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Oct. 31, 2022 - Viva & Barnes

09:04:48

Emergencies Act Inquiry - Monday, Oct. 31, 2022 - Live With Chat

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	Page 176.
	I want to start by asking you some questions about the Hendon reports.
	So I'll just wait for the...
	And it's page 176.
	Okay.
	Thank you.
	Just to situate you for where we are in time, it's February 12th.
	And then if we could just turn to the next page.
	Thank you.
	And so you'll see, Mr. Slowly, that on February 12th, you've just gotten off of a call of the Big 12 services.
	Do you recall that?
	Yes, sir.
	And on page 177, you'll see if you just stay at the top, please.
	You raised a concern with the OPP that OPS was being compared to Toronto and the suggestion that OPS wasn't prepared and you wanted to address that situation.
	And Commissioner Carrick asked that you go offline to have that discussion in a professional manner.
	You recall that?
	Yes, sir.
	And so you raised concerns about the Toronto situation, and you also want to discuss the assertion that OPS was not prepared.
	And I want to read a passage just below Mr. Soley and ask you to confirm whether that's accurate.
	And so if you can just scroll up a bit, please.
	Thank you.
	Chief, can't continue to compare Ottawa to Toronto.
	Also, we had a blind spot.
	Ottawa was not soft or something sold on civil disobedience.
	I'm not sure what that word is.
	Commissioner Carrick says, don't disagree with you.
	And then says, never any suggestion that the Toronto situation is like Ottawa.
	This situation was not caused by OPP.
	If we could keep scrolling, please.
	The second bullet, you indicate to Commissioner Carrick, it sounds like Ottawa got caught off guard.
	We need a collective understanding of what we did good and bad.
	Want the message to be we didn't have the intel and couldn't prepare and have a message going forward.
	And then underneath that, Superintendent Morris says, Hendon report, not perfect.
	This type of activity is novel.
	April 2020, saw a messaging re-vaccination talk against, if we could continue please to the next page, January 2022, first heard on the specific event.
	So this is Superintendent Morris speaking.
	Discussed it on January 21, 22, and sent out via Hendon.
	Worked closely with OPS.
	We underestimated, and as we learned more, we tried to collect the information and work closely with OPS.
	Don't know how Ottawa could have been prevented.
	Toronto was completely different, and we learned from Ottawa.
	The strategic intelligence would not have provided a key to prevention.
	Chief, and this is you, asks Pat, Tom, Chuck, that's what needs to be told more broadly and to the politicians, that intelligence update needs to be done.
	Needs to be done.
	Done.
	Judging the various police services against each other, people are second-guessing me.
	I can't point fingers at RCMP and OPP.
	I need someone that is credible, objective, to speak out, not someone fighting for their job.
	And you'll see Commissioner Carrick says, fair comment.
	We do provide Hendon to government.
	Can ask Pat, which I assume is Pat Morris, to include a summary to include in the next Hendon.
	We can make sure it's clearly articulated in the Hendon reports.
	And does that, in fact, reflect the conversation that you had with Superintendent Morris and Commissioner Carrick?
	Yes, sir.
	Thank you.
	And although your witness statement did not say so, I understand that, in fact, you only reviewed the Hendon reports sometime after February 10, 2022.
	Is that correct?
	No, sir.
	Okay.
	And I'm going to suggest to you that it was only after you reviewed the Hendon reports...
	Sometime after February 10th that you formed the conclusion that you just reached?
	Absolutely not, sir.
	Okay.
	And I'm also going to suggest to you that none of the Hendon reports were ever forwarded by you to either Deputy Chief Bell or Deputy Chief Ferguson.
	My recollection is that I did, but I stand corrected if there's no actual evidence of that.
	Regardless, the discussions of the Hendon reports took place at literally every briefing.
	Right.
	I understand you couldn't find any record of that.
	And you read over the witness statement of Deputy Chief Bell?
	Yes, sir.
	Or Acting Chief Bell?
	And you're aware from his testimony and his witness statement that he learned of the Hendon reports sometime in the week of January 24th through discussion with Superintendent Patterson.
	Who was the superintendent in intelligence and then began to receive the reports on January 27th.
	You understand that, correct?
	I understand that's a statement, sir, yes.
	And you understand from Deputy Chief Ferguson that she only started to get those reports in the week of February 4th.
	Again, that's her statement, sir.
	And you have no evidence to the contrary, correct?
	Except that the Hendon reports were being discussed well before those days, so I have no other evidence other than that.
	And Deputy Chief Bell noted in his witness statement and in his testimony that you began to receive the Hendon reports on January 13th and that you personally received...
	Sorry, was that a question for me?
	Yes, do you recall that?
	Yes, I received a Hendon report in regards to the convoy on January 13th.
	I believe I was on the distribution for the Hendon reports prior to that.
	Right.
	And Kevin Maloney is your executive officer, or was your executive officer, is that right?
	Yes, Inspector Maloney, yes.
	And you worked very closely with him?
	As my executive officer, yes.
	Mr. Clerk, if we could please turn up OPS 409554.
	And if we could just scroll down to the bottom of the page, you'll see, is it Inspector or Superintendent Maloney?
	Inspector Maloney.
	Inspector Maloney.
	Sends an email to Jamie Dunlop, to Superintendent Dunlop, and he says, Hi Jamie, there is apparently an operation Hendon being run by OPP or RCMP.
	This is an intelligence-based operation that has apparently been producing daily briefings since the end of January.
	A couple of questions from the Chief.
	Are you aware of this operation?
	Do we have an OPS representative?
	Is it integrated into our ICS model?
	Do we have copies of all briefing notes, especially from 5 and 9 February?
	The chief would like a copy of all briefing notes passed and going forward sent to him and Christian Huneau.
	And so he made inquiries on your behalf about what the Hendon reports were.
	I don't recall this email being asked to be sent.
	I do recall asking for, not specifically through my executive officer, but for all previous copies of Hennon reports.
	The rest of the bullet points, I'm not sure where they would have come from, but they were not my directions.
	Okay, so he sent this on his own.
	He may have been looking for a background on his own.
	I don't know to what extent the inspector would have been briefed up on all these matters.
	So he says a couple of questions from the chief.
	You were the chief at the time.
	So I assumed he was talking on your behalf.
	I don't recall asking for these things in the way that they were asked for.
	He's tried to do his best to get that information, but I obviously knew all of those answers already.
	What I was looking for was all the copies of the Hendon reports.
	Okay.
	Can we scroll up to the top, please?
	Thank you.
	And so Superintendent Dunlop replies.
	Hi, Kevin.
	Hope you are getting some rest.
	I am aware of Project Kendon.
	It's a provincial project of summary of intelligence across the province and national partners in regard to the convoy.
	I have not received any updates in the few days I've been assigned intelligence as it related to this occupation, but we'll make sure to forward everyone to the chief, and through this email, we'll ensure Inspector Bryden sends directly from source and not through the chain of command that may delay sharing.
	I personally have not received most of them.
	I started to receive them in November from Robert Drummond, and I note the chief is on the mailing list.
	I have a gap through the month of December and January, as I'm not directly in Intel, but started to receive a few from Mark in February.
	I'll forward those now.
	I asked Ken Bryden to have all reports forwarded to you dating from the first one.
	And you are, in fact, copied on that email, correct?
	Yes, sir.
	And so we heard from the OPP witnesses, and specifically Superintendent Morris, that he found it very odd that they were getting requests from your office for copies of the Hendon Report when they had gone directly to you from January 13th onward.
	You heard that testimony.
	And I can understand why.
	My request was to my own folks to get past copies of the Hendon Reports.
	Technically, we should have been able to get them from our own intelligence directorate, as you can see by the email from Mr. Dunlop.
	For some reason, my staff weren't able to get them from our own folks, and so I guess the request went on from there.
	I was not aware that we had sent a formal letter to Superintendent Morris for all these reports.
	We should have been able to get them from our own intelligence archives.
	But you had them.
	They all were sent to you.
	They were addressed too slowly.
	Yes, sir.
	And I don't manage my email inbox.
	I have an EA that supports that.
	And for whatever combination of reasons, it wasn't available to my EA.
	And so a request went through to the Intelligence Directorate.
	And subsequent to that, for reasons I'm not fully aware of, it went over to Superintendent Morris.
	The point is, you're right.
	They were available inside the Audible Police Service, and my request was to the Audible Police Service produce the Heinen Report so I could start to have an archive of them and look through them myself.
	I'm not understanding how you needed an archive when every single one was addressed to you and in your inbox.
	I often deleted reports that I wasn't actually using anymore, and so I wouldn't have a complete access to them myself, and so I'd have to get assistance from my EA, sometimes from IT, to get past documents.
	For a wide variety of issues.
	So your evidence is that you did receive them and you did read them at the time?
	No, actually my evidence was I read most of them at the time in terms of line by line.
	Some of them I skimmed through.
	And some of them I would have forwarded on to different people for actioning items.
	And if I suggested to you that not only did you have them, they were unopened in your inbox, what would your response be to that?
	It is possible that some of them were unopened, depending on the day and how much I had going on.
	I might not have been able to read everything that came into my inbox.
	And so when your executive officer, Inspector Maloney, sent that request to the OPP, he did so without your authority.
	No, he has my authority to do a wide variety of things, including extending to seek information in order to accomplish his purpose.
	I don't give him directions and details on every aspect of what he does as the executive officer.
	I'm going to suggest to you, Mr. Slowly, that once you receive that email, this one here.
	You at some point decided that you could blame Deputy Chief Bell at the time for not planning for this event.
	That is absolutely incorrect, sir.
	And I really take offense to that notion.
	Thank you.
	Okay.
	If we could please turn up OPS 409565.
	If we could scroll to the bottom, you'll see, then there's an, yeah, if you could scroll all the way to the bottom, please.
	Just go up, I'm sorry.
	Okay, so you'll see above that email, the next email in the chain, which we just saw, and then if we can go above that.
	You'll then see Superintendent Patterson, and you're copied on that, says, thanks, Jamie.
	Further to that, all of the Hendon reports were submitted to DC Bell for the intelligence briefings that were provided on a daily basis.
	OPS members in attendance have been myself prior to the MIC role, Inspector Bryden and SIC members.
	Yes, it is integrated into our model.
	The briefing notes from February 5 to 9. We're supplied by D.C. Bell.
	And then we see above that, so now you believe that Deputy Chief Bell at the time had received the Hendon reports.
	And then you indicate on February 10th to your general counsel, FYI and for your records.
	This could become very important in any, I assume that's a typo, post-event inquiries.
	Well, there was a massive amount of information in there, including the information about Deputy Chief Bell.
	Obviously, this has actually become very important in an inquest.
	So, yes.
	And so even though the OPP found it odd that your office was specifically making inquiries about what these ending reports were, and even though Deputy Chief Bell's evidence, which was not contradicted, was that he only began to receive them at the end of January, you're now saying...
	This could become important.
	And could it become important, Mr. Slowly, because it will indicate that you received the Hendon reports or that Deputy Chief Bell received the Hendon reports?
	It's important, sir, because it provides a history of what the Audible Police Service received the Hendon reports and what they did with them in totality.
	Okay.
	And so you don't have any response, I take it, to...
	Superintendent Morris, who was really quite puzzled by why you were asking for Hendon reports.
	I could appreciate why Superintendent Morris from the OPP would be puzzled about it.
	I want to talk about Deputy Chief Ferguson.
	Deputy Chief Bell at the time.
	And you've testified on Friday that there was a period of time when you lost confidence in your two deputies.
	No, I testified that the trust factor had taken a hit, but that I had not lost confidence in my two deputies.
	If I had lost confidence in my two deputies, I would have taken a much more firm and direct course of action.
	Okay.
	And so you lost trust.
	And that must have been very hard.
	I lost some level of trust, sir.
	Thank you.
	And that must have been very hard for you.
	I think that's hard for anybody, sir.
	And you decided that because you couldn't trust them, you needed to do certain things yourself.
	Again, just to correct, it wasn't because I could not trust them, meaning I had zero trust.
	But yes, I would have to then take some course of action to deal with that until efforts were made on all parties to rebuild that trust.
	And I stated that efforts were made.
	Thank you.
	And you also didn't trust Superintendent Dunlop as the event commander that they had chosen.
	No.
	Superintendent Dunlop was still part of a review that was going on for the Panda Games events, and it would not have been fair for him to be in that position until that review was completed.
	And so several of your most senior officers you had trust issues with?
	I had a momentary trust issue with Deputy Chiefs Bell and Ferguson as a result of the decision to put Superintendent Patterson, sorry, Dunlop.
	I was concerned because I was not made aware of the decision.
	And you spoke to Deputy Chief Bell and Ferguson about it?
	Yes, sir.
	And then you consulted with them about who should replace Superintendent Dunlop because you said you didn't want him in the position.
	Because it wasn't suitable for him to be in the position given that he was still under review.
	Yes, sir.
	But you did not suggest putting Superintendent Rayome back in as the event commander.
	I asked them for their opinions.
	His name was not offered back to me.
	Okay.
	So...
	There's another one of your superintendents that you may have had some trust issues with as well.
	No, sir, that's not at all correct.
	Commissioner, Commissioner.
	Thank you.
	My friend, Mr. Mijakovsky, has more than one occasion this morning not stated the witness's evidence correctly, and I would be grateful if my friend could listen more closely and not suggested the evidence.
	It's something other than it is.
	I'm doing the best I can.
	If I have misstated a word, please correct me.
	You've actually repeatedly misstated the word, so I appreciate it.
	I'm going to have to interrupt.
	I think you should be very careful.
	You have on a couple of occasions done it.
	It happens, but please be cautious.
	I will, and I'm not doing it intentionally, but there's a lot of information, and if I've gotten something wrong and I haven't picked up on it, please do.
	I certainly feel your pain.
	There's a lot of information.
	You've also, I believe, told us about not wanting to give too much information to the board because you didn't entirely trust them to keep things confidential.
	Again, that's incorrect, sir.
	That's not what you said?
	That's not what I said.
	You had concerns about sharing certain information because of confidentiality?
	There were instances where the board members were documented in terms of leaking information, service information, board information.
	That includes in-camera information.
	We've also heard evidence about your perception that there wasn't political support to get the resources to you and that they wanted to see you fail.
	I've talked about the concerns that I had from comments and actions by various levels of government, yes, sir.
	And Superintendent Party, you'll recall, from the OPP testified that you told him there were people in the ministry who wanted you to fail.
	And that you had sources telling you that.
	I'm sorry, can you repeat that please, sir?
	Superintendent party from the OPP testified that there were people, that you said at a meeting he was at, that there were people in the ministry who wanted you to fail and that you had sources telling you that.
	It's not exactly right, but I was aware from people in the ministry that had made those suggestions over the course of my tenure as Chief of Police.
	And you expressed that to Superintendent Hardy, correct?
	That's correct, sir.
	And so I take it from that that there were also people you could not trust in the ministry?
	No, sir.
	That's not correct.
	Let's talk about the change in incident commander from Superintendent Rayon to Superintendent Dunlop.
	And I want to begin by talking about your comments about Superintendent Dunlop.
	What I understood you to say on Friday, and perhaps I've written it down incorrectly, was you did not want him in the position because he had been the incident commander in the Panda game.
	No, sir.
	He was not the incident commander in the Panda Game, but he was the superintendent overseeing, actually the acting deputy chief overseeing the area that was responsible for event planning and the event plan implementation on the day of the Panda Game in 2021.
	My understanding was that you referred to him as the incident commander or the event commander, and so I've got that wrong.
	He was not the incident commander, and I don't know if there was a major incident commander or event commander, but he was overseeing that operation.
	He was part of the briefings in regards to those operations.
	He was with me when we briefed board and council members in regards to those operations.
	So he had a very active involvement in the planning and the overseeing of the implementation of that plan.
	My understanding was that the incident commander of that was Inspector Michel Marat.
	And there was no event commander for that.
	You have probably more accurate information recollection at this point than I do.
	And in terms of Superintendent Dunlop's experience, I understand that he had been the logistics and staffing lead in 2016 for the North American Leaders Summit, and he was part of a joint planning and communications group with the RCMP.
	He was also the lead planner in the past for the presidential visit.
	And was extremely well qualified for the position, but that you had some personal issues with him.
	First of all, I'm not aware of his CV, so I can't comment on the accuracy of it.
	Your last comment, I don't know where you've got that from, sir, but that's not accurate.
	And then last but not least, planning and logistics for the Panda Game was not the problem.
	It was decisions made around removing the ESU prior to the time where the traditional public order and disorder issues took place.
	And I still at that point in...
	January, February of 2022 had not had a report back that explained why our public order were removed prior to what we knew to be the high-risk period of the panda game.
	Planning and logistics had nothing to do with it.
	He was just finishing his answer.
	Thank you, sir.
	Planning and logistics had nothing to do with it.
	It was an operational decision that was made at some level.
	To remove the vast majority of our resources, including our public order resources, literally at the moment that the troubles would have begun.
	You're not disputing that he was extremely well qualified for that position of event coordinator?
	But he was not an event coordinator by your own.
	Sorry if my question wasn't clear.
	I'm event commander for the protest.
	I don't know what his CV.
	I didn't know at that time what his CV was.
	Okay.
	And you indicated that the event commander was changed, you said, on February 1st, 2022.
	That was your evidence on Friday?
	That was my understanding, although I don't know when the actual change took place.
	Okay.
	On Friday, you said it was the first.
	I believe it was around the 1st, but I don't know the exact date.
	And you understand that Deputy Chief Ferguson testified that Superintendent Rayome was the event commander until February 4th in the evening.
	That was her evidence in her witness statement, and it was also her evidence in the transcript.
	I'm sorry, did you say that Superintendent Rayome was the event commander until the 4th?
	Until February 4th in the evening.
	That was her evidence.
	That does not...
	That's not aligned to what I understood.
	And no one challenged that evidence when she gave it.
	You heard that, correct?
	I don't recall any challenges.
	And on the institutional report that Ottawa police filed and that came in through her evidence, that institutional report had a chronology of dates and said that Superintendent Rayome was the event commander up until February 4th.
	And nobody challenged that either.
	I haven't read that report, sir.
	And you're aware that Deputy Chief Ferguson testified that Superintendent Rayom had asked for some time off on the weekend, which was the weekend of February 5th, and that's why she said he had been replaced by Superintendent Dunlop.
	My recollection is that Deputy Chief Ferguson told me somewhere around February 1st that Inspector Lucas...
	And asked for time off and that he was being replaced to allow to go home.
	Apparently all that information wasn't correct.
	And to this date, I am still not sure what happened between February 1st and February 5th when I was finally made aware that Superintendent Dunlop was the event commander.
	Okay, so you indicated on Friday that you did not believe.
	That statement when she said that he had asked for time off that weekend, and that's why he had been replaced.
	Again, it's not a matter of belief.
	My recollection, independent and to this day, is that Inspector Lucas was asking for time off somewhere around February 1st.
	Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson provided that time off and replaced him with somebody.
	I wasn't sure who that was.
	I assumed that was a decision that was just temporary for...
	24 to 48 hours, so I wasn't particularly concerned about it.
	I became concerned about things on Saturday, February 5th, when I kept asking for who the incident commander was, event commander was, and I was then told at the end of that meeting on February 5th that it was Superintendent Dunlop, and until that time, I had no understanding of that, sir.
	Can I ask, please, Mr. Clerk, to turn up OPS 30-14454?
	page 142.
	At the top of the page, you'll see Chris Rayome was the commander.
	Sorry, whose notes are these, sorry?
	These are the same notes that we looked at before, Miss You Know's notes.
	And what's the date for this?
	February 10th.
	Chris Rayome was the commander.
	Chris Rayome, he needs time off.
	Decision to ask Jamie be there on Friday.
	Friday would be February 4th.
	On Saturday, Superintendent Rayome asked if Jamie, that would be Jamie Dunlop, should just stay in there.
	Decision to just keep.
	Thank you.
	I have no idea what the context of this telephone call that Ms. Youno had with Deputy Chief Bell on February 10th.
	Those are not notes that she was taking on my behalf.
	Those are notes she was taking on her behalf, and I have no understanding of the context of this.
	And if that is correct, then what that would mean...
	Well, it's not correct, sir, from my understanding.
	If that was correct...
	It's not correct, from my understanding.
	If I could ask my question, please.
	If it was correct, that would mean that on February 4th in the evening, Superintendent Rayom...
	Was asked for time off and was given it, and Superintendent Dunlop became the event commander on the 5th.
	If that was correct, then that would completely discount the fact that Superintendent Dunlop presented himself on two occasions on Thursday, February 3rd, to present the public order unit subplan that I had asked for.
	And that Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson was responsible for coordinating in her major incident command role.
	And so none of this makes sense.
	Okay.
	And what also doesn't make sense, if we could please turn up OPS 3014484, page 10. So this is your typed note.
	I don't know when you typed those notes, but you'll see it.
	I advise, this is on the February 5th in the morning, it's nine o 'clock, it says, I advise that I had only just officially heard that Superintendent Dunlop had replaced Inspector Lucas as the incident commander at the previous briefing.
	Deputy Chief Bell advised he was the new incident commander installed this week.
	That can't be accurate, Mr. Slowly, I suggest, because the incident commander from the beginning of this event to the end was Inspector Lucas throughout, correct?
	What's happening here is there's an interchange of terms between incident commander and event commander.
	Event commander is not a vernacular that I was used to from my time in Toronto Police Service.
	We didn't have such a designation.
	You'd like an explanation, sir?
	I'm trying to provide that to you.
	So in terms of terminology, you're right, it doesn't make sense.
	But I go back to it.
	On or around February 1st, I believe it was February 1st, but I stand to be corrected if there's other documentation.
	I was advised by Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson that Inspector Lucas was tired, that he was involved in planning prior to the arrival of the convoys, had worked through the weekend under intense pressure, that Inspector Lucas...
	I don't recall whether or not she told me who he was being replaced by, but I accepted that.
	Then I was waiting for a briefing from Staff Sergeant Mike Stoll on the public order unit plan that I requested on February 1st.
	Superintendent Dunlop showed up on Thursday, February 3rd on two separate occasions presenting that plan and that caused great confusion for me.
	And it also meant that we couldn't actually get the presentation.
	When finally we started talking about it again on February 5th, I was then told that Superintendent Dunlop had been the incident commander.
	And that's my recollection, and that's why I wrote my notes as such.
	I had replaced Inspector Lucas as the incident commander, and that's why I wrote my notes as such.
	These are not notes that you prepared at the time of the discussion?
	These are contemporaneous notes, yes, sir.
	And I suggest to you that you've got it wrong there, because what you were told on February 5th in the morning was that Superintendent Ray Ohm had asked for some time off.
	No, sir.
	You have to let me finish, Mr. Slowly, and had been replaced by Superintendent Dunlop.
	And in your notes, you've written that it's Inspector Lucas who was replaced by Superintendent Dunlop as the incident commander.
	Thank you for your statement.
	You're inaccurate.
	That's not true.
	And so we are in agreement, however, that Inspector Lucas was never replaced.
	I'm still under the impression that he took time off, but I've heard his testimony that he never had days off.
	But up until that point, I was advised and still believe that, well, I was advised that Inspector Lucas had requested time off.
	It turns out it was Superintendent Reel.
	I stand corrected.
	And you're asking us to accept that for the period of February 1st to February 5th, you were under a misapprehension of who the event commander was?
	Yes, sir.
	If, in fact, the change was made on February 4th in the evening, as we've heard from the evidence...
	That would mean you were uninformed from the evening of the 4th until the morning of the 5th, correct?
	No, I was uninformed from the 1st until the 5th.
	Commissioner, may I interject again?
	Forgive me, please.
	I'm not trying to follow my friend's questions.
	If the suggestion that my friend is making to the witnesses of the evidence before you is that Inspector Rayom left on the 4th, then my friend should recall that...
	Commission Council led the evidence on Friday of Inspector Rayome's note that showed that he was placed as the, I think, event commander on This is quite proper cross-examination.
	If my friend wants to raise that in re-examination, he can.
	Superintendent Rayome was not called as a witness.
	Two different notebooks from him were put in.
	We knew nothing about that.
	So my friend can certainly pursue that in re-examination, but I submit this as proper cross-examination.
	Commissioner, may I just add one comment?
	I'm concerned about my time.
	I'll be very brief.
	It's a matter of some significance.
	My friend cannot say on behalf of the entity, the OPS, that he can pick and choose through which notebook he likes.
	Commission Council led that notebook.
	My friend just has to take account of it, is all my point is.
	He's not being fair to the witness.
	Thank you.
	Well, I think a lot of this is re-examination.
	If need be, there is conflicting...
	And I think given the short timeline that we have, there's a certain amount of liberty.
	But if you could, as much as possible, put everything in context without necessarily citing everything.
	Sure, I understand that, you know, that's the narrative.
	I'm challenging that narrative, and my friend is certainly open to explore it, but I'm going to move on from that point.
	You would agree with me that as the major incident commander, Deputy Chief Ferguson operates at a strategic level?
	For the most part, sir, yes.
	And below her would be Inspector Lucas at the operational level?
	No, below her would be the event commander.
	I'm sorry, the event commander, and below the event commander would be Inspector Lucas at the operational level.
	Well, not to get too far off track, but then what is the role of the event commander?
	Okay.
	And strategy at the major incident commander would be at a very high level, correct?
	No, sir.
	And I don't see anywhere in the record any instructions that prohibited the major incident commander from choosing who should be the event commander who reports to her.
	And there are no instructions in that regard, and there certainly were no instructions that I gave in that regard either.
	It's her decision, is it not?
	Yes, but as a strategy-level contact and the direct contact to me that I would expect such decisions would be communicated to me with an explanation that I could understand in a timely manner.
	And when you raised it with her on the 5th, you in fact told her that it was her decision to either keep Superintendent Dunlop in that role, if she wanted to, Yes, and she'd be accountable for it, given that I had raised my concerns, yes.
	So, obviously, she had that right to make a decision as to who she wanted as the event command.
	Yes, sir, and I retain the right of Chief of Police to make a decision if I felt that it was going in the wrong direction.
	But you also warned her that she'd be accountable for the decision to put Superintendent Dunlop into that position.
	I explicitly did so because it was such an important decision to make, yes, sir, but it's implicit in everything.
	And you would agree with me that it's somewhat of a threat that if things go wrong, you'll be blamed?
	Not at all.
	It's not a threat at all.
	It's simply stating the facts.
	This is an important decision-making.
	We've just had an important discussion.
	We are in a significant public safety crisis.
	Decisions of this level are incredibly important.
	It's your decision, but you'll be accountable for it.
	Yes, sir.
	And that was on February 5th.
	And at February 5th, just in terms of what was going on on the ground, things were not going well in the City of Ottawa.
	Fair?
	We were still struggling to retain control, yes.
	Right.
	And you were facing really unrelenting criticism in the media and on social media because people didn't understand what the Ottawa Police were doing.
	The Ottawa Police Service was facing unrelenting criticism.
	And yes, as Chief of Police, that would come with the title.
	And that was very intense pressure on you, was it not?
	Intense pressure on everyone, yes, sir.
	And it was intense on me.
	And what Deputy Chief Ferguson confirmed with you was that in deciding who to replace Superintendent Rayom with, she had consulted with her colleague, who was the Deputy Chief and was experienced in the Deputy Chief role, and you were suspicious of Deputy Chief Bell for having had a conversation with Deputy Chief Ferguson about his thoughts on the skill set required to be the event command.
	Sorry, you just lost me there.
	I'm not quite sure what you're asking or asserting.
	Sorry if my question had multiple parts.
	I'll try to break it up.
	Deputy Chief, you indicated that you did not support the decision she had made to choose Superintendent Dunlop.
	Correct?
	My first concern was that I wasn't advised about it.
	Then I raised the concern that he might not be appropriate because he's still under review.
	And you also, she told you, as did Deputy Chief Bell, that he had consulted with her and suggested Superintendent Dunlop.
	And you weren't happy about Deputy Chief Bell giving his opinion to Deputy Chief Ferguson?
	No, quite the opposite.
	I was clear.
	Once I understood that it was Deputy Chief Bell's suggestion or recommendation to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, I turned to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and said, you're the major incident commander.
	Whoever made this suggestion is irrelevant.
	You've made that decision.
	It's on you to communicate that to me.
	And she doesn't have the ability to consult with her colleague who's been in the Deputy Chief role to say, hey, what do you know about...
	I never said anything to that.
	Just try not to talk over them and if you could try and tighten your questions a bit.
	I had no issues whatsoever with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson consulting with Deputy Chief Bell on that occasion or any other occasion.
	In fact, I encouraged it repeatedly.
	And I suggest that on February 9th, so a couple days later now, you were pretty concerned that you would lose your job and be blamed for what had happened.
	Absolutely not, sir.
	Okay.
	And what you were looking for was to blame somebody else.
	Absolutely not, sir.
	Okay.
	If we could please turn up OPS 144, page 131.
	And if we could scroll down, please.
	There's a meeting at 9.30 to 9.50.
	Meeting with Chief Christian Huneau and Inspector Maloney, your executive officer.
	Do you see that?
	Yes, sir.
	Okay, and if we could scroll down.
	And so you'll see at the bottom of the page.
	Oh, sorry, just go up a bit.
	If we could just go up to the top, please.
	Chief, thank you.
	Double-sided incident command, question mark, still don't have it.
	Chief outlines concerns over last week in the event he is shipped out.
	I'm sorry, I don't see that.
	Double-sided incident command, still don't have it.
	Chief outlines concerns over last week in the event he is shipped out.
	That indicates a concern you expressed again about this incident of Superintendent Dunlop.
	Again, not sure what double-sided incident command question mark is.
	That's clearly the scribe.
	I guess this is Christiane Heneau herself.
	Not quite sure what the point was.
	That's an indication of some confusion on my scribe.
	Still don't have it.
	I don't know what that refers to.
	Chief outlines concerns over last week.
	That's definitely how the meeting started.
	In the event he has shipped out.
	Again, that's her interpretation of what's being said.
	I can't speak to that.
	And by February 14th, I would suggest things were looking very bad for you in terms of media coverage and what was happening with the OPP and the RCMP.
	I'm sorry, have we left this meeting now?
	We have.
	Okay, thank you.
	What was your question?
	By February 14th now...
	Less than a week later, things were looking even worse for you in terms of what the media was reporting and what was happening with OPP and the RCMP.
	You were under immense pressure.
	Yes, there was an incredible amount of pressure, yes sir.
	If we could please call up OPS 3014479, page 97. And if we could just go to the bottom of that page, please.
	So these are Deputy Chief Ferguson's notes.
	Advise, Chief is looking for emails to support I. We purposely left him out of the information loop on the demo coming.
	You can go up to the next page and then it ends.
	I'm sorry, I did not see what you're referring to before the page.
	I apologize.
	Advised, Chief is looking for emails to support.
	We have purposely left him out of the information loop on the demo coming.
	And again, if these are Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's notes, I think I said several times on Friday, I can't understand why she was writing these things and what was in her mind, but if that's her interpretation, that is her interpretation.
	That certainly wasn't my intention at all.
	She said you were looking for emails to say that people intentionally left you out.
	I can see what she wrote.
	I certainly never gave those directions.
	I never sought emails for that purpose.
	I completely deny that assertion, as I have before, and will continue to do so.
	Thank you.
	You can take that down.
	Or you can keep it up for a moment.
	I may go back to it.
	Thank you.
	You indicated that one of the concerns you had about Superintendent Dunlop taking over as event commander on Friday, you said, was he wasn't at the February 1st meeting you had with the POU, so perhaps he wasn't even up to date on everything.
	That certainly would have been a concern, yes, sir.
	And Superintendent Rayom wasn't at that February 1st meeting either, was he?
	No, he wasn't, sir.
	And neither was Inspector Lucas at the February 1st meeting.
	But they were assigned roles within the Major Incident Command structure and would have been properly briefed by all the members there.
	And I understand from Superintendent Dunlop's note that, in fact, he met with the POU group on the following day, on February 2nd.
	You have no reason to disagree with that?
	I have no reason to know why he would have met with the POU group because he wasn't part of the Incident Command team.
	He was overseeing investigations.
	So that's confusing on its face.
	And I understand on February 3rd, the following day, there was a POU update that Superintendent Dunlop attended with you and the two deputies at 10.15 that morning at which the three options were presented.
	Yes, and Commissioner, I just want to be clear.
	Superintendent Dunlop had no functional role in the incident command system on February 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th.
	I only became aware of his involvement on the 5th, the Saturday.
	My understanding on the February 1st meeting in Kanata with the public order unit officers was that I had invited the major incident commander, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, the incident commander, Inspector Lucas, and the public order commander, ESU commander, Staff Sergeant Mike Stoll.
	There were a number of other people who were there who were within the incident command system, PLT members, external public order unit commanders, everybody that should have been there.
	Was there, with the exception of Inspector Lucas, who said he could not be there.
	I don't have a reference as to why Superintendent Ryome wasn't there.
	Okay, Mike.
	But Superintendent Dunlop had no functional role to play within the incident command system on the Tuesday, the Wednesday, the Thursday.
	I will concede at some point in that period, he was substituted in for Chris Ryome.
	I still don't know fully why or when.
	But he should not have been at any of those other meetings.
	And he was.
	And that was very confusing because he had no functional role to play in those meetings.
	And you recognize the importance of communicating and messaging, correct?
	That's an important obligation that you have as a chief.
	And it's important that you communicate appropriately, both in the service and externally to the service, correct?
	Yes, sir.
	And in that regard, you retained a company called Navigator to provide strategic communications and issues management advice related to the Freedom Convoy from January 30th.
	They were procured to support the Ottawa Police Service and the Ottawa Police Services Board, yes, sir.
	And so we know they provided services to you, a little bit to Chair Deans as well during that period, from January 30th to February 15th.
	Navigator was procured by the Audible Police Service for services to the Audible Police Service and the Audible Police Services Board.
	In fact, they even prepared a report for you on what your reputation was.
	They prepared general reports.
	That covered a range of topics, including general trust of the Ottawa Police Service, and yes, they broke it down in some cases to assess trust in the Chief of Police.
	And there was a specific report, actually, about your reputation.
	I can't recall exactly, but I'm sure it did come up in reports.
	If we could please have OPS 408402.
	You'll see that is a reputation audit performed of relevant media, social media, and political commentary relating to Chief Slowly's reputation across local media, national media, and social media.
	You reviewed that report, I assume?
	I don't recall.
	There were lots of reports that came across my desk, sir.
	What you say and how you say things can be very important, correct?
	Yes, sir.
	And my understanding is OPS spent $185,000 on Navigator providing communication advice for the period of January 30th to February 15th, most of it related to meetings with you, correct?
	That's not correct, sir.
	If we could please turn up OPS 3014934.
	Commissioner, may I...
	Commissioner, forgive me again.
	I understand that this document was loaded into the party database only last evening.
	I may be wrong.
	My friend will know.
	But it's a document, obviously, that we had first learned about minutes ago when our friends emailed to say they were going to put this document.
	It's, in my respectful submission, not appropriate to put to the witness for the first time in cross-examination.
	I haven't even myself had a chance to look at it.
	In fairness, the question of Navigator was certainly something that was raised throughout.
	The Commission asked us for the invoice.
	We actually provided the invoice to the Commission.
	Yesterday when I was preparing, I discovered that for some reason it was not on the database, although certainly the Commission had it, and there were many questions asked about Navigator of many of the witnesses, so I don't see any unfairness in it.
	Let's see where it goes first and give him some time if he needs it.
	But at the moment, I don't see a problem.
	This is a document that would have been available certainly to him when he was chief, but that can certainly be asked.
	And if he's not familiar, he can take the time to review it.
	Thanks.
	And so if you'll just see on the first page, please, if you could scroll down.
	You'll see the total bill, keep scrolling, was $185, and you'll see from the invoice that it covers January 30th to February 15th.
	You heard Deputy Chief Bell say that he stopped using them when he became interim chief, correct?
	Yes, sir.
	I want to talk, so Navigator provides communication advice.
	Deputy Chief Ferguson has in her notes on page 67, and I can turn it up if you want, but I suspect you may remember this, that during the meeting on February 9th, you said twice that you will crush anyone who undermines the operation.
	And she said your chin was twitching when you said it.
	I use the term crush, and that was an inappropriate term at a very stressful meeting, but yes, sir.
	And Ms. Huneau recorded that in her notes as well.
	And you would agree with me that when you say no changes can be made and you will crush anyone, what your command team would understand from that is you better not disagree with me.
	Not at all, sir.
	I was actually very explicit after that.
	And Ms. Huneau's notes talks about the context of that explicit context around no changes.
	The notes are very clear.
	There's no changes to the strategic direction, the framework, the changing of major positions within the incident command team.
	It was not set as a blanket statement that there could not be any operational, tactical, or even strategic changes, but that we were to communicate carefully.
	We were to act as a committed and coordinated team and demonstrate that continuously going forward.
	In fact, what the notes say is no changes can be made to the command team unless you approve it.
	Which notes are you referring to, sir?
	Deputy Chief Ferguson's.
	Well, I haven't seen it.
	You need to put that up on the screen, and I contest Deputy Chief Ferguson's interpretations of my comments on many occasions.
	Unfortunately, she seems to have taken her own interpretation and great liberties with those interpretations on a regular basis, and I've stated that in my evidence-in-chief.
	And Superintendent Abrams testified from the OPP.
	And you recall that the OPP had an inspector, Don Ferguson, who was working with the Ottawa Police.
	Sorry, you confused me.
	What question are you asking?
	Sure.
	I'm moving on.
	I'm asking you something else.
	We're talking about communication.
	You recall Superintendent Abrams testified?
	Yes, he testified.
	And you recall that there was reference to an Inspector Don Ferguson, who was an OPP officer who was working with the OPS?
	Vaguely.
	Okay.
	And Superintendent Abrams records that at 10 o 'clock...
	You went on a rampage, was reported to him by Inspector Ferguson, and were making unrealistic demands of your staff.
	Sorry, my recollection is that Inspector Ferguson heard from somebody who described me as going as a rampage.
	So this would be fourth or fifth-hand information.
	That's my recollection, sir.
	And it says that you went on a rampage and were making unrealistic demands of your command staff and their partner agencies.
	You don't agree with that?
	I don't agree with what?
	Was told to Inspector Ferguson.
	I don't agree how he related that to Superintendent Abrams, and I certainly don't agree with how Superintendent Abrams would relate third- and fourth-hand information in official channels to a partner agency as important as the OPP.
	I think that's all very unfortunate and very untrue.
	And Deputy Chief Ferguson also records a meeting on February 9th where you got angry and spoke of the conspiracy and told you it was all political.
	You remember that?
	I'm sorry again, sir.
	Could you pull up those notes?
	Do you remember that?
	Again, I don't even know what day you're on right now.
	I said February 9th.
	Yes.
	That you spoke of a conspiracy and told her it was all political.
	In what meeting, sir?
	If we could please turn up OPS 3014479.
	OPS 3014479.
	Oh, I'm sorry, I didn't give you the page.
	On page 67, the last bullet.
	Or you can actually go above.
	Talked about the plan for briefing the embedded cell of planners and commanders.
	And if you could keep scrolling down, please.
	And he spoke of a type of conspiracy that is happening at provincial and federal levels.
	And this team is being handled by their political masters and promoted the idea that they're not really there to help, advise that they were asking us not to bring the politics into our operations.
	He got angry and told me this was all political.
	Again, I'm sorry, but I'm just amazed at the amount of liberties that an acting deputy chief, a superintendent, relatively newly promoted superintendent, would take in terms of interpreting my intentions.
	But none of this is accurate.
	Well, she's saying that that's what you said, and you were angry.
	And nobody else made notations of that, so she seems to be the only one making those interpretations.
	And on the same page, if we go to the top of the page, please.
	It said, that morning, you called them all into the office after the morning briefing.
	Present were the chief, Deputy Chief Bell, CAO Dunker, is it?
	Kevin Maloney, and Christian Huneau and myself.
	And the chief began by saying, he floundered last week.
	I believe that was he floundered, sir.
	That's not he floundered.
	We floundered last week.
	I read that as an H, but there's a W underneath it, but perhaps I've misread it.
	And because we switched riders partway through, indicating the switch between Rayome and Dunlop to Patterson.
	So now the chief and the team will not change any of the players until the operation is over.
	And so, again, you raised this issue about the switch in event commanders.
	You now are not referring to Inspector Lucas anymore.
	You've sorted that out.
	I believe we've sorted out a lot of things in that time frame, sir.
	And the people that you accused were Deputy Chief Ferguson.
	I didn't accuse anybody, sir.
	Okay.
	You spoke about what had happened the previous week.
	In which Deputy Chief Ferguson, in consultation with Deputy Chief Bell, had replaced the event commander.
	And you had that discussion in front of their colleagues.
	I think the term we is used throughout this sentence.
	There was no finger pointing or blaming.
	You're applying your own interpretation, sir, which I completely disagree with.
	And on the same day, you have a presentation to the OPP.
	And Deputy Chief Ferguson said that you were hostile when they asked questions.
	I don't have any statement that says Deputy Chief Ferguson said that.
	If you'd like to pull it up, I'd be happy to see it.
	The notes are in the record.
	That's fine.
	Superintendent Abrams was also at that meeting.
	And his notes say, and I'm happy to turn them up if you want, that you became very stern with him.
	Please show me the statement, sir.
	You keep referencing statements and then you say they're in the record or you'd be happy to put them up.
	If you're going to reference the statement, sir, please put it on the screen for me.
	Well, I'm trying to save time.
	I need to see the statements if you're going to question me about it.
	Please, let me control the proceeding.
	Sorry, Commissioner.
	So if you're going to reference a comment in the record, you should either ask him to confirm it.
	If he doesn't want to confirm it or deny it until he sees it, then you have to take it to him.
	But you can't, it's not useful to just say there is this in the record.
	I appreciate it, given the time constraints I'm trying to do it, but I will call it up.
	It is OPP400774.
	And unfortunately, or fortunately for everyone, I have not noted the, I've noted what line it is, but I haven't noted the page in my notes.
	So I won't take you to that.
	I apologize.
	What he indicates, and you can tell me if you agree or disagree or you don't remember, is that you became stern with him during that meeting and you became heated again.
	I have no recollection of Mr. Abrams' statements here unless you can show it to me.
	Excuse me.
	He's not asking you about the statement.
	He's just asking you if you recall and whether you agree or disagree.
	I don't recall the statement by Mr. Abrams, Commissioner.
	Sorry.
	And Superintendent Party records the meeting in his will-say statement as the overall tone of the meeting was somewhat unprofessional and disrespectful.
	You heard that evidence.
	I do recall Mr. Party's evidence, yes, sir.
	And you obviously don't agree with that either.
	I can understand why he would see that from his perspective.
	But I said in Evidence-in-Chief that this was a critically important issue, the resourcing, and that we were discussing things that had affected the resourcing, and politics was one of them.
	And so, yes, I could understand it became a very tense moment in the meeting.
	And the following day, February 10th, There was an issue that arose about the Rideau Sussex operation that was supposed to have been the subject of a POU operation the previous night.
	Do you recall that?
	Yes, sir.
	And that had ultimately been called off because Superintendent Burnett was of the view that it was too dangerous.
	I believe that was his decision.
	I don't know all the reasons behind it.
	I'd heard dangerous, I'd heard resources, but it was called off.
	Yes, sir.
	And if we could please turn up OPS 3014479, page 74. If we could go down to
	the bottom of the page, the last paragraph.
	Let me read to you if we could go up a little bit.
	Okay.
	I advised, this is Deputy Chief Ferguson, I fundamentally did not agree with the approach.
	The concern was about the use of PLTs, correct?
	I don't know what she's referencing.
	I'll continue reading.
	That they were not allowed negotiations to take place.
	They didn't give them the opportunity to negotiate fairly.
	I told them that our policing partners have huge concern with the way things are running, and I don't believe we are listening to them.
	If we can scroll down, please.
	I advise the OPP...
	are horrified with the Rideau Sussex plan and that both Dave Springer's information was incorporated into Paul Burnett's decision.
	Chief asked who we should have in to be POU incident commander and I asked for Dave Springer.
	At that point Mark Patterson said Dave Springer, an inspector.
	Came into my office this morning and told me what I should be doing, that he wasn't actually there.
	The chief responded by saying if he did that, he would cut off Dave Springer's nuts and call his boss.
	And it goes on.
	And I don't recall.
	Do you remember the rest of the statement you made?
	I don't even recall that incident, sir.
	Okay.
	So you don't recall it or it didn't happen?
	I don't recall the combination of things that she's talking about here, sir.
	And you don't recall saying that you'll cut off Dave Springer's nuts and use them as bookends?
	And use them as bookends?
	No, sir.
	I don't recall saying that.
	I don't think I've ever said anything like that.
	I want to move on, and you would agree with me, though, I think you said communication is very important.
	Yes, sir.
	I want to talk about the PLTs.
	Inspector Lucas was the incident commander and expressed the view that PLTs should be a negotiating team and de-escalating as many issues as possible and that POU as a tactical resolution should be the last step.
	Is that Inspector Lucas you're referring to?
	Yes.
	Again, I don't have a clear recollection of that, but I don't have any reason to...
	That is your memory of his position.
	I think that's what his testimony was here.
	And he explained in his witness statement that it was made clear to him after the first weekend that you interfered with his efforts to use the PLT to shrink the footprint of the protesters and that both he and Superintendent Ray Elm, the event commander at the time, supported efforts to remove the protesters from the Rideau-Sussex intersection.
	And that it was made clear to him that Superintendent Rayom lacked the authority to do this and the Chief's approval was needed.
	You remember that evidence?
	That was a lot of information there.
	I'll just be very clear.
	And I've said it again in my evidence.
	I never gave any direction in regards to PLT at any level, with the exception that PLT were critically important to all of our operations in this.
	I did everything I could repeatedly and demonstrably to support them.
	Including bringing the PLT commanders to the February 1st meeting with POU.
	So I will say it again, sir, I have no idea where this narrative of I did not support, would not allow, and had to approve PLT actions.
	The only evidence I've heard so far is that someone assumes that that was my position.
	I gave no such direction at any time during my tenure as chief, and at no time during the entire events of the convoy.
	And Superintendent, so you disagree with Superintendent Lucas?
	Sorry, I disagree with the entire assertion that I had some position against the PLT and gave some direction that required my approval for any PLT-related action.
	And you disagree because Superintendent Abrams was also very clear in his evidence on that point, so you disagree with that?
	Superintendent Abrams was very clear that he got his information third and fourth hand from sources that he never names as part of a rumor-mongering mill.
	And Deputy Chief Ferguson also noted fundamental disagreements with you on the role of PLTs.
	And yet Deputy Chief Ferguson never points to any direction that I gave to that.
	If we could...
	turn to OPS 405631, please.
	That's the February 1st POU meeting that you attended.
	If you could just scroll down a bit, please.
	You'll see the discussion point is, PLT would like one more attempt to speak with every convoy to get them on the same page.
	Truckers need to clear all the roads and stop honking in exchange for fuel and a place to park.
	Have zero room to negotiate.
	If they don't deal with it this way, they will be removed.
	That was the position you were espousing.
	I'm sorry, sir, but this is a meeting with some 25 people in the room.
	There is absolutely no attribution to who said anything on this document other than meeting with the chief, and the chief wants something in writing within 72 hours.
	I don't know who made those statements, sir, and I said that in my evidence-in-chief.
	Okay.
	The opportunity to shrink the footprint by not getting the group at Rideau Sussex to move came up yet again on February 9th.
	And if we could please go to OPS 409573.
	Thank you.
	At page 2. At the bottom you will see that there is...
	At the bottom of the email chain, Superintendent Burnett is emailing Superintendent Patterson, and he says at the end, he's talking about a possible move of the Rideau Sussex, and he says, look, although it may not be the desired outcome, it can assist in bringing an overall resolution to the incident.
	Sir, this is a long email.
	I need to read through this from top to bottom to understand.
	Well, so you'll see at the bottom, he said, you know, the various options.
	Again, I'm sorry.
	I'm going to need to see the email.
	I'm not going to do that because I'm running out of time.
	So that's fine.
	You don't recall this discussion, correct?
	I don't even know what the discussion is about, sir.
	Okay.
	And I'm going to suggest to you that...
	That information was forwarded to you as chief, and you said we'll discuss it in the morning.
	Sir, I don't know what the information is.
	If you give me the chance to read through this email, I can give you an answer.
	But unless I can read through this long email, I don't know what point you're trying to make.
	And so I won't agree to it or disagree with it.
	Okay, I'm going to move on and come back to the subject of Navigator, who was hired to provide you with some advice.
	Yeah, Navigator again, sir.
	Please stop putting words in my mouth.
	Navigator was hired by the Audible Police Service in consultation with the Audible Police Services Board to support both the Audible Police Service and the Audible Police Services Board.
	The function of the Office of Chief happens to be a function of the Audible Police Service.
	If we could please turn up OPS 14454, page 24. That's a meeting on February 2nd called Next Steps Meeting, OPS and Navigator.
	Present were Christian Huneau, the Chief, John Steinbeck, who is a communications person in OPS.
	He's the Executive Director of Strategy and Communications.
	Aaron Kelly, Matthew Barrier, Jamie Watt, Amanda Galbraith.
	The last four names are from Navigator, correct?
	No, they're not, sir.
	One of them is from ASI?
	Yes, that's correct, sir.
	That's the other company that was doing social media scrolling for you?
	I don't think I would call it that, but they were a company that was provided to us that had capabilities in open source information, yes.
	And none of your command team are present at that meeting, correct?
	Well, yes, John Steinbach's.
	Okay.
	He wasn't involved in the actual operation, though, was he?
	Yes, he was.
	He provided communications, daily communication support to the incident command system.
	Okay.
	And so this is February 2nd.
	You've had, just to situate you in time, you've had a meeting with the POU the previous day.
	That's correct, sir.
	And you'll see on page 25, the following page.
	Keep scrolling, please.
	P.S., that's Peter Slowly.
	You ask them the question.
	So you've just had the POU meeting the previous day.
	What do we need to do more?
	More arrests?
	Tickets?
	Use of force?
	Then what?
	Go to the politicians?
	Go into big lockdown mode?
	Massive show of police presence and then hold hands and come together?
	Or two, bigger lockdown of city for weekend?
	And then you'll see Aaron at the bottom.
	Aaron is from Navigator or ASI?
	ASI, sir.
	Job is to keep the peace and keep people protected.
	When you take a hard line, citizens of Ottawa want this, but not everyone.
	Need to acknowledge not everyone...
	Resents or resonates as fringe group.
	This is a national problem, and Prime Minister needs to get us out of it.
	Jamie.
	Jamie is also from Navigator?
	Jamie is, yes.
	People want to do our job.
	When does that begin and end?
	When is the chief's responsibility starts and end?
	And it then goes on, and then you'll see at the bottom.
	Erin.
	Erin is also from Navigator or ASI.
	Erin is from ASI.
	We need to be honest, but the chief will lose the trust of people if the messaging exaggerated.
	And she then says, they need to go out and lay charges, but that may not be enough.
	Two-pronged approach.
	We'll lay charges and we'll do what we can.
	And secondly, but also recognizes it may not be enough.
	And I believe that it then goes on.
	Aaron says that you needed a communication strategy to show that this is beyond Ottawa.
	Do you remember that?
	Do you have that in the notes, sir?
	I don't have it in the tiny microphone.
	Page 27. You'll see just at the top, we need a communication.
	If you scroll up, you'll see, she says, we need a communication strategy to show this is beyond Ottawa.
	That refresh your memory?
	I'm sorry, I'm just trying to find.
	Okay, thank you.
	Does that refresh your memory, that meeting?
	The notes refresh my memory, but, well, the notes are the notes.
	I don't have an independent reaction of it, but the notes are the notes.
	Page 29. Is February 3rd.
	So that's the next day.
	And on page 30, again, it's another meeting with ASI and Navigator.
	Sorry, can you scroll back up again, please?
	Follow up again.
	Aaron, Jamie, Matthew, Chief, John, Amanda, and Christiane, you know, correct?
	Yes, thank you.
	Page 30. Aaron, are we at the top of the page, please?
	Aaron says...
	At that meeting, that your line there may not be a police solution, which is what you delivered at the press conference the previous day after your navigator meeting might have come too soon.
	And then you'll see, I wonder if you could shrink it a bit, just so I can find the reference to Matthew on that page.
	If you could shrink it a bit, please.
	So I could see more of the page, please.
	You'll see, Aaron, this might not be a policing solution.
	Anger against OPS has come down.
	They're the ones who came up with this might not be a policing solution, correct?
	Not at all, sir.
	Okay.
	And if we could just, Matthew, plan for today.
	Matthew's from Navigator or ASI?
	He's from Navigator, I believe.
	Plan for today.
	Show you are doing everything in your power.
	Need creative solutions.
	Cut off something.
	Riot gear.
	Police.
	Can't read that word.
	Floodlights all night.
	Tickets.
	Stickers for residents.
	tactics we are trying to do is that it looks like we are doing everything possible to resolve this.
	Do you recall that meeting then?
	I recall the meeting, sir.
	And do you recall, I'll just...
	There had been a discussion on February 3rd with you about the POU options of hard, medium, and soft tactics, correct?
	Sorry, the meeting on February 3rd, there were two such meetings.
	Both of them had to be ended because the people who were supposed to be there...
	And the information that was supposed to be provided were not available.
	That meeting was actually held on the afternoon of February 5th.
	And hard means tactical, soft is negotiation, and medium is somewhere in between.
	No, sir.
	In any option, there will always be an effort of de-escalation, mediation, communication, engagement.
	OPS, if we could please turn up, OPS 14479.
	Page 32. And just to situate you, this is February 3rd.
	And you'll see a discussion, chief, hard, medium, soft options for each approach.
	And then if you go to page 36. Scroll down, please.
	Yes.
	So there was this discussion about Navigator.
	Sorry, is this in the same meeting?
	This is with respect to Navigator.
	I don't know what meeting we're in right now, sir.
	February 3rd.
	That's the date.
	What meeting are we in?
	February 3rd.
	You've just had a meeting with Navigator, and you've also had a meeting with Deputy Chief Ferguson and others.
	In fact, you told us you had two.
	I'm sorry, sir.
	Can you scroll up?
	I don't know.
	There's a Navigator reference, but I'm trying to figure out what meeting...
	Well, I haven't asked you the question yet.
	No, he's asking what meeting this is, the notes of?
	That's why I gave you the previous page.
	It was February 3rd meeting.
	If you just want to go back up to the previous page.
	So I'm at a 10-15 meeting in regards to the POU update.
	Okay.
	And then on page, the following page, and we saw, just keep it there, we saw elsewhere the notes of the meeting of February 3rd with Navigator.
	I'm confused.
	I haven't asked you the question yet.
	We saw that you went to a meeting with Navigator on February 2nd and February 3rd, and you talked about options.
	Do you remember that?
	I was getting communications advice, yes.
	You talked about options.
	I was getting communications advice.
	And you talked about hard, medium, soft.
	Not with Navigator.
	Okay.
	And they talked about enforcement tactics and the consequences.
	No, sir.
	Okay.
	You don't agree.
	Okay.
	And if we could please go to OPS 30-14479.
	This is 14479.
	Yeah, I'm sorry.
	Page 97 now, the section of the page, The seventh line.
	First, that bullet.
	This is Deputy Chief Ferguson.
	In the last several weeks, there have been daily navigator prep meetings for command.
	I have begun to decline them because I believe it has begun to drive our operations and influence the Chief's decision around things like enforcement.
	Which, as we know, has been putting our officers at risk for safety reasons.
	What date is it, sir?
	If you can just go backwards, you'll see the date.
	February 14th.
	So she's talking about the last several weeks, what's been happening, and you don't agree with that either.
	Well, what I'm concerned about is that my acting deputy chief in charge of, who was the major incident command, would have any reservations that weren't shared with me.
	I don't recall any time that acting deputy chief Ferguson came to me and shared those concerns, and that would have been an expectation of me, of her.
	And one of the messages we saw that you were getting from Navigator was the need to emphasize enforcement efforts of the police.
	To let them know that the police were not letting people break the law and get away with it.
	I think that was what we were hearing almost universally at that point.
	On Friday, I want to move on.
	To talk about some evidence he gave on Friday.
	You said that the two deputy chiefs were responsible for lost time as a result of the decision to replace Superintendent Rayom with Superintendent Dunlop.
	No, sir.
	And again, you're putting words in my mouth and I don't appreciate it.
	What I said that we had lost time with the churn of the different event commanders moving in and out.
	And if there was a problem with how the pre-arrival intelligence was analyzed, you're suggesting it was the fault of Deputy Chief Bell?
	Again, I made no such assertion.
	You keep making it, sir, and I disagree with it.
	Okay.
	And even if he didn't get the Hendon reports and you did?
	I'm sorry, I don't understand the point you're making.
	And you told us...
	Sorry, I don't understand the point you're making.
	I'll move on.
	Well, I'd like to respond to it.
	Deputy Chief Ferguson oversaw the intelligence information.
	and investigative directorates.
	Several of his members within there were receiving the Henin reports from the very first time the Henin reports came out.
	He was responsible and assigned to oversee the intelligence threat risk assessment that would inform all the operational plans going forward.
	Whether or not Deputy Chief Bell received reports is immaterial to me, as long as he had an understanding that intelligence was coming in from appropriate sources.
	It was being reviewed appropriately and provided in an appropriate timely manner to Acting Jeopardy Chief Ferguson for the operational plans.
	That was my only concern.
	And the Project Hydra plan was something actually that Navigator and ASI came up with.
	Absolutely not, sir.
	So I should disregard that if that's what the notes say?
	There's a note around the naming of it.
	The plan itself is a concept of operations that I brought to the team that morning and laid it out in an eight-point.
	Structure, yes.
	And you said that if people on your command team had concerns about your project hydro plan, you would have expected them to raise it, correct?
	You recall saying that?
	In what meeting, sir?
	That's what you said on Friday.
	If anybody on your command team had concerns about your project hydro plan, you said you would have expected them to raise it.
	That was your evidence on Friday.
	About the eight-point structure?
	Yes.
	And we had probably a two-hour meeting, well, one-hour meeting to that function.
	Okay.
	And even though you had just said you would crush anyone who did not agree?
	Again, to be very clear, the notes that Christiane, you know, talked about not disagreements with every aspect, but the overall structure.
	The removal of significant leadership within the incident command, it was not a blanket statement.
	And in fact, the entire meeting on the Friday, sorry, now I'm confused about the dates and times.
	The meeting where HYDRA came up was the February 9th, I believe.
	Yes, February 9th, the morning, was an open planning session with the incident command team.
	All of the executive team in the room to get a roundtable effort to pull that plan to the highest level possible before the 12 o 'clock meeting with the OPP and the RCMP.
	And if you didn't succeed in resolving the demonstration, it was because the ministry wanted you to fail and delayed in sending you resources.
	I'm sorry, what's the question?
	I'm asking if you agree with that.
	That was a statement.
	You're asking me a question.
	Do you agree with that?
	No, I don't, sir.
	Not at all.
	And if the OPP superintendent reported that he heard you tell your commanders to say they want to double the actual number of resources they needed, he misunderstood that.
	He misunderstood and he also misrepresented it to his command staff.
	And if David White, the city solicitor, said that the police told him that there wasn't a public safety concern on January 3rd after his phone call with you, he's got that wrong too.
	I don't understand the context of what you just said, sir.
	Okay, well, you testified on that on Friday.
	You said that did not reflect your view, and he's got it wrong.
	Again, I'm just trying to get clarity.
	You keep jumping around dates, and I don't know what date you're on and what meeting I'm supposed to have said that thing.
	And so if we go to OTT...
	Sorry, I need to understand the point you were making around Mr. White.
	If we go to OTT at 3029695.
	It's a meeting from David White about his call with you.
	He says, "I just got off a call with Chief Slowly.
	This is January 30th, and if you go to page two, he talks about you were taken to this document, I believe, on Friday.
	And then he concludes by saying, frankly, I was left with the impression that the chief is looking for an opportunity to say that the city denied OPS a tool and they cannot be blamed for any public criticism of the police handling of the protest.
	It's an alarming assertion made by the counsel for the city and absolutely incorrect.
	Okay, so you wouldn't agree with that either?
	No, sir.
	And many of the OPS officers who testified here said you didn't properly follow the incident command system and insisted on approving every operational or tactical decision.
	And that's wrong as well, correct?
	I don't know about many, sir.
	Again, I've heard that Ottawa Police commanders heard from somebody and assumed things, but I haven't heard a single Ottawa Police Service commander.
	Commissioner, if I might just have a couple of extra minutes.
	I'm just finishing up.
	Sure.
	Thank you very much.
	February 14th was your last full day as the Chief, correct?
	The next day, you concluded an agreement with Chair Deans.
	I had a full eight-hour day on February 15th, sir.
	February 15th, you concluded an agreement with Chair Deans, correct?
	That's correct, sir.
	And I'm not asking you the amount of the payment, but you concluded an agreement in which you negotiated a payment from the Board.
	And then resigned, correct?
	I included an agreement with the board for my separation from the organization, yes sir.
	And in fact, you've been thinking about resigning for a while.
	Not at all, sir.
	Okay, so if that appears in writing somewhere attributed to you, that's incorrect.
	If you'd like to show me it, I'd be happy to give you an assessment of it.
	If we could please turn to...
	If it was in a tweet, I wouldn't know about it.
	If we could please turn to OPS 3014479, page 93. This you'll see is on February 14th, so the day before.
	Good morning, everyone.
	I'll explain.
	What's going on with the lawyer?
	I know people are looking at him saying he's all over the place, doesn't know what he's doing.
	We succeed as a team or we go down as one.
	Did you say that?
	I don't recall saying it, but that just sounds like a good old team kind of rah-rah talk.
	Stick together.
	Let's get through this together.
	And if we could please then go to OPS 14566.
	Page six.
	These are the scribe notes of Vicki Nelson, who was your scribe.
	And if we could please go to page six.
	This is February 14th.
	I hope they go to pause soon.
	I got to go on Steve Bannon's war room.
	If you could keep going down, please.
	The last three bullets.
	They're pressed for time, and what I was explained is the issue.
	This is you.
	OPS has a long-standing incident command system.
	We can do candidate, they vary, but then when there's something that's longer, the incident commanders don't have the base of level of expertise to draw on.
	When we get something we don't expect, we don't act well.
	At the onset, we didn't have a core group of senior commanders who have the skill sets we needed, which caused me to go through the different levels of management.
	And if you could please go up to the next page.
	The third area to discuss, this is your discussion with Chair Deans.
	Some people, persons took the opportunity to use this for their personal agendas, which were not aligned to the mission and objectives.
	I can absolutely prove that significant changes were made to the command team, which was withheld from my knowledge for days, which caused us to miss opportunities.
	This includes acts by both D.C. Bell and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson.
	Do I have evidence to prove it was deliberate misconduct?
	No, I don't have that evidence at this time, but it's all formally documented if needed.
	Cannot and will not blame on this entirely on these members, but it has affected the outcome.
	I might have to put this on mute for a few minutes.
	Hopefully they go to break at the same time.
	You said if you succeed as a team, it's as a team effort.
	And if you fail, it's as a team effort.
	And I guess, Deputy Chief, Mr. Slowly, I apologize.
	You would say that I guess you failed as a leader then.
	So you're making a whole bunch of jumps around here.
	Sorry, would you like me to answer your question or your assertion?
	No, please go ahead.
	Thank you so much.
	So every day in some way or the other, I made comments around team, and I used a variety of terms that are familiar to me.
	So yes, I would make that.
	I was asked a direct question by the chair of the police services board if we encountered any problems, and I gave her a good answer, a full answer, and that answer is consistent with my evidence.
	And finally, we saw a number of text messages between the police and city officials, between the police and other police services.
	We've seen text messages from the OPP Commissioner Carrick with you.
	Those were provided by the OPP.
	You did not provide any text messages, correct?
	I'm not sure what was requested of disclosure.
	On May 26, 2022, a representative of OPS provided you with a USB stick of your records from your emails, and at that meeting, you returned your phone to her.
	Do you remember that?
	Sorry.
	Remember giving her back your OPS phone?
	Who's the person?
	Sorry, you just got me confused.
	Do you remember somebody bringing you a USB key with all of your emails?
	The Ottawa Police Service provided an amount of information to allow me to prepare for the commission, yes sir.
	At the time you then returned your cell phone?
	Yes, that's correct, sir.
	Correct.
	And all of your texts had been wiped off?
	The phone had been wiped, yes sir.
	And so we don't have any of the texts that you exchange, except to the extent they've been produced by other parties.
	No, sir, that's actually not correct.
	I handed in my phone the day of my resignation to the IT services.
	I asked for it back after, so I would have a time to communicate with people until I could get a new phone.
	And there are no text messages that we had provided?
	The IT department could have and should have secured whatever content was on that phone, sir.
	My understanding is they were wiped.
	No, they weren't, sir.
	When I handed in my phone, it was a complete phone.
	They had all my passwords.
	They had it for, I think, several days before I asked for it to come back to me.
	That was the opportunity for the Ottawa Police Service to retrieve any information on that phone.
	As far as I know, they should have had all that in their archives anyway.
	Thank you very much, Mr. Soli.
	I appreciate your answers.
	Thank you.
	Thank you, sir.
	Okay.
	Thank you.
	That's fine.
	We can move on to the convoy organizers.
	If you'd like to start, then do sort of 15 minutes or half hour.
	I think that probably is best.
	But if it is a problem, then we can take the morning break now.
	I was afraid of that.
	Okay.
	I shouldn't have given you the option.
	My problem.
	Okay.
	Well, we're going to take the morning break for 15 minutes and we'll come back with the convoy organizers then.
	The commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
	La commission enlevé pour 15 minutes.
	La commission enlevé pour 15 minutes.
	La commission enlevé pour 15 minutes.
	I know you guys can hear me.
	I know you guys can hear me.
	I know you guys can hear me.
	I know you guys can hear me.
	I know you guys can hear me.
	You'll be able to hear me, but not Bannon.
	And I can't figure out how to get StreamYard to share the mic with Skype.
	And don't worry, the hearing is not on now anyhow.
	So, still on pause.
	This might be the better way.
	Just go watch on Steve Bannon.
	War Room.
	Audio, general, camera, audio.
	Audio, general, camera, audio.
	Do you hear now?
	Do you hear now?
	Do we hear now?
	Boomer Bucks, self-loathing lib, thank you.
	We should hear Bannon now.
	Do we hear Bannon?
	Do we hear Bannon?
	How about now?
	Do you hear anything now?
	Now you can hear me, but not Bannon.
	Got a new chair.
	Got a new chair.
	You might get to hear only me, people.
	Sorry about this.
	Hearing is still on pause anyhow.
	Thank you.
	The hearing is back on, but we might be late.
	I am...
	Currently locked out of my account for reasons.
	Literally, that's what it says.
	For reasons.
	I don't know how long the lockout's going to be.
	I don't know exactly what rule I broke.
	Considering my Twitter feed, it was a pretty innocuous tweet.
	That is the object, the impugned tweet.
	Thus far locked out and no news one way or the other.
	Absolutely.
	Absolutely.
	Thank you.
	Absolutely.
	Let me get my Twitter thing up.
	So everybody, I think you can hear me and me only, my stream, but we'll live with it.
	I need to go here.
	I'm gonna have to put the hearing on pause when I do the interview.
	It'll be a few minutes.
	Now stop sharing screen.
	So.
	Tell you that they were specifically a part of one convoy or specifically a part of some group that had Okay.
	But there was criminal code level assaultive, threatening behavior that became the subject of criminal investigations.
	I don't know the status of those investigations.
	Okay.
	Thank you.
	Barricade, but they put up the cement barricades where the vehicles were parked basically in the first few days and that those barricades essentially would prevent any other vehicles from getting into where they were parked on the roadways or from leaving.
	Is that fair?
	Again, my understanding is there may have been cement barricades used to close or redirect traffic routes even in advance of the convoys coming in.
	Certainly, I think as a general statement, once the quote unquote red zones were established, that those reds.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Anything in the records that you ever changed your advice or anything to the city, you still were in support of them getting an injunction if they wanted to do so, but it was up to them.
	Agreed.
	Okay, sorry.
	I'm back, people.
	I had a problem.
	I was doing an interview with Steve Bannon and I could not have the audio going at the same time.
	I'm back.
	Can we share the link and let everyone know?
	We're back with audio.
	Right.
	So I then want to take you to another document, if I can.
	It's the one that my friends have been referring to, if I may just second.
	And that would be OPS 00014454.
	It's the long set of notes.
	And I'd like to go to page 24 of those notes.
	This is Brandon from...
	The convoy representation, amazing, amazing.
	It does an amazing job.
	And I'll talk about the other lawyer afterwards.
	So just from my understanding too, sir, these notes from the disclosure package, they say they're from somebody called CH.
	Do you know who that is?
	That's General Counsel Christian.
	I would tweet this out, but I can't access Twitter yet.
	And so she's the General Counsel of the OPS.
	That's correct.
	All right.
	So if we can scroll down.
	So these are from February 2nd, and it's a meeting that all of you had.
	And there it says, Steve K. had a meeting with the federal government today.
	And at the bottom, it says, not likely an injunction.
	So, from your recollection of that meeting...
	Did Steve K. tell you that the feds told him not to get an injunction?
	Or whoever was representing Steve K. at this meeting?
	Yeah, thank you.
	I want to be very careful because...
	I think I've suffered somewhat from this, trying to interpret other people's language from somebody else, so I want to be very careful on this.
	This is the 2nd of February, so this would have been the first time that City Manager Steve Kanellakis advised me that he'd been participating in what I call tri-level calls.
	Federal government, provincial government, municipal government.
	And he gave me a very quick overview of the one or more calls that he had been on.
	And that's my best recollection of his very brief overview.
	So I wouldn't want to ascribe anything particular to the federal government based on this line in this document.
	So do you remember, can we scroll up too, just so you can see the date and who was there?
	So it doesn't look like Steve Bell was present.
	No.
	So it's myself, Christiane, you know, John Steinbeck, who's the Executive Director of Strategy and Communications.
	The rest are from two external service providers.
	Right.
	And do you know who was making the statements with respect to Steve Bell's meeting with the Feds that are at points 1, 2, 3, and 4?
	Do you recall?
	That would be me providing that briefing to the group.
	Okay.
	And that's Steve Kanellakis, not Steve Bell.
	Or Steve Bell.
	My apologies.
	So many names.
	So Steve K. had told you at another point in time before this meeting that he was not likely going to go to the injunction.
	That he was on meetings, tri-level meetings, in which the topic of an injunction was raised, and that's my best recollection of his best recollection.
	Okay.
	All right.
	So, outside of injunction, I just want to talk to you about sort of protests generally and how they work, and I'm not going to be asking questions as well.
	This isn't an exam, but I just went through this with Commissioner Carreric, and I think it's important to go through with you as well.
	Can you agree that in sort of general protest law and enforcement and criminal offenses regarding the same, you basically have three types.
	You have lawful protest, which is protected under the Charter, then you have an unlawful assembly, and then you have a riot.
	Can you agree with that?
	Under the law, if you're asking if that's the definitions under the law, I will cede to you.
	Under policing, we would talk about peaceful, peaceful, lawful.
	Peaceful, unlawful, unlawful.
	But from a legal definition perspective, I will leave that to your analysis.
	Right.
	And you're aware, of course, with protests that when they cross the Rubicon between lawful protest and unlawful protest, it becomes a criminal matter under Section 63 of the Criminal Code.
	I am not as conversant with the code.
	Again, I will trust your...
	Right.
	And so with that, is it fair to say that the OPS and your office at no time prior to the declaration issued any form of formal notice to the protesters that they had been deemed to be an unlawful assembly and they must disperse?
	That's correct, sir.
	So no time that didn't happen?
	Not to my understanding.
	Right.
	So you're aware also of the riot provisions in the Criminal Code for the Riot Act?
	I am serious.
	And so that requires that even if a general riot isn't happening, as recognized in law without the declaration, that if a sheriff, a mayor, or a justice of the peace or judge of the Ontario Court of Justice goes out, says this set of words that end in, God save the queen, or now God save the king.
	And it's then deemed an illegal gathering and people in order to disperse.
	You agree that's what that does?
	Yes, sir.
	Sorry, I'm just...
	So when it was written, it was probably in an age where people might hear those words.
	Exactly.
	Everybody in the area would hear those words.
	Right.
	And so there was never a declaration, of course, as a riot, and there was no formal declaration that there was an unlawful assembly.
	And...
	Therefore, the protesters who were there, who were sitting there, no one in authority, it's fair to say, told them that they were doing anything illegal.
	Is that fair?
	Again, I will cede to the legal definition of it, but I couldn't agree that that would be the case given the massive amount of social media, mainstream media coverage of what was happening in our city here and across the country.
	I think it would be very...
	Hard to believe that any individual could not understand that there was a level of unlawfulness and public danger and risk, heightened risk at any point from January 29th onwards.
	Right, and so that brings me interestingly enough to my next area and I heard your evidence or read your evidence about misinformation and it's fair to say that on social media and particularly and even in the news There was a whole bunch of misinformation about the protesters.
	Is that fair?
	About everything that had to do with it, yes.
	Right.
	So, for example, there was reports in the news that there was an arson committed by the protesters, and I understand that was investigated, and it turned out that wasn't true.
	Yes, sir.
	Sorry, the investigation was concluded after I left office.
	My "yes sir" is what I understood to be in the media, but not from the actual investigators themselves.
	Okay.
	And with the misinformation, did you have any idea about how the misinformation about the protests started?
	Do any analysis with your Intelligence Bureau on that?
	No, sir.
	Okay.
	Well, not that I'm aware of.
	They may have made such attempts, but I wasn't aware of.
	All right.
	So I want to bring up a document.
	I gave notice of this earlier today, and I don't know if the Feds are going to object, but I wouldn't be surprised.
	If I could bring up document SSM.CAN.00007722_REL.0001.
	All right, so what this is, sir, this is a text message from a fellow by the name of Alexander Cohen.
	Are you familiar with him?
	It doesn't ring a bell, sir.
	Okay.
	He's with Minister Marciano's office, Minister of Public Safety, and it's between him and Mary Liz Power.
	Are you familiar with Mary Liz Power?
	Again, the names aren't ringing a bell.
	Okay.
	She's with the Prime Minister's office.
	So I'm just going to read that to you for you so you have an understanding.
	And this is from about the 24th, on or before the 24th of January.
	And it says, I got a quick response.
	People are into it.
	Let me know if your boss is too.
	Happy to help however I can.
	This is what I sent through, though, by the way.
	Hi, I just had a chat with Alex at PS, meaning public safety, who had a bit of an interesting idea.
	As you saw in the pod goals chat, the truckers' convoy and some of their more extreme comments in brackets, i.e.
	calling for a January 6th insurrection, closed brackets, are getting more coverage in the media.
	Alex was surveying whether there'd be interest in his boss doing some media on this eventually.
	He was chatting with Mediciano about it.
	Right before he went into the Cabinet retreat.
	Now, I can tell you the Cabinet retreat was on the 24th.
	That's how I know it was before the 24th.
	I think there could be an opportunity to get in on this growing narrative of the truckers, particularly with the research that LRB is doing into their backers.
	My thoughts of the framing here would be similar to what PM slash Blair, meaning the Prime Minister and Minister Blair, said last year when January 6th occurred.
	And the first thing is, our democracy is something we need to nurture and protect every day.
	Now, that text message then continues, and I'd ask Mr. Clark if you could bring up ssm.can.00007722 _rel.0001.
	Thank you.
	Councilor, I think that's the current document we're on.
	Sorry, 2716.
	Nope, I apologize.
	Well, I've got the name of it wrong.
	I think I got the wrong number.
	I emailed it to you earlier.
	If you could open it up, it's text message 2. It just says text 2. I have a text to pbcan0001527 underscore route.
	We can see if that works.
	I'll let you know if it's the right one.
	It looks to be a text from someone named Pam.
	No, it's not.
	I can forward it to you again here.
	I just sent it.
	I think that's why it's good to have these things done in advance and not last minute.
	True.
	Mr. Clerk, it's Eric Berzo.
	I think I've opened the document that my friend, I think, sent you, and I think it's 7724 would be the second text message that he's trying to refer to.
	Thank you.
	All right, so this is the continuation, and it's what sort of the lines are going to be.
	We will always support the right to peace with protests.
	Some of the call that organizers of these events are making are concerning, and we're taking them seriously in brackets.
	We'd need something to back this up, close brackets.
	We'll continue to monitor the situation closely.
	The fine line to walk would be to ensure we are not looking like we're directing the police, which obviously is not the goal here.
	Hoping to canvas your thoughts.
	Alex said he'd come back to me with a proposal this afternoon, and he gets to chat with Modiciano again, and obviously pending his boss and our interest in looking into this further.
	And if you could scroll down.
	And Alex responds, thanks.
	I had an initial chat with my boss, and he's supportive, but wants to wait a day or two.
	There's a danger that if we come down too hard, they might push out the crazies.
	And then the response.
	I think that's fair.
	Apparently, Global and others are working on stories.
	Maybe see how those land.
	So, when I show you this, and after this, the exact same sort of narrative came out from the federal government following these suggestions from their staff.
	Is that misinformation?
	I'm sorry, I can't really comment.
	There's just not enough context to know who these people are, what they represent, what information.
	Or influence they have.
	Right.
	Okay, well, and then just moving on to a last thing I'd like to question you about, and this is sort of on the fly.
	I sat here and listened to the evidence with respect to the notes that Deputy Chief Ferguson took.
	And all of those notes were about you.
	Now, I've only been doing this for 12 years, but I've never seen anything like that with...
	Officers keeping notes on one another.
	Can you explain to me how odd that is or would you like to elaborate on that?
	Because to me, officers keep notes on an investigation.
	They don't keep notes on their chief and they don't keep notes on their colleagues.
	It's for investigative purposes.
	Do you have any concern with what happened there?
	In my 30 years in policing, I've never seen anything like that myself.
	Anything else?
	Well, I think my evidence, Commissioner, is that her extreme editorial license that she took was extremely problematic for me and reflects on her, not on me.
	And would you agree that it's in police training that officers are taught to make notes and whatever they write is for court or for proceedings, typically?
	And it goes and it's used.
	If you don't have something in your notes, it goes against your credibility.
	And if you do, it supports your credibility.
	You're probably familiar with that.
	Except for the last part.
	Yeah.
	My understanding is that notes are evidentiary.
	They are produced for the purpose of judicial processes as well as for internal system and policy requirements.
	But I need to agree just because someone writes something in their notes doesn't mean it's true, does it?
	They are supposed to be an honest representation.
	Sometimes they're not.
	Clearly in some cases.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	So next I'd call on the Government of Canada, please.
	Good morning.
	My name is Donnery Nygaard.
	I'm counsel for Canada.
	Good morning.
	I just want to start by going back to something my friend just asked you about, and that was in regards to your use of the word assaultive and what was occurring during the protests.
	And he put to you that there were a very limited number of charges for assaults following the protests.
	Would you agree with me that a lack of charges doesn't necessarily mean that these activities weren't occurring?
	Absolutely.
	And there's a variety of reasons why charges may not have been laid.
	For example, the perpetrator couldn't be identified.
	That's correct.
	There's been earlier in the hearing, and I'm not sure if you watched all of this evidence, a lot of discussion about the resources that were provided to OPS from the RCMP and when they were provided.
	And I just want to go over some of that with you to try and provide a little bit more clarity around that question.
	So starting at the beginning, on the first weekend of the protest, there were, and you were aware that there were...
	Two public order units of the RCMP stationed in two different locations in Ottawa, one at Parliament Hill and one at Rideau Cottage.
	They were not under OPS control, but you were aware that they were there, correct?
	I understood there were three RCMP public order troops, but they were all assigned to protection services that were under the RCMP's mandate and not under the control of Ottawa Police Service.
	If something were to arise, those units were there and would come to the assistance of the OPS, correct?
	That was my understanding, yes.
	And in fact, after that weekend, you sent a note to Commissioner Lucky and also to Commissioner Karik, and perhaps we can pull that up.
	It's pb.nsc.can.401396, the underscore relativity, et cetera.
	And if we can just scroll down a little bit.
	A little bit more.
	That's good.
	So this is an email that, as I said, you sent to Commissioner Lucky and to Commissioner Karik, amongst others.
	After that first weekend, it was dated, I don't know if you got a chance to see it, it was dated January 30th.
	And in there, you're expressing your appreciation for the public honor units that were on the ground during that weekend.
	Yes.
	And you didn't make the first formal request for officers to assist the OPS under the OPS's direction until February 2nd, correct?
	In regards specifically to the RCMP?
	Yes, sorry, in regards to the RCMP.
	And I can pull up the email if you like.
	Yeah, I won't challenge it.
	I do recall just lots of emails going out prior to the arrival, so I can't 100% say one of them didn't go to the RCMP, but I'll take your...
	So let's...
	Help refresh your memory.
	It's pb.nsc.can.401743.
	And if we can scroll down to the first email in the chain, please.
	And just maybe up a little bit so we can see the date on it.
	So there.
	So this is on February 2nd.
	It's an email from you to the commissioner of the RCMP.
	And you're requesting 50 uniform members who would be able to frontline traffic requirements and leadership to go along with those teams and three public order units.
	That was your call.
	Yes.
	Again, just for clarity, though, I don't have an independent reaction that there wasn't some conversation with the commissioner or one of her NCR-level staff that we might need some resources.
	But this would be the first formal request that went out.
	Right.
	And Ottawa's a little bit unusual, isn't it, in that in Ontario, normally if a police service is in need of extra resources, it's the OPP.
	Go to first.
	But in Ottawa, you sometimes go directly to the RCMP?
	Sorry, I was about to interrupt you, so sorry about that.
	No, actually, my experience has mostly been you would usually, well, maybe Toronto was lucky.
	We had GTA police services all around us, and so we would normally go to one of our border agency partners and ask for those resources.
	I can't recall other than from major planned events like the G8, where we would go first to provincial police and then escalate to RCMP.
	Normal transaction, we don't have enough.
	We need more.
	We would go to those closest to us or those who we had worked with and knew that our public order commanders had a good rapport with.
	So it's more informal in that respect.
	But yes, and I should have been clearer.
	I apologize.
	In respect of going to the RCMP, the normal...
	Chain would be to go through the OPP to go to the RCMP.
	Normally municipal, provincial, and then RCMP.
	But in Ottawa, just because of the OPS's previous relationship working with the RCMP on large events, you sometimes, as in this situation, went straight to the RCMP, correct?
	At the same time as going to the OPP.
	Yes, and again, I want to be clear.
	At this point, there's no sort of hierarchy of where we should be going to.
	We were just going to everybody.
	Yes.
	And you'd agree with me that this email, if you're going to go directly to the RCMP, that an email from you to the commissioner is the appropriate route to be making such requests, correct?
	Absolutely.
	I would normally follow...
	I would probably have sent a text, but if I didn't, that would be the normal just...
	Informal reach out and then heads up, there's something more formal coming.
	Yeah.
	And when you make such a request as you did in this email, you set out exactly what it is you're requesting, that you need frontline traffic requirements, that you need leadership for those people, and that you need public order units.
	That's important information to include in the request.
	As best as I could receive it.
	From my folks, and as best as they had that laid out, yes.
	And after this request was made, the RCMP did, in fact, provide you with not, in fact, perhaps I'll back up and scroll up a little bit to Commissioner Luckey's response.
	So, yep, we can stop there.
	So, in her response, Commissioner Luckey sets out in the second paragraph that all of her public unit Order units were actively deployed and she wasn't in a position to be able to redirect any to Ottawa at that time,
	and that in the next paragraph she indicates that the RCMP is experiencing significant resource challenges, but she is asking her management team to explore the possibility of providing you with some or all of the other 50 resources you requested.
	And the RCMP Did, in fact, over the following days provide you with resources in that range, correct?
	I can't tell you to what extent they achieved the request that I sent on February 2nd.
	Perhaps we can turn to another document that might assist you.
	It's OPB401014.
	And maybe I'll start by asking, have you seen this chart before?
	Yes, well, I've seen this framework.
	I can't say I saw exactly this chart, but this was an effort towards the last week of my time in office to try to identify all of the resources that were available to us over the course of the days of the convoy-related events, yes.
	So this is an OPS-produced document?
	I believe so.
	There may have been some...
	Some support from our integrated partners, OPP, RCMP, to help to build this document and then obviously provide the content and verification of it.
	Right, and this document came to us through the OPB, so I assume at some point you provided it to them.
	OPSP, the Audible Police Services Board?
	Yes.
	Yes, I believe there was a point where a version of this document was sent to the Audible Police Services Board.
	Okay, so if we can just have a look at this document, it's broken into two parts, and the top part of the chart is, as I understand it, the public order units or public order members that are provided, and the bottom part of the chart is regular members.
	Am I interpreting that correctly?
	Yes.
	And there's a note down the bottom that external public order deployments are incomplete between January 30th and February 9th.
	But if we just focus for a moment on the regular members that are provided, and the RCMP are listed at the top of that bottom part of the chart.
	Yes.
	And we can see that on February 4th...
	Which is two days after you made that request.
	There are 20 and then it increases up to 45 the following day and 52 and 49. That's correct.
	So you'd agree with me that the request for 50 members was in fact actioned within a couple of days by the RCMP?
	That's correct.
	And as was said out in Commissioner Luckey's response to you, you weren't provided with any public order units directly under your control at that time?
	That's correct.
	And that was because she said that they were deployed on other duties at that period of time?
	That's what her letter said, yes.
	And you would agree with me that when a request is made to a...
	Partner policing agency, they have to make sure that they can fulfill their own mandate before they can give you additional people, correct?
	I assume that it wouldn't be just that brutal, but they would also assess what the overarching threats are and make a decision not just based on fulfilling their own staffing, but that they could or should make another investment.
	Sorry.
	I'd like to think it was more than...
	Let's just look after ourselves before we look after anybody else as an equation to make a decision around approving or not approving, particularly public order unit assets.
	Yes, but if those assets are actively operating somewhere else, then that has to be obviously taken into consideration.
	Absolutely.
	The entire threat risk assessment, I would assume there would be some effort of assessing risk as well as assessing responsibility.
	And shortly after this, on February 7th, I won't pull it up, but I assume you are familiar with the letter that was sent by the mayor, both to the prime minister and an identical letter to the province as well, requesting 1,800 resources, correct?
	1,790 and change, but yes, I understand that.
	And that's not the normal way for requesting.
	No.
	And I said in my evidence on Friday, these were not normal times.
	No.
	And that was an attempt by everyone involved just to do whatever they could to get the resources that you felt you required at the time.
	Yes.
	And I assume it was hoped that by having a piece of correspondence go from the mayor to the political level, that that would apply some political...
	Pressure, incentive, whatever the right term, but I think it was to send a different signal under very unique and different circumstances.
	But at the end of the day, you also knew that you had to have that discussion directly with the RCMP.
	That letter in and of itself wasn't going to result in anything by itself.
	Absolutely.
	And as I understand it, There was additional resources provided by the RCMP on February 8th to stand up the integrated planning cell, correct?
	They sent...
	Experts like Superintendent Lou, yes, to be part of that integrated team.
	So senior members of the RCMP to assist with the planning.
	And I think you said, and I can turn you to it if you like, in your witness statement that they were provided, at least in part, to assist the Ottawa Police Service in securing the requested 1,800 police resources.
	That's correct.
	And then the following day, on February 9th, there was a meeting.
	With the RCMP and others in which the February 9th plan was explained, and you provided some more information about the nature of those resources, correct?
	That's correct.
	Because the letter that went from the mayor to the prime minister didn't include any details about what those 1,800 people were.
	To be made up of, correct?
	I believe that's correct, yes.
	You had prepared internally that chart that we've seen, but that wasn't part of the letter that went to the press.
	I don't think it was.
	That's my recollection.
	So that information was provided to the RCMP through this February 9th briefing, correct?
	Absolutely, it was.
	The only hesitation, there was a request that came from, my recollection, that came from Deputy Minister Rob Stewart.
	For more details and I've, I actioned that request through Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson.
	I believe I saw emails with her corresponding back.
	I just don't know what the timeline would have been between the 9th and that request from Deputy Minister Stewart.
	And, and I don't think I have the document number here, but I have seen the email you're referring to.
	I believe it occurred on the 10th.
	Would that fit with what?
	I wouldn't argue with your recollection somewhere in that zone.
	Yes.
	Um, and so On February 9th, the resource ask was explained in a little bit more detail because you would agree just a number of 1,800 isn't something that people could actually act on because they don't know what that is comprised of.
	Yes, sorry.
	I am going to back you up one day, though.
	February 8th was the first time that the Audible Police Service met with the members of the integrated planning team, and that was at RCMP headquarters in the afternoon.
	There were discussions.
	I wasn't there for the whole meeting, but I understand there were discussions around what that $1,790 would look like.
	The meeting carried on over into February 9th, and then there was a much deeper discussion with more information provided around the staffing levels on the 9th.
	Right.
	And if we can go back to that chart that was OPB 1014, four zeros, one zero, one four.
	So if we look at this very shortly after that meeting on the 9th, by the 11th, the numbers of RCMP officers start to rise quite significantly on the 11th and the 12th, correct?
	Yes.
	And um There is some delay in getting RCMP officers into a position where they can actually assist the Ottawa Police Services, correct?
	They have to be sworn in?
	There is a delay.
	Again, just sorry, as I'm recalling, somewhere around, well, it was February 5th, I received correspondence from Commissioner Lucky that the RCMP were providing 250 officers.
	And I actually think I made that announcement at the public board meeting.
	On February 5th, I just received this communication.
	So even before the official letter went out from the mayor and the chair to the two levels of government, there had been an offer of, promise of, 250 officers.
	That didn't materialize until past the dates on this chart here.
	And I, to this day, don't know what happened.
	To that deployment of 250, but certainly there is an indication that the 50 that was requested on February 2nd was achieved very quickly and maintained, and then there was a significant increase in staffing on the 11th, I guess.
	But you'll agree with me that if the RCMP provide a certain number of officers, they cannot all work every day?
	So you need a pool, for example, larger than 50 in order to have 50 people working every day.
	So I'm not sure I understand what you're...
	So if the RCMP are going to have supply to the OPS 50 boots on the ground on a given day every day, that's not 50 individual officers.
	It has to be more than that in order to cover off...
	50 boots on the ground every day.
	If a police service is sending me 50 officers and they'll be operating under our incident command system, then my expectation would be that we would not just deploy them on a day shift, we'd deploy them on an as-needed basis, and some of that 50 would work daytime, afternoons, nighttime.
	But we would have 50 officers, 50 human beings who are capable of being deployed under the direction Of the Audible Police Service Incident Command System.
	I think we're saying the same thing, but I'm not sure we're saying the same thing.
	I'm not entirely sure we're saying the same thing either.
	I guess my point is because RCMP officers have to come and be sworn in and obviously have to have some time off, they can't work 24 hours a day, that you would need a pool larger than the number of boots you want on the ground in order to have that many boots on the ground.
	There certainly would be a delay around the swearing-in piece, and I've heard it described differently in terms of the actual timing of that.
	There wouldn't be an expectation that whoever arrived in Ottawa would work every day, although most of our officers had been, and we know in some cases, like Inspector Lucas, did work every day.
	Again, that was one of our challenges, was just maintaining the health and wellness and safety of our members and partner agencies.
	My expectation would only be if you're offering us something, make sure it arrives and that we can fully deploy it, including days off.
	There wouldn't be an expectation that any agency would have to oversupply to manage days off.
	We just needed to know how many officers will be in our theater, dedicated to our incident command system, deployable as fully as possible at whatever time and whatever relevant duties that are relevant to their capabilities.
	So you wanted to ensure you had 50 people on the ground every day, and that might require more than 50 people being here in order to accomplish it?
	No.
	No?
	And I just needed to know I was going to have 50 officers from whatever jurisdiction had asked.
	So in this case, with the RCMP letter I sent on February 2nd.
	That was the date of the letter I sent, the official letter?
	Yes.
	The 50 uniformed officers, my expectation, if it could be honoured, that they would arrive as quickly as possible and be deployable as fully as possible for whatever period of time they could stay.
	Okay.
	And I want to take you to one more document on this, which is PB NSC CAN 403118.
	Okay.
	This might help somewhat with this confusion.
	If we just scroll down to the bottom a little bit, a little further.
	This is an email on, I believe it's February 12th.
	And it's from Mike O 'Byrne from the RCMP to a variety of people, including Chief Superintendent Party, about RCMP resources as of that day.
	So if we can just scroll down to the numbers.
	So this is the resourcing that the RCMP are reporting as of February 12th.
	And they indicate there are...
	Detachment to support the OPS assist operation slash deployment 320.
	Deployed as of this date, 24 hours, 225.
	And operational readiness, 159.
	Can you help me and explain what, or if you know, what the difference between those three numbers is?
	I can't, and they don't align to what was on the chart either.
	No, they don't.
	I agree.
	That was a huge challenge for us.
	Again, this is in no way meant to be a criticism with the RCMP, but different police services call things differently.
	They count things differently.
	They account for things differently.
	And there wasn't a day that while I was in office that I had a report from anyone, including my own folks, that anybody could say was 100% accurate.
	Nor was there a day...
	Other than maybe my last day in office where we had a number that anyone could reasonably believe, give or take 20 or 30, that we were no longer just hanging on protecting the red zone.
	We were now getting sufficient resources to contemplate substantial additional operations.
	But this was a problem right from the beginning when everyone was trying to figure out how many people Ottawa Police Service actually had in our theater.
	Under our ability to direct through our incident command system.
	This is probably very accurate for the RCMP purposes, but not particularly helpful for us to understand what we actually had in terms of Ottawa Police Services.
	So you can't help us with the difference between deployed and operational readiness?
	No?
	Okay.
	Certainly there were not 225 RCMP officers deployed.
	To the Ottawa Police Service under our ICS on the date of February 12th.
	The numbers on the chart we just saw don't bear that out.
	Well, they don't match up with the numbers in the chart, but you just said yourself, even your own numbers couldn't be guaranteed to be accurate.
	Yes, but our numbers were plus or minus 10, 15, 20. These are very different numbers, 320.
	Detachment to support.
	Again, I don't know what the term means.
	These are substantially different numbers.
	So I want to move on to another issue.
	And that's the tow trucks.
	You would agree with me that obtaining heavy tow trucks in particular.
	Was a significant issue throughout these events, correct?
	Second only to getting extra police officers, yes.
	And on Friday in your testimony, you commented at one point that towing was happening throughout, but I take it that you were referring to...
	Towing regular vehicles with regular tow trucks, not heavy tows, correct?
	I stand to be corrected, but I do recall having information that we did tow heavy trucks, not in the red zone, but in other parts of the theater around the red zone.
	But my understanding was that there were some successful efforts, minor successful efforts, to tow heavy trucks.
	And do you know where those tow trucks were obtained from?
	We had a number of contract tows.
	I believe we had city-owned heavy trucks.
	So I don't know exactly where they were obtained from.
	I think we had some three or five heavy tow trucks through logistics pre-staged for that first weekend, and I'm assuming it was some combination of those heavy tow trucks that did the towing.
	But in any event, it very quickly became, particularly with the heavy tow trucks, a problem to get them to cooperate, correct?
	Absolutely.
	And I think the first reference...
	That I have seen in relation to this is on February 4th.
	if we can pull up OPS 406270.
	And so this is the notes from a command briefing that you appear to be...
	Have been at.
	Do you recognize the notes of this nature?
	I don't recognize these particular notes, but if it was a command briefing, unless I was tied up on something else, I would have been there.
	So, and this, the date on this is February 4th, and this is one of those ones where we have to subtract five from the time to get an accurate reading.
	So it would have been around four o 'clock in the afternoon.
	Would that make sense for a command briefing?
	Yes, there's usually a morning and afternoon briefing cycle.
	Okay, so if we can scroll down to the bottom of the document, so, oh, not quite that far there.
	You'll see there's an attribution to you in the last comment, and if we look at the very last...
	A couple of lines of that.
	It says, chief concerned about lack of heavy tow truck availability, need to manage public expectations if this is the case, add to operational plan as a logistics need not being met.
	If tow truck drivers are being threatened or extorted, this needs to be investigated.
	So as early as February 4th, you were hearing about tow truck drivers being threatened, I assume, from this comment?
	Yes.
	And you are already having trouble getting tow trucks at that point.
	Absolutely.
	And then if we can go to OPP401521.
	This is a couple days later on February 6th.
	And if we can go to the fifth...
	Oh, well, first I'll situate you.
	This is a call that appears to be between various federal officials and provincial and city officials and yourself.
	Do you recall?
	This is what I think what I would call the tri-level meetings.
	Yes.
	And if we can go to page four to start.
	Towards the bottom of the page, and you can see these comments are attributed to you.
	You're talking about the RCMP officers being sworn in, and then if we can scroll down a little bit, about three bullets down on the next page, you say Ottawa Police Service has two city tow trucks supporting, and they are looking for other heavy tows.
	So at that point, it appears you had two tow trucks.
	Now, we've heard that OCC Transpo had two heavy tow trucks.
	Are those the tow trucks you're talking about?
	I honestly don't know.
	But in any event, you were still looking for other heavy tows at that point, and I assume you were still having difficulty getting them to cooperate at that point.
	That's correct.
	And in fact, I won't...
	Well, I can take you there if you like, but in the February 9th plan, there's specific reference to the fact that tow truck operators were receiving hundreds of threats and some of them death threats.
	Is that your recollection?
	Not necessarily from the February 9th plan, but that was really just the state of affairs from the middle of the first week throughout.
	And at one point, there was an attempt to get the Ministry of Transport to assist with the tow truck issue.
	Do you recall that?
	Federal Ministry of Transport?
	No, provincial.
	I don't specifically recall, but that was such a regular discussion.
	At one point, I think even Commissioner Luckey, I don't think she was flipping about it, but they were looking at Kijiji to find heavy tow trucks in Canada.
	And even on as late as February 14th, you were still making comments that you needed heavy tow trucks, correct?
	That's correct.
	And this document that we just looked at is one example, and you've referred to it as well.
	This was a consistent conversation you were having with both federal ministers and federal officials that there was...
	No heavy tow trucks to be had.
	Certainly not sufficient heavy tow trucks to be had to carry out the work that you needed to do to deal with this situation.
	Yes, and I think you mean it implicitly, but to make it explicitly, they were there.
	It's whether we could predictably count on their ability to support our operations was the gap that needed to be closed.
	They physically existed.
	Yes.
	Our ability to engage them reliably, predictably on scale was the challenge.
	Because they were not cooperating.
	They did not want to participate.
	They were intimidated for a wide variety of reasons.
	The sum total effect was we could not access them predictably on scale.
	And that was a consistent message you were giving to your federal partners.
	Yes.
	And at no time did you tell them, problem solved, we've got tow trucks.
	not from me.
	So, I'll switch off of tow trucks now.
	We seem to spend an awful lot of time talking about them.
	Although, actually, just before I do, I just wanted to confirm in your witness statement, and I think you just said this now, you indicated that that was...
	The second most pressing problem you had in order to be able to address this issue was the lack of heavy tow trucks, correct?
	From a resourcing standpoint, people, police officers with particular knowledge, skills, and abilities.
	Secondly, from a resourcing standpoint, tow trucks.
	There were other issues that were challenging, but those were the two main resource issues.
	So I want to turn to the issue of negotiations.
	Broadly speaking, in dealing with the situation in Ottawa.
	And there's been quite a bit of discussion about the work of the PLTs.
	And they were involved in various negotiations throughout this piece.
	But these weren't negotiations to resolve the entire thing.
	They were, I'm correct about that, right?
	They were negotiations to deal with particular issues within the protest.
	Well, technically, anything that could move us towards a safe, successful end was designed to get us to a safe, successful end, and PLT always has that role.
	I couldn't tell you that any one PLT negotiation, there was a huge expectation that that in and of itself.
	No.
	Would resolve the entire theater of risks and issues that we were dealing with.
	I think that would be unrealistic.
	Yes, exactly.
	In any circumstance.
	Yes.
	So they were working at smaller goals, working towards the larger goal, correct?
	Working at smaller goals in support of the larger goal, yes, absolutely.
	For example, one of the things we've heard about is the Confederation Park negotiations, which resulted in federate...
	Confederation Park being cleared.
	So that's an example of one of the smaller goals towards the larger objective.
	However, all of those smaller goals that they were working towards during this time, even the Confederation Park...
	The success didn't result in a significant shrinking of the footprint or a reduction in the number of protesters.
	It dealt with some important issues getting people out of Confederation Park, but those people didn't leave, correct?
	They were important contributions, but none of them on their own were sufficient enough to end successfully and safely the entire events taking place.
	And even the negotiations that the mayor brokered, It was along that same line.
	It wasn't going to resolve the entire situation.
	It was an attempt to solve a particular problem, the awful circumstances that the residents in the downtown core were facing with the trucks in their neighborhood, correct?
	That was my understanding, yes.
	And to your knowledge, there were no trucks that left as a result of that negotiation, although they were moved around.
	I don't know.
	I believe my understanding, there was some that departed the theater, but again, I don't have any independent recollection.
	There was certainly a lot of movement, and my understanding was some of them left the theater, whether they went outside of the city limits or just left the downtown core.
	I can't tell you.
	And some of them refused to move at all during that attempt.
	That is my understanding.
	You were asking for these large numbers of resources, the 1800 that you had requested, because although you thought and hoped that you would be able to shrink the footprint of this protest through some of these tools, there were significant elements within the protest that you knew weren't going to voluntarily leave, correct?
	Certainly that's part of.
	The considerations?
	I go back to the February 1st meeting with the Public Order Unit Commanders, where during the sort of open discussion phase of what's our understanding of what we're dealing with here and what's our best estimate at this point, I think barely four days into it, as to what it's going to take to substantially remove the red zone and bring about ultimately a safe successful end.
	It was at that meeting where the scale of the resources really became apparent, where public order commanders from four or five different agencies within a relatively short confab unanimously came back and said it's going to require every public order unit officer in Ontario and much more from across Canada.
	I did quick math in my head.
	We all looked at each other.
	That's somewhere between low ball 700, high ball 1,000, maybe a little bit more than that.
	That scale, I think others have said it.
	Unprecedented.
	Add in patrol officers, add in investigators, covert officers, civilian dispatchers, crime analysts, your number goes towards 1,800.
	Ultimately, I think some 2,200.
	But the scale was clear.
	Absolutely.
	But my point was, at some point, even using a measured approach and using the PLTs to their utmost ability at some point, Given the nature of this event, there was going to have to be some enforcement action, correct?
	I can't rule out.
	I ruled in the likelihood that a PLT alone negotiated effort or any negotiated effort, including the mayor's attempt, would not likely result in the penultimate safe successful end.
	I can't rule that possibility out.
	The likelihood was very, very tiny, but I can't say that it could not happen, that some combination of negotiation efforts by the Ottawa Police Service, by partner agencies, by some involvement of one or more levels of government, an unknown and incredibly talented interlocutor couldn't have arrived on the scene, and some combination of factors could have resulted in a fully negotiated end.
	The likelihood, though, was very small in my estimation.
	Right.
	And that's why you needed the resources.
	That's why I had to ask for those resources.
	And you were of the view that the situation in Ottawa, particularly taken in the context of everything that was going on around the country, created a threat to national security, correct?
	That was my view.
	And why were you of that view?
	Again, to be clear, I'm not a national security...
	Expert, but in the totality of my experience, over 35 years, 30 of them in policing and almost five years in security and justice, which included national security work, supporting agencies doing that, this was the closest thing that I could see to a true national security event.
	And when you say the totality of events, what are you taking into consideration there?
	Absolutely, what was happening here in Ottawa, but how that was being coordinated to different sites across the country, Cootes and Ottawa happening at the same time.
	The first real signal to me was the, and I think it's captured in Commissioner Karik's, either his statement or in his testimony, I forget, but clearly the move.
	To Windsor as the southernmost point away from Ottawa for a significant policing operation was designed to split our resources across a significant piece of territory at two very high-profile, high-risk locations that would demand significant resourcing.
	I recall explicitly in conversations with Commissioner Creek when the Windsor piece was clearly underway that, you know, we had some very capable- I want you to be careful in the use of this term- but capable adversaries.
	Who, through command, control, and communication, could understand the limitations of our resources and our logistics and create two major events, literally polar opposite North and South.
	And your view that the situation was all of that nature, that it created a national security risk or threat, that was a view that you expressed quite...
	Consistently throughout these events, correct?
	And quite publicly?
	I can't recall, stand to be corrected, if I used the term national security event while still in office.
	I certainly have used it consistently as I've appeared before various standing committees in my statement and in my interviews with Mr. Au and others.
	And your view of, even if you didn't use those words, Of the nature of the event at the time it was going on was something that you would have communicated to the various federal officials and federal ministers that you were dealing with.
	Absolutely.
	Whether I used the term national security event or not, again, I stand to be corrected, but there was no doubt that my communication was this was not just an Ottawa event.
	This was provincial and national in nature, and they had elements of international in it.
	And not only was it not just a local event, but that it was a very serious event.
	Absolutely.
	And that it was causing, created significant risks.
	Absolutely.
	Thank you.
	Those are my questions.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	CD Varva, please.
	Okay.
	Good afternoon, Chief Slowly.
	Good afternoon.
	Sorry, Mr. Slowly, my apologies.
	My name is Anne Tardeep.
	I represent the City of Ottawa.
	Thank you.
	So I want to start by confirming what I think, what I hope is an obvious point, and that is that the Ottawa Police Service was the lead agency with respect to the events that bring us here today.
	It was until my last day in office, and it's my understanding that it wasn't until the end of these events here.
	Okay, thank you.
	And the only reason I raise that is in your witness summary, you indicated that the City saw OPS as the lead agency, and that's, of course, because it was.
	Yes, that's correct.
	Great.
	Thank you for that.
	Okay.
	Now, we've heard evidence already that obviously OPS would provide some briefings and messagings to the city in advance and during the demonstrations, correct?
	That's correct.
	And my understanding, and for reasons you've already gone into, is that in general those briefings were at a fairly high level.
	Is that fair?
	Either with the mayor's office, his staff, and whoever they invited to the meeting, or at council meetings where we were invited to make presentations and answer questions.
	Okay, thank you.
	And I realize I was unclear, Mr. Zloly.
	I meant that the information provided would be at a fairly high level.
	Yes.
	Yeah.
	Okay, great.
	Thank you.
	Now, we've talked a bit about how by January 31st, which is the Monday, in your view, this had turned into, not only in your view, but since I'm the one questioning you, into an occupation, right?
	There was a pivot required to use the language employed by some witnesses.
	Is that fair?
	That's correct.
	And from that point forward until your last day in office, my understanding is that the number one thing you needed was resources.
	Is that fair?
	And we talked a bit about how from January 34th forward, because this is now an occupation, the OPS is working on perhaps on a new plan, but on evolving the plan to meet the changed circumstances.
	Fair?
	That's correct.
	Okay.
	I want to talk a little bit about the injunction.
	I appreciate we spent some time on it already.
	I can take up documents, and I will if we need to, Mr. Slowly, but I think we might be able to get by without it.
	My understanding is that as early as January 31st, both Commissioner Luckey of the RCMP and Commissioner Karik of the OPP expressed some concerns around an injunction.
	pardon me, being obtained at least at that time.
	Is that accurate?
	That's correct.
	And at least part of that concern had to do with an issue you've already raised, which is if you get an injunction, you have to be able to implement or enforce it.
	Is that fair?
	correct.
	And you did not, I take it until the day you left office, have the resources to do that.
	That's correct.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	All right.
	So, if we could then bring up OPS 3014454.
	And these are Ms. Uno's notes, the notes of your general counsel, just while they're loading.
	And if we could start at page six, please, Mr. Clerk.
	And I'll take this opportunity, Mr. Commissioner.
	I did not bring up my watch.
	I don't expect to go over time, but please don't hesitate to let me know if you want me to stop my questioning for the lunch break, because I did come up at quarter to one o 'clock, Mr. Commissioner.
	So I'll accept, gratefully, the interruption.
	Okay, and you'll appreciate I gave you no option.
	Yes, I did.
	I wasn't expecting one after my previous refusal.
	Okay, so this is the chief's meetings with city councillors.
	You see that there on January 31st?
	Yes.
	Okay, and if we could just scroll.
	My understanding, Mr. Slowly, and you'll have to correct me if I'm wrong, is that this is you briefing these bullets.
	And perhaps we can go back up to the top, Mr. Clerk, just to give Mr. Slowly a moment.
	My understanding is this is you providing information to the councillors.
	Does that accord with your understanding?
	Yes, I believe at different points I invited comments and presentations from...
	Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and Deputy Chief Bell, but I let off.
	Yeah, okay.
	That's my understanding as well.
	That's helpful.
	Thank you.
	And you'll see there, so we're January 31st, the fourth bullet down, increasingly volatile and aggressive.
	Do you see that?
	Yes.
	I should have started a point above.
	We've already talked about this, turning from demonstration to occupation, correct?
	That's correct.
	And if we scroll down then to page seven, right here.
	A little bit, well, before we just stop there, and you'll see there it says, the crowd is turning and officers getting swarmed.
	Do you see that?
	Yes.
	Now, I couldn't tell, to be fair to you, Mr. Slowly, who made that comment, but does that accord with your recollection of events?
	Is that some of the volatility you were speaking to?
	Absolutely.
	Okay, perfect.
	And so let's scroll down a little bit, please.
	A little bit further, Mr. Clerk, sorry.
	Perfect right there.
	Now, do you see where it says Mathieu at the top?
	Yes.
	And so my understanding is that's a reference to Mathieu Fleury, who was at the time a city councillor, right?
	That's my understanding.
	Okay.
	And he has some questions.
	He's very shaken.
	He has some questions.
	About OPS focusing on the Hill, but need to look at other communities and some of the concerns that he, in fact, raised in this proceeding.
	Do you see that?
	Yes, I do.
	And if we scroll down a little bit, there's a response attributed to you, and it says, Chief, agree many minor incidents that would usually get a police response, but this is not normal times.
	We'll look at new areas but call for more resources and complexity.
	So does that sort of accord with what the service was able to do?
	You know, there were some minor issues, minor incidents that would usually get a response, but you simply couldn't up until that point because, again, you lacked resources.
	I do want to clarify something, and this may not be going to your point, so I apologize if I'm taking your time.
	But certainly, Commissioner, it was something that I had to make adjustments about.
	Minor incidents.
	In the vernacular of a police officer is, okay, it's not a homicide.
	It's not a shooting.
	It's not a sexual assault.
	It's not an assault called bodily harm.
	It's a mischief.
	It's a hate incident.
	It's a threatening behavior of someone yelling at someone, take off your mask.
	In the pantheon of incidents, it's minor in policing.
	But to a community member facing that, that is a major incident.
	That is a traumatic incident.
	That is assaultive in nature.
	And it can have long-standing trauma.
	And I believe that that is the case.
	And I needed to make a shift in my language to be more clear about that.
	It's probably one of those regrets and something that if I would have a chance to do over, I would have been much more clear in my language.
	So I understood it in the way you've just explained it, but I appreciate that, Mr. Slowly.
	So with that explanation, those...
	You've called them here minor.
	You've elaborated now on what you meant.
	But those are the kind of incidents that you say would normally get a police response, but didn't over the weekend into that first Monday because the service simply lacked the resources.
	Fair.
	And if we keep scrolling down to page nine.
	Yeah, a little further down.
	And stop there.
	And scroll up a little bit.
	Sorry, Mr. Clerk.
	Just up to where we see Menard.
	Okay, S. Menard is Councillor Menard.
	Do you see that, Mr. Slowly?
	Yes, I do.
	And I'll let you just read what he says.
	The point I'm going to draw your attention to is at the bottom, he says, two messages, it's peaceful, but violence if we proceed.
	Do you see that?
	Yes, I'm not 100% sure what he meant by that, though.
	Well, then we'll scroll down to your response, the response attributed to you in the notes.
	You say, better language, re-peaceful, because Chief feels this, this is what's attributed to you, this is peaceful, can't build a moat, I think that word is moat, around the city, re-people, cars, charter violation.
	Do you see that, Chief?
	Thank you.
	Again, this, I think, goes to the...
	Clarification, I tried to prefer peaceful, meaning we had no deaths, no serious injuries, no rioting, no burning police cars.
	But we had a lot of other assaultive behavior and a term I think we can use more broadly, violence impacting communities, the closing of schools, the inability of people to get medication, the constant, at this point, constant noise and so many other things happening in the theater at that time.
	Thank you for that.
	Again, I tried not to use the term peaceful after that and recognized there was a disconnect in the police language versus what community was experiencing and therefore could consume.
	And I wonder, Mr. Slowly, if I could put this to you.
	We can bring it back up if we need to, but you've been taken twice now to...
	David White, the city solicitor, Mr. White's email, his summary or his notes of the call he had with you.
	And is it possible that this focus on public safety, maybe he's reflecting a change in your language over time, that perhaps you use words like minor and this is peaceful with him, intending what you've explained here today.
	So possibly his notes of that call reflect wordings or language that you were using at the time, but now you've since explained, well, I wouldn't use that wording.
	And as it went on, I don't use that wording.
	It's possible.
	I would have hoped that he would have asked for clarity on that because he expressed it in such a strong way that I would have assumed and hoped that he would have asked for clarification on that either before he wrote that email or subsequent to it.
	He never did to my recollection.
	Okay, fair enough.
	Now, if we could go to page 10. And there should be, if we could keep scrolling down.
	Keep scrolling down.
	There we go.
	We have a note from Steve Kay, who is Steve Kanellakis, the city manager, correct?
	That's correct.
	And we're still in the same meeting, just so you're aware, Mr. Slowly.
	And he's explaining in response to various queries, no, they haven't opened the lines with the province and federal government, not a fan of bringing military in to deal with civil issues.
	And then he says, our lead will come from chief on whether he needs more supports.
	Do you see that?
	Yes, I do.
	All right.
	And in fact, when you did need more support from the city, fair to say that they offered that support, including with the letter of February 7th.
	The city was very responsive throughout the events.
	If we could turn, please, to OPP 401521.
	Okay.
	And you've already seen this document, Mr. Slowly, but these are notes.
	They've been produced by the OPP and I believe also the provincial government of a call on February 6th involving you and various federal and one provincial representative.
	You're familiar with this document?
	Not the document, but the meeting itself.
	The meeting?
	Fair enough.
	So if we could scroll to page two, please.
	Further down.
	A little further down.
	Perfect.
	Stop there.
	And you'll see here you explained to provincial and federal representatives, and I should mention there's also a city representative on the call, that...
	The OPS was successful in negotiating the resolution of the encampment at Confederation Park, correct?
	That's correct.
	And that had been, in fact, just that day or the day prior, right?
	Confederation Park was resolved February 5th into February 6th, correct?
	Yes.
	And if we turn to page 3...
	In big, bolded words.
	So, Mr. Clerk, you can just go down.
	Perfect.
	Thank you.
	And that's where you advise that the service is compiling a list of resources that the service will require for the next 72 hours, just two weeks, to assist in managing the situation, and it will be exhaustive and provided to the Mayor of Ottawa, correct?
	The only thing I would take some issue is the two-weeks amount.
	That would not have been...
	We were not seeing it as a two-week event, so that just may be a mis...
	Misinterpretation by whoever compiled the notes, but otherwise it's accurate.
	Sort of 72 hours till the end, if I can put it that way.
	Till the end, yes.
	Okay.
	And this is the list of resources you were preparing further to the direction provided you by the OPSB, the board, on February 5th, correct?
	That's correct.
	And you're giving them a heads up that this is coming, right?
	That's correct.
	Okay.
	And if we can go to page four, please, of the document.
	Further down.
	There we go, Deputy Chief Bell.
	He's explaining on the 6th that the service has about, as of that date, 120 to 130 officers on the ground, and that's a combination of OPP, RCMP, and Ottawa Police Service, correct?
	I'm guessing that looks low, so I'm guessing that's Ottawa Police Service members.
	Okay, he says, what date is this?
	February 6th.
	No, we should have had a lot more than that.
	You believe the numbers were higher?
	Yeah, because the 6th was the Sunday, and that was the weekend, and so our numbers should have been a lot higher just based on the chart that we saw earlier on.
	Okay.
	Maybe just a transcribing challenge as opposed to...
	The accuracy of Deputy Bell, sorry.
	No, that's no problem.
	The 100 to 130 officers, would that have been per shift or both shifts combined?
	If it was, it would be per shift, and then you would double or triple that number, and that would be a more accurate number based on my recollection of weekend staffing.
	Fair enough.
	And then at the top of page 5. The second bullet, second clear bullet you'll see there, the additional support from OPP and RCMP, which was expected as of this date, will help provide relief to Ottawa Police Service Officers who have been 12, I think there's a word missing, working 12 to 14 days straight, correct?
	That's correct.
	And the influx that was expected as of that time was really to help the service maintain its current posture.
	It was not enough, basically, in the coming days to shift towards an enforced solution to the demonstration.
	Is that correct?
	Absolutely.
	We never reached those numbers until the final week.
	Okay.
	If I could take you to the bottom of this page, please.
	You'll see in the response from Chief Peter Slowly.
	You see that, Mr. Slowly?
	Yes, I do.
	And you'll see that first bullet underneath.
	He is concerned about the risk and efficacy of enforcement actions.
	Now, you say the powers of existing legislation are sufficient, but whether to enforce, given the dynamic risk situation, is the issue.
	And the number of vulnerable individuals, such as children and families, embedded in the encampment elevates the calculation for Ottawa Police Service, right?
	That's correct.
	And that's the same issue we've been discussing.
	That is that you can't enforce powers unless you have the resources necessary to do so safely.
	Yes, and the additional element in this, I believe it was around the end of the first week going into the weekend that I became aware of the presence of children and other vulnerable persons in the red zone in and around the critical areas.
	So it really was now two factors, the necessary resources to do it safely and lawfully.
	And then the additional risk factors of children and vulnerable persons in and around there that became even more challenging.
	If we could go to the bottom of page 8, please.
	Right here, yeah.
	And actually into the top of page 9. Keep going.
	There we go.
	And you'll see here their discussion again of the possibility of involving an interlocutor, and there's a couple of names mentioned there.
	You see that, Mr. Slowly?
	Yes, I do.
	And so this was still in the mix, if I can put it that way, as of February 6th, as a possible way to manage the demonstrations.
	Yeah, absolutely.
	This was a very healthy discussion that was happening at the tri-level meetings, and I'd been asked a number of times to suggest names, and these were names that We're top of mind to me.
	Just, and I put the caveat, I didn't, I mean, I knew some of them, but I couldn't in any way presume that they would be willing and able or that the government would even want to go in that route.
	But as I was asked for potential names, I provided it in that context.
	So is it fair to say that by February 6, we've still got the notion of a negotiation strategy, perhaps involving an interlocutor on the table, but we're also looking at What a POU enforcement plan would look like?
	Because you've testified at some length that you were looking for a POU briefing up into this weekend, correct?
	That's absolutely right, yes.
	And if we need to go the enforcement route, then we're going to need resources.
	No questions.
	And again, I'm sure you're aware, but even the enforcement route, just to be clear, still requires communication, negotiation, engagement, de-escalation.
	All of those things remain even in an enforcement public order focused.
	Fair enough.
	But if you're going to end up, however long you get there, at the enforcement end, you're going to need those massive numbers of resources we've discussed, right?
	And was proven true.
	Right.
	And when we're talking about the involvement or potential involvement of a negotiator and interlocutor, fair to say that the person or the entity that the protesters really wanted to exchange with was the federal government, correct?
	I can't say that.
	No?
	I can't say that for sure.
	That was not your understanding.
	There was clearly a lot of information on different open source channels, but I can't tell you for sure that, first of all, I'm going to go back to there wasn't a convoy or a demonstration or anything.
	There were a lot of interested parties and a lot of them had cross purposes or no converging purposes.
	But there certainly was a lot of noise around it, you know, the governor general, the prime minister.
	But I can't tell you that that was the domino that had to fall over for any substantive negotiated end to these circumstances.
	Yeah, and I, sorry, and I think I misspoke.
	What I was trying to say was, you said earlier, these were the interlocutors, but you couldn't say if the government would agree to that.
	That was my question is, who's the government when you said that?
	Who are you referring to?
	Probably predominantly in my mind.
	Yes, the federal government, but not exclusively.
	Fair enough.
	That's all I wanted to clarify.
	I can keep going, Mr. Commissioner, but my sense is that we're right around one o 'clock?
	You have a good sense.
	So if this is a good time, we'll take the lunch break and come back in an hour.
	The Commission is in recess for one hour.
	The Commission is in recess.
	Thank you.
	Or you're allowed.
	The Commission has reconvened.
	La Commissione.
	Afternoon.
	Good afternoon.
	Still Anne Tardif for the City of Ottawa.
	Before the break, we had a bit of confusion around the number of resources.
	I want to take you back to that chart that my friend, the Lawyer for Canada, had up just to avoid any confusion.
	So, Mr. Clerk, if we could go to OPB 401014.
	I think you'll recognize this, Mr. Silley.
	So this was the chart of resource deployments for the service from all agencies that was prepared, and some version of this went to the Police Services Board, correct?
	Yes, that's correct.
	And if you look at the 6, 6-02-2022, which was the date and issue, and you look at regular members, there's a total there in the dark blue of 355.
	You see that?
	Yes.
	And the two days prior, which would have been the Friday and the Saturday, because of course the 6th is the second weekend of the convoy, the Sunday, are roughly the same number.
	329 on Friday the 4th, 362 on Saturday the 5th, and 355 on Sunday the 6th from all services, correct?
	That's correct.
	And so when we saw in the minutes of that meeting that there were about 120 or 130 officers on the ground, that must have been, I'm assuming that must have been per shift.
	Again, I'm not sure where the number came from, but that would be the only logical explanation.
	Right.
	But these numbers are the ones that ring a bell to you and that you were referencing in your testimony before the break, correct?
	These were the most accurate numbers, although, again, none of them were ever 100% accurate.
	Okay.
	All right.
	Thank you for that.
	we could now turn up ops four zeros eight three two five And if we could go right down to the bottom, please, Mr. Clerk, and we'll work our way up.
	Right there.
	So this is an email, Mr. Slowly, from John Steinbeck, and you'll forgive me, I can't remember his exact title, but I do know part of it is communications.
	He's the Executive Director of Strategy and Communications.
	Okay, thank you.
	So from him to you and some of your colleagues at the service, and he says MO, which is the Mayor's Office, you can see that the subject line, Mayor's Office Request, this is on Monday, February 7th, and he says MO, Mayor's Office.
	Called Chair Deans' office this a.m., advising that we need to send a letter of request for staffing to our federal provincial counterparts prior to sending a letter to Solgen, meaning the Solicitor General and Public Safety Minister.
	Has this occurred yet?
	If yes, can we bundle them all and send over to Chair and Mayor?
	If not, Kevin and Michelle are on this email and can assist in drafting, organizing John.
	And so my understanding, Mr. Sloan, and I do see this email went to you and I don't have that understanding.
	I don't really recall the...
	The email, to be frank, but...
	I read it the other way.
	We need to send, we meaning the mayor and the chair, need to send a letter to their federal counterparts.
	I'm assuming that would be the premier and prime minister, prior to us sending a letter to the Solicitor General and Public Safety Minister.
	So, I actually read that the other way around.
	But it's still a bit confusing for me.
	Right, because I take it in your capacity as Chief, you never sent a letter requesting resources to the Premier or Prime Minister, correct?
	Nor did I send one to the Solicitor General or the Public Safety Minister.
	Fair enough.
	And I think the way I read it is because it's John Steinbach's...
	Drafting the email.
	He's the author.
	And he's with Ottawa Police.
	So the way I read it, just so you understand, is that the we was police.
	And if you read it differently, that's fine.
	But my understanding is that in the ordinary course, before, you know, the first level of request would be from chief to commissioner.
	Bear?
	Again, I just have no recollection of the email, and it's a bit ambiguous in the way it's written.
	All right.
	Can we scroll up?
	Maybe that'll help.
	Pass the redactions.
	No, scroll down a little bit.
	There we go.
	Sorry, just up a little bit so we can see who it's from.
	This is from Michelle Gauthier, and she works with John Steinbachs, is that right?
	She was supporting him directly, yes.
	Okay, and it's to John and you, among others.
	And if we scroll down...
	She says, this is what I have so far in terms of requirements for immediate 30 days greater than six months, getting more details through my calls with superintendents, etc.
	My discussions this a.m. is focused on immediate needs as per 9 a.m. call.
	We'll need a breakdown of the officers' general duty and public order officers in terms of immediacy.
	So fair to say she's trying to put together the numbers, correct, that are being requested of other forces.
	Yeah, she's for the central hub.
	For all the spokes of information coming in.
	Okay, and Mr. Clerk, can we scroll up from there, please?
	No, and this is Blair Dunker now forwarding the information, because Blair Dunker, I understand, is the one who would have, in addition to Michelle, all of the information around resources.
	Fair?
	Well, she was the CAO, so she would have had a material role to play in all this, but my recollection actually on this email now is that...
	Michelle really was sort of the quarterback of all the requests coming in.
	Blair would oversee our HR and finances area, so she would have an active role.
	I don't know if she was practically driving the numbers in the way that Michelle was.
	Okay, and just to make sure we've gone to the top, to be fair to you, Mr. Sully, can we scroll all the way up, Mr. Clerk?
	I think that's it.
	Right.
	And it ends with an email from Blair Dunker.
	So, fair to say what we've seen here is the Ottawa police.
	Those involved in this process, quarterbacking the resource request and trying to figure out what in fact they are, right?
	That's the emails we've just gone through?
	I think so, the back end of that process.
	Okay, and leaving aside this email, so I'm no longer asking you about this email, but my general understanding is that where the service requires additional resources over and above what it can provide, in the ordinary course, the request is made from chief to chief or chief to commissioner, correct?
	That's right.
	Okay, and I think you've mentioned and you've agreed that the letter...
	from the mayor and the chair deans of the OPSB was uncommon, but that these were uncommon times.
	That's correct.
	Okay, fair enough.
	Okay, and then I don't need to bring it up, but you're obviously familiar with the February 7th letters signed by the chief and chair deans sent to their political counterparts in support of the OPS request for roughly 1,800 officers, right?
	That's correct.
	And my understanding, and you testified to this, Is that Chair Deans on the meeting of February 5th directed you, in her capacity as Chair of the Board, to particularize your request for resources, right?
	That's correct.
	And after you'd done so, you gave it to the Mayor and the Chair, and in fact, you briefed City Council at their February 7th Council meeting, correct?
	That's correct.
	And at that Council meeting, you did explain that, in fact, this request for 1,800 officers was being made.
	That's right.
	Right.
	And once again, you said that's out of the ordinary, but given the events leading up to that and the request by Chair Deans, that's what happened in this case.
	That's correct.
	And a little indulgence, but I think I gave this in my evidence-in-chief on Friday.
	The board meeting on the 5th, the Chair's commencement of that board meeting was really around, do we have the ability?
	To adequately and effectively provide police services, dot, dot, dot, direction to chief, send us the request for adequate and effective, the resource request for adequate and effective.
	Not only was this out of the norm, but it was the board, I believe, trying to exercise one of its sole primary functions, which is getting us the resources that we need.
	The chair and the board were very aware of all of our efforts to get resources, including the February 5th announcement in the middle of the meeting that the RCMP was coming in with 250 resources.
	So it was unusual, but I think my interpretation, and I recognize that comes with some difficulty, but my interpretation of what the chair and the board were trying to do, the mayor and council were trying to do, was to help us to get those resources through unusual but direct means.
	Thank you.
	If we could now turn up OPS 00014565, Mr. Clerk.
	And while that's coming up, Mr. Slowly, you told us that after the pivot to recognizing this is an occupation on January 31st, the service had to evolve its plan.
	Right?
	To address these new circumstances.
	And my understanding is that the service did that and we have seen, I don't need to bring it up, but we have seen as part of these proceedings, a plan that's not what's on the screen now, Mr. Slowly, a plan that's dated February 9th and that's referred to as the 3.0 plan.
	You're familiar with that plan?
	Yes.
	So this is your scribe notes of that same day, February 9th.
	It's not the plan, but it's scribe notes of that same day.
	And if we scroll down, Mr. Clerk, right there, you'll see there's reference to a phone call that you received from the mayor, Steve Canelacos, the city manager, and Serge Arpin, who's the mayor's chief of staff, in the afternoon of February 9th.
	Do you see that?
	Yes, I do.
	And the scribe indicates only her chief side of conversation.
	So I think we're safe attributing these bullet points to you.
	So you explained to the city representative that you've been in a meeting all morning and into the early afternoon with the RCMP and representatives from the Big 12. And that's the Big 12 police forces in the province of Ontario, correct?
	That's correct.
	Regarding the resource requests that went out yesterday, and I assume that's the request for the 1,800 officers or so, correct?
	That's correct.
	And you say making progress, but we have not gotten one officer out of it, right?
	Yes.
	And then a few bullets down, there's a bullet that starts with if mayor hears anywhere.
	Do you see that?
	Yes.
	You say if mayor hears anywhere that we don't have a plan, we have a plan.
	Right?
	And that's what you were communicating to the mayor on that day?
	That's correct.
	Okay.
	If we could turn now to OPS 00011411.
	Okay.
	It should be, yes, your scribe notes of February 10th.
	And I'm going to scroll to page two, please.
	A little further down.
	And then just the call with Steve Kanellakos, Mr. Clerk, so we can...
	Perfect.
	Do you see there at 9.48 a.m. on February 10th, you had a call with the city manager?
	Yes, I do.
	Right?
	And again, you explained to him...
	And it's the second bullet there.
	We spent almost 24 hours with OPP and Big 12, presented them our plan, right?
	That's correct.
	And although obviously the city would not have participated in that meeting, I assume that's a reference to the February 9th meeting that we've heard something about in these proceedings.
	Yeah, it would actually be the February 8th meeting out at RCMP headquarters and then the carryover into February 9th at our headquarters.
	Perfect.
	And then you'll see...
	There's a reference there to, again, we cannot do anything more if they don't give us the numbers.
	That's you communicating to the city manager that you still need resources to action the plan, correct?
	That's correct.
	And below that, you've provided some, I don't think we need to go through it, but you've provided some additional details to Mr. Kamalakis about resources that you think will be forthcoming, including from the OPP, correct?
	That's correct.
	So there's reason for cautious optimism at this point in time.
	Fair?
	Yes.
	And then if you go to the before last bullet of the call, do you see it says we, and I assume, but I'll ask you to confirm that you mean Ottawa, we are not their number one priority.
	Their concern is Sarnia and Windsor.
	Was that your understanding at the time?
	And this is February 10th.
	That was my understanding.
	That's probably more so a self-assessment than an explicit expression from...
	There, whoever there is.
	I'm assuming that's OPP, but I just can't put that on them as a statement.
	I won't do that.
	Fair enough.
	And then you say chief is low expectations.
	And I take it what you mean from that was you knew it was going to take a little bit of time for those resources to come to Ottawa while the situation was resolved in Windsor.
	Fair?
	And other locations across the province.
	There were multiple locations at that point.
	Understood.
	And one final document, if I may, Mr. Clerk, it's OPS 3010373.
	Thank you.
	So these are scribe notes of a meeting on February 12th between yourself and other Ottawa Police Service representatives and Commissioner Lucky of the RCMP and Commissioner Karik of the OPP.
	They're an OPS document, Mr. Sully, so I believe they were taken by an Ottawa Police Service scribe.
	Yes.
	If we could go to page two, please, Mr. Clerk.
	So, do you see the comment there that's attributed to Commissioner Luckey getting exhausted that someone cannot communicate with Mayor or Steve Kanellakos?
	Do you see that?
	Yes, I do.
	And I expect that we will be asking Commissioner Luckey what she was referring to then.
	At that point.
	But given that you're in the meeting, I thought I'd ask you whether you recall that comment or a comment to that effect.
	And if you know what she may have meant by that.
	Yeah, I think there was a general concern, not just from Commissioner Luckey, about the accuracy of the numbers.
	And, you know, from our standpoint, we were being promised more than we saw on the ground.
	And from the standpoints of other agencies that I don't purport to speak for them, but that they felt that what they had.
	Said they were going to provide were there and available.
	The numbers did not reconcile.
	By this point, the level of integration with the chief party-led team was substantially underway.
	And I think everyone was starting to feel that with their planning and logistics capabilities, what they were doing.
	Centrally for the province and even more for the country, that we would very quickly get to a greater level of certainty, if not 100%, but we weren't there yet.
	And I mean, as much as I could feel the pressure on people saying exactly how many people do you have, I'm sure Commissioners Karik and Lucky and other police leaders were feeling similar pressure.
	I take it from all of that, that's the expression that we got.
	Add on to that when there are statements made in the public about this or that, then the rollback towards the Chief of Jurisdiction or Commissioner of Jurisdiction would have been substantial.
	So just an expression of that frustration that the numbers that the OPS was providing the city and the numbers that the RCMP and OPP were providing provincial and federal politicians didn't add up.
	An expression of that frustration.
	That's the way I took it.
	Thank you very much, Mr. Slowly.
	Those are my questions.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	The next is the Ottawa Residents Coalition, please.
	Good afternoon.
	Good afternoon.
	My name is Emily Tamman.
	I'm one of the lawyers representing Ottawa Residents and Businesses.
	And it's a group of community associations and BIAs who are most impacted by the convoy occupation.
	And I want to start by acknowledging how validating it is for our clients to hear you acknowledge on Friday and again today the significant harm and trauma that they experienced in the course of the occupation.
	You were asked on Friday by my friend Ms. Rodriguez for the commission whether the streets of Ottawa were more akin to a family fun festival or a tinderbox waiting to explode.
	And you'll recall, unless I'm mistaken, that you didn't hesitate in expressing the view that it was more akin to a tinderbox.
	Is that right?
	That's correct, ma 'am.
	And with just a little indulgence, if you don't mind.
	Again, I'm always mindful, I've said this before, about pejorative terms.
	The overarching sense was a tinderbox.
	There were clearly elements and areas where it was less so, and elements and areas where it was far more so.
	I want to be careful about that.
	I think there were some genuine people trying to do some genuine things, and there was a lot of disingenuous people doing very dangerous things.
	So I just want to be careful about pejorative terms.
	But overall, the sense was a tinderbox ready to explode.
	For sure.
	And the residents wouldn't be attributing their experience to any particular individual or group, but that was the reality you'd agree that they were experiencing within their community.
	Yes.
	And so I take it then you'd agree with me that as early as January 29th, when you had the opportunity to walk around and witness for yourself what was happening, that there was extremely loud and prolonged honking.
	Yes.
	That there were spewing diesel fumes from idling trucks?
	Yes.
	Blockading of streets?
	Yes.
	Threatening an antisocial or assaultive behavior, as you've described it?
	Yes.
	And a general sense of chaos and lawlessness?
	If I was a resident, yes, I would have that sense.
	Resident or business owner.
	Okay.
	And as the occupation dragged on...
	And the significant trauma and victimization that local residents and service providers and city workers and businesses were experiencing were caused by a number of different things.
	And that would have included, again, the honking, the fumes.
	And I think you'd agree that also just living under the constant threat of potential fires and explosions as a result of fuel canisters being stored beside burn barrels and wooden pallets and fireworks, a tinderbox waiting to explode, as you described it.
	Yes, ma 'am.
	And I believe you'd agree as well that there were a number of residents and workers and businesses who did experience harassment and intimidation by some protesters.
	Yes.
	And you've been very careful to say that you would never take away from someone's feelings.
	And so I take it then that you'd agree.
	Yes.
	in the Corps that they had been abandoned by their government and by their police.
	I understand that, yes.
	So I take it then that you would agree that enforcement activities In and around the red zone, not only had value, but were actually quite critical for public safety.
	Absolutely, yes.
	And my friend from the Ottawa Police Service this morning put it to you that your interest was more about being seen to do something, and you disagreed with that, right?
	Absolutely.
	And that to describe them as small wins or a kind of pandering to residents.
	Really grossly underestimates the legitimate risk to public safety throughout that occupation, right?
	More than that, I think it disrespects the residents and businesses who are actively calling for that directly, indirectly through their councillors and through many other channels.
	Right.
	Now, my friend from the Freedom Corporation this morning put it to you that any and all complaints of criminality And second caveat, that we would pursue those charges when they were more appropriate and safe to do so.
	Right.
	But you wouldn't have direct knowledge of incidents that were reported and not investigated Either due to the exercise of officer discretion or a simple lack of resources, do you?
	Not to that level of detail.
	That was the general briefings that I was getting, but exact incidents, not to that level of detail, no.
	Okay.
	And in fact, there were a large number of complaints, or there were a number of complaints made to OPS, which would have been difficult, if not impossible, to investigate.
	Because the location and or identity of the alleged assailants weren't known to the complainant, right?
	That's correct.
	And are you aware or maybe you've heard in the course of these proceedings that Councillor Mathieu Fleury made a report to the Ottawa Police Service regarding intimidation and harassment by protesters at his personal residence?
	Actually, I'm not aware.
	I was aware of something in relation to former Councillor McKinney.
	Other public officials can't recall if I spoke directly to Councillor McKinney.
	I know I called another public official, a very high-profile public official who was receiving some type of threatening behavior.
	A lot of public officials received, including myself, received direct threats as a result of all this.
	And Councillor Fleury's evidence before this commission, in fact, was that he reported it to police and he never heard back from anyone about that complaint.
	So I think I put that to you as an example that, you know, there likely are unknown to you numbers of complaints that for one reason or another in a very chaotic environment were not followed up on or investigated.
	I would expect and hope that there would have been some occurrence taken.
	Whether or not, meaning an occurrence taken of whatever the nature of the threat was from Councillor Fleury, even if it didn't meet the criminal threshold, there would be a record of it, if not an active investigation into it.
	It's not meant for any solace to anybody, including Councillor Fleury, but I think when I left office, there were some five or six or seven threats against me, and to this date, I haven't received a follow-up call yet myself.
	Right.
	Right.
	And so I think ultimately then you'd agree that any available data regarding criminal activity, which was investigated and resulted in charges, is not necessarily a reliable indicator of the scope of criminality in the course of that occupation.
	That's correct.
	Okay.
	It's one of the reasons why within our request, we requested additional investigators, crime analysts.
	We just couldn't keep up with the volume of intake.
	We needed extra dispatchers.
	So a lot of it was public order, and yes, investigations, but the ability even to do intake of complaints, follow-up on complaints, were significantly restrained during my time in office, I suspect, for weeks if not months after all the events concluded.
	So things like customer service and reliability of follow-ups were challenged always, would have been extremely challenged during that time.
	Right.
	Okay, so I'd like to ask you a couple of questions about the lead-up to the convoy occupation, and I wondered whether you would agree that two big factors leading to the convoy to become so entrenched, whether as the result of reasonable mistake or misunderstanding or lack of information or otherwise, were, number one, not anticipating that this would be a longer event than it ended up being.
	Would you agree that that was a factor that allowed the convoy to become so entrenched?
	Maybe I'm not sure of the question or the assertion, so just if you could try one more time for me.
	Yeah, no problem.
	Apologies.
	So perhaps if OPS had anticipated that it would be a longer occupation, the type of planning that would have taken place would have maybe...
	Prevented them from becoming so entrenched, that that was a factor.
	Thank you.
	You probably said it clearly the first time.
	Just my ears were slow catching up.
	Yes, but no.
	Okay.
	So length of time isn't the issue as much as it is the quantity of the people that would be staying.
	So it was clear to me in the week leading up that I was getting regular briefings from the intelligence threat risk assessment side of things, that there will be a small group of people staying longer, but that...
	We had experienced those things in the past that were well-established contingency plans and removal plans that would go through stages of days, weeks, sometimes months, and that our partners in the NCR were well-versed in how to do that.
	So there was always a sense that there would be a longer portion to the weekend demonstration involving a smaller group of occupiers.
	What we did not have, and to this day, I still have not been able to see even in hindsight, is there will be a massive number of people who will remain behind for weeks, if not months, and they will be engaging in a wide range of social disorder and criminal assaultive type behaviors for that entire period.
	Right, and that's fair.
	You've been clear to say that that was also probably one of the missing pieces was the number of people who would stay.
	And would you agree then?
	And again, not asking you necessarily about the reasonableness yet at this point, but that had the trucks not been allowed to enter the core, it likely would have been more difficult for the protesters to have become as entrenched as they did.
	Again, yes, but no.
	Entering the core meaning...
	Yes, but no.
	Did he just say criminal assaultive type behavior?
	I'm not sticking around for too long.
	I've heard this even before.
	Getting ready to do an interview with Alexa Lavoie, Rebel News.
	Closing down our core, closing down our interprovincial bridges, for any reason, are hugely problematic.
	And they create a range of public safety and community wellness issues.
	For example, I believe it was in the late spring of 2021 where there was a provincial order that related to the pandemic.
	That provincial bridges and access points be closed.
	There is very little, if any, material consultation with the Ottawa Police Service that of all the police of jurisdiction in Ontario had the biggest impact by that order.
	And it caused a significant staffing challenge.
	We did close the bridges to the letter in the first 24 hours, but the pushback was massive and immediate from the healthcare sector, from the business sector.
	Closing things anywhere in the downtown court, anything in the downtown court.
	It's going to cause a range of public safety, wellness, and economic impacts on the city.
	It had been closed for a year and a half.
	The concept of closing the entire downtown core, I think you've heard from other witnesses, would probably use as many resources as it took for the public order operation.
	They pretend they hadn't closed downtown core for a year.
	And it took the better part of a week and a half to get those officers here.
	So the assumption that if we had known...
	We could have locked down the downtown core.
	It would have still taken seven to ten days to get that many officers in here to execute that plan.
	And then the impact on the city of Ottawa and the greater Ottawa-Gatineau area might have been greater than the public safety problem we were trying to prevent in the first instance.
	What was the public safety problem?
	But do you recall at the January 26th special board meeting of the Police Services Board where Matt Schiff-Lurie, Councillor Flurie, I don't recall.
	I recall the truck route comment.
	I believe my comment was in relation to the broader discussion.
	Can we block the downtown core?
	Can we...
	Blocked them from coming into the city.
	Did he cry today?
	That was the context in which I gave my response.
	Trying to give a little sympathy from us?
	If it was the 26th, I would have already had my legal advice from my general counsel.
	And by then, I think the 27th was when we requested external legal advice, which essentially supported the same position.
	And when you say external legal advice, are you referring to OPS legal services?
	OPS Legal Services sought external legal advice to bolster their own opinion that they provided internally.
	Not to bolster, but to validate one way or the other their own opinion internally.
	Okay, but there doesn't seem to be any record of that internal opinion.
	Is that fair?
	I'm not aware, but that was a question I asked of my own general counsel.
	And you recall asking that question?
	Yes, I do.
	Do you recall seeing the opinion?
	Okay.
	Just bring you to some of the other evidence that we've heard and get you to comment on it.
	So Deputy Chief Bell testified that he believed that Ottawa police did have the authority to stop vehicles entering into the city, but that because the service had successfully managed vehicle convoys in the past, it wasn't viewed as necessary.
	I'm not sure if you're aware of that.
	I don't recall his testimony.
	In that way.
	Yeah.
	So I apologize.
	No need to apologize.
	And my review of acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's evidence was that she couldn't recall whether a legal opinion had been sought, but that like Deputy Chief Bell, based on decades of past experience managing events, OPS believed it had the capacity to manage trucks in the Corps.
	Again, I've watched much of their testimony.
	I just can't recall.
	Those specific elements.
	But is it possible, do you think, that you never did receive a legal opinion before January 28th and that, in fact, the question of whether to stop trucks coming into the Corps never arose?
	I wouldn't have gone to external counsel unless I'd started with my own counsel first.
	Okay.
	Okay, so I'd like to ask you, just going to move on to another topic then, if you don't mind, sir.
	You had a discussion this morning with one of the council about the role that Navigator played in the course of your managing of the occupation.
	And if I could just ask Mr. Clerk for you to pull up a document, please.
	It's OPS 405912.
	This would have been on the Commission's list of documents.
	And if we could just go back down to the start of the chain.
	Okay.
	So here we have an email.
	Can you just go up a teensy bit more?
	Yeah.
	From John Steinbach from Corporate Communications to Aaron Kelly and Lee Thompson.
	And who are they?
	That's with Advanced Symbolics Incorporated.
	So that's ASI?
	That's correct.
	And what is that exactly?
	It's a private company that uses open source information.
	I'm not going to do a great job on the company's description, but...
	To a degree, it's sentiment analysis, but it also tends to predict, small p predict, what opinion will be around different topics.
	Okay.
	And in that first inquiry, if we could just scroll down a little bit, the question is, are there any sentiment indicators you can provide us relating to, and then it lists a number of issues.
	So, and sorry, what's your understanding of what a sentiment indicator is?
	Again, I'm probably doing a disservice to this company, but broadly speaking in the industry, a scrape of social media sentiment expressed on various platforms and then rating it one way or the other, positive, neutral, negative.
	Okay.
	And what was the purpose of seeking this information?
	Again, to see how...
	People within our community, a million people across the largest municipal geography in Canada, the second largest in North America, were feeling around an incident that was happening, unfolding in a very, very small area.
	Again, to see we had policing responsibilities across the city, and we obviously had increasing policing responsibilities in this micro percentage point in the heart of the city.
	And you would have received regular briefings from ASI, I take it by email, over the course of the time that you were managing the application?
	Okay, so if we could go back up to the first page, please.
	So this is now an email dated February 3rd, again from Aaron Kelly, to yourself and others within the Ottawa Police.
	And it starts, hi team, we ran the scenario, the chief asked, what if we were to take further action and what happened in Alberta were to happen in Ottawa?
	What did you mean when you asked what happened in Alberta?
	So Coutts, Alberta was happening almost concurrently.
	I forget whether it started on the same day, the 29th, that our events happened or escalated.
	And I recall whether it was a Sunday or the Monday, but early in the week there was an attempt by the Coutts, by the operational.
	Well, there's an operation attempting to remove the blockade in Coutts.
	And I could see just from mainstream media, and I believe I got a briefing later on from Commissioner Luckey, that it wasn't successful.
	That literally within minutes, what looked like a well-planned and well-staffed exercise was frustrated and failed within minutes by a wide variety of countermeasures, whether they were planned and exercised before or they were just done in the spur of the moment.
	And my concern was that if that was on a two-lane highway in a very rural part of Canada with no other buildings on sides of the road and no density and no school zones or anything else, a much smaller footprint of vehicles and protesters and a proportionally much larger amount of available resources, if it failed so quickly, then any effort that we would do here.
	Could be extremely dangerous.
	So it was in that context that I asked that question.
	Okay, so you're asking for their assessment of what would be the impact on public sentiment vis-a-vis the Ottawa Police Service if there were to be a failed operation to dismantle the convoy or to...
	Yeah, I don't know if I put the emphasis on the failed, but just on the operation as a whole.
	Okay.
	But yes.
	Okay, fair.
	And so Aaron Kelly then goes on to say, having undertaken that assessment...
	Currently, under 10% of people in Ottawa are experiencing deep concern about how the trucker convoy is being handled.
	Most of these people are downtown.
	That wouldn't be surprising to you, right?
	The people with the most concern were the people that were experiencing it.
	If you were to take an Alberta-type action, you would get a 10% lift in public opinion from Centre Town residents because they're happy you took action.
	But you would take a 50% hit from residents in other parts of the city who are currently not expressing any concern with the situation.
	If things went south, like in Alberta, then they would blame the Ottawa police for the misstep.
	So why would it matter what the sentiment indicators were for residents unaffected by and unconcerned about the Freedom Convoy?
	It really didn't matter to me at this point, to be honest.
	I'd already had my meeting on February 1st in Kanata with the public order commanders.
	The level of effort that we would have to have, the scale would be, as I said, somewhere between the 700 range to the 1000 plus range to even begin to contemplate an operation that happened in Cootes.
	So, I mean, I don't want to say it was too little too late.
	Whatever modeling was taking place here, it really was immaterial.
	The situation in here just required a scale that we couldn't contemplate a similar operation.
	So the circumstances on the ground were just changing so rapidly that you weren't even really contemplating an Alberta-like intervention by the time you received this analysis?
	Yes, and importantly to the point I think you were making, and if I get it wrong, I'm sure you'll correct me, but understanding We brought in ASI to understand the budget implications.
	That's the original contract of ASI was around the almost year-long budget debate that happened throughout 2021.
	In which case, the budget expectations and needs of a farmer out in the outskirts of Ottawa was as important as a condominium dweller or a business owner in downtown Ottawa.
	But in terms of, to your point, the people that were most directly impacted.
	Traumatized, victimized.
	Were the people living immediately within the red zone or around the red zone?
	And so while it was somewhat interesting to know how people felt more broadly, the victimization was happening in a micro-location and the risk was happening in a micro-location.
	98%, 99% of what we were dealing with was within 1% of the geography of the city.
	And so it was an interesting exercise.
	It didn't prove fruitful.
	And the scale of the operation that ultimately was required made this a rather less than productive exercise.
	But you did continue to get updates from ASI throughout, kind of gauging.
	So, in fact, if you scroll up to the very top, please, Mr. Clerk, you'll see, you know, anger against OPS is down 10% from yesterday.
	You know, you're trending in the right direction.
	So, I mean, I guess what I'm asking is...
	Do you see why some residents might be concerned that there was a preoccupation with almost a PR matter when, you know, they were going through something really tough?
	Absolutely.
	I can see why.
	And as I've said, Commissioner, to you and others, public trust is a direct equation to public safety.
	And what might look like a PR exercise to some is as rudimentary an attempt as we could in the crisis that we were having to get a sense of where public trust lay.
	I could look at crime stats up and down, but I can tell you, you can actually have crime going the wrong way and public trust going the right way.
	For instance, underreported sexual assault and domestic assault.
	When you can win public trust, what happens is you get an immediate spike in reporting.
	And so sometimes a crime trend up is an indication of public trust up.
	And I've learned that over the decades in policing.
	It's important to keep an eye on trust indicators as much as it is important to keep an eye on crime.
	We're victimization indicators.
	They are necessarily coupled.
	This was our best effort in the middle of a crisis to try to do some of that, but it was by no means a perfect effort.
	It was quite imperfect, as you can see.
	Okay, understood.
	So just one last area I want to ask you a few questions about.
	In your testimony on Friday, you indicated that misinformation and disinformation are causing challenges as far as policing is concerned, right?
	Yes.
	And you agree, and I believe you agreed on Friday, that there was a perception in the public that there were elements within your police service and other police services who were sympathetic or even supportive of the Freedom Convoy.
	Yes.
	Right?
	But if I understood your evidence correctly, it's your view that the public perception in that regard was based on misinformation or disinformation.
	No.
	Wasn't that black or white?
	Never is in my world anyway.
	No, I mean, I think legitimately there would be within communities that were directly impacted and those that were literally within line of sight would question a lot of things.
	Again, without having background information or other context, would question those things.
	I know that there were complaints coming in, and every one of those complaints that came to my attention were assigned to our Professional Standards Bureau for a review, and any one of those reviews that showed misconduct were then assigned for proper investigation.
	During my time, I suspended one officer.
	I don't know what the status of that case is right now.
	So to any extent where there was a reasonableness to a complaint around not sympathy, but actions that in any way undermine our ability to keep the city and the community safe and...
	Bring about a successful, safe outcome.
	We took documented, formal, measured actions.
	Okay, and I appreciate that more detailed and nuanced answers because certainly I think your evidence on Friday might have left the impression that you rejected completely that any high-five or selfie or fist bump could be anything but a calculated effort at...
	I appreciate the chance to clarify that with some subtlety.
	The majority of it, I believe, were genuine officer efforts to keep people calm and situations calm, but I can't rule out that some element of that at some point could have been more nefarious.
	Okay.
	Well, I appreciate that.
	And you're aware then, I take it, of reports in the media, and you may even be aware of this from your own tenure as chief, There are at least two dozen current and former members of the OPS who have been identified as donors to the Give, Send, Go campaign that was raising money to support the convoy occupation.
	I've seen some media reports, but that information wasn't available to me during my time as chief.
	And are you aware of recent media reports that there's a review by professional standards?
	Into a member of the OPS Intelligence Unit, Sergeant Chris Keys, who authored a pre-convoy intelligence report that expressed sympathy to protesters against COVID-19 public health mandates, described the convoy protesters as mainstream and holding opinions that are, you know, the views of the silent majority of Canadians.
	Are you aware?
	Have you...
	Read any reports of this?
	No, I haven't.
	Okay.
	And there is a document in the disclosure, that particular report, that has been reported in the media as raising concerns about a perceived double standard between how left-wing or, as Keyes describes them, professional protesters and...
	Characterizing this particular occupation as more of a grassroots, real, authentic movement.
	Were you aware of any sentiments of that nature among your members in your time as chief?
	I was going to answer, but then you threw a little curve at the end.
	So I just want to make sure I don't answer the wrong question.
	But there is a point I would like to make to the commissioner and yourself.
	So can you just repeat the last part just so I get the question right?
	Well, I was wondering whether you were aware that there...
	Is at least a perception of a double standard and how some kinds of protesters, be they, you know, associated with the defund police movement or Black Lives Matter or environmental protesters or indigenous protesters on the one hand and a movement like this one on the other?
	So I was not aware of any complaint or internal matter in regards to that.
	I'll put that aside.
	But I think your question is important.
	Commissioner, I would sort of engage you more directly with your indulgence.
	But this has been something that I saw during my tenure as Chief of Police.
	It was something that I saw during my time in the private sector.
	And it is something with less clarity, but in general, a trend in regards to intelligence gathering, threat assessments at Local, provincial, national, international levels.
	There is a bias, and I've spoken very publicly about systemic bias in policing, not limited to systemic racism in every aspect of humanity.
	I saw this during my time in Kosovo and peacekeeping after 9-1-1 happened.
	There was a significant shift operationally, politically, socioeconomically, geopolitically, to the threat that was posed by...
	The various terms around radical Islam and Islamic-based terrorism.
	When I was in private sector, I was invited by Public Safety Canada to be the co-chair of a committee of citizens from across the country looking at online radicalization to violence and terrorism.
	And we received a briefing from CSIS, including senior RCMP officials, on the current state of Of the National Threat Assessment, and this would be the summer of 2019, 18 months before the arrival of the convoy.
	But this is also the time that we had the incel van attack in Toronto.
	This is also the time that we had seen a rise of right-wing extremism, white supremacy, and violent events south of the border, and increasing levels of violence and recruitment north of the border.
	The presentation that we got on the National Threat Assessment had no mention whatsoever.
	Zero.
	Of right-wing extremism and white supremacy.
	So the question that was asked of me, is this a concern of mine?
	It was a concern of mine in my days with the Toronto Police Service, in peacekeeping missions, in private sector, on a Public Safety Canada committee, and as a Chief of Police here in Ottawa.
	I would validate that concern.
	And just a final question, then I take it then that you would violently agree that in order to rebuild...
	Trust in policing institutions generally, but specifically here in Ottawa after the events of January and February of this year, that it will be important for the organization to sort of confront those biases straight on and not be shy to recognize when its own members fall short by engaging in that kind of unfortunate analysis.
	First of all, I'm probably out of order here, but your line of questioning has been excellent and how you're probing is helpful for me.
	I hope it will be for the commissioner.
	That's almost entirely the reason I was brought here, man.
	That's why they recruited me.
	Because I have an outspoken track record over decades, not just when it was popular to do so, to confront racism and discrimination in any form in policing, a profession that I dearly love and devoted my life to.
	But one that I know, not because of so much of individual factors, because we're just human beings and we are incredibly imperfect, but incredibly imperfect human beings will build really imperfect systems.
	And those systems can have very bad impacts on communities, usually the most marginalized and racialized communities.
	And I have been outspoken on those matters and I've dedicated the bulk of my leadership to addressing them.
	When I came to Ottawa, Commissioner, that's exactly why I was recruited to come here.
	That's the mandate I was given.
	And that I did that every day I held my office until the last day.
	And it is singularly the number one reason for the resistance to me, the undermining of me.
	And so, yes, that was a priority for me on day one, and it was still a priority for me on day last one.
	Okay, thank you very much.
	Those are my questions, sir.
	Thank you.
	Next I'd like to call on the OPP.
	Good afternoon, sir.
	Chris Diana for the OPP.
	Good afternoon, sir.
	Just a couple of topics that I'd like to discuss with you.
	The first one relating to OPP assistance that was received by OPS during this time.
	As a general proposition, I'm sure that you would agree with me that the OPP provided a significant level of assistance to the Ottawa Police Service from the beginning to the end of the convoys, plural, presence in Ottawa.
	Yes, sir.
	And even before the convoy arrived, the OPP was already offering to provide assistance, correct?
	Yes, sir.
	Now, we've seen text messages between you and Commissioner Karik.
	Is it fair to say that you communicated with the Commissioner Karik?
	Almost every day, if not every day, during the course of late January until the day you left.
	Yes, sir.
	So we can go please to OPP 4586.
	All right, so these are the text messages that I was referring to between you and the Commissioner.
	And it starts off, I believe, the first one.
	It says, good afternoon, Tom.
	Just up to you, a voicemail.
	Please have a listen and call me back at your earliest convenience.
	That's January 27th, so that's the day before the convoy arrived, correct?
	Yes, sir.
	And I take it, even the day before, you had already established kind of a relationship with Commissioner Karik where you felt you could discuss issues.
	Yeah, sorry, just one small, the 27th is the Thursday, 28th of Friday, 29th.
	Technically, the convoy started arriving on the 27th.
	Technically, in trickles.
	A little bit more on the 28th of Friday, and then the big wave tsunami on the 29th.
	Yes, thanks for clarifying.
	You are correct.
	I always think of it as a 28th, because that's when a lot of them really started to come in.
	But I guess the point that I'm trying to make here is that even early stages, before many of the people and trucks arrive, you've already got an established relationship with Commissioner Karik.
	I had an established relationship with him throughout my entire tenure as Chief of Police.
	He was incredibly assisting on a number of issues.
	Okay, so if we scroll down, we got January 28th, which is the next day.
	My understanding, based on what we've heard before, is that the time stamp is actually five hours earlier than the time actually stamped.
	And that appears to be a text from the Commissioner.
	Hi, Peter.
	Just checking in to ensure you have everything you need.
	Your response is to thank him for checking in, and your response is, as it says, all good right now.
	We greatly appreciate the public order support.
	Please also keep the intel coming.
	That's on January 28th, correct?
	Yes, sir.
	All right, and so you're, at this stage, happy with how the OPP has stepped up and offered that kind of assistance as well as the intel.
	I very rarely use the term happy, but I am very satisfied.
	Yes, fair enough.
	For that first weekend, we've heard evidence prior.
	That the OPP provided frontline officers in addition to public order unit members.
	Is that your understanding?
	Yes.
	Although, in fairness, I now understand the POU were not underneath our incident command, but they were certainly within the theater.
	Yes.
	If we go down to page three.
	We're looking for the time that stamped 11. So this is February 4th.
	We're looking for the time that stamped 11.07.
	There we go.
	So this is to situate you.
	Sorry, this is February the 4th.
	This is Peter.
	Over and above the number of people we have supporting, checking in to ensure you are receiving the level of support and counsel you were hoping to receive from our POU, CIC, and PLT command group that is contributing to your concepts of operations and planning process.
	Scroll down.
	And you've asked for a quick call.
	Scroll down again.
	Okay, and so he was available at your convenience.
	So again, on February 4th, we're a few days into this now, the Commissioner is again reaching out by text to make sure you've got everything you need, correct?
	Yes, sir.
	And that's consistent with how the Commissioner was available to you throughout this time period?
	Yes, sir.
	All right, can we go to another document?
	I want to go back to this one eventually but let's go to OPS 7455.
	All right, so if we can go down to the bottom of page one.
	All right, so stop there.
	This is an email, again, to situate you, an email from yourself to Commissioner Karik, February 4th, 5.30 p.m.
	Scroll down.
	And here, again, you can read it just as well as I can, where you're expressing your appreciation for your word significant and ongoing support that the Commissioner and his team have provided to the OPS over the course of the demonstrations.
	And you referred to OPP officers demonstrating the highest levels of professionalism and work ethic and that their turnout is universally top shelf.
	I'm curious what you mean by turnout.
	I'm not sure what that turn of phrase means.
	They're dressed in deportment.
	The way they presented themselves, which is quite frankly the most positive level and the earliest level of officer enforcement.
	Just a professional image of an officer.
	And they were really top shelf just across the board.
	And I take it that...
	I mean, this is you obviously showing your appreciation for the support you've been given, but I take it this is a genuine email.
	I take it from the tone of that that you generally did appreciate that.
	You could have done blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.
	Their turnout was universally top shelf.
	I was telling the commissioner of the largest police service outside of the RCMP that whoever they selected, however they arrived here, they showed up looking good and gave me confidence that they would do good in the circumstances that they're here.
	Okay so we can can we go back to the tax exchange please which is OPP 4586.
	And let's go to page 6. So we're looking at, if you scroll down a little bit, we're looking for February 7th at the time stamped as 1058.
	So it says, hi, Peter, at your convenience, can we connect regarding operationalizing the request for additional police resources that the province received from the mayor?
	Thanks.
	Do you see that?
	Yes, sir.
	And your response, hello, Tom, I've consulted with Deputy Ferguson and the resource planning team will be established within the current OPS incident in command.
	Inspector Palmer will be the correct contact point for your OPP team.
	So do you recall that exchange?
	I do.
	The gap in three hours is probably some other conversation that we had, but this is the understanding that we've discussed an integration, a greater level of integration.
	He was going to send some of his best, not just planners, but operational leaders.
	Chief Superintendent Party's name was one of those, and I welcomed it, welcomed the support of expertise and experienced leaders, and welcomed the greater level of integration.
	And this is just me advising.
	Yep, I got point people on our side to make this thing happen as quickly as possible.
	Yes, and you also indicated that this would be under OPS command.
	So I guess you're just being clear so there was no misunderstanding that this is an OPS operation.
	And that's what we had agreed to in our conversations, that you're not coming in to run our shop.
	You're coming in to help our shop run at a higher level.
	And I take it the commissioner respected those jurisdictional boundaries at all times?
	Not only did he respect them, he understood that what we needed was help.
	We did not need, and I think he's, I won't put words in his mouth, but I think his testimony ultimately said that there wasn't a need to come in.
	And because we understand under the Police Services Act, the OPP just can't walk into another police or as a jurisdiction and take over, right?
	Well, it can't and it shouldn't.
	There should always be a reason.
	Right.
	And there's only very limited exceptions that would even allow that under the Police Services Act.
	That's my understanding, sir, yes.
	And you felt at the time that the OPS was more than capable of handling this with extra help.
	That's correct, and I don't want to speak for the commissioner, but I believe that's what he shared with me throughout our daily calls, and nothing changed to my last day in office.
	And in addition, and I don't need that document any further, you're probably also aware that during this period of time, the commissioner also chaired various calls almost every day with Big 12 or OACP to help coordinate further resources, correct?
	Again, that was a phone call that Commissioner Karik and I had.
	I think it was the first weekend.
	A suggestion that I had made that we have some sort of a convened group of police leaders.
	I think I was focused mostly in Ontario.
	And as Commissioner Creek would often do, he said, "You know what?
	Let's get on that.
	We'll run that for you, Peter.
	You're busy." And then what he established was more than I requested and grew in a relatively short period of time.
	Right, and you may be aware, you may not have seen the document.
	It's an OPP document, but he sent correspondence out to other police officers trying to integrate all that.
	Absolutely.
	I was very much aware of it without even seeing the documentation.
	I had that sense he was lifting that to the highest level possible.
	And so you understand, of course, that the OPP provided not only boots on the ground, but a lot of specialists as well, and services such as logistics, aviation, PLT, undercover, incident commanders, planners, PLU.
	Yes, sir.
	And did you hear Commissioner Krieg's evidence?
	For the most part, yes, sir.
	One of the comments he made was that when it comes to providing assistance, the OPP unfortunately doesn't have extra officers that he can take off a shelf and send where they're needed.
	Do you recall him saying that?
	I do.
	I feel his pain.
	And so he also indicated that every frontline officer that goes to help with Ottawa or Windsor or anywhere...
	I had the same experience in Toronto where we had to move hundreds of officers on a regular basis to other jurisdictions and they were not available for their primary duties in Toronto.
	And so you can recognize that when, and I believe the OPP's institutional report, and I won't pull it up, I think the maximum number of frontline officers on any given day was 463 on one day in Ottawa.
	You would recognize and understand the kind of strain that could put on the OPP and the Other communities that polices.
	Absolutely, sir.
	All right.
	The other area I'd like to move on to intelligence, because I think one of the things we're trying to figure out here is kind of what happened and how do we do things better going forward?
	So we need to figure out what happened on the intelligence side.
	I've spoken about the different levels of assistance, but I'm sure you would agree that the Hendon reports and the daily conference calls on intelligence were another form of assistance provided by the OPP.
	Yes, sir.
	Well, I believe your evidence was, and if I misstated, please correct me, was that you became aware of the January 13th Hennon Report.
	You received it.
	You understandably had a lot of other things on your plate at the time, and so you asked Deputy Chief Bell to conduct an intelligence review.
	Is that correct?
	No.
	Well, it is mostly correct, but I asked Deputy Chief Bell to oversee, not to conduct himself.
	The intelligence threat risk assessment that would then inform Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, who was assigned the role of developing the operational plan, an intelligence-led operational plan that was reliant on the intelligence threat risk assessment.
	The Hendon reports would be one of many things that would go into the intelligence threat risk assessment.
	And that made sense, of course, because Deputy Bell at the time was responsible for intelligence part of the portfolio?
	Yes.
	And Deputy Ferguson was responsible for planning?
	Yes.
	And if I get the chain of command incorrect, then please correct me.
	But under Deputy Bell, would it be Superintendent Patterson at the time on the intelligence side?
	I believe so, yes.
	Now, when it comes to Deputies Bell and Ferguson, you did give some evidence about a lot of the changes that were taking place and the challenges you had in senior command, COVID, turnover, other things.
	But neither had been in their positions for long, correct?
	That's correct.
	The transition had happened at the command level, I think, the last week of, or second last week of December 2021, and then functionally it flowed down into the first week for superintendents, inspectors, and civilian equivalents.
	Both of them were senior officers, though, right?
	They had been with the OPS for a long time?
	Yes.
	And both had many years of experience dealing with large protests in Ottawa.
	I don't know to what extent Deputy Bell had, I don't think he had as deep experience in that area as Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, but yes, they would have both been around.
	I think Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's actual experience as a critical incident commander and training was a little bit more than Deputy Chief Bell's.
	But either way, you trusted in their ability to review the intelligence and prepare an appropriate plan, correct?
	Yes, sir.
	Now, you testified that you did not review the Hennon reports.
	I read reports in detail, but not every one.
	I skimmed other reports, and sometimes I would not have had time to open my email.
	But again, at that point, I would have known that these reports were being sent to individual members within the Audible Police Service, but particularly within the intelligence section.
	Right, because there were a number of OPS members on the distribution list, so you trusted in your team.
	To review them and to keep you apprised as necessary, correct?
	As necessary, yes, sir.
	And I take it that once you saw the first Hendon report, I expect that you knew that that could be a valuable source of information as the convoy made its way across?
	Yes, sir.
	That's why my recollection to this day is that I forwarded it on, but I stand correct.
	Now, I take it you did not participate in the daily Hendon conference calls?
	No, sir, I didn't.
	And that's something you would have relied on either?
	Deputy Bell or Superintendent Patterson or someone within that?
	Someone would have had that delegated responsibility, yes.
	Now, you testified that it was your expectation that this would primarily be a weekend-long event, correct?
	Yes, sir, with a small group remaining behind.
	Now, this is what you were told by your team.
	You're not coming to your own assessments necessarily at this point.
	You're relying on your team to tell you that.
	That's the sum total of the balance of information and the threat risk assessment that came from it that was briefed to me.
	And so I believe in your witness summary, you indicated that you were advised by Deputy Bell that he expected the vast majority would leave at the end of the weekend or shortly thereafter.
	Yes, sir.
	Did he tell you, and this is where I just want to get into kind of your own personal awareness of what was in the Hendon reports, kind of when you knew.
	Did Deputy Bell tell you that there were a number of indications in the Hendon reports that suggested there could be a lengthier stay?
	Again, I just want to be careful.
	The briefings I was getting from Deputy Chief Bell are what the briefings were passed up to him.
	Sorry, can you say that again?
	The briefings that Deputy Bell provided were the substance of briefings that he received.
	So I just want to be careful.
	He's not the intelligence commander.
	He's not the OPS's version of Superintendent Morris.
	Right.
	Just to be clear.
	No, that's good clarification.
	But you're hearing it from Deputy Bell, and Deputy Bell can kind of speak for himself as to where he heard it or who he heard it from or who briefed him.
	You're hearing it from Deputy Bell, correct?
	Yes, sir.
	And so my question was, did Deputy Bell inform you of some of the warnings in the Hendon reports?
	I don't have explicit recollection of explicit lines from the Hendon report, and nor would I expect.
	I would expect and received briefings that said, on total.
	The balance of what we're getting.
	Here's what I'm being told in totality.
	As opposed to there's a line in the Hendon report that says X, there's a tweet that says Y, and there's an Instagram video that shows Z. What I was getting was a roll-up briefing not attributed to the exact data source where it came from.
	Did we at some point discuss explicitly the Hendon report?
	Or reports, probably, but at a macro level, at an aggregate level, as opposed to a line-by-line detailed analysis and whether or not all of that added up to X. I was getting briefings on the sum total of balance of intelligence information available.
	Because ultimately, as a chief, you need the higher level, right?
	So you don't necessarily need to hear the details.
	You need to hear from Deputy Bell, who needs to hear from his people.
	Look, this is going to be a weekend event, or this is the sum total of what the problems could be, correct?
	Yes, sir.
	And so, but Deputy Bell, again, just so I understand this, your understanding was this would be a weekend event, and was that kind of the summation of what you were told by Deputy Bell?
	Weekend event with a small group that would be remaining behind with some level of occupying, but nothing that we had not seen in previous events.
	But he did not say...
	Look, we think this is going to be a weekend event, but there are some indications that suggest it actually could be a long-term event.
	Okay, so we looked at the range of what...
	I was getting a briefing on the range of what this could be, and yes, there were certainly in some of those briefings this could be longer term, but the sum total of it came back to the consistent.
	Briefing of the threat risk assessment.
	Multi-day event, primarily over the Saturday, Sunday.
	Smaller group remaining behind.
	Something that we've dealt with in the past.
	That's what we're planning for.
	All right.
	And I'm going to ask if you, at the time, and this is pre- Sorry, and I apologize.
	I am interrupting you.
	But there was the other end.
	This is all a overblown social media thing.
	This group may never even make it here.
	If they do, it could be a relatively small thing.
	We never cancel anything out, but the aggregate of the assessment landed where we were.
	No, but were both possibilities being given as kind of equal probabilities that it might be, it's equally likely they're here for the long term and equally likely they're not coming at all?
	No, and in fairness, I don't think there was an algorithm attached to that level of sophistication.
	I'm not sure it exists anywhere, but it certainly wasn't the level of detailed and mathematical equation that...
	You may be vindicating, but I was given a reasonable overview of the reasonable spectrum around which it could be, and then an assessment on the balance of probabilities, what it was planned to be.
	All right, so what I'm trying to understand now is, again, and I know you were briefed, and that was primary source more than your own review with the Henning reports, correct?
	Yes.
	And so I'm just trying to understand kind of what you knew before the convoy arrived.
	Did you know, for example, that the reports indicated that there was no exit strategy?
	I believe I saw that at some point in a Hendon report.
	But again, I just want to be clear.
	I can't tell you how many protests and demonstrations pop up or planned where the presence or absence of an exit strategy were weighted in any significant way.
	I'm just telling you what my experience has been.
	And did you know that the intent was to remain in Ottawa until all mandates and restrictions had been lifted?
	Again, I just want to be careful about pejorative language.
	It was clear in a variety of forums and reports, including the Hendon report, that they could not speak for every person that was planning to or talking about coming.
	So that much was clear to me that Hendon reports or other reports, social media monitoring that was happening.
	Canvassing of various people, PLT actions, was clear over and over again.
	There is no one entity called the convoy.
	There is no one person who represents the protesters.
	And so everything that I got briefed on had explicitly or implicitly, this is what we're getting from some.
	This is what others are saying.
	We've got a line here that says this, but we can't extrapolate that to mean this.
	That's the context in which the majority of the briefings were coming to me.
	And the reason I ask, in particular, the last point, I think, is...
	There's an interesting one about their stated intention to remain until the mandates and restrictions were lifted, because it's one thing to say there's no exit strategy.
	It's another to set a specific goal before they leave.
	And that's something that you probably wouldn't have experienced before, is it?
	No, actually, many demonstrations, 76 days straight in front of the U.S. Embassy when NATO was bombing in Yugoslavia.
	We're not leaving until the war's over.
	I mean, you can stand on a corner here and watch somebody taped in a Ukraine flag.
	I'm not leaving until the war's over.
	So that's a relatively common.
	The Tamil events in Toronto, and I believe here in Ottawa, all had that sense.
	We are here to support what's going on over there, and we're not leaving here until over there is better or completed.
	That's a pretty regular item.
	But what's not, and I'll just put to you, what's not regular is that the protesters that come all the way across Canada have millions of dollars of fundraising.
	Have lots of trucks and people all converging with that stated goal.
	That's not regular, is it?
	Again, I want to be careful.
	Not all of them had that stated goal, and not all of them came from across Canada.
	A lot of them came from right here in this good old city as well, too.
	So again, I just want to be really careful.
	I don't operate in pejorative terms.
	That is a universal application of anything, good or bad, to any group is never fair to any one individual in that group.
	And I can't take that position.
	No, I understand that.
	But I think what we're trying to do here is to try to figure out to what extent the planning here was based on the actual intelligence that was being received, or as I would suggest, it was based more on experience of OPS and others that have seen a lot of protests come and go, and that perhaps there might have just been a bit of an overemphasis on what had happened in the past.
	Yeah, I'm certainly going to be agreeing with you that it was a little bit of both.
	It was a lot of both.
	I can't tell if it was 49% versus 51% on any particular topic.
	But I think there was some good evidence presented, and it's certainly been my experience, that you go based on imperfect intelligence, and you go based on imperfect experience, and you try to project forward what is the most likely outcome that's going to happen.
	And then you build a plan that will not only address the threat that you've now...
	Now, I know we're looking back at it, and we have a certain lens because we can look back at what happened.
	But when we look back, the issue isn't the quality of the Hendon reports.
	Isn't the issue the fact that Ottawa police just didn't take them seriously enough?
	Absolutely not, sir.
	First of all, the issue isn't the Hendon report.
	And I don't know when it became the issue.
	Maybe for the OPP, you see it as the issue.
	For me, I don't see it as the issue.
	And I don't know any member of my police service, former police service, that said, you know what, this is all on the Hendon Report.
	If OPP had done a better job, I actually never heard that.
	I've never said that.
	I've never heard that.
	Because the Hendon Reports, in fact, were actually very useful tools, right?
	I always said they were.
	I would say, though, and Commissioner, I referenced this to you on Friday, I think the OPP did an outstanding job.
	I'm not sure it was their job to provide national threat intelligence assessments.
	I'm grateful they did because otherwise it wouldn't have gotten done from any other form that I know of.
	But I don't think it's fair to the OPP to do that.
	Thank heavens they did it.
	I just don't think it's fair to them.
	It's a structural deficit that the OPP did their best to fill.
	But it's actually not the job of a provincial police service to provide national threat risk assessments on what was a national event from beginning to end.
	I'm not sure you would get any disagreement with the OBP on that point.
	But I guess, again, looking back at things with the hindsight, which is what we're forced to do here, of course, a lot of the warnings in the Henning reports were correct, right?
	A lot of them were incorrect.
	But a lot of them were correct.
	And a lot of them were incorrect, sir.
	Again, it's not an indictment of the Henning report, and I don't want my answers to you to seem that I'm somehow blaming a deficiency.
	But they are like most intelligence reports.
	They get some of it right and some of it wrong, and you never know until after the event what was right and what was wrong.
	We heard some evidence from Superintendent Bernier, who indicated that even though that wasn't his role at the time, he did happen to see some Hennon reports, and his evidence was that they were, in his view, comprehensive and like nothing he usually would see in advance of a typical demonstration.
	I would agree with Superintendent Bernier that the Hendon reports were one of the better intelligence documents that I had seen.
	I'd seen some outstanding examples, and I'd seen at least one that was even better.
	But it was one of the better ones.
	But I want to be cautious.
	Superintendent Bernier, acting Superintendent Bernier, then Inspector Bernier, because he was an inspector, was not involved in the incident command system.
	He was not involved in getting daily briefings.
	He was not involved in the threat risk assessment.
	He, like many members of the Ottawa Police Service, were picking up a little bit of data, and he had an opinion.
	But I think even he cautioned that his opinion was less informed and not fully appropriate, given that he was not involved.
	So Deputy Ferguson's evidence was that the plan that was prepared, Presumably under her own watch, was not intelligence-led.
	That was her evidence.
	Would you agree with her or disagree with her?
	That was her evidence, but I have to tell you that's alarming that she felt that was the case, and she really needed to have worked harder on it.
	So, again, just to get the answer, you would disagree with her then on that point?
	I never heard her say at any point in any of the briefings that we had that there was a misalignment, an underdeveloped plan, and one that she...
	Wanted to change substantially.
	The plan I received from her on February 28th was one that I received with no reservations from her.
	I sent back some minor feedback and I heard nothing else from her until she gave testimony before the commissioner and said some things that were very concerning.
	All right.
	Thank you sir.
	I appreciate your evidence.
	Thank you.
	Next, I believe it's the Canadian Constitutional Foundation.
	Mr. Slowly, good afternoon.
	My name is Suji Choudhury.
	I am counsel for the CCF.
	I'd like to begin my questions to you by returning to the theme.
	Of your conversation with my friend, Ms. Nygaard, from the Government of Canada.
	And I think that my recollection is that you agreed with her that there was no need for the OPS, or for that matter, for the City of Ottawa, to reach out to the OPP or the province first before going to the RCMP for assistance.
	It was perfectly appropriate.
	For the OPS to go to the RCMP directly in parallel with outreach to the OPP because Ottawa is the seat of the federal government and of federal institutions.
	Up until the last comment around the seat of anything, my comments were exactly that.
	At that time, I was trying to get resources from any source, and I didn't have a priority in my mind as to...
	What sequence I should go through.
	I was simply actioning a series of requests to agencies that were large enough and near enough to provide immediate resource relief to what we were facing at that time.
	Good.
	So let me take you back to when you dramatically increased your request for resources.
	And I'm speaking here of the February 7th letters, one sent to the province.
	One sent to the federal government.
	I'd like to focus on the federal letter, if I may.
	So it was a letter from Chair Deans and Mayor Watson to Prime Minister Trudeau and Minister Mendocino.
	And I won't call it up because we've seen it a number of times, but it's true.
	Is it true that in that letter that was based on your advice?
	That a request was made for a total of 1,800 additional officers from other police forces in Canada.
	Again, I believe the number was 1,790 and change.
	1,800 has become the rounded number.
	And some 100 of those resources were civilian.
	But yes, substantially, yes.
	And is it true approximately that about one-third...
	Of that number was to come from each of the RCMP, the OPP, and other municipal forces.
	I never put those restrictions on there.
	I've never heard those numbers, those divisions of responsibility, until you've just put it to me now.
	But you know Mayor Watson put it that way to Prime Minister Trudeau.
	In the letter?
	No, in a phone call with him.
	I have no idea what that conversation was.
	Well, and so how many RCMP officers did you wish to be deployed from that 1800?
	I'd never put a percentage or a number against it, sir.
	Okay.
	So, Commissioner, I'd seek leave to pull up the interview summary for Minister Bill Blair and to show it to Mr. Slowly, if I may.
	Okay, well, that's unusual.
	Is there any objection?
	So maybe we can see again that will not be entered as an exhibit in the normal course.
	It'll just be referred to and wouldn't go in as an exhibit if and until Minister Blair comes to testify.
	So go ahead and we'll see if there's any problem.
	Sure.
	So this is, Mr. Registrar, this is Witness Summary 48. And could you please go to page 5?
	And so let's just stop there.
	So, Mr. Scholle, I take it you've never seen this document?
	No, I haven't.
	So we're going to take a little bit of time to let you read a couple of passages.
	So the first passage I'd like to direct you to is the paragraph that states, Minister Blair explained there were two problems with the mayor's request for resources.
	And then in the next paragraph, I'll summarize for you.
	He speaks to the issue of planning and the need for a comprehensive plan in order for the OPS to receive assistance from the OPP and RCMP.
	That's not what I want to focus you on.
	It's the next paragraph.
	So if you could scroll up, please, to the paragraph that begins...
	Sorry, go ahead, sir.
	I thought I was being asked to read something, and now you're scrolling away from it.
	Do you want to explain everything to me and then have me read everything?
	Well, I'm just summarizing that one paragraph, but I want to ask you questions about the following paragraph.
	I'm in your hand, so I can start reading now, or just wait until you finish summarizing and then read everything.
	Well, why don't you read these two paragraphs, and I'd like to ask you about the second.
	Okay, thank you.
	Okay, I've read as much as what's on the page here.
	So I want to ask you some questions about that second paragraph.
	So Minister Blair, would you agree that in that paragraph he makes two points?
	First, that in his view, the OPS was required to go to the OPP first before requesting assistance from the RCMP.
	And second...
	That the Police Services Act requires the OPS to go to the OPP first before going to the RCMP.
	What's the question?
	Sorry.
	Do you agree that that's what he says?
	It's a bit confusing because in all my times in the Toronto Police Service when he was a chief, that was never the case.
	Okay.
	Well, I want to ask you some questions about that.
	Before we get there, I want to talk about and ask you some questions about the tripartite meetings that took place on February 7th, 8th, and 10th.
	And if you were at two of those meetings, February 7th, where you came a little bit late.
	And February 8th.
	I think four or five of those meetings.
	So, Mr. Sully, I'm sorry.
	In the course of the Commission's work, we've referred to three of those meetings, 7th, 8th, and 10th.
	So let me focus your attention on those three.
	That's fine, but I was at far more of those meetings.
	So let's go to, if we could, Mr. Register, if you could please call up the readout for the February 7th meeting.
	And the document is PBNSC.
	35. So, Mr. Sully, have you seen this document before?
	What's on the page here doesn't...
	If you could scroll down, please, Mr. Never seen this before.
	Okay, so this is a readout from this call.
	If you go down to page four, please.
	Let's go back up a bit.
	And so here is an exchange between Minister Blair, BB, and you.
	And I just want to focus on the last exchange here.
	What's the date on this, sir?
	So we've been told that this is a readout from a call that took place on February 7th.
	February 7th?
	Correct.
	The only recollection I have of a direct conversation with Minister Blair was on the last weekend.
	But I may be wrong.
	So, sorry, continue on.
	Well, let me ask you what, you know, a question based on this evidence.
	And so there's an exchange here at the end where you...
	You discuss how you have great respect for former chief, now Minister Blair.
	And Minister Blair says, we are working to provide the city with the resources you require.
	That is our sole intent.
	There will be follow-up conversations.
	We will be here for you.
	I take it you don't recall that exchange?
	No, I don't recall that exchange.
	I recall a different exchange on a different date.
	What date was that?
	I haven't been able to find it in any of the notes yet, but it was either the Saturday or the Sunday of the last weekend in office.
	So what would that be?
	The 12th and 13th.
	Maybe the 14th, maybe, but I think it was more the 12th and 13th.
	Okay, well, let's get to that in a minute.
	But would you agree here that in this record of this exchange you had with Minister Blair, he didn't raise with you the concern?
	That the request was somehow problematic because you had not gone to the OPFU first or you hadn't complied with the Police Services Act.
	That's correct.
	In what's transcribed here and certainly my recollection of the other conversation, neither of those times were those concerns raised to me.
	Okay.
	Or anything about a plan or not having a plan or not having a good enough plan raised.
	Mr. Sully, I'll ask you to come back to that in just a minute.
	Mr. Registrar, could you please take us to the readout from the February 8th tripartite meeting?
	the document number is SSM NSC CAN 2052 So, Mr. Stoli, do you recall participating in this call?
	I imagine there were hundreds of calls, so probably not.
	Sorry, I'm looking at a date.
	Could you scroll down a bit, please?
	Wednesday, February 23rd, so that definitely wouldn't have been me.
	Oh, I think we might have the wrong document.
	Give me a second, please.
	And I apologize, Mr. Registrar.
	me one second Commissioner, I have a request.
	When are we due for a break?
	Because it might be helpful if I could pull up these notes correctly.
	I apologize for having given the wrong document ID to the registrar.
	Council, is it a February 8th meeting?
	Yes, it is.
	You have it.
	Thank you.
	We've had excellent service with our document.
	Yes, we have.
	So if you could scroll down to...
	So this is another readout, Mr. Slowly, and if you could scroll down, please, to page four.
	The participants in this call were yourself, BB, who's Minister Blair, MM, who's Minister Mendocino, and others.
	And I'd like to take you to the last exchange.
	Between yourself and Minister Blair, where it begins, on the RCMP, only 20 have been sworn in.
	The rest are with Rideau Cottage, which of course refers to where the Prime Minister's residence is, and the precinct, which I assume refers to the Parliamentary Precinct.
	I need more.
	And then Minister Blair says, For how long are you asking resources?
	And then it's not attributed to you, but I think it's reasonable to infer that the five to seven days answer came from you.
	I wouldn't say five to seven days, sir.
	You wouldn't have?
	No, not at that point.
	But you would agree that these notes state that you said, we need more RCMP officers, only 20 have been sworn in.
	Yes, that was...
	Okay.
	That was part of the challenge in terms of getting RCMP getting sworn in.
	And you'll agree that?
	So when Minister Blair asked you for how long are you asking resources, he did not raise with you the concern that you were going to the RCMP first or not going to the OPP first and you were not complying with the Police Services Act.
	That's correct, sir.
	But just a note for the commissioner, this is the first time I'm seeing these documents.
	I'm not debating.
	The content, but I just haven't a chance to read through them to see the context and situate myself in it.
	So I'm answering your questions as best as my recollection can be stimulated from these documents, but they're the first time I'm seeing this.
	Of course, Mr. Sully, and we're doing our best here, given the limited time we have available to you.
	Mr. Sully, you referred to a third conversation you had.
	Yes, sir.
	With Minister Blair.
	Would you be able to tell us a bit about that conversation on these themes?
	Yes.
	Again, my recollection is that this other conversation takes place on the last weekend that I'm in office.
	This is a Saturday, Sunday, potentially Monday, the 14th of February.
	I was late coming onto the call.
	Ministers Mendicino and Blair were on the call.
	There were others.
	And sort of kind of waited in until things turned around towards me.
	And then I recall there was an exchange between the two ministers.
	Minister Minichino indicated that he would leave the commentary to Minister Blair, and then he proceeded to ask me two questions.
	The first question was whether or not we had considered using bylaw enforcement to address some of the challenges that we were facing here.
	I thought it was an odd question, and so I said, yes, we've actually issued hundreds, if not thousands, of bylaw enforcement tickets.
	But that any level of enforcement was difficult, both in terms of the potential volatility of...
	Public safety impacts and the resource restrictions.
	He then asked a second question as to whether or not we consider towing trucks or vehicles.
	And I said, yes, we towed hundreds of vehicles and we'd actually towed some heavy trucks.
	But again, there's extreme volatility around that type of enforcement action and that we had resource challenges with the tow trucks, particularly heavy trucks.
	And that was the sum total of it.
	So he never raised these procedural objections that he appears to be raising?
	Neither the procedural objections or the concerns around the plan or lack thereof a plan.
	So, Mr. Sully, how long have you been or were you a police officer in Ontario?
	I think just over 30 years in total in two different police services.
	And so you're familiar with the Police Services Act?
	Yes, sir.
	And is there any provision in Section 9 of the Police Services Act that requires a municipal chief of police to go first to the OPP before seeking assistance from the RCMP?
	Not that I'm aware of, and I stand to be corrected by lawyers who understand the act better than I ever will.
	But as I said, my practical experience has been...
	Over the course of those 30 years in two police services and for a substantial amount of time where I actually performed that function for Chief Blair, that if we needed help, we went to the best agency available where we're likely to get the best help from.
	I wasn't directed to nor did I have a system where I had to reference Section 9 and call the Commissioner of the Day from the OPP and then through that process find my way to the right resource.
	I would call north of Steeles and say, hey, York Region, can you send us a public order unit?
	I'd call west of the 427, hey, Peel, can you send us a public order unit?
	I'd call over past the zoo and say, hey, Durham, can you send us a public order unit?
	And they would do the same thing, and we would do that in reciprocity.
	I'd never before seen any reference to Section 9 of the Police Services Act.
	And, Mr. Slowly, RCMP officers...
	Can be sworn in as special constables.
	That's my understanding, sir.
	Pursuant to Section 53, Sub 1 of the Police Services Act.
	I'll trust you on the section.
	And as far as you know, there's no condition for swearing in an RCMP officer as a special constable that a request must first be made to the OPP.
	I'm not aware of that, sir.
	And so, now, Mr. Slowly, if we had more time, I would take you to the RCMP Act.
	But I'd put it to you that there is no provision of the RCMP Act that requires a local police force to go first to its provincial police force, if there is one.
	I'll trust you, and that's right.
	I have no understanding of the RCMP Act.
	And so would you say, Mr. Slowly, that at best, so there is no federal or provincial law, there's no RCMP policy.
	There's no OPP policy that required the OPS to go to the OPP first.
	I'm not aware of any of those things, sir.
	I've just used a practice that was long established and never previously challenged by any level of government or any other police service.
	And Mr. Slowly, do you wish that these concerns about procedure had been raised with you at the time so you could have responded to them?
	That would have been the fair thing to do, yes.
	Thank you, Mr. Slowly.
	Thank you.
	Next, if I can call on the CCLA.
	Okay.
	Good afternoon, Mr. Slowly.
	I'm joining you via Zoom.
	Can you hear and see me?
	Good afternoon.
	I can see you, yes.
	Thank you.
	My name is Kara Zwiebel.
	I'm a lawyer for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
	And I have a few questions for you, and I think, I apologize because I know you're having to go back and forth in time here, but I think we might actually talk about some of the other sort of tripartite-type meetings that you were just mentioning, some other ones that you had participated in.
	So I'm going to be asking you about a few meetings that involved Commissioners Lucky and Karik, as well as the head of CSIS, Mr. Vigneault.
	As well as Deputy Minister Rob Stewart and Jody Thomas, who I believe was the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister.
	Before we do that, though, we're going to do that by looking at some of your legal counsel's notes, the notes that we've looked at a number of times.
	But before we go there, I just want to take you to some of your notes and ask you a few questions.
	And this is document OPS three zeros.
	14484 and we would be starting at page 20, please.
	These are, I think, notes you said you sometimes sort of send yourself an email or make notes through Outlook or your email program about things that are going on.
	So on page 20. This is a call, sort of reporting on a call, I'm not sure whether it was a call you made to Yasser Nakfi or a call that he made to you.
	Do you recall?
	I remember it was a phone call.
	I forget who contacted who.
	Okay, so this is January 31st, so I guess the Monday?
	The Monday, yes.
	Yes, the Monday, okay.
	And he was contacting you because he's an MP in the Ottawa area?
	Yes, ma 'am.
	Okay, and he also was asking how he could help.
	Yes.
	I mean, I think it was both a situation update and what can we do to help you, Peter?
	Okay.
	And do you know, was he going to engage with his network within the federal government to see what he could do?
	Was this the sort of first outreach from someone within the federal government?
	Other than my communications with Commissioner Luckey, I think this was the first time I'd spoken with anybody else.
	Okay.
	So sort of the first political person, let's say, within the federal government.
	Yes.
	Okay, great.
	Thank you.
	And if we can just scroll down, I think it's the next page.
	Thank you.
	This is a call from the Deputy Solicitor General of Ontario, Mr. DiTommaso.
	Yes, that's correct.
	And this is from February 2nd.
	And if you could just scroll down a little bit.
	So he asked you if there was any interference of hospital or medical staff from the demonstration, and you advised yes.
	He asked if you were getting help from the OPP, and you advised yes, and that you were also getting support from the local Crown Office.
	And you also told him that other than the OPP commissioner, he was the first provincial official to call you regarding the demonstration.
	Do you recall how or if he responded to that statement?
	He did respond.
	And he asked if I would like to have a call with then-Solicitor General Jones.
	And I said yes.
	Okay.
	And did that call happen?
	It did.
	I think it was scheduled for later on on the same day, somewhere in the evening hours, I believe.
	And, I mean, were you making that statement because you were surprised that by this point, I guess February 2nd, we're at the Wednesday or Thursday?
	Wednesday?
	Wednesday, yes.
	That by that point, were you surprised you hadn't heard from someone at the provincial level yet?
	Yes.
	Okay.
	Do you recall where things went with Minister Jones, with the Solicitor General, when you did eventually speak to her?
	There's probably notes around that, but I think that the sum total of the call was that she had received the information from Deputy Solicitor General Di Tommaso that is noted here.
	She had understood that I was interested in a phone call with her.
	I provided for her a very brief update on what had transpired locally.
	She quietly listened to it and said thank you, and there was sort of a bit of a pause.
	I asked if she wanted to get a deeper briefing, if she felt there might be any need to engage other ministers or even the Office of the Premier.
	I can't remember what her exact response was, but essentially, you know, she would consider that on her own undertaking, and that was the substance of the call.
	Okay, thank you.
	Thank you very much.
	Okay, and now if we can take a look at that other document I mentioned.
	So this is OPS 3014454, and we're going to start at page 35. So these are, once again, who knows?
	Sorry, I apologize for interrupting.
	No, go ahead.
	In my update to Minister Jones, I did reference that I felt at this point, February 2nd, that this was going to have a significant impact across the province.
	While I didn't have specific locations, I don't even think at this point the planned protest to Queen's Park had been announced or I wasn't aware of it at this point.
	Certainly the Windsor and Sarnia events were not known at all at this point, but it was clear to me that this was going to have a larger provincial impact.
	And so it was actually more of a suggestion than a passive voice that the Premier be briefed to some degree and that other ministers be prepared to engage beyond the Solicitor General.
	Okay.
	And did Solicitor General Jones at any point, I guess, between when this conversation took place and your last day in office on the 15th, did that briefing to the Premier or other?
	Provincial ministers ever happen?
	To my knowledge, I don't know.
	Okay.
	But you didn't provide a briefing?
	You weren't asked to arrange one?
	No.
	Okay, thank you.
	Okay, so this is, again, Ms. Hewner's notes, and this is looking at the February 3rd meeting in the evening with Mr. Kanellafos, Mr. Stewart, Kevin Maloney.
	Commissioner Luckey, David Vigneault is at this meeting.
	I'm not sure what that middle name is, Press.
	I don't know if you know.
	That's fine.
	So I just want to, if we can scroll down just a little bit.
	So there's the Prime Minister's office, you know, wants to open up a line of communication here.
	And I'll give you a moment to read through this.
	to ask you about a particular part um There's a note, understanding we've avoided the worst, but now dealing with illegal protesters.
	We are risking public confidence to solve this problem.
	Government wants to be helpful but has limits.
	What can we do if we were going to engage and who would we engage with?
	There's questions about bylaw and the Highway Traffic Act enforcement.
	Can we scroll down a little bit more, please?
	Yeah, keep going.
	I know that, so there's a bit, something for Mr. Kanellakos.
	A little bit, next page, please.
	Sorry.
	Okay.
	And then, sorry, can you scroll down just a little bit more?
	So these are, I think, RS refers to Mr. Stewart.
	And he's asking about enforcement and what leverage do you have?
	And this is the note that your counsel has written.
	If you want an assessment of risk of this demonstration, please frame the questions properly so you can get the info you need.
	Don't appreciate you suggesting I police differently based on color.
	And I think Mr. Stewart is saying that, or there's a reference that a minister said this.
	Your observation is very insulting to me.
	And he's, I think, saying I hear you.
	And then you're providing him with a briefing about the risk assessment.
	Do you recall this exchange and what this was about?
	Very much so.
	Do you mind telling us about it?
	This was the first of the tri-level meetings that I attended.
	I've been advised about their existence, I think, the day before from City Manager Candelacus.
	He suggested that I participate in it.
	I welcome that invitation because it would allow me to be able to speak to all three levels at the same time.
	Ideally to secure resources that we so desperately needed at that time.
	So I attended the meeting with great expectation and hope, quite frankly, that this would be a very productive and constructive environment and one that would accelerate the delivery of resources, not just police officers, but across the board support to something that we desperately needed here in Ottawa.
	And I think increasingly the province and the country we're dealing with, Coutts, Alberta was active, other locations across the country were active.
	I think by this time we knew there was something going to be happening in Queen's Park on the weekend, so I was looking forward to this.
	The section on the page above that you scrolled through was largely, I'll describe it as a monologue that Deputy Minister Stewart was providing to the group on the call.
	I wasn't familiar with most of the people on the call, so I was just quietly listening and sort of waiting for it to become more of a discussion.
	But there was a comment near the end of that that isn't captured by my general counsel, but it's what I reference on this page here.
	And this is not an exact quote because I don't have, I'm going off of memory and it's not captured in these notes, but essentially the comment was the Ottawa Police Service seems to be wanting to help a group of extremists and white supremacists to take over Ottawa, Wellington Street.
	It is that comment that I took great offense to.
	Okay, and this was a comment made in the meeting, or was it reflecting something that had been said by a minister elsewhere?
	It wasn't sort of clear to me from the notes.
	Well, so I took it as a comment from Deputy Minister Stewart.
	I don't recall him clarifying as that note in the corner says that this is something he heard a minister say, but it seems to be captured by General Counsel Hugh Noe here.
	Okay, okay.
	So would you agree that even at this point, we're at the 3rd of February, you're starting to feel some significant pressure from the government about this situation?
	Well, I would go well past pleasure.
	That seems to be a condemnation statement, an allegation, and that is why I said I found that suggestion that I police or the Ottawa Police Service who I represent differently based on colour, on race.
	Was this, I know that in your testimony on Friday, you mentioned that there were a few points where you felt that individuals, both at the federal level and the provincial level, had made some public statements that you felt undermined the public trust in the Ottawa Police.
	Is this, I know this wasn't a public statement, but is this the type of comment that you're talking about?
	Yes, not a public statement, but in a room that had representatives, city manager.
	Ministers from across a variety of platforms at the federal level.
	I don't believe the province was represented on this call, but I don't know everybody else that was in the room, but these are policing partners like Commissioner Luckey, national security partners like David Vigneault.
	I found it very problematic and very embarrassing.
	Thank you.
	Can we scroll down again to page 38 towards the end of the page?
	This is the same meeting.
	And I think you've been talking, there's been some discussion about the possibility of negotiations.
	I think Mr. Kanellako said maybe, you know, is it worth it to negotiate?
	Mr. Stewart, or sorry, Mr. Sorry, can we scroll down to just the next page?
	I think this was Mr. Stewart saying, I hear you say, yes, it's productive to negotiate.
	And you say, I need constructive conversation and questions from all levels of government.
	So in this meeting, am I right that you're communicating or trying to communicate to the federal government representatives that, as you said before, all options are on the table.
	The federal government...
	I think Mr. Stewart was interested in understanding what the group needed to feel like to have a win.
	There's a statement, I think, earlier up that was attributed to him.
	Is that sort of the nature of the discussion that's happening here?
	Yes, we got into a very constructive dialogue at this point, and that is the gist of it.
	Okay, thank you.
	And can we just go down to the middle of page 40?
	This is where Mr. Vigneault comes into the conversation.
	I think that first note is this is unprecedented, the word of the day or the word of the commission, I would say.
	The social media is creating reactions.
	And then he talks about command structure.
	So we need to break this down better.
	We can look at foreign interference.
	Observe the people involved are nimble.
	Ex-cops might be some things to be done to expose.
	Their roles.
	I'm not sure what the thing in brackets refers to, but...
	Psychological operations.
	Okay.
	And then a notion of engagement.
	People below the PM and ministers that may better understand the dynamics.
	Today, press conference, she is more organized.
	They have lawyer.
	So I'm not sure if you...
	Do you recall those things being mentioned?
	Do you know what Mr. Vigneault is doing there?
	Are these sort of the items he's taking back to look at?
	Yes, my understanding and my recollection is that Mr. Vigneault was giving, from a CSIS perspective, his assessment of unprecedented.
	In point number one, he's talking about the command structure of the convoy's demonstrators writ large.
	Again, I won't speak for Mr. Vigneault, but I'm not suggesting there was a unified command, but he's talking about elements of a command structure there.
	He then goes into in point two to talk about how nimble they are, including the fact that it involves ex-police officers.
	I forget if he talked about ex-military or national security, but certainly referenced officers.
	PSYOPs is a term that I knew from my time in peacekeeping in Kosovo.
	And in point three...
	Engaging and educating my word, educating his word, engaging prime minister and ministers to better understand the dynamics of what's actually taking place here.
	And he used the example of the press conference, I believe that day, to give an example of the level of ability and capacity to use social media, use mainstream media for leadership that seems, if not unified, cohesive as examples of capability.
	Around his original term, this is unprecedented.
	We haven't seen this before.
	And I would suggest of all the moments in this meeting, and one of the most significant moments for me in my entire time in these events was hearing the head of CSIS describe what I had at that point begun to realize.
	This was a national security level event.
	That nobody had seen coming, nobody fully understood, and was rapidly still evolving, not just here in Ottawa, but across the country.
	And I hope that was a really big alarm bell for the people on this call, more so than the one that I had been trying to ring loud and clear here in Ottawa as a police chief in the Ottawa Police Service.
	Okay, and so am I right?
	Just to remind you, you're over your time, so you're going to have to wrap up.
	Okay, I'm already over my time.
	Okay.
	Can I just pose maybe one or two more very brief questions, Commissioner?
	As long as they're quick and sharp.
	All right, I will do my best.
	Can I just ask a bit, Mr. Vigneault, is it accurate to say that at this stage he hadn't formed any opinion or hadn't made an assessment about whether this was, you know, a foreign-influenced...
	Action or these are things that he was going to explore, but there was no assessment at this stage.
	I don't believe there was.
	I do remember either on this call or a subsequent call, he touched on the level of foreign involvement and it was, I believe, minimal if anything.
	I can't recall if it was on this call or not.
	Okay, thank you.
	And can we just briefly go to the bottom of page 92 and this will be my last point.
	This is another one of these meetings, I believe.
	This is the one on February 6th.
	Mr. Eno and Mr. Stewart are in this meeting again, as is Mr. DiTommaso.
	And if we go to the bottom of page 92, yeah.
	So...
	Mario, I think that's Mr. DiTommaso, no appetite to engage and think federal government needs to step up and engage.
	And then if you can scroll down.
	And then I think this is Ms. Thomas saying, you know, if not Ottawa, would province be looking at federal government?
	And he replies, yes, this is a...
	Trekker protests because of mandates at the border that federal government put in place.
	Do you recall this exchange?
	I don't have an independent recollection, but it seems to be well noted here.
	Okay.
	Was that your overall sense that Mr. DiTommaso was communicating to you that the provincial government had no appetite to engage in the negotiations that were being discussed?
	Again, with great reluctance, I don't want to presume intention on anybody.
	It's been used against me too much.
	I can only give my observations.
	It was several days into it before there was any outreach from the provincial government to me directly.
	The first two meetings that I was on in the tri-level meetings, I don't believe there was any provincial representation.
	The next two, I believe there were.
	Those are the only facts I can tell you.
	I won't try to put intention into anybody's comments.
	Thank you.
	Thank you very much for answering those questions, and thank you, Mr. Commissioner, for the indulgence.
	Okay.
	Next is the National Police Federation, but before we turn to them, this might be a good time for the morning break.
	I don't mean to...
	Sorry, I'm sorry, the afternoon.
	I'm just having...
	It's so exciting that I want to hear more.
	Thank you for the correction.
	I will take the afternoon break for 15 minutes.
	The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
	The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	The Commission has reconvened.
	Okay.
	Are you ready?
	I am.
	Hello, Mr. Slowly.
	My name is Nene Jones, and I'm counsel to the National Police Federation.
	Can you see and hear me okay?
	Yes, I can.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	The National Police Federation is the union for RCMP members.
	And one of the good things about going late in the day is that most of my questions have been asked and answered already.
	So I'm going to be very brief with you and focus in on an area that we haven't touched on, I don't think, over the course of the day.
	So you've had lots of questions today about the resources available to the Ottawa Police, including from the RCMP, as well as the OPP and other large police services in Ontario.
	No one's asked you about the Parliamentary Protective Services, or the PPS.
	Are you familiar with them?
	Yes, I am.
	Okay, and you know that there are a few hundred security officers based out of Parliament Hill?
	Yes, I do.
	In the main.
	I mean, other elements of the parliamentary precinct.
	And the Ottawa Police Service didn't look to them for assistance in responding to the convoy, correct?
	I'm sorry, did or didn't?
	I didn't hear you.
	Did not.
	They were part of our Intersect planning team and have been for years.
	So, in that sense, yes, they would have been able to support information gathering, intelligence, potentially logistics.
	So, I have no information to suggest that they weren't involved.
	Maybe not as involved as other entities like the RCMP, but I have no indication to say that they were not involved.
	Okay.
	You know that their security officers are not peace officers?
	That's correct.
	And you know they're not a law enforcement agency?
	That's correct.
	And so, in fact, if a criminal offense occurs on Parliament Hill, they actually call the Ottawa Police Service, right?
	That's correct.
	And so during the convoy, just to sort of circle that back, PPS officers weren't a resource in terms of what I think some of my friends have said earlier, in terms of boots on the ground to support OPS in its physical response to the convoy.
	No, actually, I wouldn't say that.
	While they certainly are not imbued with full police powers, they have some force protection capability.
	They would be able to provide, at a minimum, situational awareness, updates from the ground as to what's taking place.
	All of that would have been at Parliament Hill.
	Their line of sight would have taken them well beyond Parliament Hill.
	They would have had interactions with...
	Protesters and other people, and those could have produced information that could have been valuable and could have been shared in real time or in briefing notes at the end of the day and in briefing cycles.
	So again, I'm not saying that in any, these aren't items that I know took place, but to suggest that they would have had no physical benefit to the entire theory of operations, I don't think is correct.
	Okay.
	Well, just to go back to some of the evidence that we've heard, you know, it's clear Ottawa Police Service was looking for additional bodies or boots on the ground to respond to the convoy.
	Yes.
	And you'll agree with me that the PPS did not provide that in terms of boots on the ground to respond to the convoy in terms of those policing responsibilities on Wellington and beyond.
	Again, all I can say is that I never made a specific request.
	I wasn't asked to make a request and I never made a specific request.
	For PPS members to be participating in it.
	I can't rule out whether or not any PPS members would have had the skill sets, the knowledge, skills, and abilities that we listed in our 1,790-odd requirements.
	There potentially could have been a member of the PPS that had a background in investigations and crime analysis who had a background in some form of skill that could have helped with mass arrests.
	and processing of prisoners so i just can't rule it out i don't have an explicit note that we made an explicit request to them okay Okay.
	And in fact, would you agree with me that as police of jurisdiction, OPS had to actually account for providing policing assistance or support to the PPS on Parliament Hill?
	That would have been a risk area that we would have had to assess.
	But again, I would suggest that by the virtue of the PPS I think it's fair to say that we can agree that some security is better than no security.
	That's fair.
	To be clear, if there was an unlawful event, the convoy protest overtook Parliament Hill, for example, there was some sort of unlawful event on Parliament Hill, you'd agree with me that that would fall to the OPS and the additional resources it had gathered to respond to in terms of criminal conduct or the convoy actually making headway towards Parliament Hill.
	Yes, as police jurisdiction, we would have primary responsibility.
	Just again, note there were, I believe, three RCMP public order unit troops and two OPP public order units assigned into that theater, not to the audible police service.
	And any one of those units could have also responded, not as police jurisdiction, but could have responded in exigent circumstances to support whatever was happening there.
	And in fact, just to sort of close the circle on that.
	The fact that those POU units had to be placed inside the Parliamentary Protective Services areas meant they couldn't be available to OPS outside of Parliament Hill, right?
	Fair point, yes.
	Okay, those are my questions.
	Thank you so much for your time.
	Thank you.
	Thank you very much.
	Okay, thank you.
	Next it's the Democracy Fund and JCCF.
	Good afternoon, former Chief Slowly.
	My name is Rob Kittredge, and I'm counsel to the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms in these hearings.
	I think maybe we had all hoped that the towing question was put to rest last week, but it's starting to look like a bit of an inquiry into a purported national towing emergency, so I've got a few questions to ask on that subject about your conversation with the Council for Canada earlier today.
	You indicated that you felt that there were two main obstacles to clearing the Ottawa protests.
	First, you needed additional resources, meaning about 1,800 people, skilled police officers or skilled associated people.
	And second, you needed to secure heavy towing services.
	Is that a fair characterization of your testimony?
	From a resource standpoint, that's what I was needing.
	I was needing a lot more beyond resources to have a safe, successful outcome that was envisioned.
	So maybe on that note, I'll skip the next two questions and jump to something a little more certain.
	In your conversation with Council for Canada, you said that while you may have had some concerns about their willingness to participate in clearing the protests, tow trucks were there.
	When you say that tow trucks were there, you're talking about the city's standing order towing contractors, weren't you?
	So my understanding is we had somewhere between three to five tow trucks available to us on the first weekend.
	And those numbers did not increase to my knowledge until my last day in office.
	Right.
	So those would be the towing contractors that you typically deal with when you have towing to do on any given day.
	City-owned vehicles and or tow contracts.
	But again, I'm not certain about the tow contract part of things.
	Right.
	Just the number of vehicles.
	Okay.
	You weren't directly involved in the procurement of towing services for the eventual police operation that cleared the protests, were you?
	No, sir.
	And in fact, that procurement was handled by the OPP and not the OPS.
	Isn't that true?
	I don't know who handled it, sir.
	Right.
	But you don't have any direct knowledge related to the out-of-town towing services procured by the OPP at all, do you?
	No.
	So you really don't know if there was any reason to think that the tow trucks procured by the OPP weren't, as you put it earlier to Council for Canada, reliably and predictably engaged to provide towing services during the police operation, do you?
	Well, what I was talking about to Canada Council was the need for reliable predictability around the resources necessary for any operational plan of the scale that was being considered.
	Whether this contract was going to prove reliable and predictable, I had no involvement in that contract.
	Right.
	And the towing providers that eventually participated in the police operation had traveled long distances to Ottawa, and if the OPP was confident that they were, in fact, ready, willing, and able to participate in the towing operation, you have no reason to disagree with their opinion, would you?
	I had no involvement in whatsoever, so I can't comment on it whatsoever.
	Right.
	But you'd have no reason to disagree with their assessment.
	Again, I had no involvement in it, sir.
	Okay, fair enough.
	And Council for Canada also asked you about national security issues relating to the protests.
	I take it that you agree with the evidence from all OPP and OPS officers who've testified on the subject so far, that there was no credible intelligence or evidence indicating a threat to the security of Canada, as that term is defined in Section 2 of the CSIS Act.
	I'm unfamiliar with Section 2 of the CSIS Act, and I've heard some testimony.
	From where I stood, this was a national crisis.
	Right.
	But did you have any credible intelligence or evidence of espionage or sabotage against Canada, which is detrimental to the interests of Canada, or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage?
	No, sir.
	Did you have any credible intelligence or evidence of foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that were detrimental to the interests of Canada and were clandestine or deceptive or involved a threat to any person?
	If you'd like me to read that again, I'm happy to do it.
	From where I sat in Ottawa and the information available to me, there were significant elements of foreign funding.
	There were briefings that people might be coming north of the border to join in some of the protest activities.
	I can't rule out as police chief here that there were not some elements of other nation involvement in one way or the other.
	Whether it rose to the level as you're describing under Section 2, I don't have any ability to say that.
	Right.
	So you're saying that you had credible intelligence or evidence of such a threat?
	I had information available to me that suggested there were...
	There were activities taking place beyond our borders.
	that there were activities taking place beyond Canada's borders.
	So, I mean, I guess, can you just...
	I didn't test it with any great measure.
	Again, the level that you're describing in Section 2, this is just the vast funnel of information that was coming to me.
	Different calls where questions are being asked or information was being provided about whether or not convoys were joining from United States into Canada, whether or not the convoys here were impacting other countries, whether or not money was flowing into any of the different funding projects from foreign sources.
	So I'm just telling you, in the sum total of all the information that I was aware of, some of it related to activities outside of our borders.
	Right, but would it be fair to describe that as you had a...
	Information or a suspicion that there might be participants in the protests coming from outside of Canada and that some amount of funding might have been directed, you know, donations to the GoSendMe account or GoFundMe account or whatever.
	That's the balance of the information that I had, yes.
	So that would be the sort of, that's what you're talking about when you're talking about foreign-influenced activities.
	Yes, sir.
	All right.
	And there was nothing mentioned in the Hendon report about a credible threat on that.
	I don't have a complete memory of the Hendon report, so I wouldn't be able to say for certain.
	But you don't think, as a matter of recollection, that that's the source of your information?
	There were some 20-odd, 24-30 Hendon reports.
	I can't tell you whether or not it was ever mentioned within the Hendon reports.
	It's a question probably better placed to the OPP.
	Sure.
	With regard to your own recollection on this subject, can you remember what the source of the information that you're talking about was?
	There was a discussion at one point on the tri-party level where I believe CSIS Director Vigneault referenced his discussions with CBSA and other entities around whether or not convoys were coming north, people were crossing the border.
	He made some reference to international funding as an example.
	And that would be funding in the level of donations to the GoFundMe?
	I couldn't tell you how he broke down the funding comment, but that's my recollection, sir.
	All right.
	Well, then I'll move on to the last two items here, and I'll be finished with you for the day.
	So we have, did you have credible intelligence or evidence of activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious, or ideological objective within Canada?
	There was a wide array of social media posting.
	I don't know to what extent they were all identified, validated, and in one way or the other, canceled as a threat, but I was aware of a wide variety of...
	Open source social media that made a wide range of threatening type behavior that might touch on one or more of the points that you raised, sir.
	And do you consider any social media posts to be a credible threat?
	On its own, no.
	It has to be validated and corroborated by other information.
	But you aren't aware of any social media posts that was validated and corroborated?
	Not to my awareness, sir, no.
	Okay, thank you.
	And was there any credible intelligence or evidence of activities directed towards undermining by covert unlawful acts or directed toward or...
	No, sir.
	All right.
	Well, thank you very much, and my sympathies, and I'm very impressed with your sheer endurance here on Friday.
	Thank you so much.
	Thank you very much.
	Thank you.
	Next, if I could call on the province of Alberta.
	Thank you very much.
	I have just a few brief questions this afternoon aimed at possibly clarifying just one aspect of the timeline.
	Mr. Clerk, if you could please pull up document Thank you very much.
	And so, Mr. Saleel, recall my friend Mr. Choudhury for CCF took you to this document earlier.
	It's minutes that somebody recorded of a February the 8th tripartite meeting that you had been on.
	Yes.
	And in that discussion, you had mentioned that it was your recollection that you had had a subsequent call.
	You believed it was the weekend of February 12th or 13th with Ministers Blair and Mendocino, in which Minister Blair had asked you about two issues.
	First of all, whether you had considered by law enforcement and the second issue on the status of towing efforts.
	Do you recall that conversation?
	Yes.
	Could I just take you to page three of this document, please, about halfway down the page?
	There you go.
	And I'll let you read this, Mr. Sully.
	It's just starting at the part that says BB, which is Minister Blair.
	Then there's a brief response from the mayor, and then there's a paragraph indicating your response to Minister Blair.
	Well, thank you.
	This is hugely clarifying, and that's why I was hoping to be able to read the whole document the first time.
	So this would be the one and only time I did speak to the two...
	Well, I was on a call with the two ministers, and it does relate to the conversation that I had with Minister Blair.
	Could I just read the document now, though?
	Because it is refreshing my memory.
	This is my only area of questioning, and I have five minutes, so I'm content, if the Commissioner's content, to give you the time to look at that.
	Okay, thank you.
	Could someone just scroll back up to the top of this and...
	i'll just read through it then Sorry, can you just go up a little bit further, please?
	Okay, thank you.
	Yep, even further then, please.
	And these are all notes from within the same meeting?
	Yes.
	Okay, please go further.
	Up to the very top, please.
	Sorry, I just need to know when I come into this meeting because I recall coming in part way.
	okay keep going Okay, keep going now, please.
	Stop there.
	Okay, thank you.
	Okay next.
	Okay, thank you.
	keep going.
	Thank you.
	Keep going.
	Sorry, just down a little bit.
	Check up a little bit more now.
	Thank you.
	Just up there.
	Okay, up to the top there.
	Please keep going and stop there.
	And down again.
	Okay.
	I believe that's the end of it.
	Yes.
	Thank you very much, Commissioner, for your indulgence.
	And so, Mr. Clerk, if we could return to that portion on page three, please, with the exchange with Minister Blair and Mr. Slowly.
	Would this then, just for the transcript, briefly, Minister Blair asks whether you'd look at traffic laws, et cetera, and expands on that.
	And your response is rest assured.
	You talk about a number of ticketing efforts.
	We're looking at insurance and licensing.
	We're looking to create an impound zone.
	Simply put, we can create this zone, impound these vehicles where they are until we are able to remove them with the trucks we have or get more trucks.
	Very, very brief summary of what the exchange is.
	Would this be...
	The exchange that you thought had occurred perhaps on February 12th or 13th?
	Yes, it is, in fact.
	Okay, thank you very much.
	I just wanted to clarify that.
	Those are my questions.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	The next is counsel for Mr. Slowly.
	Thank you, Commissioner.
	For the record, I'm counsel to former Chief Slowly.
	I just have a few questions that I'm going to ask you to help.
	And you are?
	Tom Curry.
	Sorry.
	I left that part out.
	Thank you, Commissioner.
	The voice would have given an indication which counsel, but I think there are three, so it doesn't say everything.
	Thank you.
	Chief Slowly, a few things for you, please.
	Chair Deans of the Police Services Board has told the commissioner that when you became chief of this police service, she described as the honeymoon period was very short.
	Do you agree with her?
	It was, yes.
	And counsel for the OPS has raised a number of issues about trust and confidence among the members of the command staff, including some issues raised in notes that he took you to.
	Including a conversation that you had, I believe, recorded with a meeting with Chair Deans, February 14th.
	I wonder if I could just ask you to look at that to refresh your recollection of it, please.
	For the registrar, it's OPS 14566.
	And it should be found on page 3 or it's 13, 14 hours.
	So if that's page three, could you try page five?
	I think it's 13, 14 hours we should see in the margin.
	There it is.
	Thank you.
	Thank you for that.
	Do you recall this conversation February 14th with the chair?
	Yes, I do, sir.
	And you can see, if we just scroll down just a little bit, thank you, that the discussion between you and the chair concerned the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
	Yes, sir.
	And the implications for, among other things, enforcement through tow trucks that are described there.
	You were asked questions in the middle of that bullet about orders that might have been disobeyed during the demonstration, and you described, I won't repeat it, it's in the note.
	What is recorded is that you said that the best and the worst of us have been strained.
	This is why there has been tense meetings and why some have not demonstrated their best levels.
	Like everyone, I have been at my best and I have not been at my best.
	You were asked some questions about this previously, but just explain to the Commissioner, from your perspective as the Chief at the time, we can probably understand the things that you did that were your best.
	What were the things that you did that were not your best?
	The range of meetings that we had on a daily basis.
	I mean, I think there have been some in my examining chief where I started my day at, you know, four o 'clock in the morning and didn't end it till sometime after 10, 11 o 'clock.
	And for me, I think I was 21 days in and there are officers that worked longer than that and members that worked longer than that.
	It's just beyond the human condition to be.
	At your best and turn up as a leader in every single moment, in every single conversation, phone call, text message, email, operating at the highest levels.
	And I've been in three different professions, and every one of them required me to be a high-performance athlete, high-performance police executive, and high-performance business executive.
	And despite your best efforts, you just can't perform optimally in every single occasion.
	That's what I was trying to say here, not just on my behalf, but on behalf of the people that work for me at every level and every part of the organization.
	And in fairness, that holds across all institutions and organizations.
	Did the fact that you came from outside the Ottawa Police Service with the mandate that you told the commissioner have implications for the points that you made in this conversation?
	Absolutely.
	Chair Deans, again, I think it's been well documented.
	That the board of the day was seeking an outside chief of police, one that would tackle a major change agenda.
	Almost all of the questions put to me and all of the components of the negotiation for me to sign a contract were around a change mandate.
	The introduction of me by Chair Deans to the public in late August was all around an outsider coming in to change an organization that was in significant need of change and a change that was...
	Well established for years and was going to be a very large effort.
	Almost every conversation, board meeting that I was involved in during my entire tenure of Chief of Police had some element of major change, culture change, administrative change, HR change, operational change, change of the relationship with our communities, particularly racialized and marginalized communities.
	It couldn't have been emphasized more before I took the job.
	It was continually emphasized literally every time I had any interaction with the board and certainly was the focus of the vast majority of my efforts as chief of police internally with our members.
	Chair Deans told us that, of course, you were the first black police chief in this community.
	That's a fact.
	And how many at the time that you assumed that command in 2019, how many...
	Police services in our country had black police chiefs.
	Only the Ottawa Police Service.
	She also discussed publicly and also in her evidence, in her view, you had faced issues of racism during your time as chief of the OPS.
	That's correct, sir.
	And did that impact your ability to lead the service?
	Absolutely.
	I mean, it's an outflow of resistance to change on a variety of levels.
	It's an indication of the depth of the change needed.
	And any personal attack on the office holder of Chief of Police will be a challenge to manage.
	But attack of that nature on the office of the Chief of Police, I would suggest is a very significant indication of the depth of the challenges that were facing me and the board and the organization and the city.
	I want to ask you some questions, please, about staffing.
	My friend from the Ottawa Police Service asked you about the event commander, and in particular Superintendent Rayom, who was event commander, and when you learned that that change had been made.
	Do you recall those questions?
	Yes, sir.
	I'm not going to turn it up, but for the record, OPS 14537, Commissioner, at page 5, are the notes that Superintendent Rayom made.
	Indicating that he had been removed from that role by Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson on February 1st.
	Did you know about that at the time?
	No, sir, I did not.
	And within the incident command structure, who had the responsibility for making those decisions?
	The Major Incident Commander.
	Who is?
	Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson.
	In relation to the...
	Incident command structure.
	The commissioner's heard some evidence from Commissioner Karik about this, but what role is played by the chief of the police service?
	Like all things, I'm responsible for all operations and all administration of the police service.
	It all rolls up to me.
	I delegate authority down through several levels around functional responsibility.
	Usually that is in the function of an organizational chart, but in this case, that's the function of an incident command operation.
	In which case, I delegate operational authority down through the major incident commanders, the event commander, incident commander, and so on.
	Thank you.
	In answer to questions from my friends at Commission Council, you spoke about the numbers of vehicles that were in the city to support the protest over the first weekend and that left on the first, I believe, Sunday.
	So if you're with me, the end of the first weekend where there was an expectation some vehicles were leaving, could I ask you please to look with us at OPS IR?
	So this would be the institutional report, Mr. Registrar, on page 13. I just want to have your assistance with something, please.
	This is an institutional report prepared by, on behalf of the Ottawa Police Service, I believe by our friends who are counsel to the OPS.
	So, if you, if I understand, just to look at the paragraph in the text, please, Chief, slowly.
	In actuality, thousands of vehicles descended on Ottawa for the first three days.
	It says, following sets out an estimation of individual protesters and vehicles present in the downtown core.
	The data is imprecise and it refers to the fluid nature of the circumstances.
	Do you see that?
	Yes, sir.
	If you look at the column on the date, 29 January, 30, 31, and then into February, do you see the numbers there according to the different geographic areas, Parliament, Wellington, Elgin, Rideau, Sussex, other and...
	Do you see that on February 1st, looking at the final column, 676 is the estimate of vehicles on Feb 1, and thousands is the estimate on the three days previously.
	Do you see that?
	Yes, sir, I do.
	Does that accord with your recollection and the information you had that vehicles left at the end of the third?
	A significant number of vehicles left at the end of the weekend.
	Yeah, and math was never my strong suit, so someone will correct me, but Jan 31st is actually the Monday, so I would look at the Monday, not February 1st.
	If I'm looking at the total, the first two columns that say Parliament, Wellington, are those protesters or vehicles that I'm looking at?
	I believe those are protest numbers, protester numbers.
	Protester numbers are down to 250.
	Which, if I just use the 5,000 to 6,000 number, that would be 5% of 5,000.
	Can I stand to be corrected by any math teachers in the room?
	Right.
	And there is another, Commissioner, we can deal with it later, but there is another document.
	I won't ask it to be turned up, but the RCMP has an estimate of the number of trucks at PB NSC.
	C-A-N 1369.
	I don't need that document, Mr. Registrar, thank you, but just for the record.
	I'm going to ask you some questions, if I can, about the plans and mission statements.
	Yeah, and sorry, just not to interrupt you, sir, but again, there's been a lot of questions about, well, what did you know?
	There's a large group coming and some will stay behind.
	Five percent stayed behind as of Monday.
	I don't have the number of trucks because it says thousands.
	But I think the estimate of trucks was somewhere between 3,000 to 5,000.
	Again, 676 would indicate around 10% of the vehicles stayed behind.
	I think that falls more closely to the bucket of some than all.
	Right.
	And, of course, the numbers continue to increase on the weekends, as you have already described.
	Absolutely.
	I want to ask you then some questions, please, about the plans and mission statements.
	You were asked by my friends for the Commission about a February 5th plan.
	Could I please ask you, Mr. Registrar, for your help?
	OPS 6941.
	Do you recall those?
	Well, that document's coming up.
	Do you recall those questions?
	Yes, sir.
	I'm interested in two things in this document.
	Mission statement, first of all.
	Thank you.
	It's just within the first few pages.
	It's after the...
	Keep going I think.
	Well...
	If you go to page...
	There it is.
	There it is.
	Thank you very much.
	You'll see that the mission statement in this plan was for the Ottawa Police Service in a collaborative approach with other police agencies, etc.
	Provide a safe and secure environment in the city during the Freedom Convoy event.
	The primary goal is to end the protest peacefully, maybe achieve through proactive engagement.
	By all officers, including police liaison teams, facilitating communication, de-escalation, and negotiation.
	Do you see that?
	I do, sir.
	And was the idea of negotiation important to you?
	Clearly it was by how much space it took up in the mission statement.
	Now, that's fine with that document.
	Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
	Can I ask you some questions, please, next about resources?
	I want to first start with your own resources, the management of the OPS resources.
	Can you tell the Commissioner what steps were taken by your service in cooperation with the Ottawa Police Association to use the resources it had available to maximum effect to maintain the safety and security of the city?
	Thank you very much, sir.
	As I was reaching out for resources, I had to ensure, Commissioner, that we had utilized everything that we had available.
	In good faith, I couldn't ask for other police services to go down in capacity when we hadn't exhausted everything that we had.
	To that effect, I think by the end of the first weekend, we had extended shift schedules, increased our overtime pay.
	We then canceled a COVID reserve.
	Platoon that we kept in case a new wave of COVID wiped out a platoon that we'd be able to bring another in and not have any gaps.
	So we canceled that and deployed those resources.
	That would be the Monday, Tuesday after the first weekend.
	Shortly around that time, we got into negotiations with the Ottawa Police Association.
	I don't want to exclude the Ottawa Police Senior Officer Association because we probably needed to extend our senior officers and senior managers as well.
	That was assigned to CAO Blair Dunker to lead that.
	I believe towards the end of the first week into the second week, we achieved a successful negotiation with the OPA, and that allowed us to change the shift schedule timing significantly, and that brought additional hundreds of more officers into bear.
	We had already notified that we'd be cancelling elective leave, and I think at that point, we just cancelled everything.
	I'd say the end of the second weekend, I don't think we had anything in reserve.
	And at that point, we were only giving officers time off, literally for health and safety reasons.
	And we've heard some examples around that.
	We already had officers working in excess of two weeks straight, 10, 12 hours a day.
	And it's been given in evidence.
	I've given it.
	Most of this is during the coldest snap that Ottawa's had in over a decade with average temperatures daytime minus 25 to 30 and nighttime minus 35. There was a frostbite warning for the majority of that.
	So these were all the efforts.
	There's probably more that I can't recall off the top of my head that we put in place leading up to the request for that additional 1,790 odd officers.
	Thank you.
	My friend from the Ottawa Police Service also asked you some questions about OPP Superintendent Abrams, including questions, I believe, about the memorandum or an email that he sent to his chain of command.
	Just tell the Commissioner, did Superintendent Abrams raise any concerns with you about the nature of the estimate for resources that had been provided?
	No, he did not.
	Or did anyone on your team raise any concern or question about that?
	No.
	Now, resource requests, you've told us, were made both to your policing partners, both before and during the convoy protests.
	Did you have direct contact with ministers and deputy ministers and police leaders throughout the entire period of occupation concerning your need for resources?
	Yes sir.
	Now um A couple of just questions to fill in for the Commissioner.
	Who is the Deputy Minister of the Solicitor General, Mr. DiTomaso?
	I'm sorry, I don't...
	Did you know, we saw the Deputy Minister of Solicitor General of Ontario is Mr. DiTomaso.
	Yes, sir.
	Were you familiar with him?
	Very, very much so.
	And how do you know him?
	You and I were colleagues together in the Audible Police Service.
	Worked together for probably the better part of two decades.
	I'm going to stop you.
	You said Ottawa Police.
	Sorry.
	Yeah, sorry.
	Toronto Police Service.
	Thank you.
	We worked together for the better part of two decades.
	Probably the closest time working together was when he was promoted to staff superintendent.
	I was already a deputy chief, so his promotion would probably have been around 2012, 2013, and he reported directly to me.
	He was one of two staff superintendents that reported directly to me.
	Ran an area of responsibility of some seven, eight, nine business units, mostly frontline operations.
	I also became very involved in a significant incident in Mario's life, and I won't go into it for public record, but it was a significant incident and one that I was able to provide as much support as I could beyond my role as his supervisor to him and his family during that period, this extended period of time.
	And you were also asked questions about Deputy Minister Rob Stewart, and we've seen communications.
	What about Mr. Stewart?
	Did you know him prior to the events of the convoy?
	No, sir.
	Now, I want to ask you some questions about an exchange that you were asked about, again, concerning between the two commissioners, Commissioner Luckin and Commissioner Carrick.
	OPP 4583, please.
	Page three and four.
	Thank you.
	If we could just stop there.
	You've seen this exchange and correcting for the hour of the day.
	Commissioner of the RCMP writes between you and I only.
	The government of Canada is losing oblique stroke, lost confidence in OPS.
	That's written on February 5th.
	Did you know about this at the time?
	No, I didn't, sir.
	Did you know what lay behind the loss of confidence, if indeed that was accurate, that is expressed here by the commissioner of the RCMP to the commissioner of the OPP?
	No, and when I take GOC, I take that to mean government of Canada that...
	The entire government of Canada, the entire government of Canada had lost support or was losing lost support confidence in the OPS.
	It's quite a statement.
	Could you scroll down, Mr. Registrar, please?
	The exchange continues with Commissioner Karik describing that he has looked like he reached out to you.
	We're going to assume that you're the Peter there for a call.
	Are you free for a call?
	And then the commissioner of the RCMP writes, nope, still on the call with ministers, and then please scroll down.
	Trying to just stop there, thank you.
	Trying to calm them down, but not easy when they see cranes, structures, horses, bouncing castles in downtown Ottawa.
	Just stopping there.
	To the extent that the...
	That the concern from the Government of Canada is expressed at the level of ministers observing the circumstances on Wellington Street.
	Would that concern have been shared by you and every other person affected in Ottawa?
	Yes, sir.
	Now, sticking with...
	Thank you for that one.
	Sticking then, please, just with Commissioner Karik now for a moment.
	I want to show you OPP 4586, and Mr. Registrar, it's page 5. I believe you spoke to counsel about this.
	You exchanged messages with Commissioner Kreek by text and email and other forms of communication, calls and so on.
	I want to ask you about this one, February 6th.
	Do you see that?
	Yes, sir.
	This is to you from Commissioner Karik.
	Good morning, Peter.
	Or GM, Peter.
	Good morning.
	A beyond difficult day yesterday.
	Here for you, if you personally or OPS need anything this morning before the 11 a.m. meeting or in general, then just scroll down.
	You describe back to him you're getting a 10 a.m. briefing.
	Then we'll let know if any new resource needs.
	And you say thank you to him.
	And then he writes back to you, and I believe that I'm not going to take you to it, but I believe the briefing to which this is a reference, the commissioner will learn, is a briefing of the larger group, federal and provincial representatives, including the two commissioners and so on.
	Commissioner Kareeks writes to you, outstanding briefing this morning, Peter.
	Thanks for representing us all so well.
	You've got this, and you continue to have our unwavering Did you receive that message from the Commissioner?
	Yes, sir, I did.
	In his discussions with you, did Commissioner Karik continue to support your command through to the end of your term?
	Yes, he did.
	And in your discussions with Commissioner Lucky, did she convey the same thing, that you had her support?
	Not as explicitly and certainly not as emphatically.
	Or regularly.
	There were, you know, clear statements that she would consider resource requests, and there were efforts to fulfill those.
	But I found I was getting a lot of questions from Commissioner Lucky on things that I thought we had cleared and kept coming back to them.
	Things like, did you sign off on the plan?
	Has the plan been signed off on going into my last weekend in office?
	Overall, it was constructive, but there were elements.
	That I found we seem to be just going around in circles on a little bit.
	Right.
	I think you touched on this in your evidence, my friends from the Commission, about knowing what you now know, the embedded convoy protesters and the challenges that it posed to the Ottawa Police Service and your policing partners.
	Just in terms of the issue of resources, can you tell the Commissioner whether...
	Knowing what you now know, you would have approached the resource requests differently in order to accomplish your objectives.
	Again, with the wonderful benefit of hindsight and all of what's been presented, sir, and disclosed, if I had arrived at an earlier understanding of the level of the occupation fortification that took place here and the resulting impacts and events that took place across the country.
	At any point that that became crystal clear, I think the effort would have been around convening a very specific meeting, probably with the Big 12 agencies.
	I would have no doubt either hosted or asked OPP Commissioner Karik to host it or Commissioner of the RCMP if she felt other agencies from across the country should have been involved.
	But essentially, I think we needed to have the discussion around Greater integration leading to a unified command structure, as was where we ended up on the 13th of February.
	There would have been a joint assessment, as there was on February 1st in Kanata, where we had multiple POU commanders, experienced, credible commanders, whiteboarding.
	An understanding of the scale of resources and very quickly coming to an understanding that it was going to be of a scale that we had never seen outside of a planned event in the range of 1,000 POU officers.
	And that within that same 72-hour period that I asked for a three-option plan to come back, we would have had an integrated, if not a unified effort across Big 12 agencies nationally, three levels of policing.
	Putting the logistics and planning in place to lift those officers into this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction that was facing a similar level of threat.
	That's probably the number one thing that I would have initiated.
	And I suspect if I had this information, Commissioner Creak would have had this information.
	Commissioner Luckey would have had this information.
	Interim Chief Jim Raymer would have had this information.
	And we would have been blowing up each other's phones saying, "We need a call and we need a plan." And we need to pull this thing together on behalf of Canadians.
	You raised an issue about planned events.
	Were you a member of the Toronto Police Service at the time in 2010 of the G20 Summit?
	Yes, sir.
	I was a deputy chief.
	And I understand from Justice Morton's report that the Toronto Police Service had four months to plan for the G20, approximately.
	I recall five, but...
	Call it five.
	Did you play a role in the G20, in the response to G20 by the Toronto Police Service and other police services, either before or after?
	Yes, sir.
	I was asked by Chief Blair to attend the initial briefing up in Muskoka.
	That was a briefing done jointly, I believe, by OPP and RCMP on the status of the G8-G20.
	At that briefing, It feels like about an hour into a two-hour briefing, the announcement was made.
	We're severing the G20 from Muskoka.
	It will go down to the City of Toronto.
	That's a memory that won't leave me very quickly because at that point, even without fully understanding the implications of that statement, I knew that our colleagues there had some four or five years of planning lead time, and we were going to be really behind where they were to take on the G20 aspect.
	In the City of Toronto, and driving straight back down to provide that information to the command team.
	Did your experience, G20, Toronto Police Service, inform any part of your response to the events that unfolded here in Ottawa?
	Hugely.
	Hugely.
	Now, then, a couple of other things, then, please.
	Navigator.
	You were asked by my friend, again, from the OPS, about Navigator.
	I understand Navigator is a best-in-class advisory firm dealing with communications advice and crisis management.
	Yes, sir.
	Have you been involved in other complex crises other than the protests that we're dealing with here?
	All too many, sir.
	And have you made use of, or other police services to your knowledge, made use of experts in communications?
	Yes, sir.
	Yes.
	Now, why in this case did the OPS and the board, the OPS board, want the advice of communication specialists of the caliber of a firm like Navigator?
	I can't remember if I provided it in statement or in evidence-in-chief, but throughout my tenure as chief, my performance evaluations by the HR committee of the board were always outstanding.
	The one area that they wanted me to continue to try to push on was the services capability for corporate communications broadly, crisis communications specifically.
	While I explained that was a function of a lack of staffing and a lack of budget to fill staffing, our inability to recruit that type of quality communications into the organization, it was going to take far too long for us to build that capability organically through HR processes.
	And if they felt that we needed to Make a leap, then we would have to procure those services.
	The board was very much supportive of that, particularly going into the long budget battle that was 2021.
	And so I made a recommendation, I believe in a public board meeting, that the board consider a procurement for a firm of navigators quality.
	And I was granted approval by the board to pursue that with the condition that they would support both the board and the audible police service through the procurement process.
	Navigator was signed on.
	That was to help us with a very high-risk, high-profile, controversial joint board service initiative to address workplace sexual harassment, workplace sexual violence and harassment in the Ottawa Police Service.
	Systemic misogyny, to be clear.
	And Navigator was contracted to come in to support the board and the service around internal and external communications.
	When the convoy events arrived here, I recommended to the board That we continue the contract with Navigator to support both the board and the service around communications and crisis communications.
	My friend again from the Ottawa Police Service showed you an invoice that actually was delivered after you had left office.
	But had you remained as chief of the police service once this convoy event was over, would you also have ended the mandate?
	That was the procurement for assisting in that respect?
	No, until I had probably had the conversation I would have had, Commissioner, was through that unified command structure.
	To what extent would Navigator support that unified command structure, particularly the communications component of it, if there was no need for any further supports from Navigator to the incident command?
	Unified command, then I would have ended Navigator's participation in that because they did support communications efforts up until that point.
	The next conversation I would have had was Commissioner to Commissioner, Karik and Lucky.
	To what extent do the three of us believe that Navigator supports benefit us going forward in that unified organization chart that you showed?
	And if I had received significant negative feedback or a significant decision?
	Position from both of them that we discontinue, I would have taken that into serious consideration and likely ended the contract totally at that point.
	If I didn't and my two colleagues felt that it was useful, I would have continued on the contract, but only to support the strategic level, the command level of that unified command.
	Right.
	And just as to that, I'm not going to pull the document up, but am I right that you shared?
	The fact that OPS and the OPS board were using Navigator to assist in communications with...
	You're a federal agent, a federal policing partner and other policing partners.
	Yes, sir.
	Both Navigator and ASI were referenced in my tri-level meetings where all three levels of government were present.
	And in both occasions, I offered their services to any of those levels or any of those parties if they thought it would be helpful.
	I was completely above board about the fact that we procured these services and I was willing to share those resources should there be any value in it by any of those partners.
	Just for the record, OPS, I don't need it, Mr. Registrar, but OPS 14454 at page 39 is one such communication.
	I think you told the Commissioner that Navigator was working with your communications team at the OPS.
	Significantly augmenting vacancies that existed in capabilities that we simply did not have.
	I want to ask you then, please, some questions about your February 2nd comment that there may not be a policing solution to this protest.
	You've explained that this was an aspect of the event that you wish you'd done differently.
	I won't go back to that part of it, but after the meeting of February 2nd, 2022, you did clarify your comments in a number of communications.
	I want to just get your...
	Get you to identify them please.
	Register OPB424 please.
	This should be an email of February 3rd.
	between you Chief Sloely and Chair Deans.
	Just scroll down if we can.
	There, if you see the first paragraph, I encourage you as Board Chair and other City officials to use your influence to secure additional resources for a safe, lawful end to the demonstration.
	I once again accept your full support to secure more resources.
	This aligns with my statement that there may not be a police solution to this demonstration, despite the fact that we are doing everything reasonable to resolve the situation safely and lawfully, and it carries on.
	Did you send that to the Chair?
	Yes, sir.
	Can I please ask you to look at OPB 981 and Mr. Register, this time on page 2 of the document, please.
	Thank you.
	No.
	Of course I have.
	Ah, there it is.
	You see the Radio Canada reporter earlier.
	The question is to you.
	These are notes of a press briefing.
	Earlier, you said there might not be a policing solution.
	Do you still have that same opinion, regardless of what is being said at the federal level?
	We continue to do our very best, and as you know, this has gone far beyond Ottawa.
	I will continue, and you gave another answer.
	This continued to be a discussion and you continued to try to clarify and answer press questions and other questions.
	Absolutely, sir.
	Okay, and it carries on, but I'm going to leave it at that, please.
	You were asked questions today about documents, rather, that showed the possibility of an interlocutor to assist in negotiating a solution to this issue.
	Is that a...
	A policing solution?
	No, it would not be, sir.
	Right.
	I want to ask you some questions about the PLT and your support for PLT.
	Could I please ask you to look at OPS 14454?
	And Mr. Registrar, this is page 49 of the document, please, February the 4th.
	These are notes of your...
	I believe you're general counsel.
	Scroll down, if you would, to page three of the meeting notes.
	It's page three of this meeting.
	One, two, three.
	There we go.
	Just at the top, then.
	Thank you, Mr. Ready to start.
	Do you see PS?
	That's you.
	Yes, sir.
	Want a full...
	Negotiation strategy.
	Negotiation strategy.
	Thank you.
	It won't be perfect, but build a PLT part into it.
	Yes, sir.
	We won't take this down at once.
	We are working on a larger negotiation strategy.
	Yes, sir.
	Did you make that comment?
	Yes, sir.
	Not just in this meeting, but many, many others.
	Did it express your...
	Your intention and attitude towards PLT and negotiation?
	I think so, explicitly and repeatedly.
	Could I ask you please to look at OPS 7999?
	Just for the record, that was February the 4th.
	Could I go to February 7th, OPS 7999, please, Mr. Registrar?
	Thank you.
	This is an email message that you sent.
	You see to a number of people.
	I'm not going to get the ranks right, but you can see that it's a senior command.
	It's a superintendent, or perhaps at that time, Inspector Bernier.
	Actually, the two-line is to Sergeant Louis Carvalho, who's an outstanding front line.
	PLT.
	Thank you.
	On the same line I've put Mark Patterson, who then was the event commander.
	And you wrote, thank you for this.
	You and the PLT members are invaluable.
	We are still learning how best to work with you, integrate you.
	Please be patient and continue your great work.
	Be safe and be well.
	You sent that to the team?
	Yes, sir.
	Same question.
	Did it express your view and attitude towards PLT and its work?
	Absolutely.
	And beyond this email, I went down to the PLT room at City Hall and spent the better part of an hour with them, listening to their concerns, hearing their ideas, expressing directly unfiltered from me to them my full support and appreciation to them.
	Louis Carvalho and his colleague, I shouldn't forget his name, another excellent road sergeant who led the PLT to the November 1st meeting with the public order unit to make sure that they had direct input and involvement in that most critical moment.
	I just can't think of any more that I could do and could say to demonstrate my full commitment to the PLT function in these events and this reflects my commitment to them.
	Well before these events arrived in my city.
	Thank you.
	A couple of other questions then please, finally.
	Text messages, mobile devices.
	You were asked questions by Council for the OPS about your mobile device.
	I understand that you surrendered your service-issued mobile phone to the OPS when you left your command.
	Is that true?
	That's correct, sir.
	And when did you receive it back?
	I can't remember the sequence, but shortly after, when I didn't have any communications and people were trying to get a hold of me, I asked if I could get it back, and I was given it back.
	And then I asked, when are you going to, once I got my own device, personal device now, set up, I asked when they were going to pick it up.
	And I literally got no response sometimes for weeks on end.
	Somewhere around May, I'll take Council Madzikowski's advice that it was late May.
	When they finally sent somebody around, A, to deliver disclosure that I'd been waiting on, and B, to pick up my device.
	I had stopped using it months before, and so I simply cleared it to make sure that it wasn't going to be used by anybody else.
	Did you know in the period of time when the service had it back prior to it being returned to you, what was extracted from the device or what could have been recovered by the service?
	They could have taken everything out of the device if they chose to.
	Or what might be available to them as the...
	The service from the service provider that provided mobile phone services to the service.
	Absolutely, sir.
	Right.
	And final question then, please.
	Final topic, your resignation.
	Chair Deans told the Commissioner that in the midst of these events, the convoy events, she spoke with you and performed a form of wellness check during you had a conversation with you.
	Do you recall, first of all, having that counter with her?
	A conversation where it was not a wellness check, sir.
	She told us that she told you that there were people who, I think she used this language, wanted your head.
	Yes, sir.
	Do you recall that?
	Yes, sir.
	Can you tell us what was your reaction to that?
	I have to tell you, sir, I think by that point, the wanting your head comment just piled on to the...
	Hundreds, if not thousands, of other comments that I was receiving through literally every form of human communication possible.
	She told us that she telephoned you on the evening of the 14th of February and that she raised the issue of your possible resignation.
	You told us about that.
	Yes, sir, she did.
	Please tell the Commissioner, what was your answer to Chair Deans when she asked you whether you wished to resign?
	My answer was actually reasonably accurate, as reported by Chair Deans.
	I've put my heart and soul into this, and by this, Commissioner, I meant this entire Ottawa Police Service for my entire tenure as a Chief of Police, and it included the last three very difficult weeks of the convoy events.
	I told her that it was my intention to see it through, right to the end, a successful and safe end for the events happening here in Ottawa, and through that, a contribution to the events happening across the country.
	I told her that it was very inappropriate for her to have this call with me, I think at 9.30 at night on Valentine's Day, and I just happened to be in my bedroom with my wife trying to get some sleep before another busy day the next day.
	And to be asking me to resign from my office at this stage at that time and in that manner, I thought was very inappropriate.
	What did she ask you to do in response when you told her that?
	Think about it.
	Which to me meant she'd already made up her mind.
	She wasn't interested in hearing anything about my commitment to the organization, my commitment to see it through.
	She was pushing for me to resign.
	Did she ask you to think about it overnight?
	Yes.
	Now, you've explained to the Commissioner your resignation was motivated by your wish to enhance public safety and removing yourself from the equation.
	We could allow the resources to be obtained.
	Was it also important to you, or how important was it to you to show the community and the service and your family who had followed you here to Ottawa that you were not quitting?
	It was critically important on both ends.
	Most importantly, Commissioner, to do everything I could, literally with the last act of my time in office, to remove myself out of a trust equation.
	That was heading in the wrong direction for the Audible Police Service, which I led.
	Anything that could have contributed to faster and more resources arriving in this city to address this still metastasizing local crisis and national crisis was my obligation, was my responsibility.
	And so I took that last act.
	But I will tell you, it mixed very heavily with the concept of me quitting something.
	And to this day, it still rubs me.
	I won't do justice.
	It still hurts me and it hurts my family.
	Thank you very much.
	Thank you, Commissioner.
	I have a question.
	Thank you, sir.
	Thank you.
	Any re-examination?
	Yes, please.
	Go ahead.
	Good afternoon, Chief.
	Good afternoon, sir.
	This morning, Council for the Ottawa Police Service asked you about the circumstances in which Superintendent William was removed.
	Do you recall those questions?
	Setting aside any dispute as to why he was removed, help us understand how the incident command structure works normally.
	Isn't there someone predestinated to step in for contingencies, such as when the event commander becomes unavailable or simply to cover 24-7 when the event commander needs to go to sleep?
	Yes, a challenge.
	That I found when I came into the organization.
	When I built the Incident Command Team and the Toronto Police Service, I identified that as a major risk.
	So if we're going back, Commissioner, this would be somewhere in the range of 2000 and late 2007-2008.
	We would have multiple cycles on a regular occasion in Toronto for major events, major incidents that would require an incident commander and potentially an event or major incident level commander on top of that.
	So when I started to build that as a staff superintendent for the Toronto Police Service, I built in three levels of redundancy so that we could handle any three major events in the city at any time with full incident command teams.
	Full teams meaning an incident commander.
	An operations lead, a planning lead, a logistics lead, at a minimum, and then it could be built out from there.
	But we could have three stood-up incident command teams, fully trained and capable, deployable within a 24-hour basis.
	It also meant that if we had one event, but it was protracted and went longer than 12 hours or 24 hours, we would have a plan B and a plan C to come in place.
	Now, I did not inherit that level of staffing or that level of funding when I came here as chief of police, but that is an optimal level.
	And the Audible Police Service at no point during my tenure was anywhere near that optimal level.
	Even with that, I encouraged our thinking around incident command and critical incident command to go beyond the 12-hour cycle because every now and then something takes us past that point of human resilience where we see a significant decline in decision-making and capability.
	We didn't have that ability going into these events.
	We were very stretched.
	We were already overwhelmed by the events of the explosion that we've talked about in Maryvale.
	And so we were overstretched and overtired before we even got to the point of these convoy events unfolding on the weekend of January 29th.
	Now, you also said this morning in response to questions from my friend, counsel for the OPS, that Superintendent Dunlop attended a meeting on February the 3rd.
	in the morning.
	Do you recall if you asked the deputies that afternoon as to why Superintendent Dunlap was at that earlier meeting?
	I didn't ask them that afternoon.
	I asked them both times when the meetings happened.
	I think the first meeting is around 10:30.
	I stand to be corrected.
	I asked during the meeting, why is Superintendent Dunlop providing this briefing?
	I want to hear from Staff Sergeant Mike Stoll.
	I want to hear from Inspector Morin.
	Jamie, why are you providing This briefing.
	And he tried to give me some explanation.
	We've moved off of the public order plan.
	We're going to talk about a neighborhood policing strategy.
	And again, I politely interrupted.
	That's not what this briefing is about.
	The briefing is about the public order options, the plan that I asked for on February 1st.
	Literally after doing that two times and not wanting to go to a third time, I said, look, I think we're not in a constructive place.
	Let's end this meeting.
	I would like another meeting before noon hour.
	Where I get Inspector Moran and Staff Sergeant Stoll giving me a briefing on the public order plan with the three options.
	I waited patiently for another hour and a half.
	I think somewhere around 12 or 12.30, another briefing happened.
	Again, Superintendent Dunlop appeared on my team's screen and started to present a discussion around neighborhood policing in the neighborhoods outside of the red zone.
	Again, I politely interrupted.
	That's not the briefing I'm looking for.
	Where is Staff Sergeant Mike Stoll?
	I was told he was in another room.
	I said, "Well, let's wait.
	Somebody go get him.
	Bring him onto the screen or have him sign on to the Teams meeting.
	I need to hear from Staff Sergeant Mike Stoll." Eventually, Staff Sergeant Mike Stoll was brought into the room and given a chair next to Superintendent Dunlop.
	I then asked Mike, "What is the plan?
	What are the options?" He started to tell me that they hadn't got the resources they had requested on February 1st.
	He wasn't in a position to provide the briefing to me.
	I was extremely frustrated and disappointed, and I was confused because I still did not understand why Superintendent Dunlop was involved in this meeting, nor did Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson.
	I can't remember if Deputy Chief Bell was on either one of those calls, in fairness, but Deputy Chief Ferguson didn't explain to me at any point.
	As to what the role of Superintendent Dunlop was and why we were not getting a presentation on the public order plan and the three options.
	I only found out about Superintendent Dunlop on Saturday morning, February 5th, towards the end of that morning incident command briefing, where finally I said, where's the incident commander?
	And I was told then by Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson that that was Superintendent Dunlop.
	I closed the meeting.
	I raised concern that I was not aware of it.
	I closed the meeting.
	And then I asked for Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and Deputy Chief Bell to see me in my office.
	It was at that point I finally had a disclosure from Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson that she had switched Superintendent Dunlop into the incident command.
	I felt I understood it was an incident command level, not an event commander level.
	I understand there's confusion around that.
	But the essential...
	Disclosure on February 5th was that Ryome was no longer part of this.
	Lucas was at a lower level, and Superintendent Dunlop had been inserted into the significant decision-making operational level.
	That was the first time I heard of it.
	I counseled both for their respective roles, and I made sure that from there on in, in repeated meetings, that we would not have a repeat of that level of miscommunication.
	I never removed the decision-making authority from Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson.
	I always allowed her to confer with whoever she needed to around these decisions.
	But I was very clear going forward, no more surprises like that.
	Now, in relation to these events, I'd like to take you to a document and see if it refreshes your memory.
	OPS 3014454.
	Mr. Clerk, if we go to page 3 and 4, please.
	Oh, sorry, 14484.
	So this appears to be some notes to yourself, dated February the 3rd.
	Page 3. The time is 1 o 'clock to 1:30.
	And the title says, Meeting with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and Deputy Chief Bell with POU briefings.
	So this would be the afternoon after Superintendent Dunlap attended the morning meeting at 10, right?
	Yes, sir.
	So if we go down to page four.
	So scroll down a bit.
	Do you see the paragraph that starts with, I asked why Superintendent Dunlap?
	Was during the POU briefing and not Staff Sergeant Stowe.
	Was that a question you asked at this meeting?
	I believe so, yes, sir.
	What answer did you get?
	I don't think I got any answer, except that Jamie was, Superintendent Dunlop, was really experienced with neighbourhood policing issues.
	I said, that's not what we're dealing with here.
	It's a POU plan.
	Jamie's not in charge of the ESU, which is our version of the POU.
	Staff Sergeant Mike Stowe was in charge of it.
	Again, There was no, sir, you need to understand we've made the switch.
	This is what's going on.
	And in that switch, Superintendent Thumlop feels that we don't need a POU plan.
	We need a neighborhood policing plan.
	That wasn't provided to me.
	Now, in relation to Staff Sergeant Mike Stowe, who the person who you expected a POU briefing from, what was his role within the POU at that time?
	He was in charge of the public order.
	And do you know if he continued in this role into February?
	No, that's my understanding, and I still haven't received any formal explanation, that he removed himself from that role at some point in the next week.
	I still don't tell to this day a specific reason why.
	I've heard through my own staff that he was frustrated with the overall incident command.
	But I haven't heard it was in relation to any one individual or any one particular incident to this day, and I don't know if in the after-action review that was completed that that's become more clear for anyone.
	We've seen references in some documents that he resigned his position on February the 7th.
	Now, are you aware of why he left his position with the POU?
	Or anything that was expressed either in writing or otherwise?
	My ceremonial sergeant major, Steve Boucher, was the one that gave me the information that he was frustrated with what was happening.
	Something to do with the turnover within the incident command team and that his position was no longer valid or valued enough.
	But I never got any more details than that.
	Okay.
	Counsel for the OPS also asked you about...
	Your meeting on February the 9th at 9.15 a.m.
	Yes, sir.
	And he put to you some corrections based on the notes of Deputy Chief Ferguson, and you commented on the quality of her notes.
	Now, we also happen to have notes taken by Ms. Honnold.
	She's the general counsel for the OPS, and I want to take you to those notes, please.
	OPS 3014454.
	OPS 3014454.
	So can we go to page 130, please?
	Go down, please.
	So, do you see the notation that starts with very little political support to get us supports or resources?
	If we don't change that dynamic, we'll get...
	Nothing.
	Now they've sent their team to support us over 30 days.
	Their political masters don't think OPS did their jobs and we won't bail out.
	They don't have a plan.
	They then will go publicly.
	That and then I guess as a equal signs with a slash.
	So that doesn't equal.
	Leadership, and they will take it from us.
	That's the best I can make from the handwritten notes.
	Now, I want to ask you to comment on the quality or the accuracy of these notes.
	Well, Christiane, you know as many things.
	I don't know if she was ever trained on being a scribe, but she's certainly capable of taking a lot of notes and has proven so not just in these events.
	But just what particular are you looking for?
	No, just because these are notes of the same meeting that Council for the OPS had asked you, and your answer to Mr. Medzikovsky's corrections were based on your correctioning of W. Chief Ferguson's notes.
	So I want to take you to a different set of notes and ask you to comment on what happened at that meeting.
	Do these notes accurately reflect what happened at that meeting?
	The things that were said.
	Yes, there are more accurate reflections there, yes.
	Okay.
	Those are my questions.
	my colleague, Ms. Rodriguez, we have more.
	This one might be easier.
	Again, just, sorry, the portion of the notes you've just showed me are what I'm referring to.
	If you'd like me to adopt the entire thing more fully, then I'm not sure if that's sufficient.
	No, I took you to this passage because I believe that was the context in which Council for the OPS asked you the questions this morning.
	Thank you, sir.
	Hi, Mr. Slowly again.
	I do have some clarification questions that arose from your questioning today.
	I wanted to take you first to OPS 3014565.
	Now, Council for the City of Ottawa took you to this document and asked you some questions.
	And these are your notes of February 9. And I want to take you to the fifth bullet point.
	Sorry, fifth from the redacted portion.
	Important for Mayor to know, so this is now a phone call with the Mayor, Steve Kanellakis, Serge Arpan, at about 2.20, and this is your side of the conversation as recorded by the scribe.
	Important for Mayor to know, until this is fixed in Ottawa, this will continue in other areas in the province.
	If Mayor hears anywhere that we don't have a plan, we have a plan.
	They think we have a too aggressive of a plan here.
	So I wanted to ask you about that part.
	My understanding is that 12.10 or so, there was a meeting with respect to the 3.0 plan.
	And so when you say they think we have too aggressive of a plan here, I assume the they in that sentence is OPP and RCMP.
	Is that right?
	The integrated planning team that had arrived.
	Yes, sir.
	Yes.
	And so I wanted to ask, why did you think that their view was that the plan was too aggressive?
	I think we've heard in previous testimony, might have been Chief Superintendent Abrams or, sorry, Chief Superintendent Party or Superintendent Abrams, that there was a pretty healthy and long discussion at the point where Superintendent Patterson started to present our 24 to 72 hour priorities, operational priorities.
	Again, just for context, sir, that was never a presentation to be a tactical briefing for commanders to pull apart a plan and assess it that actually took place later on in the evening.
	But Superintendent Patterson wanted to present a sense to the integrated planning team that we, having just heard the overall plan from Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, comments from me, that this was a demonstration that as the operational lead, he had a sense of what The priorities were for the next 24 to 72 hours and what the resources would be necessary for those types of priorities.
	It wasn't intended to invite a detailed debate about the adequacy and effectiveness of those priorities and those plans.
	A debate did ensue and probably, in hindsight, a healthy debate to have at that point of forming, storming, norming around a very new escalation in integration.
	But the feedback, as I was giving, was they might not like our plan, but there is a plan.
	They might think our plan is too aggressive, but there is a plan.
	And if you hear from other sources that there isn't a plan, well, there is a plan.
	That's the context around which I'm giving that information.
	Right.
	And was there anything in particular that they thought was too aggressive about the plan?
	Again, I think it was the concept of a nighttime public order operation at one of the sites.
	There were other...
	You know, you don't have enough POU resources.
	Have you used PLT all the way?
	There was a range of issues that were raised and I think are documented in chief.
	One or both of those OPP officers.
	And there was an intervention, I believe, by an RCMP officer that suggested we would need some 700 or 800 POU officers to carry that out.
	And then a commitment that they would get us some 500 or 516 public order officers to effect that.
	Thank you.
	Now, in response to a question from my friend for CCF, you indicated that in a conversation with Minister Blair, you had indicated to him that you had towed hundreds of vehicles when he asked about enforcement and whether enforcement had been considered.
	You recall saying that?
	I can't remember.
	It was hundreds of vehicles, but I know the document was on there, and I had given some accurate numbers of vehicles that we towed.
	It wasn't in a document.
	You were relaying a discussion you had had with Minister Blair in which you said to him, you know, we've issued thousands of tickets, we've towed hundreds of vehicles.
	Okay, there was a document that I viewed earlier on, but yes, I did try to give him the most accurate assessment of the bylaw offenses that we had issued and the number of vehicles and the nature of vehicles that we towed.
	Okay.
	Mr. Ayotte testified that on the first weekend, 28 vehicles were towed as a result of essentially blocking emergency lanes.
	And so towing was used as a way to clear emergency lanes.
	He testified that that was essentially the purpose of towing, to maintain those emergency lanes.
	And after the first weekend, there was generally compliance with maintaining those emergency lanes, and therefore there wasn't much towing needed after that.
	And he agreed that there were about zero to three vehicles towed thereafter, after the first weekend, every day.
	So many days there were zero, some days there were one, two, up to three vehicles.
	But in total, the number of vehicles towed was quite low, and there were never any heavy trucks that were towed.
	They were all passenger vehicles.
	So I just want to understand where you got that understanding that hundreds of vehicles had been towed.
	Again, I would need to see a document where I said that I just...
	I recall seeing a document earlier on today about hundreds.
	I felt I gave an accurate answer to Minister Blair that have you considered towing any vehicles?
	And I said we had been towing vehicles since the beginning.
	I think that aligns with what you've just said.
	If I got the total wrong, that's a challenge of communicating numbers and me would be able to remember numbers.
	But we were towing vehicles heavily at the beginning and consistently throughout.
	Where it was safe to do so, using the equipment that we have.
	And that was my substantive answer to Minister Blair when he said, have you thought about towing vehicles?
	Okay, so we can rely on Mr. Ayotte's evidence and the documents from the City of Ottawa bylaw with respect to the number of tows.
	I would prefer to rely on the incident commander and the stats that we kept overall, because there may have been other towing operations that Mr. Ayotte was not aware of.
	Again, I'm not challenging Mr. Ayotte's numbers.
	I just don't know if that is the single source of truth for all towing activities in the theatre.
	Okay, fair enough.
	I want to talk to you a little bit about a discussion you had with Mr. Miller about crowd dynamics and generally the risk of harm in enforcement efforts.
	If I can take you to OPS 3014454.
	And this is, again, Ms. Hano's notes.
	And I'll take you to page six, which is notes from January 31st.
	And I believe we've seen this before.
	If we can zoom in.
	Right.
	So if you see the third bullet turning from demo to occupation, increasingly volatile and aggressive.
	And then it says police intervention to remove massive risk, which is underlined, injury, loss of life.
	And so if we look further down after the list of police forces that are there, it says operational arrest, no safe way to do this, injury, death.
	And then under that, avoided full-scale riots.
	So I wanted to understand...
	Your basis for understanding that there was no safe way to carry out removals or arrests without the risk of injury or death.
	What was the basis for saying that there was no safe way to do arrests without risking injury or death?
	Just to be clear, clearly we did do enforcement and clearly we did make arrests.
	But to be absolutely clear, I forget who asked the question, Commissioner, but was this more like a family event or a powder keg?
	It was more like a powder keg.
	And no point ever more powder keg than that very first weekend.
	I had experienced it myself when I went on foot patrol at Wellington and Rideau and Sussex.
	I had experienced it myself.
	I had seen it and felt it firsthand.
	And those efforts of swarming officers, not just an individual officer riding a bylaw offense, but sometimes officers in twos or threes or more, were swarmed.
	Senior experienced officers.
	We had brand new recruits on the street.
	This was a regular occurrence.
	Sometimes that serious injury or death is not the death or the injury to the officer.
	It's that an officer being swarmed and overwhelmed physically may need to resort to serious injury or death to prevent themselves from being overwhelmed.
	So it's a two-way issue.
	Not fair that the officer is going to get hurt, but the officer may hurt.
	Or take the life of someone who's trying to overwhelm them.
	And in every one of the instances that I saw or I even attempted as a uniform officer to gain compliance, even the most small compliance, was aggressively surrounded and intimidated.
	And if I had carried through on that or other officers carried it through on the most basic level of engagement, never mind enforcement.
	There was a risk of escalation to violence.
	And the crowd dynamics that existed that weekend, it is only but for the grace of God that something worse did not happen.
	Right.
	So you're telling me there was enforcement.
	And my understanding is no police officers were ever assaulted.
	That's not correct.
	I believe that we...
	I've given an example on the situational report from the night of February 4th into February 5th.
	Inspector Dehu talked about one of our sergeants.
	Who was swarmed and assaulted?
	City workers in the same situational report who were swarmed.
	I don't know whether or not a criminal code charge was ever laid, whether or not the officer could identify who did it, but as was led earlier on, not every incident of assault or threat led to an actual charge, but those incidents occurred on a regular basis, on a 24-7 basis, across that micro-theater that caused us so much harm and trauma in the city.
	And were you also then, in that assessment, that there was risk of injury or death and that the crowd was volatile, were you receiving specific intelligence about the composition of some of the people there that led you to think that?
	Were you receiving intelligence or information that led you to believe that there was this risk?
	I could see it firsthand.
	And yes, I got regular reports literally at every single briefing cycle about the level of volatility across the theater.
	And you were using that then to determine when enforcement actions should be used and where?
	No, I didn't determine when enforcement actions should be.
	I set a strategic level direction, use discretion.
	We don't want to cause a bigger problem than we're trying to solve.
	Make sure officer safety and wellness is there.
	Make sure we understand that trying to do enforcement in one area may be more risky than not.
	So, I never directed any particular enforcement action, if that's what you're asking.
	Sorry, by you I meant OPS generally, not you personally.
	Through the incident command process, yes.
	Okay.
	Ms. Tammen for the Coalition of Businesses and Residents had asked about closing access to the downtown core prior to the convoys arrival and your view that the charter precluded that activity.
	You recall that discussion you had with her?
	I think I put some nuance into that, but the advice that I had got around full closures of the downtown area were not in alignment with that course of action.
	And did you ever consider the distinction between an individual's right to go down to Parliament Hill and protest and the need for the trucks to access the downtown?
	So that is, did you ever consider blocking access to the trucks but not the individual protesters?
	I won't say there was no consideration around that, but the conveyance, whether it's a skateboard or a truck, is what brings the person to the location.
	Okay, sorry.
	But the skateboard is clearly able to go into downtown.
	There's no restrictions to skateboards.
	There are established truck routes that allow only certain types of vehicles to be on certain roadways, right?
	And it's my understanding that PLT tried to negotiate around those truck routes and to keep as many trucks out of the downtown core as possible.
	Okay.
	So, you also told Council for the City of Ottawa that one of the OPSB's primary functions was to assist in getting the resources that OPS needed.
	Do you recall that exchange?
	Yes.
	Now, are you aware of the other primary functions of the Board during a major event such as this one?
	During a major event or just the primary functions of a Board in general?
	Well, in setting priorities, especially when it comes to a critical incident or a major event such as this one.
	I'm not aware of the Board's ability to set priorities during a major event.
	They can set priorities for the organization, overarching priorities, strategic priorities, but I'm not aware, if I stand to be corrected, that the Board can set priorities for any specific event.
	Okay, so I'll take you to the Morden Report, which we've seen before, COM 50616.
	And I just want to make sure that we're clear about the scope of the function of the Board, that it's not limited to getting resources, at least not according to the Morton Report.
	If you can go to page 22. So there it talks about three elements to the consultation protocol.
	So the first element is information exchange between the Board and the Chief of Police.
	Reciprocal information exchange.
	Must exist, and I'm going to kind of condense it a little bit for time, to ensure that each obtain information relevant to their respective roles.
	The Board will be provided with operational information that will inform its policymaking function, and the Chief of Police will have an opportunity to provide his or her views on policy options the Board is considering.
	With this exchange, both policies and operations may be adjusted to address changing circumstances.
	And so the first step is really exchange of information.
	Now, the critical point is the second element, which seeks specific operational information from the chief of police where a critical point arises.
	And now, according to Morden, this is specific policing operations, such as a gun and gang operation, events such as, for example, a G20, or organizationally significant issues.
	I would put to you that the events that happened in January and February of 2022 in the convoy was a critical point that the board should have been involved with at an operational level.
	Would you agree that that's contemplated in Morden?
	No, I wouldn't.
	And even with this information in front of me.
	I mean, if what Morton is considering, first of all, Morton is a report, it is not a statutory authority under the Police Services Act.
	So it's informative, but it's not instructive.
	Secondly, if what he refers to as a policing operation is a gun and gang operation, if that is, for instance, what is, I'll go back to my Toronto Police days, but Toronto Police experienced, you know, sometimes years in a row of escalating guns and gang violence.
	What is chief?
	Your approach to addressing gun and gang violence in the city.
	We'd like to have some policy positions on that.
	For instance, we are not going to use street checks and carding to disproportionately stigmatize or victimize black and brown populations in the city.
	Check.
	Morden's right.
	If what Morden is considering is that, Chief, when you go to take down the Bloods and the Crips operating between 31 and 23 Division, you need to make sure that you have overwatch capability to make sure that none of our officers get hurt.
	Sorry, you've crossed the line.
	You shouldn't be there.
	I can't imagine in a thousand years that Morton would consider that the board would sit down with the chief of police in the middle of the first weekend and start to debate policy instructions around a still unfolding national security event.
	Well, maybe we should keep reading.
	So, specifically, I was considering the point of event, not a specific operation, but an event like an international summit of world leaders.
	A protest of this size, I would put to you, is a significant event that would trigger.
	The second element that's identified here?
	No.
	A planned event for a visit of world leaders usually has a four to five-year cycle of planning, and in which case, yes, they would have plenty of opportunity.
	I gave information earlier on, Commissioner, about...
	The planning that went into the G20 that severed from Muskoka down to Toronto.
	In five months, we had regular meetings, regular scheduled board meetings, specially scheduled board meetings, where Chief Blair and the command team, which I was a part of, provided a lot of information to the board around what we were planning for.
	The board had time to take tour of facilities that we were giving.
	We were able to give very detailed updates, even though we were on an incredibly intense timeline.
	And the board could therefore in those occasions express policy matters, but not in the middle of the weekend where the G20 burnt cars down in our city, where we're sitting down having policy discussions with the board.
	So I'll take you to the third element, board collaboration in defining the what, but not the how of an operation.
	So it says the board should use the operational information it obtains from the chief of police to determine what the police service's overall objectives and priorities will be for a particular operation, event, or organizationally significant issue.
	So if I hear what you're saying correctly, you're telling me that the protests in Ottawa did not fall into any of these categories.
	Is that what you're telling me?
	I don't believe they did, and even if they did, the ability for us to slow the world down in order to have a policy discussion I don't think would have been practical.
	With these established, the Toronto Police Service can create specific operational plans that will outline how the policing missions and objectives will be achieved.
	The Toronto Police Service must always maintain its autonomy to make and execute particular decisions during the operation.
	The board should review the Toronto Police Service's So, if I'm understanding correctly, your view is that that doesn't apply to this situation, correct?
	If I understand everything that's in this paragraph.
	And where it fits into the larger structure of the Morden Report.
	If I understand that Morden is suggesting the Board should set the mission statement for the Incident Command Operational Plan, I would have to reject that.
	Okay, fair enough.
	And so it's fair to say that in this case, the Board did not have an opportunity to provide input on the "what" as is contemplated here.
	Is that correct?
	Again, based on my limited ability to interpret this section in regards to the large report.
	Okay.
	Now, during the February 5th OPSB meeting, Chair Deans asked you to indicate what you needed in order to bring the demonstration to an end.
	We've talked about that.
	And today, the fact that the answer was made public has come up as something that was potentially problematic.
	Do you recall that?
	Is it being discussed?
	So, in your witness statement, you say Chief Slowly publicly announced the request for 1,800 police resources during a special city council meeting on February 7th.
	This was not his normal course of action, but the Freedom Convoy was unprecedented.
	Specifically, Ms. Deans asked Chief Slowly in a public OPSP meeting to provide a detailed report on that level of resources required.
	Page 43, you say, Commissioner Lucky expressed concern that his public request for 1,800 officers was creating officer safety issues.
	Chief slowly recalls defending the decision as it had been made by his board chair, Ms. Deans, at a public meeting.
	Did Chair Deans or the Mayor consult with you on whether to make the specifics of the request public?
	The short answer would be yes.
	There was a lot of discussion back and forth as to who would sign the letter, when the letter would be presented, how it would be presented.
	Quite frankly, I left that largely to the Chair and the Mayor to sort out.
	But in terms of them asking whether or not the request should be made public, in a public forum, and to be released to the public, was that...
	Well, the substantive discussion was...
	Around the board's ability to secure adequate and effective resources for what we were dealing with, it was going to be a public document.
	I don't think there was discussion about it.
	It probably wasn't a very long discussion.
	The intent was for one or both of those individuals to sign a public letter and send it to the highest offices of the land provincially and federally.
	And did you ever ask that it not be made public?
	No, I didn't.
	Okay.
	Those are all my questions.
	My apologies.
	Perhaps I've missed it.
	Is the fact that the letters made public just that it's sent?
	I just want to make sure I understand the question.
	No, the numbers were not provided in camera and that the letters were made public and were not kept confidential, like sent on a confidential basis.
	Sorry, and perhaps I've just misunderstood, Commissioner, that the letters were made public when they were sent to the Prime Minister.
	And the Solicitor General and the Premier and the Minister of Public Safety, or that they were otherwise made public?
	I'm not sure we're going to be giving evidence lawyer to lawyer.
	If you want the counsel to ask the witness further question, you might put it that way.
	But I'm not going to ask for evidence from counsel.
	That was certainly not my intention, Commissioner.
	I'm just trying to understand the basis for my friend's question.
	That's all.
	I just, I don't understand what my friend means by making the letter public.
	I just, I don't understand.
	And if the suggestion is that the letter was made public otherwise, and by sending it to the politicians, then I question the basis for the question.
	That is all.
	Well, the question stands.
	What it means is something that the witness can be asked what he understands from the question, but it's not up to you to cross-examine or question the questioner.
	If you want a further opportunity to ask questions to the witness, that's fine.
	It's a question and answer.
	Maybe I've misunderstood, but there was a question and it was answered.
	Am I wrong about that?
	Sorry, Commissioner.
	Perhaps it's late in the day, and I apologize if I'm no one adding to the confusion.
	I certainly don't intend to cross-examine my friend on her question.
	You were, but go ahead.
	What are you seeking?
	I don't believe I was, Commissioner, and certainly I can assure you and my friend that was not at all my intent.
	The only reason I'm speaking is I had understood Mr. Slowly to say his witness sound free and it came out during his evidence and I put it to him that he had made the number public during the February 7th council meeting.
	My friend has asked him whether the letter was made public and I didn't understand that to have been the case or that to have been in evidence up until the moment of the council meeting.
	So I'm just asking what is meant so that I can understand the basis for the question.
	Cross-examination, but of course, there has to be a basis for any question put forward.
	That's the only clarification I was seeking.
	If it's confusing, I'll leave it there.
	I think I've stated my concern for the record, and I'll leave it there.
	I'm happy to respond.
	My question was whether the request was ever made to keep the request private, not public.
	It wasn't about the letters.
	It was about the resource request, the numbers, whether that was ever requested.
	That the number of resources required be kept confidential.
	I wasn't asking about the letters.
	I was asking about the number of resources, but in any event.
	I'm more than content to leave it there.
	I just, again, maybe it's late in the day.
	I'm content to leave it there.
	Okay.
	Well, if everybody's content, I'm content.
	So you've completed?
	Those are all my questions.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	I don't have...
	I really only have one area I want to just touch base with you on and that's following up a question you answered from Ms. Rodriguez towards the end and was something like they I think referring to OPP and RCMP commissioners might not like our plan but there is a plan.
	Is that?
	You remember that answer, that question?
	Yes, Commissioner.
	It wasn't so much the commissioners wouldn't like my plan, but the representatives that they had sent in the integrated planning team might not having had that briefing suggest that it was a sufficient plan or the right type or tone of plan, but there is a plan.
	We spent 24 hours discussing our plan, presenting our plan, and there was an agreement to move forward around.
	Integrating around that, the details still to be resolved.
	Should you hear from other services, other sources, sorry, that there is no plan, there is a plan.
	And then I'm trying to understand a bit, big picture, what that plan involved.
	And I saw as we went through the documents, there was reference to, and I think this comes from meetings with the levels of government, but also from other documents.
	That there was, for example, bite-sized plans to, for example, deal with the Rideau Centre or the Rideau and Sussex problem, and we heard about that operational plan.
	I guess what I'm asking was, big picture, was the plan, as you saw it at that time, that you would take bites out of the Whole demonstration, starting with Rideau and then moving to other areas.
	I think I saw reference to that.
	And you would take chunks out of it.
	That was big picture, the plan you conceived of at that time.
	I would add to that, sir.
	So that is a significant portion of it.
	Two things that are important.
	That plan was based on on February 8th when it was first presented.
	Refined again on February 9th, still based on the level of resources that we currently had and could reasonably predict.
	And based on that current level of resources, February 8th, 9th, 10th, until we started to really see the numbers go up over the 12th, 13th, 14th, the best that we could envision operationally is taking chunks or bites out of the red zone and holding that, moving on to the next part, removing what was in there and holding that ground.
	If we were able to get the concept of predictable resources in the thousand, thousand plus, the majority of which would be public order, we could conceive of an entire theater of operations similar to the one that ultimately was deployed at the back end of the fourth week, the 17th, 18th, and 19th.
	But given the resource amounts that we currently had and could reasonably predict for 72 hours out, the best we could do was prioritize a list of locations and attempt each day.
	To take one or more of those out, secure that area so people couldn't come back in, and move to the next highest priority based on intelligence, based on the context of that 24-hour period, and based on the resources available in that 24-hour period.
	Because you did talk about this 24-hour to 72-hour.
	I'm just trying to understand.
	Was that, in essence, the plan you were referring to when you said we do have a plan?
	Or is it another plan that is the one, as you say, the big plan to take down everything?
	Or were they separate plans?
	I'm trying to understand.
	Thank you.
	I think it's caused a lot of confusion for a lot of people.
	And I'll try to do a better job.
	There was only ever one plan.
	In my humble opinion, only ever one plan.
	February 28th pre-arrival plan that pivoted after the first weekend into January 31st.
	That became the February 5th document that my council shared with you, sir, earlier on.
	That was the 2.0 version of it going into the second weekend.
	And then going into the meeting with the integrated planning unit, February 8th and 9th, that became the 3.0 document.
	The concept of operations was, I remember it being an eight-point concept.
	I believe it was finally captured as a seven-point concept.
	Talked about things like a public order sub-plan that would take and hold area.
	Talked about negotiations.
	It talked about officer member wellness and health and safety.
	A range of frameworks around which the overall operating plan was focused on.
	The take and hold component, the public order component that I was previously answering, I would say that would be a sub-plan that fed into the larger plan.
	It wasn't the plan on its own.
	That wasn't on its own the take and hold, the overarching plan that we were inviting the integrated planning team to come in and assist with.
	It was our current attempt.
	With the current resources we had to make a meaningful impact, safe and successful, but meaningful impact in the small way that our resources would allow us at this current time.
	I hope that clarifies things, but there is one overarching plan and several subplans.
	That subplan of take and hold was specifically explained to the integrated team at the February 9th meeting, and they challenged that subplan.
	I think constructively challenged that sub-plan, but they weren't challenging the overarching plan, the framework of operations.
	Because I'm still having some trouble understanding if you have the take and hold, basically, and I think that was explained in one of the documents to the tripartite group, I think, saying, well, that allows us to move and It included, I think, moving to Wellington.
	So I'm trying to understand.
	You don't need a big plan if you've got the bites that work.
	But maybe I misunderstood.
	No, and again, sorry, it is hard to understand.
	That wouldn't be sustainable.
	We could, with the resources stretched as we were, we were trying to take what we could in terms of public order plans.
	If we didn't get a significant greater amount of resources, we would run out of steam very quickly.
	It's not a sustainable thing.
	And bite-sized across even the theater that we had, that would take weeks, if not months.
	And we just couldn't sustain our operations at that point without that massive extra amount of resources that the larger concept was requiring, the 1800 or 1790 change.
	The concept of operations plan, the 3.0 plan, was for a massive amount of resources to come in, to do a significant amount of activities.
	While that was happening, we presented this sub-plan of existing resources to take and hold areas of the red zone.
	But that was not sustainable, and that would not have ultimately led to a safe, successful outcome.
	It's the best we could do at that time, and that's what we were presenting.
	Okay, so that may answer the question I was going to ask you.
	So your bite-sized plan process, you weren't asking or you weren't complaining about the lack of additional resources by OPP and RCMP to fuel that sub-plan.
	You were focused on the big plan.
	Yes, sir.
	Okay.
	Thank you.
	That's helpful.
	So we'll adjourn for the...
	Oh, sorry.
	Oh, yes, there's one further announcement to make.
	I'm sorry.
	Yes, the former chief, slowly, is the last witness we intend to call from the OPS, but I do want to note for the record that the Commission had hoped and intended to call Superintendent Mark Patterson as a witness in these proceedings.
	His counsel advised the Commission that he's unable...
	Superintendent Patterson is unable to testify for medical reasons.
	The Commission did its due diligence to ascertain whether he could testify with or without accommodation in these proceedings.
	That due diligence included seeking and reviewing the opinions of two medical experts bearing on his health.
	The Commission is satisfied in the circumstances that it would not be appropriate to call him as a witness.
	Thank you.
	With that further explanation of a witness not attending, we're going to adjourn for the day.
	And tomorrow, I think we're going to start with some of the witnesses who are involved in the protest themselves, I believe, or organizing the protest.
	So, adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9.30.
	Thank you.

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