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Nov. 16, 2022 - Viva & Barnes
08:25:48
Emergencies Act Inquiry CONTINUED! Nov. 16, 2022 (and I got a new modem!) Viva Frei
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They had the staff there that were trained to do that type of function.
Right.
So a resource diversion, basically.
And lastly, the other main port of entry where blockade happened was Pacific Highway.
We touched on that briefly, but I understand, and this is from your colleague, Nina Patel, who's the Regional General Director of the Pacific Division or the Pacific Region.
And in her interview summary, which we don't need to pull up, but for the record, it's WTS 6045.
Traffic was rerouted from Pacific Highway on February 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th.
Is that right?
I believe so, yes.
And they were redirected to the neighboring ports of entry of Aldergrove, which is about 20 kilometers away from Pacific Highway.
That's correct.
And Huntington, which is about 40 kilometers away.
That's correct.
And I understand that Aldergrove and Huntington are commercial ports of entry.
I don't believe Aldergrove is, but I could be wrong.
I think your colleague Nita Patel said that they were, they just didn't have the same commercial vehicle capacity as Pacific Highway.
Yeah, they might not have had the same number of lanes available for processing.
Yeah, that's exactly right.
So in the email that we showed you earlier, which we don't need to pull up again, but it's the email where you advise Minister Mendicino in regards to the Couth's port of entry.
Do you recall that?
Yes.
And you also advised him that at 11.05 p.m. local time on February 14th, the RCMP had successfully cleared and opened north and southbound roads at the Pacific Highway for the resumption of traffic.
Is that right?
That's correct.
And so the traffic flow had resumed and there were very few protesters remaining on site, which is what you advised him of.
Yes.
Sorry?
Yes.
Thank you.
And so you've mentioned that when traffic is diverted, there's an increase in border wait times.
Truckers have to drive longer to get to their destinations.
In the case of Ambassador Bridge, thank you.
In the case of Ambassador Bridge, There were some impacts on supply chains?
Absolutely.
I think it's closer to 200 kilometers away from Ambassador Bridge to the Blue Water Bridge.
The Blue Water Bridge has seven commercial lanes compared to the Ambassador's 15. Given the fact that processing time takes the same, you're trying to squeeze more volume through a smaller sort of sieve, if you will.
And at one point I heard reports that the traffic lineup was 10 kilometers long at the Blue Water Bridge.
So it had a significant impact.
And there was a significant or specific impact on the automobile industry.
Is that right?
Absolutely.
Just because of the just-in-time manufacturing sector in Southern Ontario where the whole process is set up to not have inventory on hand but have it delivered as it's required.
So it's very finely tuned.
Right.
The Ambassador Bridge blockade was cleared up on February 13th as a result of enforcement action, is that right?
I think it was February 14th we reopened.
Right, you reopened on February 14th, but because the protesters had cleared on February 13th.
That's correct.
Right.
Overall, would you say that the CBSA responded well to these blockades?
I was very proud of the way the organization responded to it.
I mean, I think that I can't emphasize enough how unpredictable and escalating this was for us.
And it was more than just the ports of entry that you're referring to.
And certainly, when you look through our institutional report, this was literally from coast to coast.
And obviously, some suffered more severe disruptions than others, but it really...
Kept us on our toes in terms of trying to anticipate and work with our American colleagues in the local police and jurisdiction to make sure that we could continue to manage the border effectively.
Right.
And CBSA, you'd say, took active steps to mitigate the impacts?
Absolutely.
And it staffed alternative ports of entry as well?
That and as well worked with all police and jurisdiction.
If they were going to set up a command center, we would embed ourselves in there so we had good situational awareness.
To the point, you know, the port hardening that we talked about earlier in terms of installing cameras to make sure that officers were safe in their operating environment, working with their U.S. colleagues so they could understand what they might need to do in terms of reallocating their resources.
So it was a very busy time.
Right.
And as we talked about earlier, CBSA was able to successfully divert much of the commercial traffic, not all of it, especially at Ambassador Bridge, but a lot of it, due to the steps that it took.
Yes.
I'm going to now turn to your role specifically during the convoy.
So as president of the CBSA, you were first in command, is that right?
That's true.
And you reported to Cabinet?
I reported to the Minister of Public Safety.
And that's because CBSA falls within the general umbrella of public safety, is that right?
All of the deputy heads report directly to the minister.
To the minister, you mean Minister Mendicino?
Yes.
And deputy heads, you mean of the agencies that fall within public safety's men?
Yes, so CSIS, RCMP, CBSA, Fractional Service.
Right.
How did you report to him?
So was it oral briefings, written briefings?
Emails, text messages, oral briefings, written briefings, yes.
And how often?
Very frequently.
A few times a day?
Yes.
And your second in command was your executive vice president, who at the time was Ted Gallivan?
Correct.
So I understand that you attended meetings throughout with officials and at the political level.
That's correct.
You attended Deputy Minister Committee on Operational Coordination meetings, and we refer to those.
And sometimes I understand you sent Mr. Gallivan as your delegate to those meetings?
That's correct.
Okay, so you didn't attend all of those?
Correct.
And you also attended meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Safety, Security and Emergencies.
Is that right?
Yes.
And we refer to that as the SSE.
And so there were three meetings, the third, the sixth, and the eighth.
Did you attend all of those meetings?
I don't recall exactly which ones.
I think you attended the third and the sixth, and Mr. Gallivan attended the eighth.
Does that refresh your memory?
That sounds right.
Okay.
And you also attended meetings of the Incident Response Group?
I did.
And those occurred on the 10th, 12th, and 13th, and then every day from the 15th to the 23rd, I understand?
I believe so, yes.
Do you recall whether you attended all of those meetings or only some?
I think most of them, but I don't think I was all of them.
Okay.
And if you weren't at one of those meetings, you would have sent your delegate, I see?
Yes, I would have.
And you also attended some of the FPT-CPPC meetings, which is the Federal Provincial Territorial Crime Prevention and Policing Committee.
Is that right?
That's correct.
So I'm actually going to take you to a readout of that committee's, one of the meetings of that committee, which happened on February 7th.
So that's SAS 8012.
Mr. Clark, please.
And if we go down to page two.
So we see that you gave an update here.
Major commercial vehicle traffic in Alberta.
One lane open.
Still protesters there, but allowing through.
Presumably allowing some traffic through.
And normally double other areas.
Ambassador Bridge blocking in Windsor, Detroit area.
Major port of entry blocked.
Is a police of jurisdiction issue.
Working with POJ.
To share intel, but comes down to enforcement.
Ready to work with PT partners to share what we know.
We'll continue to work with them.
Do you recall this?
Yes.
Is this the type of update that you would have typically provided at these meetings?
Yeah, just to sort of give everyone situational awareness of what we were seeing and hearing and what potentially might happen.
Right.
If we go down to page three.
Keep going.
Keep going.
It might be a bit lower.
Keep going.
There we go.
Sorry, page four.
So you say, issue is large trucks, tow trucks, and cannot compel drivers.
Emergencies acts could be used to compel.
So we've heard a lot of evidence throughout this inquiry that there was an issue procuring tow trucks and that one of the powers that the Emergencies Act provided was for the police to be able to compel those tow truck drivers to assist.
So this is on February 7th.
Does this mean that you were contemplating the use of the Emergencies Act as early as February 7th?
No, in fact, when I saw this readout, I looked at that and I was looking at the plural of that.
And I think in the context of the call with the FPT meeting that we were having, we were talking about provincial emergency powers that could be brought to bear to compel tow trucks.
And your understanding with that provincial emergency powers could be used to compel tow trucks?
I wasn't sure who had them.
I understood afterwards that Alberta actually had that power, but I wasn't sure who else might have that power.
And when you say Alberta might have had that power, what do you mean by that?
Under their Emergency Act.
Is that the Critical Infrastructure Defense Act?
No, I think that's another act that they have the ability.
Their Provincial Emergency?
Yeah.
Okay.
And your understanding was that other provinces may or may not have had?
I think that's what we were trying to discuss here, was how could we get these tow trucks into action.
Was there ever any follow-up on that?
Not that I'm aware of.
Okay.
To be clear, we had no authority to procure tow trucks at the CBSA ourselves.
We had a very limited role that we'll probably discuss later with respect to helping tow trucks come in from the United States because of an agreement that we have with USCVP for emergency vehicles.
Right.
Well, we can discuss it now.
So I understand that, effectively, CBSA's role could have been not the procurement of tow trucks, but facilitating immigration.
For those tow trucks to come assist, is that right?
Yeah, so normally there would be, to bring a vehicle like that into work in Canada, you need a work permit.
And so what we would do is say we would waive that requirement in the sense of the emergency agreement that we have and allow them in and make sure still that they weren't, you know, unable to enter so that they didn't have any serious criminality issues and weren't bringing guns with them or anything like that.
Right.
And did you provide that assistance for any of the ports of entry?
We did in Windsor, yes.
And do you recall if tow trucks actually came over the bridge?
They did.
Yes.
Okay.
Any other ports of entry?
No.
All right.
So, Mr. Clerk, if we could pull up SSM NSC CAN.
Five zeros, two, one, four.
So while Mr. Clerk is pulling that up, Mr. Osowski, this is the meeting minutes from the February 12th IRG meeting, which you attended.
Mr. Clerk is on page six, please.
And keep going down.
Sorry, page seven.
So we see here at the bottom that it says the Prime Minister asked for an update on other POEs and what is being done to prevent further disruptions.
The Minister of Public Safety and President of CBSA, that was you, confirmed that there is real-time reporting in all critical POEs and ongoing engagement with local law enforcement.
If an authority or asset gap is identified, departments remain ready to respond.
Currently, it remains only three blocked POEs.
There was an attempt to block the Pacific Highway, but police successfully thwarted this attempt.
So I have a couple of questions about this.
What was meant by if an authority or asset gap is identified, departments remain ready to respond?
Well, just whatever we had within our authority to sort of deal with the situation and collectively with respect to all of the partner departments.
I don't recall seeing this language before, but I would say that I was referring to the fact that we were looking collectively as Deputy Ministers at the time in terms of any authorities or asset gaps to resolve the situation.
Right.
And when you say currently, it remains only the three blocked POEs.
This is on February 12th.
So which ports of entry are you referring to here?
Let's turn to my report here.
So I think it would have been the Ambassador Bridge, Emerson...
Presumably Coutts.
Yes, Coutts.
right yeah okay so emerson ambassador bridge coots it's on page 54 of our institutional report all of the disruptions on february 12th great thank you and then if we can go to ssm can So
the Prime Minister asked the Minister of Public Safety to outline additional actions that could be taken by federal authorities to deal with and prevent further blockades.
Do you recall this?
Yes.
And the Minister of Public Safety explained that great progress had been made in clearing and securing the Ambassador Bridge.
But that there was no definitive timeline for reopening.
Correct.
But as we established earlier, the Ambassador Bridge was reopened the next day.
Yes.
And he also noted that enforcement actions were occurring in Coutts and Emerson.
Do you recall this?
Yes.
And lastly, and we'll skip the part about Ottawa, at the Blue Water Bridge crossing, the CBSA had also doubled its capacity for commercial vehicles, allowing carriers Additional corridors for cross-border trade.
Is that right?
Correct.
And that was in response to the Ambassador Bridge blockade?
Yes.
So that was the update that Minister Mendicino provided.
Did you also contribute anything to this meeting?
Generally, at these meetings, I would have provided any situational updates in terms of what was happening at ports of entry and or what we might have gathered in terms of potential disruptions that would be happening in the near future.
And when Minister Mendicino gives an update like this, is the information that he's conveying, information that you have briefed him up on?
Yes.
In the context of your daily touching base?
Yeah, and /or reports that we would have shared with the minister's office and public safety as well as other departments.
And what kind of reports were those?
We provided a number of different reports, situational update reports, called bluff reports, bottom line upfront reports, that were very real-time in nature.
Right, and the Border Operations Center situational reports that we talked about earlier, those as well?
Yes.
So those were sent to both Minister Mendicino's office and Public Safety?
Yes.
Okay, I'd like to now ask you questions about the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
And sorry, the decision to invoke the Emergencies Act.
So earlier, we talked about how you and some of the other deputy ministers discussed alternative authorities that could be used.
Is that right?
Yes.
And in one of your deputy minister briefing talking point packages, which I understand are binders prepared for you.
Either for DMOCs or IRGs, is that right?
Correct.
We don't need to pull it up, but the reference for the record is SSM NSC CAN 321.
And so that briefing package says that the CBSA considered various avenues as deterrents.
So the Nexus trusted trader status of a commercial driver, cancellation of FAS applications, and other options.
This is not the first time that those options had been raised.
Is that right?
I believe so, yes.
It was not the first time?
I don't think it was the first time, no.
Right, because this was February 13th.
and if we go to february 10th which actually we will pull this one up ssm can four zeros two three so this is a Email from Mike Jones, who is Minister Mendocino's Chief of Staff, is that right?
Correct.
To Mike Macca from Transport, Samantha Khalil from PMO, and Zeta, who is Bill Blair's Chief of Staff, is that right?
Correct.
And he says, I've received these enforcement options from CBSA, which I've asked for more context around.
I understand that it is part of a broader effort to provide options to the clerk.
I'm tracking down from my side and Z is going to check in with the NSIA.
So the clerk here would be the clerk of the Privy Council, is that right?
I assume so.
And then he goes on to list some of the options that we just talked about.
So the Trusted Trader Program, Trusted Traveler Program, Nexus, and others.
Do you know whatever happened to those deterrent options that you put on the table?
Well, I think we ended up dismissing the trusted trader programs because these are administered bilaterally with the United States.
And so we just weren't sure that we could do something very expeditiously here in terms of what's referenced above as the good character clause for these participants in the program and try and leverage that so that they would be aware that there was consequences for their participation in the protests.
And then as well, the designated international trade corridors.
There, I think I would just point out that ports of entry up until the invocation of the EMA and the regulations was not a critical infrastructure.
And certainly the trade corridors, the highways were not federal.
There also are provincial responsibilities.
And so the designation of the routes to and from the ports of entry were an important aspect.
Right.
Right.
So the EMRs designated the ports of entry and the trade corridors as critical infrastructure.
Yes.
And we won't pull it up, pursuant to Section 6 made those exclusion zones.
Is that right?
Yes.
So ultimately, none of these options ever went anywhere.
Well, except for the trade corridor piece.
Right.
Yes.
Right.
Because of the Emergencies Act.
I mean prior to the Emergencies Act.
No.
And did you play a role in the decision to invoke the Emergencies Act?
I simply provided advice from the CBSA perspective in terms of managing the border.
Can you elaborate on that?
Well, the one thing that we identified a gap in the sense that as we were starting to get to the point of declaring the protest a prohibited protest that There was no ability for us to stop people from coming and foreign nationals from coming in and participate in that protest if they were otherwise able to enter.
So they met all the other program requirements, Quarantine Act requirements, whatever else may be involved.
So we identified that as a gap.
And when you say we identified, you mean you reported it to Cabinet?
Well, first through, obviously, through the Deputy Minister, colleagues, and then ultimately to Cabinet, yes.
Right.
But you were not asked for your advice on invoking the Emergencies Act or directly for your input?
No.
So you never advised any of the cabinet members whether they should or should not invoke the Emergencies Act?
No.
And so you just identified this legislative gap to cabinet.
And you explained that the gap was that there was no authority to turn somebody away.
In relation to wanting to participate in a lawful protest.
Is that right?
Correct.
I was surprised to know at that time that we couldn't do that.
That a foreign national could enter the country for the purpose of participating in a protest.
Right.
And the CBSA was concerned with this legislative gap in allowing foreign nationals to come into the country to participate in a peaceful protest?
Well, I think collectively when you look at the tools that we were discussing.
At that point in time, we were trying to de-energize the situation and obviously allowing people to continue to come into the country for the purpose of participating in a protest was inconsistent with that.
And was it your understanding that many U.S. or foreign nationals were coming into the country to participate in the protest?
Well, certainly as part of the enhanced vigilance exam process that we invoked before the Emergencies Act, we turned away people that intended to come and participate in a protest or we suspected were.
were going to participate in a protest, but it was only because they weren't vaccinated or didn't meet up with some other programs.
Right, so they would go to secondary and be turned away because they didn't meet the requirements of the Quarantine Act, for example.
Did the CVSA consider whether they had the authority to turn away foreign nationals on the basis that they wanted to participate in an unlawful protest?
I don't quite understand the question because it's not a prohibition on entry under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to come in and participate in a protest.
So what the EMR added to was to our abilities under both the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for a new prohibition on entry.
Right, but the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act would...
It does set out...
Admissibility, inadmissibility criteria, right?
Yes.
And if somebody went to the border and there was reasonable grounds or they were suspected to go want to be admitted to Canada to engage in unlawful activity, would that be sufficient basis to turn them away?
Certainly, if the officer felt that they weren't here for a lawful purpose, you can turn them away.
But if someone showed up at the border today, And said, I want to come to Ottawa to protest something.
That's not a reason to prohibit their entry if they're otherwise admissible.
Right.
So the issue, the legislative gap was specific to turning foreign nationals away who wanted to participate in a lawful, peaceful protest.
In an unlawful protest.
What was defined in the act as a prohibited protest, I believe, is the language.
Right.
So I guess what I'm getting at is it seems like the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act would have already given the CBSA that power at the point in which the protests were deemed to have been unlawful.
Not specifically, because it wasn't a specific prohibition on entry into the country.
What do you mean by that?
It wasn't part of...
The ERPA tools that were available to officers to exercise.
So we don't know where you're going to go once you've come in.
Right.
But if there were reasonable grounds or there was a suspicion that that was their destination, then that would be a sufficient basis to turn them away.
I believe so.
You're assuming that they're going to tell us the truth about where they're going.
Right.
Border services officers are trained to assess whether somebody is telling the truth or not?
Yes.
Right.
So, you talked briefly about how a lot of foreign nationals were turned away because they didn't meet the requirements under the Quarantine Act, whether they weren't vaccinated, for example.
And my co-counsel will get into this further, so I'll leave that to him.
But I guess my question is whether that was sufficient to attenuate the CBSA's concerns that foreign nationals were entering to participate in the protests.
The idea that they would most likely be turned away pursuant to the Quarantine Act.
Requirements?
Well, as I said, I think we were fortunate in that we had these other prohibitions on entry at play to prevent people from coming in and participating, but there were people that came in that met all of the requirements and could have gone to the protest.
Right.
Okay, thank you.
So I only have about five minutes left before I'm going to turn it over to Mr. Cameron.
So I just want to pull up one last document, and that's Mr. Clerk, COM50670.
So this is the Government Section 58 explanation.
Are you familiar with this document?
Yes.
Did you have any role in drafting it?
I think we might have given some factual inputs that were used later on in the document with respect to sort of the situation at the border.
Okay, so inputs, but you didn't hold the pen?
No, absolutely not.
Right.
So if we go to page seven.
Yeah, right there.
So just a little bit.
up just where it says in addition it says um it describes two events where it's that occurred one at the pacific highway port of entry one in fort erie and it says that at those two locations protesters had breached the confines of the cbsa plaza resulting in cbsa officers thank you mr commissioner Locking down the office to prevent additional protesters from gaining entry.
So the event at Fort Erie happened on the 12th, is that right?
I believe so, yes.
And according to a situational report, it was 120 vehicles that converged in the area of the Peace Bridge, is that right?
I believe so, yes.
And protesters accessed the CBSA Plaza, which I understand to mean sort of the parking lot.
Yeah, the buildings, yeah.
Right.
On foot.
And then it says that police and the CBSA were able to direct the protesters to leave after 20 minutes.
Is that right?
Well, the officers, in the case of Fort Erie, locked down the building because they were trying to get access to the building.
And I think the building was locked down for 12 hours.
And I would just actually make a correction here that in Pacific Highway, there was a vehicle that you may recall, there was pictures of in the media that had sort of military camouflage paint that breached a barrier, but I don't believe that they actually locked down the building in the Pacific Highway region.
Right, and we have evidence from Dwayne McDonald, who's the commander for the E-Division of the RCMP, and he describes the event basically as a...
Exactly as you've just put it so that there was sort of a painted vehicle that crossed a threshold, but it wasn't a breach per se.
Yes.
And he also observed that the media reports on that specific event were not accurate.
Would you agree with that?
I couldn't speculate without reading them.
Yes.
Okay.
Do you have any doubt to any reason to doubt his evidence?
No.
And just for the record, I'll note that that's WTS 6069 at page 20, which is the RCMP panel witness summary, and Dwayne McDonald's evidence is in there.
So, my last question for you, before I turn it over to my colleague, is that the Section 58 explanation also talks broadly about the economic impacts of the border blockades.
And I understand that CBSA itself did not conduct any analysis on the economic impacts.
Is that right?
That's correct.
We just simply track the number of conveyances that cross the border.
And as well, we do something else called value for duty, but that wouldn't be used for any kind of real economic value impact analysis.
Okay.
Did you say value for duty?
Yeah.
Okay.
And who did you provide that data to?
All of that data is provided as a matter, of course, to other government departments, Department of Finance, Statistics Canada, other entities that sort of track these types of things.
And so they would have then undertaken the economic analysis based on your data.
Okay, thank you so much, Mr. Osowski.
Those are all my questions.
I'm going to pass it over to Mr. Cameron now.
Okay, thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Good morning, sir.
My name is Gordon Cameron.
I have just a few questions to finish off your examination by Commission Council this morning.
Let me begin just so that I don't get it wrong for the whole examination that I do.
Do you prefer Osowski or Osowski?
Osowski.
Thank you.
I'll apologize if I speak in the present tense because I acknowledge you've since retired.
So if I talk to you as if you're still in charge of CBSA.
I still feel like I am.
Make the time change on my behalf.
But certainly when you were at CBSA, CBSA had and you would have had overall responsibility as its President or Deputy Minister, the Intelligence and Enforcement Branch?
That's correct.
And am I correct?
I'm just going by website information, so if I get it wrong, please correct me.
Ted Gallivan, as Executive Vice President, would have had that under his purview as well?
No, at the time it would have been Vice President Scott Harris that was in charge of the Intelligence and Enforcement Branch.
Thank you.
Tell me briefly why CBSA has an intelligence and enforcement branch.
So what that branch is responsible for is giving the frontline the situational awareness in terms of targeting, for example.
So we have a targeting center and where we do And try to add value to officers on the front line in terms of things that they need to be aware of.
So, for example, if law enforcement partners want lookouts on the system, they're the ones that would sort of manage that type of thing if somebody's of interest coming into the country or leaving the country.
They would be the relationship lead with all of the other national security partners on intelligence that would be...
Important in terms of the day-to-day functioning of the border.
They're also responsible for the removals of people that are found to be inadmissible to Canada after they've gone through their due process.
So it's a complicated job.
And it's a fairly substantial department within CVSA?
The branch?
Yes.
Yes, it is.
And they produce...
What we've learned to call intelligence products for use by CBSA management and personnel?
Well, I would say that in terms of the national security apparatus, we're largely a consumer of intelligence.
So they would, as I said, be liaising with other partners domestically and abroad.
To create products that would be useful to the frontline in terms of how they're managing the border on a day-to-day basis.
Fair enough.
So they would take in information and distill from it the information that's most likely to be relevant to CBSA's mandate and then distribute it within the organization?
Correct.
Thank you.
And it seems just by instinct that the two concerns here will be Using that intelligence and those assessments to protect the security of Canada in terms of people who might be coming into the country and to protect your personnel who have to deal with these situations on the front line.
Absolutely.
Thank you.
Now, you produced for the Commission, helpfully, a series of these.
Situational reports and intelligence assessments, if I can use that term.
And I'd like to call up the first of these, if I could, Mr. Clerk, SSM NSC CAN 7068.
I say the first, it isn't the first sequentially, it's just the first I'm going to refer to.
And we can see that this is a situational report for February 14th at 10:30 in the morning.
Is this type of report that you're familiar with Mr. Ozoski?
That's correct.
And if the clerk can just scroll down the page so that people looking at the screen can see that just the type of content in this sort of report we see.
A description of each of several ports of entry and keep going.
Mr. Clerk, I'm going to ask you to ultimately to get through to page 8, but just scrolling through, people can see the type of statistical and observational analysis that this type of report would give to your personnel for the objectives we just described.
And when we get through to page 8, there's a table.
And then a heading, Intelligence and Law Enforcement.
Sorry, Intelligence and Enforcement.
And then underneath that, a heading, Intelligence Landscape.
And I'm going to make the point of observing the parenthetical comment, updates in red, close brackets.
And then the first heading there is BLUFF.
Can you tell us what that acronym is for, if you remember?
Bottom Line Up Front.
Okay.
Bottom Line Up Front.
So it's a compact presentation at the top of the assessment that gives the high-level view.
Yeah.
I mean, this was an evergreen document, and so it was just so you don't have to scroll through the entire thing every day.
You can get to the...
To the bottom line.
Very quickly.
Right.
And the words there, as of February 14th, 2022, at 08:30 Eastern Time, the overall threat to CVS officers and infrastructure is low.
And this is February 14th, so the convoy and the protests have been going on for more than a couple of weeks.
I wonder if you can confirm for me, because it's certainly the impression that Commission Council got, that that had been the bluff in these reports throughout February.
That is exactly as it appears there.
Is that your recollection, too?
Yeah, I don't think it ever changed from low.
And I would say overall, we're looking at the entire national picture here, right, as opposed to little things that might be happening at...
Individual ports of entry, but overall the threat was low for the entire period.
Thank you.
And if I just may add, what I'm really referring to here is, and it says officers and infrastructure, but that is our domain, right?
So there's obviously a duty of care responsibility to the officers to make sure that they're trained and operating in a safe environment and as well that the infrastructure itself is properly protected.
Thank you.
That's actually a very helpful addition for the...
Point I'd like to see if we can learn from the next document.
And so, Mr. Clerk, if you could pull up same prefix, but 1519 SSM NSC CAN four zeros 1519.
18. And so here we have the situational report.
And you'll recall that the last one was for 10.30 in the morning.
We are now at 4 p.m. in the afternoon, correct?
That's correct.
And was it typical for the situational reports, at least during, you'll note that it's a situational report specific to the COVID-19 mandate protests.
Was it typical, and it's our impression from your documents, that these would be produced twice a day, one in the morning and one in the afternoon?
That's my recollection.
And again, Mr. Clerk, if we can just scroll through and take us down to page 8. Again, the same type of situational analysis of the various crossings with tables and statistics and maps and whatnot.
Then we get, again, our bluff bottom line up front.
And we have the same statement as we saw in the last one, and that, as you confirmed, had been in all of the bluff, bottom line, encapsulations of intelligence and enforcement at this time, February 14, 2022, though now, later in the day, the overall threat to CBS officers and infrastructure is low.
But there's now an addition.
And the addition to this bluff is there has been a significant operational impact that may result in a threat to Canada's economic security and prosperity.
Now, you know why you're here today, and we've all been watching the progress of events in the first couple of months of February, so you'll appreciate the significance of the date, February 14th, right?
Yes.
As the date that the government invoked the Emergencies Act?
Yes.
And do you recognize that language there has been a significant operational impact that may result in a threat to Canada's economic security and prosperity as language that is lifted from the Section 58 justification that Canada used for the invocation of the Emergencies Act?
I'm not aware that it's exactly the same language, but if you say so.
No, I'm not going to say it's the same language, so let me put it this way.
It's the concept that you will have been familiar with as having been part of the Section 58 explanation, correct?
Thank you.
And so I'm going to circle around to this later, but...
Can you tell me, do you have any knowledge as to why your bluff report, which throughout all of the protests had been describing the risk to your frontline personnel and the guidance for your management,
why it changed from a description of the threat being low to your officers and infrastructure to the addition of this point about Operational impact may result in a threat to Canada's economic security and prosperity.
So I can tell you at the time that I didn't even pay attention to that new language in the report.
After the fact that this was brought to my attention, we looked into it.
And what I understand is that the Acting Director General of the Border Operations Centre at that point in time decided of their own volition, given all of the events that had happened up to that point in time, to put this in.
And I want to be very clear that I'm satisfied that they did that in no way trying to provide any tacit or implied support for the Emergencies Act.
I believe they just did this on their own volition.
And that's what I understand to be true.
Fair enough.
And thank you for that.
Let's look at another sequence of similar...
A threat assessment or situational reports.
Mr. Clerk could you call up SSM NSC CAN 7064?
Thank you.
Thank you.
Now, just have a look at that, Mr. Ozofsky, and perhaps as the clerk scrolls down, you'll be able to just tell us, roughly speaking, this is a very similar-looking report, although different in some respects.
Can you describe what type of report this is?
So this would have just been something that was set to a very long email list that shows what has transpired and whatever the current situational status is of the various ports of entry.
Okay.
And again, scrolling down just so Mr. Osofsky can see the report as it progresses through, but stopping there, please, Mr. Clerk.
Again, we have a bluff, a bottom line up front description under the same type of heading, intelligence landscape.
And again, for this report, it says that...
8:30 in the morning on February 14th, and I'll quote, "The overall threat to CBSA officers and infrastructure remains low." And do you see that, Mr. Osofsky?
I do.
And can you agree with me again, so that we don't have to go through them all, and perhaps subject to check if you do want to, that that had been the report given in all of these reports throughout February?
Correct.
And Mr. Clerk, if you could next call up SSM CAN 406200.
And I think we'll see that as you described it earlier.
Wide distribution email with similar situational information.
And if you could just scroll through it, Mr. Clerk, we're looking for page four, bottom of page four.
Again, tables and statistics about activity at the various border points, and then we get the intelligence landscape bluff.
And I'm sorry, you know what I forgot to do was to get the date and time of this.
Mr. Clerk, could you go up to the top, please?
Thanks.
So we are now the next day.
So this is February 15th.
Thank you, Mr. Kirk.
I just wanted to make sure we understood this.
So this is the next day's report of the same type.
And when we look at the intelligence landscape bottom line up front, we see the same words about the threat being low.
But now there's some more words.
But caution should be exercised in light of recent reporting surrounding IMVE groups.
And do you know why that appeared on February 15th, the day after the invocation of the Emergencies Act?
Not specifically, no, but I can say in general when events like this happen, one of the things that as a national security, part of the national security apparatus is that you're always concerned that That might tilt somebody from just being an online sort of person thinking about this type of thing that actually moves to action and does something.
And that actually happened later on after this on February 17th.
I can describe an event where something like that potentially happened.
And you see that below the sentence we were just talking about IMVE groups.
We have a repeat of the observation that the protests at POEs have caused significant operational impact that may result in a threat to Canada's economic security and prosperity, the one we saw last time in the other report, correct?
I see that, yes.
Now, your explanation, as I understood it earlier, for the appearance at the end of the day on February 14th in one type of report and then in the next day on February 15th in the other type of report for the appearance of these references in the intelligence landscape description of the threat.
To CBSA officers and infrastructure, this sudden appearance of references to a threat to Canada's economic security and prosperity as being not motivated, in your view, by an effort on the part of the drafters of these reports to repeat the government explanation for invoking the Emergencies Act.
You're confident of that?
I believe that to be true.
And I think you'll agree that a threat assessment is meant to be a guide to action and policy, not to serve as a vehicle to rationalize it, correct?
Correct.
And in fact, if your personnel get the idea that the content of these threat assessments that they are getting are driven...
By an attempt to repeat government talking points, it's going to dilute the utility of those assessments to your personnel and to their ability to protect Canadians?
I don't disagree with that.
So it's important that the explanation you gave that is that it was more or less a coincidence that this language appeared immediately after the invocation of the Emergencies Act, that it was just a coincidence and not an attempt to...
Repeat the government's talking points for the invocation of the Act.
I believe that to be true, yes.
Thank you.
Another point that chronologically, because we're at the end of the process here, chronologically at the invocation of the Act, you mentioned that the only impact you mentioned in answer to questions by my colleague, Ms. Hein.
That the only input that CBSA gave to Cabinet when it was considering how provisions in the Emergencies Act could assist CBSA's mandate was to observe that you didn't currently have the authority to prohibit entry on the grounds that people were heading to one of these protests and that that would be useful to you.
In terms of the objectives that Cabinet appeared to be trying to achieve.
Do you remember that evidence?
Yes.
And if we can call up, Mr. Clerk, SSM NSC CAN 50405.
This is IRG minutes for February 20th.
Do you recall participating in IRG meetings, Mr. Rosofsky?
I did, yes.
And Mr. Clerk, if we scroll down to page 6 at the bottom of the page...
So just slow down a little bit, Mr. Clerk, so we can get the context here.
Can you go up just a bit?
So this is the IRG reporting on progress with respect to actions that have taken place consequential on the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
And then we have...
Some input from CBSA at the very bottom.
And Mr. Zosky, did you provide that input to the IRG?
I believe so, yes.
And did you participate in person or virtually in this meeting?
It was all virtual.
And for your virtual participation, was this you speaking or had you submitted a report to this effect?
It was probably me reporting this.
And you would have been briefed in advance, I suppose, even for the president of CBSA, an appearance at the IRG as a significant event.
You'd have had your staff brief you on this input?
Yes.
So, February 19th, there was an event in Prescott where two people were turned back using the emergency management regulations.
Sorry, can you just slow down a little bit and repeat that?
So, on February 19th...
In Prescott, at the Prescott Court of Entry, two individuals, two foreign nationals, attempting to come into the country for the purpose of participating in the protest, who are otherwise not prohibited from entry, were turned back using the EMR powers.
And that's what that refers to.
Right.
And had you made any other reports to the IRG?
About similar instances in which the Emergencies Act powers had been used by CBSA?
That was the first time I reported on that, I believe.
And I think it was the last time also?
Yes.
And so, as far as CBSA is aware, the authority in the Emergencies Act that empowered CBSA to deny entry to people...
Was with respect to a couple who were turned away on February 19th?
That's correct.
And that's the totality of it?
That's correct.
Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
Those are my only questions.
Okay.
Thank you.
So I'd like to first call on the convoy organizers to...
Good morning, sir.
For the record, Brendan Miller.
We've corresponded before on other files, as you might recall.
I'm counsel for Freedom Corp., which is the representatives of the protesters that were in Ottawa in January and February.
Nothing to do with the border, sir.
So I just wanted to get out some of the information.
With respect to the information that you gather internationally and that is given to the CBSA, if you don't mind.
So if you can turn your mind to that.
So Canada, of course, is a part of what they call the Five Eyes.
Can you sort of give an explanation of that for the folks at home?
The Five Eyes is Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
That's the term that's been used to the allied relationships since World War II.
Right.
And in the Five Eyes group and everything, a lot of the information that is gathered by the Five Eyes is provided to the CBSA for security purposes.
Is that fair?
Yes.
Right.
And so, and of course, the Five Eyes, the United States, you get information from...
The agencies in the United States about any sort of threats that may exist both for Canada, but also for the United States.
And that's essentially put into the CBSA's information bank so that you have it with respect to people coming across the border.
Is that fair?
If the information is relevant to the border, yes.
Right.
And it's fair to say that throughout the protest, and at least based on the disclosure, the agencies in the United States, such as the FBI, etc., they did not provide the CBSA or the Five Eyes any form of information with respect to any threat to Canada.
Is that fair?
I wouldn't be aware of that exactly.
I think you'd probably better talk to those like Communication Security Establishment and or CSIS to find that out.
Right.
But nothing was brought to your attention as the president of the CBSA with respect to any sort of threat to Canada coming from the United States during the protests.
Is that fair?
That's correct.
Right.
And so, of course, you never relayed such information to Cabinet or to any of the political executive because you weren't given any.
I believe that to be true, yes.
Right.
And just to be clear, and I think my friend has made this clear, at no time did you advise Cabinet or provide information to Cabinet that there existed a Section 2 CSIS Act threat under the CSIS Act.
Is that fair?
It wouldn't have been my purview to refer to a CSIS Act threat.
Right.
And so, is it within, and we keep hearing that, we haven't had CSIS testify yet, all of the law enforcement agencies that have testified to date have said that that purview was solely up to CSIS.
Is that your understanding of how it works?
That's correct.
Right.
So, and if CSIS is the only agency providing that information, and CSIS says there's no Section 2 Security Act threat, is it fair to say that Cabinet would have been never advised of any Section 2 CSIS Act threat?
You'd have to talk to the director of CSIS about that.
When you were present, when you were dealing with the IRG, is it fair to say that no law enforcement agency, no intelligence agency within Canada advised the government that there was a Section 2 CSIS Act threat?
Again, you'd have to talk to the director of CSIS about that.
Right.
And during your dealings with the political executive, essentially, they have been...
Stating in public that law enforcement agencies advised them that the threshold for invoking the act was met, all right?
What law enforcement agency advised them that to your knowledge?
I'm not aware of who may have provided that advice.
Right, neither are we.
Thank you.
Okay, next I'd like to call on the City of Windsor.
Good morning, Mr. Osofsky.
Am I pronouncing your name correctly?
Yes.
My name is Jennifer King.
I'm legal counsel to the City of Windsor.
The Ambassador Bridge proper and the structures housing the CBSA around the bridge are privately owned by the Canadian subsidiary of the Detroit International Bridge Company, correct?
That's correct.
And the Canadian subsidiary is the Canadian Transit Company, correct?
I believe so, yes.
Does the Canadian Transit Company own the land around the bridge infrastructure and the structures housing the CBSA?
I believe so, and it's provided to us under Section 6 of the Customs Act for us to use that facility.
Are there any other international border crossings managed by the CBSA that are owned and operated by a private corporation?
Yes, there's several what we call Section 6 operators that provide us the facilities in order for them to provide that availability for travelers and commercial vehicles to cross.
So the Peace Bridge, for example, is another example of that.
Okay.
I take it, Mr. Arsovsky, that you are familiar with Windsor and the location of the Ambassador Bridge?
I am.
The Ambassador Bridge sits at one end of a municipal roadway here on Church Road, correct?
That's correct.
And that road is a...
About three kilometers or so from the provincial highway?
That's correct.
So truck drivers have to contend with, Mayor Dilkins testified, six or seven local intersections with traffic lights as they move along here on Church Road to and from the bridge.
That's correct.
Is this unique in particular with respect to points of entry geared towards commercial conveyances?
I wouldn't say it's unique, but I'd say that every part of entry is different in terms of the infrastructure leading to and from them, but that is a different situation for sure.
Okay.
And the road is surrounded by residential areas on both sides, educational institutions and businesses?
Yes.
The University of Windsor is right beside the bridge and the CBSA facility is correct?
I believe so, yes.
And you'll agree that Huron Church bisects the city, so serving as an access point between the east and west sides of Windsor?
Yes.
And are you aware that the route under the bridge along Huron Church is an important route connecting West Windsor to downtown?
I'm not familiar with that particular road.
Okay.
So the thousands of trucks that cross the border every day share Huron Church Road with local Windsor residents?
Yes.
Mayor Dilkens of Windsor testified last week in response to a question from Commission Council who asked whether or not there was any discussion about trying to prevent the blockade.
And Mayor Dilkens testified that because of the distance between the Ambassador Bridge and the highway and the number of businesses, homes, hotels and schools that require direct access to Huron Church Road, he said that it would be, for all intents and purposes, practically impossible to guarantee With any certainty that you could provide a route for trucks without having huge disruption to the community.
Would you agree with Mayor Dilkens?
I agree.
And in fact, there was a fair bit of activity after the bridge reopened to put Jersey barriers up there to make sure that other protests didn't manifest along those intersections.
Okay.
Well, if I can just ask, I wanted to ask you a few questions about that.
If Mr. Clerk could please pull up SSM NSC CAN 50340_REL.301.
Mr. Ossofsky, I'm not sure if we've discussed this document yet today.
I'm not sure if I missed that.
Have you been asked any questions about this document yet this morning?
I don't believe so.
Okay.
Can you tell us what this is?
So this is briefing material that would have been prepared for me to participate in a meeting.
I'm not sure which one.
Okay.
So these are the February 16th date.
It would have been around February 16th and certainly after the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
Yep.
Okay.
If you could just go to the last bullet on the first page, please.
And you'll see here that the last bullet discusses or states that since the reopening of the bridge, we have not seen any service disruptions or border wait times, which is good news.
Law enforcement partners are maintaining a strong presence in the area with police erecting concrete barriers along the length of Huron Church between the Ambassador And so that was what you were referring to?
Yes.
All right, if you could please scroll to page three, Mr. Clerk and the heading.
Temporary PoE and trade corridor hardening.
The second bullet, you'll see that the CBSA identified 22 high-risk PoEs that, if impeded, would continue to exacerbate the fragile international trade chain.
And the Ambassador Bridge was one of those 22 high-risk PoEs?
Yes, for sure.
The CBSA collaborated with police agencies of jurisdiction.
And provincial and municipal officials to ensure the integrity of these essential transportation routes, correct?
Absolutely.
Although our responsibilities are just the port of entry.
Just the port of entry.
So in Windsor, the police of jurisdiction would be Windsor Police?
That's correct.
And the municipal official obviously would be the City of Windsor?
Yes.
Are you aware that this temporary hardening had a significant impact on the community around the bridge and Huron Church Road?
I'm sure it did.
Okay.
I have a few questions about just to clarify the impact of border blockades on other border crossings.
Mr. Clerk, you can take down that document.
So the CBSA Ambassador Bridge Operations is also responsible for the Windsor Truck Ferry, right?
The ferry?
Yes.
I'm not aware of a ferry.
Okay.
Well, then perhaps I won't ask you any questions about it.
I'll note that the CBSA produced an Ambassador Bridge profile.
I won't bring it up if you're not familiar with it, but the profile for the record is at PB NSC CAN 409539 _REL.
And that profile, Mr. Assovsky, states that the CBSA Ambassador Bridge Operations is responsible for the Windsor Truck Ferry.
And I wanted to ask you whether or not there was any impact on the truck ferry operations.
Yeah, unfortunately, I wasn't aware that there was a ferry aspect to the Windsor Truck Bridge.
Okay.
You spoke this morning about the impact of the Ambassador Bridge blockade on the Bluewater Bridge and some of the other bridges.
Did the slow rolls and blockades of other border crossings like Bluewater impact traffic at the Ambassador Bridge?
Absolutely.
I can't overstate how tied together all these events are and that when one slows down, we would send out a border alert or people would go to our app to see where the border wait times are the shortest than they would.
Reroute themselves.
And so if there was a disruption or a planned disruption, then we would try and reallocate officers and or provide situational awareness to our American counterparts to make sure that we could manage whatever flows might materialize.
So it was very dynamic time for us.
I understand this morning you stated that the Blue Water Bridge, the blockade of the Blue Water Bridge started around, was it the 6th of February?
I believe so.
I'd have to go check my notes.
At that time, were there slow rolls also at the Ambassador Bridge?
Again, I'd have to go back and look at the reports, but yes.
Okay.
But certainly, slow rolls and blockades of any of the bridges in Southern Ontario will impact the use of the neighboring bridges?
Absolutely.
Okay.
I have a few questions just to clarify the CBSA's authorities at and near ports of entry.
This morning, you testified that the CBSA has limited authority to arrest within the port of entry.
Your institutional report confirms that the CBSA does have arrest authorities when conducting their duties at a port of authority.
Yeah, so our authorities are limited generally.
The arrest authorities are under the criminal code for what?
What happens under the Customs Act, sorry, and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
So an example might be if we would detain somebody that is suspected of drinking and driving or drinking under the influence, then we would call local law enforcement and then they would proceed with whatever criminal charges that.
So we're circumscribed to the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
Well, CBSA officers, do they have the authority to arrest under the criminal code?
I'd have to defer to the lawyers, but I believe that it's only with respect to the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
Okay, so they don't have the authority to enforce, for example, a breach of a court order under the criminal code?
Not that I'm aware of, unless they were under...
You know, they were listed as an open warrant for their arrest, for example.
So if we could look at SSM NSC CAN 50340 _REL.301.
This is back to your briefing material.
Thank you.
And if you could go to page five, please.
This seems to be an attachment to your speaking notes, Mr. Osowski, entitled Emergencies Act, CBSA Actions.
Do you recognize this document?
No, but it looks like it was one of ours, yes.
Okay.
If you can just go to page six and the second last bullet, please, Mr. Clerk.
You'll see here it states, CBSA officers are not designated to enforce the criminal arrest provisions of the Emergencies Act and cannot directly engage in enforcement operations at prohibited public assemblies.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And that's your understanding?
Yes, because CBSA officers are not peace officers, so they wouldn't be able to enforce those provisions under the Act.
Okay, and then the last sentence states, That CBSA officers are advised to immediately contact their regional intelligence officer who may share information with their appropriate law enforcement agency in accordance with disclosure requirements.
And I missed the first part of that sentence, but it's in circumstances where an officer encounters an offence under the EA regulations.
That's correct.
Okay.
So if a prohibited public assembly happened even within the port of entry?
You would still rely on the police of jurisdiction to enforce?
We always work with the police of jurisdiction for matters that we don't have the authority to deal with ourselves.
Okay, and certainly outside of the Port of Authority in Windsor, you relied on Windsor Police Services to address the blockade because that blockade happened at a municipal intersection, correct?
You embedded CBSA's district director in charge of Windsor, Mr. Joe McMahan, at the command centre that WPS set up near the Ambassador Bridge, right?
That's correct.
Were you aware that the command centre was located in the city's emergency operations centre?
I wasn't aware of the exact location, no.
Okay.
Was it your understanding that there was some disagreement between the province of Ontario and the federal government?
Over which level of government had the jurisdiction and authority to respond to the blockade at the Ambassador Bridge?
Not in any great detail.
I was aware of the extent of our authorities, which are, you know, limited to the port of entry itself.
Okay, if we can bring up ssm.can50374 _rel.301.
This is an email that Natalie Druin sent to you on February the 10th.
Who's Natalie Druin?
She's the Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council.
Okay, if you can scroll all the way to the end of the email chain, Mr. Clerk.
And you'll see here the email from Natalie Druin to yourself and some others.
Yes.
Okay.
And so, she's asking whether or not we can declare the region of the Ambassador Bridge a trade corridor and then get jurisdiction.
Do you see that?
I see that, yes.
So, if you can scroll up, Mr. Clerk, we'll see that, Mr. Osowski, you sent this question to Michael Keenan of Transport Canada?
That's correct.
And if you continue to scroll up.
We'll see his answer.
Do you recognize this email?
Yes.
Yes, and I won't go through the entire response, but this email references that the Ontario Minister of Transportation was continuing to suggest that the federal government had...
Full authority to manage international crossings.
And Mr. Keenan responds that this purposefully confuses authorities between governments.
Do you recall that?
I'm reading it as you're telling me this, yes.
Okay.
And Mr. Keenan refers to the federal authorities under the Customs Act and the International Bridges and Tunnels Act.
Concludes that these acts don't directly bring any authorities to bear on the blockade, right?
That's what it appears to be, yeah.
Okay, and do you agree with Michael Keenan's email?
I do.
All right.
Thank you, Mr. Clerk.
Mr. Ossofsky, you understand that Windsor...
And other municipalities were challenged in terms of their capacity to respond to these protests, in terms of the availability of local policing and other resources such as, in Windsor's case, Jersey barriers?
I do.
Would you agree that bolstering local capacity and resources is necessary to mitigate the risk of major impacts on the operation of the federal border crossings in the future?
I think that would apply to many ports of entry that saw disruptions like this based on the geography and or access routes to and from the ports of entry.
Yes.
Okay.
Thank you.
Would you agree that that the blockades revealed a mismatch between jurisdictional authorities and responsibilities?
I think we saw that across the entire country and I think that You know, from my perspective of trying to run the border in a nationally consistent manner and seeing the variations in response across the country, either how law enforcement chose to respond to it or what the particular infrastructure was, was problematic for us.
Okay.
Mr. Commissioner, I know I'm at the end of my time.
I just have a couple more questions.
You're actually over your time, but please wrap up as quickly as possible.
Thank you.
Mayor Dilkens of Windsor, we've heard that he wrote to the Ontario and federal governments in March earlier this year, and he stated that following the blockades, the need for broader collaboration and support, and I think in this case he meant of local authorities, from provincial and federal governments to bolster the safety and security of our borders appears obvious.
Do you agree with Mayor Dilkens?
I agree.
Okay, and given the particular jurisdictional issues surrounding international bridges like those in Windsor and the evidence that you've already given, would you agree that a specific plan should be developed by all three levels of government for international border crossings?
If I were to be so bold as to offer a potential recommendation of the commission is that I think that that is something that should be done in it as well.
In terms of how police and jurisdiction choose to respond to something like this should be exercised regularly so that this type of thing doesn't, you know, take root and be so hard to disentangle, as was the case in January and February.
Okay.
And my final question, Mr. Osofsky, and thank you, Mr. Commissioner, for this indulgence.
Would you agree then that...
Coordination across all three levels of government, including the coordination of responsibilities and responsibility for costs, should be part of that plan.
Well, I can't speak to cost, but I can certainly speak to coordination of responsibilities.
It would make it a lot easier, I think, for all parties to manage these situations in the future.
Thank you.
Those are my questions.
Okay, thank you.
Next, I'd like to call on the government of Alberta.
Good morning.
For the record, my name is Stephanie Bowes.
I am Counsel for the Government of Alberta.
I'll ask the Clerk to please pull up the institutional report DOJ.IR 706.
And when that report is up, I'll ask to scroll down to page 35. I just want to ask some questions about the accommodations made.
During the Coutts border closure at different ports of entry in Alberta.
And I'm not going to run through this chart other than to note that there are days during the course of the blockade where traffic was, commercial traffic was traveling through the Coutts port of entry, but there were also days when there were no traffic, in particular January 31st to February 2nd.
Do you understand that that was at a time that Highway 4 was completely blockaded?
I believe so, yes.
And then we see that again on February 9th for reasons of a blockade.
That's correct.
And then on February 13th and 14th, that was due to the RCMP request for the closure of the Coutts Port of Entry, correct?
The suspension, yes.
The suspension, thank you.
And then if we go to page 36 in the institutional report.
We can see the charts for the Del Bonita and Carraway ports of entry, and those charts will track some of the changes in traffic through those ports.
And there were accommodations made to try to accommodate some of that commercial traffic that would normally travel through coops to these two ports of entry, correct?
Yes.
For example, Del Bonita, which was normally closed on Saturdays and Sundays, was opened on February 12th and 13th.
That's correct.
And ours were extended at both Del Bonita and Carraway?
Carraway, yes.
Carraway, thank you.
I also understand that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Services permitted boxed meat to go through other ports of entry and then reroute to Sweetgrass, Montana for USDA inspection.
Is that correct?
I believe that to be true, yes.
And Sweetgrass, Montana is basically on the other, on the Montana side of the Coutts Port of Entry, is that right?
Yes.
And the USCBP also agreed to facilitate the clearance of livestock at any port into the United States, with the carrier then diverting to a location that had USDA and veterinary services?
Yes.
And the CBSA allowed livestock shipments coming into Canada to be inspected at Sweetgrass and then divert to another port of entry while services were suspended at Coutts.
Is that correct?
Correct.
Now, did the Coutts port of entry experience any other protest or blockade disruptions after February 15th?
I think there was some reference in my materials that, if I may, I would just refer to the end of my institutional report that shows the day-to-day.
So, so, I think on February 21st, I reported in the institutional report on page 58, the RCMP was monitoring assembly of protesters at Milk River.
I would call these more sort of skirmishes that were happening after the arrests were made when essentially the blockade came down, but there was still activity happening.
Activity, but did it affect services at the Coutts Board of Entry?
No.
Okay.
And you were asked a question by a commission council about a reference attributed to you wherein you referred to the Emergencies Act.
And I believe your response was that you think you were referring to provincial powers under emergency legislation to compel somebody to render services.
For example, towing services.
Is that correct?
Are you referring to the report from the FPT meeting?
Yes.
And you were specifically thinking about Alberta and powers that it may have under its legislation?
I think I was just making a general reference to what provincial powers could be used to compel tow trucks.
I found out after the fact that Alberta, I think, has that power under its emergency powers.
Right, and I just want to clarify one thing, because Commission Council put to you that it was under the Critical Infrastructure Defense Act.
You said no, you believed it was under emergency legislation, correct?
That's what I believe to be true, yes.
And if I told you that the legislation you're referring to is the Emergency Management Act, would that accord with your memory of what you were likely referring to?
I believe so, yes.
Okay, thank you.
Those are all my questions.
Thank you.
Next, calling on the Ontario Provincial Police.
Good morning, Commissioner.
Can you hear me?
Yes.
Unfortunately, it appears my video is not working.
I do have it on.
My apologies.
If you'll allow it, I'd like to proceed.
I only have a few brief questions for Mr. Ossofsky.
Yep, go ahead.
Okay, thank you very much.
Mr. Ossofsky, good morning.
My name is Jananne Capersi, and I'm counsel for the Ontario Provincial Police.
And I have just a few brief questions for you on the topic of intelligence and information sharing among agencies.
So I understand from the witness summary, you were also interviewed with your colleague.
Mr. Harris, who was the Vice President of Intelligence and Enforcement at the CVSA during the convoy.
Is that correct?
Yes, it is.
Scott Harris, I should say, his full name.
And so I expect that you rely on Mr. Harris to report up to you with respect to intelligence.
Is that fair to say?
Anything relevant, yes.
Right, and so of course I appreciate that you may not be aware of the details with respect to processes and sources of information within the intelligence.
An enforcement branch of the CBSA, but I'd like to ask, were you aware that the OPP Intelligence Bureau was in fact actively sharing Freedom Convoy-related intelligence throughout the period of the convoy in January and February of 2022?
I would say I generally remember that happening, yes.
Okay.
So given that you...
Generally remember that happening.
If we could just clerk, perhaps pull up the witness summary.
It's WTS 46. We were referring to it earlier in your evidence today.
Now, if we go to page three.
I'd just like to look at that second paragraph.
And if we go a little bit into the second paragraph, it says to Mr. Harris's knowledge, the CBSA did not provide or receive unique intelligence disclosures from or to law enforcement partners prior to the arrival of the convoy in Ottawa.
Mr. Ossofsky, from what you just said, it seems to me that...
You did have a general awareness that the OPP was providing some intelligence information to the CVSA, or you have become aware of that at some point?
Well, I think that, as Mr. Harris states in the notes here, I was aware that OPP was producing intelligence from other tables that I was sitting at, but generally, in a situation like this, what we would be getting from law enforcement partners was...
Situational awareness so that we could actually figure out how we were going to make any adjustments at the border in terms of the management of the border.
So I wasn't aware if Mr. Harris said that we didn't receive any direct intelligence from the OPP, then I believe that to be true.
Okay.
And, you know, it's not that I'm questioning Mr. Harris's knowledge as set out.
In this witness summary, but just from the perspective of the OPP, just want to ensure that the record is accurate with respect to information sharing in the intelligence realm.
And so, for that reason, I'd like us to please pull up, clerk, OPP 4577, if you could.
And Mr. Ossofsky, this is a distribution list from the OPP's Intelligence Bureau that we'll take a look at together here.
And also for the record, this distribution list is referred to at the OPP's Institutional Report at page 23. But Mr. Ossofsky, we can see here That if we just scroll up to the top, this says original partner agencies.
It's dated 22nd of February 2020.
And if we just scroll down to page three.
And I appreciate Mr. Ossofsky.
I expect you have not laid eyes on this document before.
No.
Is that correct?
Yes.
Okay.
But if we take a look at page three and scroll down, this is a bit of a challenge, but there, we can see at the bottom there, there's Melanie Rose at CBSA.
Can you confirm that you see that entry with a CBSA email address?
Do you know who Melanie Rose is?
No, I don't.
Nope.
And if we scroll down...
A little further to page 5. We'll go about halfway down.
Again, just seeing, again, we see a CBSA address.
Clerk, I think if you continue on that page, we will see some additional CBSA addresses.
Joshua Newby, for example.
Mr. Ossofsky.
So you confirm that you can see that this distribution list includes some CBSA staff.
Are you familiar with Joshua Newby, just to assist us in understanding his role within the organization?
No, I'm not.
Okay.
You're now out of time, so you're going to have to wrap up.
Okay, one last quick point.
Thank you very much, Commissioner.
Clerk, if you could pull up PB CAN 401535, please, to take a look at that document.
Thank you.
Okay, if you could perhaps reduce it.
I believe towards the middle of the document, there should be an indication of the role of Josh Newby in this mandate protest incident command structure.
Mr. Ossofsky, do you see that?
Yep.
Okay, and so according to this chart, it appears that Josh Newby was Executive Director in dealing with the mandate protests.
Is that what we see here?
That's what it appears to be.
Okay.
Okay.
Well, thank you very much.
Those are all my questions.
Thank you, Commissioner, for that additional time.
Thank you.
Those are all my questions.
Okay.
Next is Democracy Fund, JCCF.
Good morning.
I'm Hattam Care Counsel for the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms.
The first topic I wanted to ask you about is the power for border agents to turn people away if they were coming to participate in a protest under the Emergencies Act.
So you testified that that was one of the powers that was granted to border agents by the emergency regulations?
Yes.
And you were also asked about the ability of border agents to turn away people who are coming to For a known unlawful purpose, and they could do that if they knew about that, correct?
Before or after...
Sorry, before the emergency measures were...
It wasn't an unlawful protest at that point in time, before the Emergencies Act, right?
Right, but you were asked if you knew someone was coming, if your agents, sorry, knew that an individual was coming to enter the country...
In order to engage in unlawful activity, your agents could turn that person away, correct?
If it was not for a lawful purpose, yes, they can turn somebody around.
Right.
And you indicated that one of the problems with that is that your agents would actually have to know that a person is coming for that purpose, which could be difficult, right?
Yes.
And under the emergency regulations, your agents could turn someone away if they were known to be coming to...
Engage in a certain kind of prohibited public gathering that might breach the peace through listed.
Known or suspected.
Right.
But your agents would then face the same problem in terms of having to identify a person's intentions, correct?
Well, a standard question for a foreign national is what's the purpose of your visit to the country, right?
And so that would just lead you down a line of questioning that the officer then would decide whether or not the person was prohibited from entry or not.
Right, and the same thing would happen if a person's purpose for coming was an unlawful reason, correct?
Yes.
Okay, thank you.
And the other topic I wanted to ask you, so you described how the CBSA was able to help facilitate obtaining tow trucks by waiving the requirement for a work permit to enter the country, correct?
A little bit broader than that, but essentially, yeah.
So basically...
With the agreement with the United States for emergency vehicles, where we got many communities that share access to these vehicles to help each other out, is we would facilitate the entry of those vehicles to participate in whatever the event was, notwithstanding the fact that they didn't have a work permit.
Okay.
So under the normal circumstances, there's some sort of a regulation, I assume, that requires them to have a work permit?
Well, under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, you have to have one of the requirements for entry would be a valid work permit.
Right.
So, just trying to understand how that actual process worked, would it fall under the discretion that border agents have when they're enforcing these laws to simply not apply that?
I believe it's just a memorandum of understanding that we have with our American counterparts to facilitate emergency vehicles for the purpose of participating in.
Right.
But would I be correct in thinking that that would operate as an exercise of the border agent's discretion to simply not apply what would normally be a requirement for entry into the country?
I don't know that the individual officer would do that.
I think that would probably take, it would go a little bit further up the command chain in terms of saying, yes, this is where we're going to invoke this memorandum, for lack of better words, to facilitate the entry of emergency vehicles.
Okay, but what I'm trying to get at is the operation of law that's happening here.
It's a decision not to apply a law that normally exists, right?
Yes, officers have discretion.
Right, okay.
Now, we heard yesterday from Deputy Commissioner Curtis Zablocki that one of the things that RCMP tried to do in Coutts was to obtain tow trucks from the United States, but some of them couldn't actually come and help because they were unvaccinated.
Did the CBSA waive any of the vaccine requirements for tow truck drivers to come and help?
I'm not aware of that.
Okay, those are all my questions.
Thank you for answering them.
Thank you.
I don't know if we should take the break now, because there's not much time left for this witness, but I'm in your hands.
Mr. Commissioner, if it's all the same to you, I would probably benefit from the break to just tighten up my examination a little bit, but I could also go if that's your preference.
Okay, well, if you're okay, we'll take the break now and come back in 15 minutes.
Okay, perfect.
Thank you.
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
La Commission enleve pour 15 minutes.
Merci.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Order I vote.
The Commission has reconvened.
Thank you, Commissioner.
For the record, I'm Andrea Gonzales, counsel for the Government of Canada.
Mr. Vzovsky.
You mentioned in your testimony that the impacts of the blockades and the protest activity were coast-to-coast and the situation was escalating and unpredictable.
Recall that evidence?
I do.
And you testified that there were official service disruptions at three ports of entry, Emerson, Ambassador Bridge, and Pacific Highway?
Correct, where we actually put out a border alert.
Right.
I think it was that context for that.
And at the Pacific Highway, it was in fact two times there were border alerts issued, right?
That's correct.
And the second one was after the Government of Canada had invoked the Emergencies Act on February 19th, right?
Correct.
And there was then the service suspension at the Coutts port of entry.
But is it...
Accurate to say that the impacts were experienced beyond just these service disruptions and the service suspension and at other ports of entry?
Absolutely.
And in fact, if you look at the institutional report, I believe 22 different ports of entry had varying degrees of disruption throughout the protests.
You mentioned in your evidence, in response to Commission Council's questions, The delays, the added travel distances and times of having to divert to other ports of entry, that this created problems in particular for just-in-time supply chain manufacturers as well as for perishables or livestock.
We have heard some evidence that at some ports of entry there were alternate roads, in some cases gravel roads.
Were those a viable option for commercial traffic looking to cross the border?
Not always because there were load limits.
So an example that pops to mind is at Coutts there was a side road that the BSOs were able to use to drive to and from the port of entry while it was functioning.
But that would not have been appropriate for a large commercial vehicle to go on.
let's go to ssm.nsc.can6050 This is the CBSA SITREP as of February 12th.
So that's the Saturday of the third weekend.
And if we just scroll down, we see reports of activity at Cornwall.
Mr. Ozofsky, I understand that the port of entry at Cornwall is particularly complex jurisdictionally, is that correct?
It is.
Its placement is not at the first point of landing in Canada, which makes it very inconvenient for the members of the Mohawk Akwesasne Band that live on the island.
And so the members of that First Nation live on an island that is between the Canadian side, where the port of entry is located, and the U.S. side.
Is that accurate?
Yeah, so the actual international boundary is to the south of the island, but the port of the entry is on the mainland to the north of the island.
And for members of that First Nation, then, if they want to access any services on the mainland...
On the Canadian side, they have to pass through the port of entry.
That's correct.
And so a disruption to that port of entry would be particularly problematic for that community.
Very much so.
Okay.
And then also on February 12th, there are incidents being reported at Lansdowne, which I understand is in the Thousand Islands area.
Yes.
Ambassador Bridge, Peace Bridge.
Let's scroll down.
Sarnia, Blue Water, Emerson.
Coutts Pacific Highway.
And then there's a table there of upcoming protests, events that are ongoing, confirmed, and unconfirmed.
Yes.
Mr. Ozofsky, does that help illustrate the coast-to-coast dynamic that you testified about earlier?
I believe so.
And did the protests and slow rolls and blockades near ports of entry stop on or before February 14th, or did they continue after?
Several disruptive activities continued well after the invocation of the act.
And we can look to the details of that in the chronology in the CBSA institutional report?
Yes.
You mentioned port hardening measures that were imposed at the time.
Are those still in effect?
I believe the cameras stayed up, yes, that I referred to earlier, the CCTV cameras.
Now, in response to some questions earlier, I understood you agreed with the statement that prior to the invocation of the Emergencies Act and the EMRs, CBSA could use the immigration...
And Refugee Protection Act to stop a foreign national from entering Canada to join an unlawful protest.
Do you recall those exchanges?
I do.
And I just want to be clear.
My understanding is that under the IRPA, there must be an assessment made that an individual poses a danger to Canada or will engage in violent crime when they...
Am I correct on that?
I believe so, yes.
And where that assessment is made, it's not the situation that the CBSA would prohibit entry, but rather it would look to detain the individual?
Likely.
And then there are two options from there, either to transfer the individual to the police of jurisdiction to handle concerns about future crime.
That's one option?
Yes.
Or CBSA could prepare an inadmissibility report on security grounds under IRPA, and then that would trigger the inadmissibility process before the Immigration Board.
That would be the other option?
I agree, yeah.
And both of those entail delay in an expenditure of resources that is significant?
Yes.
So it's not a situation of being analogous to the EMR provisions that create a direct back power where the individual could simply be denied entry.
Correct.
Okay.
You testified that CBSA collected information from open sources, including social media, in relation to the convoy protests.
That's correct.
And based on the information that was available to you, did you understand that there were connections between the Ottawa protests and the border blockades?
I think events like this, they feed off each other's energy and their successes and defeats.
So I think it might not have been direct, but certainly through social media channels.
I would say that there was an implicit link between what was happening all across the country with all of the different activities.
So let's go to pb.can.401317.
And this is an email from Lynn LaMarche who's with the CVSA.
Yes.
And if we scroll down, she discusses reports this morning from information received by BIS operations.
What's BIS?
Border Information Service.
Okay.
And pasted there is information received from the public by email.
And we see where it's shaded in the first bullet.
In Alberta, those who cannot go to Ottawa are being encouraged to block the COOTS border and not move until the demands in Ottawa are met.
And so is that the sort of information that you were discussing when you said about energies feeding each other?
Yes.
And let's go to pb.can.401523.
This is a CBSA Prairie Region Intelligence Alert.
And if we scroll down, they're reporting on some information about a group that intends to stay at the Coutts border.
And if we look to the right there, they're talking about, there's the poster, and it says...
Trucks and vehicles all over Alberta are planning to head for coups Alberta starting Jan 29 and are staying there until all mandates and restrictions are lifted.
And did you have any understanding about whether Well, in fact, on the left, it says sources indicate that the group intends to stay at the border as long as the larger convoy stays in Ottawa.
And did you have any understanding of whether those objectives were similar to the objectives of at least some of the Ottawa protesters?
Yes, and they're obviously inspiring each other in that same vein.
Your institutional report speaks to...
Threats to safety and security, both to CBSA officers as well as information received by CBSA.
I just want to highlight a couple of those, including examples that aren't referenced.
If we go to pb.can.401541.
This comes from the CBSA Border Operations Center on Sunday, February the 13th, although I think we're in a situation there where we subtract the five hours, so it's the evening of February 12th.
And this email, Mr. Ozovsky, indicates that the BOC was notified that two emails from the same client containing threats to the CBSA As well as to the Prime Minister of Canada, received through the CBSA Contact Us web form.
My understanding that's an online form where individuals can submit?
That's correct.
Okay.
The first email, which was on February 7th, says, We would like to come to Ottawa to support the protest, and if you want a war on your people, we are prepared to die to stop you.
No border of yours will hold us back.
Liberty or death, you choose.
I take it this is being reported by the BOC because that's a matter of concern for CBSA?
Yes.
And the second one, which is sent on February 12th, says in the event there is no solution and the Canadian government continues its destructive path, we are prepping to come to Canada to support the people's fight against Canadian government tyranny.
We will donate a gallows to the people of Canada to assemble for Justin's hanging.
Again, that was a matter of concern for the CBSA.
Yes, it was.
Let's go to SSM.nsc.can50351.
This is a CBSA SITREP February 17th, 1600 hours.
So this is a...
A few days post-invocation.
And let's go down to page 4, please.
Under that chart, pausing there.
February 16th, Border Information Services is reporting increased activity related to the COVID mandate protest.
Email containing conspiracies, threats against the CBSA and law enforcement agencies from the same phone number.
And an increase in calls relating to the importation of items such as body armor, ammunition, firearms, and gas masks.
And was that report a matter of concern for the CBSA?
Absolutely.
And we refer to that in the institutional report as well, where people were asking for information, particularly on armor-piercing Teflon-coated bullets and what it would take to import those into Canada.
That's not something you see very often at the CBSA, I assume.
No.
And let's go to OPP50-938.
Mr. Ozovsky, what is a controlled delivery?
Controlled delivery is when we pick up something at the border, usually in courier or postal mode, that is prohibited.
And we'll work with the local police of jurisdiction to deliver the goods in order to ascertain the extent of...
If it's an organized crime ring or whatever, instead of just holding back the good to actually see if there's any further criminal activity that needs to be investigated.
Okay, so if we go down to page three, this is an OPP document.
And it advises that at 4 a.m. on the 17th of February, CBSA and OPP executed a weapons importation warrant in the York region.
Upon entry to the residence, it was discovered the suspect was not present, but firearms and ammunition were observed, located improperly stolen in the residence.
A 3D printer was located.
The POI, I understand that to be person of interest, had ordered parts to complete a Glock-style handgun, item seized by CBSA.
Believed they may have been...
May have manufactured frames using the 3D printer.
Machetes were located at entry doors.
An anti-government police notice was observed taped to the front storm door.
The POI is prohibited.
Firearms neighbors indicate he is currently in Ottawa.
Is that information that you knew at the time?
At the time, it was reported to me, yes.
Okay, and if we scroll up, please, to the top of page two.
I understand that the OPP put out a BOLOA be on the lookout for this individual.
Yes.
And it says here the phone was just pinged and the location has him within eight meters of the war memorial and that's in Ottawa at the time of the protest.
Yes, it is.
And then if we go to pb.nsc.404460.
This is an email on Okanagan Nation Alliance letterhead sent to the Prime Minister, Premier of BC, Minister Miller and Minister Mendicino.
And this was also copied to you by CC?
Sorry, we just...
And I understand this is a letter regarding an assault of a Salx Nation member by protesters at the Soyuz border crossing.
Is that correct?
Yes, I do.
I believe, Commissioner, I still have a few minutes.
I just wanted to go to a couple of videos.
Let's go to pb.can.401800.
And we're going to begin at the 2 minute 49 second mark.
This is, there's no sound on the video, so I'll just speak.
What we're seeing is time-accelerated footage of the backup at the Blue Water Bridge as of February 8th, which is the second day of the blockade in Windsor.
Yes.
You mentioned before, you said at one point this backup was approximately 10 kilometres long?
That's correct.
We'll let it continue to play while I ask my questions.
When we look at a...
Backup of this nature.
Would this meet the one-hour service standard for processing that the CBSA accepts?
Absolutely not.
And this is, as I said, only one day after the Windsor blockade.
You mentioned the difference in the lanes for commercial vehicle processing between Ambassador and Blue Water Bridge.
You recall that evidence?
Yes.
And so when we look at that footage, we can stop it there.
Terrorists or anything like that.
Would you say that Blue Water on its own was a viable solution to the Windsor blockade?
As I testified earlier, it was not able to accommodate all of the volume that would normally have gone through the Ambassador Bridge.
And if the Blue Water Bridge was blockaded at the same time as the blockade in Windsor, what would the impact of that have been?
Well, it would have made it very unfeasible for traffic that was hoping to cross in that part of southern Ontario to do their particular trade, because the next available ports of entry were 400 kilometres away at Queenston-Lewiston or the Peacock Bridge.
And are you able to comment on how long it would take to work through a backlog of that nature, even once the blockades are cleared?
I don't have the volume of the actual number of vehicles involved there.
You know, essentially the process takes, say on average, a minute per vehicle to do that.
And you only have seven lanes available to you at the Blue Water Bridge.
And so I think the math could be done in terms of how long, but it was certainly well beyond an hour.
Okay.
And my last video and last set of questions, pb.can.401802.
And we'll begin at the 7 minute 26 second mark.
And you testified earlier, Mr. Ozovsky, about the activity at the Pacific Highway.
The so-called envoy drew hundreds of anti-mandate protesters today and blocked traffic near one of the lower mainland's border crossings for hours.
We're now learning several people could face charges under the Motor Vehicle Act after breaking down an RCMP barricade.
CTV's Penny Daffloss reports.
Military-style vehicles, one of several heavy-duty trucks Mount D.C. broke their barricade, helping get protesters to the Pacific Highway border crossing itself.
Hundreds of convoy supporters parked alongside the roads, some walking well over a kilometer to join the demonstration.
Initially, they'd kept to the edges so traffic could keep moving.
But by early afternoon, the crowd ballooned in size with COVID denial messages and anti-vaccine talking points everywhere.
Traffic backups impacted much of South Surrey and Mounties rushed to use their own cruisers to block access to the border.
Anti-mandate protesters have been near the crossing since the last year.
I've never worn a mask.
I will say I'm not vaccinated because I'm a pureblood.
I don't believe in this.
It's not right.
In solidarity with a so-called freedom convoy started by truckers with anti-vaccine and anti-government messaging as they express pride in standing up for their beliefs, no matter how controversial they may be.
We're peaceful.
We're Canadians.
And let me tell you, the world's giving us a bear hug right now.
A big bear hug.
Because they know how to protest.
We can stop that there.
Mr. Ozofsky, did we see in the video what you were describing of the protests being essentially on the doorstep of the plaza, the POE?
That's correct.
And the vehicle that you described military style being painted in camouflage?
That's correct.
Okay, thank you.
Those are my questions.
Okay, thank you.
any reply Thank you, Commissioner.
Just briefly, I'd like to take the witness back, and Mr. Clerk, could you call up for me, please?
SSM, NSC, CAN, four zeros, 15, 19. Okay.
And go to page 8 of that document.
Mr. Osofsky, this is the February 14th in the afternoon, the one that is dated February 14th, 2022, 1600 Eastern Time.
And this is the one we looked at before where the sentence is added to the bluff bottom line up front heading of the intelligence landscape.
And on the next page, The line was added, there has been a significant operational impact that may result in a threat to Canada's economic security and prosperity.
And when I asked you questions about this before, I might not have gotten as complete an answer as I should have about why you believe that sentence appeared on that document.
Do you know where it came from?
That is where the person who added that sentence got the information and why they decided to put it there?
I don't know why they decided to put it there, but when we were made aware of this additional sentence, the colleagues at CBSA went and made some inquiries, and my understanding is what they found out is the Acting Director General at the Border Operations Center decided to add that line in.
If I can just put a little flesh on what you were saying.
What you're saying is when this point was put to you in your interview by Commission Council, you then followed up on this point?
Yes, we did.
And can you repeat that again?
It sounds like you consulted with the person who added this sentence and the answer was they decided to add the sentence.
I don't understand or have any understanding of what their motivation was to add this in, but I think that...
What was reported to me was that with all of the activities that had escalated to that point in time, they decided to put that particular language in.
I also believe they said that this was not an attempt to provide any tacit or implied support for the Emergencies Act, so that's all I know about it.
Thank you.
Mr. Commissioner, that's the only matter I wanted to follow up on.
Okay, thank you.
So thank you very much for coming and testifying.
You're free to go back to your retirement, and it's much appreciated that you came to give evidence today.
Thank you very much.
Okay, so next we have, I believe, a panel.
It may be preferable that we take a short break to organize the panel.
I'll just take five minutes to do that, if that's agreeable.
We'll just take a five-minute break and come back.
The Commission is in recess for five minutes.
Thank you.
Order alert.
The Commission is Regan Wind, la Commissora Brown.
Good morning, Commissioner.
We have now the Panel for Transport Canada.
Could I ask that the witnesses be sworn?
Let's take a moment to Mr. Keenan and Mr. Drake.
Mr. Keenan, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
A religious document.
We have the Bible, the Quran, or the Torah available?
uh the bible please For the record...
Please state your full name and spell it out.
Michael James Keenan.
Last name is K-E-E-N-A-N.
Do you swear that the evidence to be given by you to this commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
I do.
Thank you.
Mr. Day, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
The Bible will be fine.
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
Yes, my name is Christian Day.
D-E-A.
Do you swear that the evidence to be given by you to this commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
So help you God.
Thank you.
Good afternoon, gentlemen.
My name is Gordon Cameron and I have some questions for you on behalf of Commission Council.
First, I would ask you to cast your minds back to August 30th of this year when you were interviewed by my colleagues in company with some of your colleagues.
And so what I'm going to ask you to do is confirm To some extent what you can confirm and to some extent what you can confirm on behalf of your colleagues, and in particular, have you reviewed the summary of that interview that was prepared by Commission Council?
Yes, I have.
And you, Mr. D?
Yes, I have.
Thank you.
To the extent that that summary captures information that you two provided to Commission Council, can you confirm that it's accurate and that you adopted as your evidence before the Commission?
Yes and yes.
Yes as well.
Thank you.
And to the extent the information is that of your colleagues at the interview, can you confirm that it was reviewed by them for accuracy and believed to be accurate?
Yes and yes.
Thank you.
And also, Transport Canada filed an institutional report with the Commission.
Can you confirm that that document is accurate and that it forms part of the evidence that Transport Canada has submitted to the Commission?
Yes.
Thank you very much.
Now let me ask you, each gentleman, to introduce yourselves and describe the role you have in Transport Canada.
My name is Michael Keenan.
I'm the Deputy Minister of Transport Canada, so I'm responsible for overseeing all aspects of the operations of Transport Canada, and I'm the head of the transport portfolio, which includes eight Crown corporations, four agencies, and 50 shared governance organizations, and I am responsible for providing advice to the Minister of Transport.
Thank you.
And Mr. Diak, can you give us an outline of your position and what you do there?
Yes.
My name is Christian Diak.
I'm the Chief Economist and the DG, the Director General of the Transportation Economic Analysis Unit at Transport Canada.
My role and the role of my group at Transport Canada is to monitor the performance of the transportation system and to conduct economic assessment on any disruption.
In doing so, I'm providing the advice and the results of the analysis to the senior management, including the deputy and the minister.
Thank you.
If I can go back to you, Mr. Keenan.
I ask you to describe, it would probably take you all day if you were comprehensive, but just describe what Transport Canada does, what its jurisdiction, what is the federal jurisdiction that Transport Canada administers?
So Transport Canada is responsible for all aspects of the Canadian transportation system that is within federal jurisdiction.
And we have three key priorities that we pursue across the organization of...
6,400 people.
The first is to ensure the safety and security of the part of the national transportation system that's in federal jurisdiction, ensure the environmental safety, environmental green performance, and to ensure the system is efficient.
Both for moving people and goods and so that there's a strong trade and transportation network.
In terms of jurisdiction, it varies by mode.
So in aviation, it's essentially...
It's exclusively federal jurisdiction, so Transport Canada is responsible for all aspects of aviation, working with international partners like the International Civil Aviation Organization.
It is responsible for the vast majority of marine transportation, although there is some provincial involvement.
The majority of rail transportation, road transportation is very much a shared jurisdiction.
Transport Canada is responsible for some aspects.
But provincial governments are responsible for significant aspects as well.
And we have significant federal, provincial, territorial governance to coordinate our efforts in that respect.
And I'm going to ask you to expand on exactly that last point that you mentioned, that road transportation, which of course is, for a trucker's convoy, the more relevant aspect of your...
Department's jurisdiction.
For road transportation, you have this divided jurisdiction where there are federal responsibilities but there are also provincial responsibilities.
If you could just describe to some extent what that division is and then I'll ask you to expand on how that prompts you to have interfaces with the provincial and territorial authorities.
So in the area of road transportation, Transport Canada has responsibilities under two Principally under Two Peaches legislation, there's some others.
We administer 74 acts and 400 sets of regulations, but the two principal acts involved here, the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, where we certify the importation and the use of motor vehicles as to their safety, and the Motor Vehicle Transport Act, where we have responsibilities and authorities with respect to international and interprovincial road transportation.
Intra-provincial road transportation, i.e.
within a province, is essentially the exclusive domain of the province, except for the aspects that touch the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which is certifying that the equipment is safe.
In practice, while we have, for example...
International interprovincial trucking, things like there's safe practices like hours of service limits for truckers.
In practice, that is federal.
The interprovincial rules are federal jurisdiction, but for trucks that don't travel interprovincially, they're provincial jurisdiction.
We work together very closely at the two levels of government and there's a lot of coordination of all of the rules and the regulations and the policies with respect to commercial transport through the CCMTA, the Canadian Council for Motor Transport Administrators and the Council of Deputy Ministers of Transport and the Council of Ministers of Transport.
It's some of the federal rules we delegate to provincial authorities to enforce, for example, the hours of service with respect to interprovincial trucking.
And we work as much as possible to get an alignment between the provincial and the federal rules so there's as much as possible a consistent set of rules across Canada.
Canada being a decentralized federation, there is some diversity in the rules across the country with respect to motor vehicle transport.
The use, the licensing of the operators, and the conduct and the operation of the vehicles on the roads is typically in provincial jurisdiction, and most provinces have something like a Highways Act where they set out all of the rules.
And governs the regulations by which they oversee the transportation on the roads and highways of each province.
Thank you for that.
And now, if you could help us with the second half of what you were describing, which is as a result of that interplay between the federal jurisdiction over some aspects of transportation by motor vehicle and...
The jurisdiction of the provinces and territories over other aspects, you have quite a bit of intergovernmental connection at your level and probably at the level of the people who work with you, but can you expand on that for us?
I think that's exactly it.
For the reasons you stated, the effective transportation policy in Canada requires extensive intergovernmental coordination.
And so it starts at the top of it is a Council of Ministers of Transport and Road Safety.
And then there's a Council of Deputy Ministers of Transport and Road Safety that I co-chair with a rotating provincial partner.
There is the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators.
There is a group of assistant deputy ministers, people that report to deputy ministers.
The PPSC, the Policy Planning and Support Committee.
I would guess at any moment in time under PPSC and CCMTA, and I apologize for the acronyms, there are probably a dozen working groups of various experts working on some aspect of coordinating federal and provincial transportation policy.
Now, with that background in mind, both the complexity of the overlapping jurisdictions and the extent of your network, The network that your department is responsible and presumably also you personally have between the federal government and the provincial government.
I want to take you to the beginning of the convoy and the days as it is just sort of starting to appear on the horizon.
What did Transport Canada see when and what was your reaction?
At Transport Canada, we saw in the lead-up to that weekend of the 22nd, 23rd, which was a full week before the trucks arrived in Ottawa, we began to see the reports of trucker convoys that was just beginning to show up on the screen.
I think some folks in the department noticed something as far back as January 19th.
I think that's in our institutional report.
It came to my attention around, I would say, the 22nd.
And we were initially watching it because it was truckers.
And so there was for two reasons.
One is we have relationships with the commercial trucking industry.
The second is that when you have convoys and the prospect of slow rolls, that has the potential to have an impact on the transportation.
And trade corridor system, a potentially negative one.
So we began watching it about a bit more than a week before the trucks got to Ottawa.
And then shortly after that, it began the...
The interdepartmental monitoring and deliberations began through the Deputy, for example, the Deputy Minister's Operations Committee, DEMOC, of which I'm a standing member.
I'm just going to stop here.
We've heard about that, but I'd just like you to rewind just a little bit.
Describe the committee again and what your role is in it.
Sure.
The Deputy Minister's Operating Committee is a standing committee of about eight Deputy Ministers who have responsibilities that are directly related to maintaining the safety and security of Canadians and protecting the national security of Canada.
It's chaired by the National Security and Intelligence Advisor, the Prime Minister.
The security agencies are on RCMP, CSEC, etc., as well as a number of departments that have responsibilities that connect directly to the safety and security Canadians.
Transport Canada is one of them.
Our responsibilities in that respect are geared towards the transportation system, but we have significant responsibilities with respect to both safety.
And security.
For example, a threat, there have been.
Unfortunately, in the past, terrorists and ideologically motivated extremists have targeted the transportation system.
So we have a mandate to ensure the system is safe from such attacks.
And so I had interrupted you there when you were describing the invocation of the ADM NSOPS meeting that you attended as the convoy is coming onto the horizon.
It's a small correction if you'll permit me.
I'm a member of DMOC, the Deputy Minister's Operating Committee.
But my assistant Deputy Minister for Safety and Security is a member of the ADM NSOPS.
Thank you.
So, you were describing the DMOC.
Please go ahead with that.
Transport, because it started out with, I would say, the brand of a truck convoy and a trucker protest.
Transport was involved because we were monitoring early because of our relationships with the industry.
And that started a few days before the DMOC.
I think the first DMOC meetings on this were early.
Around the 24th or 25th, around there.
The one thing that came to our attention fairly early on is that the brand of a trucker convoy wasn't really accurate.
And in fact, when we talked to the professional trucking industry, the Canadian Trucking Alliance, the private motor carriers, transport, PMTC, I can't remember.
Too many acronyms and we're so focused on acronyms.
They made it clear that this wasn't them and this didn't represent the professional trucking industry and pretty quickly started making public statements, initially distancing themselves from this activity and then making it clear that they didn't support it and then finally articulating how it was harming professional truckers.
And can you describe the steps then that your department started to take to respond to the emerging convoy?
The first step was trying to understand what was happening and what was brewing because, as I think you may have heard from other witnesses, it was quite hard to get a fix on because it was rapidly changing, it was dynamic.
Quite unpredictable.
So it would have been some initial discussion with industry partners to get a sense of what was going on and finding that point I raised that really wasn't the industry per se.
Second was working in the structure of DMOC and ADM and SOPs, working with our partners in public safety to understand what the collective Assessment was of what's going on.
So that was a key aspect of the, I would say, the early activities leading up to the arrival of the movement in Ottawa.
As things progressed, our roles evolved into probably about four different types of activities.
Why don't you list those now and we'll go from there.
Sure.
So the first I just covered.
The second is that as we started to see blockades and occupations, we started analyzing what the potential impact was on the trade and transportation system.
That accumulated in, I would say, peak impact once the Ambassador Bridge was closed for several days.
The third is that in the event of major events, protests, incidents, whatever that requires a large and complex police response and crowds, Transport Canada will provide certain sort of technical expertise and authorities in support of local law enforcement.
In this crisis, we did that in two ways.
The first is that because of our responsibility for aviation, we will close airspace at the request of local police as they try to manage large events.
Riots, whatever the activity.
Over the course of this crisis, I think we issued airspace restrictions.
They're called NOTAMs, Notice to Airmen.
And we issued them in about a dozen cities across Canada.
And we do that as a matter of course when the police and jurisdiction are seeking that in order to help them manage some major event or crisis.
The other aspect of operational support is that we essentially make our authorities and our expertise available in support of police of local jurisdiction as required.
And that will vary.
In this incident, One very relevant authority and expertise we have is the transportation of dangerous goods.
We have a significant directorate and we have significant responsibilities to ensure the safe transportation of dangerous goods in Canada.
And I think around the 9th of February, the Ottawa Police Service They were growing quite alarmed at the extent of propane being stored in unorthodox manners and the extent of the transportation of diesel and gasoline.
And they sought some expert advice and support from Transport Canada.
We had the same assessment just watching from a distance.
There was a lot of dangerous conduct with respect to explosive and flammable material like propane and diesel.
We provided two inspectors who did ride-alongs with the Ottawa Police Service to give them technical advice as they were seeking to monitor and ensure the safety of the occupation.
In Ottawa, they were on scene with the OPS, I think, for about three days and supported the OPS in writing up probably about 20 sort of administered monetary penalties for violations of the safe handling of essentially a lot of propane and diesel.
So that was the third.
I think the fourth, it would be the...
After coming out of a meeting organized by my colleague Deputy Minister Stewart of Public Safety with the City of Ottawa and the Ottawa Police Service, we were absolutely struck by the overwhelming challenges the Ottawa Police Service was facing on several areas and that generated That led to some thinking of how we could be of assistance to frontline
police jurisdiction.
And from that, some thinking about that, we ended up developing two strategies that we worked with a lot of partners on through the course of this national crisis.
The first became known as the Strategic Enforcement Strategy.
And the second became known as the Tow Truck Strategy.
That would be, in sum, the four areas of work by Transport Canada with respect to the crisis.
Maybe I could ask the clerk to call up for us.
PB Can 50860.
Now, um...
To assist you, Mr. Keenan, I'll draw your attention to the upper right-hand corner of this page where it says working draft February 13, 2022, but we haven't found a later draft and I think that you've confirmed for us already that this is effectively the final version of this strategy.
Is that right?
Yes, that's correct.
And describe, if you can, what you were trying to accomplish with the Strategic Enforcement Strategy.
Sure.
So, the genesis of the Strategic Enforcement Strategy came out of the February 3rd call between a few Deputy Ministers of Canada with the City of Ottawa.
The chief and a few senior officers of the Ottawa Police Service.
And it was an update on the situation and the NCR was the purpose of it.
When the Ottawa Police Service described the challenge they were facing, I think we were all struck.
I know I was personally struck by three things.
The first is that the sheer scale and intensity of the unlawful activity Was eclipsing their ability to manage clearly.
The second is that when they applied fines, they were issuing fines to the people blocking the streets.
And they were quite struck by, they just ignored the fines, they threw them out, they laughed, whatever.
So the deterrence effect from the fines that they were levying seemed to be very low.
The third is that when an officer tried to take an enforcement action, they would often be swarmed.
And then they would have to back down in what they described as in the interest of officer safety and public safety.
And the fourth was that they were trying to build an operational plan to bring the occupation to an end.
One of the impediments was they were unable to secure the heavy tow trucks they needed to move the commercial vehicles.
And so we found that was a very sobering discussion.
In coming back from that and reflecting on that, we had discussions inside Transport Canada, briefed Minister Elgabra.
And he was obviously keen for us to do whatever we could do to help resolve the situation.
And because we're a large organization with extensive regulatory responsibilities, we have a large oversight operation, compliance operation, enforcement operation, we have some expertise in compliance promotion and strategies to encourage parties to comply with, well, usually transport regulations.
Short of actual enforcement.
And so we started developing two sets of things.
One was a strategic enforcement strategy, and that's the document you have here.
The other is a tow truck strategy.
The idea here was to try and marshal every legal resource available and all of the best practices and strategies.
To try and convince people that, first of all, what they're doing is illegal because there was some sense that a number of the people involved in the occupation did not have a clear understanding of how much illegal activity they were undertaking.
Second, the consequences of it and how that could be quite significant adverse consequences for them.
Third, to encourage, thereby encouraging them, at least the ones that were open to any persuasion, to cease participating in the occupation and thereby the so-called shrink the footprint.
And so, given the fact that the initial attempt to levy fines, according to the Ottawa Police Service, had no effect.
The thinking here was, what if we looked at all available legal tools and had a comprehensive approach to deploying everything, municipal bylaws, Highway Traffic Act, criminal code, etc., both in terms of as a communications exercise to encourage people to cease and desist the illegal activity, and then, as necessary, using multi-pronged sort of options for enforcement.
This product you see here, the February 13th final draft, was the ultimate product of that initial thinking on the part of Transport Canada.
But it was refined through extensive discussions and consultations with our federal partners and with our provincial partners.
It went to probably, I would say...
Call it 10 different federal provincial discussions, both with our provincial transport colleagues and with public safety's provincial solicitor general public safety colleagues.
Okay, we're going to come back to the aspect of interprovincial cooperation in developing this strategy.
While we're, though, describing the items you mentioned earlier in your list of points that Transport Canada mobilized to react to the situation, can you tell us about the tow truck policy or the approach that Transport Canada developed to the point you were describing about the need for heavy lift tow capacity?
And so that was the second stream of thinking and strategizing that came out of the stark realization from the February 3rd meeting with Ottawa.
And we began exploring through a series of discussions both through the meetings convened by Deputy Minister Stewart with Ottawa and with Our police and procurement colleagues at the federal level and with provincial colleagues, we began exploring options for solving the tow truck problem.
What could be done in order to address the fact that the tow truck industry was declining to provide service to police in Ottawa?
We ended up developing a six-part tow truck strategy.
The initial focus was to work around, if you will, the inability to secure tow trucks by having a strategy of, first of all, using this, the strategic enforcement strategy to try and convince the commercial drivers that it's in their best interest to stop.
The second is that in the event that you can't secure the tow trucks, the services of the industry, but the police are ready for operations to bring the occupations and blockades to an end,
to have strategies like, as they enforce, to get the keys, And if they detain the driver because they're breaking the law, have somebody who knows how to drive a truck drive it away to some secure location.
A lot of the trucks were purposely disabled.
And so then you'd have to have, the next stage was to have mechanics get the truck in working order so it could be driven away.
And then a key part of the strategy is that having maximized what you can do without.
Tow truck services because they were blanket refusal.
Looking at a whole range of strategies to try and overcome the reluctance of this part of the tow truck industry.
And I should emphasize that because of the commercial vehicles involved in some locations, you needed not just your average everyday CAA small tow truck that shows up for a Honda Civic.
A large wrecker that had the mechanical capacity with an operator with the skill to safely move like a semi truck.
And so we worked through a series of ideas that we kicked around with different partners to try and overcome the reluctance of that specialized heavy wrecker or heavy tow industry to provide service.
Through the course of that, it became clear how deep When we started this out around the 5th or 6th, we were optimistic we could find a solution.
As we worked it and worked it and worked it, we got to the 13th, a solution was still elusive.
And what we came to realize over this period was essentially how deeply rooted the reluctance is from the industry.
And quite frankly, it was quite clear.
The picture that emerged to us was quite clear that they felt quite threatened and that if they showed up in support of a police operation on a convoy, they were putting their future business at risk, their property at risk, and to a significant extent, their safety at risk.
And so while we thought we could figure out a financial instrument that would get them to show up...
We weren't able to figure out a financial instrument strong enough to overcome those threats.
And whatever happened then with the tow truck strategy, did it get implemented in any measure?
It was the product of a lot of discussions, and it was implemented in some marginal ways in some places.
It's ultimate manifestation, I would say, was the fact that having sort of worked through all of this, that the ultimate manifestation was that, and I should make a point that,
interestingly enough, on the 12th and 13th, I think between myself and the Assistant Deputy Minister of Safety and Security, I think we had about four Meetings and discussions to try and find the solution, to try and find a way where the tow truck strategy would actually work.
And there was some interesting back and forth with different provinces, police and procurement officials on that point.
Ultimately, I would say the tow truck strategy was ultimately manifest in the Emergency Act orders where there was a specific provision to request essential services, specifically tow trucks.
If I can capture what you've just said, and then I'm going to...
Ask you some questions about this.
The purpose of developing the tow truck strategy was to come up with a solution to all of the parked trucks.
That is sort of obvious on its face.
And you describe an effort in which you and your colleagues thought of everything you could to deal with the fact that you needed to move these big rigs and different ways of either getting them to go on their own or...
Or to move them with tow trucks.
And ultimately, by the 13th, you'd basically decided there was not a viable solution with the authorities you had at your disposal.
Is that right?
I would say that by the time we got to the 13th, we had failed to find a viable solution.
Right.
Now, on that point, what I'd like to hear is...
Is your response, if you're familiar enough with the facts I'm going to suggest to you, the Commission has heard evidence from different representatives of the Ottawa Police Service and the Ontario Provincial Police that they had had some success in securing voluntary compliance from heavy lift tow truck operators without, this is before the Emergencies Act gave them authority to compel that.
So I'm not going to ask you to To offer a view on the truthfulness of that, because I don't think you were directly connected to it, but did you have information about that effort by the OPS and the OPP at the time you were developing this tow truck strategy?
No.
And I should say that we'd had a lot of discussions with a lot of partners on the strategy, and no partner had shared any information with us to that effect.
And did your partners include representatives of the OPS, the OPP and the Ontario government?
Yes, they did.
Is this a good time for the lunch break?
It's a perfect time.
Okay, so we'll take the lunch break and come back at two o 'clock.
The commission is in recess until 2 o'clock.
The commission is in recess until 14 o'clock.
The commission is in recess until 14 o'clock.
The commission is in recess until 14 o'clock.
Order alert.
The commission has reconvened.
La commissora Brown.
La commissora Brown.
Good afternoon again gentlemen.
If I can pick up roughly where we left off, we had run through the life cycle of the tow truck strategy and I wanted to ask you some questions and this will to some extent bring back in your enforcement strategy and your tow truck strategy but just talk to you about the point we began with which was your federal provincial territorial coordination as you were Trying to come to solutions.
And in particular, I'll call up a document, though I don't know if we'll need reference to it, but we'll get it on the screen just in case we do.
It's SSM CAN 50363.
And to...
While that's coming up, Mr. Keenan, you'll recollect perhaps that on February 7, Transport Canada, Public Safety and CBS convened a Feds, Provinces, Territories discussion?
Yes.
And now you can see on the screen an email.
My notes from the FTP call.
And if to recollect your memory in response to any of my questions, you want to have the clerk scroll down and help you through your answers, please feel free to do so.
But perhaps just generally, who convened the meeting?
The meeting was convened by Deputy Minister Stewart of Public Safety, but in part upon the suggestion of myself.
And what was the purpose of the meeting?
There was a number of purposes, but there was one overall purpose, which was to bring together at the federal and provincial level the Deputy Ministers of Public Safety and Transport to take stock of developments and to talk about...
Ways of working together to deal with this rapidly evolving national crisis.
And then you have the notes there that...
Well, actually, I suppose I should back up a second.
It was a federal, provincial, and territorial meeting.
Without listing all the names, can you just describe the categories of people who were participating in this?
Probably three.
At the federal level, it would have been the Deputy Rod Stewart and some of his senior people from Public Safety, myself and senior folks from Transport Canada.
And I see here on the list, on the notes, that we also had CBSA, which I'm sure was John Osowski.
And then from the provincial side, essentially my counterparts, the deputy ministers of transport or transport and road safety from all of the provinces and the territories.
And then on the public safety side, the public safety departments or solicitor general, whatever they're called in each of those jurisdictions.
So it would have been a fairly significant number of people in total.
Significant in number, and it sounds like...
The senior or close to the most senior officials in their portfolios for each province and territory?
Yes, and sometimes when you have these calls, like sometimes when I'm called to a meeting, I'll be called to two or three meetings at the same time, I will delegate the less important ones.
This was the most important discussion any of us were having, so if my memory serves correctly, I think it was almost all of jurisdiction showed up with what you called the deputy head.
The Deputy Minister, Deputy Solicitor General, etc.
And under the fourth bullet there is Transport Canada Proposal.
And the first bullet, I'll help you through, I believe, Maximum Enforcement Strategy is one of the early monikers for what became the Strategic Enforcement Strategy, is that right?
Yes, that's correct.
Okay, so there's your strategy.
And some bullet points for it.
Did you present this strategy?
You were one of your officials?
I presented this strategy.
At that point, we didn't have a written document, so I verbally outlined the concept and the idea of the strategic enforcement strategy, which at that time we were referring to as the maximum enforcement strategy.
And then, Clerk, if you could just scroll down a little bit, and then Mr. Keenan, I'll ask you, what was the reception to the strategy?
As these notes that Aaron and Assistant Deputy Minister of Transport took were captured, the mixed, so you could see.
In general, when we were having this discussion, there was a cool reserved response by provincial colleagues.
Good colleagues and collaboration, but there was a lot of anxiety about the rapidly escalating scale of unlawful behavior, so everybody was nervous and being careful.
That said, there was different complexions in the response.
Alberta had mixed feedback, as per these notes.
They made the point that we were seeking both ideas and participation and engagement on the strategy.
And they were making it clear they were prepared to be engaged.
The appropriate and usual cautions about letting police make operational decisions.
I think, as you go down, I think my recollection is BC was more positive.
Quebec was positive.
In fact, I think they were saying...
That's the point I was remembering, that not only were they supportive, they said that the strategy that we were advocating aligned well to the strategy that they had executed the last weekend to, in their view, some success.
With respect to the protests in Quebec City?
Yes.
And then how did Ontario receive the strategy?
I think they were on the slightly cooler side.
The government should issue a statement of support for police.
They were one voice, and to be fair to Ontario, there were other voices that were uncomfortable with the word maximum.
And so we, in the spirit of building a consensus, we were happy to change the word maximum to strategic at the expense of making the title a little bit redundant.
it.
Now, we're going to go to the next day after this FPT meeting, February the 8th.
And we're going to talk about a letter you received and that I think you know well by now from the Ontario Deputy Minister of Transportation, your counterpart in Ontario.
Before we get there, I'd like to put up, if you could please, Mr. Clerk, PBCAN 50820.
And this is an email chain.
That starts with the transmission of the letter, but...
If you could go back to the top, please, Clerk, just for a second.
So, not sure where this ends up taking us through, but if you scroll down, you'll come to a paragraph.
We have had several discussions.
There we go.
So this is your contribution having received the letter.
And I'll just read this out so that it's in the transcript.
We have had several discussions with Ontario about enforcement options.
Ontario has always been cautious and reserved about making full use of its authorities under the Highway Traffic Act, but was engaged.
This letter, and I'm going to try to ellipse your typos here, but this letter represents a pullback from those discussions.
It is consistent with the pattern we saw in the last 48 hours where Minister Mulroney is unavailable to talk to Minister Al Ghabra.
And then it's got your name at the end.
Have I been fair to the typos there?
Yes, I think you've done them more than justice, and I apologize for the typos that came from typing fast.
We've all been there.
Now, we're going to go to the letter in a second, and you'd already mentioned that in the FPT meeting, you sent some coolness to Ontario and some of the other provinces about the enforcement strategy.
But the reason I wanted to begin with this...
You foreshadowed by saying the letter was a less-than-embracing acceptance of the enforcement strategy by Ontario, and you're saying that that is consistent with the pattern in the last 48 hours.
Can you explain what you mean by that about Minister Mulroney, which would be an Ontario minister, being unwilling to talk to Minister Elgabra or unavailable?
Certainly.
So, in the follow-up from the call with the Ontario Police on the 3rd, so we started thinking about this on the 4th, and over the weekend of the 5th and 6th, had reached out to Ontario.
I reached out to the Deputy Minister LeBlanc by phone.
My Assistant Deputy Minister of Safety and Security reached out to his counterpart, and so we had started the conversation.
And we were getting good colleagues returning our calls, constructive discussion about cool and reserved, and so that was notable.
At the same time, at the ministerial level, Minister Al-Ghabra, because I was briefing him day by day, Reached out, saw the importance of this issue and reached out to Minister Mulroney.
And the normal course of events in the good relationships amongst the Minister of Transport, when one minister is keen to talk to another, they connect quite quickly.
They can be busy, but they'll find time.
And it was several days, I guess here, at this point, it was at least 48 hours where Minister Mulroney was unavailable to talk to Minister Al Ghabra.
Then this letter arrived on February 8th.
In that context, this letter arrived in February 8th from Deputy Minister LeBlanc.
And I believe that Minister Mulrini then got back to Minister Elgabra and said that we're providing a response.
My Deputy Minister is providing a response to your Deputy Minister.
And that response was this letter.
Not a slightly unorthodox way of having those communications, but it did close the loop.
Okay, and just so we have the cast of characters accurate for those who haven't been following this too closely, Minister Agabra was the Federal Minister of Transport and Minister Moroni was Ontario's Provincial Minister of Transport?
Yes.
Thank you.
Now, if we can go to the letter, clerk, it would be PB CAN 50821.
Now, you're...
You by now, I'm sure, are quite familiar with this letter.
And as a matter of fact, it's had some airtime at the hearing already in front of other witnesses, so we don't need to spend too much time on it.
But perhaps you could explain to me the substance of this response and your reaction to it.
The substance of the response was, I guess, first and foremost, the tone of the response was collaborative and collegial.
The substance of the response was...
Negative in the following sense.
And as you go through down, if you could scroll down just maybe a little further up and stop there.
Scroll up just slightly, please.
Thank you.
There was an explanation for this is based on us inquiring about the possibility.
Of finding a way to leverage the potential sanction of a commercial truck driver losing their commercial operating certificate because of significant and repeated violations of the Highway Traffic Act as a result of blocking a highway with the truck, honking the horn, all of these violations of the Highway Traffic Act.
And we were sort of exploring that and sort of asking a question to our provincial colleagues in charge of that, like, what could be done here?
And this is a very sort of detailed description of the various reasons why in what I concluded was a polite, detailed, substantive description of why and how nothing could be done in this respect.
And there are very good points of procedure, et cetera, procedural fairness, et cetera, but I interpreted this that because it ended saying we don't think we can do anything here and we would ask that you redirect discussions to my colleague, the Solicitor General, this was a very polite but firm no, we're not going to get involved here.
Okay, thank you.
And with that response, I'll ask my colleague to pick up a new line of questions.
commissioner Stephen Armstrong Commission Council will pick up for for a section of questions and then I'll come back to finish you
Good afternoon, Mr. Keenan and Mr. Day.
My name is Stephen Armstrong.
I'm Commission Council.
I'm going to be asking some questions about the economic impact analysis from the border blockades.
And my questions are primarily for Mr. Day, but Mr. Keenan, if you have anything to add, please do.
So, Mr. Day, I understand that your directorate has previous experience analyzing trade shocks.
Is that correct?
Yes, it's correct.
Can you tell the Commissioner about some of that experience?
Yes.
Well, basically, my group is responsible to monitor and track any disruption on the transportation system.
And of course, you know, with what happened in the previous years in terms of the rail blockage, for example, but also other events, you know, we develop expertise.
And knowledge about how to assess this different disruption on the Canadian transportation system, but also on the Canadian economy.
And just in terms of understanding the impact on border blockades, the Commission understands from the institutional report that the nature of trade between Canada and the United States, I guess some of the features of the economy are an important background.
Can you describe or provide some context on that?
Yes.
For any economic impact assessment, we follow a very rigorous framework to make sure that we're using the best data, but also that we validate that with the industry.
So we always started our analysis by having a good assessment of the context and what is happening.
And in order to do that, we use the best data available.
For example, in the context of the issue on the cross-border, we're using Statistic Canada data to get a good sense in terms of...
The nature of the trade that are affected in the different border point in terms of the magnitude, but also the type of the merchandise that were affected by the reduction or the blockade of the bridge.
We're also using other sources of information, for example, information from CBSA about daily movement at the border, just to get a sense in terms of the fluidity.
And the capacity of the movement at the different border.
We're also using direct information and data from the industry to get a sense from them in terms of how they have been impacted and the impact for the operation overall.
So based on this data, we're getting a bit of a portrait of what is really happening.
And following that, we always validate this information directly with the industry.
So I was having, or my colleague or my group were having daily calls with the different...
Sector affected by the blockade on the borders in order to validate again the data that we have, but also get a better insight from them about how they have been affected and what might be the implication for them in terms of production, in terms of issues for investment, for example, which was also a real threat for the auto sector, for example.
If I could jump in, sorry.
Could I just ask, I guess, more specifically of the ports of entry that experienced blockades in February 2022, which were the most concerning from an economic perspective and why?
Well, when you look at the Ambassador Bridge, for example, this is a very significant, you know...
I would say, corridor to exchange, basically, merchandise between us and the United States.
The magnitude is important.
It represents just by itself about 26% of the value of the export that Canada is moving to the United States.
And 33% of the import that Canada is making, the U.S., is going through the Ambassador Bridge.
The strategic importance of these bridges was very, very clear.
It's clearly also very strategic in terms of the sector affected.
In the south of Ontario, the auto sector, the manufacturing sector was clearly affected directly and quickly because they are all now in a just-in-time kind of a production schedule.
So any delay or a reduction or not accessing the equipment that they need We need in order to produce at the direct, almost direct impact instantaneously in terms of their activities.
But there are other commodities that have been affected as well that are important for the Canadian communities, like, you know, the farmers.
Basically medical equipment, from archaeological equipment as well, furniture, food.
So there's a lot of movement of merchandise to the bridge that clearly had a direct and instantaneous impact in terms of not only the manufacturing sector, but also the Canadian communities about accessing some of the goods that are important for them.
Thanks.
And I just wanted to pick up on a point I think that you were just getting into there, is that some of these goods that you were looking at are critical goods, correct?
Or something that could be deemed critical goods.
Can you explain to the Commissioner what are critical goods?
What is the significance of that?
Well, there's no official definition of the critical goods right now, but we can...
Probably extract and get an agreement that's saying that when it's touched the health and the food security of community, for example, these are very critical to the day-to-day needs of the community in Canadian.
And they are also another element of the critical aspect when it's also affecting the economic activities.
And again, coming back to the manufacturing sector.
Not having access to the different equipment that was needed in order to produce had a direct impact on them in terms of their capacity to basically conduct their activities.
So we have seen reduction and stoppage of the production in the auto sector and other sectors following the block at the Ambassador Bridge, for example.
Right, but I just want to tie back to the critical goods for a second.
I think you linked that to sort of the well-being of the goods that are essential for well-being and health.
Is it fair to say that if we're looking at critical goods, that imports are more important than exports or are they equally important?
You know, when you look at the composition of the import and the export, they are both very important.
They are important for our calling in the US as well, because we do export some of these critical goods as well.
And not only for the community, but also to ensure that they can, on their side, also produce what they need to produce in terms of sustaining the economic activities in the auto sector, for example.
It's a bit particular in a sense that the two economies are very integrated overall in terms of the economic activity, but the auto sector is probably one of the most integrated.
And the way they manage all the supply chains, it's really integrated.
It's not a US supply chain, it's not a Canadian supply chain, it's an integrated North American supply chain.
So any disruption in terms of the movement of what is needed on the supply chain is affecting both sides of the country.
So, Mr. Clerk, I'd like to call up the institutional report.
It's at doj.ir.severalseros5.
And if we could turn to page 22, please.
And I guess I'm going to ask about paragraph 89 here.
You have some figures.
So this is focusing on the Ambassador Bridge.
And am I correct in understanding that, for example, where it says agri-food in the bullet, it's 10.7% of all exports.
Is that a percent of agri-food exports nationwide that are going through the Ambassador Bridge?
If I remember correctly, let me see.
Yeah, I think it's correct.
And that would apply to pharmaceuticals and critical minerals.
Exactly.
And so in paragraph 90, you address Western Canada, and in the second sentence there, sorry, I shouldn't say you, it's the institutional report, but it refers to Western Canada as 1% to 2% of critical exports and imports.
Is it fair to say that when we're talking about critical goods, is the main concern the Ambassador Bridge?
Well, given the magnitude and the importance of the value and the importance of this committee, yes.
Okay, and then on paragraph 91, the report says, It addresses the impact on automobile manufacturers.
Can you tell the Commissioner, how did Transport Canada come to learn about the impact on automobile manufacturers, and can you just expand on that a bit?
Yes.
Again, you know, it's based on, first of all, getting good data and statistics from States Canada and other sources about the situation there.
But again, data is not always reflecting what is really happening right now.
So that's why we had different, you know, engagement with the industry in order to get a sense in terms of how they have been affected by the different reduction of the movement.
At the border.
And we have been in contact with...
Here you have a short list of the key auto-producers, but we have had a comprehensive engagement with also other sectors as well that were affected, just to get a sense in terms of all the different sectors were affected by the block at the border.
And did you consider, in your analysis, Whether these auto manufacturers could make up production after the blockades ended?
Yeah, we implicitly take that into consideration because I was thinking at the beginning, the first element is to get an assessment about the How the movement at the border is affected.
So we had a good understanding, based on Statistics Canada, about the magnitude of the export and the import and the value of that.
And at the bridge, it was about 390-93 million per day that are affected by the blockade there.
And after that, we're trying to translate that in terms of how much of these movements at the border will lead to a It's a real issue in terms of economic costs and loss of economic activities.
And in order to do that, we're using, well, what we think is state-of-the-art economic model in order to look at the impact of a reduction of the movement of the merchandise at the border and get a sense in terms of...
What are the sector that will be the most affected and how they will be affected?
And these models allow us to get a good picture, a good portrait of what happened on that side.
And it's with this model, again, validated with the industry that we're developing a kind of a net economic assessment of the impact of the blocking.
I'd like to turn to paragraph 92. It's on the screen already.
Here you address the food and beverage industry, and it says here that it appeared likely at the time that some manufacturers would have to shut down if the blockade persisted, which in turn could lead to less availability of food and beverage products and higher prices.
How did you come to the opinion that that appeared likely?
What was the source of that?
Well, this stream I meant to consider here.
First of all, It was during the winter.
It's always more a challenge to move perishable products during the winter.
So you have to work in a window that is already really more narrow.
And after that, we had a good information that in terms of...
How much these industries on both sides of the border were affected.
And of course, for them, it's real time.
If you're not taking the fruits, vegetables, the flowers, the other perishable goods.
Even if there's a delay of a one day or two, it means that they are losing basically some of the business or their business on that side.
So they were very, very concerned about, you know, not having predictability on their side about when they can move their products and where.
And again, even a delay in terms of the transportation.
Their side were not only adding costs, it was sometimes causing a problem of not being in the situation of delivering their products to their clients.
How did you come to understand that that occurred?
Well, it's true, you know, conversation we have had with different shippers on that front in order to get an appreciation of the challenges that they were facing.
Mr. Clerk, can we please go to page 23 of the report, the next page?
There's a chart in the middle of the page.
We can scroll up or down if you want the context, but Mr. Day, could you walk us through this chart briefly?
Yes, this is basically a table summarizing.
What I just mentioned.
So we're, of course, monitoring the situation at the different border crossing in terms of what is happening there.
And using, you know, Statistic Canada trade data, we had a...
It's basically a statistic about the value of the import and the import that was affected for specific days.
And this table is just trying to provide, again, contextualize in terms of the value of the export and the import that were affected by the different blockade in the different border crossing.
Just to get clarity on some of the terms, I guess, and I know they're, I think they're explained in the paragraphs above, but trade per day, that includes imports and exports.
Exactly.
And what is trade impact?
What is that figure ultimately showing us?
Well, the trade impact is basically looking at the trade per day that are affected times the number of days of the blockade.
So this is giving you a bit of an estimate of the value of the export and import that are affected or have been affected by the blockade in the different border crossing.
Right, but it doesn't purport to be the...
The cost to the Canadian economy, correct?
No.
Again, we're starting to get a sense in terms of what is affected first.
And in order to derive the net economic cost, we're going through this validation process.
Economic modeling, we can generate basically the loss of economic activities that were associated with the blockade at the different border crossing.
Okay, yeah, and then at paragraph 97 here, we have a figure It says that the total number of trucks entering or returning to Canada from the United States was down 5% in February 2022 relative to the same period in 2021.
Are you able to say what the cause of that 5% reduction was?
What was the cause?
Well, the numbers here refer for the full month, but given the data that we're getting on a daily basis from CBSA, we were in a position to look at the impact of the blockade at the different border crossing.
And I think my colleague on CBSA this morning presents some of these tables where we are showing a significant reduction, if not, you know, a total closure of the traffic in the different border crossing.
So we were in a position with this information and the validation with the industry to get a good sense in terms of what was really stopped or reduced at the border crossing in terms of traffic.
Are there any other factors that would impact, if you just look year over year, from 2021 to 2022, that would impact the flows?
Of course, at that time, we were in an environment that was under...
Under stress, I would say, economically and for the transportation sector, with the COVID situation, there were some challenges in terms of the global supply chain and the domestic supply chain.
But, you know, looking at historical average...
It was giving us a bit of a benchmark.
Usually, when you're doing this kind of analysis, you're using different benchmarks just to ensure that your assessment is robust enough.
Here in the paragraph, we're referring to the previous year, but we use different time periods just to make sure that our benchmark was robust enough to get a sense about the impact of the blockade of the bridge at the moment.
And do you know how much of the 5%, do you know how much that represents critical goods flowing across?
Was that impacted?
I don't have this information with me, but you can assume that, you know, depending of the composition of the, you know, the movement of the trucking, that probably most of the commodity that I've highlighted at the beginning were affected.
How much?
We don't have this information right now.
In paragraph 98, the report notes that a reduction in traffic was observed in Western Canada and the number of trucks entering or returning to Canada decreased by 48% at Coutts and 29% at Emerson.
Do you have the information for whether there were corresponding increases at the other nearby ports of entry in Alberta and Manitoba?
Well, in our analysis and using, again, daily information from our colleague on CBSA about the movement on the different...
We were in a position to see if the traffic were redirected, at least partly, to other border crossing.
And was it?
In some part, the traffic has been redirected to other border crossing points, but it was never a perfect...
Rerouting of the traffic from one bridge or one area to the others.
There were always, you know, a net cost or a net loss of traffic.
And there were also, even though if the traffic was rerouted, there were some cost issues in terms of adding time.
Adding costs, adding capacity in the other area, and causing problems in terms of the just-in-time kind of production in the different sectors that were affected.
And depending on the region, on the...
I focus a lot on the manufacturing sector, giving the south of the Ontario challenges.
But on the western side, their focus was more on live animal products, agri-food products, for example, or mining.
And again, there were some specific problematic there as well in terms of not being in a position to timely deliver these products to the different markets.
Okay, Mr. Clerk, I'd like to go to...
The next page, please.
So, it sort of ends the economic impact section here of the report saying, it's clear that there has been an impact, however, it's difficult to attribute the shifts noted above solely to the impact of the blockades.
Can you tell the Commissioner, I guess, some of the challenges in making that assessment and why that's not possible?
What was possible to do first is giving the shock that we had good information about the value of the export and import that were affected by the different blockers.
It was relatively straightforward to translate that to a modelling and validation in terms of net economic costs for the different regions.
We have done the analysis for the Ambassador Bridge, for example.
And we come with an estimate of the net economic cost.
In terms of the attribution of the overall other factor that is happening, that's where it was getting difficult.
For us to assess the role of vaccination, COVID, global supply chain challenges and /or challenges in terms of shortages of workers due to COVID or other issues, it's really difficult to make an assessment about the exact contribution of each of these factors when you're doing a global and macroeconomic impact assessment.
And if that's the case, then how can it be clear that the blockades had an impact?
Well, because, you know, for the reason that I just mentioned, we were in a position in the context of the blockade to know exactly what was affected in terms of the traffic of the merchandise on the exportation and the importation.
So that was, it was clear about, you know, the sector affected.
So we can use, basically, and we have used this information through our modelling to see.
How the Canadian economy and the regional economy and the sectoral economy were affected by the reduction, for example, of the traffic on the Ambassador Bridge.
And that was a clear assessment of the impact of the reduction of the importation and the exportation at the Ambassador Bridge.
So for this one, it's pretty clear.
It's when you're trying after that to look and get, I would say, A kind of an overall perspective about how the Canadian economic growth was affected for the different other shock and how can you attribute the reduction of economic growth, for example, in specific areas.
Then it's getting more difficult to make sure that you can do the causality or the attribution for the...
The global shock versus domestic shock, health-related shock, or any other shock.
But in the context of the Ambassador Bridge and the blockade on the crossing border, because we add information about the nature and the magnitude of the export and import affected, we were in a position to derive a net economic cost estimate.
Yeah, and I'd like to talk about that now, actually.
So, Mr. Clerk, if you could pull up.
PB CAN 00000840.
So, Mr. Jay, I think you've been alluding to this document.
This is a document that I understand your directorate prepared, is that correct?
Yes.
And we have a key messages box here that summarizes Could you walk the Commissioner through some of the key messages?
Yes.
Again, the first key message was basically to highlight the trade that was affected at the Ambassador Bridge.
Again, using Stats Canada data that was available there.
And we're in a position to highlight that about 390 million.
Of trade daily were affected, which again represent 26% of the export of the country to the U.S. and 33% of the merchandise imported from the U.S. by Rome.
So we're looking at that and now, and the next bullet, the next point was to say, okay, how this translates into economic...
Lost in Canada.
In order to do so, we have used, you know, a modeling that we have right now in our group.
And this model, or a state-of-the-art model, they are giving you a snapshot, based on Setsu Canada, of the...
Full economic structure in Canada, giving you the detail by sector, which allow us to look at, not only at the macro level, but at the very sectoral level and regional level, the nature of the impact of the reduction of the import and export.
And when we used that, we got an estimate of about 45 million of economic loss per day.
But we're using, giving, you know, that they are modeling tools, giving some uncertainty about how the different sector might have been affected at the beginning of the reduction of the activities in order to...
To bring a bit more certainty about the magnitude of the impact, one of the strategies to derive scenario.
And the second bullet there presents three different scenarios of how the reduction of the trade at the border impacts.
The first one is assuming that the main sectors affected will be transportation sector and the manufacturing sector and more precisely the auto sector.
And again, this was informed partly by also the conversation we were having with the industry.
And when you will look at this impact, the modeling is giving you an estimate of about 45 million.
of net economic loss, which means that the industry are producing less or stopping their production.
It means that they are losing income and salaries.
Less expenditure in the economy, less economic activities, and the 45 million there is capturing the direct impact of the reduction of the trade on the transportation and the auto sector.
The other element, or more to explore, assuming that other sector might have been also affected by the reduction of the...
Of the trade activities at the border.
The $86 million referred to a scenario where it was not only the transportation and the auto sector.
It was the full manufacturing sector in the south of Ontario that was affected.
And then the estimated rise from $45 million to $86 million a day.
And the last one, which is more kind of a...
An extreme case for us is to look at, okay, what is happening if all the sectors are instantaneously affected by the reduction of the export and import of the border, and then you're getting this estimate of $161 million.
And can I ask, what kind of assumptions went into the $45 million a day scenario?
The $45 million scenario is assuming that, again, looking at what is the traffic at the border that is affected.
So we're shocking basically the economy saying, if we're seeing these exports and imports are affected, what will be the impact for the transportation and the auto sector first?
And that's where you're getting the $45 million estimate.
And there's a reference.
When you're describing in the key messages the $45 million a day scenario, it says $45 million a day over the first week based on current mitigation efforts put in place by shippers and available alternative options.
What assumptions were you making about mitigation efforts for that scenario?
Well, we're assuming, given that we're assuming that the others, only the transportation and the auto sector were there.
We're assuming that all the other sectors of the economy, the food sector, the resource sector, the furniture sector, for example, they find ways.
To get access to the material that they need to maintain their economic activities.
And by redirecting some of their traffic or their import and export from trucking to rail or other mode, for example.
Or they were in a position to have and sustain economic activities because they...
They had some inventories to allow them to do so.
So that's why the 45 million for us was a kind of a conservative estimate of the impact because we're assuming that more or less all the other economic factors find ways to continue to produce, to continue to operate with minimal disturbance.
questions.
Okay, Mr. Clerk, I'd like to go to another document.
It's SSM.can.00003798.
And if you could go to the bottom, it's an email chain.
Okay, so Mr. Day, I don't have any questions about this first email, but I just would pause on it to let you refresh your memory.
Okay, and can we scroll up to the next email?
So here, Mr. Day, you've responded to Ms. Turcote on February 10th on economic impacts of the blockades at border crossings.
Mr. Clerk, could you scroll down?
And so in these three scenarios you outlined here, trade track one, two, and three, do these correspond to the scenarios that we were just talking about?
Yes.
So this is about the Ambassador Bridge.
Exactly.
And Mr. Clerk, could we scroll up again?
And so Ms. Turcote responds to your email.
And she has some questions for you.
Well, first she says, at first glance, impacts seem large to us, especially scenarios two to three, implying limited diversion options and high sensitivity to any delays.
Do you have any response to that comment?
Yes, we do.
First of all, we have to acknowledge that when we're doing this kind of analysis, There's a lot of exchange with other departments as well, just to, again, validate if they have any information that we don't have access to, but also making sure that we collectively play this challenge function together in order to make sure that we're getting the best advice to our respective minister.
And there have been exchange throughout this process with the Department of Finance at different levels, at my level and at the...
The working group level as well, in order to make sure that their assessment, the way they are conducting their assessment, to get a sense in terms of if they can share any of their insight to us, and we're sharing a bit of their insight.
On their side, they're using more, it is my understanding that they're using more macroeconomic...
You know, modeling tool to derive impact.
And on our side, we're using other set of tools that is giving us a lot more sectoral details about the nature of the shock and how the different sectors are affected.
So we're always, in that regard, trying to collaborate and collaborate effectively to make sure that what we're coming in terms of economic assessment were consistent in the way.
And if there were some questions about some of the results from the different tools that we're using, we're trying to get a good assessment together about how can we explain the difference between the two.
But in the context of the work with the Department of Finance, they have used our assumption about the trade impact or the shock in their model.
And they were shocking the economy.
We're using their macroeconomic tool, and they get some results.
And on our side, we're doing the same.
And this email is in that context to exchange information about, you know, the preliminary estimate of the impact from their side and our side.
So we had an agreement.
We're very consistent in terms of the way to get to the first element of the impact, which is referring to the scenario one at 45 million per day.
But they were questioning in terms of how far and solid were the other scenarios that we were doing.
And the email was just to exchange and provide them with more information about what we're trying to capture on scenario two and scenario three in terms of the sector affected, but also the dynamic aspect of the shock on the trade in the Ontario economy.
And so she had a number of questions for you.
I'm, I think, mostly just looking to highlight the first one.
She asked, what do you assume in terms of percent of impact shipments that are able to divert to other crossings, e.g.
Sarnia, Niagara land crossings, rail, and air?
And Mr. Clerk, if we could go up to the next email, I believe Mr. Day, you responded.
If we could go up to the next page as well.
This is the beginning of your email.
Well, let's find the...
So this is Mr. Day's response on February 11th.
If we could scroll down a bit.
Here we see some of the information from the background that we just looked at.
If we could scroll back down to the other page.
So my understanding, Mr. Day, if you recall this email, is that the questions are in the bullet points and your response is below in a different sort of color.
Is that right?
Yes.
And so your response to the question about...
Your assumption on diversion, it looks like you said our scenarios do not consider any diversions to other crossings.
Is that correct?
We, the shock, are assuming that this is a pure shock for the sector.
But that's why we're also looking, and I'm coming to that in the different response later, in terms of how can we, you know, capture the dynamic element associated with the rerouting as well.
And that's why we're using every day, you know, the information that we're coming from CBSA about, you know, the movement of the traffic or the perceived.
Movement of the traffic to other bridge to get an appreciation about, okay, if our shock was still reflecting what was happening on that side.
And so does your comment about the scenarios not considering diversion?
Does that apply to scenario one as well, the $45 million a day?
The scenario one does not consider any redirection of the traffic at the day of the shock on that front.
Sorry, I'd like you to clarify on that.
Does that mean there's no diversion on just day one of the one-week closure or any of the seven days of the week?
Well, implicitly, you know, the short answer to your question is that the model is already capturing the potential substitution of the rerouting to a certain level.
And this was already embedded in the modeling that we have had because we can see in terms of...
How our commodity needs to be moved.
And it was moved in the past.
And all the past behavior was captured there in terms of the way to get access to these elements.
And they have been shocked in the past as well.
That was affected also some of the manufacturing sector that was giving us some benchmark about the dynamic element of the rerouting.
What the model was not capturing, though, is the day-to-day Change that we were seeing with some redirection of the traffic from Ambassador Bridge to the other bridge.
And the model was not allowing us to capture also the cost associated with this rerouting.
Because rerouting doesn't mean that, you know, it's a...
It's basically reducing the overall cost, the net economic impact.
There might be a bit of a reduction associated to that, but there's also costs associated with rerouting about time, additional costs, loss of economic opportunities.
And we mentioned previously the perishable good, the food sector, where basically delay means for them that they are losing economic production and activities.
So in order to fully capture that, we had to basically play a little bit more with the model or qualify a bit more the result of the model to see how we can take that into consideration.
If I could add in, Christian, I think, tell me if this is right, that there's a number of real-world kind of challenges that some sectors had in diverting to other bridges that the model for all its sophistication couldn't fully capture.
One of them is...
In the auto sector, it's a just-in-time system where sometimes a truck is really geared to make two round trips in a day.
And then with this diversion, they can only make one round trip or half a round trip.
And so that, because it's so time sensitive and so synchronized, and that's one of many crossings, it's hard to have that in the model.
The second is that one of the...
We came to this issue at transport, which is the hours of service limit, because for safety reasons, truckers are limited on how many duty hours they can have before they have to stop and rest, and that the trips under normal conditions are synchronized around the duty hour requirements.
When they have a four-hour diversion and a 10-hour wait, they time out, and then they have to pull over.
For the safety rules.
There was some discussion of a temporary waiver of those, which we do at occasion.
So those kind of costs are material.
And I don't know, I assume the model in its sophistication can't fully capture all of that.
It can.
Yeah.
So, Mr. Clerk, could we go up to the first part of Mr. Day's response?
Yeah, you can pause right here.
So at the bottom of the screen.
I just, there's this, looks like you got some data here on diversion.
And so I'm just, I'm going to ask you some questions about that.
Where did you get this information from?
That's the daily data that we're getting from CBSA.
And so were you able to factor that into your scenario one or is that not factored in?
This was not fully a factor in in the scenario.
But the reason why we use a scenario one was precisely for that reason.
We haven't shocked all the sector of the economy.
And implicitly by doing that, we're trying to take into consideration that there will be some rerouting.
And it's not all the sectors that won't have access to all the equipment that they were looking for.
So that's why we're quite, you know, prudent with the scenario one by saying the sector that has been affected, it's mainly transportation sector and the auto sector.
All the others, you know, we're continuing basically to produce business as usual almost.
And this is what...
This is the attempt to try to capture that, to say that all the others will find ways to get access to their input, their equipment, to continue the production.
So we did explicitly use this number, but the fact of restricting the shock to the transportation sector and the auto sector was more or less to capture these elements that a lot of the other sector will be in a position to access.
Maybe not on a timely basis, but access what they need to continue to produce.
Mr. Clerk, can we scroll up to the next email in the chain?
So, Mr. Dea, I think you're not on the chain anymore, but I wanted to get your response because finance officials continue to comment on the scenarios.
And in the first bubble...
They say, based on description scenarios 2 and 3, I'm not sure we should include these, especially given that the ambassador is open again.
And then in bullet 2, they say, scenario 1 seems like a reasonable upper bound for the daily cost.
They could easily get there.
And they say, they see it as an upper bound.
Do you have any comment on that point or anything to add?
Well, you have to refer that at the date of this email as well.
We're talking about February 14. So we have started to do these estimates at the beginning of the blockade.
So in early February, when we're starting to see some issues in terms of the blockade, we're starting this estimate, not knowing exactly what kind of rerouting would happen and how it will happen.
And I think this email was on the February 14th.
Mr. Clerk, can we scroll up and see the date?
Yeah.
Right.
Yeah, and it was exchanged within the Department of Finance, between the analysts there.
We had a lot more information at that time about, you know, what happened over the past few days in terms of rerouting.
And that's where they were focusing a bit their elements, saying maybe now the scenario two and three, even what we know right now, were probably a bit more on the eye side in the way to look at the economic impact of this situation.
And they were more in line with us with the scenario one as a prudent and a conservative estimate to assess the net economic impact on that regard.
And at the end of the second bullet, I just want to get your comment on the remark that the costs are also probably mostly transient with catch-up production expected in the coming weeks.
Do you have any response to that?
Well, again, we're all trying to infer maybe some behavior in terms of the economy there.
I think on the February 14, we had a bit more...
A better understanding about the nature, the magnitude of the shock and the return to that.
And I think this exchange there was more or less to capture now or better reflect this information.
But again, it was more to say that given what we know right now and given the current situation on February 14, maybe a scenario two and threes were more on the...
Upper bound of the net economic impact.
If it's helpful, could I add a point here?
First of all, what you're seeing is an exchange between finance and other department on economic analysis, which is very typical.
I've been involved in that in three or four different departments.
But on this issue, I think there's an important point around this issue of transient that I think is important context.
And this is a good discussion.
Put this impact in context.
In one sense, there's a transient.
Once the bridge opens, the shock wears off and the economy adjusts and gets back going.
There's two aspects that are not transient.
One is that there was some period, and because the thing was closed for six days, it wasn't that long, but there were a number of days and shifts.
Billion-dollar plants were idled, and you don't actually ever regain that.
If you shut down a billion-dollar plant for a day, that's a loss of production that you don't actually ever truly get back.
But if you looked in paragraph 91 on the institutional report, you don't have to show it, but it listed the impacts on the auto manufacturing plants in Ontario, and it went through like Honda, GM and Oshawa, and these different places in Ontario.
What it didn't say, because it wasn't a Canadian economic impact, is the same thing was happening in the US, and there were auto plants as far as South as Kentucky that were disrupted because they couldn't get the parts across the ambassador bridge they needed for their production.
And that created an economic impact that could have been quite devastating and permanent, and that is the loss of confidence that Canada is a reliable trade partner.
And that a loss of confidence that a production in U.S. boardrooms and U.S. state and national capitals, that a production system that went across the border wasn't reliable and you should consolidate in the U.S. And so there was an immediate, extremely high level of anxiety out of the boardrooms of the automakers.
Out of Michigan, the governor of Michigan, the calls were coming in from Washington.
I was getting calls from my counterpart immediately.
What's up?
Can we help?
And because there had been a significant disruption two years ago with rail blockades, we were seeing a growing sense of a question as to whether Canada was a reliable trade partner.
And whether these trade corridors would stay open.
That's really important because that affects investment decisions.
And there was a high level of concern at Transport, at Finance, at GAC, that this was having an adverse effect on investment decisions.
In boardrooms of US companies, and in particular, at the worst possible time, because there were a number of major decisions pending on production mandates and investments in auto plants in Ontario, and they typically weigh competing locations.
And this bridge outage, particularly if it's extended, could actually tip the balance in Canada's disfavour.
Billion dollar investments that would have otherwise happened in Ontario were going to happen in Ohio or Kentucky or Michigan.
That was, I would say, an extremely high level of concern.
And that if this had gone on longer, if it had restarted, the risk of that happening was quite high.
In the end, I think the consensus was it was a near miss.
While it was a problem and there was a lot of anxiety, Canada was still able to land a number of billion-dollar investment decisions by automakers like Stellantis, Honda, GM in the following months all made billion-dollar investment decisions in Ontario.
If this had gone on longer, if it had been repeated, then any one of those could have been easily unwound, because a big decision like that is not final until it's final, and boardrooms are always assessing those kind of risks.
So that is a major, I would say, strategic economic risk that represents economic harm to the country that comes in the future.
That is quite material to the national interest, but as sophisticated as these models are, either the transport one or the finance one, there's no way to include them in the model.
So my assessment would be the economic cost is, say, different versions of around $50 million a day and potentially much higher if this disruption...
It undermines and reverses some future investment decisions in Canada.
And if I could just follow up on that with one question.
The concerns you outlined, Mr. Keenan, about the automotive industry and about Canada's reputation and attracting investment, was that more top of mind than the importation of critical goods?
What was most important in your mind at that time?
I think both were really important.
The importation of critical goods is a here-and-now problem that puts the health and safety of Canadians at risk.
And the investment confidence is a future economic prospects issue that puts future really good, high-paying jobs at risk.
And both of them are important.
Thank you.
Those are my questions.
my colleague Mr. Cameron has some more.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I've been told I've got 30 minutes left, and I think I can probably eliminate some material and get this done in that time.
And for those of you who've been following the last hour or so, I can point out that...
Tomorrow the finance panel comes on and we'll have another perspective on the similar analysis about the impacts of that.
So in the spirit of if you liked this, you might like that.
Gentlemen, if I can take you back to the narrative of the development of the federal government's response to the convoy.
We were just talking about the The letter from Ontario saying that they weren't enthusiastic about the enforcement strategy for the reasons articulated in that letter.
I'd like to pick up now where things went from there, beginning with a question to you, Mr. Keenan.
Did you brief that letter up to Minister Alcalde?
Yes, I think you could see from the email chain I briefed that letter to Keenan.
Federal colleagues almost immediately, and I briefed that letter up to Minister El Gabra probably even before then.
And did you have discussions with him or give him feedback on what you thought the implications of that letter were for the development of your enforcement strategy?
Yes.
And can you give us a few minutes on that?
I think I characterized the letter as disappointing.
Ontario is pulling back, and this narrows the tools available for the strategic enforcement strategy, but we will continue working with them and others to try and flesh it out.
Now, leading up from the time of the letter towards invocation on the 14th, What was Transport Canada's role in developing the government's thinking on the potential use of the Emergencies Act?
Our first role was working up the strategic enforcement strategy and the tow truck strategy, which we've discussed.
The second key one was assessing the scope of the adverse economic impact that was unfolding starting February 7th because of the accumulation of the border blockades.
Over that course of 7th through to the 10th, And into the weekend of the 12th and 13th, we were continuing to advance those strategies essentially as the Index Track 1 approach.
Somewhere around the 10th and through into the 12th and 13th, we put our minds to options for increasing authorities under a Track 2 Emergencies Act approach and had produced A couple of background pieces were the experts in safety and security with the different in aviation,
road, marine, et cetera, rail were explaining, well, what could we do with our existing authorities and where could there potentially be a new authority that might be helpful?
And those were assembled into some tables of background analysis.
And tell me, as you're doing this thinking, on February 11th, Ontario adopted its emergency measures, and how did that have an impact on your thinking about, first of all, how you viewed the Ontario measures, how they might have counterparts in other provinces or federally?
First and foremost, we got the news on the 10th that Ontario was contemplating or was about to issue an emergency declaration.
And then I think on the 11th, we saw the orders and we understood on the 11th that it would include things like An ability to suspend the CIVOR, the commercial operating certificate of a truck that's involved in an illegal activity.
And so through that evening of the 10th and the 11th, we took that as a very welcome development.
It was clear that Ontario had executed a major pivot and that the February 8th letter to me saying there's nothing we can do had been replaced with a decision to do something.
Material and significant.
And so that was a welcome development that contributed in a material way to the strategic enforcement strategy.
And did that prompt you to either think about or perhaps even encourage other provinces to consider similar measures that they might be able to take in their jurisdictions?
Yes.
In fact, there was a Almost an evergreen draft of the strategic enforcement strategy that would evolve through discussions with provincial colleagues, and it would evolve through developments.
And we began explicitly citing the Ontario Emergencies and Civil Protection Act measures.
And in particular, some of the elements of that that were relevant to the transportation enforcement strategy, like the ability to suspend CIVORs.
And I remember making the comment that Ontario is stepping up and taking some action and the extent to which other provinces can take similar action will strengthen this strategy.
Now, the next point I'd like to bring to your attention as we're following this chronology.
There was an email thread on about February 10th, and Mr. Clerk, if you could call up SSM CAN 50374.
This is the email thread started by the Deputy Clerk, Ms. Truen.
Again, this is a document that's received some attention already in the hearing.
We don't need to go into it line by line, but you might remember this as the inquiry as to whether or not there is an opportunity for this concept of a trade corridor that might assist in giving federal jurisdiction that could prevent obstructions at point...
Border crossings.
Do you remember that?
I do.
And if we could just scroll down in the email a bit.
And if we could start by going to the bottom just so we can see the actual proposal.
There we are.
I'll read it out.
As you know, we are looking at different options to get jurisdiction.
One of the questions I received is, can we declare the region of the Ambassador Bridge a trade corridor and then get jurisdiction?
And then if you received that and considered it, and we'll now look at your response, Mr. Keenan.
So, Clerk, if you could scroll up again.
Further, please, to Mr. Keenan's thoughts.
Okay.
Now, you have a number of points that you mention in here.
It's a four-part answer, and because we've only got a little bit of time, perhaps you could just give it to us in bullet points, and then I'm going to ask you to talk in some detail about this.
But if you can just give us the quick overview.
Of your thoughts about the trade corridor idea?
And the context of this was both the question from the Deputy Clerk, as well as, I think, a public comment that the Ontario Minister of Transport had made, I think, the day before, after the letter came, that the problem with the Ambassador Bridge was a border crossing.
It's federal jurisdiction, so we're looking to the...
For the federal government to solve it.
And it was a combination of those two things that I think led to the deputy clerk's question.
And so the key points I raised, because we had looked at this, and the first is that there is no, in statute and law, as of today, there's no trade court or federal authority.
So it's that simple.
There is...
Second of all, I think the second point is that there is legislation that governs and protects the point of the crossing, and the two of them are the Customs Act, the CBSA authorities under the Customs Act, and Transport administers the International Bridges and Tunnels Act.
And so there were suggestions we should go use this Act to solve that problem.
And we looked at that, but the Act gives the Minister of Transport some very significant authorities.
But the geographic scope of those authorities is the actual federal infrastructure itself.
So if the protesters had set up in the middle of the bridge and were blockading from the middle of the bridge, then that act would be of some potential use.
But because they were on the...
The third point is because they're on the city streets of Windsor.
These federal acts have no scope covering the city streets of Windsor.
And that the remainder of it was making the point that Ontario sort of backed away, either on the basis that they think this can be left to the federal government and its jurisdiction, but we need to make it clear that that doesn't work and that if they, the only feasible way, that they have to do something.
And because the streets of Windsor...
are under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Authorities of Windsor and the Provincial Government and if they really truly want us to solve this the only way to do that is to declare an emergency and ask us to intervene through our Emergencies Act.
That would be a very provocative approach and it may succeed in having Ontario come back to the table and start working using their authorities to solve the problem.
Okay, if we could, Mr. Clerk, just scroll back up to the point, first of all.
Down, please.
So your first point is there's no such thing as a trade corridor.
I think we get that.
The second point...
You've described to us as being there are authorities, but they don't work in this context because the ones you're thinking of only cover the actual facility itself.
A third one intrigues the reader because you say the Ontario Ministry of Transportation continues to suggest the Feds have full authority to manage international crossing, but this purposefully confuses authorities between governments.
I think this was your point here, that when Ontario says they are your bridges so you can control the blockades, you think Ontario, this is my expression, not yours, Ontario is being cute because everybody knows the problem isn't in the centre of the bridge.
It's on provincial territory with provincial jurisdiction or municipal authority.
Is that right?
I think that was part of it.
It was, I would say in the main, that was right.
Yes.
Now, did Ms. Thurence Did the proposal go any further than your critique of it?
I think she was asking a question, and I think in the follow-up discussions, both in email and in person, I think colleagues found this four-part analysis helpful in clarifying.
And then, actually, it's interesting because as I was typing this, this was the 10th of February.
And that day, perhaps at the same moment, unbeknownst to me, the Ontario Cabinet was deliberating on declaring an emergency and getting active and fully exercising its jurisdiction on the streets of Windsor.
That became known to us later that evening, and it became a reality the next day.
So I would say that to a certain extent, on this particular issue, it was overtaken by events, the event being a pretty hard pivot.
On the part of Ontario.
Right.
A welcome pivot, as you described.
A welcome pivot.
Yes.
Moving ahead to February 13th, so we're now just coming right up to the cusp of the invocation of the Act.
You participated in a DMOC meeting where the potential use of the Act was contemplated.
Yeah, do you recall that meeting?
Yes, I do.
And do you recall, we're not going to ask for a roll call or perfect memory, but who was at that meeting to the best of your recollection?
Excuse me, it was the, and it's interesting because on that weekend, I think there were up to 12 deputy minister and cabinet meetings, so it was a bit of a, it was jammed in, but on that one.
It was the core group of deputies working on this issue.
So the National Security Intelligence Advisor, Deputy Minister of Public Safety, the President of CBSA, myself, RCMP, CSIS, and some of the normal members of DMOC who didn't have, who aren't actively involved, may not have been there like the Public Health Agency.
But the core people working on the crisis were there.
Right.
Mr. Clerk, perhaps it would help Mr. Keenan if we called up his notes of that meeting.
It's SSM CAN 50399.
What you can see here right at the beginning of the notes.
First of all, are these your notes?
I assumed that, but I should get you to confirm it.
Yes, because it's for Rob and I, and the I here is me.
Right.
And your first point, I think, is self-evident.
The next one, Rob and I argue that Emergencies Act can backfire in building more...
We heard some evidence from Mr. Stewart on that point.
Can you give us your perspective on that point?
Sure.
We're in an environment, we're in the third weekend.
Going across the country, the level of unlawful behavior energy is really high in a lot of places.
And there was an assessment that there's enough energy that things are really very close to some significant violence.
And so managing the energy and trying to bring it down and downscale is obviously a key objective.
On the 13th, we are well into the discussion of the Emergencies Act and the options and sort of how and whether to use it.
And there was a discussion about the implications, what we would gain in terms of necessary tools to resolve.
The blockades and occupations and whether the invoking the act itself would add energy to the blockades and the options and both Rob and I in different ways but we both made the point we had to be very mindful of the emergency act causing a bigger blockade that it's trying to solve.
This is the it's late at night it's it's an intense weekend but this reflects Us working through and grappling to understand as quickly and as best we can all the intended and unintended consequences of something as serious as invoking the Emergencies Act in order to provide the most rigorous analysis we can.
I had one more point.
If we hadn't been looking...
At this kind of issue of unintended consequences, it would have almost been irresponsible given how serious the decision to invoke the Act is.
That's a helpful point.
And if I can key off that and ask you, having weighed that point into the balance, that is the potential adverse effects of invoking the Emergencies Act.
Did you express a view at the meeting about whether you thought the invocation of the Act was appropriate at this time?
I certainly expressed view on implications and I expressed a clear...
I brought into it a clear analysis of the impact of the...
I brought into it a clear analysis and...
On what the Emergency Act could do to solve the tow truck problem.
I didn't provide an overall comprehensive view on the Emergencies Act for the following reason.
There was a number of potential powers that were being considered and authorities that were being considered.
And I didn't feel I had the expertise to assess the total sum of it.
But on the tow truck issue, it was very clearly would solve the problem.
Thank you.
That's a very helpful answer, and I'll use that to just ask the last question, which is, having been in the position you were, which appears to have been very senior in the federal government and very intricately connected with your counterparts at the provincial and territorial governments on the transportation portfolio,
which turns out to have been Quite involved in the government's reaction to these events.
Are there things you wish the Commissioner should take into consideration in contemplating recommendations for how you would have been better able to handle a problem like this if they'd been in place or looking into the future?
What structures, regimes or tools you would hope to be in place if you encounter a situation like this again?
I've had the fortune or misfortune of encountering this kind of situation.
Well, this situation was unprecedented crisis in the country.
But two years before, there was also a series of fairly significant blockades of transportation infrastructure, the rail blockades of the winter of 2020.
I would say that looking at those blockades and the much graver crisis the country faced.
In the winter of '22, there is an issue related to the emails.
The email was up on the screen about trade corridors.
And that confusion, I'm imputed, it was purposeful, but I would say my assessment is that there's a gap in the laws of the land with respect to the tools available to government to secure strategic trade corridors.
And because once you step one metre off of a bridge, you go from a broad federal toolset to municipal bylaws, and that bears attention.
I think there's a solution to that, and if I would submit any suggestion to the Commission, it would be...
Thoughts in terms of that problem and what governments in total should do about it.
Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
Those are the questions of Commission Council for this panel.
Okay, so with that we can turn to the questioning by the convoy organizers.
Mr. Commissioner, before we begin the cross-examinations, during the examination by Commission Council, my friend Mr. Miller for the convoy organizers emailed some documents that he proposes to put to the panel.
We weren't given notice of those in accordance with the rules.
In a couple cases, they're not even in the database yet.
And before cross-examination begins, at the very least, I would like an opportunity to Review those documents with the witnesses so that they can be properly prepared.
Given the breach of the rules, I think that that is appropriate.
Well, one of them wasn't uploaded to the database till today.
I just found it.
The other two, that's fine.
I don't have an issue.
These are, I think, important.
So we just found them.
Big database, sir.
I don't have an issue.
Okay, so maybe we can start with the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and what we'll do is you can speak to the witnesses at the break when we take the break.
Is that agreeable?
Yes, that's fine.
Thank you very much.
And we'll simply go to the convoy organizers after the break.
Okay, so...
Thank you.
Good afternoon.
Can you hear me okay?
You can see me, hopefully?
Great.
Good afternoon.
My name is Kara Zweigel.
I am counsel for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
A lot of the questions I'd intended to ask you have been covered, so I just have a few things I want to take you through, and they are relevant to some of the issues that Mr. Cameron was just talking to you about.
That trade corridor And if you want, we can pull it back up, but you might be able to answer this question without it.
But there was, I think you described it just now as a provocative suggestion in there about letting Ontario know that if they wanted the federal government to take some sort of action, Ontario would have to declare an emergency.
It was your view that the federal government would not really be in a position to declare an emergency if Ontario, where probably the most significant of the blockades were taking place, had not yet taken that step.
Is that accurate?
I apologize.
Could you just clarify the question?
Sure.
So I'm just...
There was the suggestion in this email, I think you talked about sort of this poison pill, where Ontario needs to be made aware that if they expect the federal government to step in, they will have to declare an emergency.
So leaving aside, I guess, that sort of characterization of it, was it your view at the time that the federal government could not or would not be in a position to make use of the Emergencies Act unless or until...
Ontario had declared an emergency.
I think I got it.
Thank you for that clarification.
Thank you.
That's very helpful.
The core point or the core logic of that particular point in the email was a bit different.
And the purposeful and the earlier point relates to the fact that if you look at The letter that came from Deputy Minister LeBlanc on the 8th, the public comments of Minister Murray on the 9th, Ontario was really backing away, sort of washing its hands and saying, this is a federal problem, the federal government has to solve it.
And so the provocative point was to go back to Ontario and say, no, it's in your jurisdiction.
You have to use your authorities to solve this or it can't get solved.
If you're not going to use your authorities...
We don't have any unless you hand it over to us.
And the only way to do that is the Emergencies Act.
So it was more of an attempt to be provocative and get Ontario back in the game of actually exercising its jurisdiction on the streets of Windsor.
Okay.
And I know you said that while this was happening, unbeknownst to you, things were already in the works in Ontario to declare an emergency.
So I take it that notion.
Was never communicated to Ontario, by you at least?
Or are you aware whether anyone articulated that to Ontario, that the federal government's emergency power is unlikely to be used unless Ontario has declared an emergency?
Well, I don't think that that point was in my email, and I don't know if...
I did not communicate that, and I don't know if anybody else communicated that.
Okay, thank you.
Sorry, just eliminating things that have been covered.
There's a few emails right around when Ontario declared the emergency where you're...
You seem pretty happy that that's happened, right?
That's a significant turning point, potentially.
And especially, I think, when you see the Ontario, the orders, and understand the potential to use those to incentivize drivers to leave, those seem to be useful powers to you.
Now, there was a document.
If we can turn up SSM.CAN.50409.
And just while it's coming up, I think this is an email from...
So I think this is a different, I think there's a Doug Jones, oh no, sorry, there's a Mike Jones that we've heard about.
This is a Doug Jones, who I think is in Ontario at the Ministry of Transportation.
And we can, sorry, we can scroll down to the bottom just so Mr. Keenan can see where this starts.
So this is on the 15th of February.
And Mr. Jones from the MTO has written to you.
Further to our discussion this morning, I was in contact with Deputy Minister DiTommaso.
He advised that he had a similar conversation with the OPP leadership earlier today.
I suspect that we will see more field action related to vehicle registrations in the very near future.
And then, just scrolling up, you note that on the federal side, you appreciate the update.
It's a positive development.
On the federal side, the regulatory orders under the Emergency Act are just now signed, and we've briefed infrastructure operators.
I think there will be some early actions on freezing financial accounts used to fund illegal blockades.
The combination of Ontario and federal measures should, I assume, really help restore law and order on the streets in Ottawa and make it easier to keep the bridges to the US open.
And he writes back, great news.
I'll be watching for that.
So, first of all, can you tell us, do you recall that discussion that's referenced further to our discussion this morning, where Mr. Jones says, Mr. DiTommaso had a similar conversation with the OPP leadership.
Do you have any recollection of what that's about?
Well, I think if you scroll down, I'm not sure what the similar refers to, but my guess is it's covered.
Further down in the document?
I think this is the end, yeah.
I know it's a long time ago, so if you can't remember, that's fair enough.
I just thought I'd...
Well, there's clearly a cutoff in the email chain because similar is referring to something that follows.
I think that in general, I should declare that Doug Jones is the Deputy Minister of the...
Thank you.
was long scheduled to retire and she delayed and delayed it but she ultimately retired and transitioned to Doug.
So Doug is my new colleague and I can't, without seeing the email that came before, I'm not 100% certain what similar is referring to but in general this is an exchange between Me and my new Ontario colleague updating each other on developments.
And this is the 15th.
So this is, I think, the day that the federal regulations were issued under the Emergencies Act.
Okay.
And so I think what the similar is referring to is the, it's further to our discussion this morning than it starts.
So I don't know if that means you had maybe a phone call.
Or something.
And this is an email follow-up.
I think I did have a call with Doug around there.
Okay.
And do you know, I mean, so we're at the 15th now.
The provincial state of emergency was declared four days ago.
Do you know sort of why we're just talking now about seeing more field action related to vehicle registrations?
Why there haven't been any?
Related to vehicle registrations prior to that?
Well, there's two things.
So the regulations, as I remember, the regulations under the Ontario Emergency Declaration came out on Saturday the 12th.
Okay.
And so this is the 15th.
This is three days later.
And so it's not that long since they started doing this.
And with a lot of these things...
They have to, you have to figure out how you're going to operate the new authority.
And the other thing that's interesting in the email, and it reveals our thinking at the time, I think on the, this is the 15th, I think on the 14th, traffic was restored to the Ambassador Bridge.
But the briefing from the police is they were not 100% certain they could keep it open.
And so there is a continued vigilance looking and a concern about what it would take to keep that bridge open and hence the point that the combination of the two authorities would make it easier to keep it open.
If the bridge had closed again, our estimation because of the previous comment I made about investor confidence and reliable trade partner, a second closure right away would have been It's probably worse than the first closure.
Okay.
So like you said, I mean, this takes a bit of time, right?
These emergency orders, it's not like when legislation is passed by Parliament and there's a fair bit of lead-up and preparation time.
When we have emergency orders, they're sort of operative the moment they're printed, and people are figuring out how...
How to operationalize them.
So at the federal level, when the emergency measures, the regulations, the orders were put in place on the 15th, it was still a few days.
It took a few days for law enforcement, for example, to start integrating some of those messages into their communications with protesters and things like that.
Sorry, go ahead.
Sorry, I didn't mean to cut you off.
Go ahead.
No, I'm just wondering if that's, I mean, you know that there's a little bit of lag time, right?
It takes a little bit of time for these new powers to sort of make their way to the street.
It depends on the nature of the power.
And interestingly enough, in this context, I would say because There was an acute national crisis with significant risks to safety and the economic security of the country.
There was a real urgency.
I'll talk about the federal orders because I'm a bit more familiar with their implementation than the Ontario orders.
On the 15th, the proclamation of the emergency by the government of Canada was the 14th.
The regulations were issued on the 15th.
On the same day the regulations are issued, Transport Canada assembled all of the key transportation operators in the country and with our partners at Public Safety briefed them in detail on these authorities because we remain significantly concerned about.
You know, slow rolls at airports, blockades of railways.
And on the 16th, Transport Canada joined public safety senior officials in a detailed briefing of all provincial transportation, all provincial transport officials, all provincial soldiers.
All provincial police forces and the major city police forces, police services, excuse me, running them through in detail all of these orders.
And so within 24 hours, there was an extensive promulgation to all operating partners on the orders, and they were, and some of them were being used as early as the 16th, 17th.
So it was, I would characterize that.
Not a lot of implementation of regulations.
This is the fastest I've ever seen anything implemented.
Right, which makes sense, right?
The idea, obviously, behind using these emergency orders is that they need to be implemented quickly.
So I think, and I know your colleague, Mr. Stewart, did.
Tell us about the briefings.
It sounds like there's quite a lot of them to various stakeholders and to including media and things like that.
Were you aware that Ontario may have been a little bit slower in terms of carrying out some of the powers that it had under its emergency order when Mr. Freeman from the Ministry of Transportation Testified before the commission.
I'm not sure if you had an opportunity to review his testimony.
Did you?
I have not.
Okay.
So Mr. Freeman, he was taken to a document where it's the suspension warnings that the Ministry of Transportation in Ontario is sending out to operators saying that their licenses may be suspended if they don't.
Stop engaging in unlawful behavior under the emergency order.
So those are not sent out until the 17th of February.
Is that timeline, is that something that you were aware of at the time?
Did you know that there was this...
I suppose what I'm getting at, maybe I'll just come out and ask you.
One of the questions for me is whether Ontario's orders might have been enough had they been given...
Some time to work.
Now, there's a question, I think, whether they weren't prepared to sort of engage in more serious enforcement until the federal government's emergency had been declared.
That's a question only Ontario can answer, and we can't ask them.
Do you think Ontario's powers, had they been exercised and given a bit of time to work, might have addressed?
The main problems being Windsor and Ottawa.
A couple of things, sort of a hypothetical, which had to be careful not to be speculative, but I didn't have the sense you're describing that Ontario was like slow walking of the doors.
I didn't have that sense.
Okay.
In fact, I thought that...
The Ontario Declaration and the regulations were used almost instantly in communicating to the blockaders in Windsor.
And so in that sense, they were put to use instantly.
And if you go back to our strategic enforcement strategy, that was textbook sort of how to do that.
And in fact, we had incorporated that in real time.
And the second is that, so I didn't have a sense they were slow walking them.
And I think in terms of all of the problems that tools were deployed for under the Emergencies Act, I'll focus myself to tow trucks because that's the one where I sort of had developed over three weeks some instantaneous expertise.
And on that one, I didn't see how the Ontario artists were going to solve that problem, even if given lots of time.
Okay.
You're well out of time.
I don't know if you can wrap up.
I'm sorry.
The one last question I could ask.
Did the federal government ever consider purchasing tow trucks or has it purchased tow trucks since this incident happened?
Is that something on the table or something you might suggest would be something to consider?
I could say we looked at a whole range of options, including purchasing tow trucks, but we didn't.
And the reason we didn't is because of the problem Alberta ran into.
They bought a couple of tow trucks, but then they were stuck with a couple of big pieces of equipment that they didn't have trained operators for.
So we looked at it, but we didn't think it would solve the problem.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Keenan.
I see.
Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
Okay.
Well, maybe this is a good time for the morning break or the afternoon break.
I'm back into that bad habit.
So, the afternoon break will take 15 minutes and during that time, perhaps you won't get a break because you'll be reviewing documents.
If you need more time, please indicate it to Commission staff, Commission Council.
We can accommodate small additional time if needed.
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
Let's take this place.
Jeff, you know it's like a bad one?
It's gonna be fucking good.
I didn't know how to do it.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Order allowed.
Okay.
Go ahead.
Gentlemen, good afternoon.
My name is Brendan Miller and I'm counsel to Freedom Corp, which represents the protesters that were in Ottawa in January and February of 2022.
So, I just want to begin first by bringing up an email and it's government document ssm.can.00004353 _rel And if we could scroll down to the last page, it's in reverse order, okay?
And up, I apologize, up to the beginning where the email starts.
Okay, so this is an email from Ron Renes.
Are you familiar that he's the GM of the Peace Bridge?
He's the general manager of the Peace Bridge?
Yes.
Okay.
And then the other individual who the email is sent to is Vance Badway.
And I take it you understand that Vance Badway is the member of parliament for Niagara Center?
Yes.
And are you familiar with Tim Clutterbuck?
He, I understand, is the recently retired president of ASW Steel.
Are you familiar with him?
I don't think I know this person.
Okay, so I want to go through this email with you briefly.
And in it is some information about not the blockades, but as of January 27th, there the GM of the Peace Bridge advises that yesterday border delays were 70 to 75 minutes entering Canada and trucks were queued across the Peace Bridge and miles up The I-190 in Buffalo.
Truck processing times at Canada Customs have increased from two minutes to three minutes per truck.
While some truckers are leaving the industry because of the vaccination requirements, what is not being talked about is drivers quitting because of border delays that impinge on their hours of service requirements, onerous arrive can, and PHAC requirements in tech.
If they are not quitting the industry, they are getting out of long-haul cross-border business and switching to only domestic routes.
And the U.S. Bureau of Labor Reports just released states that the long-haul trucking transportation costs in the U.S. have increased 25%.
Do you agree with that statement as of January 22, 2022?
Which statement?
The one I just read to you.
Sir, sir, it's just there's six statements here, which one are you referring to?
Well, we can go through each one if you want.
Which one, actually, we'll just, I'll do it this way.
Which of these each statements don't you agree with?
I have a hard time agreeing or disagreeing simply because there's a few stats on a very specific moment and a very specific crossing on a very specific day.
So I don't...
Track that in my head, so I couldn't agree or disagree with it.
Okay, but you have no reason to say that this email is not correct?
When you say the email, this is an email I've never seen and I've only read a quarter of it, so I have a hard time coming up with a proper judgment of this email.
Okay, so you haven't seen this email before?
Today?
No.
Okay.
But it's to a number of people.
Like, I'm not on the chain, right?
Okay.
And it states there under the link, if we can scroll down, it says steps need to be taken immediately to reduce the processing time to pre-pandemic levels, rethinking the necessity of asking multiple health-related questions as they are not being answered honestly anyways, and adding a field of a driver's fast card to indicate vaccination status are a couple of suggestions.
Was that...
Addition to a FAST card, was it ever implemented?
So this would be a question that you would need to put to CBSA because it has to do with the details of the operations of a border point, which is their responsibility.
Okay.
And if we can scroll down, where it discusses arrive cab, and we'll just hop right to the points there beginning as traffic returns.
So there, the GM of the Peace Bridge says, as traffic returns to normal, the longer processing times associated with the Rive Cannon travelers not filing or not filling or improperly filling will result in border gridlock.
Did that happen?
The characterization of border gridlock at this time is not consistent with my memory or our analysis of the transportation trends.
Okay, and it says there too, Arrive Can is not a binational program like Nexus and Fast and is unknown to the U.S., meaning many American visitors will arrive at the border unprepared.
Is that true?
I think it is certainly true that Arrive Can is not a binational program.
It's a national program.
It's a tool of CBSA, so it's a national program.
And in fact, actually, Arrive Can is not a program.
Arrive Can is a border facilitation tool.
What about the statement there that they state that these mandates essentially will adversely impact travelers, particularly the elderly who do not have smartphones?
Would you agree with that?
Sorry, Reid?
Sorry, I might have skipped that.
Can you just point out, because I'm...
Oh, yeah, so we'll adversely...
You have to give me a break, because this is a document I've never seen before.
Right.
Okay.
So which point?
So where it says, "Will it adversely impact travellers, particularly the elderly who do not have smartphones." And that point relates to what?
The essentially vaccine mandates and, as I understand it from reading it, the essentially administrative process now put in place by the federal government in trying to cross the border.
My general impression of vaccine mandates is they...
Vaccinations protect the elderly.
Right, but would you agree that it adversely impacted travelers, particularly the elderly, who do not have smartphones?
Can you agree with that statement?
I can't agree or disagree because I don't really get the context in which it's sort of asserted.
Okay.
Would you agree that the experience with the border from the general manager, as he states, is that requirements that impose additional steps, more documentation, providing more information, create border delays, and as a result, border avoidance, so avoiding going across the border?
Can you agree with that?
Well, I would agree they're his statements, but there's some generalities here that I have a hard time sort of agreeing with or disagreeing with because...
The context is unclear to me.
Okay, and so if we can scroll up then to page number, the one directly before the email, because he's in reverse.
Okay, and so in this email, I take it you know who these folks are.
Mr. Bataway forwards the email to the following people, and that's to Minister Mendocino, the Minister of Public Safety.
You know who he is?
Yes, I do.
And he also forwards it to Minister Algarra, the Minister of Transport.
I know Minister Algarra well.
Right.
And he's the minister that you report to?
Yes.
Right.
And he didn't pass this on to you?
To my memory and knowledge, he did not pass this on to me.
Right.
But, you know, as the Deputy Minister of Transport, as the highest, essentially, civil servant within that ministry, isn't this sort of information something important that you should know?
I think you have to understand the context.
Transport Canada, Minister of Transport, gets a...
Massive amount of correspondence.
I get a massive amount of correspondence on something like this on an exchange between an MP and the minister.
I may or may not see it depending upon the nature and the context.
So it's neither surprising nor it wouldn't be surprising for me to get it and it wouldn't be surprising for me not to get it.
And this one, I do not recall this being forwarded to me.
Okay.
Can you agree that having this forwarded to you would have been of assistance in carrying out your duties as the Minister of Transport?
No.
All right.
So, in your evidence earlier today, you talked about the economic impact of the protests at the border.
Is that right?
Not of the protests at the border, of the blockage of the transportation of commercial goods.
Right.
And all of that evidence, can you agree with me that most of it was hypothetical and that you haven't done an ex post facto analysis?
It wasn't hypothetical because the blockade was an actual thing.
Well, I understand that.
And the concerns, the impact was an actual impact.
And the stress and the adverse sort of impact on assessing Canada as a place to invest in sort of auto production was an actual impact.
Right, but you can agree that those things I just showed you from the GM of the Peace Bridge, those would also impact the issue with respect to being able to get across the border in a timely manner.
People were quitting trucking because of delays.
So that's an adverse impact, is it not?
The list of issues you raised were ones that we were monitoring closely with our colleagues at CBSA and other departments.
And in fact, we were tracking over the course of...
Excuse me, we were tracking...
Over the course of January, the trends in truck traffic across the border, things like sort of congestion and gridlock, I don't think we, until the border blockades caused by the Freedom Convoy, I don't think we were observing gridlock.
What we did see was actually that the...
Trucks were flowing at about the rate you would expect given this time of year.
Okay.
So we analyzed it.
I understand.
And our conclusion was different.
I thank you for your answer.
But you're familiar with the government agency Statistics Canada or StatsCan, is that correct?
Yes.
All right.
And StatsCan is the National Statistic Office.
It's the agency that ensures Canadians have key information with respect to the economy.
You understand that?
Yes.
And StaxCan comes under the Ministry of Innovation, Science and Industry, you're aware?
Yes.
And it's accountable to parliament through that minister who's currently Minister Champagne, is that correct?
Yes.
Okay, if I could please bring up poe.hrf0000009.
So This document is a report done by StatsCan on Canadian international trade merchandise trade February 2020.
And the key point that I want to take you to is I've highlighted if we could roll down please to I think it's page four.
Oh, apologies.
I will just get the right page for you.
It is on PDF page 8. My apologies.
Okay.
And so there, they did a summary of their findings, and it says blockades at border crossings, and I'll just read that to you, and then I'll put the question to you.
So in late January and February 2022, some border crossings between Canada and the United States blocked by protesters, preventing the normal flow of goods between the two countries.
According to Statistics Canada data, when combined, Canada's highway border crossings at the Ambassador Bridge, Coutts, Emerson, and the Pacific Highway represent more than one-third of Canada's trade activity by road.
Road transport accounts for more than half of Canada's trade with the United States.
In customs basis figures for February, trade activity by road transport at these border crossings fell.
8.8% compared with February 2021, with the Ambassador Bridge and Cootes cross-post crossing postings the largest decline.
However, increased trade activity was observed at other crossings near the ones that were blocked, partly offsetting the decline in traffic.
Overall, the block border crossings appear to have little impact on the aggregated values of Canadian imports and exports in February.
Do you agree with that statement?
I think to provide the best possible answer, if you permit me, I'll defer to the Chief Economist of Transport Canada, who is familiar with Statistics Canada's reporting more so than I am.
Could you repeat your question, please?
The statement I just gave from Statistics Canada, do you agree with it?
Well, I think this is based on monthly data that they're providing, yes.
Yes, okay.
So you agree with it?
We agree with the statement where they were saying that there were a decline in terms of their data on the train, and at the same time that they have seen some realignment of the traffic.
And so have you seen this document before today?
I have seen the document before.
All right, and when did you see it?
I don't remember exactly the date.
Well, it's clearly probably the day they produced the document or the following day.
Okay, so I just got this document today and we uploaded it to the system.
Why wasn't this document provided when you produced your production in this matter?
I'm just curious.
Well, there's always a lag in terms of the...
You know, I don't know the date.
If you can look at the date of the publication of this document?
April of 2022.
Well, there's a point.
So, you know, our estimate was done in early February with the information that we had at that time.
Okay.
And as I was mentioning this morning, we were monitoring the situation on a daily basis.
Okay.
This is not an economic impact assessment.
This is just a review of the monthly trade data pattern.
I only have so much time, so I'm going to try to move on.
My last question is to do with ts.can.001-0000002-rel0001.
So this is for you, Deputy Minister.
So this document was uploaded by the Department of Justice just today.
And I happen to just see it.
What this is, is essentially a decision chart on whether or not to decide if there is what's referred to as a Section 2 CSIS Act threat.
And I understand you're not an expert in this area and I'm not going to put anything in here to you per se, but have you seen this document before other than today?
I think I may have seen this document in the course of my work, but I don't have any familiarity with it, and I have not done a detailed review of it.
Right.
Can you remember, because you were at the IRG meetings and you dealt with this matter, was this document provided to members of the IRG?
Do you know?
I think it was definitely not provided by Transport Canada.
And whether it was provided by somebody else, CSIS, for example, would be a question best put to CSIS.
Right.
So you don't recall seeing this during the IRG meetings?
Do I recall seeing this document during an IRG meeting?
No, I do not recall seeing it.
Thank you.
And you can see there, and I don't want to put this to you, You're familiar in public administration and governance generally in deciding.
Are you familiar with the OODA loop?
Sorry, can you say that again?
The OODA loop process.
Are you familiar with it?
The OODA loop.
It sounds like an acronym for something.
Observe, Orient, Decide, Act.
You've heard of that before?
I've heard.
Yes, I've heard of that and many variations for analytical processes.
Right.
Well, you'll see in here it says identify, assess, decide, act.
So it's essentially the OODA loop.
And on the second part, it actually outlines what you have to do before you can move to the third.
And it says means and effect societal change.
In order to do a Section 2 C-Sex threat, it has to be a finding, according to the thesis or this document, willingness to kill or inspires others to kill, right?
I take it during your IRG meetings, you didn't hear any evidence of the protesters in Ottawa.
With any specific persons saying that they were willing to kill or inspiring others to kill, did you?
I can't answer that because there was extensive deliberations in the IRG meeting protected by cabinet confidence.
Right.
Thank you.
Okay.
Next is the City of Ottawa, please.
Good afternoon.
My name is Daniel Chomsky and I'm a Councillor to the City of Ottawa.
My questions are going to be mostly for you, Deputy, and what I want to focus on is the period between February 4th, sort of when you started to speak to other provincial departments about what ended up being called the Strategic Enforcement Strategy and leading up until the emergency that was called by the province on the 11th, okay?
Okay.
Now, as you alluded to earlier today, your department raised a number of detailed questions about commercial vehicle operators' registration.
Is that correct?
With the provincial government of Ontario?
Yes.
Okay.
And you gathered information about how CBOAR, as it's known in its acronym, works?
Yes.
And the system that underlies it?
Yes.
It would have been, the details of the system underlying it would have been a conversation by a transporter.
Officials that report to me, not me.
Right, at the ADM level?
And the DG level.
And the DG level, okay.
But you're aware that the CIVOR program monitors and evaluates operator safety records, driving infractions, and that there's a carrier record?
I'm generally aware of that, yes.
Okay, thank you.
So after you had these detailed conversations, or your deputies did, and your assistant deputy ministers did, and...
And you did as well.
I believe you came up with something called the Maximum Enforcement Strategy.
Is that correct?
That's right.
We initially called it the Maximum Enforcement Strategy, but based on feedback from some provincial partners, we changed it to Strategic Enforcement Strategy.
Okay.
And I understand that as part of that, and it was detailed in an earlier email to your minister, Registrar would communicate, and this being the motor vehicle, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles in Ontario,
would communicate to owners, CBOAR, people, owners that have the CBOAR certificate, and it was to suspend CBOARs for any vehicle participating in blockades and demonstrations by a particular date.
Is that correct?
Could you give me a bit more context for that question?
For sure.
Are you talking under the normal course of events or the emergency orders of Ontario?
So, I'm talking in the ordinary course of events.
So, before the emergency was declared in Ontario, you had gathered information from the province of Ontario, particularly the Ministry of Transportation.
Is that correct?
We had both made inquiries as to what is possible and we had gathered information.
Okay.
And at some point, your department and you were of the opinion that you could issue notice to holders of CIVORS saying that we could suspend your certificate in the event that your vehicle is participating in a blockade or demonstration and would not leave by a certain date.
Again, and you're talking in the absence of the Ontario emergency, right?
That's correct, yeah.
That sounds like a bit of a stretch to me for two reasons.
One is that we were working collaboratively, so we were seeking their engagement to get their determination of what is possible, and I don't think we would have arbitrarily overruled them.
And the second is that we were trying to get...
To the kind of warning that you declared, that you described.
I wasn't given the cool and then sort of negative response of Ontario.
I didn't have a sense we had gotten all the way there with Ontario until they made the pivot to the emergency declaration.
Okay.
So before the emergency declaration then, I'm going to take you back to the maximum enforcement strategy.
Yep.
And from what I can glean from the documents, both in the emails, and that were part of the strategy itself, communications was a big part of it, was it not?
Yes.
And part of it would be communicating offenses that the government could enforce.
Exactly.
Okay.
And it was your belief or your partner's belief that this would be a deterrence.
If done properly, we believe that this would help deter people from either joining or induce them to end and leave.
Right.
Okay.
And I'm going to take you to a document.
And this document is actually going to relate to after the time period in which the emergency order in Ontario is brought into force.
And so we're talking about February 11th.
That's when the order was brought into place, February 11th, 2022.
And now, you'll know that's in place.
Now, it granted the Registrar of Motor Vehicles the power to make an order suspending or cancelling plate permits, driver's license, and commercial vehicle operator registration certificates.
So, again, the CBOAR.
You're aware of that?
Yes.
Okay.
Now I'd like Mr. Clerk if you could please bring up document ONT 0000403.
I'll just leave it right there, Mr. Clerk.
Thank you.
And you'll see you're not on this email chain, but if you could just scroll to the top.
It's an email, actually, to Michael Beaton from a Ministry of Transportation of Ontario civil servant.
And you'll see at the top there, Michael Beaton is the Chief of Staff to the Minister of Transport.
And you'll see at the top, it says, Hi, MO.
I think we can all agree is the Minister's office.
Agreed.
Okay.
And it goes on to say, I wanted to bribe you with a quick update on the situation in the City of Ottawa, also providing some general background information on the barricade in Windsor, further to our email last night, as well as an update on a CIVOR warning letter.
And if you could just please scroll down, and you'll see that header there, it says CIVOR warning letter.
You see that?
Yes.
Okay.
And it says FYI.
TSD has created a warning letter for CIVOR holders as another tool that can be used at the front lines for the convoy or protest.
I read the second bullet.
Police are aware of this strategy and supportive of the approach.
The Police Command Centre in Ottawa will be providing a list of the carriers that they want MTO to send letters out to.
All of this, and this is the important point, all of this will be tracked and can be reported on.
The other option of suspending plates license CIVOR remains.
This will just give enforcement additional tools to manage the situation as they see fit.
Now, this letter is similar to the letter that your department had proposed.
Could have been used before the emergency order, correct?
I would say this, not having seen...
Not having seen both letters, I think in general, yes.
And I'd characterize this as exactly the kind of strategies that we were aspiring to include in the strategic enforcement strategy.
Okay.
And so, again, just so I completely understand you, the idea would be you would issue a warning saying there could be potential infractions coming if you don't leave.
Yes.
Okay.
And did the...
Did the Government of Ontario ever tell you why they did not issue any warning letters before they brought in the emergency order?
I think the letter from Deputy Minister LeBlanc to me on February the 8th had, in a certain fashion, an explanation.
Okay.
But specifically, you weren't aware of any impediment that would have prevented them from issuing letters of a similar nature before the emergency order was brought in?
I would say that when we reached out to them on the 5th, the 6th, and the 7th, we were searching for their engagement and creative solutions to do something like sending a letter.
Did you know if you have three Highway Traffic Act infractions like this, you could lose?
So we were hopeful of something like that.
Their response on the 8th said that they had a...
I don't want to...
Put words in their mouth because the letter is on record, but they essentially said we have a process, it's fixed, and we have to follow it.
So there's nothing to, we see no opportunity to do anything there.
Okay.
Thank you very much, Debbie.
Those are all my questions.
Okay.
Thank you.
Next, a call on the OPS.
Good afternoon to you both.
My name is Jessica Barrow and I'm counsel to OPS.
My questions are for you, Deputy, as well.
I want to focus primarily on the enforcement strategy and how it impacted or didn't impact operations on the ground in Ottawa, but I want to touch base on a statement you made in your witness statement before we get into that.
First of all, obviously the enforcement strategy was created after the occupation in Ottawa had been entrenched for some time.
Is that correct?
Yes, it is.
Right.
And in your witness statement, you commented on the fact that both Toronto and Quebec City were successfully able to deter occupations from their downtown cores, and that some of the tools they implemented were similar to what you suggested in the enforcement strategy.
Is that fair?
Yes.
The events in Toronto and Quebec City, however, both occurred after the event in Ottawa was well underway.
Is that right?
Yes, indeed.
And so we've heard testimony from various other witnesses to the effect that other jurisdictions were able to take lessons from what occurred in Ottawa and apply those lessons to their own planning.
I take it you would have no reason to disagree with that?
No.
And many of the witnesses we have heard from also testified that the tactics used by protesters in Ottawa were unprecedented at the time of the convoys' arrival in Ottawa, and I take it you similarly would not have any reason to disagree with that evidence?
The tactics...
I'm not sure if the tactics were unprecedented, but I would say the absolute sheer scale and intensity by which they were applying these tactics was...
Fair enough.
By, I think, all accounts, unprecedented in the history of the country.
And cities like Toronto and Quebec City enjoyed a benefit that Ottawa did not, and that's sort of a fuller appreciation of what the group was capable of, what their intentions were, and what police tactics were and were not going to be effective in respect of that.
Would you agree with that?
I would generally agree with that, but I'm not an expert in the details of law enforcement and tactics, but I think in general.
Fair enough.
And I think you would also agree with me that the convoys and blockades in the various jurisdictions were all quite different from one another in terms of their scope.
Is that fair?
I think my sense is there were a lot of similarities, and there were some big ones in multiple places, but they did vary city by city, and they varied over time.
It was a very dynamic and unpredictable series of...
Of course.
And if we look specifically at Ottawa, I think you would agree with me that the size of it, we can agree that there perhaps were similar behaviors, but if you look just at sort of the footprint of the protest, it was much larger than any of the others.
Is that fair?
I think that's fair, but I didn't do any detailed analysis of footprints, but that seems quite reasonable.
Okay, thank you.
And so it wouldn't necessarily be fair to compare the successful use of the strategies I think so.
Could you repeat the question?
Let me say this, and maybe this answers the question.
If not, tell me it doesn't.
There is no attempt in my witness statement or in our...
Enforcement strategy to say one city, it was no attempt to actually grade the police responses.
It was simply an attempt to take stock of the challenge and help police deal with unprecedented challenges that were overwhelming them.
Of course.
So your strategy was intended to address the challenges that OPS was already experiencing and which others had not yet experienced.
Is that fair?
I would say to a degree, and it was sparked out of that really stark assessment and SITREP that I participated in with the City of Ottawa.
So the spark was from Ottawa, but the intent of the enforcement strategy, the tow truck strategy, was national because we saw this as a rapidly evolving national problem that needed to be dealt with.
Really from coast to coast.
And it was just a matter of one day to another, whether where a blockade or an occupation would hit.
Right.
And so if we look at the specifics of the enforcement strategy, and I don't think we need to turn it up, but I'm happy to if you think that's necessary.
It had the messaging component as well as the enforcement component, correct?
Yes.
And I think you've testified with respect to the messaging component that the purpose of that component was to communicate the illegality of the actions of the protesters, right?
I think the illegality, which a number of people involved in illegal activity seem to be confused about, but also the consequences and appealing to their self-interest to end.
Right.
And just so that we clear this up in terms of the purpose of that messaging, We've heard a lot of evidence about PLTs.
I don't know if you're familiar with the work of PLTs.
I'm familiar with the term, and I'm generally familiar with the work, but I'm not an expert.
Fair enough.
And so we heard a lot of evidence about the purpose of the PLT program and the need for a measured response and consistent communication as between sort of like corporate communications and what PLT you're engaging with on the ground.
Do you have any reason to dispute that evidence?
No.
And so I take it that you wouldn't necessarily say that the communication strategy that you were proposing as part of this, the strategy that we're talking about here, that it was intended to overshadow the work of PLTs.
The communication strategy, you're referring to the communication component of the strategic enforcement strategy?
That's correct.
It was based on, I would say, a premise.
That part of the solution was having a much more comprehensive, much more robust communication with the blockaders and occupiers to pierce through the fog of the event so they understand what they're doing is illegal,
has significant consequences that could affect their commercial viability, even their ability to go to the U.S. Our estimation from a strategic level, we weren't on the street, was that there was a lot more to do to accomplish that goal than what had been done to date, quite frankly, in any city.
And so you're talking sort of a global strategy to all protesters and blockaders from coast to coast that may be thinking of engaging in that activity or already are engaging in that activity.
Is that fair?
That is fair, although it was indexed off of Ottawa because of the acute scale of the crisis in Ottawa and the problem definition that came to us through the Ottawa situation.
But I think you would agree with me that given what we've heard about the importance of PLT work, to the extent that PLT messaging...
Needed to be prioritized over the messaging that you're referencing, those on the ground from an operational perspective would be the best equipped to make that kind of decision.
I think I can heartily agree with you because the purpose of the strategy was not to second-guess any operational decision of police jurisdiction.
It was to develop a strategic toolkit.
To give them tools that they didn't have and needed in order to have a more robust response to a crisis of unlawful behavior that they were struggling to get their arms around.
So I think we're agreeing and perhaps just coming at it from slightly different perspectives.
I think so.
Basically, what you're saying, if I understand it, is this was a strategic direction.
Those that were operationally engaged on the ground would be the ones making decisions about how and when to implement the strategies that you were proposing.
Yes, and I think everybody involved in the strategic enforcement strategy was very clear in their mind that we're not making operational decisions here.
We're building a strategic toolkit.
To allow police in developing their operational plans to have stronger operational plans, but it's up to the police in the development of their plans to do that, not the Solgen and certainly not the transport officials.
And of course, there's a multitude of reasons for that, but one of those reasons may be that those on the ground obviously would have far more information about what's going on operationally than you would.
I think that's, I would say, a very practical reason.
There's also a very strong principled reason, and we're very careful about this at Transport because there are officials who I oversee who do investigations and enforcement, and we have a very clear system to ensure.
That those doing investigations and enforcement have the ability and the freedom to make the judgments on the appropriate activities of investigation and enforcement without sort of being directed by...
at the strategic level.
And that principle we certainly applied in the development of the strategic enforcement.
Right.
And I think as it relates specifically to enforcement, and you've already addressed this to some extent, there were specific challenges in Ottawa around enforcement due to the sort of hostility of the situation.
You would agree with that, I take it?
There were a lot of problems in Ottawa, and the hostility to law enforcement was clearly one of them based on the briefings we received from the city and the Ottawa Police Service.
Right.
And I think you indicated that one of the main goals of the strategy was to identify sort of harsher penalties or identify those that existed, and you thought or hoped that that would...
disincentivize those from participating or encourage those who were participating to leave is that right yes And obviously we do know that ultimately harsher penalties and more significant enforcement tools do come into place both through the Ontario legislation and the federal legislation, right?
Yes, but I think it may be helpful to point out that the development of the strategic enforcement strategy was predicated on using initially On using existing authorities.
Right.
And the early versions of it, for example, I'll talk about Highway Traffic Act, Criminal Code, etc.
And then once Ontario made its emergency declaration, we folded into it the additional penalties under the Ontario Emergencies Act.
Right.
And so the goal was to either highlight those existing tools or ultimately, once there were new ones, to highlight those and hopefully there would be a change of behavior as a result.
I'm wrapping up.
Yes.
But ultimately, I think you would agree that...
Although that may have had some impact on the numbers in Ottawa, what we saw ultimately was a massive POU operation that was required to remove the majority of the protesters.
Is that fair?
Yes.
And so even though there were more significant penalties available, the choices that were being made by protesters were primarily not to leave the area.
I'm not sure to agree with that because my sense, our sense, and again, I would defer to law enforcement experts on this, but our sense is that there gradually was a deployment of the strategic enforcement strategy in the big sites in Windsor and in Ottawa, and that clear communication of the fact that they were illegal activities and that they had significant consequences, whether they were...
The suspension of the CVORs and the freezing of the bank accounts successfully shrunk the footprint.
And according to law enforcement, there's a lot of discussions with law enforcement during this crisis, the shrinking of the footprint was essential to the safe operation to return law and order to the streets.
So I think it actually did work and it did help and it was integral.
That would be my assessment.
I'm happy to defer to the law enforcement operational experts on that.
Fair enough.
I think all I was getting at is that ultimately, I think other witnesses have referred to it as the largest POU operation in Canadian history was required to dismantle the protest, notwithstanding that there may have been some impact of the previous measures and that ultimately hundreds of arrests had to occur to clear the area.
I take it you wouldn't disagree with that.
No, I agree with that.
It was clearly the biggest sort of national security crisis in the history with a scale of unlawful activity that I don't recall ever seeing.
And so even with the shrunken footprint, it was still an enormous challenge.
Thank you.
Those are my questions.
Okay.
Next, if I could call on the City of Windsor.
Good evening.
My name is Jennifer King.
I'm legal counsel to the City of Windsor.
My questions will be directed at Deputy Minister Keenan.
I'd like to start by clarifying the comment you made at the end of Commission Council's questioning.
I believe that you stated that the federal government has broad federal authority at the port of entry, but as you move off the Ambassador Bridge, you move from a broad federal toolset to municipal bylaws.
Did I get that right?
Yes.
I meant to say, if I didn't say it completely, was that you move from a federal authority over a trade infrastructure to local authority of municipal bylaws and provincial jurisdiction, the Highway Traffic Act, Ontario Police Services Act, etc.
Okay.
And that's why I wanted to clarify.
Did you listen to Mr. Osowski's testimony earlier today?
I caught a bit of it.
I didn't catch the whole thing.
We reviewed a CBSA document and Mr. Osowski confirmed that CBSA officers are not designated to enforce criminal arrest provisions and cannot directly engage in enforcement operations at prohibited public assemblies, even if they're on the bridge.
Do you agree?
I would have to defer to former President Osowski on the Customs Act.
He's an expert.
I'm not.
Okay.
And he also confirmed that if any protest activity occurred on the Ambassador Bridge property, the CBSA would rely on the police of jurisdiction to respond.
And again, you defer to him?
I would defer to him, but that sounds right to me.
Okay.
If it's helpful, I can make a point that in exercising, because this happens at transport quite frequently, in enforcing a federal statute, for example, we have 74 of them at transport.
The enforcement action may be taken by a transport official, but it may involve something that requires a peace officer, and usually it's the police of jurisdiction.
That carries out the police officer function.
So it could be in enforcing a federal statute, but it's still police of local jurisdiction.
Thank you for that clarification.
Would you agree that the protests revealed an issue with coordination and collaboration among all three levels of government with respect to their respective authorities and responsibilities related to border infrastructure?
Yes, I would.
And it revealed an issue with ensuring that sufficient resources are in the hands of the local first responders responding to this unprecedented event on the ground.
I think it revealed an issue of resources, authorities and practice.
Okay.
I have a few questions about the strategic enforcement strategy.
This strategy recognized that given the complexity of the occupations and blockades, safe resolution requires three levels of government to collaborate, right?
Yes, and that was the objective of the strategy.
Okay.
And you described earlier to Commission Council the process that went into developing this draft as involving extensive discussions and consultations with federal and provincial partners.
Did you consult with municipalities?
We did not.
We consulted with our provincial partners.
We consulted a little bit probably with the City of Ottawa because there was a particular tripartite process.
But in general, we did not consult directly with municipal partners.
And we consulted beyond the RCMP and the occasional discussion with the OPP.
We didn't consult directly with police either.
We left both of those to our provincial colleagues.
Are you aware of whether your provincial colleagues reached out to their municipal partners and asked for input?
I'm not.
Okay.
Was the strategy shared with Windsor after it was finalized on or about February 13th?
It was not shared by Transport Canada.
We were relying on our provincial partners to share it as they saw fit, and I don't know whether anybody from the province of Ontario shared it with the City of Windsor.
Well, the strategy refers to communication and communication that should be coming from municipalities.
Did you ask your provincial partners to share the strategy with the City of Windsor?
We asked them to share it with appropriate partners, but I don't recall specifying that they should share it with the City of Windsor.
Okay.
I haven't seen any evidence that this was shared with the City after it was finalized.
Mr. Keenan, can you help clarify for me which federal ministry is responsible for emergency management with respect to critical infrastructure like the Ambassador Bridge?
If you break that into three parts, emergency management in general is public safety.
If you, generally speaking, critical infrastructure, again, public safety, when you get into transport infrastructure like the Ambassador Bridge, Transport Canada.
And that's as specified in the Federal Emergency Response Plan.
Right.
And so, does Transport Canada have a plan for prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery with respect to the Ambassador Bridge and other border infrastructure?
We have plans of a different level for different points of critical trade infrastructure like the Ambassador Bridge.
The issue is that, and we've dealt with a number of safety and security issues over the years with the Ambassador Bridge, and we're very vigilant because of all of the numbers that my colleague Christian outlined in terms of its importance.
What we haven't done...
Is dealt with and worked through the kind of crisis you've seen here, which is the operation of the bridge is impaired not because of something that happens on it, but something that happens on the streets of Windsor.
And I don't want to guess your next question, but I would say yes, that represents a gap that needs some work.
Okay, well that was going to be my last question.
I noticed in your witness summary that you conclude by recommending.
That a national legislative regime that can be used to protect critical trade and transportation infrastructure on an ongoing basis may be desirable.
And do you maintain this recommendation?
Yes.
As I mentioned earlier today, I think there is an authorities gap here that bears some analysis and ideally some resolution and really aligned to what you said.
Okay, and so in addition to an authorities gap, would you also agree with me that in addition to a national legislative regime, a specific emergency management plan should be developed by all three levels of government for international border crossings?
I think there is merit.
I wouldn't jump to that specificity, but I would agree with you that there is, and we've seen this now.
In two or three different events, the crisis we just got, this inquiry is on, the rail blockades of 2020, even the outage of the rail lines that cut Vancouver off to the rest of the country.
I think there is a need for better plans that include all levels of government.
In those plans in advance.
And so I think it's an issue for the Ambassador Bridge, which is one of the most, probably the most important trade crossing, but it's a broader issue across the country.
So in that sense, I would say yes.
Well, and just to inject into this too, the Commission and the Commissioner has been hearing that, you know, Windsor isn't just a pathway to the bridge, it's a community, and in particular...
The area around the bridge and Huron Church Road, Huron Church Road is a municipal road, is a community of businesses and schools, the University of Windsor.
And so would you agree with Windsor that this planning has to include collaboration with the local governments and authorities who are also protecting the community around that infrastructure?
Yes, I'd fully agree and that's very well put.
Thank you very much.
Those are my questions.
Okay, next, the government of Alberta, please.
Good afternoon.
For the record, my name is Stephanie Bowes.
I'm counsel for the province of Alberta.
Deputy Minister, my questions are going to be directed to you as well today.
I believe your evidence earlier today was that...
There was a failure to find a solution to the towing challenges as of February 13th.
Do I have that right?
Yes.
But there was still work being done on the 13th to find a solution, wasn't there?
Yes.
I'll ask that the clerk please take you to document ALB401429.
This is an email from Mr. Dalkebab from Public Safety Canada to people in Alberta, Ontario and Manitoba, the three provinces experiencing border blockades, on Sunday, February 13th.
And in this email, he indicates that he and Transport Canada were looking to have a small group discussion on the work.
That they were advancing to ensure a clear escalation protocol is in place to remove trucks blocking roads and bridges.
And then you'll see in the second paragraph, it indicates that there would be a presentation of the strategy before moving it up the chain for approvals.
So I take it that at this time, Public Safety Canada and Transport Canada had developed the strategy.
That they were checking in with their provincial partners, and then they were going to seek the approvals that they needed.
Is that your understanding?
Not quite.
I recall this meeting, and it was not so much checking in and setting something up for approvals.
I mean, Talal may have said that somewhere, but in our minds, in the mind of Kevin, who was reporting to me before and after this, it was advancing the discussions on the tow truck strategy, the six-part strategy that's in evidence.
And it was continuing to try and find a solution to the inability to secure the services of the heavy tow trucks.
So, we weren't really looking for approval.
We were continuing to look for a solution to operationalize the strategy.
So, is it fair to say that it was discussions to come up with those strategies still?
No, there was a strategy, a six-part strategy that had been in play right through.
From the heavy toe.
Okay, and so then I'll ask that we turn to PB.CAN.50866.
And this is the tow truck vehicle removal strategy you're talking about, is that right?
Yes, I think one iteration had six parts, but here it obviously has five.
And it says that this is the working draft on February 13th.
You understand that on the 13th it was a five-part plan?
Is that fair to say?
Yes.
Okay.
And I understand that nowhere in this document does it contemplate the use of the Federal Emergencies Act.
Is that correct?
I think that is correct.
Okay.
And I'd just like you to scroll down, if you could, Mr. Clerk, to page two.
And we'll go to item number four.
This is the tow vehicle to a secure location step.
And if we take a look at D, if tow trucks are available, example, Alberta is already procuring them, but operators are not, identify and deploy municipal, provincial, and federal, including CAF employees for specialized skills.
Do you know if...
As of this time, so on February 13th, any work had been undertaken to identify federal employees that may have skills to operate tow equipment?
Yes.
What work was done to identify those employees?
The people at Transport Canada working on this, Kevin Brousseau, Erin McCrory, Melanie Van Stone, had been consulting with some colleagues and were scoping out.
To try to identify a pathway to building a roster of people with skills.
They quickly, I should say that some of this came because the day before there was a series of calls with Alberta where Alberta head officials had come to us and that was on the 12th, 11th or 12th, I think it was the 12th.
And they had just bought a...
I think two, but I can't remember how many heavy tow trucks.
And they realized that they couldn't do anything with them because they didn't have the skilled operators.
So they were coming to us to see if through the CAF or anywhere we could supply skilled operators.
And so there was a whole conversation over the 12th and 13th trying to figure out, can we find skilled operators for heavy tow trucks?
And the conclusion at some point on the 13th was no, it wasn't a viable.
It turns out that you don't have in the government people who have that particular skill set.
And did that include the CAF?
Yes, I believe it did.
But the exact scoping and who exactly was engaged in that was something that my team did.
Okay.
Then I'd like to look at document SSM.CAN.50410.
And the second email...
On this page is an email from you to Minister Al-Ghabra on the early morning of February 15th with the subject line COOTS.
You know that there was great progress by the RCMP in clearing and opening and then notes some of the comments about what happened at the protest sites.
I take it that you're understanding on the early morning of February 15th.
Was that the clearing of vehicles from the protests around Coutts was achieved without the use of any powers under the Emergencies Act.
Is that right?
Yes, that's my understanding.
And do you know if that was also Minister Algebra's understanding on the basis of this email?
I can't speak to Minister Algebra's understanding, but I think the email is relatively clear and speaks for itself.
All right.
Thank you.
Those are my only questions today.
Thank you.
Next is the government of Saskatchewan.
Good afternoon.
Good afternoon.
My name is Mitch McAdam and I'm one of the lawyers acting for the government of Saskatchewan.
Can you hear me?
We can, but your picture hasn't come up yet, so I'm not sure.
What's happening?
I'm sorry, Commissioner.
I am clicking on the link, but there, it seems to have come on.
Yep, there you are.
In living color, so go ahead.
I think I had a sticky mouse.
Good afternoon, sirs.
I am Mitch McAdam, one of the lawyers for the government of Saskatchewan, and I have a couple of questions that I'd like to ask you, Mr. Keenan.
About some of the FPT meetings that were being held in February concerning the protests and the blockades.
To start with, you indicated this morning that your department was regularly in contact with its provincial and territorial partners during this time, and that that was particularly with respect to preparing the strategic enforcement strategy that we've heard about today.
That's correct, isn't it?
Yes, it is.
And is it correct, sir, that this work began with the Policy and Planning Support Committee, which is an ADM-level FPT committee?
Is that right?
It began with that committee or sort of became a spin-off of it?
The work happened through both bilateral meetings of calls at various levels with individual provinces and multilateral ones.
I think the first couple of calls were bilaterals, but one of the first full engagement of all jurisdictions was the PPSC, and I think the first one was on the 6th of February.
Okay, and those are meetings that you would ordinarily not attend, right?
No, they would be.
Those meetings were being the lead Transport Canada participant was either Aaron McCrory, the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister of Safety and Security, or Kevin Brousseau, the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister of Safety and Security.
Okay, and they would be speaking for your department at that meeting, right?
Yes.
And they would generally report to you on what happened at those meetings?
Yes.
And I take it that one of the purposes of those meetings in early February was to gather information on the powers and the tools that the provinces had to respond to the protests and blockades that were happening in their jurisdictions, correct?
Yes, that combined use of all powers in a coordinated matter was the essence of the strategic enforcement strategy.
And I understand, sir, that there was a deputy minister level meeting on February 7th that you attended.
Do you recall that meeting?
Yes.
And I believe that Deputy Minister Stewart from Public Safety Canada attended that meeting as well, correct?
Yes.
And I think you said this morning that you began to lay out the strategic enforcement strategy at that meeting, correct?
Yes, that's correct.
And you'll agree with me that...
The Federal Emergencies Act was not discussed at that meeting, was it?
That's correct.
It was not discussed.
And, sir, there was another FPT meeting on Friday, February 11th, that was attended by Aaron McCrory from Transport Canada.
Are you aware of that meeting?
Yes, I am.
Okay.
And my understanding is that at that meeting...
Mr. McCrory laid out a more fulsome version of the strategic enforcement strategy.
Is that correct?
Yes.
In addition, the tow truck strategy.
Okay.
And at that time, the strategy was looking at a coordinated and consistent approach to enforcement based on existing municipal, provincial, and federal laws, correct?
Yes, that's right.
And again, at that meeting there was no discussion of potentially invoking the Federal Emergencies Act, was there?
uh no Mr. Keenan, my friend from Alberta mentioned a couple of minutes ago another meeting that was held on February 13th that was attended by Mr. Brasseau from your ministry along with representatives from Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta and the RCMP.
And you indicated that you were aware of that meeting, correct?
Yes.
And I believe that that meeting was described as one involving the provinces that were most affected by the protests.
Would you agree with that?
Yes, in the sense that they were the provinces, the places in Canada that were in most desperate need of heavy tow trucks showing up.
And you'd also agree with me that at that meeting, Assistant Deputy Minister Bursault...
Did not raise the possibility of the Federal Emergencies Act being invoked with those provinces, did he?
No, I don't believe he did.
Now, Mr. Keenan, would you agree with me that the provincial and territorial folks that people from your department were meeting with during this time all had expertise with respect to existing tools available to law enforcement?
For the purpose of this, yes, I would.
And so, would you agree with me that that would have been a good forum in which to raise issues about potential gaps in existing legal authorities to deal with the blockades and the protests?
Well, that forum did use the word gaps.
I would say that forum and the purpose of that forum and that discussion was to find the limits of existing authorities.
And make the most use of them.
So in that sense, they were useful in understanding where existing authorities ended with respect to the needed tools to deal with the national crisis.
But the focus of those meetings was on existing tools.
Nobody from your ministry...
Asked provincial officials at those meetings to identify gaps so that that information could feed into potentially invoking the Federal Emergencies Act.
That wasn't the purpose of the meetings, was it?
It was not the purpose of the meetings, and it would be a little bit beyond our remit to lead a consultation on the Emergencies Act, because that's the responsibility of the Minister of Public Safety.
Okay, but you would agree with the people that were attending these meetings.
Would have had some expertise and could have provided some valuable input into determining what those gaps were.
I think the meetings, there was a lot of meetings.
Some of them combined the senior officials from Public Safety and Soul Gens and Transport.
Some of them were just transport officials.
I think the ones that were just transport officials would have been less useful for that purpose.
Okay.
And would you agree with me, Deputy Minister Keenan, that at those meetings, no provincial representatives were requesting the federal government invoke the Emergencies Act, were they?
I don't think the Emergencies Act came up one way or the other.
Okay.
Sir, I'd like to turn to a slightly different matter now.
Just want to make sure that I understand your testimony from earlier this afternoon.
I believe that you indicated that your department started to work on the Emergencies Act about February the 10th.
Is that correct?
Thereabouts.
And then I think you said that the work ramped up over the next couple of days and that by February 13th, I think you said that your department was well into the discussion of the Emergencies Act.
Is that correct?
I think well into the discussion of the Emergencies Act.
Be exactly the right characterization that starting on the 10th, officials of Transport Canada went from focusing on just one thing, the track one, what can we do under existing authorities, and they started doing some thinking about potential options if there was additional authorities under the Emergencies Act.
And that work continued.
That's a little different than being full-on into the development of the Emergencies Act.
The locus of that activity was in public safety and justice.
And so we certainly did some work, but we were not the locus of activity on that.
Okay.
But it would be accurate to say that by February the 10th...
The Emergencies Act was on the table for your department and your department was doing some work on it.
Yes, because it was part of what was beginning to be a Track 2 set of options if the Track 1 set was not going to work.
Okay.
And Deputy Minister Keenan, you would agree with me that no one from your department consulted with any of your PT partners about the invocation of the Emergencies Act before the first minister's meeting that occurred on February 14th?
I would agree with that statement.
Okay.
And the first time that you would have talked to your PT partners about the Federal Emergencies Act was when you did the briefings.
To advise them of what the powers were and what the authorities were that were contained in the act that happened after the act was invoked, correct?
For anything above a passing reference to the Emergencies Act, any substantive discussion with PTs...
From a transport perspective, it happened on the 15th and 16th in terms of informing them on the details of the regulations.
We were not involved in the consultations on the Emergencies Act beforehand.
Thank you, sir.
Those are all of my questions.
Thank you.
Next, I'd like to call on the Ontario Provincial Police.
Good afternoon, Commissioner.
Janine Kabursi for the Ontario Provincial Police, and I have no questions for this panel.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Next, I'd like to call on former Chief Slole's counsel.
Good afternoon.
I just have a couple of questions for Mr. Keenan.
So you testified earlier that the ministry became aware of the convoy heading to...
Oh, sorry, I have to introduce myself.
I'm Nicholas DeStefano for former chief slowly.
You testified earlier that you became aware of the convoy directing itself towards...
or your ministry became aware of the convoy directing itself towards Ottawa in mid-January or around the week of January 20th, correct?
Yes, I think somebody in Transport Canada's...
Became aware around the 17th.
I became aware closer to the 20th.
And they were tracking open source media and social media and stuff like that?
Yes, and engaging with the trucking industry.
Right.
And around January 28th, engaging with DMOC about possible enforcement tools and enforcement methods?
I think that the DMOC discussion started a little bit before January 28th, and they didn't start out on enforcement tools and methods.
They started out understanding what this is and the scope of the potential threat to Canada.
Right.
So in any event, at that point, they weren't working on the sort of strategy that they began working on on February 3rd.
Something like the strategic enforcement strategy wouldn't have been contemplated at that point, correct?
That is correct.
The strategic enforcement strategy came out of our assessment of an acute problem in Ottawa that we became fully aware of in terms of how serious it was from that meeting chaired by Deputy Minister Stewart.
Right.
And it would be fair to say then that the reason why a strategy like that wasn't contemplated at the time...
Is that just sort of from the available information that the Ministry had, it just didn't seem like it would be necessary at that point?
No, I think that's not the reason why not.
The reason why not is that until that briefing of the 3rd, we didn't understand that this was a problem that was beyond the capacity of the police service to address, and they needed help, and we tried to provide help.
Right, and the types of things that you saw were that fines were ineffective?
Protesters weren't responding to the fines, correct?
Or that you were briefed on?
Yes, exactly.
And that it was impossible for the service to obtain tow trucks?
Yes.
And so you sort of went away from that meeting, considered those difficulties, and you spent, I think, 10 days about discussing with partners about how you could come up with solutions to those issues, correct?
Yes.
And ultimately, Around the 13th, there was still no sort of easy solution from the point of view of the Ministry of how tow trucks could be obtained for police services, correct?
Yeah, there were two strategies at play.
Enforcement strategy, the tow truck strategy.
And in terms of the tow trucks, yes, you're right.
After 10 days of trying to find a solution to the problem, we had failed to find one.
So fair to say very difficult for the Ministry.
It would have been very difficult for a police service and for a police chief as well to resolve that issue.
Yes.
In fact, it's interesting because our assessment was from the third, yes, they have a problem securing tow trucks.
Surely, if we think about this and kind of get smart and strategic and use the right incentives and strategy, we'll be able to solve it.
That was our view on the fourth.
After having worked on it for almost 10 days, our conclusion was this was, in essence, an impossible problem to solve with the tools we had.
And then just a couple of quick questions about the strategic enforcement strategy.
I'm not going to pull it up, but ultimately what you had landed on on the 13th was that the strategy had to implicate, of course, police, but provincial transport authorities, provincial solicitors general and attorneys general, federal governments, provincial governments and municipal governments, correct?
Yes.
And I believe that one of the first lines of the strategy was that given the complexity of ongoing multi-day occupations plus blockades, Safe resolution requires three levels of government.
Do you agree with that?
Yes.
Because you understood that given the complexity and the nature of the challenges that local police forces were facing, they were not going to be in a position to resolve situations like what we saw in Ottawa by themselves.
I would say this.
There was a national that was written with...
Ottawa was a really big part of the problem, but it was a national problem, and there was a national scale of blockades and occupations and unlawful behavior that was going to require a coordinated, that was unprecedented, was eclipsing the capacity of police, clearly in Ottawa, but not just in Ottawa, and was going to require a coordinated strategic approach to overcome.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Next is the Windsor Police Service.
Good evening, Heather Patterson for the Windsor Police Service.
Our questions have been asked and answered and we have nothing further for this panel.
Thank you.
Thank you.
The Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses.
Good evening, Commissioner.
Can you see and hear me?
Yes.
Hi, I'm happy to report.
Christine Johnson for the Ottawa Coalition.
I'm happy to report that all of our questions have also been answered and we have no further questions.
Thank you.
okay next i'd call on the democracy fund jccf Good evening.
My name is Hatem Kier.
I'm counsel for the Justice Center for Constitutional Freedoms.
My answers will be focused on you, Deputy Minister Keenan.
So you're aware that the Windsor protest was cleared on the 13th of February, correct?
On the 13th, the Ambassador Bridge opened the 14th, so I think it cleared sort of overnight between the 13th and 14th.
Right.
And are you aware that the Windsor police actually turned away tow trucks from the United States because by the 13th, they were already satisfied that the company in Windsor was up to the task?
I know there were tow trucks that came across the bridge.
I wasn't aware of the details of which tow trucks were used in the Windsor operation.
Okay.
But you were aware that they were able to obtain tow trucks to do what they had to do?
Yes.
Okay.
And with respect to Ottawa, we've heard from other witnesses that the OPP obtained tow trucks, so much so that the OPS incident commander felt that by February 13th, they were good.
If I recall correctly, earlier in your testimony, you stated you weren't aware of that, right?
No, we'd been working on the tow truck strategy for 10 days, and it engaged a lot of partners, and nobody had provided any information like that to us in the course of that work.
Now, you stated that around the 10th going forward, the Emergencies Act was being discussed, correct?
Options under the Emergencies Act began to be considered starting the 10th, yes.
Right.
I mean, you'd agree with me that the Emergencies Act is an extraordinary power, right?
The extraordinary power, yes.
And if alternatives are available, they should be, as a matter of policy, be used first, right?
I'm not an expert on the Act, but the working framework I have is exactly that.
It's not meant to be used if you can solve the crisis using any existing authorities.
And to that effect, it would be important to be aware of what alternatives were available and workable?
Alternatives of what to what, sir?
Whatever it is.
It's sought to be done under the Act.
If there's an alternative under existing law or that can be done without the use of the Act, it would be important to be up to date on that, right?
Yes.
And so given that your agency as a whole wasn't aware that the OPP had tow trucks, what steps were actually taken to get that information from the OPP, knowing that they were actually looking into the issue themselves?
So, from the 4th to the 13th, sort of exhaustive steps of working with our federal partners, our federal policing partners, procurement partners, security partners, all provinces, small caucus groups of provincial officials, and working through trying to find a way to execute the five-point plan and the tow truck strategy.
I would say, in short summary, there were probably 40 engagements by myself and my senior officials with partners trying to sort of unlock the tow truck strategy.
So I would describe it as a pretty exhaustive effort, right up to and including meetings on the 13th.
So my understanding is that there was a DMOC meeting on the 13th?
Yes.
Where the Emergencies Act was discussed?
Yes.
And so going into it, your role would be to provide Transport Canada's perspective on the use of those on emergency powers?
Yes.
So prior to going into that meeting, did someone from your office just give a call to a contact at the OPP to just see how the tow truck issue was going?
There had been multiple calls and multiple exchanges with a lot of partners right up.
To the 13th and I think even perhaps after that DMOC meeting because we had had a meeting with the Transport Canada ADM had convened a meeting with the RCMP partners, I think Public Service and Procurement Canada, Solicitor General and I think Transport officials in Ontario, Manitoba and Alberta.
Continuing to work and find a solution to the tow truck strategy.
And through all of that discussions, including in that meeting, nobody informed us of this solution that was in play.
And interestingly enough, even after the decision to invoke the Act and the promulgation of the regulations and all of the meetings, we had to inform people of the new powers in terms of...
This rendering essential services, the tow truck provision, even on the 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, nobody mentioned or informed anybody at Transport Canada that there had been any solution found otherwise.
You stated that the task of obtaining tow trucks was seeming like an impossible task, but the OPP's success in obtaining them shows that that wasn't the case, right?
Well, I think you're going to have to be fair with the evidence.
I don't think that's the evidence.
So if you want to put to them the problem what OPP testified to, you have to put the full picture.
So superintendent.
Superintendent Bernier, when he testified here, he stated that on the 13th, the way he phrased it was, quote, as things materialized on the 13th, I was satisfied that we were good, end quote.
And that was in reference to a question about tow trucks.
So that seems to suggest that that, at least from they had been able to resolve that issue, right?
I can't confirm that because, as I said, we've been working exhaustively in the tow truck strategy.
All of our work.
all of our conversations and all of our analysis had led us to the opposite conclusion.
So I want to change the topic slightly.
So you've referenced illegal activity in your testimony, the presence of illegal activity.
Leaving aside for a moment the border protests and blocking the border, which I grant, in terms of what was happening elsewhere, are you essentially referring to things like traffic violations, bylaw violations?
In terms of illegal and unlawful activity...
There's two things.
The strategic enforcement strategy specifically lists a whole series of examples, including violations of different municipal bylaws, multiple violations of the Highway Traffic Act, and multiple violations of the Criminal Code as the key examples of the unlawful activity that was apparent on a wide scale through the protests through the blockades and the occupations.
Two of the criminal code, the two ones that were up front, I believe, were mischief and intimidation, which, from my understanding, were being committed by obstructing the roadways.
I think mischief, intimidation, obstruction, and there was one other one that was on that list, I think.
Right, but the behavior underlying, for example, the potential mischief or intimidation is through obstructing a highway, right?
And the use of that highway in the case of mischief?
Well, that was one of many.
For example, the swarming of a police officer, I think, would count as obstruction.
Okay, but suffice it to say that all this behavior was already illegal and there were already authorities there to prohibit that activity?
Well, I think that was the point of the strategic enforcement strategies that we saw.
A scale and intensity of unlawful activity across Canada that police was eclipsing the ability of police to respond.
And in the case of Ottawa, when they tried to respond, they were being obstructed.
And so it was an attempt to communicate at a wide scale to everybody who was either participating in the illegal activity or thinking about it that it's illegal, it has consequences, and to try and convince them to rethink their approach.
To, a term I learned in the course of this crisis, to shrink the footprint of illegal activity to make it more feasible for the police to have a safe operation to return law and order.
Right, and because of the existence of those legal authorities, that's why you wrote to Ms. Druin saying that, in your view, the gap was not legislative authority but enforcement action, right?
My assessment was that there was a lack of enforcement because the scale of the unlawful activity eclipsed the ability of the police to enforce.
If I could just ask one more question.
Thank you, Commissioner.
So that gap in enforcement action, though, I mean, to the extent that the Windsor police had obtained the tow trucks they needed on the 13th and were successful in clearing their protest, to the extent that the OPS incident commander on the 13th, with respect to tow trucks, was saying that he was satisfied that they were good, you'd agree that those are steps to then, successful steps to closing that enforcement gap?
No.
Because there remained a significant...
First of all, the Windsor police needed massive assistance.
That was a massive public order operation.
And even as they struggled through clearing it that weekend, there was still a really significant gap in the ability of police to enforce the peace across the country.
So, no, the gap was not closed.
Well, I'm out of time, so those are my questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Call on the Government of Canada.
Excuse me.
Would it be possible to take a two-minute break?
Yes, certainly.
If it's possible, sorry.
No, we accommodate witnesses here.
We are actually quite friendly.
It might not show.
Thank you.
I appreciate it.
We will even give you five minutes.
How's that?
Thank you.
Okay, merci.
Prenez votre temps.
Please take your time.
We can meet this for five minutes.
And the commission is for five minutes.
We can meet this for five minutes.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Order allowed.
The Commission has reconvened, the Commissioner Afra.
Okay.
Thank you, Commissioner.
For the record, Andrea Gonzales, Council for the Government of Canada.
Mr. D, I'm going to start with you.
You've been sitting there very patiently, and I'm going to make it worth your while, I hope.
My friend, counsel for the convoy organizers, put to you this afternoon the StatsCan trade impact document.
You recall that?
Yes.
And in response to one of his questions, you started to say that the StatsCan report is about...
Trade impacts, not economic impacts.
But I believe you're cut off before you got around to explaining the difference.
Could you explain how those two concepts are different?
Yes.
Well, first of all, the report was just, you know, the monthly report released by Statsy Canada about the evolution of the trade overall.
Secondly, the point that I was referring is that You know, in the States of Canada report, which was published in April as well, they were very consistent with what we're saying when we're conducting the assessment in February.
So they were saying basically that, you know, they have seen some rerouting, which was part of the assumption that we're using and trying to capture with the scenario one on our side.
And in the States Canada report, the purpose of this report is just to release information on the trade evolution.
It's not to provide an economic assessment at sectoral detail level about the blockade that happened during, you know, the month of February, January and February in some areas.
And when you prepared your economic analysis and that background or document, Did you know at the time how long the blockades and border disruptions would last?
No.
And were you able to project out at what the long-term recovery of those disruptions might look like?
No.
It was very difficult to assess at that time.
And that's precisely why we took the approach of scenario as well.
Just to try to identify a spectrum of potential path in terms of the impact and the potential recovery associated with that.
And so if the blockades continued...
As escalated, we may be moving from a scenario one into a scenario two or a scenario three.
Yeah, usually the dynamic on the economic side is you're starting by the most affected sector.
And if it lasts, you're starting to see cascade effect and indirect impact to the rest of the other sector as well.
And this is amplifying basically the net economic loss associated with that.
Okay, thank you.
Over to you, Deputy.
You provided some evidence in response to questions from Commission Council about the assistance that Transport Canada, Transportation of Dangerous Good Inspectors provided to the City of Ottawa during the occupation.
You recall that?
Yes.
Am I understanding correctly that Transport Canada inspectors have subject matter expertise as to the activities that may amount to infractions of the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act?
Yes, exactly.
And to your understanding, what were the concerns with respect to transportation of dangerous goods infractions during the Ottawa occupation?
The two key ones were the fact that there was a lot of movement and storage of a lot of propane, which it was done improperly without the appropriate safeguards, and that there was a lot of movement of particularly diesel, gasoline and diesel, in an unorthodox, unsafe manner.
Both of those created an elevated risk of having an accident with a dangerous good, which would be some combination of an explosion or sort of a fire bomb.
That's a significant elevated safety risk to the people around the propane and the diesel.
And Transport Canada inspectors provided that assistance when requested by OPS.
Is that right?
Yes.
Now, you've given a fair amount of evidence today about the strategic enforcement strategy, and I just want to go to a couple of additional points.
If we could pull it up, it's pb.can50860.
And if we start at the section on communications, which you explained was one of the two components of this strategy, communications and enforcement, is communications something unique to this strategy or is that something that Transport Canada employs more broadly in seeking to obtain regulatory compliance?
I think it's the latter.
In building this strategic enforcement strategy, we were drawing on our knowledge and expertise as a regulatory and enforcement agency.
Essentially, it's a compliance strategy.
And so communication is always the first thing you do when you're trying to get somebody.
Or any person or regulated entity to comply with the legal requirements.
We can go down to the next page, please.
Just pausing there.
So the third bullet point that we see on the screen there says that truck owners and operators should know that by emergency order in the Province of Ontario can have their driver's license plate portion of the permit or CVOR certificate immediately suspended or cancelled.
Now this version of the strategy is February 13th, but is that a component of the strategy that you were seeking to have adopted or pursued in Ontario even prior to their state of emergency?
Yes, and in fact, the reach out to Ontario on the weekend of the 5th and 6th was scoping out what we could say to this effect under the existing law.
We obviously couldn't go this far because this is an emergency authorization, but even the prospect.
Of somebody with a commercial vehicle who, by blockading a street, is committing multiple Highway Traffic Act violations, trying to craft a communication that this could lead to demerit points and the loss of your CVOR and the ability of you to earn an income from this asset.
And so we were trying to get a milder version of this, if you will, into it before the Ontario Emergency Declaration.
The letter that came to you from Deputy Minister LeBlanc on February the 8th, let me know if you want to pull it up.
But in your earlier evidence, you testified about the explanation that she gave in that letter.
For not pursuing action under or with respect to CVORs.
And my question is, did you consider that to be a valid explanation for refusing to use provincial authorities at the time?
I considered it to be a...
Technically valid explanation in the sense that I think every sentence in that letter was technically sound and based in fact, but not a strategically valid explanation in the sense that the effect of it is they were saying they could do absolutely nothing and they didn't want to talk about it anymore with us and they asked us to go through SoulGen.
I'll add two points.
We thought, and as regulatory experts, we understand due process.
Legal requirements, absolutely fair, absolutely essential.
But in our estimation, with measures like this, there's always a way to be a bit creative, particularly both in the execution, but particularly in the communication of these sanctions, and they were declining to participate.
So technically sound, strategically not so much.
And that letter refers specifically to the ongoing protest in Ottawa, not the Windsor blockade which had arisen the day before.
Did you have any understanding as to whether Ontario's position was any different with respect to the situation in Windsor?
Not from reading that letter, but after the kind of catastrophic economic impacts of Windsor had built up over two or three days, they did do a pivot.
And turning back to the strategic enforcement strategy, if we continue down, we come to the enforcement section.
There we go.
And under provincial transportation authorities there, point one says support local law enforcement in managing vehicle flows by, for example, conducting roadside safety and emissions inspections with maximum penalties for infraction.
So my understanding that...
Part of the strategy that Transport was developing included having provincial transportation authorities actually conduct roadside safety and emission inspections as a way to prevent vehicles from traveling to sites of ongoing blockades and the occupation of Ottawa.
Yes.
We were proposing it as a collective multi-jurisdictional effort.
We weren't trying to take over their jurisdiction, but absolutely, yes.
Okay, and let's go to ONT405150.
This is an Ontario production.
It's the operations plan of the Ministry of Transportation for the Convoy for Freedom truck protest.
Is this a document you saw at the time?
I did not see this document at the time.
Okay, let's go to page 7, please.
And under enforcement officers, there's a...
The second bullet there says, conducting regular enforcement away from highways affected by the planned convoy route at the direction of the site lead.
Officers will be directed to conduct area patrol inspections at lay-bys and general patrol within the district away from the planned convoy route.
Officers will not be involved in any commercial vehicle traffic stops of vehicles that are participating.
No, I did not.
And how do you understand that interacts with what you were Trying to achieve through the strategic enforcement strategy?
Quite negatively.
It's like taking a tool out of the toolbox and throwing in the ditch.
It's notable that I think the reason that that was in the strategic enforcement strategy was that we had picked it up as what we thought was the best practice from Quebec.
They had used that at some point, I think on the second weekend, they had used that effectively to mitigate and manage.
Trucks heading to downtown Quebec City.
Let's go to ONT50311.
And to page six, please.
These are notes of a...
Call that I understand you participated in with officials from Ottawa as well as Deputy Minister Mario Di Tommaso on February 6th.
Do you recall that?
Yes, I do.
Okay.
And in the words that are attributed to you in these notes, the third sort of hollow bullet point under your name, we see an observation he provided.
Provided that while Wellington encampments may be contained, it is the spiritual source of the protest movement.
It is acting a fuel for the engagement of others.
Can you just explain what you were trying to convey on that call?
Sure.
I don't.
I recognize the idea.
I'm not sure I recognize the words.
I can't speak to the note-taking.
But it was essentially that this large...
Unlawful occupation in Ottawa was providing energy that was manifest elsewhere.
And so there was inspiration, solidarity.
There were calls back and forth from different cities, but there was clearly either a conscious, strategic, or even unconscious connection between what was going on in Ottawa.
And other sites.
And the assessment that I was sharing was that if there's this massive occupation in Ottawa, you're going to continue to see problems across the country until Ottawa is resolved.
Okay.
Now, in the Transport Canada institutional report, let's pull it up, DOJ.IR70.
There's detailing of various engagements and consultations with other stakeholders and counterparts to deal with the situation.
If we could go to page 12, please.
Beginning at paragraph 46. And so that paragraph describes the consultations that Transport led at the ADM level in connection with the enforcement strategy?
Yes.
And that includes meetings with all of the provincial counterparts who were directly affected by the events associated with what you've described as a national crisis?
Yes.
The first of those, we understand, was held on February 4th.
Do I have that date right?
I think so.
Yeah, well, there it is, February 4th.
And Mr. Cameron, in his examination, took you through the minutes of another of those meetings on February 7th.
Do you recall that?
Yes.
And then there was another meeting of the Policy and Planning Support Committee.
On February 8th, and we see that at the top of page 13 of the report?
Yes.
Okay.
And there's discussion in the report of additional bilateral consultations with Ontario and Alberta on February 5th, 6th and 7th?
Yes.
We don't need to go to it.
But I understand that further down in the institutional report, there's discussion of other consultations and meetings by you and other transport officials as well as your minister regarding possible responses to the crisis, right?
Yes, intense ongoing engagement and consultations every day.
And just to be clear, these consultations were not only with the provinces, but also with municipal officials in areas that were impacted?
I personally was involved in consultations with the City of Ottawa and the Ottawa Police Service through the meetings that were organized and chaired by my colleague.
Rob Stewart.
And my officials were involved in extensive meetings, but I don't know if there were not very many meetings beyond the Ottawa ones where we were directly engaged with municipal officials.
But to the extent they took place, they're set out in the report.
Yes.
Okay, and then I understand there were also consultations with...
Industry associations and business organizations in sectors that were affected.
Oh, sorry.
Okay, go ahead.
Yes, extensive consultations.
One of the things you spoke about in your earlier testimony was that the professional trucking industry was not supportive of the demonstrations and tried to distance itself from it.
You recall giving that evidence?
Yes.
And I don't know that we need to go to each one, but I do want to put them on the record.
There was a letter from the Canadian Trucking Alliance on January 19th, SSM.can.50335.
You remember receiving input from the Canadian Trucking Alliance?
Yes.
There was communication from the Atlantic Truckers Association on February 1 at SSM.can.50345.
You recall that?
Yes.
The Canadian Trucking Alliance and the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters reached out on February 10 after the blockade in Windsor.
Do you recall that?
Yes.
SSM.can.50987.
And then there was a public statement put out by the Alberta Beef Producers, Alberta Cattle Feeders Association, and the Canadian Cattlemen's Association on February 3rd regarding the protest activity at Coutts.
Do you recall that one?
Yes, I do.
And that's SSM.can.50945.
And then one final one.
Or your minister and transport head engagement with the motor vehicle industry?
Yes.
And that's at SSM.can.50958, for the record.
Sorry, that is a letter from the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers Association of February 8th.
If it's possible to do so, summing up all of the...
The input that was received from these various associations, what were they telling you?
Three things, and the three things evolved over time.
The first thing they were making clear to us privately, and they were making clear very publicly, the professional trucking associations, the professional trucking industry said, this is not us.
This is not an activity of the trucking industry.
Further, they made that very clear repeatedly.
The second thing is, as Ottawa got occupied, I know specifically the Canadian Trucking Alliance and others said, hey, this is not us.
If you're a truck driver and you're there, you're not representing your industry, and that they asked everybody to be peaceful and leave soon.
And then there was a third round that was very intense from the 8th to the 10th, and that was 12 trucking associations across the country, the cattlemen, the vehicle manufacturers, the food manufacturers, a wide range of the tool and dye industry with a really strong appeal to the blockaders at Windsor to stop.
And to allow the bridge to open.
And there was some fairly impassioned communication from the trucking industry saying, you're really hurting truckers.
You're killing their ability to earn a living.
They're stuck.
You're actually stopping truckers from doing what they want to do.
So it was sort of those three messages evolving over time.
Okay.
And just returning to the engagements and consultations that you were having, particularly with provincial counterparts, in your evidence earlier you described mixed reactions and in some cases reactions that were cool and reserved.
Do you remember that evidence?
Yes.
Through those consultations, did that inform your views as to the effectiveness or not of...
The coordinated enforcement strategy that you hope to achieve?
It did.
I would say that at the beginning, it was a little slow going because of that initial response that has been described by Ontario.
And there was a general, I would say, reluctance of provincial colleagues to jump to the front on this because it was such an awful crisis.
The problems were so messy and the intensity and the anger coming from the blockades and the occupations was a cause for pause.
Over time, I would say we saw more of a convergence of efforts over the course of the week, particularly after the Ontario pivot on the 10th.
Okay.
Now, you...
Also gave evidence today concerning the discussions that were taking place around invocation of the Emergencies Act at DMOC and the IRG, particularly February 12th and the 13th.
You recall that?
Yes.
And you described that, I think your words were, we're really close to significant violence.
You were concerned about...
How things were building.
And you understand that both the Ambassador Bridge and the arrest, the Ambassador Bridge blockade was cleared, it was reopened, and the Coutts arrest had happened by the time the Prime Minister announced invocation of the Emergencies Act on the 14th?
Yes.
Did you understand those areas or the national crisis to no longer be a concern at that point?
No, it was still a significant concern.
And recalling that the 13th was a Sunday and the 14th was a Monday, had you seen a pattern in previous weeks of activity increasing on the weekends and then dropping off during the week?
Yes, in fact, we were.
Unfortunately, we were seeing a well-established pattern because the 12th and the 13th was the third weekend of blockades and occupations.
And so there was both the weekly cycle of it getting bad on the weekend and then receding a bit on the weekdays to get...
Worse on the weekend again.
In addition to that, I think you could see a bit of an upward trend in the size of the problem.
It was growing both in terms of the entrenchment in Ottawa, where the occupation was getting more entrenched and attitudes were hardening on both sides.
But as we went into the weekend of the 12th and 13th, you could see a growing It
would have been even worse.
You mentioned in your earlier evidence the 2020 rail blockades.
And were concerns about a rail blockade something that you had turned your mind to at the time?
Yes.
Once we started to see the slow rolls sort of transition to blockades and occupations.
And as the crisis dragged on, we became more and more concerned that the next step or the next shoe was going to drop, which is that the next blockade would be a rail line.
And then we would have both the border blockades and the rail blockades at the same time, which would dramatically escalate the economic harm to the country.
And I think we saw in the background or...
Appears in the background that the products that are largely carried by rail are different from the products that are carried by truck.
And so one mode of transportation is not a substitute for the other.
They each present their own concerns if there are blockades.
Is that fair?
Yes, that's right.
In the two minutes I think I have remaining, I just want to touch on the tow truck issue.
As I understand, one of the elements of the tow truck strategy is that if a vehicle that's present at one of the blockades is not in movable condition, that a mechanic would prepare it for being driven.
Is that correct?
Yes.
And were you aware during these events of protesters taking deliberate steps to disable their vehicles so they could not be driven away?
Yes, and that was why that mechanic part of the strategy was in the strategy.
And the issue with tow trucks was primarily an issue getting access to heavy tows and suitable operators.
Is that fair?
Yes.
I mean, there was a general tow truck industry problem, but the part that was absolutely insurmountable was getting the heavy wreckers and the skilled operators to move large commercial vehicles.
And Council for Democracy Fund and JCCF put to you that tow services were made available in Windsor through a tow company contracted by Windsor.
Is it your understanding that the vast majority of the vehicles at the Windsor blockade were passenger vehicles, not commercial rigs?
Yes.
In fact, my understanding is they used tow trucks and they were able to deal with it with a few small tow trucks.
They didn't require large wreckers.
And was it your understanding at the time that the OPP did in fact use the measures in the EMR to require tow truck companies to provide services in order to assist in clearing the occupation in Ottawa?
Yes, our understanding is that the tow trucks, the heavy wreckers that were secured by Ottawa were secured through the OPP going out to the industry, informing, requesting the service, informing them of their legal obligation to provide it and their indemnity.
And that kind of cracked the problem.
Thank you.
I think my time is up.
Those are my questions.
Okay, thank you.
Any re-examination?
No, thank you, Commissioner.
Okay, well, we'll have an early night.
So, thank you very much for your testimony.
Merci beaucoup.
Thank you very much for coming.
Thank you very much.
We appreciate you coming.
So, we'll adjourn till tomorrow morning at 9:30.
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