to make a change?
I'll answer that question.
That's exactly why we developed the criteria as to what Thank you.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Okay, thank you.
We're ready to go.
Okay.
Convoy organizers, please.
Robert McKinnon, Government of Canada.
We've just received...
What I think my friend is going to put up on the screen and it is not what had been agreed to.
It has commentary.
It has statements along with the document.
If that's what is going to be put up, at least it was just sent around by the Freedom Corp just a few minutes ago.
It's a lesser version of the one we sent earlier and took out everything except simple facts, sir.
There's some documents.
That are such that I can't just copy and paste them into the document.
They're PDFs and things.
So I had to type them out, but they're verbatim.
So if my friend wants me to refer to each and every document, which I've now made it simple as well, I've had all of them uploaded in one PDF.
The clerk has them on standby.
As we go through, I have no problem deviating from this at all and going through the document, but I would like to finish the examination, at least, if I'm forced to do that.
In order to get through these records.
These records, there's, in my view, I would submit as we go through, there's simply no issue with the facts stated herein.
Did you say there is a PDF with all of them on it?
I had that uploaded just now.
So I got them all of them consolidated and put into one PDF so that I can stop wasting.
Why can't we use it?
Well, we can if we want.
It's just going to have to navigate it.
So because it's not exactly labeled completely great.
So I guess we could.
Can we use that?
Yep, we can do that, sir.
That would be best.
I think then we avoid any any issues.
Great.
Okay.
Time to get now.
You've already taken a fair amount of your time, but I'll be generous.
Robert McKinnon, again, sorry, last thing.
Just as long as the documents that we're referring to, you have, I don't know how many here.
They're all the ones in the document that I've given you already.
So they're all in relativity?
Pretty much.
All of those are in relativity because that document is in relativity.
So if we could pull up the document, and I just don't want to run out of time.
Okay, so let's see how it goes.
I'll try and keep an eye out for you, Mr. McKinnon, if there's an issue.
Okay.
So, if I can first...
Director, does CSIS have a concern with the current elected executive leaking information and CSIS information to the media?
Do they have a current concern about that?
Do you have something specific you want to refer to?
No, not specific.
But does CSIS have a concern generally about the current political executive leaking information from CSIS to the media?
We always have concern when we see information that is, you know, unauthorizedly, you know, made public.
I don't know where the source of that...
Unauthorized disclosures are, so I do not have a specific view on your premise.
I'm concerned when I see unauthorized disclosure.
Right.
But I take it the unauthorized disclosure, it's highly unlikely it's actually coming from your agency.
It's not coming from them directly, is it?
I'd like to think that, you know, we have an organization that, you know, has a very high standard for that, but, you know, I would not want to speculate as to the source of potential unauthorized disclosures.
Okay.
If we could go to the January 24th tweet of Mr. McGregor.
Or, sorry, the January 25th one of Aletheia Raj.
Tweet 14, number 14. Council, may be assistance for you in your time.
If you know the page reference in that PDF, it'd be a little bit faster.
It does not appear to be hyperlinking to the particular Yes, I think the hyperlinks didn't carry through when we uploaded.
Unfortunately, that happens sometimes.
That's why I wanted to use my sheet.
Well, in any event, sir, I'm just going to ask you.
I want to bring up then the document.
JUST SECOND.
I'll just bring it up on the normal document, Relativity, and I'm going to have to ask for more time.
I tried to get this dealt with, and if I was permitted to use the examination sheet that my friend's trying to stop me from, I wouldn't be in this position.
Mr. Commissioner, I do have a...
This is by Sheba Vandenberg, Council for Freedom Corps.
I do have a number that I can give to the Clerk, if I may.
Okay, go ahead.
Anything to speed it up?
Code for the Raj tweet is HRF401621.
Thank you.
And that's also at page 17 of the document that I had put up, actually.
So if you want to bring, we can do that.
So, sir, do you see that?
That tweet there, it's from the 25th.
It's retweeting the January 6th event narrative that had been released in the media prior to the convoy arrived.
Well, I'm looking at the screen now.
Yep.
Okay.
Did you know that that tweet...
Is what resulted in the political executive essentially becoming concerned with the convoy and having internal discussions about the narrative they were going to build?
Were you aware of that?
I'm not sure I understand your question.
I'm sorry, counsel.
Okay.
So I'm going to take you to...
And, sir, I have them consolidated.
They're the text messages between...
Mary Liz Power as well as Alexander Cohen.
They're verbatim in my examination aid.
There's nothing added.
If I could bring up the examination aid, please, again, and I can use that.
can just scroll to where it starts with mary liz power sure thank you Does the Council have any objection to the use of the examination?
If he's going back to the same document...
Well, then I'll read it to him.
Okay?
Verbatim.
So, on January 25th at 9.22am, Mary Liz Power issues a policy advisor to the office of the Prime Minister.
They have a text message exchanged with Alexander Cohen, the Director of Communications, the Minister of Public Safety.
Okay?
And it begins when...
That tweet is sent.
They send it out, all right?
And Mary Liz Power sends that text to Alexander Cohen and states, I'm sure you've seen this, but flagging.
Alexander Cohen responds, yep.
I've been encouraging journalists to take a closer look at who these people are, in brackets, and where their three mil comes from, closed brackets.
Obviously, a light touch, given the portfolio.
Then Mary Liz Power states, hmm.
Do you know if there's anything to be found in that GoFundMe?
And Alexander Cohen replies, I think it's worth looking into.
I've put Mary Wolfe on it.
Highlighted.
Well, it was highlighted.
And she's obsessed with this kind of stuff.
Mary Liz Power replies, nice.
I'll look into what I can do.
Now, can you agree with me from an intelligence perspective that those are two staffers building a political narrative with respect to a national security issue?
Commissioner, there's a lot of information that has been put to us now.
I have not read those tweets before.
I could not make any informed, you know, opinion of what this information is in the context of today's hearing.
And then, later that day, at 12.02 p.m., Mary Liz Power and Alexander Cohen exchanged further text messages, all right?
So Mary Liz Power states, got a quick response.
People are into it.
LMK, meaning let me know.
If your boss is too.
Happy to help however I can.
This is what I sent though, by the way.
And this is whoever she sent it to with respect to the narrative.
Hi.
I just had a chat with Alex at PS who had a bit of an interesting idea.
As you saw in the pod goals chats, the trucker convoy and some of their more extreme comments in brackets, i.e.
calling for a January 6th style insurrection, closed brackets, are getting more coverage in media.
Alex was surveying.
Where there'd be interest in his boss, that's the public safety's minister, doing some media on this eventually.
He was chatting with Mendicino right before he went into the cabinet retreat.
I think there could be an opportunity in getting in on the narrative of the truckers, particularly with the research that the LRB is doing into their backers.
My thoughts of framing here would be similar to what the PM and Blair said last year when January 6 occurred.
Our democracy is something we need to nurture and protect every day.
We will always protect the right to peaceful protest.
Some calls that organizers of these events are making are concerning and we're taking them seriously.
We'd need something to back this up in Bracknell.
We'll continue to monitor the situation closely.
And the fine line to walk would be to ensure...
We are not looking like we're directing the police, which obviously is not the goal here.
Hoping to canvass your thoughts.
Alex said he'd come back to me with a proposal this aft when he gets to chat to Mendicio again, and obviously pending his boss and our interests in looking into this further.
Mr. Cohen responds, Thanks.
I had an initial chat with my boss and he's supportive, but wants to wait a day or two.
There's a danger that if we come down too hard, they might push out the crazies.
Mary Liz Power replies, I think that's fair.
Apparently Global and others are working on stories.
Maybe we see how those land.
Now, I'm going to ask the same question again.
At that point, are there a bunch of political staffers essentially planning to create a national security issue or make one look like it is?
Mr. Commissioner, I will have the same answer.
You know, there's a lot of information just been put to us for the first time.
There are acronyms that were mentioned.
I don't know where they refer to.
And I think, you know, I could speak to information I'm aware of, privy to, but unfortunately not this one, Council.
So are you aware of the LRB, what it is?
You are, aren't you?
Not the specific acronym.
Maybe if you spell it out.
Liberal Research Bureau.
Yeah, I know about the Liberal Research Bureau.
All right.
And so...
Is it fair to say that it's kind of strange that the political branch would have the Liberal Research Bureau doing research on protesters with respect to these concerns they're raising, as opposed to yourselves, who are the national security agency?
Mr. Commissioner, I would say that...
You know, this is not something that would be of interest to CSIS.
As my colleagues and I have testified, we very much, you know, since the beginning, mid-January on, we've been looking at these issues and the developments and potential threats to the safety and security of Canada based on the CSIS Act.
So, we would not be looking necessarily for what other parties would be involved in this context.
Okay, can we go to document sxm.can.00006358 _rel.0001 Okay,
can we just scroll to the bottom to the first email, please?
Okay, so this email is from January 27th, okay?
And it's an email between, again, more political staffers.
It begins with Carolyn Williams.
She's the Director of Parliamentary Affairs at the Privy Council.
You're aware of that?
No, I do not know Karen Williams.
And what about Zita Estrava, the Chief of Staff to the Minister of Emergency Preparedness, Bill Blair?
Do you know her?
Yes, I do know Ms. Estrava.
And Annie Cullen, she's with the Privy Council as well.
Are you familiar with her?
No, I'm not.
Okay.
So in this email, and again, it's January 27th, 2022 at 4.21 p.m.
You're aware that the protesters in Ottawa hadn't really even arrived at that time, right?
Sorry, on the 27th specifically?
I do not have those specific chronological details with me.
I'm sorry.
So there it says to ML, that's Mary Liz.
I wanted to reach out on the current issue-led situation for the convoy.
Given how this is transitioning to a whole of government coordination response, I feel like emergency preparedness.
We are a well-positioned office to provide more of a high-level messaging going forward.
Public safety, of course, has a major role to play when it comes to the RCMP, CSIS, and IMVE threats.
But we have a helpful perspective on the whole government coordination and collaboration with other levels of government.
These are the lines we worked up earlier today.
Any thoughts on if this is a helpful approach?
Convoy, emergency preparedness.
It says, our government recognizes and respects that everyone in Canada has the right to safe and peaceful protest.
Threatening acts of violence and inciting hatred, as we have seen from a select few in recent days, is unacceptable and does not reflect the views of the majority of Canadians.
We condemn all such hateful and violent rhetoric in the strongest terms.
As is common with any significant gathering of potential impacts of government operations, such as the annual Canada Day celebration, law enforcement and security agencies across all levels of government are engaged in coordinating to ensure a safe event.
Now, do you recognize the phrases and the sentences in the first three bullet points?
Have you heard them somewhere before?
I do not have a specific recollection of these words.
Do you recall the Prime Minister's speech on January 31st?
Do you recall him when he was in isolation, he came out and gave a speech on January 31st about the protest?
Do you remember that?
I do not remember the specific date.
I remember having the Prime Minister speaking to this effect when he was indeed in isolation.
That's what he said.
So he said, can you agree with me that writing out a narrative like this, prior to the protest even arriving, and then on the January 31st, despite the fact, and this is in evidence, there had been no real actual violence in Ottawa, he says these things.
Do you find that concerning?
From what point of view?
As an intelligence officer, as an intelligence agency, that there's a narrative being built for an emergency before the purported thing creating the emergency has even taken place.
Mr. Commissioner, what I can say is that...
As we've testified, you know, the interdepartmental community got together to understand what was happening, share information, make sure that each of the organization would be able to discharge their mandate appropriately.
And so at that point, you know, of course we are, as I testified, you know, we're keeping aware of what's happening around us.
But we are very much focused on making sure that we are discharging our investigative responsibilities and not opine on other issues.
Okay.
And let me ask you this.
The biggest concern, it appeared, was over the first weekend of the protest, there was the appearances of Confederate flags and Nazi flags and Nazi symbols.
Right?
Did you investigate those issues at all?
Mr. Commissioner, we testified earlier that we have written an intelligence assessment about the presence of flags and some of the meaning of those flags.
And so I can go back to our analysis, what we've described then.
I'd be happy to, if you want to refer me back to the document, speak to that concept.
Mr. Cook, if you could just go back to my examination aid, this shouldn't be an issue.
It's a paragraph 16. Just scroll right down to it.
Mr. Commissioner, just for your information, this is the document that the DOJ has an outstanding objection over.
And if we can go to paragraph 16. Mr. Commissioner, we've already objected to this document being put.
I understand, but I'm going to ask for a ruling on the Commissioner to put this page to them.
So let's deal with that, if we can.
So if we can put up page 16 again.
And what is page 16?
Paragraph 16 is just the two pictures of the first post in time at 10.13am on January 28, 2022, of the spotting of a Confederate flag.
And there's also a license plate number.
If you'd like me to go through and bring up...
All of the documents.
I'm just trying to get this done quicker, sir.
Well, you're way over time already.
I understand, but this is so important, sir, that I need more time to get through this area.
It is extraordinarily important.
Well, so far asking a bunch of questions to people who have no knowledge of the documents or the information is not...
I'm trying to explain something.
And I know you're frustrated, but...
That's not good use of your time.
And reading into the record, that exchange of texts was done days ago, and again, that's not a good use.
So I'm just trying to be patient, and I understand you want to get something done, so let's try and work together to figure out how we can navigate this in a...
Okay.
So you want to put up a picture of a license plate that's in relativity?
Yes.
Okay, and I think your co-counsel has the number for that, the relativity number, so we can, I'm guessing.
Yes, Mr. Commissioner, from my understanding, Mr. Miller would like to first put up a...
A tweet of Aerial Truster that shows the image of the license and then the license.
So we'll call up the number HRF.
So poe.hrf6021.
Okay.
So I think that's okay, Mr. McKinnon.
We're just putting up the picture for what it's worth.
We'll see what it is.
We've gone to page 16 with respect, and it's not just a picture.
But we've moved on, Mr. McKinnon, so...
If it's just the picture, that's fine.
Okay, so that's what I think we're doing, so I'm just...
Let's try and get through this.
Okay, so, sir, this is my first understanding that this was the first post in time that I can find with respect to when a Confederate flag or a Nazi flag appeared, and it's at 10.13 a.m.
On January 28th of 2022 and it's posted by Ariel Troster.
Do you know who she is?
I do not.
You're not aware that she's the new councillor that replaced Councillor McKinney?
I do not know who the individual is.
All right and so then if I could just bring up the closer photo with respect to the license plate please and that it actually is at Page 43 of the Examination Book of Authorities.
That'll just be easier for you, Mr. Clerk?
Well, no, I don't think we'd go there.
So your co-counsel, I think, has the reference?
yes mr commissioner the reference is poe dot hrf six zeros two nine
So, and it's been clear, so online, that license plate number is BL, then it's got a crown in the middle, is three, and I can literally tell you what it is, and people were trying to look it up.
It's viewable.
Did at any time CSIS do an investigation into who that license plate holder was?
Mr. Commissioner, I do not have the specific knowledge of this.
And even if I add specific knowledge, we would not be at liberty to disclose specific details.
That's why there was an in-camera session with the Commissioner and Council.
Okay.
And so the next document then would be the...
Second, please.
The next document is the one that comes after in the examination aid, and it is the January 29th being POE HRF00000000024.
You're going to have to wrap up, though, if these are just pictures you're putting up, you can put it up with any witnesses.
I understand.
So, the next time a Nazi flag or a swastika or whatever you appears...
The next time you've found it.
Right, right.
The next time...
So, you knew about the situation where Conservative Party, Member of Parliament, Mr. Cooper, he was giving an interview and this...
Upside down Canada flag with a swastika appeared.
Are you aware of that?
I remember something to that effect.
I've not researched this recently, but I recall something to that effect, yes.
Okay.
Could I now bring up POEH.hrf00000026?
Okay.
So, this is the post from a fellow by the name of YouSkipPop, unidentified on Reddit.
He posted at 3.12pm, and it's, from my understanding, the first time that the Nazi flag photo appears.
Are you aware of that?
I'm not aware of that, and I'm not seeing anything.
Yeah, it's just...
I'm just trying to get through it.
And then there is the...
Issue with respect to that, that no one was able to identify this gentleman.
And I believe there's a close-up photo of my friend, Ms. Van Berg?
I think that's going to have to be it, though.
Right.
Well, I'm just going to, if we're going to run out of time, is this.
Were you aware that the first time that the picture of the gentleman...
All covered in army fatigues, with a mask over his face, walking with a confederate flag through a crowd.
It first appeared in an opinion piece in the Toronto Star from someone who actually works for the Liberal Party of Canada.
Were you aware of that?
Mr. Commissioner, my friend seems to be giving evidence now.
I'm asking if he's aware of that.
He asked a question and I'm...
I can guess what the answer is going to be.
Okay, but there's a presupposition of a fact that's not...
Yeah, because you keep interrupting me when I'm trying to ask questions and I'm running out of time.
Just please.
Okay.
I'm not aware of the articles and I'm not aware of those facts that you mentioned.
I'm sorry.
Are you aware of a company called Enterprise Canada?
Not specifically, no.
And have you identified the individual, one that is, it was all over the news, the gentleman that was carrying the Nazi flag?
Have you identified him yet?
Mr. Commissioner, as I said before, the specific details of our investigations have been shared, you know, with the commission earlier.
I would not be able to go into more specific details.
So I think that's it.
No, and I take it then, sir.
That you know that that individual was Brian Fox from Enterprise Group.
I have not said anything in that respect to the council.
I have not testified to that council.
Yeah, you haven't testified to it, but you know that to be true, don't you?
No, that's not fair.
Firstly, not a fair statement.
So please, and please don't.
If you're going to make a statement, please make it.
Don't.
Make statements back to the crowd as you leave the podium, please.
As Council, you're well aware of the appropriate way to conduct yourself.
Okay, next I'd like to call on the Canadian Constitution Foundation, please.
Good afternoon.
My name is Sujit Choudhury.
I'm counsel for the Canadian Constitution Foundation.
I wanted to ask you a few questions about the legislative history of Section 2C and the emergence of IMVE as a central focus for CSIS's activities, if I may.
So, is it true that Section 2C was amended?
In 2001, by the Anti-Terrorism Act, to include a religious or ideological objective?
I believe so.
I believe that's accurate.
And is it true that that amendment was ensured that the CSIS Act would align with the Criminal Code's new definitions of terrorism?
I wasn't involved in that, so I don't want to lead you in error, so I'm not certain.
Mr. Vigneault, you're shaking your head.
Same answer.
Okay.
All right.
Fair enough.
And so I'd ask you to take my word for it that it was part of the same legislative package to get those two statutes in alignment.
And then in 2019, there is a major initiative.
And the part of CSIS is the development of a definition and framework for ideologically motivated violent extremism.
Is that right?
I believe that the work started before that, but I think it was maybe put in higher gear.
In my first public speech that I had made after becoming director in 2018, that speech spoke to the rise of this, and I believe I used the concept of IMV then, but it's around 2018, 2019, indeed, that work was solidified and the concepts were developed to try to understand, characterize better this new phenomenon dynamic we were seeing in society.
Good.
And, sir, just so we're clear, I believe that the first time CSIS reported out on this development and its thinking was in the 2019 annual report.
That sounds accurate, yes.
Okay, good.
And is it true, in your interview summary, you stated that IMVE does not mirror the criminal code definition of terrorism?
I don't recall seeing that.
You'd have to show me the document.
Sure.
So could we pull up witness summary 60, please?
could we go to the bottom of page three Thank you.
If we could expand, yes, that's very helpful.
Thank you.
Okay.
So, Mr. Vigneault, do you agree that you said here that the definition of IMVE does not mirror the Criminal Code definition of terrorism?
I'm just trying to look at it here.
Is it the last sentence?
Yeah, it's the last.
It started at the third line from the bottom, sir.
Yes.
And then if it could continue, you could discontinue.
You said you gave them the example of Alexandre Bissonette, who met the services definition of an ideologically motivated extremist, but who was not charged with terrorism offenses under the code.
Did you say that?
Yes.
And so is it reasonable to infer from your evidence there that the definition of IMVE is broader than our criminal code definition of terrorism?
I'm not sure I would say it's broader, but it's for different purposes, for sure.
And I think I am, I'm familiar, very familiar with the attack at the Quebec City mosque.
And this example and other unfortunate examples is what foresees us to say, this dynamic, we need to better understand what is happening.
So that work to define, better define IMV, the four quadrants and so on, was in relation to that.
But it's also very important in this comment when I say that it was different than the criminal code, is that you could meet a definition of threat to security of Canada under the CSIS Act.
You could meet the sociological definition of terrorist activity, which I believe that Alexandre Bissonnette was indeed engaged in terrorist activity.
But that may not transfer the Crown charging someone for a terrorist defense.
And I think it is a very important notion that indeed has been, you know, very troubling for many in the country, including in this specific case, the Muslim community in Canada.
So does it follow, sir, from what you've just said, that IMVE or the notion of IMVE gives CSIS broader tools?
To assess and respond to extremism that might be available under the Criminal Code.
I think by statute, CSIS has been built to be separate and distinct from law enforcement and from the Criminal Code in the sense that our threshold for investigations would be different than the police.
Our techniques might be also different.
So I think, you know, it is clearly separate, the two.
Sorry, ma 'am, did you?
No, I think that's a very accurate response.
Would you say that CSIS over the last number of years has developed a lot of expertise on IMVE?
I would say yes, because unfortunately there are more cases in Canada, there are more cases internationally.
We have worked very closely with a number of partners at the federal, provincial, municipal level and international partners.
And as my colleague testified, that conceptual framework has been adopted by a couple of international partners as well.
And the analysis is done in the first instance by skilled intelligence professionals?
Yes, that would be accurate.
And you're a learning organization, so you're always trying to improve how you analyze IMV.
That would be accurate, yes.
And so would it be fair to say, if you can now look back to 2018 or 2019 and think about the world before then and the world after in terms of CSIS's function, do you think that the adoption of IMVE has broadened the scope of the activity CSIS investigates under 2C?
I would not say they broaden.
I would say that to help our investigators, our analysts, to better understand how the CSIS Act applied, what would be the...
Because, again, we make a very significant distinction in what we call awful but lawful speech, protected by the Charter, versus activities that would be...
So I think it's not a broadening, it's more a fine-tuning of the understanding, developing analytical tools to make sure that not only do we not go over the law, but that we are indeed investigating the threats to Canada as mandated by Parliament.
But you would agree that IMVE now occupies 50% or more of CSUS resources?
Of our counterterrorism resources, yes.
Mr. Commissioner, how much time do I have left?
You have about two minutes left.
Okay, so I'd like to pivot at the end just to the issue of threats to government officials online, if I may, because my friend Mr. Champ raised it for you.
And so it seems to me, and I ask you to agree with this, that it seems that the mere utterance of a threat...
Online doesn't necessarily per se cross the Section 2C threshold.
Is that right?
Yes, that would be accurate.
Could you tell us when it would?
I think as we tried to maybe unskillfully try to do an exchange previously.
The analysis, you know, is based on the best way possible to describe it is what we have on this placemat.
These analytical tools have been developed to make sure that, you know, at all levels of the organization, but also more broadly within the community with law enforcement.
Who are themselves in their own jurisdiction trying to understand what is happening and make a distinction between something that would be bravado online, that would be something that should be investigated, you know, under the criminal code by law enforcement and something that we see would be doing.
So it's probably the best way of describing it, which is maybe not helpful for your purpose.
Okay.
Well, Mr. Commissioner, I think we're out of time.
So thank you.
Thank you for your time.
But you actually had a minute left, but I don't.
Okay, so I think probably we'll take the lunch break now and come back as I think we have, we should have a little over a half hour of time left.
So let's come back at two o 'clock, please.
The commission is in recess until 2 o'clock.
La commission a la vege jusqu'à 14h.
La commission a la vege jusqu'à 14h.
La commission a la vege jusqu'à 14h.
Order a lot.
The Commission has weakened me.
Good afternoon.
Good afternoon.
The next is the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs.
Good afternoon.
My name is Cheyenne Arnold Cunningham and I'm Counsel for the Union of BC Indian Chiefs.
I will be directing our questions today to Mr. Vigneault, but I welcome the answers of any participant on the panel who may be able to supply additional information.
Mr. Vigneault, are you familiar with Bill C-15, which received Royal Assent and came into force as federal legislation on June 21st, 2021?
To adopt and implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, also known as UNDRIP.
I'm generally aware of the bill, yes.
So under that legislation, the Government of Canada is required by Parliament to take all measures necessary to ensure that the laws of Canada are aligned with UNDRIP.
How is CSIS meeting this obligation?
That's an interesting question.
I think that our work as an organization, we're supporting the government, continues to be making sure that our specific act is respected, that we are, of course, respecting the law, but at the same time that as an organization that we are taking measures and steps internally to make sure that we live up to our obligation on human rights.
I do not have a specific reference to the CSIS Act in relation to UNDRIP.
Okay, that's what I was going to ask next.
We noticed in your mandate letter that you've been mandated to advise Minister Mendocino on deficiencies within the CSIS Act that require modernization.
So, I just wanted to confirm if a review of the CSIS Act for alignment with UNDRIP has been prepared within the agency.
There's been no specific review of the CSIS Act.
We have been advocating in my transition advice to Minister Mendicino.
I have advised that the Act is close to 40 years old and the world has changed very significantly.
And in order to make sure that CSIS was not only able to discharge his national security mandate.
But also make sure that we're doing so with the evolving expectations of Canadians vis-à-vis an intelligence organization that there was a need to modernize the Act.
There's some internal discussions at the moment in that respect, but there's been no specific legislative amendment introduced.
Okay, thank you.
Does CSIS consider Indigenous rights in conducting its assessments and evaluations?
Actually, we do.
There is one specific document that I have in preparing for this Commission's work that I would like maybe Council to bring up in relation to our analysis.
I believe the document that Mr. Vigneault is looking for is ts.nsc.can.00250225.
Okay, great.
Thank you so much.
I'm sorry, is it going to be pulled up?
Sorry.
I'm going to make note of that document and I'll take a look at it, but I'd like to move on to the next question.
I'm sorry, it's just one specific element.
If you go scroll down, scroll.
So there is just before go down.
Sorry, you're going too fast.
Okay, stop please.
So if you look at the last paragraph here, this is something that I'd like to point out that as an organization, we are obviously not perfect, but I'm very proud of the work that the organization is doing to be aware of how our activities can potentially impact people.
The quote here is, despite the lack of concerted Indigenous support for the Ottawa protests, any law enforcement response must be culturally sensitive in an effort to negate any backlash from the broader Indigenous community.
And I think it's important to bring this on the record because, as I said, we're not a perfect organization, but we try very hard to make sure that we understand how our actions are perceived because, again, we are an intelligence service that works in a democracy, and we want to make sure that our actions are specifically directed towards threat-related activity and not unduly to other groups.
Okay, thank you.
Branching off of that, thank you for bringing that up.
Has CSIS considered whether UNDRIP's implementation means that there should be distinct considerations on CSIS's ability to monitor non-violent and unarmed First Nations people who engage in activism pertaining to their lawful rights, even in situations that are perceived to be public order or emergency events that are allegedly unlawful?
So, as I mentioned earlier, we have not done a full analysis of the intersection between the CSIS Act and UNDRIP.
What I can say is that...
I think testament to the document I just pulled out there.
We're trying to really understand how we can discharge our mandate as directed under the law that Parliament has given us, but make sure that we do that in a way that is sensitive to how a lawful protest, including in your question, counsel, the Indigenous protest is taking place.
We have testified that we cannot monitor, investigate lawful protest and dissent.
And our analysis of events always takes that into account.
That is not to say that we will not be, of course, you know, in order to make a determination if there is a threat to security.
Of course, we look at a number of different issues.
And I think there were some documents that recently were released on the Access to Information Act that concluded that CSIS advised government that, you know, maybe some Indigenous protests did not constitute a threat to security of Canada, which is, I think an important point to make sure that people understand when there are potentially law enforcement action, they understand how we see it from our own mandates point of view.
I'm going to wrap up with just a few...
Last questions.
So, in your mandate letter in May 2022, Minister Mendocino mandated that CSIS must work to eliminate any systemic racism or unconscious bias in its operations.
He specifically made reference to ensuring that "minority communities" are not subject to unfair scrutiny in the name of national security and that CSIS, quote, ensure the intelligence and evidence used when making determinations are free of bias, prejudice, and up-to-date, unquote.
What work is CSIS doing or planning specifically to eliminate anti-Indigenous discrimination in its operations, monitoring, intelligence gathering and analysis, or reporting to other government branches or agencies, specifically in the context of Indigenous rights defenders?
There are probably three main aspects of our work.
The first one is, I think, as exemplified by the document I pulled out, our intelligence professionals within the organization are trained and continue to receive training to better understand how the work that they do might be perceived, how it would impact different communities differently, and to make sure that they have this awareness.
The aspect of training is an important one.
The other aspect is as an organization, in terms of our management of our organization, how do we make sure that we bring diversity, that we continue to work to have a much more diverse organization, that we understand that some of our policies and procedures.
Might not intend to be biased, but the net effect might be systemic racism and we want to understand how this works and we take measures to correct that internally in our own procedures.
And finally, I would say we have launched a very specific stakeholder outreach program to make sure that we understand and we meet with communities.
I had the chance personally, early in my tenure, to meet with the Assembly of First Nations to establish some contacts.
Ability to talk to each other.
So if there are any concerns, any issues, that we have those lines of communications open.
Because it is very complex work that CSIS professionals do.
And we want to make sure that we understand how it is being received and perceived by the population we serve.
Okay, and last question.
Do you have any...
Uh, specific indigenous officials working, um, in those advisory positions, whether it be an advisory body, an internal committee, or just an advisor to advise on, on matters such as making sure, um, you know, surveillance of ideologically motivated activism doesn't suppress legitimate activism by indigenous peoples regarding their rights.
I would.
Point out to two specific bodies if you want.
One is an internal one.
It's called the Black Indigenous Persons of Colour Congress within CSIS, the BIPOC Congress.
So we and I personally meet with them.
The last meeting was probably a month and a half ago where we are sitting down and looking at our specific strategies, plans to make sure that we get their input.
Before our policies are changed, so we want the input, we want co-development of some of these approaches.
So that is an internal one.
And the second one, I would say, is not as much an advisory body, but the fact that our activities are reviewed by two specific agencies, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, NCIRA, and the National Security Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.
Both organizations have access to all of the specific classified details of our operations and are looking at our ability to make sure that we not only respect the law, but our procedures.
And NSICOP in the last couple of years has indeed looked at how the security intelligence community was engaging with communities and how we were making efforts to be...
Much more diverse and inclusive organizations.
Okay, thank you so much for your time today.
Those are all of our questions.
Okay, thank you.
Next, call on the Ottawa Police Service.
We have no questions.
Thank you.
Okay, thank you.
Council for former Chief Slowly.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Rebecca Jones for former Chief Slowly.
We have no questions.
The province of Saskatchewan, please.
Yes, good afternoon.
My name is Mike Morris.
I'm counsel for the government of Saskatchewan.
I'd like to start out by discussing CSIS's February 13th draft threat assessment.
So I'm going to ask the registrar to pull up the document.
It's TSNSC CAN 001 Mr. Vigneault, just as we're waiting, this document is entitled Possible Implications of Emergency Act across the IMVE space.
I gather you're familiar with it.
Is that fair?
Yes, I am familiar.
The Clerk of the Privy Council mentioned last week that this document was available to attendees of the February 13th Cabinet meeting.
Do you recall it being distributed?
My recollection is that the document was discussed earlier that day at the IRG meeting.
And the document was made available to the Privy Council office, who is charged with cabinet materials, cabinet documentations.
So I do not have personal knowledge if the document was distributed, but I am aware of the clerk's comments last week.
You attended the cabinet meeting on February 13th, correct?
I did.
I guess my question is, would you expect to have received notice from the clerk that this document was being made available or distributed for that meeting, if it was?
I was aware that we CSIS were asked to make the document available to PCO, so I knew that the intent was for the document to be distributed.
I just do not have the personal knowledge, if indeed it was, because it...
The meeting was obviously scheduled fairly quickly that Sunday evening.
Right.
Would all attendees at Cabinet have had the security clearance necessary to view this document?
They will all have the right to see it.
Ministers do not have security clearances.
As previous councillors, they are deemed to have access to the classified information.
So yes, every member of the Cabinet would have been entitled to see that information.
Okay.
To the best of your recollection, was the content of this document related fully and accurately at the Cabinet meeting?
I do not remember the document being discussed specifically.
Okay.
I'm going to quote you a statement that the Clerk of the Privy Council made in her evidence on Friday.
So I want you to just listen closely.
If we need to pull up the transcript, we can.
The Clerk stated, Cabinet was aware that CSIS had not assessed a threat to the security of Canada necessary to trigger their authorities under the CSIS Act.
Are you able to agree with that statement?
Yes, I'm able to agree because I have been part of previous meetings.
My colleague, Madame Tissier, has also been part of meetings when we were providing that assessment to cabinet.
So it had been provided a few times.
And as we testified to earlier, this was a dynamic assessment.
So it's not because we...
We came to that position earlier that we would not change.
When we returned to Cabinet, it was the assessment of the day that continued to be the same thing.
So I'm very comfortable to say that Cabinet was aware of this assessment.
Okay, thank you, sir.
I want to move on to discuss the ability of the federal government to disclose CSIS's bottom-line assessment.
to provincial governments and premiers in particular because we're aware that there was a first ministers meeting on the morning of February 14th and I'm interested in whether CSIS's bottom line conclusions would have been able to be disclosed at that meeting and I want to put two of those bottom line conclusions to you sir.
One is that CSIS's assessment that the protests did not I would say that probably not because the CSIS Act under Section 19 It's fairly restrictive in
terms of who can access classified information, and so that access does not go to provinces, territories, or municipalities.
I was not part of the specific meeting, but for the purpose of this discussion, that would be my reaction.
Section 19 will not allow the classified information to be shared.
Well, if there was information of a threat...
For example, in the province of Saskatchewan, how would that information then be conveyed to the provincial government?
Somebody must have the authority to release it.
Is that fair?
So the way that information, threat information, operational information is relayed is through between CSIS and law enforcement bodies in this context.
It would be RCMP.
We referred earlier to a construct called Integrated National Security Enforcement.
Enforcement teams that exist across the country that allow different levels of law enforcement to receive the information.
So that's normally how the classified threat information will be relayed.
Okay.
I just have a couple more questions.
We heard some evidence the other day That the NSIA asked the RCMP to produce a threat assessment for the use of the Clerk of the Privy Council on February 14th.
I'm wondering, was CSIS asked to prepare a similar threat assessment for the Clerk of the Privy Council on February 14th?
I do not recall such a request.
I have seen the testimony and as part of the preparation for this appearance, I've seen an exchange of email that was in reference to that threat assessment.
I do not recall that day being asked specifically to do such an assessment.
Okay, I just have one final question.
This one's more of sort of personal interest and it's to Ms. Tessier.
Ms. Tessier, you've had a lengthy career with CSIS and I understand that you would have been employed with CSIS following the September 11th attacks.
Is that correct?
Yes, that's correct.
We've heard that CSIS's threat assessment remained at medium throughout the Freedom Convoy.
Can you advise whether CSIS's threat assessment exceeded medium in the period immediately following the September 11th attacks?
I'm going to have to refer, because the national threat assessment level is assessed by ITAC, so I'll refer that question to my ITAC colleague.
Thank you.
It would be very difficult to say.
The ITAC was created following a 2004 policy.
A national security policy, so it was not in existence right after the September 11 attacks.
Maybe if I can add to that, Commissioner, I would say that, to my knowledge, the first time that the National Terrorism Threat Assessment was created was in 2014.
And so, to bless my knowledge, it did not exist in the aftermath of 9 /11.
Thank you for answering my questions.
Okay, thank you.
Next is the Government of Canada, please.
Good afternoon.
I'm Robert McKinnon for the Government of Canada.
I just want to clarify first the document that my friend put to you just a moment ago.
It's actually an attachment to the cabinet minutes in a different document ID.
If you want to pull it up, you can see it, SSM NSC.CAN, number of zeros, 216, page 12. Is that the assessment that my friend just put to you?
Yes, it looks to be it, yes.
And if you scroll up a little bit, you'll see it's part of the minutes from cabinet meetings.
So that would have been distributed as part of the cabinet, is that right?
Yes, yes, it appears so.
All right.
On another...
Question that Mr. Miller put to you, put to your question suggesting that it was only on or after January 25 that there were concerns about threats and extreme ideologies in connection with the convoy.
Do you recall that?
Yes.
You have also testified that CSIS was receiving the OPP's Project Hendon reports and participated in the Joint Intelligence Group in relation to the convoy.
Is that correct?
Okay, I'd ask that you pull up the document OPP-40-1606.
This is a Project Hendon report dated January 23rd.
And if you go to the second page...
Okay, stop.
If you look at the paragraph that starts the third, we assess the commercial truck drivers participating in the Freedom Convoy are likely to be generally supportive of holding a lawful protest.
However, Convoy supporters may include individuals representing ideological movements who may view the protest as an opportunity to advance their own causes or beliefs.
Some of these individuals may engage in activities that are not sanctioned.
Sure.
That are not sanctioned or supported by convoy organizers in order to achieve their own objectives.
The post on the Rise Up Durham website referencing Ottawa being wild, which echoes the language used by former US President Donald Trump prior to the 2021 attack on the US Capitol, tends to support this hypothesis.
If accurate, then this assessment could indicate the possibility Yes.
I'd also ask you to pull up OPP...
0001608.
another Hendon report dated January 24th.
And just the first bullet point, if you can go up a little bit.
Yes.
You'll see it says, "Diagalon content has been posted or pinned on some social media sites promoting the Freedom Convoy." Some Diagon adherents are indicating an intent to attend the event in Ottawa.
We have not yet identified any comments from convoy organizers disassociating the convoy from Diagon.
Diagon flags were also observed at a pro-convoy rally in Sudbury on January 22nd.
And then if you go over the page to...
Just above tactical considerations, the range of anti-authority movements supporting the convoy, the presence of diagonal insignia on convoy social media sites, and at the Sudbury protest, and the potential attendance of supporters from the line at the protest in Ottawa validate previous assessments that noted the use of the Freedom Convoy by actors who may be willing to engage in acts of public disorder and possibly violence.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And that information, again, would have been received by the CSIS regional offices and all recipients of the Hendon reports on January 24th.
Is that correct?
I would have to assume so.
And the last one, document I'll take you to ts.nsc.can.001.156.
This is an ITAC threat assessment.
Of the possibility of IMVE-driven violence on the margins of the truck convoy protest.
So this one's dated January 26th, before the January 27th date in the email that my friend took you to.
So if you look at the first, the second paragraph...
While this is intended by the organizers to be a peaceful protest, open-source reporting indicates that prominent ideologically motivated violent extremism actors in Canada have seized upon this protest to advocate for their own ideological objectives, and some have expressed interest in attending the protest in Ottawa this coming weekend.
So, again, this would have been received by CSIS's regional offices and won't...
Well, it's created from ITAC itself.
Well, you can speak to that, Ms. Sheyer.
Is that correct?
Published that document January 26th, and it was distributed to our ADM and SOPS colleagues, so the broader National Security Committee and the federal government.
And the next day, we published an unclassified version, which was made available to our security colleagues in other jurisdictions.
So all these reports...
Would they not indicate a concern about violent extremist elements attending or being part of this convoy?
So our assessment pointed to a number of possible scenarios.
We talked about the possibility of INVE voices, if you will, leveraging the...
The event to push their own narrative, their own violent narratives and potentially recruit and incite violence.
We also talked about the possibility of this event and a very, you know, very present narrative of some IMV-inspired people.
Which could potentially trigger vulnerable individuals to mobilize quickly to violence and then conduct an act of terrorism.
Okay, I don't need that document anymore.
This one's for Mr. Vigneault.
You were asked a question earlier today and you gave an answer that's also in your summary of the in-camera testimony about your support for the invocation of this act.
And you said, based on your understanding of everything you had seen up until that point, do you recall that?
Yes.
Can you detail what you had seen or been informed of that contributed to your opinion that it was necessary to invoke the Emergencies Act?
Essentially, the...
Our information that we've testified to is an evidence for the fact that we knew they were ideologically motivated by an individual who were interested in this event.
The unpredictable nature of this event, the fact that...
Gone through different phases and its size and scope continue to be both in Ottawa and across the country continue to vary spontaneous and not so spontaneous events, blockades and so on.
The fact that law enforcement resources were being diverted from different sites to potentially deliberately to make sure that they were less capacity to deal with these events.
The fact that we, as part of the many interdepartmental meetings they attended, information from the CBSA, from Transport Canada, from Finance Canada, about the impact that the disruption, the protests, the blockades were taking the country, and the fact that there was an evolving operational plan by law enforcement.
At that point, I've not yet been put in place to be able to deal with this situation.
All of these elements of unpredictability, based on my experience having been around national security issues for quite a few years now, led me to believe that the regular tools were just not enough to address the situation.
Okay, here's another question concerning...
Did the GIC have the same inputs that CSIS had when it made its decision and CSIS made its decision under its act?
Are you aware whether they were exactly the same inputs?
I did not have full access to, you know, necessarily the documents that the GIC was presented.
What I can say is that I had been part of personally or my colleague, my name is here, but I've been part of the cabinet discussions, the IRGs.
So I had a, I would say, a very good understanding, but I could not characterize it as being perfect information necessarily.
Right.
I'll take you to briefly the summary of the in-camera proceeding that a couple of council have taken you to, just to look at a couple other paragraphs.
So if you could pull up WTS 6079.
Page 4. Where it says in the paragraph, Ms. Tessier explained, that's right, that unlike RMVE, IMVE groups often do not have a command and control structure or organized membership.
Now we've heard that said today.
Could you just, you mentioned networks, but perhaps one or other of you could just explain just quickly the difference.
Yes, certainly.
As I mentioned earlier today in my testimony, in the past, I use al-Qaeda as an example.
There was very much an organized structure.
Not anybody could adhere to al-Qaeda.
Whereas today, especially given the internet and the ability to network together on social media, there is difficulty in just having...
Comparing it to what would have been the case in the past, where you had a physical presence, you had to be vetted to be part of this group.
Not to say that there are some INVE groups that don't do that, most certainly there are, but given the vastness of communications today, especially on the internet and various social media sites, the ability to get to know individuals who share your extreme audiology is a lot easier than it would have been in the past.
And so it's these, that's why we prefer to call them networks.
And we referred to Lowell and Wolf's earlier, how one person can commit an act.
They don't necessarily have to be directed to do so.
They weren't necessarily vetted by anybody, but they adhere to this network.
And that's just one example in terms of what we see today.
If I could ask you to turn to page eight.
Under threat assessment concerning invoking the Emergencies Act.
If you could look at the paragraph that starts, Ms. Tessier explained that there was an initial increase in online rhetoric after the invocation, but because it was announced at the same time as public health measures being lowered, the increase petered out.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
That's our assessment, yes.
So it didn't, it wasn't as aggravated as perhaps the assessment first foresaw?
Is that?
I would say that's very specific to the Emergencies Act itself, but we have most certainly seen, as I testified to earlier, an increase in anti-authority rhetoric.
Okay.
And because I may not have time to take you to some of these ITAC assessments that are referred to in the next paragraph, can you just confirm that the summary there is accurate?
It says the panel will refer to several CSIS and ITAC assessments between 2020 to the period the convoy ended describing threats to journalists and politicians.
The panel agreed that since 2020 there has been an increase in IMVE online rhetoric and threat to authority figures including law enforcement, public and elected officials.
Ms. Shire explained that this rhetoric was mostly targeted towards politicians including as against Do you see that?
Do you have any sort of further comment on that threat environment from 2020 to today?
Has it changed in any way, or has it remained the same?
I would say it is increasing, and I'll pass to my colleague as well, but I would, from the CISA's perspective, part of the concern is you're seeing a lot of this type of discussion in more mainstream media.
And we know through some of the individuals that we would be concerned with, and as I mentioned a number of times today, they try to use that to recruit individuals towards a more extreme ideology.
So because we see a lot more of this...
Globally, frankly, adherence to this type of a movement, it is of increasing concern in terms of the ability for people to access that type of violent propaganda.
I don't know if my colleague...
I completely agree.
I would also add that we have seen during the pandemic, especially while people were staying home, they spent a whole lot of time On social media, on the internet, and there are surveys that are being done that show a large increase in the number of people researching internet sites that have IMV content.
So we have seen that trend.
We have seen also the number, as is written in this summary, the number of threats targeting public officials, politicians have been increasing also quite significantly.
And can online rhetoric translate into...
Action in the real world?
Sometimes.
But I think, as Ms. Tissier mentioned earlier today, one of the things that we're very concerned about is the people who actually consume that rhetoric, that see those threats and get maybe inspired to conduct act of violence after having consumed all of those narratives.
So when someone posts a threat against a politician, it doesn't necessarily mean that the person has the intent.
To carry out an attack to target the person.
But it can and it has inspired others to do so.
If I can be permitted to add concrete examples, we saw that the attacker in Christchurch, Brendan Tarrant, had written the name of, amongst others, Alexandre Bissonnette on one of his weapons.
And many others who obviously influenced by that activity.
More recently, we saw the Buffalo shooter do the same thing and put the name of individuals who have committed these typical or sorry, these previous acts as well, writing that on their weapons.
So you see the influence of these individuals who live stream these attacks and how other individuals go towards that type of And then give them credit when they actually conduct the attack.
Is it difficult to predict the point at which online violent rhetoric translates into action, violence?
Absolutely.
It's very difficult.
And you had mentioned, I'd heard the words dynamic and fluid and so forth.
How would you describe that type of threat assessment?
Is it done on a daily basis?
Yes, I believe I mentioned that earlier.
We have to, and we did, continuously assess the situation.
Look, if anybody was radicalizing because of the environment and because we knew that there were individuals trying to recruit and recruit people towards their more extreme violent movement.
Maybe if I could add one point to this is that...
We talked earlier about the very dynamic nature and evolving nature of the IMV environment.
And because we are sitting on the same table with our law enforcement partners, we share a lot of information.
And sometimes it will be information coming from a law enforcement source that will inform CSIS that we may need to look at it from a national security threat to a security of Canada point of view.
And sometimes it's information we would have collected as part of our own investigations that we would have collected.
And so that is a very dynamic exchange between us.
All right.
I have a question for Mr. Vigneault concerning questions that were put to you earlier.
So you were asked a number of questions about the interpretation of the CSIS Act.
And you're aware that the Government of Canada has received legal advice generally on the Emergencies Act.
Is that correct?
Yes.
And you're aware that the Government of Canada has received legal advice generally?
On the Emergencies Act and has claimed solicitor and client privilege over that advice, are you not?
I am aware.
And you have not been given authority to waive any solicitor and client privilege over that advice, is that correct?
That's correct.
And when you answered questions regarding the interpretation of various statutes, you were expressing your own understanding, is that correct?
Absolutely.
All right, I have a document to pull up.
Pretty well out of time, so you're going to have to wrap up.
All right.
I don't know if one of my friends who gave up their five minutes would cede me that time, but I see a nod.
I feel like it's a bingo.
I'll even cede him my five minutes.
I just think that I'm not going to get through what I want to, but I think some of this is important, I thought.
Okay, we'll focus on...
Yes, I've got a document that I'm going to ask for your explanation of Mr. Divino.
It's ts.can.001, well several zeros, 001 then several zeros one again.
So it's entitled Fabric of Society.
It's a CSIS document.
So it's ts.can.001.number of zeros, then one.
In case it assists, there are seven zeros before the one ts.can.
There we go.
All right.
Mr. Vigneault, could you explain what this represents and how CSIS utilizes this?
Again, we've done a lot of work inside the organization to better understand the dynamic of IMV, what's happening in society, what are some social movements that potentially have an impact on our CSIS mandate.
And this, if you can maybe reduce this on the front.
If you look at this, it has the shape of a funnel.
And essentially what we try to do with this is to explain at the top of the funnel is that, you know, a lot of personal grievances.
A link to Islamophobia, oppression of indigenous people, the fear of conspiracy theories like QAnon, xenophobia, neo-Nazi influences.
So there's a lot of things that circulate in society.
And that is essentially what is unfortunately very present on social media.
When I referred to earlier as awful but lawful, we see a lot of that potentially extremely violent and vile information.
And, but again, this is protected by charter.
This is, you know, acceptable in a democracy.
And the further down you go through the funnel, you know, you're getting into areas that, you know, might be potentially constitute aid speech under criminal code.
And at the narrowest part of the funnel, this is where, you know, CSIS are analytical.
Analysis describes this is where the narrowest part of the funnel, where our 2C investigations would kick in.
And so that is a conceptual analytical construct to help identify what is happening in society and where we versus the police versus...
Other elements of the society should be concerned with.
You know, CSIS should be informed of what's happening on top of the funnel where it's lawful.
We are informed by that information, but we're not investigating that.
That is, you know, lawful information.
Where we are, as I said, is the nervous part of the funnel.
So one other element that is, I think, critical in all of this is we've said earlier on that people can radicalize extremely quickly or mobilize to violence very quickly.
So we've seen people move from being consumer, as my colleague said, consumer of those narratives, to go down and very quickly to say, I need to do something about it.
I will mobilize, I will engage, I will train, I will acquire weapons, and I will commit violence.
And so this is our attempt to depict what is happening in society and where the CSIS mandate fits.
Last question.
Was there a concern by CSIS concerning this convoy that others who have been radicalized in some form and were engaging in online rhetoric would use the convoy as a vehicle to recruit?
Indeed.
I think it was our assessment that CSIS and ITAC came to the same conclusion.
Where we are seen, unfortunately, in the past, you know, people are exploiting those types of events for their own purposes.
And other people, again, very quickly are mobilizing to violence based on information, based on motivation to use such an event to engage in acts of violence.
Okay, thank you.
Thank you.
Any re-examination?
Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
Two brief points of clarification, I hope.
I see my friend, Mr. McKinnon, rewrote the summary himself while delivering it to the witness, so it might be that it's had the salutary effect that we need here.
I think this question is for you, Mr. Vigneault.
I'd ask that the summary of the closed session, which is WTS 079, be brought up.
And if we could go to the top of page 9, the bottom of page 8 and the top of page 9. Thank you.
And this passage has had some discussion a fair bit already today.
So I won't repeat the whole thing, but Mr. Vignon, I think what some people have expressed some puzzlement about is just the way you phrased it.
And you know that if I tried to say something in French, you would have to cover your ears.
So I'm not faulting your English here.
It's just that...
Sometimes we see Francophones express things this way, and I want to see if I can offer you an alternative expression in English, or, if you'd prefer, just ask you to say it in French.
The way you phrased the last eight or ten words there allows for two meanings in English that I think you intended only one of them.
So it says, he advised the Prime Minister of his belief that it was indeed required to invoke the Act.
And some people are wondering if it has any meaning other than an article that is reflexive to invoke the Act.
So one way of rewording that might be advise the Prime Minister of his belief that the invocation of the Act was required, or...
It was, as Mr. McKinnon put it, necessary to invoke the Act.
Do either of those sound right to you?
and if they don't, please just say it in French, and you'll lose me, but the commissioner will be right on it.
I think I, To be clearer than maybe the summary is, and of course it was not a verbatim record of what was said.
It was a summary.
I think if I pick up on top of Page 9, opinion of everything he had seen to that point, he advised the Prime Minister of his belief that the situation indeed required to invoke the act.
I think that would be a fair assessment of what...
What I wanted to say.
Okay.
I'm going to tell you that that leaves us with the same ambiguity.
So, do you want to try it in French?
I'm not sure that I can be clearer than that.
If you want to put to me, you know, the two interpretations, you know, again.
I'll try it again.
Would you think it sounded right if you said he advised the Prime Minister of his belief that it was indeed necessary to invoke the Act?
I think that would be in my head.
It means the same thing.
So necessary would be absolutely fine.
Then we're there.
Thank you.
And then on another point of clarification, probably this one for you, Ms. Tessier.
Not everybody followed the graphic about IMVE the way the graphic designer probably hoped everyone would follow it, which is quickly and easily.
And we were going to try to walk you through that when we realized you've actually got it written out in words in your institutional report.
So if you could, Mr. Clerk, if you could call up DOJ IR 701 and take us to page 7, about two-thirds of the way down.
And Mr. S.C.A., if this is a question for you, I'll ask you to look at the...
Verbal description of the placemat, which is there.
And in particular, if you can confirm that that's an accurate description of what the placemat is trying to say, with us being especially interested in the paragraph afterwards, if an actor only demonstrates.
Which the words for us seem much clearer than the placemat was able to describe.
So if you can confirm that those words are accurate, that'll resolve that for us.
Yes, they are accurate.
Okay.
Thank you very much, Mr. Commissioner.
Those are my questions.
Okay.
So that ends your testimony.
Thank you very much for coming.
Testifying at the Commission.
Much appreciated.
And you're free to go.
We're going to move on to the next.
So I'm going to do a five-minute break just to change the arrangements.
Maybe ten minutes to change the arrangements and move to our next witness.
So a ten-minute break.
The Commission is in recess for 10 minutes.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
Order a lot.
The Commission has been convened, la Commissar a lot.
Okay.
Now, just before we start, if I could just, I just want to make a brief statement that from now on for the balance of the week, We will be hearing from a number of senior government ministers, including the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister.
The Commission recognizes that this is exceptional, and even more so as the House, as I understand it, is sitting.
So the latter fact, the fact the House is sitting, is such that it may require some accommodation.
For these witnesses in the event of votes, the House of Commons or events requiring that they respond to pressing needs.
So I just wanted to put that on the record.
So for parties, it's also important that in the course of these examinations, we not lose sight of the reason that they are here to testify.
That is the subject matter of this inquiry.
The examinations therefore must remain focused on this, particularly in light of the limited time we have.
Finally, as I have insisted throughout, I will continue to insist that the conduct of the public and indeed the parties be respectful at all times, which I'm sure everyone understands.
So I just wanted to say that because it's...
We're sort of entering another phase for the balance.
Okay, so with that introduction, Commission Council.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Gordon Cameron for Commission Council and the first witness in this category of Ministers.
Is Minister Bill Blair?
If you could take the stand and he will be sworn.
Okay.
Minister Blair, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
On a Bible, please.
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
My name is William Blair, B-L-A-I-R.
Do you swear that the evidence to be given by you to this commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
So help me God.
Thank you.
Sure.
Good afternoon, Minister Blair.
I'll begin just with some housekeeping, some formalities.
And in particular, what I'm going to ask you to do is recall that you had an interview with me and some of my colleagues on September 6th.
And for the record, I'll note for parties that the summary of that interview is WTS 7048.
Now, Minister Blair, have you had a chance to review this witness summary that was prepared following your interview?
Yes, sir, I have.
Can you confirm that it's accurate and that you adopt it as part of your evidence before this proceeding?
I can confirm that, yes.
Thank you.
Now, if we can just go through a little bit of background for those who aren't already familiar with your role in the federal government recently and before that.
You were the Minister of Public Safety.
From November 2019 to October 2021, is that correct?
Yes, sir.
And in October of 2021, you were appointed, and this is a long title, and it requires a bit of updating.
You were appointed as President of the Queen's Privy Council.
Now you will be the President of the King's Privy Council, I take it, and also as the Minister of Emergency Preparedness.
Is that right?
Yes, sir.
Now, in the Prime Minister's mandate letters, that is the letters that the Prime Minister writes for each of his ministers to describe what he expects from them during their tenure, the Prime Minister assigned leadership responsibilities regarding public safety and emergency preparedness, both to you, Minister Blair, and to Minister Mendocino.
And so the question is, can you help us understand how that division works under the umbrella of the Ministry of Emergency Preparedness and Public Safety?
Yes, sir.
As you noted earlier, I previously held the position of Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.
But frankly, the government recognized in the most recent past a significant increase in both the severity, complexity, and frequency of national emergencies taking place in this country.
And so a decision was made to bifarcate my previous ministry.
And into public safety, which is a portfolio held by my colleague and friend, Minister Mendicino, and Minister of Emergency Preparedness, which is the portfolio that I am responsible for.
Under that, I think there's a very clear delineation of responsibilities, but there's a very close alignment between the work that I do and that Minister Mendicino does.
Mr. Mendicino is, for example, responsible under the act for five different significant agencies in the federal government, including the RCMP, CBSA, CSIS, Corrections Canada, and the Parole Board.
Henry, he also has a number of other significant responsibilities within his own For myself, my responsibilities particularly pertain to ensuring that the government of Canada is prepared to respond effectively to all hazards and emergencies in this country to improve the way in which the government prepares and also creates greater resiliency in the country about these events.
Among the administrative processes I am also responsible for is I oversee requests for assistance that are received from the provinces and territories for assistance in the advent of an emergency.
If I could just, if you could try and be a little slower for the interpreters because they have to translate everything you say and you have a tendency to have a high output.
Yes, sir.
I'll certainly do my very best.
And I would appreciate the occasional reminder that I think Mr. Cameron is quite prepared to provide.
The scribes at the interview got lost after a few minutes of the interview.
Now, that's a helpful description, Minister Blair, of the division between the two parts of public safety and emergency preparedness.
Here's something that's more challenging for all of us, is if you can describe for us your role as president of the King's Privy Council and what role you play there.
I'll remind you, just as a place to start, that among other things you chair the SSE Committee, the Safety, Security and Emergencies Committee.
But writ large, can you describe that office and what responsibilities come with it?
There are, within federal legislation, certain federal agencies, such as the Transportation Safety Board, that answers directly to the president of now the King's Privy Council.
But it also is important to recognize the close collaboration that exists between my responsibilities as the president of King's Privy Council and the work of the...
It requires, in addition to my responsibilities in sharing, for example, the SSE Committee, the Safety, Security, and Emergency Committee, a very close collaboration with the Privy Council Office.
I have, for example, within PCO, a Deputy Secretary, Ms. Bogdan, who I believe you've heard from, who I work very closely with on matters of emergency preparedness, and with respect to other...
I'm very close with the deputy.
Well.
Right.
Right.
And something we'll come back to in a little bit of detail a little later in this examination.
One of the functions of your office includes handling Requests for assistance, what we've now learned to call RFAs, where somebody from a level of government lower than the federal government asks for the assistance of the federal government in some particular sphere.
Can you tell us, just broadly speaking, how that works?
as we'll come to the one specific to the convoy in a minute, but just broadly how that process works.
Yes, sir.
There is a provision within our government for provinces and territories to make requests Of our government for assistance for certain types of emergencies.
The criteria is reasonably well established.
In the past two years, I've been responsible for, well, since the beginning of the pandemic, I've actually managed about 200 requests for assistance that the government has received from our provincial and territorial partners.
These can take a number of different forms.
There were quite a number of them related to the pandemic in particular.
But also in the advent of floods and fires, the hurricanes that recently took place in Atlantic Canada, all can result.
When events exceed the capacity of the provinces and territories to manage it, the RFA process allows them to reach out for assistance and whatever we're able to provide, it is my responsibility to arrange that.
Much of that work is done with other federal departments, public safety, the Department of National Defense, and others.
But to ensure that whatever federal supports can be provided to the provinces and territories, we do that as expeditiously as possible.
The formality that that process follows, and it's probably not the same in every case, but sometimes it's a phone call, perhaps followed up later by writing, sometimes writing followed up later by a phone call.
But can you describe for the Commissioner just how the process tends to take place in the example of a typical flood?
In my experience, sir, and as I said, we've done now a couple of hundred of these, senior officials usually begin talking very quickly, even in anticipation.
For example, if we know a hurricane is coming or at the beginning of the wildfire season, communications begin to take place between senior officials in both either the province or territory and our federal departments, whichever is implicated.
Most of that is managed through the Ministry of Public Safety.
And for example, in my experience, most of that work has been done by Deputy Stewart, who I think you've also heard from.
There's usually discussions that take place between senior officials.
There is also a table of senior officials, sometimes referred to as the senior officials responsible for emergency management, who also engages in these discussions.
That's usually followed up very quickly by a formal letter of request from the province or territory that is directed to the Ministry of Public Safety and then on to me for determination.
But we try to work as quickly as possible in order to see if we can, whatever helps we can provide in response to those requests.
And then through, again, Deputy Stewart, our response to that request is prepared, to which I'm able to then hopefully quickly respond.
So if the hurricane's coming up the coast, you don't wait till the letter arrives before you start mobilizing of response to a request?
No, and in fact, in our most recent experience with Hurricane Fiona as it was moving to Atlantic Canada, we were receiving very good forecasting from Environment Canada, which gave us a pretty good idea of where that hurricane was going to land.
And so there were conversations that began days in advance so that we could be better prepared and mobilize and even stage resources in order to respond to what we knew was going to be a significant impact on those regions of the country.
and that we would be able to work closely together There are a number of other...
And for example, I'm also responsible for what we refer to as the humanitarian workforce, where we work very closely with NGOs such as the Canadian Red Cross and stage those resources and begin to register people well in advance of the hurricane in that case, so that we can respond as quickly as possible in real time to help people be safe.
And I assume that if you do act immediately before the paperwork arrives...
There will be the requirement for the orderly administration and documentation of the RFA that the paperwork eventually come through.
The request be properly documented?
Yes, sir.
Those requests are properly documented, but we don't necessarily wait for the paperwork.
Sometimes there have been very limited circumstances where the paperwork arrived first, and then we start responding to that immediately.
But in the vast majority of cases, there's outreach from the province and territory who identify a situation that exceeds their capacity, where they seek our help, and then we undertake immediately to see if we can find that help within the federal government.
Thank you.
Now, if you can describe, perhaps, well, certainly atypically relative to most other government departments, you are lodged, so to speak, in the Privy Council office and supported by people.
Also in the Privy Council Office.
And one of the people also there is the National Security Intelligence Advisor, Jody Thomas.
If you could describe for us how you, as Minister of Emergency Preparedness, work with or relate with, interact with the National Security Intelligence Advisor.
Yes, the National Security Intelligence Advisor is actually a very important source of guidance, advice and information.
For our preparation in order to respond appropriately to emergencies.
In a number of different capacities, including that I chair, the Safety, Security and Emergency Committee, but even in our daily and weekly interactions, the National Security Intelligence Advisor is a person who gathers information from...
The National Security Intelligence Establishment, from law enforcement and from other sources, and provides it to government, including to me, to assist us in making sure that we're able to do our duties in a timely way and be well informed of what government needs to know in order to keep people safe.
Thank you.
Now, we've had, as you probably know, already testifying among the senior government officials who testified last week, Jacqueline.
Bogdan and Jeff Hutchinson, maybe you could just remind us, now that you're here, where they fit in the scheme of your Department of Emergency Preparedness.
Yes, sir.
When the government decided, when the Prime Minister decided, that to place a special emphasis and create a unique ministry dealing with emergency preparedness, we recognized that in order to make that work, we also had to fundamentally change the way in which the public service Through the Privy Council office organizes itself in response to preparation for emergency.
And so there was decisions made within PCO by the clerk in order to create some additional positions within the Privy Council office to essentially create an office to more formalize and...
I think to make more effective the government's response to emergencies and in our preparation, in a wide variety, a very significant spectrum of activities, including increased resilience, investment in critical infrastructure and an all-hazards approach.
And it was also, I think, very important to make connections.
One of the things I have found in my responsibility, sir, and working with PCO, that emergencies are not uniquely located within any one ministry or department.
They're very often implicate like a whole of government.
We learned that certainly in the floods, for example, in British Columbia, where, you know, initially when I went to British Columbia with the prime minister to meet with the provincial government, you know, we looked at it as an emergency response to a flood, but very quickly learned that.
Agriculture, transportation, fisheries and oceans, natural resources, Environment Canada.
All of these different departments of government were deeply implicated in that emergency.
And so one of my responsibilities working with PCO and Ms. Bogdan is in a convening role to bring all of the departments together and bring senior officials to make sure that all of government is responding appropriately as necessary.
To every emergency.
And so a decision was made.
Ms. Bogdan was brought in as the Deputy Secretary, responsible for emergency management, and she also has responsibility for the COVID response of the government.
She's also overseeing that.
And Ms. Hutchison was also brought in and serves in a number of different roles, including his secretary.
To the cabinet committee that I chair, the Safety, Security and Emergencies Committee.
He's also acted as secretary in other duties that I've been assigned by the Prime Minister.
And for example, I co-chaired with British Columbia, a committee with the British Columbia government involving all the ministers and very significant representation from First Nations leadership in coordinating all of government's response to the floods.
And Jeff acted as the secretary for that committee as well.
Okay.
And a third name that we're going to encounter in some of the documents and that those who have been following will have seen already, Zita Astrovis.
Can you describe what her role is in your department?
Yes.
Zita is the Chief of Staff.
For my ministry office, I have within my ministry office people who are responsible for policy development as it pertains to emergencies, with communications and media relations, and finally with operations, because we engage with every region of the country.
And all of the people that work in that office are overseen by my chief of staff, Hazita Estraves.
She is a very serious and experienced political staffer within a ministry office, and she previously served.
As my Chief of Staff when I was the Minister of Public Safety.
Now, again, people who've been following this proceeding or following the original events will know that there's another part of your background that ended up assuming special significance as these events unfolded in January and February, and that was your first career.
As a police officer and ultimately the Chief of Police of the Toronto Police Service.
First of all, can you describe in broad strokes what that experience was?
And then I'll bring you back to the particular public order experience that you had in those roles.
Yes, Mr. Cameron.
I joined the Toronto Police Service in 1976.
I served as a Toronto Police Officer for 39 years.
And for the last 10 years of my 39-year career, from 2005 until 2015, I was the Chief of Police of the City of Toronto.
And in that capacity, I served in a number of roles that were somewhat related to the events that transpired.
Right.
Now, as I understand it, as you were coming up...
You, in fact, served a term as an inspector of a public order unit itself, that is, the actual unit that goes out and deals with public order incidents, is that right?
Yes, sir.
I was public order trained, and I served as a public order incident commander for very, very many public order incidents in the City of Toronto over a number of years.
Okay.
Now, the one that...
Often gets remembered because it was so newsworthy, was the G20 event in Toronto, which ended up being a public order event as well as its political event on its own.
And you played a role in that, but it would probably be helpful if you described what role you played, what role you didn't play, and roughly what you learned from that experience.
Yes, sir.
The G20, it occurred in June of 2010 in the city of Toronto.
It was a planned event.
I was, throughout that entire period of time, the chief of police and therefore responsible for policing in my city.
But the event itself was actually headed up by an integrated command structure.
With a gold, silver, bronze command structure that was put in place, the leadership of which was with the RCMP, but also it had representatives from my service, but also from some of the regional services around and the OPP.
And they were actually responsible for the operational response to the G20.
But throughout that period, I was the chief of police and therefore ultimately responsible for every policing-related matter taking place in my city.
And as you mentioned, probably in a 30-odd year career, and especially Tena as Chief of Police, there were more than just the G20 event.
And the one other, perhaps, event or series of events that was memorable during that period when you were Chief of Police were the Tamil protests in Toronto.
And I mention them because you might...
Find some similarities with some of the events that happened around Ottawa, and if you could just tell us about those events and how they were resolved, at least as best as you can recollect it.
Yes, sir.
That took place in May of 2009.
It was a period in which there was a great deal of concern within the Tamil community, and there's a very substantial Tamil community in the greater Toronto area.
About events that were taking place in Sri Lanka at that particular time.
And as a consequence, a number of people came out onto the streets to begin to protest.
There were two, frankly, significant and somewhat distinct matters that I had to deal with as the Chief of Police during that event.
On Mother's Day of 2009...
About 5,000 people from the Tamil community were demonstrating and marching and unfortunately went up on a ramp of the Gardner Expressway and ended up on the elevated highway that runs through downtown Toronto.
I was called because, of course, they had blocked the highway.
It wasn't a particularly serious traffic issue because it was Mother's Day, a Sunday evening and not too concerning.
But I heard from my operational commanders that evening that there were no...
There was a real concern because the guardrail really is for vehicles, not for pedestrians.
There were children and elderly people up on that elevated highway, and there was a very sincere concern among my officers that any action that we might take to remove them from the bridge or even bring them down the ramp could result in a stampede, a crushing of people, and would just be simply too dangerous.
And so I directed that we would slow down.
That we would engage with the people that were on the bridge.
We would find people that we could talk to on the bridge, and that took a couple of hours.
And then eventually I engaged them in some conversation.
I had a pretty good relationship with that community and found a way to have them safely come down off that bridge.
And it was, in my opinion, an entirely appropriate and safe resolution of what could have potentially been a very dangerous situation.
The other element to this is...
Tens of thousands of people initially converged on University Avenue in the area of University of Armory, which is right near the 361, our superior courts in Toronto, but also right opposite the U.S. Consulate.
And initially when they went there...
It was considered quite disruptive.
It was noisy and it was interfering with traffic.
But very quickly, we were able to work with that crowd to allow the TTC, for example, to operate on both Queen and Dundas so that the transit would continue to move.
Those are pretty important transit routes in the city.
We also were concerned about accessing egress for our hospitals on Hospital Row on University Avenue.
We worked out with them a way in which we could do that.
And although that protest went on for several days...
And there were concerns actually being expressed by the time I remember hearing from Superior Court judges about the noise outside their courtrooms.
But at the same time, you know, there was very little residential in that area.
I would also want to acknowledge the people that were protesting did so in a very respectful way.
They cleaned up after themselves.
You know, they were on the street.
They were very seriously concerned.
But I think that was a situation that in Toronto we were able to resolve appropriately and safely.
And eventually, I think it actually strengthened our relationship very much with that community.
And if I recollect accounts of those events, one of the things you were able to accomplish with that demonstration was to move it from...
An arguably illegal demonstration in the sense that it was blocking University Avenue to a location nearby where the demonstration could continue but not be obstructing traffic and potentially breaking the law.
Yes, sir.
And actually, that was based on some experience that we'd had in that particular area as well.
I also remember in the late 90s, there were very significant demonstrations among two other communities serving in Croatian at that same location, and we worked very closely with those protesters.
To allow them to engage in their lawful peaceful protests, but do it in a way that minimizes the disruption to traffic, to the movement of people, and to the functioning of basically the city's daily life all around them.
And as an incident commander, a public order, senior police officer, how do you factor in that particular attempted transition that is you encounter?
A public order incident, ideally you're able to keep it legal from beginning to end, but when it starts to transition into illegality, either because it's obstructing traffic or violating some other law, where in your ranking of objectives do you put turning what has become an unlawful protest into a lawful protest?
I think it's important.
Frankly, I actually very sincerely believe in the right to lawful peaceful protest.
It's a protected charter right in this country.
Sometimes it can be a challenge.
It can be very difficult to manage these events.
But I think if the protesters are willing to work with the police and if the police work with them, there are always some individuals who will push the limit and sometimes will break the law.
And there are...
Ways to deal with those individuals.
But in my experience, it is always preferable, if you're able, to minimize the impact and to facilitate lawful, peaceful protests, not allowing unlawful protests or risk to public safety.
And you might not have monitored this part of the evidence, but we had a similar discussion with Deputy Commissioners of Lockie of the RCMP.
About this attempt that the RCMP took in and near Coots, Alberta, to find a legal way for the protest to continue.
And let me ask you, if you found in those days when you were doing this the same tension, because the protesters want to be visible, they want, in effect, cause at least enough of a nuisance that they're noticed and that they're able to make their point and be heard.
And yet you want them to be as little a nuisance as possible.
And is that a tension that your forces and the people you have as your liaison team are trained to try and sort out?
Well, if I may, just let me cite as an example.
During the G20...
We designated certain places where we wanted to facilitate lawful peaceful protests.
And for example, over at Queen's Park, we said, you know, if you gather there, you'll be able to protest.
And some people were quite willing to do that, but unfortunately not everybody is.
And then some people, you know, prefer to be, you know, to disrupt traffic or in the case of the G20, unfortunately it also...
Resulted in a set of circumstances where there was significant property damage, fires were set and windows were smashed.
But I think it's important to distinguish there are always people who seek only to engage in lawful, peaceful protests.
And I think it's our responsibility, and I say, forgive me, it's the police responsibility to facilitate that to every extent possible.
And unfortunately, there are also, in some circumstances, people who choose to engage in unlawful behavior and don't engage in lawful but rather unlawful protest.
And then there has to be whatever action is required in order to curtail that.
Right.
Now, coming to Denson's question, as the...
As the matters were developing, there was a series of what ended up getting called briefings on truckers' convoy among ministers and senior officials in the government.
And it looks from our account of the documentation that you attended.
Probably all of them or almost all of them.
Is that your recollection?
I believe almost all of them, yes.
Yes.
There was one on January 28th, and I'm going to ask the clerk to call up SSM NSC CAN 50251.
And if you...
Mr. Kirger, if you can just scroll down, there's a point where we have a number 18. There we go.
This is the notes of the readout, as it's called, of that meeting.
Do I understand the way this is laid out correctly, that beside the number 18 in your name are a series of points that you were making at the meeting?
Yes, sir.
What I'm going to ask you to talk about is C. We need to keep the language down.
And probably the people in the room...
Knew what you were talking about, and you probably used more words than just that.
So if you could flesh that out for us, what message you were trying to get across during that briefing when you said we need to keep the language down?
I believe we all have a responsibility to do what is necessary to keep the peace.
And I was concerned that inflammatory language could incite a more violent response, potentially, or incite others to continue to come to the protest.
And so I think I can maintain, and I've had some experience in this, in your language, to speak of it as a...
So, minimize name-calling and...
I don't normally engage in name-calling, sir.
Right.
But is that what you mean by keep the language down, keep the rhetoric moderate on the government side, on the protester side?
I believe, in my experience, sometimes people live down to your expectations, and so one should be careful in how you speak of these events.
I also, quite frankly, I'm always concerned about fear.
I think fear is one of the greatest enemies of public safety.
And I think if our language is intemperate, we can make people quite fearful.
And if people are fearful, then they don't use public space.
They don't engage with their neighbors.
It can actually create a more dangerous situation.
And so my advice to colleagues was that we would remain temperate in our language.
I'd like to move now to another topic area that it's apparent that you took a role in and that has to do with the arrangement of what were called perhaps it was ended up being a misnomer but what were originally called the tripartite meetings.
Can you describe, first of all, what those were meant to be, to situate them in time if it assists you?
They were February 7th, 8th, and 10th, the ones that started it off.
But if you can just tell us what you had hoped to accomplish with those meetings.
Yes, sir.
It was my intention to convene all three orders of government.
To bring them to a table, because I believe that all three orders of government had a role and responsibility here.
I believe that good communication between all three orders of government could have been facilitated by convening a meeting among, initially, it was attempted to do so at the political level.
And as you said, it wasn't entirely successful.
But I believe what we were able to achieve is convening officials.
To come to that table, because I believe that the events that were transpiring in Ottawa really did require good communication, clear expectations and communications, and how we could assist each other.
All of us had a responsibility.
All of us had a role to play, and I was attempting to convene that.
But inconsistent with the role that I also play, as I mentioned earlier, in convening other orders of government.
I've learned that at the table to share perspectives and to help each other.
There's two topics I'd like to see if we can talk about, and I'll see if we can do it without pulling up too many documents, but just going by your memories of these meetings.
And I'll just describe the topics and then we'll try to treat them one at a time, though they might end up getting blended together.
One is the fact that you didn't succeed in getting Ontario at the political level to the table, as I think had been your ambition.
But the other topic is why there seemed, in at least the records of these meetings, so much...
Confusion or misunderstanding between the city of Ottawa and the federal government, and to the extent they were there, officials of the Ontario government, about...
Which resources would be committed by whom, when, who was actually there, etc.
The documents just seem to be the equivalent of a whole bunch of ships passing in the night and nobody understanding what the other person's saying and perhaps even a lot of mistrust.
So let's take the first of those issues, the effort you made to include the province of Ontario and how much success you had there.
Well, first of all, I reached out to Minister Jones, who was the Solicitor General in the province of Ontario at that time.
I've enjoyed a very long-standing and very positive professional working relationship with Minister Jones.
I reached out to extend an invitation for her to join that table.
Minister Jones indicated to me during the one call I had with her that she would consider the invitation, but she did express some concern, and I understood that concern, and I acknowledged that to her.
She expressed some concern that she did not want to be seen to be directing the police.
And actually, we had a very brief exchange, because I'm also very familiar, as she was, with the Linden Commission report on the Ipperwash event.
And I think there is an actual sensitivity and concern among Ontario officials about any appearance of being seen to direct the police.
I would also acknowledge Minister Mendicino.
Who has a direct reporting relationship.
He is essentially Minister Jones' counterpart.
He also had a number of conversations with her and with the Premier at the time.
But in my one conversation with the Solicitor General, I sought to make the invitation and to provide her with assurances about what my intent was in convening that table.
Mr. Clerk, perhaps you could call up SSM NSC CAN 402676 and just start at the top so we can orient ourselves with what this document is.
That's got a nice helpful heading there, Tri-Part Meeting Readout.
This is a February 10th meeting.
And so, Mr. Clerk, if you could scroll down to about page three.
Thank you.
And just a little further, please, Mr. Clerk, so we get Minister Blair's comments there.
Under BB, which is doubtless you, there's this notation.
Thanks.
If we can speak frankly for a moment, it has come to the media's discussion that they are not in this meeting for the third day.
And are we understanding this correctly, that they is Ontario?
Yes, sir.
And so this is the third of your three attempts to table a tripart meeting and the third time that Ontario is missing in action.
And you refer to a statement from Ontario that your meetings will accomplish nothing.
Is that what you're saying there?
I believe that's what I'm referencing, too.
I don't have a memory of that statement at this moment, but I think clearly my comment here is that there was a statement suggesting the table would accomplish nothing.
Right.
And then there's a discussion between you, and I take it that's you and the mayor?
Yes, sir.
Myself, the mayor, I believe, as well.
I believe the city manager and Minister Mendogino, of course, were on that call.
Right.
And you say good point, and then, sorry, the mayor says good point, and you say you...
Refine a point he's trying to make, and then the mayor says, in the third line, "I can say that I'm disappointed that the province has not come to the table.
Premier is telling me," and then he's quoting, it appears, what the premier is telling him, "anything you want, but then there is silence." Now, we've already heard from the mayor and he's...
Given his side of this, but from your perspective, were you disappointed that Ontario hadn't participated in these meetings so far?
And was it your sense that the mayor was also disappointed that Ontario, at least at the level you had hoped to have participation, hadn't shown up at the meetings?
Frankly, I had hoped that we would be able to convene the tripartite table as I had originally...
But I was, you know, this was on the 10th.
By that date, I was receiving assurances that, you know, for example, Deputy Minister Stewart was in regular contact with his counterpart in Ontario, Deputy Minister.
Minister Di Tommaso, and that there was ongoing discussions between my Government Operations Center, between the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, and between, as frankly the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, Mr. Stewart, was acting as an...
And so, yes, a little disappointed that the minister wasn't able to attend, but quite gratified, frankly, and that there was now, I think, And my goal had been good communication between the three orders of government.
I believe that that was being achieved.
That is helpful.
Thank you.
And the other point, again, the mayor wasn't only, as you'll recall, because I think you might say you got an earful from him as well.
The mayor wasn't just disappointed in Ontario.
Notes, which I don't think you need to be taken to remember because you probably had some of the same frustration experiencing these exchanges as one gets just reading them, which is the mayor seems very frustrated that he cannot get the support from either Ontario or from Ottawa in terms of boots on the ground in Ottawa, in particular federal.
He'd be looking to you for commitments with respect to the RCMP.
And there seems to be almost interminable confusion about how many are committed, how many are actually there, different ways of counting how many people are there.
Were you able to participate usefully in that discussion?
Did you have good lines of communication to the RCMP?
Because it doesn't seem that...
Much was being accomplished on that front in these meetings.
Minister Mendicino is the minister with direct lines of communication to the Commission of the RCMP and that organization.
That's his responsibility.
He was on this call and made a number of comments in response to the mayor's, as I recall, from those discussions.
One of the things I tried to contribute to this discussion is that it wasn't just a numbers plan.
It wasn't just about how many people.
And in fact, I pointed out that it's actually...
Difficult to start talking about specific numbers because, you know, the number of police officers to be deployed is a matter, frankly, of police confidentiality, and it can actually compromise police operations, in my experience.
And so I cautioned about that.
And so my recommendation is that we should be talking about resources.
We should be talking about providing the support that the city needs without being specific about numbers.
There had also been discussion, Mr. Cameron, throughout these tripartite meetings and in other fora.
About the need for an integrated action plan, not just how many people were required, but how those people will then be utilized in order to affect the purpose of bringing the protest to a peaceful resolution.
Okay, well, you've segued right into my next point, which is from your perspective, and we've heard a lot of police perspective.
from people similarly qualified already but you were in a unique position here so we'd benefit from your perspective on why it was, as you saw it, that there might have been some challenge for the OPP and the RCMP to commit resources to solving the problems that Ottawa was facing.
To be very clear, sir, I was never briefed on any operational aspect of the plan.
That would have been inappropriate.
I never sought to be briefed on it, and I was not.
But what we were seeking was assurances from those who did have operational responsibilities that they were satisfied with an integrated operational plan, an action plan, and that they were prepared to action it.
That, I think, was a consideration.
Because it's also useful to remember, I think, Mr. Cameron, there were a number of things happening right across the country at the time.
The OPP in particular were dealing with a difficult situation in Windsor.
They had also had to respond to other events across southern Ontario.
Their resources were being quite significantly challenged because they had to continue to respond to a very dynamic and mobile threat across the country.
My understanding was that they needed the clarity of an integrated command action plan that they'd all agreed to in order to facilitate the movement of people to go and deal with the situation in Ottawa.
And in that context, did you have a view as to whether there was any logical order of operations, if I can call it that way, in terms of...
Where Ottawa should look to first, we have heard from Commissioner Lucky that she wasn't standing on protocol here.
She was prepared to devote resources as quickly as she could while Ottawa sought help from the province as well.
But putting aside those urgent first steps that were taken...
Did you have a sense of what the proper protocol was for Ottawa to follow in this context, putting in mind both the hat you were wearing as Minister of Emergency Preparedness and your history of having encountered similar situations doubtless over many years in Toronto?
Yes, sir.
To be very clear, there's a number of different ways in which this has been approached, particularly if there's a planned event.
A planned event, as I've already mentioned, the G20 in 2010, there was another planned event that I was involved in.
Involving the visit of a U.S. president to the city of Ottawa.
This happened in the early 2000s.
That was a planned event where there was an integrated command structure put in place.
At the time, I actually brought about 400 Toronto Police Service officers up here to Ottawa to work under that integrated command structure and to assist in public order for that event.
I'm also aware, because I've been around a long time, that there was always a very close working relationship between...
All of the police services working in the National Capital Region, they convened a table that they refer to as Intersect.
I've had no dealings with it in the recent period, but I was familiar with it when I was a police chief, where the RCMP worked very closely with the Ottawa Police Service.
I believe the OPP were at the table and the Gatineau Police.
And so there's always been good cooperation among the police services in the National Capital Region.
I'm also very familiar.
I've been involved in very many incidents when I was a police officer, where we would, in the Toronto Police Service, we had a lot of people.
We had a lot of people trained in public order, and we would bring our public order resources to assist in Kingston, for example, for their homecoming event, in other towns around Ontario that didn't have those resources available to them, so we would go and assist.
But there's also, and I'm aware, that within the Ontario Police Services Act, which is, frankly, the legislation that governs policing in the city of Ottawa and in the province of Ontario, there is a provision in that act that in circumstances that exceed the capacity of the police of jurisdiction, a municipal police service, to deal with an emergency, there is a provision within that act for the chief to make a request.
So the commissioner of the OPP and the commissioner is required under that act to respond.
You may also make a request to another municipal police service and that municipal police service has the ability to decline.
But there is a provision whereby a police service dealing with an emergency, exceeding their capacity to manage, can also within the act make an appeal and a request to the OPP.
I believe that was done, in fact, in Windsor.
In response to the event at the Ambassador Bridge, it's a rarely used provision of the Act, but it is a tool that was available.
You describe it as a tool that was available.
Was it your view at the time, or is it your view now, that it was necessary for Ottawa to take that step before it came, the City of Ottawa to take that step before it came to the federal government for policing assistance?
Not if...
The police services, the OPP, the RCMP and other police services were willing and able to send their people.
Keeping in mind, it's a difficult thing to pull people from various jurisdictions, bring them to Ottawa for this type of a planned event.
And that's an approach that had been used successfully in the past.
If that could be facilitated, that could be used.
And if it wasn't available to the chief, there was the tool within the Ontario Police Services Act.
Now, you describe the use of either the formal use of the Police Services Act or more likely when you're talking about planned events, simply consensual arrangements where looking perhaps months or even years ahead to an event, you can get a multi-police organization team put together.
That doesn't...
Work if the event manifests itself over the course of a weekend.
And so one thing that the Commissioner might be interested in your views on is whether it would assist matters to have a protocol in place so that there isn't quite as much confusion and disagreement about whose responsibility it is to who goes where and who provides what.
To have a protocol in place and perhaps even stand by memoranda of understanding or something so that within days rather than weeks, everybody knows who goes where, whose responsibilities are what, and the matter hopefully gets sorted out more quickly.
Yes, sir.
I believe good communications and to the extent that it is possible to plan for an unplanned event, those types of arrangements can be very useful.
I've actually had the experience as a police chief making arrangements with other police services in the event of emergency, how many people I would send them and how quickly I'd be able to get them there.
Because we all know that certain types of events can exceed any of our capacity to respond to an emergency.
Planned events is actually pretty straightforward.
And I believe that we've got a long history and a lot of success in dealing with...
I'll stop saying we, sir.
In my previous capacity, the police services have a long history of working very collaboratively together for planned events.
And a number of different things are worked out well in advance, including the integrated command structure, who's going to be in charge, what they're often referred to as a gold-silver command structure that is put in place.
Who's paying for what and etc., what resources and obligations each of them will undertake to provide is usually worked out well in advance.
It is, quite frankly, more challenging in the event of an emergency and made even more challenging when that emergency might be taking place in multiple jurisdictions.
All right.
Thank you.
The speed with which you're able to deliver information, Minister Blair, is helpful, if not to the translators, to me in getting through my questions in record time.
So I'm flipping through some pages here.
I want to ask you some questions about a related issue.
You talked about IPRWASH.
You had the...
Probably not entirely pleasant experience of having a Commission of Inquiry look into the events of the G20.
Not an entirely pleasant experience of having your conduct examined in a Commission of Inquiry.
And one of the issues that came up in the Morden Inquiry into the G20 event and in IPRWASH as well had to do with the extent of Administrative oversight and political input to the activities of the police.
And so, again, with your long policing experience and your role now as a Minister of the Crown, can you start by giving us an overview of how you see either Police Board or other levels of...
Government officialdom oversight of police, where you see that fits in and how you view what has been called in this hearing so far, sometimes the line between church and state or the conundrum of how much police forces should resist political interference and that whole topic.
Thank you, sir.
If I may, first of all, just a point of clarification.
Justice Morden's report, although a very important report, was not a public inquiry.
It was a report commissioned by the Toronto Police Services Board in the aftermath of that report.
There was also another public report done by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director, Mr. Gerry McNeely, also on that report, but also not a public inquiry.
Thank you.
One of the things I can share with you, sir, I was a police chief for 10 years.
I was appointed by the Police Services Board.
The Police Services Board is constituted under the Police Services Act.
It's defined on its duties and responsibilities and how it's comprised.
I very firmly believe, very sincerely believe, that good policing requires good governance.
And governance is not to suggest, sir, that a Police Services Board or the governance authority...
We'll direct the police in their investigations, in their operations.
We'll even direct them in the administration of their police service.
That's not the function of good governance.
The function of good governance, in my experience, is oversight and accountability.
I think it's fairly well articulated in a number of provincial statutes across the country, including the Ontario Police Services Act.
In my own personal experience, I used to meet with my board every month.
For several hours over the course of a day, it was done in public.
Some of it was in camera, much of it was in public.
They would ask me questions about use of force.
They would ask me about training.
They would ask me about HR issues, the discipline and maintaining of conduct within my organization.
I reported to them in a very public way about our engagement with diverse communities, about a number of efforts that we were making to prevent crime, all those things.
That we're the responsibility of the police service to deliver adequate and effective police service, and that's actually directed at the board and then designated, delegated to me by the board.
The police have extraordinary authorities in our society, but those are not unfettered authorities.
There's an expectation that we will be held to account for the way we use those authorities and that there will be independent civilian oversight of policing activities.
And I believe that's absolutely key.
There is no good policing without good governance.
Sorry, slow down and say that again, please.
There is no...
There's no good policing without good governance.
And when you use governance in this context, you're not talking about the police and his or her deputies.
You're talking about some level...
Sir, I'm talking about independent civilian oversight of policing.
The police chief answers to someone.
I answered to my board.
I worked for my board.
And I was accountable to my board.
And I understood that was my responsibility to be accountable to answer their questions.
They were always very careful, by the way, and I can't remember recalling you at one incident in 10 years where they ever directed me in an investigation, in an operation, but they asked me a lot of questions about what we were doing and why we were doing it.
I believe it was my responsibility to provide them with that information so that they could fulfill their function of providing oversight to me and to hold me accountable.
For the job that I was doing.
And so I know there's been, because I've watched, there's been a lot of discussion about, you know, having a civilian or a politician directing the police.
And that's never acceptable.
But at the same time, the police must be accountable to an independent civilian authority.
And that can be achieved through a government minister who's assigned responsibility, can be done through a police services board.
But in my experience, public...
Policing is all predicated on public trust and the consent of the people who are policed.
That trust is really warranted by that oversight and accountability and transparency and the way the extraordinary authorities given to the police are exercised.
Right.
And in the time that you were Chief of Police and having this governance relationship with the Police Services Board, Would you have considered it interference or what is sometimes called directing the police for that board to have outlined to you either long-term or immediate priorities or rankings of objectives to accomplish with your available resources?
There are a number of different models of governance that are often employed by police service boards.
One of them is through policies and priorities.
I believe it's called the Carver model.
Sorry, slow down for the reporter again.
The what model?
The Carver model.
I've actually spent a lot of time.
I also felt it was my responsibility to help my board be a good board because they would help me be a good chief.
And so we spent a lot of time talking about how they could do their job and that would help me do my job.
As a board, and I think it was a very effective relationship.
They did set priorities for the service.
They also set my budget.
I would collaborate with them and work very closely with them, and they would consult with the public on what those priorities should be, because there is a bridge that a governance body can serve for a police service to be that connection on behalf of community.
And so they would bring...
There was lots of community deputations made at our board meetings where people would outline their expectations and their concerns, and the board would set priorities.
But my board was also very careful not to cross a line into operational matters to suggest where we should deploy people or what investigations or what laws would be enforced.
They never went there, and neither would, frankly, I allow them.
I had to push back on that.
But they often talked about...
Placing a greater emphasis on community policing, on community outreach, on building greater diversity within the police service, and how we interact with the incredible diverse population of our city, and issues of crime prevention, and how communities were to be policed.
And frankly, I never considered those infringements on police operations.
I just thought we were working together to do good policing.
Effort at direction from the Police Services Board was aimed at a more immediate situation.
And I don't mean a particular investigation or anything of that type.
But, for example, if the Tamil protest had shut down University Avenue for four days, would you have considered it out of line for the Police Services Board to...
To ask you what you intended to do about it and express to you their view that they considered this a serious problem for the city.
I would have considered it entirely appropriate.
Frankly, I recall getting these questions from the board.
What are you doing?
Why are you doing it?
There was a fair bit of criticism, as you can imagine.
As a matter of fact, some of the national papers were accusing me of being overly tolerant.
My board was very supportive of what we were doing, but they did ask questions about what and why, which I considered entirely appropriate.
But at no time did they tell me how to police that community.
And I think that's, for me, there's a bright line there.
And they didn't cross that line, but they held me to account to the decisions I was making on how I was going to deliver policing services.
In those circumstances.
And I didn't consider their questions infringements on any aspect of my authority and responsibility.
It was my job to answer their questions and to allow them to perform that oversight role and to hold me accountable for the decisions I made.
That's very helpful.
Now, I'm going to ask you to see if you can direct those thoughts to the...
I don't know if unique is the right word, but at least the different situation of the RCMP, which doesn't have a police services board structure to which it is accountable.
The commissioner reports to the minister and has a relatively thin statutory framework that delineates that relationship.
Have you had some thoughts about what?
What you're calling governance of the RCMP could and should look like if it's different than it currently is now?
Yes, sir.
And in fact, it actually appeared in my mandate letter when I was the Minister of Public Safety that we were looking at the issue of governance.
I also had some responsibility.
I have a keen interest in the delivery of First Nations policing program across the city, and we're working towards the development of a new legislative framework.
For First Nations policing in Canada, in order to make sure that that's as effective as it can be, I believe we have to resolve the issue of governance in those communities, give people a say in how they're going to be policed.
That doesn't mean they get to direct the police operations, but they can make decisions about how the police will function within their communities.
And I would also make the observation in a number of jurisdictions across the country.
You know, we sometimes see the tension that exists for the contract policing across this country.
But very often, it's an issue of governance.
And I'll just cite, if I may, I also recall vividly, in Ontario, there were a number of communities that had their own little small police services who made a decision to go and contract with the Ontario Provincial Police to deliver policing services in their community.
And I witnessed the OPP.
Make a very strong effort to give those communities governance authority over their detachment and to meet regularly with the local officials and to actually give them a say in how they're going to be policed.
I thought it was very thoughtful, and I also believe that model, which I'm familiar with Ontario, could assist us in improving the quality of policing right across the country, particularly in contract areas and in particular in First Nations.
And do you have any specific recommendations, or I shouldn't say specific in the sense of drafting legislative terms, but what a more complete governance structure would look like for the RCMP?
I think there's a number of models to be considered.
I also want to be respectful.
This is the responsibility now of my friend and colleague, Minister Mendicino.
If you want to stop there, then we're going to hear from him shortly.
But at the same time, I have obviously some thoughts on the matter, and I'm more than happy to share that with Minister Mendicino.
I think ultimately it's going to lead to better policing, which is our collective goal.
There were a couple of times, and you might remember them, I'm going to bring you to one in particular, where you made comments to the effect of the police just need to do their job.
In other words, you made comments that gave the public the impression that you didn't think the police were doing as much as they could to deal with the situations in both Ottawa and elsewhere in the country.
And the Ottawa ones, I think you're familiar with, and we've heard a lot from the OPS about their reaction to your comments.
So let me just begin there.
Did you have the impression that the Ottawa police were not doing as much as they could or should have, or perhaps as early as they should have, to deal with the situation that they encountered when the convoy arrived in Ottawa?
I think initially their response was incorrect.
Was?
Was incorrect.
And based on the intelligence that they had, I think allowing those trucks into the downtown core to establish themselves and become essentially very large barricades in hindsight.
And I appreciate this is the clarity of my hindsight, but I believe that was a mistake.
And I think they would acknowledge that it would be better had that not happened.
But once that actually happened...
They were dealing with what, in my experience, would be a unique set of circumstances, a uniquely challenging set of circumstances, which was extremely challenging.
And in fairness to them, my concern and the statements I made, frankly, it was not my intention to criticize the police.
It was to encourage them to utilize the tools that were available to them.
Because, again, I've spent most of my life telling police officers to do their job.
And I have very good confidence in them.
I'm very proud of my profession.
I'm very proud of the men and women who do that work.
And I was just trying to encourage them.
We, as a society, needed the police because they're the only ones empowered to deal with these public order events.
And we needed them to do what was required to bring it to a peaceful resolution.
And I was simply commenting that we needed them to do that job.
Okay.
And I'll ask the clerk.
If I can read this, to call up SSM NSC CAN 403129.
Minister Blair, this will be a text exchange between you and Zita Astrovis, your Chief of Staff.
And of course, you can see the words that caught our attention when your office sent the commission.
This document among all the others.
And that is your comment.
The police are finally doing their job in Windsor.
And we'll go on to the next paragraph in a second.
But had it been your impression that the situation in Windsor was taking longer than it should have to resolve because the police were not doing their job?
And again, not something I would have ever said to the police because I believe that would have been appropriate.
But personally, I believe that the impact of the blockades at the Ambassador Bridge were being hugely impactful, not just economically, but auto plants were being shut down right across the province.
There was a huge impact that was taking place.
People were being laid off.
They were being sent home.
Factory floors were being idled.
And I believe there was a sense of urgency to resolve that.
I respect, you know, the operational commanders.
I wasn't second-guessing them, certainly to them, but I was, frankly, relieved that they were, in my opinion, finally resolving that.
I also had every expectation, as I indicate in that note, that they would do everything to avoid violence, that they would be measured and proportional and professional, because I know those guys, and I have every confidence in their work, but I was very much seized with a strong sense of urgency.
About the blockades at that particular location because I believe that they had been so impactful.
And do you recollect any view you had about the liaison efforts?
And we're looking now at the second paragraph where you say it appears they, presumably the police, Windsor Police Force and the OPP and RCMP who are acting here, it appears they didn't actually need to offer terms and concessions to the protesters.
Can you explain what you were thinking there, if you remember?
I don't really recall, except, again, I was feeling a sense of relief that they were now clearing that bridge, because it did strike me as a matter of urgency, and previous tactics had not been effective in clearing.
I'm going to move...
To a different topic.
So before I leave, is there anything more you'd like to say about those topics that we've just been covering about police governance, about the effectiveness of the police operations in Ottawa?
I'm not expecting any more from you, but I'm just about to change topics, and so I'd offer you that.
Let us change topics, sir.
Okay.
Although you might not like to change the topic, it's to the Alberta RFA.
You'll recollect that, I think.
And can you just, to those who haven't followed the proceedings quite as closely, maybe as the rest of us, can you just outline what that was about and how it came across your desk?
Yes, sir.
And I don't recall.
Precisely whether the letter arrived first or I heard from Deputy Minister Stewart.
But I became aware that there was a request from the province of Alberta, and I believe it was from Minister Rick MacGyver, stating a number of things about what was transpiring in Alberta with respect to the Coutts blockade.
The Coutts blockade had been going on for some time.
And among the things that Minister MacGyver...
He made a number of comments, but his primary ask was for access, and he was very specific, to Canadian Armed Forces' tow trucks, I believe, in order to assist in the movement of trucks that were blockading the highway in southern Alberta at Coots.
And so immediately, because he was asking for Canadian Armed Forces resources and personnel, In order to respond to this.
That request I forwarded to the Department of National Defence and to Minister Anand because it didn't fall under any of our existing agreements.
So it would have been something that, first of all, we'd have to hear from the Canadian Armed Forces whether or not they had equipment fit for purpose and would also require the approval of the Minister of National Defence.
And so that information went on over to them.
I also recall...
A number of days later, being advised by Deputy Minister Stewart that the Canadian Armed Forces advised that they did not have equipment fit for purpose and didn't believe that they would be able to respond to that request.
The advice I received from the Deputy Minister at that time is that we should simply advise Alberta that we weren't able to respond positively to their request for assistance.
We always endeavour to try to do our best, but there have been a few occasions when we've had to say, no, we just don't have that equipment.
But I did ask the Deputy Minister and some of my own staff to explore, again, from a whole government standpoint, did we have any other resources that we could draw upon?
I was quite reluctant to say just say no.
And so we looked at other departments and agencies, Parks Canada, Transport Canada, even had people checking to see if we could access trucks in the United States that could have been brought across the border to assist.
And ultimately, I was advised no.
And that they weren't able to do that.
I then asked because Mr. MacGyver had called me and wanted an answer to the question.
And I said to my people, we have to have a formal response to Mr. MacGyver.
A letter was produced.
I approved it.
I was concerned that, again, we were saying no, but I approved it.
Also making an offer because he had indicated that they were going to.
Purchase some of their own vehicles at that point in time that the federal government would assist in paying for those vehicles.
And eventually a letter was approved, and I signed off on it thereafter.
It goes back to officials to be sent.
I understand in my subsequent messaging with Minister MacGyver that he never received that letter.
I have no explanation for that.
And we've heard an explanation from your staff, so I won't...
I would ask you to expand on that.
But if we could, it might give some more insight on that process if we looked at another document.
So, Mr. Clerk, could you call up SSM CAN NSC 402689?
If the system is working, this will be the unredacted version of a document that has been redacted to the parties until just about right now.
And you can see we're at February 11th here at this exchange of emails.
The email we're looking at right now is from Ms. Astrovis and she's recording that the PMO is approved and this we're going to find out when we go down here is followed by an email from you and I'll suggest to you, you might recognize it, but you're commenting here on the response to Alberta.
And if I've got that right, what you're saying is it's a weak response.
That is the response you or the federal government is giving to Alberta.
It's a weak response, but all we have, I approve.
Please advise Alberta.
And if I've correctly characterized that as your message in relation to the response to the RFA, why were you describing it as a weak response?
Because I wanted to help Alberta.
And we had examined all of our options, and we weren't able to provide them with the equipment that they sought.
And so a letter was prepared.
I believe it indicated our willingness to provide them with financial assistance for what they were requiring.
But at this point in time, we weren't able to provide them with the trucks that they sought.
I had hoped we would be able to, and so I thought a weak response.
But I also thought it was equally important that we respond and that we advise Alberta of the position that we were in and that, in particular, the CAF had advised, excuse me, the Canadian Armed Forces had advised that their equipment wasn't appropriate and it requires their approval and they didn't give that approval.
Okay, so one reading of It's a Week response would be...
We, the federal government, don't have a good rationale for denying this RFA.
That is, it's a weak response to Alberta, but that's not how you intended those words to read.
Not at all, sir.
Frankly, the rationale was pretty straightforward.
We don't have the equipment you asked us for.
The Canadian RFA said it's not fit for purpose and they're unable to buy it.
You know, that's exactly what it is, sir.
So you would say it was a complete and logical response, but it was unfortunate in that you weren't able to deliver anything?
My strong preference would have been to help Alberta.
Now, moving chronologically through events to the consideration of the Emergencies Act, as it came up, you participated in the SSE meetings.
And then the IRG meetings when the forum transitioned to the IRG.
Were you present at or represented at all of those meetings?
I was present at all of them, sir.
Thank you.
And if you can describe in general what was Cabinet, or at least those members of Cabinet who were gathered in those meetings, looking to you for and what were you able to contribute to the meetings?
First of all, in the safety, security, and emergency committee that I chair, it's a smaller group of cabinet ministers that regularly convene, although each of these meetings was what I refer to as ad hoc.
It was beyond our regular schedule of meetings, but I brought them together in order to receive briefings from, depending on the officials, Deputy Minister Stewart, Commissioner Luckey, the NSIA advisor.
To provide information to my cabinet colleagues, also to discuss the appropriate government response.
I also took the opportunity during these meetings, and I think what I was able to contribute was to provide them with an understanding, because of my policing background, with the policing environment that governed this event, and as the event unfolded over the course of a number of days, about what...
Again, the policing environment, not just in Ottawa, but in various locales in Alberta, British Columbia, in Manitoba, and a number of points of entry in Ontario.
Right.
Now, I have a particular question that comes out of something we discussed in the interview that I believe you have a view on.
You were participating in these meetings.
As events were coming to a head, we had IRG meetings coming up towards the IRG meeting immediately before invocation on the 13th.
And I'm going to get in your interview summary, which the parties have already seen you outline, the reasons that you thought were certainly bearing on your thoughts as you were contemplating the propriety of invocation.
But there was a particular sub-point that I wanted to ask you about, which was whether you were aware of, because I think you've probably heard about now, at the time you were contemplating this and ultimately giving your input to the Prime Minister on the 13th, whether you were aware of Commissioner Luckey's views that she thought that there were still law enforcement tools.
Available to the RCMP to deal with the situation in Ottawa and elsewhere in Canada.
I don't believe I was aware of that on the 13th.
Right.
Or before.
Or before.
Yes.
I've obviously subsequently become aware.
You've asked me about it, but I don't recall being aware of it prior to that.
And I'll just...
To be clear, despite having been at all of the SSE and IRG and ultimately cabinet meetings that we're considering invocation, is that correct?
Yes, sir.
Okay.
Now, can we come to your four?
You don't have to do them off by heart, although you might remember them.
I can help guide you through them, but as I recollected from our interview with you, you had categorized the reasons that you thought.
Invocation of the Act was important and I don't want you to characterize these necessarily as the advice you gave Cabinet because that would be a confidence of Cabinet.
So, if you can just describe them to us as how you were viewing the matter as you were contemplating invocation.
Yes, sir.
If I may, the situation in Ottawa had been enormously challenging for the people of Ottawa.
And I think people were living in a state of fearfulness and intimidation.
And frankly, I think it was a very difficult set of circumstances for them there.
And I was aware of that and, you know, obviously anxious to resolve that.
But I remained hopeful throughout.
And I'd like to also sort of be clear to characterize.
I believe very much the Emergency Act was a measure of last resort and that it was incumbent upon us to, first of all, either exhaust all existing authorities or acknowledge that they would not be successful and could not be used for a number of different reasons.
And we were hearing that type of feedback from law enforcement about the enormous challenges they were facing.
We were also hearing about...
How stretched their resources were being pulled because of events that were taking place in different parts of the country that required them to respond to one place but then be required in other places.
And that was a challenge that we were hearing quite frequently as well.
But I will also tell you I became very concerned because one of my responsibilities as the Minister for Emergency Preparedness is the resiliency and safety and security of critical infrastructure.
And we define critical infrastructure as 10 different sectors of critical infrastructure.
And in particular, as it relates to this event, it includes such things as manufacturing, our transportation routes, the essential supply lines, the movement of essential workers.
And what I was witnessing at the Ambassador Bridge, at Coutts, at Emerson, and then in a number of different...
Venues that I would see similar activity being threatened to be done at Point Edwards, at the Peace Bridge, at the Pacific Highway in British Columbia, that escalation I viewed as a significant escalation because it did result in significant disruption of critical supply lines, the cutting off of essential goods and services, the impact that it was having, not just economically.
But on people, on families, and, you know, people who we laid off their jobs, and factories were being idled.
I was also concerned because I'm aware, being a person from Ontario, that the integrated manufacturing processes in Ontario, particularly in the auto sector, but in many other manufacturing sectors as well.
You know, prior to being Public Safety Minister, I was also the Minister of Border Security.
And so it really did give me an understanding and an appreciation of how important...
The integrity and functioning of that border is to our prosperity, to our economy, and to the well-being and health and safety of Canadians.
And so when those borders were essentially closed, and that the movement of goods and services, particularly some of the parts that go into our factories, was being essentially stopped, it was hugely impactful.
And I believe that it had risen to the level of a national emergency.
We were also seeing, frankly, the information that we received from the RCMP on or around February 10th that they believed that there were firearms present at Coutts, and then subsequently, I believe on the 13th and 14th, when they completed their criminal investigation and arrested people and seized a number of firearms, it also, for me, elevated concern about public safety and the risk that not everyone involved in these protests represented, but embedded within these protests.
The possibility, certainly in Alberta, of violence and even serious violence taking place.
And so, for me, the impact that it was having, not just in the city of Ottawa, but I don't want to minimize what was going on in Ottawa by any stretch of the imagination, but right across the country, particularly as it pertains to critical infrastructure, for me, elevated the situation to a national emergency.
I would also observe as well, I believed that there was strong evidence that the fact that this protest was so well entrenched in blockades in Ottawa really anchored what was taking place even right across the country.
There was, in my mind, a clear correlation between the activities of border blockades and what was taking place in Ottawa.
And it also, for me, highlighted the need we had to resolve.
The whole situation and failure to do so, and failure to resolve in Ottawa, would have resulted just continue to, like whack-a-mole, chasing border blockades from one point of entry to another.
There are 119 border points of entry, land border points of entry in this country, plus our airports.
And all of them are vulnerable to this type of unlawful action.
And in my opinion, that represented a serious threat to our national security.
And became a national emergency.
And when you describe your observation that the impact on a critical infrastructure elevated the situation, the blockades, the convoy, the protests, etc., elevated that to a national emergency, when you say that the impact on a critical infrastructure, when I think of infrastructure, I think of physical built bridges and roads and trains and things like that.
I don't think there was any actual harm to those, so I take it you're talking about the impact on trade and the economy and people in the vicinity, their lives, things like that, not the infrastructure itself.
When an artery, a point of entry into the country, in Manitoba, in Alberta, in Ontario, is essentially rendered dysfunctional, when it's closed and...
and you
you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you you
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you you you you you I don't think people want to see that.
Thank you.
Was the very significant challenge that the police were having and getting access to vehicles that they could tow.
the large trucks that were being used basically to blockade.
You know, they were fortresses.
And very, very difficult to move.
There were a number of reasons that I think have been articulated for this commission as to why they couldn't gain access to those, but it was a reality that they could not.
I looked very carefully, by the way, on the Friday when Ontario brought in their measures.
They did attempt to address making those tow trucks available, at least in Ontario.
But, you know, it authorized the use of the truck.
It did not compel.
And so I was concerned that...
Given the circumstances and what I believe to be the reasons why those trucks were available to the police to clear the blockades, either at Ambassador Bridge or in Ottawa, that we needed to do something else.
I'm also aware, in a previous part of my police career, I was very much involved in organized crime and money laundering investigations.
And so I am familiar with the authorities and the activities of FinTrack.
And one of the questions that we had as a government was, where is this money coming from?
And how is it being used?
I became aware that FinTrack did not have existing authorities to provide us with that information.
And so that was, in my opinion, a deficiency in existing authorities and something that we needed to consider how we might be able to address it.
There were also a number of areas, like one of the things, when Ambassador Bridge, as an example, was blockaded, one of the first things I did is I dug out the International Bridges and Tunnels Act to see what authorities we had.
But the authorities within that act were limited only to the bridge.
And as you recall, the blockades in Windsor didn't set up on the bridge or even in their primary points of access.
It was further down the road.
It was very effective in closing down that bridge.
But it happened to be on a municipal roadway, which is governed by municipal bylaw and the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, but not up.
Really effectively by any federal statute.
And so the ability to designate certain spaces, that also became relevant in the city of Ottawa, I think, for Wellington Street and the Sir John A. Parkway in order to, it became necessary to designate certain spaces where those activities would not be prohibited.
And so there were a number of circumstances where the normal tools that the police would rely on, either in municipal statute, in provincial statute.
Municipal bylaw, provincial statute, or in federal statute, were not being able, they could not use them effectively to resolve this in a peaceful way.
And, you know, we listened very carefully to the challenges that we were facing, and I came to believe that we needed to find a remedy to provide them with the tools that they required in order to affect the purpose of bringing these protests to an end.
Okay, and coming to the end of our time and to the end of part of the story that the Commission hopes to have you talk about, you observed, not as a police participant, but as an experienced public order commander, the enforcement action that eventually came to pass in Ottawa when the plan, the Joint Forces Plan was implemented.
Did you have observations about the propriety effectiveness, time management, Yes, sir, I did.
And I can tell you, it restored my pride in my profession.
I have great respect and admiration for the men and women who do that very difficult job of policing.
And what I witnessed, certainly in the city of Ottawa, but in other jurisdictions as well, but particularly in the city of Ottawa.
An entirely professional, proportional, measured response.
They moved slowly, methodically, respectfully.
It was very clear that they were well-trained, very clear they were well-led.
I believe that their exercise of the authorities that they had, both in existing law and in the new regulations, was done in a very measured and careful way.
And I've seen some video of how they've done it.
It was textbook.
I've been trained as a public order commander, and I've seen it done well, and I've never seen it done better than what I witnessed here in the city of Ottawa, as they, I think, to the extent possible, as peacefully as possible, brought this to a resolution.
They allowed people, for example, points of egress.
It's always important to let people have a space to go.
They did that work.
They moved slowly.
I actually found myself trying to explain to some of my friends why they're going slowly, because that's the right way to do it.
And in my opinion, they did it the right way.
Okay.
Thank you, Minister Blair, and thank you, Commissioner.
Those are the questions of Commission Council.
I think pretty close to on time.
I think you have 10 minutes left.
Oh, there you go.
You can think up new questions, I'm sure.
We're happy to share them.
So this may be a good time for the afternoon break then, and we can come back in 15 minutes to go into the cross-examinations.
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
La Commission est enlevé pour 15 minutes.
Merci.
Thank you.
Order alert.
The Commission has reconvened the Commission on the Plan.
Minister, good morning, or good afternoon.
Good afternoon.
Long week.
My name is Brennan Miller, and I'm counsel to Freedom Corp., which is the entity that represents the protesters that were in Ottawa January and February of 2022.
If we could please bring up document SSM.CAN.00006358 _REL.0001.
so Council, is that 1658?
6358.
6358.
So if we can scroll to the last page, please.
Have you seen this email before, sir?
The last page, please.
No, sir.
I don't recall.
Okay.
So this email is from January 27, 2022 at 4.21 p.m.
You can agree with me that the protesters in Ottawa didn't arrive here until the 28th.
Is that fair?
That's my understanding, yes, sir.
All right.
So they're already preparing the narrative that they're going to label the protesters with.
Can you scroll down, please?
And there I put this to the last witness as well.
Our government recognizes and respects that everyone in Canada has the right to safe and peace of protest, threatening acts of violence and inciting hatred.
As we have seen from a select few in recent days, it's unacceptable and does not reflect the views of the majority of Canadians.
We condemn all such hateful and violent rhetoric in strongest terms.
So, can you agree with me that that labeling of the protesters had already been set out on January 27th?
Sir, I don't know the context of this email, or frankly where it comes from.
Okay, if we can scroll up.
Okay, and scroll up.
To the top, please.
So this is with your Chief of Staff, and they're agreeing about how they're going to set the narrative for the protest.
And if you scroll down again, they confirm with one another that this is what they're going to do.
So can you agree with me, again, that by January 27th, 2022, you're essentially all your colleagues and yourselves.
Had agreed that there'd be a joint government response, and this was how you were going to deal with it.
You were going to label the protesters violent to incite hate, hateful, violent rhetoric.
That was the intention on January 27th, correct?
No, sir, I disagree.
Okay.
There is no agreement here.
It's recommendation from someone on staff.
Right.
If we could bring up document SSM.can.00007719_rel.0001.
So, sir, I can tell you, these are the notes of Ms. Sarah Jackson.
I take it you know Sarah Jackson is the Office Manager to the Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister, is that correct?
I know of her.
I don't believe we've met face-to-face.
Right.
And you know who Katie Telford is?
Yes, sir.
And she's the Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister?
Yes, sir.
All right.
Can we scroll down to page three, please?
All right.
So you'll see that this note, it's the notes from Ms. Jackson.
It says February 4th, KT call.
So I'm sure you can agree with me that KT, that's Katie Telford.
Is that correct?
I have no idea, sir.
Okay.
So let's scroll down to page four, please.
And there at the note on February 4th, 2022, it says Blair Strategy Emergency Act.
You see that?
Yes, sir, I see it.
Yeah, because it was your strategy on February 4th, 2022 to get the Emergencies Act invoked, was it not?
No, sir, that's incorrect.
So why would, in a conversation, to your knowledge, why would Ms. Jackson record that in a meeting with Ms. Telford, why would she do that?
To your knowledge.
I have no idea, sir.
I can tell you I recall the meeting in which I talked about the need for the police of jurisdiction to exhaust their existing authorities and that we needed to support them.
I also made it very clear to colleagues that the Emergency Act was a measure of last resort and not appropriate at this time.
That was the conversation I had in the fourth.
And can you agree with me, though, that if there was a strategy to invoke the Emergencies Act, that if the purported emergency resolves itself on its own, of course, there's no reason to invoke it, correct?
Again, sir, there was no strategy to invoke the Act.
There was a discussion among colleagues about the various options that were available, and I was very explicit to my colleagues that the Emergency Act was not under consideration at this time.
On Global News, on the 13th, at 8 o 'clock on the 13th, you had told them, and I have the transcript, if you'd like me to repeat it, you said that the Emergencies Act was under consideration from the outset.
Do you want me to read the transcript to you?
To be really clear, I believe what I said is, and you can read whatever you like, by the way, but what I believe I said is everything was on the table and we were considering every option.
Throughout.
That is the responsibility of those of us.
Sir, what you actually said was that it was under consideration from the first day.
That's what you said.
Would you like me to show you the transcript?
That may be useful.
Okay.
If we could bring up the support documents, it I believe is in there.
You're referring to HRF 401622, right, Council?
Yes, sir.
Do we have the actual reference?
Maybe your associate can tell us what the reference is in the database?
Well, I don't want to slow this down, so I'll move on and come back to that.
So, sir, we'll come back to what you said.
By February 4th of 2022, you agree that the Prime Minister and Minister Mendocino had already labelled the protesters in Ottawa as extremists.
Is that correct?
I have no knowledge of that.
I don't agree with that.
But you can agree that on January 31st, 2022, the Prime Minister addressed the nation on TV and on the internet by video.
Do you remember that?
No, sir.
You don't remember that?
No, sir.
When the Prime Minister...
Went on television to the whole nation and talked about the Ottawa protest on the following Monday.
You don't remember that?
I know the Premier spoke.
I have no recollection of what he said.
I was busy doing things.
I'm going to read you what he said and you can tell me if you remember it.
And he stated, I know you are wondering about what you saw in our capital city this weekend.
As my friend Erwin Kotter said on Saturday's Freedom of Expression.
Assembly and Association are the cornerstones of democracy, but Nazi symbolism, racist imagery, and desecration of war memorials are not.
It is an insult to memory and truth.
Hate can never be the answer.
Over the past few days, Canadians were shocked and frankly disgusted by the behavior displayed by some people protesting in the nation's capital.
I want to be very clear.
We are not intimidated by those who hurl insults and abuse at small business works and steal food from the homeless.
We won't give in to those who fly racist flags.
We won't cave to those who engage in vandalism and dishonor the memory of our veterans.
There is no place in our country for threats, violence, and hatred.
So to those responsible for this behavior, it needs to stop.
To anyone who joined the convoy but is rightly uncomfortable with the symbols of hatred and division on display, join with your fellow Canadians.
Be courageous and speak out.
Do not stand for or with intolerance or hate.
Do you remember hearing that now?
Actually, now that you've read it to me, sir, I not only remember it, but I agree with him.
Okay.
And so you can agree there that the Prime Minister has stated that being part of the protest is essentially standing with intolerance and hate.
Can you agree with that?
I don't believe that was the distinction the Prime Minister made.
He was actually telling people who don't agree with those measures not to stand with those who do.
Right.
And I take it you know that when the protesters arrived on January 28th up to February 1st, That the evidence to date is that they were largely and completely peaceful and that there was little to no violence.
Do you agree with that?
And again, I think there might have been isolated incidents.
And frankly, I also believe the carrying of hateful symbols like a Nazi flag is in many ways causing fear.
And it is a form of violence and intimidation.
Against people who would be caused to be very fearful about such symbols in their community.
And so, the bearer of the Nazi flag, that is a person who is hateful, and it is someone that the government of Canada is concerned about.
Is that fair?
Again, I don't know the person who was bearing the flag, and I wouldn't comment on that, but I know how hurtful.
A Nazi flag can be to very many Canadians who, in their life experience, that's a symbol of anti-Semitism, hatred, and fear.
I understand.
And so, I understand that you're also, though, you're familiar with the company Enterprise Canada.
It does work for the Liberal Party of Canada.
I do.
I'm not, sir.
Are you familiar with Sucrad Davini?
Does that sound familiar?
I'm not, sir.
Are you familiar with Mr. Brian Fox?
No, sir.
Have you heard anything about the...
Individual carrying the Nazi flag, actually not being a protester, but somebody sent there so that photos were taken.
Have you heard anything about that?
Only from you, sir.
Okay.
And we'll just come back to the issue with the labeling then.
I take it, though, that you consulted your comms people on the narrative that you wanted the media to accept.
Before the protesters even got here, according to that email?
No, sir, that's not correct.
That email states that they were buying the narrative.
That's what it states.
Some of our communications people were examining and being prepared for the event coming, but no decision had been made.
None of that was presented to me, and it did not form any of my messaging.
Can you agree that from the protesters' arrival, at least after February 4th, you intended and wanted the protesters removed by force, didn't you?
Absolutely not, sir.
I wanted the protests to end and then to be removed, but I've always been committed to doing that as peaceably and proportionally as possible.
But you couldn't talk to them after they had been labeled these extremists, because your colleagues and yourself, of course, you know, extremism, Nazis, terrorists, you can't talk to that sort of group, can you?
It would look bad, wouldn't it?
I would actually disagree with your characterization in various points of my life, sir, I've engaged.
With people who are engaged in protests.
And so, frankly, I disagree with your characterization.
So, on February 7th, 2022, when the mayor of Ottawa asked the federal government and yourself to bring in a mediator to meet with the protesters, do you remember what you said to your chief of staff in response to that?
No sir, perhaps you could share it with me.
We can bring up document ssm.nsc.can.00003070 _rel.0001.
So this is your response to finding out about the request for a mediator.
And you respond as follows.
I don't know who is advising Mayor Watson, but this is a bad mistake.
He has conceded without ever using the many tools available to the city.
His language is also problematic.
This is not a labor dispute between interest.
It's an unlawful occupation.
As long as the city and its police refuse to do anything, no progress will be possible.
So I take it at the time when you wrote that to your chief of staff, that was how you felt, correct?
Yes, sir.
All right.
That's an email from myself to my chief of staff.
Correct.
And so it's fair to say that you did not want to bring in a mediator.
I was concerned about the intention of the mediation and what was being negotiated.
In my experience, the intent of engaging with protesters is to bring a peaceful resolution to the protest.
Yes, but also then on February 11th of 2022, you were given a copy of the engagement proposal that Inspector Bedoin of the OPP and Deputy Minister Stewart had drafted, right?
You were emailed a copy.
You'll have to share it with me, sir, to help me recall.
if we can bring up document ssm.can.00006131_rel.0001 If we can scroll down to the bottom.
And so, this attaches to the draft for your review and comments.
I have validated the proposed approach with the OPP expert and since shared the draft, but no word back yet.
And that is from Deputy Minister Rob Stewart.
And it is on February 11, 2022, at 12 p.m.
If we can go up.
And we can keep going.
It is then forwarded to you by your Chief of Staff.
AstraZeda?
AstraZeda?
And then it appears, if we can scroll up, you have a response, but it's redacted under Section 39 of the Canada Evidence Act.
Now, can you agree with me that your Chief of Staff should not be a member of Cabinet?
That's correct.
Right.
So, what was your response here?
I don't recall.
You don't recall.
Would it be helpful to the Commission if we had your response?
I don't know because I don't recall the response.
You don't recall the response?
But given that it's an engagement proposal and in the meeting when you actually had it before you, there's notes to the effect that this isn't action, we want action.
Is it fair to say that both yourselves, including the Prime Minister and Minister Mendocino, you were never on any terms?
going to carry out any such proposal that would essentially require you to go and talk to the protesters No, sir.
I don't agree with anything you've just said.
So you had always been open to meeting with the protesters?
We were, and Deputy Stewart had advised that he was involved in a process of engagement with the protesters.
But I, frankly, I was not in favor of having senior ministers of government go out and engage with the protesters.
In my experience, that's done at an official's level and not involving cabinet ministers or certainly not the prime minister.
But right now...
As I understand it, and there has been testimony that it's not uncommon for law enforcement to request of the political branch to assist in a negotiation like that.
It's actually relatively common.
They testified to that.
So, what was the problem?
Was it because you couldn't be seen to meet with Nazis and extremists?
Is that what was the issue?
First of all, I disagree with the characterization you've just provided, but I don't have any experience in the many years I've dealt with public order events of engaging with political figures to engage with protesters.
Okay, can we please bring up one last document?
SSM.can.00008763-rel.0001.
And you're over your time, so I hope that's the last.
Okay, thanks.
This is a copy of the proposal with respect to engaging the protesters.
Okay?
Minister, what's the problem with it?
Could I see the whole thing?
Absolutely.
Great.
Thank you.
And again, I did not express a problem with this.
The Deputy Minister was engaging with city and provincial officials in this and then came with his proposal.
Sir, this proposal was before you in the IRG on the 13th.
Actually, I appreciate you bringing that up, sir.
I also recall that in the discussion, almost immediately after Deputy Minister Stewart advised us of the discussions that had been taking place, there was very public disagreement among a number of people in the protest who disavowed this process.
And so, quite frankly, I think that had an impact on the situation.
I understand that, but that's not really what the evidence that's come out.
There's been evidence, and we'll leave it at that.
At the end of the day, when you saw this, you agreed that it was recommended by the OPP.
It had been brought to you and drafted by the Deputy Minister of Public Safety.
And they were on board.
In fact, I found an email.
Can you agree that the Privy Councilor, the Privy Councilor Clerk, she gave it the green light?
It was Cabinet.
Was it not?
Well, there was no recommendation.
Mr. Commissioner, I think that misstates the evidence of the clerk with respect to the green light claim that my friend has made.
I'd like to ask that my friend have a good faith basis for the questions put and the characterizations of the evidence that are placed before the witness.
As some of the characterizations suggest that there is a purpose to the questions, less of seeking the witness's evidence, but a purpose of stating facts as though they were evidence when that evidence is not properly before you.
I have one last question and then I'm done.
So, you agree with me that after the invocation, on numerous occasions, your government told the public that law enforcement had told you that the threshold to invoke the Emergencies Act was met.
Do you remember all those statements that your colleagues and maybe even yourself made?
Do you remember those?
To be very clear, sir, I do not agree with you.
Okay, so you don't agree that those statements were made?
I don't agree with what you said.
Okay, so you don't agree that ministers in your government have said that law enforcement advised Cabinet at the threshold to invoke the Emergencies Act was met?
And again, sir, the question you put to me, I do not agree with.
Okay, but then you do agree, of course, is that law enforcement never advised you at the threshold to invoke the Emergencies Act was met, did they?
Frankly, it was never a question I put to law enforcement.
I don't think that would have been appropriate.
Okay, thank you.
Okay, next is the Ottawa Police Service.
Good afternoon, Minister Blair.
My name is David Michikowski and I'm counsel for the Ottawa Police Service.
One of the things I gather you know from your long experience as a Chief of Police is how important an operational plan is.
Is that right?
Yes, sir.
And in order to have an operational plan to end the type of event that occurred in Ottawa, you'd agree with me it'd be necessary for the police to draw upon subject matter experts?
Very often the case, yes, sir.
And you wouldn't be critical, I take it, if the police needed to draw upon resources outside their own service, whether that be other Ontario services, the OPP, the RCMP, etc.
Not at all, sir.
That's a very common practice.
And that might take a bit of time to assemble such a team.
Fair enough?
Yes, sir.
You participated in a meeting with, and you may have had more than one, I believe, with Mayor Watson and Minister Mendicino, I believe Mr. Kanellakis, Deputy Minister Stewart, and at the time OPS and the city had made a request for more police resources.
Do you recall that?
Yes, sir.
And you indicated at that meeting that It may be necessary to look at the matter of information sharing around the allocation of resources.
Because fair enough, you'd want to know what are you going to do with those resources, correct?
Yes, sir.
And one of the things Deputy Chief Bell said at the time was that the OPP were asking for the same thing.
And then Minister Mendocino said, we need to know from the chief what the plan is with the appropriate boundaries on operational independence.
How is the convoy being broken up and disengaged?
And then he added, we need to know the plan.
And I take it you would agree with that.
Respectfully, sir, I don't believe I needed to know all of the operational details of the plan.
I needed simply to be satisfied that the police services that would be contributing to its execution would be involved in the plan and be satisfied with its sufficiency.
But I did not ask for details of the operational plan.
Right.
So what you needed was the RCMP and the OPP to say they were satisfied with the operational plans.
When we were asking them to bring significant resources to bear, my understanding from them is that they also wanted to be satisfied to the sufficiency of the plan.
And the subject of the Ottawa Police Service not having a fully developed operational plan came up several times during the period prior to the Emergencies Act invocation.
Is that right?
Yes, sir.
I think that's fair.
We had heard it from a number of police officials.
There was some general discussion about the plan.
Right.
One of the comments I see that was made, and this may sound familiar, was when they showed up, there was no...
Let me turn to the document.
Mr. Clerk, if you could please turn up.
sm.can.ns402674.
And if you could turn to the first page of that, please.
And so this is from Ms. Stravas and in it, that's your Chief of Staff, correct?
That's correct.
And so she indicates there's an operational update as to what the RCMP were reporting.
RCMP integrated planning cell was set up to assess OPS operational plan.
I do have concern.
Strategic tactical planners, OPP, OPS, RCMP were identified to be part of that planning cell to review, challenge and provide plan.
When they showed up, there was no plan to review.
Slowly later, verbally shared plan was not taking feedback or challenge, no open discussion on way forward.
And I take it, Minister, if those statements are true, those actions by the Chief would be problematic.
Is that fair?
And again, I'm...
Reluctant to comment on Chief Slowly's involvement in this thing.
This is the information we were receiving back from the RCMP and to me through my Chief of Staff about concerns that they had.
But again, not being part of this discussion, I'm reluctant to characterize anybody's particular behavior on this.
But it's very clear that the RCMP had concerns.
And in fact, in course, text messages with your Chief of Staff, one of the things we see that you're saying is we still need to fairly clarify what is he going to do with these resources.
If it's just more inaction, the OPP and other Ontario Police Services will sit this one out.
Do you recall that exchange?
Yeah, I do.
In my conversations with a number of police officials outside of the city, there was concern.
They wanted to see an integrated operational plan that involves an action to end the blockade or end the protest.
And in another email exchange with your chief of staff, you also indicated, and that was the one I think that Mr. Miller just took you to, as long as the city and the police refuse to do anything, no progress will be possible, correct?
There was a concern.
We were hearing from both the RCMP and the OPP that they wanted to see an action plan for the resolution of the protests.
You talked about the importance of communication with the protesters and the style of communication.
I take it you wouldn't disagree with me that equally a chief of police needs to have the ability to communicate effectively with those in his or her organization.
Yes, sir.
And as chief of police, it would be important to respect those below the chief in the chain of command?
Yes, sir.
And you would not condone a chief of police telling his command that if they didn't support his plan, he will crush them.
I don't think that language is appropriate.
And you wouldn't take...
You understand that the RCMP and the OPP were asking for information on operational plans, and you indicated that that would make sense that they'd want that information if they're sending 1,000 or more officers, correct?
I would expect that they would have an expectation to be aware of how their people would be used.
And you wouldn't take that as evidence that the RCMP wanted to see the OPS fail or that they were serving their political masters.
That wouldn't be the message you'd want for a chief to deliver to his or her command team, would it?
Well, again, I have no direct knowledge of that communication, but my expectation is that everyone had a strong interest in resolving this quickly and peaceably.
You indicated that you attended the IRG meeting, I believe all of them, correct?
Yes, sir.
And one of the things I note at the February 12th IRG meeting was the Commissioner of the RCMP advised that there continue to be challenges working with the integrated planning team in Ottawa around communication and it says decisively, I assume it's a typo, Communication and decisiveness of the OPS chief.
You heard her make that comment, correct?
Yes, sir.
And that did not come as a complete surprise to you, did it?
I was hopeful that they would be able to resolve it.
You understood that ultimately the integrated planning team did come up with a plan that was very successfully executed?
Yes, sir, as I commented in my earlier testimony.
Team only came together on or about February 9th, and the plan was then actually signed off on February 13th.
And, sir, I don't have a line of sight into the internal meetings and discussions that were taking place.
That was not shared with me.
I was aware that all three organizations were working together, but the timing and...
The steps that were taken, I don't have a set.
And you also attended the February 13th cabinet meeting.
Yes, sir.
And at that meeting, it was reported that there was potential for a breakthrough in Ottawa, correct?
I can pull up the document if you need to see it.
It might be useful to see the document.
I don't have a precise recollection of that comment.
Okay.
The document is ssmnsc.can.
50216 and it's on page eight And I believe it's six lines up from the bottom.
Thank you.
With respect to recent actions, the National Security and Intelligence Advisor indicated that law enforcement gains have been important and that there was potential for a breakthrough in Ottawa, Ontario.
Do you see that?
Yes, sir.
And you understand that the breakthrough was that there was now an integrated operational plan, correct?
And again, I...
Recall this now, knowing that there was a breakthrough in Ottawa, we were also made aware that significant enforcement action was now taking place in Coutts, Alberta, and the Cabinet was informed about that.
I don't have a recollection of the exact nature of the potential breakthrough to which the NSIA refers.
And finally, if I may just have two minutes left, Commissioner, I was hoping not to have to go to the documents that used a bit of time, but I will be very quick.
Go ahead.
You had certain frustrations with Chief Slowly, and there's a text message exchange with your Chief of Staff where you referred to your frustrations with Chief Slowly, which is an internal issue that needs to be managed.
Do you know that text message exchange?
No, sir.
I don't recall.
Okay.
It's SSM.nsc.can.403014.
So it says individuals have relayed your frustrations with OPS slowly, which is an internal issue we need to manage.
I assure them that Mendocino has been working with the RCMP.
I've relayed this conversation to NSIA, PMO, and Mendocino Chief of Staff.
I think what was being spoken of here was that, unfortunately, some people were talking...
Making assumptions and speaking about some of the concerns that I was expressing about the police response to the Ottawa thing.
And I was concerned that, frankly, some people had been speaking in my stead, perfectly capable of speaking for myself, and was concerned that others were doing that.
And ultimately, just to finish off, you had an email, a text message exchange with Senator Vern White.
Yes, sir.
Senator White was the former Chief of Police of Ottawa.
Yes, sir.
And he expressed the view that Chief Slowly had not done his job.
And you didn't disagree with that in that exchange, did you?
I didn't take a position one way or the other.
And if I may, sir, I think I've known Chief Slowly for a very long time.
We worked together for 25 years and he used to be my field deputy when I was the chief in the Toronto Police Service.
He was facing a very difficult situation and a very challenging environment.
I have respect for the man and for the very difficult job he had to do.
And when you stated that the police response was inexplicable, that was after the actions on phase and you indicated at that point that the police then had redeemed themselves.
And to be very clear...
When I said that I was asked specifically about the police response, and I said it was somewhat inexplicable, and to be really clear, what that means is I could neither explain nor account for the police response.
It really isn't my place to explain or account for it.
And so I characterize it as inexplicable.
And ultimately, they redeemed themselves, correct?
Well, and the work, as I've already characterized in my earlier testimony.
I think they did an excellent job in utilizing the tools that were available to them and clearing the convoy in the week following the invocation of the Act.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, sir.
Okay for the OPP please.
Commissioner, I will endeavor not to go over time.
It would be nice.
Good evening, Minister Chris Diana, counsel to the OPP.
We've heard pretty extensive evidence from both Ottawa Police Service and Windsor Police Service witnesses that the OPP provided significant support to both Ottawa and Windsor.
I don't know if you've heard any of that evidence?
Yes, sir, I have.
And I would agree with it.
All right.
And former Chief Slowly, in particular, was very complimentary of the assistance provided by Commissioner Karik and the resources provided that helped bring an end to the protest.
Correct?
Yes, sir.
And as you said, you would agree with that assessment?
Yes, sir, I would.
And that assistance started with the Hennon Reports, went to frontline officers, POU support, integrated planning team leadership, and that's just in the Ottawa context, correct?
And if I may, sir, I'm not familiar with the Hennon Report.
It wasn't intelligence that I had access to or the internal activities within the police service, but my general overall impression is that the OPP were very helpful.
all right can we go to document ssm.nsc.can402983 So, what I'm bringing you to appears to be a text exchange between you and your Chief of Staff, Mrs. Stravis.
Now, unfortunately, there doesn't appear to be a date on this.
If you can scroll down and allow the witness to see it, it's fairly short down at the end.
Now, at the bottom, you'll see that you suggested that Chief Slowly does not have a strong support network within provincial police leadership.
Now, again, I don't have a date on this, but certainly at the time you wrote this, you would not have been privy to the many text messages and phone calls between.
Chief Slowly and Commissioner Karik, correct?
And to be clear, I wasn't referring to Commissioner Karik or the Ontario Provincial Police in that message.
I was referring to his relationship with some of the other police services in Ontario.
Oh, I see.
So when it says within provincial police leadership, you weren't referring to the OPP, you were referring perhaps to other police leaders?
Yes, sir.
But not the OPP?
No, sir.
Right.
And was this your own observation, or was that observation made by others that you were forwarding on?
It was in part my own observation, but also feedback I was receiving from former colleagues.
Was that the view of Cabinet?
No, sir.
All right.
I'd like to move to another issue, which is consultation on the Emergencies Act.
If you can bring up Mr. Clerk, document ID pb.nsc.can403256.
And while that's loading, we've heard evidence from Commissioner Lucky that the RCMP did not request the Emergencies Act, but she was asked to provide a list of tools that may be useful in terms of the Emergencies Act legislation.
I'm sure you're familiar with that.
Sure.
All right, so what we have here is an email exchange between Mike Jones, who I understand is...
But the Chief of Staff, Minister Mendicino.
Yes, sir.
And, of course, Commissioner Lucky.
If you can just kind of scroll down a little bit, this appears to be the Commissioner's kind of list of tools that could be potentially useful.
Did you see a copy of this list?
No, sir.
Now, by this point, if you scroll to the top, just so we can get the date.
This was February.
If we subtract five hours, this was the evening of February 13th.
And by this point, on February 13th, the OPP was heavily involved in policing protests all across Ontario.
You spoke about this in your evidence, both leading the enforcement in Windsor, integrated planning team in Ottawa, 402, there were other areas in Ontario, correct?
So the OPP, you would agree, was heavily engaged throughout the province?
Yes, sir.
Great.
I asked both Deputy Minister Stewart.
And Commissioner Lucky about consultation and both agreed that in light of that context where OPP was heavily involved and would be using these tools, the OPP could have provided valuable input into the request as to what would be useful or necessary policing tools.
Would you agree with that?
I'm not sure what the OPP might have provided.
There was also an issue of the decision had not yet been made.
At the time of this email, it was under consideration, but the decision had not been made.
And it was a matter that was still a very important consultation that the Prime Minister had to undertake with the first ministers from across the country.
And so the decision to invoke had not yet been made.
There was some consultation internally about useful tools, but it wasn't fulsomely pursued because of the need to maintain the process that is required under the legislation.
No, fair enough.
But it would have been relatively easy for Commissioner Lucky to reach out to Commissioner DeCreek to say, just in case at some point we get to an emergencies act convocation.
Are there any tools you might find useful?
That could have happened, right?
Well, I have no direct knowledge of that, but we were also, over the course of the entire event, witnessing some of the challenges, the very real challenges that law enforcement, the OPP, the RCMP, and many others were experiencing in this event, and it very much informed our deliberations and consideration of various...
Sure, but you're not in the command room anymore, right?
I mean, you're observing from afar, but Commissioner Karik would certainly have a better perspective on it.
No, and I agree, but it's also, I think one has to be circumspect about, it's not the police that determine what tools would be provided under the Emergencies Act.
We consult with them on some of the challenges that they were facing.
But it is a responsibility of government to determine what measures would be appropriate under the Act.
Sure, the decision is made by politicians, but ultimately, in terms of proportionality and using only the tools that are useful or necessary, it's a good idea to reach out to law enforcement, isn't it?
And again, to understand the challenges that they were facing, but not specifically to ask them what additional tools.
I don't believe that would have been appropriate.
I've never been in a circumstances where, you know, that was...
Question put, to a police leader, what additional legislative tools do you require?
So we heard from Mr. Deputy Minister Mendicino, sorry, Deputy Minister Di Tommaso, that that's what happened before the Ontario emergency legislation, that he consulted that way.
And of course, Commissioner Lucky was consulted for tools.
But you think it's somehow inappropriate to ask police for input on this?
I think there is an appropriate process.
I'm mindful of...
Excuse me, Commissioner Karik's reporting responsibility to Deputy Minister DiTomaso.
I'm also well aware of Commissioner Luckey's reporting relationship to Minister DiTomaso.
I'm not part of either of those.
All right.
Okay.
So just so I'm clear, would you disagree then with Commissioner Luckey and Deputy Minister Stewart that there ought to have been consultation in that regard?
I think consultation on the challenges that the police were facing.
I would not personally have asked what additional legislative authorities they might require, but it's very helpful to understand the difficulties that they were having with existing authorities.
Right.
Now, of course, you're not like most of their cabinet ministers because you're looking at this as a 30-plus year police leader yourself, correct?
Close to 40, I'm afraid.
Right.
As a police leader.
But in fairness, I don't have that role anymore and I'm mindful of the responsibilities of my current position and that I no longer hold that position.
All right, fair enough.
I'll move on.
I've only got a couple of minutes left here.
In your capacity as a politician, as a cabinet minister, of course, you're no longer in the room, the police room, so that you're no longer having a direct look at the intelligence reports.
You have to rely on...
Your federal law enforcement advisor at various agencies to advise you what the situation is, correct?
Yes, sir.
I have been regularly briefed by, for example, the National Security Intelligence Advisor, the RCMP Commissioner, and the Director of CSIS, but I don't have any line of sight into the raw intelligence or many of the reports.
And you rely on those agencies and the National Security Advisor to give you credible and reliable information so that you can make informed decisions as a Cabinet Minister?
Yes, sir.
Now, you mentioned you had never heard of Project Hendon, and nor would you have had any reason to, correct?
I was not familiar with that.
Subsequently, after other information came out, particularly through testimony, I've heard the phrase, but at the time I was not familiar with that portfolio of intelligence.
All right, now we know from the Hendon reports, and we've looked at this in some detail, that as early as January the 20th, which is a week before the protests started to arrive, that the OPP had warned in its reports.
That this may not be a short protest.
You've probably heard some of that evidence.
Yes, sir.
That there was no exit strategy and that at least some protesters intended to stay until the demands were met, correct?
I've heard that subsequently.
Right.
There was conflicting information and intelligence that was being made available to me prior to the arrival of the protests in Ottawa.
But quite frankly, there was also open source reporting that some intended to remain.
Right.
As a decision-maker, it's important to know as much as you can about potential risks of any situation, correct?
It's always our hope.
And, of course, intelligence that you get in the Henning reports would be more valuable than simply opening the Twitter machine, right?
Of course.
I see exactly my 10 minutes.
I need about 45 to 60 seconds.
Can I have it, Commissioner?
Go ahead.
I was hopeful, but...
All right, so not only is it important that you would know this information, but you want to be told in a timely way so that you can make appropriate preparations.
And again, there's a decision as to what information is appropriate to share with Cabinet, but of course we want that information to be as clear as possible, not only so that we can assess...
It's on its merits, but also its credibility, and so that information could be very important to us.
And the reason I ask, I go back to a phrase used by my friend for the commission earlier when he talked about if there's a hurricane moving up the coast, you know, you want to know well in advance, and I'm not analogizing necessarily between the convoy and a hurricane, but the earlier you would know, the better, correct?
Yes, sir.
Just went through Hurricane Fiona, and we were tracking really carefully where it was going to make landfall.
Right, and so your first briefing, according to your witness summary, was actually January 27th.
That's in your witness summary.
Yeah, I believe that's correct.
And that's a full week after the OPP reported ahead and about the fact it could be a long protest.
Again, sir, I didn't have any information about that.
I'll take your word for it, of course, but I did receive my first briefing, I believe, on January 27th.
All right.
Thank you.
Thank you for the indulgence, Commissioner.
Much appreciated.
Okay.
next is uh council for former chief slowly Thank you, Minister.
I'm Tom Curry, your former colleague, Chief Sloan.
Can I start by asking you a couple of questions about your relationship with the former Chief?
He was your Deputy Chief for the period 2009 to 2015, I know.
Yes, sir.
And prior to that, I think you told the Commissioner that you had worked with him.
In the aggregate for 25 years.
Close to it, sir.
I think we first became, like, he was actually subordinate to me in a division I ran beginning around 1997 or 1998.
Right.
And during the time that you worked with him, he had succeeded under your command in achieving promotions and taking on increasing responsibilities.
Yes, sir.
And you knew him then?
And now to be an experienced and effective police leader.
Is that true?
Yes, sir.
I have great respect for Chief Slowly, Mr. Peter Slowly.
And that included, as I understand it, in matters that concerned public demonstrations.
You mentioned the Tamil demonstrations.
I understand that Chief Slowly...
Or at that time, not Chief Slowly, but at that time as a member of the Toronto Police Service, that he was a major incident commander in that respect.
There were a number of my commanders, but Peter also held that role in the service at that time.
And you have seen firsthand his ability to manage successfully large-scale public demonstrations.
And again, I did not have direct observation of Peter dealing with large public order events.
Of course, his actual involvement in the G20, as I recall, was somewhat more limited.
But certainly I recall quite vividly the Tamil protests.
Frankly, I think we took a very careful, measured approach to that.
And frankly, I've always been proud of my services, keeping everybody safe in those circumstances.
Including the role that he played.
Including all of the men and women who were involved in that effort.
It was very much a team effort.
Thank you.
Now, during the time that you were Chief of the Toronto Police Service and Deputy Chief Slowly or Chief Superintendent, he held a number of different ranks.
During your tenure, he had your confidence and respect.
Yes, sir.
Just to be clear, if I may?
I deployed him as my field commander, which put him in charge of close to 4,000 of my officers, responsible for our divisional response, which was one of the largest and most significant jobs in the police service.
And during that time, you were asked a number of questions by my friend for the Ottawa Police Service about the role of a chief and various other aspects of things.
During the time that you worked with Chief Slowly, You just confirmed he had your confidence and respect, and you saw him in command, and he was a good commander.
True?
Yes, sir.
Now, when he came here to the city of Ottawa to become the chief, you understood also that it was to implement a change mandate on behalf of the Police Services Board.
Yes, sir.
Including in respect of the board's effort to try to improve the relationship between the Ottawa Police Service and racialized communities, marginalized communities.
Yes, sir.
And those strategies are challenging strategies as an agent of change.
Is that true?
I have had considerable experience, Toronto being a very diverse city, in bringing about a stronger relationship between the police and the minority communities we serve.
I was going to say that you yourself made improving community policing one of your objectives as Chief of the Toronto Police Service.
Very much so.
An important member of your command team on that score.
Yes, sir.
Now, when he came to Ottawa, you learned, am I right, that he faced some opposition from within the rank and file?
Actually, Peter reached out to me upon his appointment, and we met.
He requested.
We went and we had breakfast, and we talked about the challenges of taking in over a new organization and the change agenda he was hoping to implement.
Now, turning for just one second to the events of the convoy protests, you've already said in your statement and to my friends that these were unprecedented events.
In your nearly 40 years of policing, you've never seen anything like this.
There were certain aspects of it that were unique and uniquely challenging.
And in terms of the questions that you were just asked by my friend on behalf of the OPP about what could have been known or foreseen, I won't take you to the documents because there are a number of them and I won't take the time, but were you aware that representatives of the RCMP,
the OPP, the Surete de Quebec Parliamentary Protective Service all reviewed the Ottawa Police Service plan for the convoy?
I'm not aware of that activity, sir.
I had no line of sight to it.
Or that you wouldn't be aware that the OPP, one member of the OPP, described the OPS plan for managing the convoy in advance as a robust plan?
Again, I've not seen any documents with respect to that.
I have no knowledge of it.
Fair enough.
And as I understand it, you yourself aren't second-guessing the Ottawa Police Services.
Plan or the plan that was reviewed by those other police services in advance of the convoy?
No, sir.
And quite frankly, I have no insight into the plan.
I don't inquire about the plan.
I only needed some assurance that one was in place.
And then once it was here and it became a very different protest leading eventually to an occupation, you understood that the Ottawa Police Service on its own lacked the resources to manage it successfully?
That had been made clear to me, yes.
And you accepted that?
Yes, sir.
Now, let me just take you to one document that one of my friends had projected for a second, just while I have it.
SSM, please, Mr. Registrar.
SSM, N-S-C-C-A-N-2983.
Minister, this was shown to you a moment ago.
I'm just going to ask you to look at a different line than the one that was shown.
Thank you.
Just scroll down if you don't mind, please.
Keep going.
And keep going a little bit.
There, thank you.
Stop.
I doubt you wrote this.
I doubt Peter is getting a lot of support in his own organization.
They are likely sitting back and waiting for him to flounder.
And then the line that was read to you earlier about lack of a strong support network within other police leadership.
Just focusing on the first part of that sentence.
It was your concern.
That members of his own police service, the Ottawa Police Service, were not supporting this chief.
And if I may, just to be very fair here, I have no information.
I had no insight into, you know, what was going on within the Ottawa Police Headquarters.
I don't know.
I don't know the men and women under his command or anything that may have, you know, we've heard some evidence since, but I had no sense of that.
But I was concerned because...
And the conversation Peter Knight had upon his appointment, that he was coming in with a strong change mandate, and I know how challenging that can be.
And the expression to hear in this text or message was a very real concern for you.
Is that fair?
That you were concerned that his own command team, or at least members of his own organization, would sit back and wait for him to flounder, not support him.
In the expectation that perhaps he would fail and pay a price, not unlike the one that you were invited to comment about by his own police service in their questions to you.
Well, and again, to be fair, I was speculating here, and I don't want to characterize this as based on any factual information that was available to me, but I was concerned that in a very challenging set of circumstances, Cohesion within the command structure is really, really important, and I was concerned that that cohesion may not have been as strong as it needed to be.
Understood.
And of course, one cannot lead an organization that does not wish to be led very easily, right?
I know a little bit about the challenge of leading a large police organization.
I think leadership is very important, but I would also say leadership doesn't exist just in the Chief's Office.
There's leadership throughout the entire organization, and that leadership has to be mobilized to get the job done.
Understood.
Now, a couple of things, if I may, please.
I want to ask you, if I could, about RFA, Requests for Assistance.
Can I just ask you, please, to confirm that the Solicitor General Ontario asked for...
The use of the Cartier Drill Hall.
Do you recall this?
Yes, sir.
And am I right that the Solicitor General of Ontario asked for that use of the Cartier Drill Hall parking lot for two days, being the weekend of the protest?
Yes, sir.
And I also recall being able to give a positive answer to that request.
Right.
Exactly.
You made that available.
Just for the record, Commissioner, I don't want to see it, but SSM CAN 4564.
Minister, you spoke about, just in terms of the role of the chief, could you help this commissioner, please, with this question?
During the operations in respect of that Tamil protest, in your witness statement, I won't take you to it, but you described how, or I think today you described how you directed operations when you needed to as the chief in terms of keeping...
And just to be very clear, I was taking advice and guidance from my operational commanders on the ground who told me that this situation couldn't be resolved.
Utilizing our normal public order tactics without putting people at significant risk.
And therefore, it was on their advice that I made the decision that we would engage with these people and find another way to resolve.
Understood.
And in the same way, I think in your witness statement, I don't want to turn it up, see if this recall, if you recall this, it's paragraph five for the record.
You reviewed and approved plans as the chief concerning the G20 protests.
Yes, sir.
And in fact, as the Chief of Police, there were literally dozens of protests taking place in Toronto every single week.
And I, for the larger events, would have those operational plans presented to me for my awareness.
The command structure for those events was not...
The Chief doesn't...
We actually maintained a very robust command structure for those types of events.
And I think the language that you used in your statement was that you would review those, approve them, and then present them to the board.
Yes, sir.
Thank you.
Commissioner, I'm going to go a little over time with your consent, only because my friends for the Commission introduced a few new things through the Minister about police services.
No, you're already over time, so don't get me wrong.
You're already there.
I'm going to see what I can do as quickly as I can do it, but thank you for that.
The resources.
You mentioned to the Commissioner that you received a request for resources.
From Windsor for the Ambassador Bridge blockade, can you confirm that you received those via a letter directly from the Chief of Police to you, and one similarly went to Minister Jones?
Yes, sir.
We did, in fact, receive that letter.
It wasn't something that I, frankly, I'm not authorized to deal with, a request for assistance coming from a municipal police chief, but it was referred back to other officials to deal with.
Right.
Understood.
But in that respect, regarding Windsor, the request for resources came to you as the minister, to Minister Jones, for her counterpart.
There was an urgent need for resources, and you did what you could to send them urgently.
Fair?
I think in fairness, it was the OPP that responded to the Windsor situation.
And again, I...
I stand to be corrected, but I understood that the Windsor Police Chief utilized the authorities under the existing Police Services Act in order to seek out the assistance in support of the OPP.
So I think, I won't take you to it, but just for the record, Commissioner, WIN 1648 and 1649 are letters not directed under the Police Services Act, rather directly to you and to the Minister.
Yes, sir.
You passed them on and the resources came from the RCMP and the OPP.
But nobody followed the Police Services Act protocol in Windsor.
I'm not sure, sir.
My understanding is with the OPP involvement there, they essentially led that response.
That was my understanding.
And the Police Services Act protocol to which you referred isn't mandatory in respect of a sequencing.
It is there, but police services, including at the time that you were the chief in Toronto...
Gain resources through memorandum of agreement and other requests through police services, correct?
Generally for planned events, yes.
When I made reference in my earlier remarks to the Police Services Act and the provision within the Act for a chief of police to deal with an emergency that exceeds their capacity, there is that provision in the Act.
But I am in agreement, sir, that quite routinely for a lot of these events, they reach out to neighboring police services and people come to help each other as best they can.
And what you observed from Chief Slowly was that he was trying his best to get the support he needed for the community to keep the protests safe and his own service safe, correct?
He was certainly advocating for what he believed to be the necessary resources.
And your observation was that he acted in good faith in the performance of his duties?
I did not detect any element of bad faith.
And that he, did you, were you made aware?
I assume that you weren't.
You did not know of the plans that the OPS had, their evolution, and the approvals that Chief Slowly's team gave to those plans?
No, sir.
As I've previously testified, I made no inquiry and received no information of the operational plans that were either being developed or in place.
The information that you received as a minister and in cabinet came in respect of police services and resources through Commissioner Luckey.
Is that fair?
Primarily through Commissioner Luckey, yes.
Are you aware that certain of the information that you received turned out not to be accurate in terms of the resources?
I'll give you a couple of examples.
That you were aware of what has been described, I think, by Deputy Commissioner Duhame to the Commissioner as a mix-up about the 250 RCMP officers?
I'm not familiar with the...
Deputy Duhame's testimony?
I wasn't following it.
What about Minister Jones' 1,500 OPP officers on the ground in Ottawa?
Were you aware she made that statement?
I'm not.
Okay.
Or that, therefore, that it was inaccurate.
You wouldn't have known that?
No, sir.
A couple of last things, then, if I may.
You, I think, in your evidence in your statement, have described that you had requested or...
Spoken with Chief Slowly about the possibility of tagging vehicles and towing vehicles.
He explained to you why that was not possible as a matter of safe enforcement and you accepted his conclusion.
And did you know that RCMP and OPP officials were urging OPS through Chief Slowly and others to not take enforcement steps because in Ottawa they lacked resources to do so safely?
I'm not aware of that.
If they did, you would again defer to them and the OPS as to the people with the best line of sight into that?
Of course.
Chief Slowly gave me an explanation, and I accepted that.
He was the Chief of Police, and that was his belief.
Last thing then, please, if I could, because of course you know, Minister, from the nature of the questions that you've been asked, that there's a great deal of scrutiny about what Chief Peter Slowly did here in Ottawa.
Can you agree that in hindsight, that more could have been done and sooner to assist Chief Slowly and the OPS to secure the assistance of resources?
I believe with the clarity of hindsight, sir, that there were a number of steps upon reflection.
I think everyone involved would have liked to have seen a quicker outcome.
I'm very mindful of the enormous impact this was having on the people of Ottawa in particular.
And because of some of the other then-related...
The protest activities across the country was hugely impactful upon all Canadians.
And so the timeliness of resolving that, I think it was important to all of us.
And in hindsight, I think it's also our responsibility to learn from that experience and make sure that we can do it better next time.
And in hindsight, nothing more she slowly could have done individually to make a difference.
Well, again, that's a judgment, but I don't have enough information to make, respectfully.
But at the same time, I think we all need to reflect on how we could have resolved this quicker and more effectively.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Thank you, Minister.
Okay.
Next is, and now we're into the shorter, more challenging timelines, City of Ottawa.
Thank you, Commissioner.
I'll do my best.
Minister, my name is Alyssa Tompkins.
I'm one of the lawyers representing the City of Ottawa.
So I will try to be quick.
I do want to take you to a couple documents, though.
So first document, Mr. Clerk, SSM.nsc.can402993.
So this is one of the texts between you and your chief of staff.
And it's just this comment.
So if we see there a date below Thursday, February 10th, but I'm actually looking at one of the comments above.
And I believe if we scroll up, because I believe these are produced by your chief of staff, so your texts are the ones on the left.
And there's in white.
Yes, sir.
And there's a comment that says, and it's not really going to help in Ottawa unless the OPP take over here.
I just want to know what you meant by the OPP taking over.
Again, I'm not entirely clear on the context of this because there's clearly conversation that was taking place before.
But I believe that it was going to be necessary for the OPP to have a much greater operational role.
In the resolution of this event for public order.
Okay, and if the next document we can go to ssm.nsc.can403140.
More text messages between you and your Chiefs of Staff.
Now, here it's just forwarding tweets, but there's a tweet being forwarded from Robert Fyfe that says, this is what Ontario government sources have said was coming.
She slowly pushed aside to allow OPP RCMP to take charge of 16 days of chaos in downtown.
I think you then forward a text from Glenn McGregor.
Maybe the OPP will help.
I'm just wondering, particularly with respect to the text from Mr. Fyfe.
He's hearing from Ontario government sources that OPP and RCMP are coming.
I was just wondering, sir, whether you ever heard anything to that effect from the province.
No, ma 'am.
My only knowledge of this information was what Mr. Fyfe was tweeting, and that's why I shared it with my chief of staff.
Okay, those are my questions.
Thank you very much, sir.
Well under your time.
Okay next is the Ottawa Coalition.
Thank you, Commissioner.
I'll try to be as efficient as my friend, Ms. Tompkins.
Minister, my name is Paul Champ.
I'm one of the lawyers for the Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses.
As the Toronto Police Chief for 10 years, Minister, I gather you to become very familiar with the Police Services Act.
Yes, sir.
In Ontario.
And you know that under the Police Services Act, the mayor of a city is by default a member of the Police Services Board, unless he or she delegates it.
I'm aware that...
It is a position that they get ex-officio, but they can delegate it to others.
And I'm also aware of many municipalities where the mayor chooses not to sit on the board.
And in your last, I think the last mayor you had when you were chief is Mayor Tory.
He sat on the board?
Not while I was the chief, sir.
I don't, well, perhaps maybe for a few months, but only a few months.
You were near the end.
I was kind of on my way out the door.
One foot out the door.
And prior to that, it was actually Mayor Miller had served on the board for a period of time, not his entire term.
Mayor Ford didn't choose to.
We won't go into that.
No, sir.
Now, you convened tripartite meetings on February 7th, 8th, and 10th with intended to be the municipal, provincial, and federal levels of government.
Is that right?
That had been my hope, yes.
And you had, from Ottawa, City Manager Steve Cantalakos and Mayor Jim Watson.
Is that right?
Yes.
And when you dealt with Mayor Watson, you would have assumed he was chair of the Police Services Board.
Is that right?
I don't think I was making that assumption.
I'm not aware of that.
Did you know if he was the chief or if he was on the board or not?
No, and I apologize, but I'm not that familiar with Ottawa Council or its board.
Right.
But given your familiarity with the Police Services Act, would you not have wanted to deal with someone from the Police Services Board who actually has some operational...
If I may, I don't think that's an appropriate discussion for a minister of the federal government to engage with the chair of a municipal police services board.
My intention in establishing the tripartite table was to bring the three orders of government.
And I use that word advisedly, by the way, because I don't believe in levels.
There are orders of government.
The federal, provincial, and the municipal governments all had a responsibility to...
Worked together to collaborate, and it was my intention to convene that discussion.
But I gather then, though, if you were sharing information with the Mayor and the City Manager that was relevant for the Police Services Board, you would have assumed the Mayor and the City Manager would have shared that information with the Police Services Board?
Again, I make no assumptions about those discussions.
My intention was to bring the federal, provincial, and municipal governments to the table.
But to do what, sir?
It's about managing the police services.
No, sir.
It's about managing the protest that was taking place in Ottawa.
It was hugely impactful.
There is obviously a police responsibility there, but respectfully, I don't believe it is my place, and I've always been meticulously careful not to in any way interfere with police operations.
I believe the city clearly has a role with that, with their police services board, but not directly from me.
Now, we know from your testimony or for your witness statement as well that it appears that there was indeed a delay in resources, RCMP resources being provided to the City of Ottawa, in part because there wasn't a firm plan in place for the deployment of those resources, correct?
There are a number of reasons I've come to learn as to some of the challenges of deploying those resources.
Some of them were also deployed in a number of functions, as I understood it, that were dispersed from the downtown core.
But on your witness statement anyway, sir, which I understand you've adopted, you said one of the main reasons was that there was not a firm operational plan in place.
And that's true, Mr. Champ.
There was a concern that we were hearing from not just the RCMP, but other police services that they wanted...
Confidence that an operational action plan was in place before they were able to deploy their resources.
And you would have agreed with me, sir, that it would have been important for that information to be shared by someone in some way with the Ottawa Police Services Board?
I'm going to object.
This is, again, Alyssa Tompkins.
Chair Deans, in her witness statement, stated that she knew that there was Not that there was a concern that there wasn't a plan.
And my friend keeps putting that to witnesses to try to get them to agree.
When her witness summary, which she adopted on cross and confirmed, states expressly that she was aware.
Well, I'm ready for my friend this time, if I may, Commissioner.
The testimony of Ms. Deans was that that was her speculation.
But she was never told that by anyone.
No one shared that information.
She was concerned that she wasn't getting detail on the plan.
She was wondering why there was a delay, but no one shared that information.
That's what's in her statement.
That's what her testimony was when she testified.
In fact, her statement suggests that she's the one that suggested to the condition that that was the case.
Let's try and keep this.
Can you just...
I just want to be careful because it's an important point and my friend keeps putting it to witnesses.
I'll be sending a letter to my friend after this, but I just want to close with this, Minister.
You would agree with me that it would be inappropriate for a federal government official to be trying to influence the Police Services Board on the selection of a chief of police or to delay a decision of appointing a chief of police for municipal service?
I can speak for myself, sir.
I would not engage in that behavior.
If my advice was asked on a matter, I might provide the advice, but as you characterize it, I'm trying to influence or interfere with that decision.
I don't think that would be appropriate.
Okay, thank you very much, Mr. Of course.
Okay, next is the Windsor Police Service.
Hi, good evening.
Heather Patterson here for the Windsor Police Service.
Good evening, Minister Blair.
Can you hear me okay?
Yes, ma 'am.
Thank you.
In your testimony today, you praised the Ottawa enforcement operation because, and I'm going to paraphrase what you said, you said because it moved slowly, it took care, and it allowed for the least amount of force possible.
I think you described it as a textbook operation.
Yes.
Sorry, would you agree that it's a hallmark of good police enforcement, that type of slow, careful, least amount of force possible type operation?
Yes, I would certainly characterize that police operation as proportional, measured, charter compliant, and appropriate.
Great.
And you praised the Ottawa Enforcement Action, even though you had to explain to colleagues the need for police to move slowly and carefully in an enforcement operation.
That's probably inappropriate to characterize that I needed to explain to colleagues, but I have some familiarity with those operations, and what I was witnessing here in Ottawa was, in my opinion, textbook and entirely appropriate, and I certainly shared that with colleagues.
Okay, so then let me put it to you this way.
Would you agree it's important to move slowly with an enforcement operation, even when others feel there's a sense of urgency?
And again, I think the response is, it depends on the urgent nature.
If someone was being injured, for example, I think under those circumstances, one might want to go a little quicker, and it'd be necessary.
But I think a methodical...
And if their behavior is less aggressive, then that type of approach is entirely appropriate.
Okay.
And would you agree that that equally applies to the situation in Windsor and the Ambassador Bridge?
Oh, yes.
And would you agree that citizen and officer safety is the forefront in any public order operation?
I believe certainly in public safety, and that includes officer safety as a priority in every operation.
And you would agree with that, despite the fact that you felt there was a need for urgency of action in Windsor?
I was very concerned about the blockade of that roadway and that there was a need for urgency, but at the same time...
The operational decisions made by the police commanders on the ground, knowing the challenges they face, the resources available to them and their legal authorities, I respect the decisions that they make.
Okay, great.
Mr. Sololi's counsel briefly referred to the letter you received from Chief Mizuno on February 9th requesting assistance from Windsor.
Yes.
Just for the record, I don't need to see it.
It's WPS 60788.
And you advise that you pass that along to others but didn't respond to it directly.
Is that correct?
To the best of my recollection, it is not part of the process that I'm responsible for, the request for assistance.
To receive requests directly from a municipal police chief, those requests come through provincial and territorial ministers, and it was referred, to the best of my knowledge, to the appropriate minister in the Ontario government.
And do you know who that minister was?
I believe it would be the Solicitor General, Sylvia Jones.
Okay.
But if I may be clear, that was likely done through officials.
I don't want to suggest that it was done directly to Minister Jones, but it would have been done in all likelihood from federal officials to provincial officials to make sure that that information was properly shared.
Okay, great.
And Mr. Clerk, could you please pull up SSM CAN NSC 402671?
Thank you.
And while that's coming up, you're going to see that after receiving the WPS request, this seems to be a draft between Carolyn Williams and Rady Barrick.
These are members of your staff, correct?
Yes.
And did you direct them to prepare a draft response to Chief Mizuno's letter?
We try to respond to every bit of correspondence and not leave it simply unanswered.
Okay, and if we go down towards the end of page one, we see that this is a draft, but I've never been able to find whether it was actually sent or not.
Do you know?
No, I'm afraid I don't.
Okay, and if you look in the last paragraph on that page, it says, Local communities are the ones ultimately paying the price for the actions of these demonstrators.
Do you agree with that sentiment?
I think certainly the local communities are, were in fact being significantly impacted by these actions and by these blockades and demonstrations that were taking place.
Okay, and would you agree it's vital that government ensure that police have resources required to maintain public safety and bring about a peaceful resolution to a public order event?
I believe keeping people safe is the first responsibility of every order of government and to provide whatever resources are available to assist law enforcement in affecting their purpose.
Great, thank you.
Commissioner, I just have three more questions if I could have a brief indulgence.
As long as they're short.
Yes, they will be.
And are you aware the Ambassador Bridge is privately owned?
Yes.
And you're aware that it's the Windsor police that will respond to incidents on the bridge, such as a traffic accident?
I would have anticipated, yes.
Okay.
And we looked earlier this afternoon at a February 12th text exchange that you had for the record, SSM NSC CAN 3129.
I don't need to see it unless you do, Minister.
But this is where you said police are finally doing their job in Windsor.
Yes.
Are you aware that the enforcement action took place over February 12th and 13th?
Yes.
And that the bridge was opened in the early hour mornings of February 14th?
Yes, I watched it very carefully.
I was very concerned about the blockades at the Ambassador Bridge.
And so you would agree that any difficulties the OPP or the WPS were having in Windsor were resolved before the Emergency Act was invoked?
I was aware that they had been able to move that protest.
I was also aware of concerns that they were expressing to us that those blockades could either go to some other place or could return to Windsor.
And what we had heard very clearly from the police is although they had been effective in clearing it, there was real concern as to whether they could hold it open.
Okay, thank you.
And lastly, would you agree with me that the Windsor enforcement operation was a success?
Yes.
That there was no loss of life or serious injury to either the public, protesters, or police?
Yes, ma 'am.
Thank you very much.
Those are my questions.
Okay, thank you.
next uh call on the city of windsor Good evening, Minister.
My name is Jennifer King.
I am legal counsel to the City of Windsor.
Minister Blair, I would like to start by confirming your views about the unlawfulness of the blockade in Windsor.
Mr. Clerk, if you could please pull up PB NSC CAN 402437.
While this is coming up, can you confirm, Minister Blair, is it your opinion that the blockade in Windsor was unlawful from the outset, that is, when the protesters blockaded the bridge, Yes, I believe that that was unlawful.
I believe there are relevant statutes, municipal, although I don't have a deep knowledge of your municipal bylaws, but certainly within the Ontario Highway Traffic Act and even criminal code offenses that were relevant to the situation.
Okay.
So what I'm showing you is a transcript of a media availability that you held on February the 9th at 1 p.m. with Ministers Mendicino and Alhambra.
Do you recall that media availability?
I did several of them that week and the next, but I don't have a specific recollection of this unless you bring me to a specific point.
Okay, so this was one on February the 9th.
It's the first media availability that I've been able to find or statements that you made about the blockade at the Ambassador Bridge.
My friends will let me know if there was an earlier one.
Have you seen this transcript that's on the screen?
If you could just scroll down a little bit, Mr. Clerk.
I've actually not seen this transcript, but if you could scroll down, and by the way, I think I likely used the word thuggery, not thuddery.
Okay.
Well, Mr. Clerk, if you could please scroll to the bottom of page three.
And you'll see here, I think at page three of the PDF.
I apologize.
I might not have the right spot.
If you could scroll up, please.
All right, so I don't seem to have the right spot.
But instead of wasting time and scrolling through the transcript, I'm just going to read to you some of the parts of your transcript.
So in the transcript, you state these blockades are unlawful.
And I would urge all of those who are engaging in this unlawful activity, think about the people you are truly hurting and stop.
Let me be very clear.
The Ambassador Bridge is a vital artery to our country.
And it's a vital artery to our supply chain.
It's central to the functioning of our economy and to serving all Canadians.
Do you recall making those comments?
Yes.
And later in your remarks, you referred to the protesters' unlawful actions blocking ports of entry as essentially putting their foot on the throat of all Canadians.
Do you recall that?
Yes.
And in your remarks, you also state that the rule of law has to be upheld and Canada will ensure police have the resources they need to uphold the law and keep the peace, right?
Yes.
Your opinions reflected in these remarks have not changed since February, have they?
No, sir.
No, ma 'am.
I take it you made these statements to national media to make it clear to the public and to the protesters that protesting by blockading ports of entry is unlawful, correct?
Yes.
And that the protesters should stop?
Yes.
Are you aware that the same day as this media availability that it was widely reported by American and Canadian media that you and your fellow ministers labeled the bridge blockade as illegal?
I didn't have the opportunity to read the American press, but I'm not surprised.
Okay.
But the protesters did not stop, did they?
No.
Okay.
I have a few questions, Minister Blair, about planning around critical infrastructure.
So will you agree with me that systems of support should be in place to support the communities and local authorities who are most often the first responders to emergencies?
I would agree that local communities are often the very first impacted.
I tried to make the point, though, the blockaded Ambassador Bridge went well beyond that intersection in Windsor.
It was affecting auto plants, for example, right across the province and in Michigan.
A lot of people were being deeply impacted, but certainly I would acknowledge how difficult that was in Ottawa and in Windsor.
Minister Blair, are you aware that shortly after the successful police operation, Windsor representatives, including Mayor Dilkens, started asking all three levels of government to sit down and develop a long-term sustainable framework to protect the critical border infrastructure.
I did not have a direct conversation with Mayor Dilkens, but I believe my colleague did.
Well, Minister, are you aware that Mayor Dilkens wrote to you directly on March the 17th?
If you share it with me, it'll refresh my memory.
I have no direct recollection of that letter from Mayor Dilkens, although we've communicated quite extensively over the course of the pandemic and other related matters.
Okay, well, I will ask the Clerk to bring this up.
This is WIN402240.
So he sent you a letter on March the 17th.
And just to summarize it for you, and you can see it, but I don't have very much time, Minister.
He does ask for you and Minister Mendicino and former Solicitor General Jones to sit down, to debrief and work together to protect Windsor's important international border crossings.
You don't recall receiving this letter?
I have no direct recollection of it, but it...
It strikes me as a reasonable request from the Mayor.
Okay.
And Minister Blair, are you taking any steps as Minister of Emergency Management to ensure the inter-jurisdictional collaboration that's requested by Mayor Delkins here and the planning occurs to protect border infrastructures and the communities around them?
There's a great deal of work ongoing about creating a more resilient, critical infrastructure for this country from all hazards, including what we have seen over the course of last year.
And if I may, I'm over my time.
Are you taking any steps as Minister of Emergency Management to ensure that municipalities and border municipalities are included in these conversations?
I can tell you in every community that I go to, I try to go and visit the mayor.
I believe very much in all three orders of government have a role here.
And as I said, I've engaged with Mayor Dilkens on numerous occasions and many of the mayors, particularly the border mayors.
Throughout the pandemic, I met on a very regular basis with all of the mayors of Ontario border communities.
They had some important things to say, and they needed to be heard.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
I'd like to now call on the province of Alberta.
Good evening, Minister Blair.
My name is Stephanie Bose.
I'm counsel for the province of Alberta.
I'd like to start with document SSM.CAN 406055.
And if, Mr. Clerk, if you could scroll down to the last email on this page, or sorry, in this document, it'll be on the next page.
And this is an email dated February 9th from Mr. Stratfest to you, subject line ABRFA.
And if you scroll down to the text, please, Mr. Clerk.
You'll see the text on the letter itself.
John Broadhead and I spoke, and I think we revised the response about exhausting provincial resources and enforcing contracts and laws, and we look forward to learning more on that front.
So it's not a no, just more context.
Now, I understand Mr. Broadhead is the Director of Policy in the PMO.
Is that correct?
Yes.
Do you know what the reference to it's not a no is about?
I believe I do.
I was very concerned when I heard back from the Deputy Minister and the Canadian Armed Forces that they did not have the equipment that Minister MacGyver had requested in his request for assistance.
And so I asked my staff and public safety to explore other areas of government to see if there was any way that we could provide assistance to...
To Alberta and we looked, for example, in other federal departments.
We looked outside the country in Montana.
We were looking for any way that if the CAF equipment was not appropriate or available, we were looking to see if there was any alternative that we could help out there with.
All right.
Thank you.
At SSM.can.nsc40268, 402689.
This was a record that Commission Council put to you earlier today.
And I'll ask the Clerk to please pull that up.
The version that you saw today was unredacted, and I understand that that was only recently supplied.
And when we review this, this is an email from, again, your Chief of Staff.
On February 11th, if we scroll down, we see an email from Rady Barrick to you on February 11th.
Within the next page, we see a response.
Further, I understand that Alberta has the required legal authorities necessary to enforce compliance as a highway is considered essential infrastructure.
And it goes on.
There are a number of contraventions or other applicable legislation that may also be enforced by Alberta and its police forces.
So at that point in time, the reason for rejecting Alberta's RFA was, in fact, that the position of Government of Canada was that Alberta had the required legal authorities.
Is that correct?
If you could read down through the entire letter, because I want to see how this is dealt with.
Thank you.
And I think it's also, it's relevant that in the last paragraph, where the letter also refers to the lack of commercial resources, the Canadian Armed Forces being the only federal asset, and discussions that make clear that CAF have neither the type of assets required nor the expertise to do this without significant possible risk.
So it was an answer to Minister MacGyver's specific request for tow trucks belonging to CAF, and I think it was an important context for this letter as well.
But certainly also the position of Canada was that Alberta still had authorities that it could exercise to deal with the blockade at Coutts, correct?
There is some reference to that in this letter, yes.
Okay, thank you.
And if we scroll down to the last paragraph in the letter...
There's reference there to...
The use of federal resources may be reconsidered at a future date once all other provincial options and capabilities have been exhausted.
What was meant by that?
Well, again, we were also examining across all of government.
We were also talking about the possibility of providing funding to assist them in acquiring, through private and commercial means, the vehicles that they required.
But, of course, contingent on all other provincial options and capabilities having been exhausted, correct?
Well, and again, not just exhausted or unlikely to succeed.
I think that's a reasonable consideration as well.
I think we were trying to communicate.
My concern, quite frankly, is I felt a necessity to reply to Minister MacGyver, who had made a request to give him the information.
He very specifically asked for something, and we were saying no.
And I think as you saw in the email above this, I was concerned that we weren't able to say yes, but I was also concerned that we needed to reply to his letter.
And that reference, of course, is at the very top when you approve this response as the response to go to Alberta?
Yep.
And then I'll ask you, Mr. Clerk, to please go up to the top.
There's a reference to has the PMO approved?
And I take the PMO to be the Prime Minister's office.
Is that correct?
That's the usual.
That acronym represents the Prime Minister's office.
For sure.
And was it a requirement that the Prime Minister's office approve a response to an RFA?
No, not normally, but clearly there was communication between the offices because there's also an issue of intergovernment affairs between ourselves and the provinces.
I think there was complexity to this request because it involved a number of different ministries and it was an unusual outcome because we always try to find a way to say yes.
Do you know if the Prime Minister's office ever did approve a response to Alberta's RFA?
I have no knowledge of that.
I'm not involved in those communications.
All right.
There is reference in the records to your Chief of Staff arranging a February 9th meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss the RFA.
Were you aware of those discussions?
No.
Okay.
Thank you.
I am over my time.
I would ask the indulgence of the Commissioner for a couple more minutes just to touch on two more things, please.
Okay, go ahead, but try and make it fast.
Everyone's been over, with one exception, as I recall.
All right.
Mr. Clerk, could you please pull up document ssm.nsc.can403164?
And this is an email dated February 17th from you to your Chief of Staff, Minister Blair.
Yes.
I'll have you scroll down a little bit to that second email.
It says, Zeta, this letter from Alberta is incredibly helpful.
They are asking for federal assistance.
They say they have exhausted all existing authorities and resources.
They are practically begging for us to help.
We should think about publishing this.
I'll take it this as reference to the February 5th RFA that your office received from Minister McIver.
Is that correct?
Yes.
All right.
You wanted this letter to be published as support for Government of Canada's invocation of the Emergencies Act, correct?
My intention was that it would be published because we were putting documentary evidence before Parliament.
There was an ongoing parliamentary debate and there was a vote scheduled for the following week.
And my recommendation, because specifically Minister MacGyver had talked about the RCMP exhausting, the language isn't in front of me, but I believe his letter said, all of their resources and options.
And I thought that was particularly relevant to the discussion around the invocation of the Act.
But you were also aware prior to the invocation of the Act of Alberta's success in purchasing tow equipment, correct?
I was aware that they purchased tow equipment.
I also was aware that it had become somewhat moot because after the investigation by the RCMP, the seizure of weapons and the arrest of a number of individuals, The blockade that existed at Cootes, most of those people skedaddled.
All right.
Thank you.
One last record to put before you.
That's pb.can401132.
This is a transcript of an appearance you had on Global News on February 13th at 11:00 a.m.
Eastern Time.
And if you scroll down, please, Mr. Clerk, to page two.
There's a question from Mercedes Stevenson.
You can see it now just at the bottom of your screen.
Are you prepared to invoke the Emergencies Act?
It's not on the bottom of my screen.
Sorry, can you scroll down there, please, Mr. Clerk?
There it is there.
And your response is...
Certainly.
I will tell you the Emergencies Act has been under a very fulsome consideration right from the first day as to what needs to be done.
When you refer to right from the first day, what day are you talking about?
Actually, my responsibility as the Minister of Emergency Preparedness is to examine every federal authority and resource that can be brought to bear.
As I've earlier testified, I'd actually examined the use of this particular act during the pandemic and determined that the threshold was not met.
And throughout this event, I was aware of this and many other legislative options available to us.
And so it was something that we were prepared to examine.
But as you can see in my answer, a more fulsome answer below that, I was very clear that...
That our work with the provinces was important.
And I talked about the Ontario steps that they had taken with their own Emergency Act.
And as I believe, we said, we will see if their effectiveness is sufficient to bring the situation in Ontario under control.
And as I've said, I don't believe that we had, at the time of this discussion on the Sunday morning, reached that decision.
I was indicating that we were prepared to look at every option.
But you'll agree your answer was that it was under very fulsome consideration, so it's not just a background option, it's something that you were seriously considering, correct?
What I was attempting to convey is that every option was on the table and we were prepared to examine every option and then to do what was required to bring about a peaceful resolution of these blockades.
Okay, I'm going to have to say that you're now more than double your time, so one last question is all I'll allow.
Alright, you will agree with me that by speaking on news programs on February 13th, you made the public aware that the federal government was considering the Emergencies Act, correct?
I anticipated that the public was expecting their government to consider every option to bring about a piece of resolution.
To these protests because it was hugely impactful, not just to the people of Ottawa and the communities impacted, but to the entire country.
All right.
Thank you very much for answering my questions today, Minister Blair.
Thank you very much.
Okay, the province of Saskatchewan, please.
Good evening, Minister.
My name is Mike Morris, and I'm counsel for the government of Saskatchewan.
Sir, will you agree with me that after the cabinet meeting on February 13th, The Prime Minister was left with full discretion as to whether the Emergencies Act would be invoked the next day following his consultation with First Ministers.
Just to be clear, sir, because if I'm going to agree with you, I want to be precise.
Yes.
The matter had been discussed at Cabinet.
It was left what we call ad referendum to the Prime Minister, but it was very clear to everybody that the Prime Minister's decision...
Was contingent upon the consultation that he would undertake the following day with First Ministers.
Understood.
My understanding is that Cabinet did not meet again then, though, you know, until after the Emergencies Act was invoked.
Is that fair?
Yes, sir.
Okay.
So the Prime Minister did not then take the consultations back to Cabinet before invoking the Act.
You'll agree with me?
And I believe, sir, that we've had the cabinet meeting, as you've indicated, the night before.
There was a cabinet discussion, but the final decision was left to add referendum to the prime minister following his consultations with the first ministers.
I understand your answer.
Minister Blair, I understand you're the president of the Privy Council, correct?
Yes, I am.
On Friday, we heard evidence from the Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council, and I'd like to pull up the transcript for some of the evidence given by the Deputy Clerk, Ms. Durain.
So, Registrar, if we could pull up the transcript, it's TRN 6026.
And spoiler alert, we're going to be looking at page 300 of the transcript.
Ms. Drouin is giving evidence.
It'll be 300, right, not on the PDF but on the document itself.
So can you go down just a little bit further?
Remember is where I want to start.
Okay, up just a bit.
Okay, this is Ms. Drouin's evidence from last week.
And she says, remember that we also discussed today that the moment we talk about the Emergency Act, that can trigger some reactions.
And that was the CSIS assessment on the risk of triggering or invoking the Emergency Act.
So we were quite aware that the moment that we talk publicly about the Emergency Act, the timeline to take a decision is very short.
It can be a go or no-go, but you cannot wait.
I'm just going to ask you to scroll down a little bit further now, please.
Scroll down a little bit further.
Thank you.
Okay, next paragraph.
You cannot put that in the domain without taking a decision.
And what we were afraid happened very rapidly.
The moment we hang off the call on the FMM, it was already out there that we were thinking about the Emergency Act.
So this is why, you know, we were very concerned and concerned that talking about the Emergency Act will request a very rapid decision.
A no or a yes, but a rapid decision.
Now, you can probably anticipate my next question, Minister, but it is, did you share Ms. Duran's concern about publicly talking about the Emergencies Act?
I think if I read this correctly...
The Deputy Clerk's concern is that after, a very important step in any process of invocation involves consultation with the First Ministers, and Deputy Joanne's concern appears to be that after that call, some of that information was being made public, which I think, and I do understand the concern, because it does, although it's not the final decision, it does, many might take an inference.
That this was likely to happen.
That, in my opinion, is different than suggesting we were considering all options, which was a conversation that I'd had a number of times prior to that.
But the deputy's concern, quite frankly, I have great respect for the deputy, and if this was a concern she had, and it aligns somewhat with Cease's advice that the invocation of the act could result in a violent reaction from some.
Okay.
My friend for Council for the Government of Alberta referred to your interview with Mercedes Stevenson.
I understand you also gave an interview with Rosemary Barton on Sunday morning, February 13th.
Is that correct, Minister?
Yes, sir.
And that was on Rosemary Barton Live.
I understand at that time you advised Ms. Barton that the IRG had been having daily discussions about the potential invocation of the Emergencies Act.
Is that fair?
I'd actually have to see that to understand the precise language.
I was trying to be, and it was always my intent to be very precise, that we were considering all of our options, including the Emergencies Act, but that no decision had yet been made.
Do you recall telling Ms. Barton that the police now have new authorities and very effective tools?
We just need the police to do their job?
Yes, I do.
And I was referring to the new authorities as those that had come from the province of Ontario with the invocation of their emergencies, measures, and as well the regulations that they had brought in on the Saturday.
And do you also recall stating that it was somewhat inexplicable why enforcement was not happening?
I was asked if I could explain the law enforcement's response.
And I said it was somewhat inexplicable, and my meaning there, I hope, was clear, that I could neither explain nor account for law enforcement's response.
I think that's up to them.
Okay.
Did you think that your statements...
Might suggest that a decision needed to be made fairly promptly about invoking the Emergencies Act or not.
I don't believe that that would have influenced either the Prime Minister or the First Ministers in their deliberations.
Okay.
I understand that you were not present at the First Ministers' meeting held on February 14th.
Is that correct?
Yes, sir.
That's correct.
Now, in your view, would it have been appropriate to advise what that meeting was going to be about?
You're asking me to speculate on something, frankly, I have no knowledge of, and I was not part of that meeting.
If you were a Premier, would you have preferred being advised in advance about what a First Minister's meeting is going to be about?
That's quite a hypothetical, sir, and I've never thought about being a Premier.
You're well over time, so with that answer, you're going to have to wrap up, please.
Last question.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Minister, from your perspective, would there have been any risk to advising the Premiers about what the first Minister's meeting was going to be about?
Respectfully, sir, I don't believe I'm in a position to assess that risk.
Okay, that's my last question, so thank you for answering them.
Thank you.
Next is the Canadian Constitution Foundation.
Minister Blair, good evening.
My name is Sujit Choudhury.
I am counsel for the Canadian Constitution Foundation.
I have some questions for you about some remarks you made or evidence you provided in your witness statement regarding the sequencing of requests by the OPS to the OPP and the RCMP.
And so just for the sake of time, I'd prefer not to call it up, although I will if you'd like to refresh your memory.
But do you recall you said that the City of Ottawa and the OPS were not following the proper procedure for requesting resources because requests for police resources in Ontario are formally governed by Section 9 of the Police Services Act?
And I believe that I expanded upon that evidence in my examination-in-chief earlier today, sir.
I am familiar, of course, with the number of circumstances where various police services may seek and obtain assistance from others.
I was also just simply pointing out to counsel that there is a provision within the Police Services Act that allows for a police chief dealing with an emergency that exceeds the capacity of his police service to manage.
There is a section in the act that allows him to request assistance from the OBG.
And Minister Blair, would you agree?
That that provision, although it authorizes a municipal police force or a chief of police to seek assistance from the OPP, it doesn't require that they go first to the OPP before going to the RCN.
No, and in fact, well, again, depending on the circumstances, they often go to neighboring police services.
I can tell you from experience, in the Toronto Police Service, we very frequently assisted other municipalities because we had a fairly robust and well...
And so you'll recall the tripartite calls that Chief slowly participated on on February 7th and 8th.
Yes, sir.
And you had a brief interaction with him.
And this was after the request for policing resources was sent simultaneously by Mayor Watson and Chair Deans, both to Ontario and to the federal government.
And this type of concern...
About sequencing, it wasn't ever relayed to him, was it?
I did not discuss the Ontario Police Services Act with the mayor.
My primary interaction was with the mayor, and on the first tripartite meeting, she slowly joined that call right at the end, and we did not discuss.
And you'd agree there's nothing in the RCMP Act that says that the RCMP can't respond to a request from a municipal police service?
No, and in fact they do, but there is actually...
The Ontario Police Services Act is silent to the RCMP, and the RCMP has some capacity to respond, but under normal circumstances, it's somewhat limited.
Sure, and this wasn't a normal circumstance, though, was it?
No, I think, as I said, it was uniquely challenging for the City of Ottawa and then in the multiple other jurisdictions that were being impacted by the blockades.
And so if I could conclude, so you'd agree that even though in the normal course it might be appropriate and it might be standard practice for a municipal police service in this province to first go to the OPP?
Or to other municipal police forces before going to the RCMP.
Perhaps in the case of the convoy and in the National Capital Region, it might have been entirely appropriate to set aside that normal practice and go directly to the RCMP in parallel.
I can tell you from a long experience that the RCMP are actually a very important and valued partner in providing public safety services here in the National Capital Region.
Because they have a presence here, probably stronger than anywhere else in Ontario.
Thank you, sir.
Of course, sir.
Thank you.
Next is the TDF, JCCF, Democracy Fund.
Mr. Blair, I'm Rob Kittredge, counsel for the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms, and we share standing at these hearings with the Democracy Fund and Citizens for Freedom.
You understand that in order to declare a public order emergency pursuant to the Emergencies Act, there must be a threat to the security of Canada, as that term is defined in Section 2 of the CSIS Act, right?
Yes.
And I guess let's put that definition up on the screen, please, just for reference.
COM 935, Section 2. Are you familiar with the Section 2 CSIS Act definition of a threat to the security of Canada?
Yes.
CSIS themselves advised Cabinet that the protests didn't pose a Section 2 CSIS Act threat.
You were aware of their assessment, weren't you?
But I think context is really important, sir.
The advice that I understood from CSIS is that it did not meet the CSIS threshold for them to enable them to initiate an investigation.
And they were very clear about that.
But for the purposes of the Emergencies Act, that definition, I believe, has a broader application.
That is contained within that definition.
And really, the violence and the threat of violence, I believe very clearly the threat of violence.
I also believe that, excuse me, the threat of violence existed.
And I also believe that the threshold in that definition is different for the Emergencies Act than it was in the very narrow.
application of that definition to enable the CISES to undertake an investigation.
I was previously the minister responsible for CSIS.
I'm not unfamiliar with the extensive jurisprudence and very high standards that exist for CSIS to take that action.
In the interest of just trying to, I'm hoping to understand your thinking a little bit better, and in the interest of trying to do that in five minutes, if you can...
Help us get through this in shorter answers wherever possible.
That would be really appreciated.
Looking at this definition here, you haven't raised any concerns about espionage, sabotage, foreign interference, or a credible threat to overthrow the Government of Canada associated with the protests.
Have you?
And again, there was some concern, not the activities of a foreign state actor, but that there was some concern about foreign-influenced activities detrimental to the interests of Canada.
And as well, just to be very clear, I believe there was more than ample evidence in support that the threat or the use of acts of serious violence, and that or is rather important.
I think very many people felt threatened.
Okay, fair enough.
You outlined several concerns to Commission Council earlier.
Disruptions to supply chains, impacts on the flow of goods and services, disruptions to transportation, disruptions at the border, etc.
These things may be undesirable and they may have an impact on Canadians, but they aren't in and of themselves serious violence, are they?
No, but I think there is an underlying threat of serious violence.
Just if I may very quickly give you an example.
In our conversations with the police, both the RCMP in Alberta and the Ottawa Police Service here in Ottawa, they were very concerned, and CSIS actually reaffirmed this concern, that any enforcement on their part could result in a violent and provoke a very violent response.
I think as well, in all the people that we dealt with in Windsor and in Ottawa, Certainly the disruption of critical infrastructure was a very serious issue of national concern.
It's a very serious issue, but it's not serious violence in and of itself.
I mean, you spent a lot of time earlier on today speaking to Commission Council about your concerns about the protests, and you outlined concerns like the impact of the disruption to supply chains on Canadians, and you spent quite a bit of time on that.
You didn't spend much time identifying any...
And I'm pleased to have the opportunity to do so now, sir.
I believe that many Canadians experience threats of violence, intimidation, and fear as a result of the activities taking place.
Intimidation and fear aren't in and of themselves.
Let him finish the answer.
I mean, in the interest of getting me through this in five minutes and giving me a chance to ask.
Yeah, but if you don't let him answer, then there's no point asking the question.
It's true.
Intimidation and fear in and of themselves, though, aren't serious violence.
I mean, the experience of intimidation and fear, serious violence means something, doesn't it?
Well, threats of violence, I think very many people felt very threatened by what was taking place.
Quite frankly, intimidation...
And a very real apprehension of risk and danger as a result of these activities.
I think we heard from very many Canadians who were very sincerely fearful about these things.
And we heard from the police who told us that just in the normal, even writing municipal bylaw tickets could precipitate a violent response.
And so the police were very fearful of a violent reaction.
But writing municipal bylaw tickets didn't incite a violent response, did it?
Well again, we were talking about a threat of violence, not just merely the act.
Right, so can I just...
That's crystal clear.
But acts of threats, intimidation, obstruction, all of those things can also be quite violent.
It's their experience by Canadians.
There's been a lot said here in the last couple of minutes, and I'm very close to it if not over my time here.
I guess I'd like to ask you, you're making a lot of noise about intimidation and threats of violence, but can you point me to any particular specific threat of violence or event that was violent?
Well, sir, you've characterized my response as noise, but I was trying to answer your question.
Well, I appreciate that, but I'm just trying to cut through this and get an answer out of you.
I can tell you we heard from very many Canadians who were very fearful about the activities of these blockades and protests.
You know, they were afraid to walk down their street.
They were intimidated and fearful of all those reactions.
Some of the symbols and other things that were on display were very threatening to very many Canadians.
And frankly, the threat of violence.
Is every bit as impactful on a community and on individuals?
And therefore, it was a very serious matter from my perspective.
All right.
The definition in Section 2 of the CSIS Act of a threat to the security of Canada doesn't capture everything that you and your capacity as a Minister of Emergency Preparedness would consider to be a threat to the security of Canada, does it?
I'm not sure what you mean.
I think this definition is fairly comprehensive and includes the type of behaviours that I've referred to.
But you would say that in your occupation as Minister of Emergency Preparedness, this sets the limit of what you would consider to be a threat to the security of Canada, Section 2 of the CSIS Act?
I think this defines what, in my opinion, would be a public order threat to the security of Canada.
There can be other types of threats that were not necessarily evident here.
A cyber attack, for example, that's targeted at critical infrastructure that shuts off a pipeline or a power grid or a water treatment plant, those can also manifest themselves as threats.
There is a significant threat there that doesn't necessarily involve physical violence in the first instance.
Okay.
And just a final question.
It's your belief that this definition here in Section 2 of the CSIS Act applies differently to CSIS than it does in the context of the Emergencies Act, right?
I'm aware of the way in which this definition applies to CSIS's authority as determined by the courts to initiate an investigation.
But I also believe that in its reference in the Emergencies Act, that this is a...
It needs to be looked at in a broader context than simply whether or not CISAs could go get a wiretap, for example.
And there is, I think, very useful guidance here.
So the Emergencies Act uses a different definition of a threat to the security of Canada?
No, I think this definition, as provided within the Act, in my opinion...
Is appropriate and does, in fact, identify the events and circumstances that we have described as a concern within the Act as, in fact, a threat to the Security of Canada.
All right.
Well, thank you very much.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Okay.
Next is the CCLA, please.
Good evening, Minister Blair.
My name is Kara Zwiebel.
I am counsel for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
I just have a few minutes with you, and I just want to ask you about those few days, I guess between February 10th and the 14th.
So I think this is when we switch from the SSE meetings to the IRG meetings.
Is that right?
Okay.
And is it fair to say, I mean, I think probably starting at the end of January, but certainly by this time that the federal government was feeling significant pressure from many corporations I would characterize that the government was feeling significant concern.
We were concerned about the impact these protests were having on people of Ottawa and other communities impacted on critical infrastructure and in very many aspects of the country.
Okay.
And, I mean, this was a crisis not just at the borders, but also at the seat of Parliament.
We had people in the nation's capital.
If I may, Parliament continued to function throughout this, notwithstanding it was a challenge and noisy.
I think the impacts, from my perspective, were far more significant on the people living in Ottawa, trying to do business in Ottawa, and as well in Windsor.
And, you know, I'm also very mindful of the impact that these events were having.
On people's ability to make a living, to go about their business, it was very impactful on a lot of people in a lot of different places.
And around this time, so the 10th, I believe it's the 11th, when Ontario invokes its emergency under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act.
So that's the 11th, and I think we learned that the 12th is when the orders under that act were actually published.
So the actual sort of operative provisions that gave police the authorities under that act came into existence on the 12th.
That's my recollection, yes.
Okay.
Now, then we have the 13th, where there's an IRG meeting.
Was there any consideration, I guess by you, I'm not asking you to disclose the deliberations of Cabinet, but any consideration around giving the Ontario orders some time to work?
I can tell you, I had asked my staff for a full list of the Ontario measures that were enacted the day before.
I also looked at their utility and whether they would address the concerns that had been raised to us.
I'll just give you some quick examples, if I may.
One of the things that we had heard from a number of jurisdictions is the difficulty in compelling...
I looked at the Ontario regulations, and although it allowed for those tow trucks, it didn't compel.
And we were a little bit concerned about its limitations.
There was also nothing in there, as I recall, that dealt with some of the real challenges we had in tracing the financial elements of this in the crowdfunding, who was donating that money, where it was going.
And so we believe that there was...
A need to address that, how we eventually got there.
There were still considerable deliberations going on, but again, the limitations of the federal statute.
And they also did not have the ability to designate certain spaces, which was a concern as well, because we were concerned they were concentrating, for example, on Wellington.
I was very concerned about their ability to go back to a municipal intersection just off the Ambassador Bridge.
And so we look at whether or not the Ontario regulations provided us with adequate assurance that those matters could be dealt with.
And although they were very important, welcome.
I want to be very clear that I was very appreciative of the work that Ontario had done and the measures that they brought forward.
In my opinion, after an examination of them, they didn't address all of the deficiencies and the lack of tools that we had identified.
Okay.
Now, would you say that at this point...
You and perhaps some of your colleagues in the federal government are feeling embarrassed about what's happening in Canada, feeling that there's international attention and it looks like Canada's struggling to deal with this situation.
Respectfully, I've never indulged myself in feelings of embarrassment.
I've got a job to do.
We have a responsibility to protect Canadians, to protect critical infrastructure in this country, and to respond appropriately to unlawful activity.
I personally and I believe all of my colleagues.
We're deeply motivated by our responsibility to Canadians to do what was required to restore the rule of law and peace.
Can we turn up ssm.nsc.can402999?
And this is another text message between you and your chief of staff.
Now, I don't think we have dates on most of these.
I recall this.
Okay, and I think this is you on this side of the screen.
I'm wondering if anyone else is embarrassed that the protest on Wellington is expanding.
Dozens of new porta-potties and a new stage.
I'm embarrassed for my former profession and worried for my government, which is being made to look very weak and ineffective.
I can't believe that I'm hoping that Doug Ford will save us.
And again, my remarks obviously are intemperate, and I regret that, but let me be very clear.
I was very concerned by a number of things.
First of all, there was an expansion in some of the protest activity that was taking place in Ottawa.
I was hearing very clearly how concerned the people of Ottawa were about that, not just the activity that was taking place, but that it appeared to become even more entrenched.
There was also a lot of public discourse, and particularly in Ottawa, but in other places as well, about people losing confidence in the police.
And trusting confidence in the police is absolutely essential for them to do their job.
And so I was very concerned about the impact that the apparent ineffectiveness of the police to deal with this was causing the public's confidence in their competence and their ability to resolve this.
And finally, one of the things that we were also hearing, a lot of people were very confused about who is responsible for policing in the city of Ottawa.
And for most people, they don't differentiate between the responsibilities of different orders of government.
And what I was also hearing is...
That many people assumed that the federal government was responsible for this.
And my comment was that I knew it was primarily the provincial responsibility, the province's responsibility under their Police Services Act to take certain steps.
And I was hoping that they would take those steps.
And by the way, subsequently on, I believe, December 11th, they did, in fact, pass their own Emergencies Act and introduce regulations on the 12th.
Okay.
And I know I'm out of time.
Can I just have one more moment to wrap up?
Thank you, Commissioner.
So the IRG on the 13th, and then there's a cabinet meeting the night of the 13th as well.
And then the following morning is when there's the first minister's meeting, and then the act is invoked.
But we know that the morning of, or overnight, leading into the 14th, The blockade at Coutts was dealt with and arrests were made.
And the Ambassador Bridge, I believe, had also been cleared.
Is there anything that could have happened between the 13th and the 14th that, in your view, would have caused the government or should have caused the government to pause and say, perhaps we don't need to take this nuclear option that we're about to take?
Thank you for the question.
I want to be very clear.
We approached, and certainly my approach to this, but I believe an approach shared by my colleagues and the Prime Minister, we approached the invocation of the Emergency Act with great caution, with real reluctance.
We saw it as a last resort, and we were prepared to do what was required, but only if required, and only for as long as was required.
And so throughout all of our deliberations, there was that concern.
You asked what circumstances might have enabled us to say we're done.
If we'd been able to receive some assurances, the blockade at Coutts had gone on for almost, I think, 13 days.
Its resolution was not as a result of the towing away of those trucks or people deciding to leave.
It was as a direct result of an RCMP investigation in which several people were arrested, charged with very serious criminal offenses and the seizure of quite a number of weapons.
And then they moved very quickly.
We still had significant blockades at Emerson.
We were seeing them in the Pacific Highway.
Although the Ambassador Bridge had been reopened, there was lots of intelligence suggesting that they would return.
The police were telling us they had the ability to clear it, but not the ability to hold it.
And we were hearing of an intention to go to the Point Edwards Bridge at Sarnia, to go to the Priest Bridge, to go to other bridges, all of which would have had a similar effect of significantly impacting Canadians and Canadian interests.
And so we were still dealing with a set of circumstances where, although, yes, some very positive things had happened at Coutts and at Windsor, the threat that existed had not yet abated.
And we were still dealing with that.
Thank you very much.
Those are my questions.
Okay.
Next, the Criminal Lawyers Association.
Minister, my name is Greg Del Piccio.
I'm one of the lawyers representing the Criminal Lawyers Association and the Canadian Council of Criminal Defence Lawyers.
You've testified that, in your view, reliance upon the Emergencies Act was a matter of last resort, and I'm going to pick up on that theme, okay?
When Commission Council asked you questions, what now probably feels like some time ago, he asked you questions about mistrust between, as I understood it, police agencies.
He used the phrase, ships passing in the night.
He, in a question, suggests there was confusion and disagreement about who goes where and does what.
Your answer to that was in reference to governance.
But my question is, as you look back today, to what extent do you believe that better communications, more effective communications between police agencies And within police agencies might have avoided the need for resort upon the Emergencies Act.
And first of all, let me agree vigorously that good communications within police services and between police services is very important in them doing the important job that we task them with in our society to keep the public safe.
What we were also dealing with, however, in government was the reality that that communication perhaps had not been as effective.
And as a result of, you know, and again, it's not my job here to assess responsibility.
But the reality was this had persisted for a very long time.
In many respects, it had gotten more difficult and dangerous, and we were concerned that it had to be resolved.
And so, you know, I'm in complete agreement that good communications within police services and between police services, and I would also add, between those governance bodies responsible for policing and the public.
Those communications are really critically important on all aspects of this.
In the event that that had not been as effective as perhaps we would have preferred or wanted it to be, we were dealing with a situation that was uniquely challenging and required, unfortunately, in my opinion, an extraordinary response.
You looked at the Emergencies Act because circumstances pushed it onto your plate and you had to deal with it.
Well, my responsibility is to look at all federal authorities in existing legislation.
And because of, frankly, my background, I also look at municipal bylaws in their application and Ontario statutes, such as the Highway Traffic Act, which can also be applicable and useful in these circumstances.
And so one of my responsibilities is to look at every legal authority.
I've already mentioned, for example, at Windsor, we looked at the International Bridges and Tunnels Act to see if there was any application that that would assist us with.
And what we found in the unique and challenging circumstances that police and communities were confronted with as a result of these blockades, there were, I think, a need for additional tools and authorities to enable them to affect the important lawful purpose of restoring the peace.
And finally, Minister.
When you testify about your belief that the Emergencies Act is a matter of last resort, that's not just a personal preference you're expressing, that's your belief with respect to what the law requires, right?
Yes, I believe that is a requirement.
And as well, the law also requires that it be charter compliant, that it be time limited, and it also provides a number of parliamentary processes and an inquiry.
All of those are very high standards that the law puts in place, and in my opinion, appropriately high standards.
Thank you.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Call on the Government of Canada, please.
Commissioner, before he begins, my colleagues at the Government of Canada have, moments ago, provided some unredacted records, finally, based on our motions.
One of those records is relevant and material to this witness extraordinarily, and if my friend, I'd be asking to deviate on that basis because they were just provided moments ago.
To be able to ask this witness for five more minutes so I may question them about this new document, I can advise it's February 12 minutes readout from a ministerial meeting about this very issue and it's very enlightening.
Does it involve this witness?
It does.
What's your position on that?
I'm trying to sort that out right now as I'm not aware of what my friend is speaking of in terms of the specific document.
I see that there's been a response sent from the Government of Canada with respect to one of my friend's motions with an attachment to it.
And frankly, Commissioner, I don't think I'm informed enough, nor are those at the Council table at the moment, to respond to what my friend has.
If we took two minutes, we may be able to get there.
Yeah, maybe we'll take five minutes, a five-minute break, and probably the witness can appreciate it.
It's been a long afternoon or evening, so we'll take five minutes, and then maybe you can start it out and we can come back, because obviously it's better to have the...
Questioning before your final question.
And you can also deal with Commission Council.
I don't know if they can help, but I'm sure they're willing to help if possible.
Okay.
Thank you.
We'll take five minutes and you can, Commission Council, come and get me if it's...
The commission is in recess for five minutes.
The commission is in recess.
The commission is in recess.
Thank you.
Order a lot.
The Commission has reconvened.
Okay.
Has it been sorted out?
Commissioner, I've had a chance to speak to my friend with respect to the lifting of a redaction in document nssm.can.nsc00002872.
And I've undertaken to my friend that I'm happy to ask the witness.
I'm not sure if it's technically feasible to put it on the screen, but to ask the witness the question whether he was advised of the information that has now been unredacted in a document that's previously been seen as a ministerial update readout.
Okay, and is that acceptable?
No, I advised my friend it wasn't.
I would like to ask five minutes worth of questions.
That's it, sir.
That's all I would ask.
Okay.
Well, I think I'm going to exercise my discretion and let the convoy ask a few questions.
And the reason is this has been a very difficult inquiry given the time constraints.
The government has had a lot of pressure to produce documents and we're very appreciative of their continuing efforts.
Similarly with redactions, redactions have been done quickly, and in some cases we appreciate the government reviews those redactions and can then provide more clarity after they review them.
And all of this is, I think, to the government's credit.
Having said that, it does in some cases result in the parties having...
Missed opportunities and I would feel much better allowing the convoy to do the five minutes if they hadn't well exceeded their time.
But in the circumstances, I'm still prepared to give them some time.
And it's no negative reflection on the government, nor on your ability to question.
I'm not questioning that you would do it fairly.
It's simply in recognition of The circumstances we're operating under and I think an accommodation is appropriate.
I accept that you're in.
Okay, so we'll give them but it is please be respectful of what the ruling is.
So hopefully this is already in relativity and it is document SSM.can.nsc.0000287220, I think.
Do you have it?
Great.
Thank you.
So, Minister, this is the 1pm ministerial update readout, and you can scroll up and see it's a readout of what happened at your ministerial meeting on February 12, 2022, all right?
If we can scroll down to the second page, please, where it says Ottawa.
Thank you.
So, I just need to know if you were made aware of this.
Essentially, right there, it says plan.
This is the third from the bottom.
Plan presented yesterday with Solly for approval.
OPP, RCMP have approved.
We'll further present to Minister.
Meeting with Solly at 2. You're aware of that?
You're aware that was what was advised on February 12th?
I was president at that meeting, and although I don't have a specific memory of every point that's listed here, I believe this was part of the discussion.
Right, and you can agree with me that the plan presented was the one from the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, Mr. Stewart?
And I don't have any information on...
Like, whether the Deputy Minister was...
I have no recollection of what you've just said, and so I'm unable to agree with you.
Right, and are you aware, and it's already in evidence, that on February 12th at 5 p.m., Deputy Di Tommaso, Deputy Minister Di Tommaso, texted with Chief Slully, and he too approved the plan.
I have no knowledge of that.
Well, if that's the case and all of the police in the jurisdiction of Ottawa approved the plan, why'd you invoke the Emergencies Act?
The invocation of the Emergencies Act was not contingent upon an approved plan.
It was contingent upon what was necessary to bring about a peaceful resolution.
But isn't the RCMP, the OPP and the OPS approving a plan that isn't the Emergencies Act?
Isn't that what law enforcement advised you to do?
And again, I wasn't getting advice from law enforcement.
We were getting information from law enforcement.
I don't have any insight at all into whatever plan may have been devised by them.
I had every expectation that they were working together and would develop a plan, but I don't know its particulars.
And frankly, our decision was based on the threat assessment, the determination of the circumstances that existed across the country.
And yes...
I think it's a positive development that the police are working together in a plan, but the execution of that plan had not yet been realized and the threat had not yet been.
Last question.
The plan, all right, the engagement plan or proposal, in all of the cabinet minute meetings where it was discussed, it's attached to the minutes as a document that was discussed.
So I take it, can you agree that the engagement proposal...
You had that document, right?
I don't know that's what they're referring to in the document you've put in front of me today.
Right.
Okay, thank you.
Okay, now I'm calling on the Government of Canada again.
Thank you.
It's Brendan Vinnie and Heisse for the Government of Canada.
Just on the last point, looking at that word plan and the bullet point my friend was taking you to, are you certain sitting here today which plan that referred to?
No, sir.
I make an assumption that it was the police operational plan, but I've never been given the details of their planning.
I've never asked for it and did not require it.
Okay.
So is it, looking at what's noted there, is it equally possible?
Sitting here today, as far as you know, that that's the engagement plan as opposed to an enforcement plan?
And I don't know and I don't think it's appropriate to try to venture a guess.
It's clear that there was discussion that they had come to an agreement with respect to a plan, but I don't know its particulars.
All right.
I would like to come back now to the broader issues here and ask you some questions about the environment that you were assessing as one of a number of members of cabinet.
This morning Commission Council asked, or this afternoon Commission Council had asked you a number of questions about your perspective on the policing of public protest, which included a couple of well-known protest events that occurred when you were the Chief of Police at the Toronto Police Service.
that they am taking you through the 2009 tamil protein tests for example yes sir and um another well-known uh The protest event in Toronto when you were the chief was the G20 held in June of 2010, right?
Yes, sir.
I think you and I are both quite familiar with that event as well as the later process of accountability for some of the orders that were given by the Bronze Level Incident Commander on the Sunday, June 27th?
Yes, sir.
And as I recall, the evidence...
In that example, you ultimately intervened and ordered that an end be brought to certain of those operations when they came to your attention?
That's correct, sir.
I would like to ask you to focus for a moment on the events in Toronto on Saturday, June the 26th, and thinking about the scenario before us here in this inquiry.
Do you recall what happened on June the 26th of 2010 in Toronto?
On the Saturday, sir?
Yes, sir.
There was a very difficult situation.
What had been a relatively peaceful protest, although involving a very significant number of protesters, and there had been some incidents leading up to that, but on Saturday, unfortunately, a very significant portion of the protest began to riot.
Tumultuously is, I think, the appropriate term.
They were marching down towards the summit site.
They turned and began running rapidly north up Yonge Street, smashing windows as they went.
There was a number of police cars that were set on fire.
And a number of my officers were injured as well.
Yes, and one of your officers was quite seriously injured as a result of the police car being attacked by protesters, is that right?
He was injured and rescued from the vehicle, which was subsequently set on fire.
Now, leading up to that event, sir, were you aware that there was a not insignificant amount of advanced information and intelligence available with respect to certain actors?
Most famously associated with the Black Bloc actors that were shared with the Toronto Police Service?
Yes, sir.
I recall that vividly.
And those individuals and groups were assessed as intending to cause violence to property and potentially persons during the course of the G20 protests, yes?
Yes, sir.
That was the intelligence we'd received.
And in fact, am I correct that some of these identifiable groups or individuals warranted...
Or were found to warrant the issuance and execution of search warrants in advance of the protests?
Yes, sir, that's correct.
But the events you described on Saturday, June the 26th, they involved individuals who were not on your radar specifically, didn't they?
That's correct, sir.
The groups that smashed stores and laid waste to a long section of Yonge Street in downtown Toronto.
Do you know whether all of them were part of the target group assessed as subjects of interest ahead of the summit?
I believe many of them were not previously identified as subject of interest.
I also believe, sir, that a number of people, frankly, get caught up in the moment.
And it's part of the mob mentality sometimes when people begin to riot, that others who may not have come with that intention...
Join in.
And it becomes very challenging for the police to restore.
Do you have the same perspective with respect to what occurred on Queen Street West, where at least two of the burning police cars, I understand, occurred?
Yes, sir.
I recall watching that actually on video from police headquarters.
And again, there was an element of that protest on Queen West, which...
Was directly related to a number of identified anarchist groups, including the Black Bloc, but there were also very many other people that had not previously been identified and who joined in.
Putting yourself back to the situation in the streets of Toronto on June the 26th, you know, sitting there in the middle of that afternoon, would you have had any reason to think that obtaining more surveillance?
Or monitoring authorities, wiretap authorities, would have been useful as a response to what was going on in the streets amongst that mass of people?
That is very difficult to say, if I may.
I would also remind, sir, that at that time I was the chief of police in Toronto, but there was an integrated command team that was put in place, the leadership of that response.
Planned well in advance and agreed to by all parties, was led by the RCMP.
There was also integrated intelligence gathering units related to that.
Certainly, you know, we had a fair bit of intelligence available to us, but it was clearly not entirely complete.
I think in hindsight, we could always have hopefully have done more.
Would that have been a useful public order response on June the 26th of 2010 when those events were...
Occurring in plain sight on broadcast and social media in real time?
Yes.
Unfortunately, law enforcement did not have the capacity to monitor all social media.
Neither do we now, by the way.
Neither do they now have that capacity.
But again, the extent to which more information is available, better intelligence can enable a more effective response.
Now, coming back to February the 14th or 13th, the period in question leading up to the invocation of the Emergencies Act, did you have a view about whether there was an atmosphere of lawlessness in the City of Ottawa?
Yes, sir.
And I think, to be very clear, not just simply characterized by some of the activities which were bouncy castles and...
Hot tubs.
But there was a number of activities which were concerning as I viewed them.
And for example, there was a very real concern being expressed by citizens about people bringing jerrycans full of gasoline into the demonstration site.
It is rather unusual.
I will tell you for flammable liquids, potentially explosive liquids being brought into a demonstration site, it can create a manifestly dangerous situation.
And so the police had said they were not going to allow it.
But what we then witnessed is all sorts of people were coming into the site.
Carrying jerry cans, some of which had water, some of which may have had fluid, but it had the effect of thwarting the ability of the police to affect the purpose that they had stated that was their intention to keep those gas cans out of the area.
And we saw, you know, there was a clear anticipation of police tactics.
There was, I think, a very thoughtful effort to thwart those tactics and render them ineffective, which to me has also characterized, you know, a commitment to continue and persist with the unlawful activity.
So, when you draw on that example, when you assess the environment of lawlessness or relative lawlessness in that scenario, is your assessment based only on information received from public officials, intelligence agencies, and police channels, or does it include what you can see with your own eyes?
Yeah, I was obviously being briefed by our officials, but I was in the city of Ottawa at the time.
I reside in the downtown area.
I was in that area and saw some of this behavior firsthand.
Where an environment of lawlessness persists for a protracted period, does that, in your view, affect the likelihood that there will be acts of serious violence against persons or property in a given city?
I think it can.
You know, we also recognize that in areas where there is significant disorder, and that can manifest itself in many ways, but certainly during this protest, I think we could characterize a lot of the behavior as significant disorder in the downtown core.
It has the effect, first of all, it has the effect on everyone else in the neighborhood, the law-abiding citizens.
They stop using public space.
They stop shopping on their main streets.
You know, they stay in their houses, lock their doors, put bars in the windows, and they're fearful of going outside and engaging with each other.
And where that lawlessness becomes really entrenched, in my experience, that can actually create a very unsafe situation.
And even behaviors that people might otherwise not be inclined to engage in more serious criminal behaviors, I think when you create a situation of significant disorder, they're more likely to occur.
We heard from Commissioner Karik in this proceeding about his fears that his officers were being stretched between the extreme ends of this province, that is to say Windsor and Ottawa, so that it would become impossible or extremely difficult at any rate to have an effective public order response occur in both places at once.
And my question for you, sir, is did you, looking from the federal perspective, did you have a similar concern about the...
Stretching, potential stretching of resources amongst the RCMP?
I was witnessing very clearly the challenges that the OPP was having, not just for their activities in Windsor and Ottawa, but also having to cover off the Peace Bridge, assist the Niagara Regional Police, the Sarnia Police over at Point Edwards.
There was also other activities on other highways, 402, for example, all of which had the effect of really pulling and stretching.
The capacity to respond of the OPP and their policing partners in Ontario.
We also saw, for example, as a result of the Coutts blockade, there was an Article 9 request from the province of Alberta to move additional RCMP officers into Alberta to assist with managing that particular event.
They were drawn primarily from British Columbia.
But then we saw almost immediately there was protest and blockade activity taking place at the Pacific Highway.
So the place from which those resources had been drawn.
I think one of the things we heard very clearly from the commissioner is that he had to make some very difficult choices about what he could do first and what he would then have to do subsequently because he just didn't have unlimited resources to bring to bear.
If there are inadequate numbers of police officers available to maintain law and order in a given location, Do you consider that that might affect the likelihood that there will be acts of serious violence that occur in that location against persons or property?
I think it's very important to have enough resources to affect a lawful purpose.
And again, I leave that decision to the operational commanders on the ground, but in my experience, having insufficient people to deal with a substantial protest, and I've been involved in protests where we were in our dozens up against thousands, and it becomes extremely difficult to bring that situation to a peaceful conclusion.
I'd like to ask you about the risk of counter-protest.
Do you see that as a relevant risk in...
In a protest situation where a risk of counter-protest develops?
It can be.
And I want to be very clear that I know that there was a high level of frustration in Windsor and in Ottawa and in other places with the blockades that were taking place.
And I did not see...
Evidence of a violent response.
But when there has been counter demonstrations, the police are also very challenged to sort of stand between the two protesting groups to maintain the peace between them.
And that can be a very challenging environment.
And it's because people who become quite upset and emotional and feel that they're being treated unfairly may, and I say may very carefully because we did not see evidence of this in Ottawa, certainly, but they can become...
Quite agitated and upset, and that could lead to confrontation.
Did it affect your sense whether there was a risk of serious violence against persons or property when you learned about the seizure of a large quantity of guns, ammunition, and body armor from Coutts on February 14?
Actually, I had been advised earlier in the week, I believe around the 10th by the RCMP commissioner speaking at an IRG.
That I had convened that there was concern about the presence of firearms at Coutts.
That immediately alerted, like for me, was a very significant potential escalation of violence and risk at that site.
You know, it's where the police advised that they had that information and that they were dealing with it.
And when the investigation was complete, I believe on the morning of, or on the 13th going over into the 14th, and they began making arrests.
The weapons that were seized, the charges that were laid were deeply concerning.
And I can't comment on any aspect of that matter now before the courts, but I can tell you it was deeply concerning.
And that's not to suggest, I want to be very clear, that's not to suggest that I came to believe that everyone involved in these protests was potentially armed, but it was deeply concerning that embedded within that protest in Alberta was the number of people.
Did it have any effect on your view of the likelihood or the risk level that there would be acts of serious violence against persons or property in Ontario when you learned on February 13 of the theft of a trailer of 2,000 guns near Peterborough, Ontario?
Yeah, that was concerning and we were getting information from the police.
I'm aware as well that subsequently it was determined that that was not related to the protest activities, but in the moment of their theft and not knowing where they were, it was concerning that there was that many guns out there in unknown hands.
Thank you.
I'd like to ask you about a subject some of the lawyers in this inquiry have repeatedly asked witnesses about, and that is whether or not you believe in the rule of law.
I've spent my whole life upholding the rule of law, sir, so yes, I do.
Does the rule of law include the sense that citizens will generally acknowledge and abide by the law of their own volition?
I think overwhelmingly in our country, the vast majority of Canadians embrace the rule of law.
It's frankly part of our social contract, that we all agree that these are the laws and that we will all obey them.
What happens to the capacity of police to do their jobs if the vast majority of people do not voluntarily abide by the law?
I can advise it.
It can be very difficult.
If a large number of people choose not to obey the law, the capacity of the police, and frankly, I don't think it's necessary or appropriate for the police to charge everybody, it would overwhelm our criminal justice system.
You couldn't bring all those people before the court.
I think the law works best when it's done with the consent of the people, and we all agree to abide by those rules in how we treat each other and how we live together.
Do you see that if large numbers of Canadians repeatedly and for extended periods refuse or fail to abide by laws, by court orders, and so forth, do you think this has any effect on the willingness of other Canadians to follow the law themselves?
I remain optimistic, and I would hope that the vast majority of Canadians would understand the importance of the rule of law.
It's foundational to our society.
We talk about peace, order, good government, and Canada is one of the safest large countries in the world.
I think that one of the reasons that...
It is such a livable country.
It's because we all agree that the rule of law is important and should prevail.
But let's say that they didn't.
Let's say that large numbers of Canadians for a long period of time declined to obey the law, to abide by court orders, and so forth.
Do you think that there would be a greater likelihood that others would take the law into their own hands, so to speak?
I think when people lose confidence in the rule of law, when they lose confidence in their police services to uphold and maintain the rule of law, when they lose confidence in the criminal justice system to provide justice for everyone, when that confidence is lost, then I think it's far more likely that people will ignore the law and would engage in criminal behavior.
And in that situation, do you see that it has any effect on the likelihood that there will be serious acts of violence committed by someone or other?
I think as we saw the persistence of clearly unlawful and disorderly behaviors around these convoys, I think the situation, in my opinion, was escalating towards a greater likelihood of a violent outcome.
All right.
I want to ask about one more area, which is with respect to, and Mr. Cameron had asked about something.
This to some extent earlier, and I think you'd referenced it as well in later testimony.
But it's with respect to the implementation or execution of the ultimate public order operation that occurred in Ottawa specifically after the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
I wonder if we could call up pb.can.401805 _REL01 and it will be at 1 minute 35 seconds.
And while this is coming up, Minister, in this inquiry there have been some evidence or suggestion that the enforcement operation in the City of Ottawa on February 18th and following was conducted in an excessively brutal fashion.
One witness, I believe, suggested that they couldn't believe that something like this was happening in Canada.
Did you observe the public order operation?
At any time?
Yes, sir, I did.
And if we could, when we get to the 135 mark, I'm going to show you what appears to be drone footage taken by the RCMP to record the execution of the public order operation on the 19th.
I'll just let you observe that for a moment and then ask your comment on the execution and whether it is up to snuff.
Thank you.
And I'll note as we go that it appears that in a certain point the footage will be sped up and that'll be indicated on the screen.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Is this what that appears to be, sir, as a film of that public order operation?
Yes, sir.
If you can stop the video there.
Would you tell us your views on whether that represents a well-executed public order operation?
I've been involved in many, sir.
Again, I describe that type of behavior as textbook.
I believe that the officers...
We're responding in a very proportional and measured way.
One of the things that happens in any public order event, if you line the police officers up, there will be some people that will come and push against them.
And clearly the police had adequate resources and a clear plan and were moving people out.
I was particularly impressed as I watched that, that the protesters were given paths of egress so that they could leave.
And that's really important when you're trying to clear a street.
That you give people a reasonable point of exit from that street.
The other thing that I would observe is the presence of those vehicles.
I think even as I watched this, the police were dealing with a unique challenge because those vehicles, in many cases, still present in that event.
But I thought the way in which they managed the movement of those people was entirely proportionate.
And I look very carefully.
I personally did not see anything that I would characterize as excessive force.
There is a minimal amount of force that is necessary to affect that purpose, and that's what I believe I witnessed.
Are you aware of whether the public order operation that occurred in Ottawa resulted in any deaths or serious bodily injuries to members of the public or to members of the police?
I'm not aware of that.
I've seen absolutely no evidence or indication of that.
Thank you.
So those are my questions.
Okay.
Any re-examination?
Thank you, Commissioner.
With your leave, I have just one area that I'd like to explore with the witness.
Go ahead.
It shouldn't take more than a few minutes.
Minister Blair, at a point earlier in the evening when you were being asked some questions by Council for Alberta, You discussed the possibility, you discussed the fact that you were facing a vote in the House and you thought a letter from Alberta might be useful in garnering some support in that cause.
And I'd like to ask you about, in general, the efforts that you made to...
To gain support for either that vote or just generally public opinion in terms of the invocation of the Act.
And so if I could ask the Clerk to call up this document, OPP 404583.
And when you get it to go to page 54. That's it.
PDF54 should have...
Yes, there we are.
Thank you.
This isn't an exchange that you're involved in.
Minister Blair, but you're mentioned in it.
Commissioner Karik is in green.
On the right of the screen, and Commissioner Lockie is in blue on the left of the screen.
And she says this, the text begins with something that appears just a continuation of an earlier conversation, and then she says, "Has Minister Blair hit you up for a letter to support the EA?" And I guess the first question is, did you hit up Commissioner Karik for a letter to support the EA?
And we're using that colloquially, and we wouldn't be suggesting there was necessarily anything wrong in you having contacted Commissioner Karik.
I personally believe it would have been wrong.
I know Tom Karik.
We're friends.
I would not have called Commissioner Karik or any other police chief to seek their support for...
I did have conversations.
There are a number of organizations, police chief organizations, who are advocacy organizations.
The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, Justice, and the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police.
I'm quite familiar with those organizations.
I was previously the president of both.
Those organizations are advocates for policing and public safety.
And yes, we did receive support from the OACP and the CACP, but I did not.
I have no idea what Commissioner Luckey was referring to there, but I would have considered it entirely inappropriate to call Commissioner Karik.
I didn't call the chief of my old service.
I did reach out to the associations through the executive directors, not chiefs of police, to allow those associations.
To comment, and they said whatever they said.
I also had communication with the president of the Canadian Police Association, which represents all the police unions in Canada, and all three organizations, the CPA, the OACP, and the CACP, all sent very strong letters of support for the Emergencies Act and the measures that were provided.
Well, as in some other instances, you've followed right to the end of my line of questions, and so thank you, Commissioner.
That completes the questions on that topic.
Okay, thank you.
If I can just ask a few short questions, and some of them it's for a little clarification.
And I know it's been a long afternoon, evening.
I just want to confirm the...
The point you made about the Police Services Act and requesting the OPP assist, the difference there is, as I understood it, and I just want to be sure I have the right note, is the OPP is required to assist, as opposed to other police services, including the RCMP.
Would lightly support or help, but the difference is requirement.
Am I right about that?
My understanding of the act, sir, is that the OPP, if a chief believes an emergency exceeds their capacity and they ask the OPP for help, that the OPP commissioner is required.
They can also ask another municipal police service or First Nations Police Service.
Who do have in the legislation, as I understand it, and this legislation has been amended a few times, so I stand to be corrected, but I believe this is still correct, those municipal police services could decline.
Interestingly enough, the Ontario Police Services Act is completely silent to the RCMP.
And that, I mean, is that because policing is a provincial responsibility?
Yes, sir.
I believe that's true.
And certainly...
The police of jurisdiction in seven of our provinces, for example, are the RCMP serving under contract to the provincial authority.
But in Ontario, the RCMP have a very important policing role in Ontario and in Quebec.
They provide federal policing services.
They do Tier 1 investigations.
They do money laundering.
They head up the integrated national security and enforcement teams.
Those are very important RCMP responsibilities, but they also...
Quite routinely, will come and help other police services with the deployment of their uniformed officers.
Another question, and this is about the relationship between the Solicitor General and the OPP, or you, not you, but in your former role over the RCMP, or even police services boards.
I guess to use a concrete example, is it appropriate in your view or could it be that the board or the Solicitor General indicate its priority?
And to use a specific, would it be improper for the Solicitor General of Ontario to have said there are big problems in Ottawa and in Windsor?
Our view is Windsor is more important.
It's of course up to you, but...
As far as the province is concerned, our priority is Windsor, but it's your decision.
And, sir, I believe that is an operational decision.
The decision you just described and the deployment of their people, I believe that's the responsibility of the commissioner in this case and would be inappropriate to receive direction.
Direction, and if I may, I'll just give you a quick example.
When I was the public safety minister, I only issued one direction to the commissioner of the RCMP, and it was a ministerial directive in writing, which I made public, and it was to require that they respond to AATIP requests.
In a timely way.
And that was it.
And I was very careful not to sort of wade into this issue of operations.
So just to pursue that, so in this case, even though it was just what the province would like, but it's up to him, that you think would still constitute interference?
I think ultimately, in my opinion, the decision as to where he can safely deploy his people and do his job, It's an operational decision that I personally would have deferred to the Commissioner.
And then there was a question you answered about whether you were aware that Commissioner Luckey had said that there were still police tools available that had not been fully utilized.
I was not made aware.
I've subsequently heard through this inquiry that that information was available, but I was not aware of it at that cabinet meeting.
Now, leaving aside Commissioner Luckey's comments, were you aware that the police had tools available to it that they had not utilized?
I believe that, I always believe, quite frankly, that the police have to utilize all of the tools that are available to them.
And where they have an existing authority, then that authority is the one that should stand.
But I had also come to believe, sir, that there were a number of circumstances and challenges that the police were facing where they did not have the appropriate tools to deal with it.
They had not asked specifically, and had not certainly asked me, specifically for those tools, but they had indicated the insufficiency of their existing authorities and tools, and had indicated that I believe was necessary for us to remedy and address.
Okay, the...
You...
You made a mention, and I'm not sure I've got the correct note, when you were talking about the deficiencies or the tools that were added by the Emergencies Act.
You talked about the financial and the Fintrac, and you mentioned the tow trucks.
I'm just trying to...
You did mention designated spaces, and I'm just trying to understand, because we've had a fair amount of evidence here.
Let's just say I'm not quite clear.
For sake of argument, on whether the common law powers to create exclusive zones, exclusion zones, was adequate to deal with the Ottawa situation or whether it required the Act, the Emergencies Act.
Yes, sir.
And I've actually given some consideration to that.
I was a little bit concerned with the agreement that the city had attempted to enter into it.
It frankly kind of quickly fell apart because they had suggested that, you know, the trucks would park on Wellington and Sir John A. and out of the residential area.
I understand their motivation, but I was concerned it had the effect of potentially giving permission for those trucks to remain on Wellington and Sir John A., which I think could have been problematic.
I was also very mindful of the challenge that Windsor had experienced because this had taken place in a municipal intersection and our ability to designate that space because of its, I think, significant impact and vulnerability for critical infrastructure that we needed to go beyond simply the tools of a municipal bylaw and potentially take a more proactive stance with respect to that.
I am, of course.
Familiar with the common law authorities, one of the challenges of common law authorities is they're not always clearly understood or articulated, and they're always subject to challenge.
And I think some particularity with respect to defining those spaces could prove useful to the police to effect their purpose.
And when you did the G20, were there problems with the creation of exclusion zones?
There was indeed, sir.
And it needs to be very carefully defined and very carefully communicated.
Okay, well, thank you very much for, if nothing else, for your endurance.
And thank you for coming.
And that ends the examination and your testimony.
So thank you and have a good evening.
We're going to adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9.30.
And we'll have, I think, two new witnesses tomorrow.
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