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Oct. 27, 2022 - Viva & Barnes
09:34:51
Emergencies Act Inquiry - October 27, 2022 - Live with Chat!
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Time Text
Order a lot.
The Public Order Emergency Commission is now in session.
La Commission sur l 'état d 'urgence est maintenant ouverte.
Good morning.
Bonjour.
This is the first day of our third week.
So it's only five more weeks to go.
Okay.
Okay.
Morning, Commissioner.
Good morning.
For the record, Eric Brousseau, Commission Counsel, and I'd like to call the Commission's next witness, OPP Commissioner Thomas Karik.
Morning.
Morning, sir.
How are you?
Excellent.
So we're going to swear you in and then get started.
Thank you.
If you need a break, you'll let us know, but we normally have a morning break of 15 minutes and lunch break of an hour and a break in the afternoon.
Thank you, sir.
Commissioner Carrick, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
I would like to swear on the Bible, please.
Thank you.
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
Thomas Carrick, T-H-O-M-A-S-C-A-R-R-I-Q-U-E.
Do you swear that the evidence to be given by you to this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth to help you God?
I do so swear.
Thank you.
Good morning, Commissioner Karik.
Good morning.
I try to refer to you as Commissioner Karik since there are a couple of commissioners on the stage.
I'd like to pull up document WTS 6039, please.
Commissioner Karik, you sat for a couple of interviews with Commission Council this summer, correct?
I did, yes.
And I'm pulling up your interview summary.
You reviewed this as it was finalized, I take it?
I did, yes.
And do you have any corrections to make to it?
No, I do not.
Okay.
I understand there was a spelling error on page eight, if we could go to that, just in terms of the name of the...
Police Chief for York Regional Police.
His name is Jim McSween and not McSweeney.
Is that accurate?
Correct.
I provided that information this morning and as well on page 9. I think it refers to insurance and it should refer to permit.
That's the first word at the top of page 9. Okay.
Thank you.
And otherwise, the balance remains accurate.
That is correct.
And if I could pull up now, opp.ir.701.
I'm showing you now.
The OPP's institutional report.
You're aware of its contents?
I am aware of its contents, but I don't believe the document on the screen has changed.
Yes, it's coming.
Thank you.
Thank you.
This is the OPP's institutional report?
Yes, it is.
And to the best of your knowledge, its contents are accurate?
To the best of my knowledge, the contents are accurate.
And I take it you adopt it on behalf of the OPP?
I do adopt this on behalf of the OPP.
Thank you.
Prior to being appointed as Commissioner of the OPP, you were a Deputy Chief of Police with the York Regional Police Service.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Yes, I was.
And you've been Commissioner of the OPP since April of 2019?
Correct, sir.
And can you tell us briefly what that role entails?
So that role entails having overall operational administrative responsibility for the Ontario Provincial Police.
We police 330 municipalities across the province, across five regions, each led by a chief superintendent, plus a highway safety division.
We also are responsible for providing various provincial services through our investigations and organized crime section, our traffic safety and operational support section, and a variety of other specialties.
Commissioner, if I can just remind you, you may not know, this is being translated as you speak and sign interpretation as you speak.
So if you could slow down just a bit, that would be appreciated.
Thank you, Commissioner.
And I think you sort of told us just now about the various departments or divisions within the OPP.
Can you tell us who?
Was in charge of each of those in January and February of 2022.
Absolutely.
So our field operations was Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins.
We then have Corporate Services, which was Provincial Commander Mary Silverthorne.
Traffic Safety and Operational Support, Deputy Commissioner Rose DeMarco.
And Investigations and Organized Crime, Deputy Commissioner Chuck Cox.
Thank you.
During the sort of Freedom Convoy events of January and February, how often were those individuals reporting to you?
It would vary.
It could be from multiple times a day to daily to weekly.
We were in constant contact throughout the entire duration of the convoy.
Okay.
And within the OPP, is there anyone else that you were in that level of contact with on a daily basis during these events?
Superintendent Mike McDonnell, who leads our Corporate Communications and Strategic Management Bureau.
I want to ask you now about the OPP's role in general.
And I'd ask the clerk to pull up document COM 50819, which is just a copy of the Police Services Act.
And if we go to Section 19 of the Act, it sets out the responsibilities of the OPP.
Yes, it does.
And while we're getting there, if you could just sort of describe them in terms of your understanding of what the OPP is responsible for.
Yes, the OPP and ultimately I am responsible for providing policing services in municipalities where they do not have a police service or under contract once that contract and agreement has been approved by the Solicitor General.
Responsible for policing of navigable waterways that fall outside the jurisdiction of a municipality.
Also responsible for maintaining traffic patrol on Kings Highways.
And providing investigative support and specialized services as directed by the Solicitor General or the Crown Attorney.
And I understand from the OPP's institutional report that the OPP provides policing services for 328 municipalities.
Is that correct?
That is correct.
I believe we're 330.
So 328 is approximately correct.
Yes.
And what percentage of the OPP's sworn members would be engaged in that kind of frontline policing?
Frontline policing, we would have on a day-to-day basis approximately 3,000.
And specifically, if we go back to the duration of the Freedom Convoy, there were 3,000 provincial constables assigned to field operations.
And that includes maintaining policing in these 330 or 28 municipalities?
That it does.
That does not include the other policing responsibilities that we have for all the other provincial services that we are mandated to provide.
Okay.
And so other than the list in Section 19, which is on the screen, which you just took us through, is there anything else that the OPP is responsible for?
So we have a wide variety of specialized services that we provide from aviation services, Provincial Operational Intelligence Bureau, which you've heard a significant amount about, also our provincial liaison team, which I know you've also heard a lot about.
There is a wide variety of specialized services that the province relies on us to provide from a policing perspective.
Okay.
And one of those, I understand, is public order units.
Is that correct?
We are responsible for maintaining public order in the municipalities for which we police.
We do not have a jurisdictional responsibility for municipalities outside of our policing responsibilities.
We can, however, provide those services if requested.
Okay.
And can you tell us about the structure of the OPP's public order units?
Our public order unit is approximately 257 trained members.
They are primarily assigned to a function which we refer to as our emergency response team.
They have 10 mandated functions, all related to having a flexible emergency response across the province, one of which is the function of public order.
And I understand public order maintenance is, in fact, part of the...
Core police services for any municipal police service.
Is that right?
That's correct.
It's one of five core policing responsibilities that every police service in the province of Ontario has an obligation to fill to an adequate and effective standard.
And if a local police service doesn't have a public order unit, do they enter into agreements with the OPP for the OPP to provide that service?
They are required to enter into an agreement, but not specifically with the OPP.
That agreement could be entered into with another municipal police service.
There are 10 public order units across the province.
OPP is one of those 10. So there are nine other police services that a municipality could enter into an agreement with.
Okay.
And one of those is Ottawa Police Service, I take it?
One of those would be Ottawa Police Service, yes.
What about Windsor Police Service?
Windsor does not have a public order unit.
Okay.
And so do they have an agreement with the OPP?
We do not have a standing agreement with Windsor.
Utilization of public order in Windsor would be assessed on a request-by-request basis.
Okay.
I understand the OPP has sort of divided the province up into five different regions.
Is that correct?
That is correct.
And how does that work in terms of administration of the different regions?
So each region is led by a chief superintendent.
They are then assisted by superintendents that form part of their command team, and they oversee the operations of a variety of detachments who have detachment commanders.
So to put it into a municipal context, the detachment commanders share a lot of the same responsibilities as would a municipal police chief.
As it relates to communicating to a local police service board, establishing community and strategic priorities, and providing day-to-day policing services.
The Regional Chief Superintendent oversees those operations across a variety of municipalities, and they all report up through to the Deputy Commissioner of Field Operations, Chris Harkins.
And when a detachment's resources are overwhelmed or they need assistance, how has that escalated up the chain within the OPP?
So, first and foremost, if there's a neighboring detachment, that can be something that has mitigated detachment commander to detachment commander.
If it's not able to be resolved at that point, it would then be escalated through the regional command team, and it could eventually end up into the hands of the Deputy Commissioner of Field Operations.
However, if it was an emerging and emergent circumstance, those types of needs for resources would be coordinated either by our provincial communication centers or our provincial operation centers.
And if it was a long, protracted event or a planned activity, we would establish what we call an emergency operation center, and our emergency management unit would be involved in that very complex process.
And is it the same process if there's an external...
An external request would normally come into my office, and then it would be assigned to the appropriate provincial command.
If it was for an investigative type of request, it would go to investigations and organized crime.
If it was for additional uniform officers, it would go to field operations.
Public order would go to Field Support Bureau.
What we call TSOS, Traffic Safety and Operational Support.
That does not alleviate local municipalities reaching out directly to a detachment or to a regional commander, but formal requests for assistance should come in through my office.
At this particular juncture in 2022, we had already received approximately 30 formal requests for assistance from other police services, and typically I would receive between 220 and 230 formal requests from municipal services for assistance of the OPP.
In a year?
In a year, on an annual basis, correct.
I understand from the OPP's website that it is a division of the Ministry of the Solicitor General.
So can you explain the relationship between the OPP and the Solicitor General's office?
Yes, absolutely.
As you've articulated, we're a division of the Ministry of the Solicitor General.
The Ministry of the Solicitor General will set strategic priorities for the OPP, provide overall administrative direction.
The day-to-day administrative and operations of the OPP is my sole and exclusive responsibility.
So maybe you can just help us understand what kind of direction would come from the Solicitor General's office.
So that would come in the form of we have a three-year strategic plan.
So that is essentially the Solicitor General's plan that the OPP operationalizes.
It's at an extremely high level that sets the priorities for the organization.
There could be provincial initiatives whereby the ministry...
Wants to support the OPP in achieving certain operational objectives and will provide us with the necessary funding and support to do so.
And how does the reporting up to the Solicitor General's Office work?
So there's an annual report that is submitted to the Solicitor General's Office.
And then as it relates to day-to-day reporting, there will be many occasions where there will be no contact between myself and the Deputy Solicitor General for days or even for weeks.
If there are certain situations for which he requires a level of situational awareness, then it's my responsibility to ensure that he receives that information.
Okay.
And so at the time, that was Deputy Solicitor General DiTomaso?
That is correct.
Did you, on a general or frequent basis, report to anybody else within the Solicitor General's office?
No, I did not.
So you didn't report directly to then-Solicitor General Sylvia Jones?
No, I did not.
I want to ask you now about a term that...
We've heard, which is police of jurisdiction.
Can you help us understand what that term means and where it's kind of grounded?
Certainly, police service of jurisdiction relates to the police service that...
Has a legislative responsibility under the Police Services Act to provide adequate and effective services.
That police service of jurisdiction will report to a local police service board who is responsible in concert with the Chief of Police in ensuring that those adequate and effective services are provided.
And you've already highlighted the five core areas of responsibility that formulate adequate and effective services.
And when we talk about a police service of jurisdiction, does that police service have exclusive jurisdiction in their sort of physical bounds?
They have exclusive jurisdiction within their physical bounds, but just for clarity, that does not mean that another police officer doesn't have full authorities to operate within that jurisdiction.
That doesn't mean that another police service may not enter into an investigation that takes them into that jurisdiction to conduct interviews or do follow-up.
But if there is an incident within that jurisdiction...
That starts in that jurisdiction, that is taking place in that jurisdiction, that is the exclusive and sole responsibility of that police service of jurisdiction.
Okay, and you've just sort of drawn the distinction between jurisdiction and authority, so maybe you can help us understand the difference.
As jurisdiction relates to the legislative responsibilities under the Police Services Act, whereas authorities...
Relate to the authorities that a police officer has to execute their duties.
Now, I want to ask you about the circumstances in which the OPP might be called on to step in.
And this is addressed at Section 9 of the Police Services Act, which is on the screen, page 11. So, I think the first, subsection 9-1.
Is at the request of the commission, which I understand is the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.
Is that correct?
That is correct.
Okay.
And so what would that look like?
Why would that come about?
In my experience, that's usually a situation where there's been ongoing and long-term concerns over the administration of a police service and or their ability to provide adequate and effective policing.
Okay.
And so the commission can direct?
The OPP essentially to step in.
Correct, yes.
And then if we go down to subsection 4, a local Crown attorney can request the assistance of the OPP.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
And that would normally be for an individual situation and most commonly for a criminal investigation that is warranted.
Okay.
And subsection 5, it can be requested by a resolution of the local police services board as well.
Yes, it can.
What circumstances would that occur?
That would be a specific event, perhaps, or where the board has concerns over its ability to provide adequate and effective service.
The board's ability or the local police service?
It's a shared responsibility.
In legislation, the board has a responsibility to ensure adequate and effective policing, as does the chief of police.
And if we go down to subsection 6, a local police chief can ask for that assistance in the cases of an emergency.
Is that correct?
That is correct.
And if we go down to subsection 8, it says, when a request is made under this section, the commissioner shall have the OPP give such temporary or emergency assistance as he or she considers necessary.
And shall have the Ontario Provincial Police stop giving temporary or emergency assistance when he or she considers it appropriate to do so.
And so am I right in understanding that it is mandatory?
If there is a request for assistance, the language of Section 8, it requires the OPP to provide whatever assistance is necessary.
Whatever assistance that I deem necessary, correct.
Right.
And other than...
The sort of mechanisms in Section 9 here.
Are there any other ways in which the OPP's assistance can be formally or informally requested?
Other than, as I mentioned earlier, there may be a reach out to a local detachment, but in terms of as it's prescribed in law and the formal process, these are the only ways for which we can be called upon to provide that level of assistance.
Okay.
And so just to be clear, there's no...
Provision which would enable the Solicitor General's Office to effectively direct that it occur.
Not direct that it occur.
If the Solicitor General's Office had a concern over adequate and effective policing, the appropriate route in legislation would be to refer that concern to OCPC.
I want to ask you now about...
The origins of the Freedom Convoy and when it first came across the OPP's radar.
What can you tell us about that?
Well, as documented in my witness summary, we became aware of that from the provincial liaison team's perspective on or about the 12th of January.
I believe an analyst actually became aware of it on the 10th of January.
That information was then transferred to a member of the provincial liaison team.
And by the 12th of January, the provincial liaison team was starting to engage in relation to the Freedom Convoy.
Okay.
Other than the Provincial Liaison Team or PLT, what other preparations were underway within the OPP?
As of the 13th of January, the Provincial Operational Intelligence Bureau was also engaged in the collection and dissemination of intelligence.
And as information continued to come in, then various aspects of the organization came involved, right up to us appointing a major critical incident commander and local incident commanders for every region for which the Freedom Convoy would travel through.
Okay.
And do I understand it correctly that the OPP was the police of jurisdiction all the way essentially from the Manitoba border?
Until the convoys reached Ottawa.
Yes and no.
As long as the Freedom Convoy remained on King's Highways or was traveling through municipalities for which we were the police service of jurisdiction, yes.
But there were a number of events and activities that happened off of the King's Highways that would have fallen into the jurisdiction of other police services for which we worked in cooperation with those services as the convoy traveled on its way to Ottawa.
And what did that cooperation with the local services look like?
The cooperation was integration in terms of responding to the convoy as it traveled through that jurisdiction, or there were moments in time where other people would congregate to show their support for the convoy.
There may be a stop at a parking lot.
We'll use Vaughan Mills Mall as an example.
Where there were a number of protesters and vehicles that gathered in the Vaughan Mills Mall.
And that would be a coordinated response between the OPP, who was looking after the traffic aspect of it.
And then once that convoy or that congregation was to form on municipal grounds, like the Vaughan Mills Mall, that's where York Regional Police would engage as it related to what other policing provisions were required.
Now, I want to ask you about the OPP's intelligence gathering, and I'm sure you're familiar with the Hendon reports.
Very, yes.
Did you personally receive every Hendon report that was published?
Yes, I did.
And did you review them as they were published?
Yes, I did.
And did you speak with Superintendent Morris or anyone else from POIB?
About them.
On occasion, I would have had conversation with Superintendent Morris, but not specifically related to every Hendon report or at regular intervals.
The Hendon reports were very thorough, very complete, and I found them.
They provided me with the necessary information I required to have full situational awareness.
The January 20th Hendon report mentions that Police of jurisdiction resources could be stretched if rallies are organized at the local level to coincide with the arrival of the convoys in a given community.
Did the OPP take any action in response to the concern that local police of jurisdiction might be overwhelmed or stretched, to use the term?
Yes, it's my understanding.
And you've heard from Superintendent Craig Abrams that Superintendent Abrams was engaged with Ottawa Police Service, offering and providing some support from the Ontario Provincial Police.
And I'd also made inquiries with Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins in relation to our knowledge in relation to Ottawa's level of preparedness.
Okay.
And I'll ask you about that in a second.
But what...
Going into the first weekend, which is the 29th and 30th, what was your personal understanding of what this protest was going to look like in Ottawa?
This was going to include a high degree of active participation, a large number of commercial motor vehicles and personal vehicles, as well as a commitment for longer-term activity.
There was no exit plan from the protesters, and there were also demands that we knew could not be realized in the short term, if at all.
Is it your understanding that the Ottawa Police Service had that same understanding of what was going to transpire over the weekend and potentially longer?
Yes, it was.
I was well aware that Ottawa Police were also in receipt of the Hendon reports and had been for at least a year leading up to.
And in fact, on January 21st, I made an inquiry with Superintendent Morris to ensure that all police chiefs in the province were receiving the Hendon report.
What prompted that inquiry?
The content of the Hendon reports, wanting to ensure that there were no gaps within organizations and that the chiefs of police had access to what I felt was necessary and important information.
What To your knowledge, what steps did the OPP take, again, in that week leading up to the first weekend, to provide assistance to the OPS?
We provided resources.
We had provided frontline personnel to assist with traffic management.
We had provided critical incident commanders.
We had provided a public order team that was shared between Parliamentary Protective Services and the Ottawa Police, and we had offered additional resources if required.
Were there any resources sought in that first week that you weren't able to provide?
To my knowledge, no.
And we heard from Superintendent Abrams last week.
What was his role in Ottawa?
He was fulfilling the role of strategic superintendent or strategic commander, and his primary responsibility was to maintain relationships with Ottawa Police Service, facilitate any requests for assistance, and coordinate our deployment in terms of logistics and be the link of communication between the OPP and the Ottawa Police Service.
Now, he testified...
About participating in a January 27th Intersect call.
Do you know what Intersect is?
Yes.
And in learning on January 27th, which is the Thursday before the first weekend, that the OPS planned to allow 3,000 trucks into downtown Ottawa.
Was this information relayed to you before that first weekend?
No, it was not.
Okay.
What was your understanding of what was going to happen?
What happened with the trucks that first weekend?
My understanding was that Ottawa Police Service had designated parking areas for the commercial motor vehicles and that those commercial motor vehicles would be contained in these parking areas and that they were running shuttle buses to transport participants to allow them to engage in lawful protest and that they would not be permitting any large commercial motor vehicles into the parliamentary precinct.
And where did that understanding come from?
From Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins.
And if you had known, if you had been told on January 27th that 3,000 trucks were going to park in downtown Ottawa, what, if anything, would you have done differently?
I certainly would have asked some additional questions to ensure that they had the adequate resources that they required.
I would have asked some additional questions around the integrity of the Block of Parliament and Wellington.
Keeping in mind that it is not my role or responsibility to sit in judgment of an operational plan, but it would have warranted further inquiry to determine whether Ottawa required any additional assistance, then we certainly would have had those conversations.
Okay.
And again, I appreciate we're sort of in a hypothetical, but what additional assistance could the OPP have provided based on, you know, if you had learned of that plan?
We could have amassed additional resources if we're required.
We could have contributed to contingency plans and we could have just offered some advice and guidance if it was appropriate.
Being mindful that Ottawa Police Service has always been very highly regarded and respected for its ability to manage protests.
Lawful and otherwise.
And in fact, as a sergeant, I was deployed to Ottawa as a member of a public order unit and I experienced firsthand Ottawa's ability to not only plan for events, but to manage those events.
In speaking about this particular time period, Superintendent Abrams described what I think he called a sort of stay-in-your-lane mentality.
Is that what you're describing, essentially?
I wouldn't say a stay in your lane mentality.
I think as a good policing partner, if we identified something that was of concern to us, that we have a responsibility to engage in conversation.
Ultimately, the decision as to how the operational plan should be executed is that of the Ottawa police.
And I'm not sitting in judgment of those decisions, but we would have initiated some further conversation.
Just to offer any additional inputs that we thought may be helpful or additional resources.
And that did happen on a number of occasions throughout the Freedom Convoy where we did reach out to individual police services to make inquiries, not to provide a direction, not to sit in judgment of operational plans, but to ensure the collective success of policing across this province.
And I understand, again, prior to this first weekend, you You didn't see and didn't request a copy of the operational plan.
No, I did not.
And if you had known that the plan was to allow 3000 trucks in, would you have asked for a copy of the plan?
I would have asked additional questions.
I wouldn't necessarily have asked for a copy of the plan.
That is not my purview to be requesting operational plans from other police services.
Most times, I would not even see an operational plan within the Ontario Provincial Police.
There are various levels of subject matter expertise that have the autonomy, the knowledge, skills, and ability to approve those plans.
And I'm sort of expanding out from you personally and just asking, in what circumstances would the OPP ask for the operational plan of another police service?
If we were being asked to perform an active role as an active participant in a unified or integrated command, that is a situation where the appropriate critical or major incident commander or strategic commander would want to see a copy of an operational plan.
But that is not something that I would request or be provided.
Mr. Clerk, if we could pull up OPP404582.
I'm taking you to your text message exchange with Deputy Commissioner Harkins.
And if we go to page 10, these are texts exchanged on January 27th, I believe, although I believe the timing might actually be sort of Greenwich Mean Time, and so we might be off by a few hours on these text messages.
If we go there, not sure.
And so I think in blue is Deputy Commissioner Harkins, and in green is your text.
Is that accurate?
That is correct.
The blue is Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins, and the green is myself, yes.
Okay, so Deputy Commissioner Harkins is not sure you got my message.
Reference a briefing tomorrow from MCIC, having RCs all take part with us, as well as Mike from Corp.
Coms.
Carl has concerns around traffic in Ottawa Corp.
4.17 and 4.16 may become an issue.
And your response?
I did, and I'm looking forward to it.
Also very interested in what POIB has to say about any risks to Parliament.
Yes.
So what were Deputy Commissioner Harkin's concerns about traffic, and what were your concerns about Parliament?
So you would have to speak to Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins specifically for his concerns, but from my perspective and my independent recollection of our conversations is the concern was around the congestion that would be experienced.
In the City of Ottawa by prohibiting the truck traffic to enter into the downtown core, the potential shutting down of access from the 417 and the backing up of traffic that would be related to trying to corral all of the commercial motor vehicles into designated parking areas.
And you can see from my inquiry there, this is in and around what activity is anticipated to take place in and around parliaments, and it was subsequently...
Okay.
I believe Superintendent Abrams, at least in his witness summary, he may have said last week that he reported the 3,000 trucks downtown to Deputy Commissioner Harkins.
But you're telling us you never got that information from Deputy Commissioner Harkins?
Not prior to the arrival of the convoy, no.
It became evidence on the 28th and 29th of January that there was an inability to contain all the commercial motor vehicles into designated parking areas and that they had permeated onto Wellington Street and into the area of the Parliament buildings.
But prior to that, there was no communication relayed to me about that, no.
And I understand you spoke with Chief Slowly on Friday, the 28th of January.
Had you spoken with him prior that week?
I had not spoken to him prior that week in relation to the Freedom Convoy, no.
Okay.
And can you tell us about your discussion with him on that Friday?
Yes, and I believe it was the Friday.
I would have to look at the records.
But prior to that, the Freedom Convoy arriving in Ottawa, I received a call from Chief Slowly asking for assistance with public order, for which I said we would facilitate.
Passed that request along to Deputy Commissioner Rose DeMarco, who also advised me that we were lending support to Parliamentary Protective Services from a public order standpoint.
And I asked that the communication take place between PPS and OPS to ensure that they had the adequate public order units that they required.
I then followed up with Chief slowly via a text message to ask him if he had all the necessary resources for which he responded.
He did to please keep the intel coming.
Okay.
And I understand one of the issues which we'll get into and we'll talk about sort of the...
The need to have a plan to understand how your officers are going to be deployed before deploying them.
But I take it you didn't have a plan for how these public order units were going to be deployed by the PPS or by OPS on that first weekend.
I didn't have a plan, no.
And as previously indicated, I would not normally be provided with an operational plan if we are asked for assistance.
Right.
Okay.
You're not aware of whether...
Anyone from the OPP received a plan in response to which the request to sort of loan public order units to OPS and PPS was fulfilled.
So I'm not sure I completely understand your question.
Are you asking me if the request came in concert with a defined plan as to how public order would be utilized?
I'm asking if you know whether anyone from on the OPP's side...
Saw a plan for how those public order units would be used that first weekend and said, okay, we can give PPS public order units, give OPS public order units.
The deployment of public order units also comes with a public order commander and critical incident commander.
So those discussions in relation to plans and how those assets would be utilized would have taken place between those respective commanders.
And that's not something that I would be involved in.
If we could pull up OPP401583.
This is an email from Chief Slowly on January 30th, which is going to come up on the screen.
If we go down, thanking a number of, I think they're chiefs of police, for assistance provided during that first weekend.
And you respond if we go back up to the top.
Thanks for the update and your leadership, Peter.
Did it appear to you by the end of this first weekend that everything was under control in Ottawa?
I don't know that I would have an opinion in terms of whether everything was under control.
I was certainly aware that there was an ongoing protest.
There were a number of public order units on the ground assisting Ottawa, and Ottawa was doing their best to facilitate a peaceful protest and to deal with any unlawful activity.
Okay.
And what was reported up to you during that first weekend about what was happening?
As previously indicated, the first form of reporting was that the trucks were not being contained.
There was no ability to contain them in pre-identified parking locations.
And then throughout the weekend, I received situational reports in terms of the number of resources that we had assigned to Ottawa and high-level overviews of the number of protesters.
Okay.
If we could go to...
OPP 404582.
I'm taking you back to your exchange with Deputy Commissioner Harkins.
And it's at page 17. Deputy Commissioner Harkins writes to you, just FYI, our incident commander that is in the Ottawa Command Center said it's the most unorganized they have ever seen.
Comments like they got in here, let them try to get out, inappropriate F-bombs, etc.
being addressed.
Apparently willing to wait till Wednesday before action to remove if they haven't already.
And then your response is, thanks, you're available for a call in the morning.
Did you have that discussion with Deputy Harkins, Deputy Commissioner Harkins?
I did.
So the 31st, I believe, is the Monday.
That's correct.
So we're past the weekend now.
You had previously asked me about my level of knowledge.
Is it related to activity over the weekend?
So this is the first indication that there is this type of activity being reported.
And I had also had the opportunity to engage in a meeting with Chief Slowly and Commissioner Lucky also on the 31st of January.
Okay.
And I want to ask you about that meeting.
Can you tell us your recollection of that meeting?
Yes, from what perspective?
The meeting with Chief Slowly and Commissioner Lucky, what was discussed?
Chief Slowly provided us with an overview of the situation.
We talked about providing any resources that he may require and how this could be managed moving forward.
We've got notes taken by OPS.
Legal Counselor, Christian Junot.
Yes.
If we can get those up on the screen, it's OPS 3014454, and it's pages one to three of those notes.
This is a recording by Christian Junot of the meeting.
And so I think you see the second point there.
We planned for a sprint Friday to Sunday and negotiate our way out of it.
Wanted to demobilize my I think that says risks and it's not clear.
The bottom there now transitioned into an occupation.
So, first of all, did you agree with Chief Slowly's assessment that it was an occupation at that point?
I had no reason not to agree with Chief Slowly.
It certainly had turned into a situation that I felt Ottawa Police had not anticipated, and I do not think describing it as an occupation would be inaccurate at all.
You said it turned into something the Ottawa police had not anticipated.
Is the continued occupation something that the OPP anticipated?
I think the best way to answer that is to refer to the Hendon reports, and the Hendon reports clearly indicated that there was no exit strategy, and there were discussions around a long-term presence in Ottawa.
They could not...
Certainly identify how long that would be.
There was reference to multiple weeks, but also demands that would not be realized and committed protesters that would not be leaving unless those demands were realized.
Okay.
And Chief Slowly said, you know, we can't safely remove protesters without hundreds more officers, essentially.
Was that...
Did you understand that to be a request to you and to Commissioner Lucky for more resources?
There was an indication that a request for additional resources would follow, and it did follow.
I believe it's on or about the 2nd of February where I received a formal written request from Chief Slowly.
For additional resources.
However, we continue to provide resources in real time through having a presence in Ottawa through our strategic commander, Superintendent Craig Abrams, as well as our Emergency Operations Centre.
So if you look at the deployment records of the Ontario Provincial Police, you'll see that we're providing resources throughout this entire period and the amount of those resources billed as time goes on.
And if we go down to page two, I think sort of your interjection here is recorded.
Assessment is spot on.
This is now an occupation.
There is sustainability to this movement.
There's a reference there.
No injunction puts us in a different space, then have to act on it, prepare one, but timing of getting one is crucial slash dangerous.
Why were you not supportive of an injunction at this point?
So these are not my notes.
This is the first time I've seen these notes.
I would not say that I was not supportive of an injunction at the time.
My advice was, if seeking an injunction, we ought to make sure that we do have an operational plan that we can move to enforcement when appropriate and necessary.
You do not want to be in possession of an injunction order.
Which implies you have a responsibility and not have the capability and a plan to affect that injunction order.
Okay.
And if we could go down to page three, I think there's, again, another comments which are attributed to you, and you'll let us know if they're accurate.
But the first point, we will facilitate all of the requests or your requests and get embedded in the command structure.
Can you tell us about that in terms of being embedded in the command structure?
Yeah, so offering our assistance to embed into the command structure in any way that we can be of assistance, knowing that we have very experienced critical and major critical incident commanders, public order commanders, planners, PLT commanders, any way that we could assist the OPS with advancing an operational plan, that was that.
Okay.
And would it be fair to say that as of the date of this meeting, which is the 31st, the Monday, that the OPS was overwhelmed in terms of their capacity to respond?
Yes.
And sort of how quickly was the OPP able to actually mobilize resources to the OPS in response to this conversation in particular?
Immediately, we provided all resources, to my knowledge, that were requested when they were requested.
So at no point in time am I aware of us not being able to fulfill any requests.
Okay.
A few days later, on February 2nd, you mentioned this already, Superintendent Abrams was actually kind of formally appointed as the strategic superintendent.
Is that right?
What did that...
What change did that bring about to the OPP's role in Ottawa?
Really, that change enabled us to make sure that we were properly able to provision the logistics that were required.
As increasing numbers of OPP officers were assigned to Ottawa, it meant we had to have lodging, we had to provide food, we had to provide vehicles, we had to provide radios, we had to ensure appropriate shift schedule.
We had to ensure that those officers were backfilled in their home locations.
Every officer that we deployed to Ottawa or elsewhere around this province, for example, January...
On the 12th of February, there were 20 simultaneous events that we were responding to.
That means an OPP officer out of a community for which I have policing responsibility for.
So that takes a significant amount of coordination and cooperation.
So Superintendent Abrams was working very closely with our Emergency Operations Centre, our Emergency Management Unit, to make sure that all of those provisions were in place.
And then also he would have had an entire command structure that he...
Okay.
And I want to pull up an email now, which I think you referred to previously.
It's OPP401576.
And this is a request from Chief Slowly on February 2nd for some additional assistance.
go down to the bottom.
Chief Sully, sorry, if we go back up.
I'm seeking your assistance in providing resources to assist the Ottawa Police with our operational plan.
And so are you aware of whether at this point, February 2nd, anybody, and I appreciate it wasn't necessarily you, but anybody on the ground, Superintendent Abrams, had seen a copy of the operational plan?
I'm not aware you would have to ask them that question directly.
Okay.
And there's a series of requests there.
Were those requests fulfilled?
To my knowledge, all of those requests were fulfilled.
Okay.
Do you know how long it took to get the PLT, the 50 to 60 uniformed officers there?
We had PLT there.
I believe we saw an influx of PLT between the 2nd and the 4th of February.
Inspector Beaudoin, who appeared before the Commission yesterday, would be able to provide you the specifics of that.
I know he himself, at my request, attended Ottawa on or about the 4th of February.
So it would be best to speak with those that were responsible for these assets to be able to get the timing of exactly when they were there.
But many of these assets were already on ground in Ottawa ready and able to assist at this time.
Why did you ask the inspector to attend Ottawa?
It had been relayed to me that PLT was not necessarily being utilized to its fullest extent, and I felt that Inspector Baudouin could provide Chief Slowly and his command team with some experience and guidance as it relates to Marcel's expertise and wanted to ensure that the Chief had the availability of that subject matter expertise.
Weekend and up to about February 2nd, how often had you been briefing the Deputy Solicitor General?
That would vary on the day, at a minimum, at least once a day.
Okay, and we've got your text message exchanges, which do brief the Deputy Solicitor General.
Would you also have daily phone calls?
Not necessarily daily phone calls.
If something came up, there was a question about something, or there was something that went beyond what had been reported, we may connect by phone, but there were not scheduled daily phone calls, no.
Okay.
Now, I understand from Deputy Solicitor General DiTomaso's witness summary that you and he spoke on February 3rd.
Do you recall that conversation?
Not specifically, without referring to any materials that you may be able to provide to me.
Okay.
Well, we don't need to sort of pull it up, but his witness summary relays that you first told him about the possibility of a blockade of the Ambassador Bridge on that day.
Does that sound roughly accurate?
That's fair.
That's fair.
I can't say for certain that it was on that day.
I have disclosed all of my situational updates to the Deputy Solicitor General to the Commission, so it may be contained in there.
There was also the Hendon reports that were going to the Provincial Operational Security Advisor, but I can't say for certain that it was on that date during that phone call that I would have provided that information.
Okay.
The first time that you relayed that information to the deputy solicitor, whether it was on the 3rd or otherwise, were there any concerns raised in response to what impact that might have?
Any concerns raised by me or by him?
By the deputy solicitor general.
We certainly, at some point, had a conversation about the potential of a protest in Windsor specific to the Ambassador Bridge, and I had shared with him that we had offered our assistance to Windsor.
Okay.
And we'll sort of deal with Windsor as a sort of separate subject, so I want to keep the focus on Ottawa for the moment.
If we could go to OPP404580, This is page 47. This is your text exchange with the deputy solicitor general.
There it is.
Good morning, deputy.
No events reported overnight.
Sorry, the date on this is February 4th.
I spoke with Commissioner Lucky, Chief Slowly, and Chief Raymer last night.
All have access to the necessary OPP resources.
We will be continuing to assist OPS and TPS with their requirements today and throughout the weekend.
And the Deputy says, thanks, Commissioner Karik, much appreciated.
Can you tell us about that discussion with Chief Raymer, Chief Slowly, and Commissioner Lucky the previous evening?
Yes, and that was, as I recall, it was not a discussion with them all collectively.
I had spoke to all of them throughout the day.
We had numerous events that were transpiring, and in particular, there was a planned event to take place in Toronto on Saturday, February the 5th.
So we were doing our best to coordinate access to the necessary resources and provide the necessary supports to the competing and concurrent events that were taking place around the province.
So I was giving the deputy some assurance that we were lending that necessary support and we were fulfilling any requirements that had been asked of us.
Okay.
And what resources were deployed to Ottawa and Toronto that second weekend of the protest?
So there was ample resources.
There was frontline resources provided.
There was intelligence resources provided.
I don't believe at the end of the day we ended up providing any public order assets to Toronto, but that evidence would best come from the hubs that we established.
We had hubs that were ensuring that the public order teams were deployed where they needed to be, when they needed to be, which could mean any one of the 10 public order units.
units would have been deployed to any one of these locations.
So that level of detail would have to be shared with you from Okay.
And based on what you were hearing from Superintendent Abrams, who is the strategic superintendent on the ground, did it seem that everything was under control at that point on the 4th?
I'm not in direct contact with Superintendent Abrams.
My information is coming at this point in time from situational reports that are coming multiple times a day, which is providing me with a level of situational awareness in terms of the number of vehicles, the number of protesters, there's any reports of criminal activity.
Okay.
I want to, so, Deputy Solicitor General DiTomaso, again, in his summary, told us that he spoke with the Toronto Police Service Chief Raymer on February 3rd, which is the Thursday before this, and who explained to Deputy Solicitor General that TPS needed additional resources.
And DSG DiTomaso told him, That Chief Raymer, or sorry, told Commission Council that Chief Raymer said, the OPP doesn't have resources for us, essentially.
Is that accurate, that there weren't actually OPP resources to be directed towards Ottawa?
First, I can't say whether Chief Ramer's conversation with the Deputy was accurate based on what they knew at the time.
Deputy Di Tommaso did inquire with me, being under the understanding that Toronto Police had asked for OPP resources and they were not available.
I directly inquired with Toronto Police and we sorted that miscommunication out.
There were OPP resources available.
We were already integrated into their command centre.
We had a presence in there.
safety division, so we were providing resources to Toronto police.
Okay, and So it's not accurate then that there weren't OPP resources available, that they did get sent that weekend?
There were OPP assets and resources available, and they were sent that weekend, yes.
And this weekend of the 5th to the 6th was the potential...
Blockade of the Ambassador Bridge factored into resource allocations in any way.
We had made a number of inquiries with Windsor Police offering assistance and resources, and we were advised that that assistance was not required if it was required that a request would be made.
The Chief of Windsor seemed confident that they were able to handle the anticipated activities with the resources they had available to them.
Okay.
I want to take you now to OPP401507, which is a forward of an email that Chief slowly sent to a number of people on his team the morning of February 5th.
I'll just, if we can scroll down, I'll let you review it, see if you recall seeing this email.
Okay.
It kind of went up through a number of OPP individuals, but if we go down to the main email from Chief Slowly, there it is.
It was directed to Deputy Chief Patricia Ferguson.
There are a number of individuals copied on it.
Sorry, what are you drawing my attention to?
Do you recall receiving this email as a forward?
Not without having had the opportunity to read the entire string.
I can only see a small portion of the email.
So I would have to ask your indulgence to be able to review the entire thing.
If we can just scroll down, we'll let you review it quickly.
It would be most helpful if you went to the top of the string.
Okay, where you received it, you mean?
Yes.
Okay, sure.
You've received it from Deputy Commissioner Rose DeMarco.
said thanks please uh please if you don't mind stopping there i'd like to can you go back up Okay, thank you.
Stop there, please.
This is the part that has my response.
Sorry, can you bring it down?
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Keep going if you don't mind.
Keep going if you don't mind.
Thank you.
Next, please.
Next, please.
Please keep going.
Please keep going.
Thank you.
Yes, I do recall this email.
Thank you for your indulgence while I familiarize myself with it.
That's all right.
So you received this email that morning, and I understand that you actually spoke with Chief Slowly later that Yes, I believe I did speak to Chief Slowly later that day to relay concerns over moving forward with positive action as it related to public order that had been relayed to me.
Okay, and what were your concerns?
Concerns were around...
Not having a sufficient plan in place as it was relayed by my team.
So whether a plan was in place and had not been clearly communicated and not having fully exhausted the opportunities through PLT.
And what was the response to your concerns as expressed on that call?
If I recall correctly, he thanked me for sharing it with him, and he was going to review those concerns and next steps.
Okay.
Now, did you raise those concerns with the Deputy Solicitor General?
No, I would not have raised those concerns with the Deputy Solicitor General.
Okay.
So by this point, we're at sort of February 5th.
You hadn't relayed to the Deputy Solicitor General any concerns about what was transpiring in Ottawa and whether the OPS had control of the situation.
So I had had numerous conversations with the Deputy Solicitor General and I shared with him concerns as they came forward and how we had mitigated those concerns.
So concerns had been shared that we were not in receipt of a clearly communicated plan.
And that we were working towards ensuring that we did have a clearly communicated operational plan.
Certainly, there were concepts of operation, but we required a plan to move forward in facilitating all requests for assistance.
At one point in time, I had made him aware that there were numerous changes within the command structure that was challenging the development of a plan and moving forward with a plan.
At one point in time, I made him aware that I had been Concerns had been expressed to me over the underutilization of both our CMP and OPP resources that had not been tasked and were not being utilized and could have been leveraged.
And at one particular time, I made him aware of a situation where there was some conflict that emerged on a call with the chiefs of police that I believe Superintendent Morris has already provided evidence on.
So at each interval, I made him aware of those situations and also made him aware of what we were doing to address them in a cooperative manner.
Okay.
And as far as you know, or as far as you could tell, was the Deputy Solicitor General concerned?
About the sort of leadership and what was happening in Ottawa?
You'd have to ask the Deputy Solicitor General whether he was concerned or not.
My perception was that I had provided him with the information for his situal awareness and what we were doing to provide assistance.
And at this point in time, we are doing our best to assist Ottawa police.
That's our role.
This is an extremely stressful, dynamic situation for the Ottawa Police, and our role is to provide the necessary assistance, and that's what we were really focused on.
Okay.
I'd like to pull up OPP 404583, if we can go to page three.
These are your text exchanges with Commissioner Luckey, and we'll go to an exchange on the same day, February 5th.
You send Commissioner Lucky a kind of update on essentially what the OPP has done.
And if we can go down, she replies, thanks, Tom, very helpful.
Between you and I only, GOC, losing slash lost confidence in OPS, we've got to get to safe action slash enforcement because if they go to the Emergency Measures Act, You or I may be brought in to lead, not something I want.
Is this the first time?
So first of all, GOC, I assume that's government of Canada?
That's the way I would have interpreted that, yes.
And so Commissioner Luckey is relaying to you that the government has lost confidence in OPS.
Did you still have confidence in the OPS at this time?
That's a difficult question to answer as to whether I had confidence in the OPS at the time.
I was certainly aware of the challenges that they were experiencing, and I did feel with the support that we were providing.
That there was an opportunity to develop and execute a plan that would bring upon a resolution to this.
And ultimately that's what happened.
And I think it's important not to lose sight of the fact that this whole situation was resolved while preserving life without any serious injury.
And with preventing any serious damage to critical infrastructure, a significant impact on quality of life to the residents, the local residents, an impact on local economy, but a resolution through providing the necessary assistance was eventually the outcome of this.
Okay.
And there's a reference to the Emergency Measures Act.
Was that the first time that that had come up in your discussions with Commissioner Luckey?
Certainly, to my recollection, at no time do I recall her or I ever having any conversation about the Emergencies Measures Act.
At one point in time, I did ask her if that afforded the Government of Canada to actually...
Provide that type of direction and actually appoint RCMP or OPP to take over policing because I certainly was not familiar with any federal legislation that would allow that to happen.
Were you surprised to see it at this point on February 5th, a reference to possibly invoking the act?
Can't say whether I was surprised to see whether there was reference to invoking the act.
That certainly would not have been the focus of my attention.
It was more around the confidence that there was an indication that the government had lost confidence in the OPS.
That is something that obviously would be of great concern, not only to me as a policing leader.
But should be something that the Police Services Board would have been engaged in.
And I was aware through conversation with Commissioner Luckey that there had been some dialogue taking place, the details of which I was not privy to, but there were conversations taking place between the City of Ottawa and members of the federal government.
Okay.
And it's sort of a fair reading of Commissioner Luckey's text that she's reluctant to have the RCMP come in.
Did you share her concern about having the OPP step in and take over the situation?
Did I share her concern with the OPP?
She says you or I may be brought in to lead, not something I want.
Commissioner Luckey doesn't want the RCMP to be kind of appointed and put in charge.
Was the OPP taking over the lead role in Ottawa something that you would have welcomed at that time, or would you have been as...
Reluctant to take over as Commissioner Luckey appears to have been.
If the request came as defined in the Police Services Act, it would not have been something that I would have been reluctant to take over.
It would have been a responsibility, and as you've clearly articulated the responsibilities in the Police Service Act, it would have been one that would have required an assessment of me, but we would have absolutely been willing to move forward and fulfill our responsibilities.
And that would have included working with resources within the Ottawa Police Service to succeed.
Okay.
I want to ask you about a text exchange with Deputy Solicitor General DiTomaso the next day, so if we can go back to OPP404580.
It's at page 61. And you forward a link to a CBC article, and then...
If we go down and say to date, approximately 1,501 OPP officers deployed to Ottawa in response to the Freedom Convoy.
So was that information that the Deputy Solicitor General had requested from you in terms of the number of OPP officers deployed?
Yes, that had been requested from the Deputy Solicitor General's office to my office.
It had also been provided in an email, and this I know became a point of contention.
For the Ottawa Police, and that is in relation to an obligation that I have to take administrative account for the number of officers that are providing services.
If I am planning on seeking financial reimbursement, that needs to be approved by the Solicitor General.
So there was an interest in the number of resources that we were providing from a financial accountability standpoint, and to ensure that we were assisting that 1501.
Is an administrative number.
That is derived at looking at approximately, I believe it was 135 to 150 officers a day over a 10-day period is where our analysts came up with that number.
So at no point in time on that date would we have had 1,500 officers in Ottawa at one time.
Okay.
And later that same day, the Solicitor General, Sylvia Jones.
Made a statement, sort of recycling that number, I guess, if I can use that term.
And as you've alluded to, that was something that Chief Slowly was unhappy about.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Okay.
And can you tell us about, did you have a discussion directly with Chief Slowly about that?
He and I did have a conversation about that directly, yes.
Okay.
Can you tell us about that discussion?
Yes, I certainly explained how the number was derived at and that it was, in my opinion, not having spoken to the minister's office, it certainly would not have been done without any ill intent and that it was important for he and I to remain focused on operations and not engage in any political conversations that could detract us and distract us from the operations.
Okay.
And did he appear to accept that explanation?
I felt the conversation was positive.
I didn't feel that it had any adverse effect on our operational relationship, but it was clear that he was disappointed that that number had been shared publicly and that caused him concern and that he anticipated that causing him additional pressure, which was fair.
Okay.
And if we scroll down on this page, your follow-up text message to the Deputy Solicitor General.
Not for discussion with OPS, but for your and SOC.
At one point, we had three times for uniform officers the ground in Ottawa than OPS did.
This has since been balanced out /corrected.
Can you explain that?
You're telling the Deputy Social General that the OPP had three times more people on the ground than OPS.
Is that correct?
That was my information at the time, yes.
Okay.
And this is...
We've had the experience where the 1500 and one was released publicly.
This was not for public consumption.
There was great concern over OPS being provided the number of resources that they required.
So this was providing the Deputy Solicitor General with a level of situational awareness should he receive similar information from his federal counterpart over the same concern that the RCMP had expressed that this had been corrected.
Okay, so maybe you can help us understand the concern expressed about the numbers being requested.
What was the concern?
Sorry, can you repeat that?
You said this was to help the Deputy Solicitor General fend off questions.
Because there was a concern about the numbers that had been requested.
What was that concern?
And I don't believe I said to fend off questions, to provide him with an appropriate and professional level of situational awareness.
There had been concerns relayed to him over RCMP officers, allegedly sitting around, not being provided direction.
We had received same information from some of our officers and the Deputy Solicitor General.
I wanted to assure him that there was similar information, that we had had more officers there than Ottawa.
However, that that had been corrected and balanced.
So should he have to explain that, enter into a conversation with regards to that, that that situation had been resolved.
Okay.
You know, we've heard witnesses testify about what I'll call a Coventry Road incident.
Does that ring a bell?
Yes, it does.
What were you made aware of in terms of what happened at Coventry Road?
So, my level of awareness on that was very specific to feelings from PLT, Provincial Liaison Team, that that would have damaged the reputation and progress that they felt they were making.
Okay.
And if we could pull up OPP401532.
This is an email that Deputy Commissioner Harkins forwarded to you.
Sorry, I just want to make sure that the Commissioner caught at the top that it was sent to him.
Thank you.
It comes from Superintendent Abrams who wrote the email.
I'll just give you a second to read it.
Thank you.
The part I want to ask you about, I think we don't have to sort of read the whole email, but I want to get down to the two major operational plans upcoming.
So if we could scroll down to that part right there.
So Superintendent Abrams was briefing others, and then this email gets passed on to you about a couple of planned actions, one at Rideau in Sussex.
Another, which other witnesses have described as sort of snatch and grab, or was described as snatch and grab.
And if we scroll down, we see that Superintendent Abrams spoke with Superintendent Patterson and said, as a result, basically, Superintendent Abrams was not satisfied that there was any sort of plan or legal authority for the OPP-POU to be participating in this.
These two plants.
Is that a fair assessment of the email?
Yes, I would say it is.
And do you recall having discussions amongst your team about that?
Yes, and I also recall having a follow-up discussion with Chief Slowly on this as well.
Okay, can you tell us about that discussion?
I shared the concerns that were relayed by my team, and it was the next day that we had the integrated planning team that had arrived or had started to make their way to Ottawa to assist with more thorough planning.
But you were concerned with the request for OPP members to participate in the Rideau and Sussex dynamic plan to clear that intersection.
I accepted the advice of my team.
I didn't personally have enough in-depth knowledge of what was going on on the ground to have a personal concern, but certainly accepted the concerns and advice of my team and ensured that I relayed that to Chief Slowly, who I believe as a result and maybe as a result of other inputs that he received, that action did not move forward.
And I want to take you back to your exchanges with Deputy Solicitor General Di Tomaso, which is OPP 404580.
If we could go to page 71 at the bottom.
So this is on February 7th, the day after Coventry Road.
Is it appropriate to suggest that all officers in Ottawa be advised that jerrycans, whether filled with diesel or water, ought to be investigated and potentially seized?
Still seeing some social media of groups of men carrying jerrycans into the red zone?
And then your response.
They have provided that direction, supported by a Crown opinion.
The latest response is protesters walking around with diesel cans filled with water.
What can you tell us about this exchange with the Deputy Solicitor General?
I don't know that I can add too much more to what's in the text conversation.
If you scroll back up to his question of me, he is asking if it's appropriate to suggest that all officers in Ottawa be advised that jerry cans, whether filled with diesel or water, ought to be investigated and potentially seized.
He's asking a question, and I've answered that question to say that a Crown opinion has been sought.
There are protesters walking around with diesel cans filled with water, which made it very challenging for the officers on the ground to proceed with that enforcement.
Not all of the jerry cans actually contained fuel.
And I note that the Deputy Solicitor General's text is prefaced with, is it appropriate?
Did you take this to be a sort of suggestion that...
People carrying jerrycans ought to be arrested in Ottawa.
I don't know that I would take it as a suggestion.
He's asking me if it's appropriate, and I've responded, I think, accordingly.
Okay.
If we could go to OPP 401546.
I'm taking you to an email now, again, which was a forward from Superintendent Abrams arising out of the call that he had participated in with Chief Slowly and his team on February 6th.
So if we just stop there, this is your response.
Ultimately, my thanks to Craig, important info to have.
But if we can go down to the text of the email from Superintendent Abrams.
So why...
Why did you feel that this was important information to have?
I felt it was important that Craig share that with his deputy and in turn with me.
Although it was important information to have, this did not impact in any way, shape or form the resources that were facilitated to Ottawa Police.
There was very clear direction provided to Chief Superintendent Carson Pardee that whatever Resources were requested to perform permanent function or identified functions that we would provide them to the best of our ability.
But there was all sorts of public communication taking place over the number of officers, what was required, what had been provided.
So I did see this as important to have, but not impactful in terms of how we would continue to assist.
Ottawa Police, not a big enough concern for me that it's something that I would even bother following up on with Chief Slowly.
It had no material impact on our planning process and the assistance provided.
So you never discussed what you learned from Superintendent Abrams' email with Chief Slowly?
I don't believe I ever discussed this with Chief Slowly.
If it was to impact my...
Assessment on resources required or ability to provide them, I would have.
I had previously discussed with him concerns over the underutilization of our resources, which you identified in the text messages between myself and the Deputy Solicitor General, which he had not been aware of and he addressed, but I did not feel that this was something that warranted the Chief's attention.
I think about 25 minutes after you received that email, you had a call with the Deputy Solicitor General and Chief Slowly about the City of Ottawa's forthcoming request for 1,800 officers.
Do you remember being part of that call?
I don't recall that being a call with all three of us.
No, I do not.
But if it's the call that I think you're referencing, I think it may be cited that there was discussion around twice the number of resources, if you could take me to that document.
But if I am recalling correctly, I certainly did share with the Deputy Solicitor General that this information had been relayed to me, and I assured him that it would not impact the resources we were providing to Ottawa.
But I do not recall it.
was discussed.
Well, let's pull up your witness statement because I believe it's in there, which is WTS 6039.
It's at page 4. Paragraph 2. Sorry,
the actual call might be in Ontario's institutional report.
That's fine.
But you recall being aware of it and making the Deputy Solicitor General aware of this, kind of doubling the numbers, information that you had received?
Correct, yes.
But it's...
I just want to make sure we understand it.
That had no impact on the response to any subsequent requests for additional resources.
No, it did not.
Okay.
If we could pull up ONT402343.
This is a letter.
That Mayor Watson and Diane Deans sent to the Premier, Doug Ford, and to the Solicitor General, Sylvia Jones, formally requesting 1,800 additional officers.
Was this sort of politician-to-politician request unusual?
In my experience, it is unusual.
Normally, a request of this nature would come from the police chief of jurisdiction to me to be facilitated.
And do you know why it didn't come directly from Chief Slowly in this case?
I think that's a question to ask of the mayor.
I do not.
Okay.
And ultimately, I take it you...
Received a copy of this letter from the Solicitor General's office?
I did, yes.
And what was...
I mean, there's a request for 1,800 officers, and you had heard just that morning about the doubling of the number.
And did you not approach the 1,800 number with some level of skepticism, given what you had learned a few hours before that?
I think it would be fair to say that it would cause me to question the number, but the number really becomes irrelevant in the absence of having a plan to define the number.
And as you'll see in my witness summary, the eventual plan not only was not far off the 1800, it actually exceeded.
The 1800.
So the number really becomes a red herring.
We require a plan to define the number of resources required.
What are the expertise of those resources?
What date are they required on?
How long are they required for?
Those are all details that get sorted out.
So whether it's twice what they think they need, which may be out of context.
Maybe they needed half of that on one day, but for sustainability, they were going to need twice that.
This is all noise, as far as I'm concerned.
We needed to get a fully developed plan so we could provide Ottawa with the assistance that they needed, which exceeded the $1,800.
Okay.
But they're saying, I mean, here you have the mayor saying, we need $1,800.
So what is the...
I mean, and then you're telling us, oh, but we need the plan to know what you actually need.
Is that a sort of fair assessment?
I don't know that that's a fair assessment.
It's much more detailed and complicated than that.
Right away, as you've heard from Chief Superintendent Carson Party, he was identified to lead a planning team that was sent to Ottawa to assist Ottawa.
We assembled what I felt were the foremost subject matter experts required to assist Ottawa in the development of the plan.
I had a conversation with Chief Slowly to obtain a contact for them to get his agreement with the team coming.
And I did indicate to him that they were going to be there to test and verify the plan.
These are a lot of resources to be sending on any given day.
On any given day, this is more than the number of Ontario provincial police officers that are on duty.
1,800 officers on any one day would be equivalent to one of the largest municipal police services in this province.
This needed to be planned out and that we would be there to test and verify the plan, but to facilitate the necessary subject matter expertise and the resources required to execute the plan.
I want to take you back to your exchanges with Deputy Solicitor DiTomaso, Solicitor General, OPP 404580.
And if we could go to page 67. So this is, there's a text exchange with the Deputy Solicitor General.
If we go down.
This one lacks a little bit of context, but it says sounds unreasonable.
Ask that will require specific details.
And if we go down to the top of page 68, it says, Deputy, when you have a minute, we should talk re-pending OPS request for resources.
So what was your discussion with the Deputy Solicitor General about this public request for 1,800 officers?
You know, I can give you a general overview as to whether it was that specific conversation or a compilation of conversations, but it was our overall strategy to facilitate this request.
One, I had a concern that this request was made in the public, that it was made politically, that by Ottawa, the City of Ottawa indicating they needed 1,800 officers to resolve this matter.
That showed that Ottawa police was overwhelmed, and how did that impact our ability to ensure that we had the appropriate level of police resources to respond to concurrent, multi-jurisdictional events that were happening across this province, to let him know how we were intending to respond to it.
By sending a chief superintendent that could work peer-to-peer with chiefs slowly on the development of the plan and the necessary resources to develop a fully informed plan.
You mentioned your concern about the publicization of the number.
The day prior, the Solicitor General had published the 1500 number.
Isn't that the same issue, that you're publishing the number of OPP officers?
It turned out not to be an accurate or correct number, but you're publishing the number of OPP officers that have responded.
Isn't that the same concern?
It is the same concern, and the Deputy Solicitor General and I had that same conversation.
As you recall, those numbers were never shared with the intent of them being made publicly available.
It was a financial account.
For the number of resources that we were providing and to give assurance that we were providing the necessary support to Ottawa Police, that information was never shared with the intent of that being communicated publicly.
Okay.
If we can go down to page 70 of this document, you ask the Deputy Solicitor General whether the request for 1800 offices will be referred to the OPP.
And then Deputy Solicitor General says confident it will be referred, not certain.
And then below this text, referral to OPP for assessment only is approved.
Can you help us understand what for assessment only means?
I think that question is best answered by the Deputy Solicitor General.
But my interpretation of it is they were not directing me to provide 1,800 officers, or I think it was 1,700 officers and 100 civilians is what the request was actually for.
But they were going to refer it to me for my assessment, which is consistent with the Police Services Act.
As you recall, when you walked us through Section 9 of the Police Services Act, any request for assistance is to be assessed by me.
Can I just ask why it seemed uncertain or why you had to ask whether it would be referred to you?
Would it not be the case that that kind of a request would automatically go to the OPP Commissioner?
Well, yes, you're correct.
As we discussed earlier, normally that request would come directly to me.
So at this point in time, I'm responding to a request that has been made public and is yet to be received.
By me.
The request was directed to the Premier and to the Solicitor General, so I wanted some assurance that that request would be passed over to me, which I was the appropriate recipient of that request.
It should have been sent to me initially.
Okay.
And if we can pull up ONT50's 851, this is the Solicitor General's response sent on February 10th.
Which is three days after the letter, the February 7th letter.
And so my question, Commissioner Creek, is just, do you know why it took so long to respond and what happened on the OPP's side in the interim?
I can't speak to the length of time that it took to formally respond to the request, but I think you have already heard in great detail from Chief Superintendent Carson Party what transpired after we were in receipts of the letter or the information as it related to the 1,800 members required.
On the 7th, Carson Party was assigned the task of leading the integrated planning team.
On the 8th of February, he was briefed by myself and Deputy Commissioner.
Chris Harkins and then he immediately made his way to Ottawa and commenced his relationship with Ottawa and the rest of the subject matter experts in contributing to the development of a plan and the assigning of resources.
Okay, and I did want to get into the integrated planning team.
Where did that idea come from and why was it necessary?
So that was my idea as it related to the request that I was furnished to respond to.
1,800 officers or 1,700, sorry, and 100 civilian staff.
If that was what was going to be required, the Ontario Provincial Police did not have that capacity to fulfill that request on its own.
It would take integration, cooperation from across the province and perhaps outside of Ontario, which it did, there were more than 20 police services that ended up contributing to the final operation.
And knowing the status of the operation as it was, the reported ongoing challenges with moving forward, I felt it was most appropriate to support the Ottawa Police with providing The foremost subject matter experts to ensure that a plan was built that could satisfy the requirements that they were facing.
Okay.
And I won't take you there in the interest of time, but in a text message exchange with Commissioner Luckey on February 7th, you write, I spoke with Peter.
He is agreeable.
He is agreeable.
I will have Chief Superintendent Carson Party in Ottawa tomorrow to get things started.
So I take it you spoke directly to Chief Slowly about this integrated planning cell?
Yes, I did.
Okay.
Can you tell us about that discussion?
Yes, I think we covered this a few moments ago.
So we did have a conversation where we talked about the manner in which the request was received and also that I would be sending Chief Superintendent Carson Partey if he was in agreement to establish an integrated planning team.
It's been referred to as a planning team, a planning cell.
Planning group, various forms of description before this commission, all essentially meeting the same and that we would assemble the foremost experts.
And I previously highlighted for you that included in that conversation was my responsibility to ensure that we had tested the plan and that we verified it and that we provided the appropriate level of expertise to that plan and the right number of resources.
Just a reminder, you're speeding up again.
Sorry.
I know you're enthusiastic, and we all love to testify, but if you can just try and keep in mind.
Thank you.
My apologies, Commissioner.
No, that's fine.
The City of Ottawa had requested the 1,800 additional resources the day before on February 7th.
While the integrated planning cell or group or team was getting set up and assembled and starting their work, was any work being done to actually gather those 1,800 officers so that they would be ready?
Absolutely.
So there were ongoing meetings taking place with chiefs across the province of Ontario.
There were federal partners engaged in those meetings as well.
The resource requirements were discussed there.
There were various forms of communication sent out to policing partners.
Our Emergency Operations Centre was actively identifying resources across the province that could be deployed.
And I'm sure you will have heard in his evidence from Chief Superintendent Carson Party the great efforts that were undertaken to provide resources.
And the evidence will show that the number of OPP officers steadily increased from that point forward.
Okay.
I want to pull up OPP404561, which are minutes from a meeting of the Commissioner's Command Team on February 8th.
First of all, can you tell us what is the Commissioner's Command Team?
So, Commissioner's Command Team is comprised of what we would call our Provincial Commanders and myself.
So, that is Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins, Deputy Commissioner Rose DeMarco, Deputy Commissioner Chuck Cox, and Provincial Commander Mary Silverthorne.
Okay.
And if we could just scroll down, there it is in the middle.
It's Commissioners, this is attributed to you.
We'll need the process.
With OPS to be established, where is the plan?
Can't do anything until we either have it or assist with building it.
How are you going to use the resources that you've asked for?
Have a SMEAC for the next 24 hours, at very least.
And so, again, I think this is reflecting that actually sending resources to Ottawa is contingent on either having a plan or assisting in building the plan.
That's not completely accurate.
So, not sending 1,800, so 1,700 officers and 100 civilians, could not be done without a plan.
But that did not prohibit us from continuing to support Ottawa with frontline police resources, with PLT, and with public order.
That support continued throughout.
Can I ask, why did it take...
10, 11 days to get this integrated planning group up and running.
There were a few OPP planners who were embedded in Ottawa from a very early stage, but what is it that caused you to put this group together at this time?
Well, the sheer number of the resources that were being asked for.
That would likely end up being required and as I have identified were required and then some and the challenges that were being reported with developing and advancing a plan and we had had subject matter experts in Ottawa previously.
We had offered their expertise and support but not to the development of a plan that was ready to be executed.
If we could pull up OPS 3014454, these are, I think we saw these earlier, these are notes taken by Christiane Hino, who is counsel for the OPS and was taking notes at various meetings.
And if we go to page 130, this is not a meeting that you were at.
Okay.
There's a reference here I want to ask you about.
If we go Down, it says towards the bottom of the page, I believe, it says this is a meeting that is occurring on the 8th, I believe.
Tom C., and then it's got OPP kind of written in on top, is assessing if we are worthy of getting the additional ask resources.
Do you know why that would have been a sense from somebody within the OPS?
Why would they have used the word worthy of getting the resources?
I certainly wouldn't use the word worthy to describe the process that was necessary, but I can sympathize with why somebody may feel that way.
We've advised that we're sending a group of subject matter experts.
There's been various intervals along the way where we've asked that.
A certain number of our subject matter experts be consulted and their advice considered.
And Chief Slowly and I had very open and transparent conversation where I did indicate that we would be required to test and evaluate the strength of the plan.
So I can certainly see why that may be described that way.
Okay.
If we could pull up OTT405590.
You're not on this email chain, but I want to show you a table at the end of this email.
Thank you.
This is internal to the City of Ottawa, but it's something that Chief slowly sent to them.
This is a table with, I think, the total number of resources required there.
It says 1790 at the bottom.
We can maybe make it a little bit larger.
Do you recall seeing I did see something similar to this at some point in time, yes.
I can't say that it was precisely this, but at some point in time through the process, I had seen a table that identified what resources were anticipated being required or were required at that time, yes.
Okay.
And is this table, I guess there's a couple of tables, is that A level of detail that would be sufficient for you to approve or agree upon sending 1,800 officers to Ottawa?
Not in totality, no.
However, during this period, one thing that was clearly communicated was Any requests for frontline resources, we would facilitate.
And I think you will find that during this period, all requests for frontline uniform assistance was provided.
The number again becomes a red herring.
We need to know, for example, a thousand general duty officers.
Specifically, what dates are they needed for?
What shifts are they going to be working?
Where are they going to be staying?
These things all have to be coordinated.
It's not as easy as just pulling together a thousand police officers and sending them off.
Every officer, as I've articulated earlier, every officer sent to Ottawa was an officer out of a local community.
We don't have a warehouse of police officers where I can pull them off the shelf one at a time.
They are being pulled out of the front seat of police cars and our communities across this entire province.
I understand from Deputy Solicitor General DiTomaso's summary that you spoke with him on February 8th, and he recalls, and it's recorded in his summary, that during that conversation, you told him that the OPP was under enormous pressure.
And that he understood you to be referring to political pressure.
Is that accurate?
No, I can't say what he felt I meant by that, but I don't ever recall sharing with Deputy Solicitor General Di Tommaso that I felt under enormous political pressure.
At no time was I under any political pressure in relation to this.
There was a lot of political or public pressure being felt, I think, by every police leader.
But at no point in time was I under any political pressure.
I would suggest it would be worthy of asking Deputy Di Tommaso further on that.
He may have been referring to staffing pressures.
So at this moment in time, I only had 3,000 frontline.
Police constables available to us to fulfill all of our responsibilities in 330 municipalities.
I was running at an operational availability of only 73%.
So to amass this amount of resources is a significant operational pressure.
But at no point in time would I have ever communicated, nor did I ever feel as though I was being put under political pressure.
Okay.
So is it possible that you...
You told him that you were under enormous pressure, and he misread that and misunderstood that to mean political pressure.
No.
No.
At no point in time would I have ever communicated that I, myself, was under enormous pressure.
Sorry, I'm referring to the OPP generally.
Operational pressures, operationally stretched, absolutely.
With a 73% operational availability, down almost a thousand police officers on the front line for various reasons, this puts an organization under enormous operational pressure, which is completely different than political pressure.
I appreciate that.
Commissioner, I'm about to change gears, and I wonder if now is an appropriate time for the morning break.
Certainly we can take a 15 minute break and come back in 15 minutes to continue the examination.
Thank you.
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
Order allowed.
I need to stand.
I'm not a judge today.
The Commission has reconvened.
I just want to ask one follow-up question from this morning.
You mentioned that all police chiefs in Ontario are receiving the Hendon reports.
Recall that?
No.
Is there the...
We're good?
Okay, thank you.
So my question is, is Commissioner Luckey herself on that distribution list?
Commissioner Luckey herself would not be on that distribution list, but numerous members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are on that distribution list.
Now, I want to switch gears and talk about Windsor.
And so, can you help us understand, I mean, there's Windsor Police Service, there's CBSA, and then there's OPP.
So, can you help us understand what the OPP kind of has jurisdiction over when it comes to Windsor?
As it relates to the city of Windsor, we have no jurisdiction.
We police through municipal policing responsibilities in and around the city of Windsor.
Okay.
Nothing within the city, though?
No.
Not as it relates to frontline uniform patrol, no.
Okay.
Now, we spoke this morning about the sort of early intelligence, and if we could pull up OPP.
5-0 is 8-1-9.
This is a January 31st Hendon report.
And if we go to page 3, there is point 13 is a reference.
Open source information suggests that truck drivers from the United States plan to block the American side of the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor to coincide with Canadian drivers blocking the bridge in Windsor.
The available information does not include a date or time.
To your knowledge, did the OPP take any sort of positive steps to try and figure out when a blockade might occur after this January 31st report?
That level of detail isn't something that I could provide you with.
That would be more appropriately asked of Superintendent Morris, who's previously attended.
Or those that were assigned taskings related to the intelligence.
Where there is intelligence that requires further information, a lot of times there will be taskings that come out of that.
But that's not a level of detail that I would be privy to.
Okay.
And if we go ahead to the February 4th Hendon Report, which is OPP 50825, page 6. This is the evening of February 4th.
There's a little bit more specificity to the threat here.
In a section called Ontario Open Source Information, a social media message is calling for Canada-wide rail blockades on February 5th.
Commercial truck drivers and supporters may conduct slow rolls on roadways near the Ambassador Bridge over the next three days and may attempt to block the bridge.
On February 7th.
Do you recall being made aware at that time, February 4th, that there was an impending blockade?
I was aware of the pending blockade and I had communicated with Chief Mizuno to determine whether they required any additional assistance and we were connected at an operational level and at that time we were not required.
Additional assistance was not required?
Was not required, no sir.
Okay.
If we pull up OPP501519, this is, and it's page one at the bottom, this is a sort of note to yourself or an email to yourself from the same day, February 4th.
And it says there, The second to last point, the Chief of Windsor Police has requested assistance with convoys and a potential blockade at the Ambassador Bridge.
So it's my understanding that as of February 4th, Windsor had in fact asked for assistance.
Does this kind of give you a better sense of what had been requested and when?
sorry could you go back up to the top So this looks as though it's some notes that I've transcribed.
We were not formally asked for any assistance as it relates to public order.
We may have been providing some frontline resources, and we may have had some quick response teams available in the area through West Region, but we had not formally been asked to provide any assistance as it relates to.
Integrated command or having a public order unit on ground.
Okay.
I guess I'm just confused because your note records being asked for a request for assistance.
But you're saying there hadn't been a formal request yet?
No, there was not.
This obviously is something that I've pulled together in the form of constructing some sort of note, but it doesn't look as though I sent it anywhere or did anything with it.
I'm not sure specifically what that would be in relation to, but there was no formal request from Windsor for any assistance.
There had been ongoing communication with Windsor.
In particular, there was a call leading up to the 7th, a conference call, where the chief of police indicated that they had all the resources they required.
And that they would obviously be monitoring it.
This being a potential rolling blockade as opposed to a large convoy making its way to a designated and identified area.
Okay.
Well, I think the Hendon report we saw talked about both, like rolling slow rolls on the weekend and then a potential blockade on the Monday.
Correct.
If we could pull up OPP404580, which is, this is your thread with Deputy Solicitor General DiTomaso.
I'm just bringing it up because if we go to page 52, I think the same information recorded in your note to self there was provided to Deputy Solicitor General DiTomaso.
If you see that at the bottom, the Chief of Windsor Police has requested assistance with convoys and a potential blockade at the Ambassador Bridge.
And this was sent on February 5th.
Do you recall any discussion with the Deputy Solicitor General around that time about the potential impact of a Windsor blockade?
No, other than the situational update that's been provided here.
So this is obvious that these two pieces of information are the same.
So what I've likely done is been pulling information, constructed into an email format, then being able to pull it out and provide the necessary update.
So I can't say for certain, but reviewing the information, I would say that this was requests at a local level for assistance.
So as I described earlier, sometimes those requests can go from detachment commander.
Into a detachment commander, sometimes they can come in at a regional command level, and sometimes they will come in formally to me.
I did not have a formal request for assistance, and I had inquired with the Chief of Windsor if there was anything that she had needed from me additionally.
So I hope that clarifies that.
It does.
But just so we understand, I mean, even a sort of detachment-level request is a request.
It would be actioned.
It's not that a request would need to be made directly to you by the Windsor Police Service for assistance.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
So there will be requests on a day-to-day basis that will come in at a detachment level that I may or may not be aware of, at a regional command level that I may or may not be aware of.
In most cases where it's requests for specialized services, the police service of jurisdiction will be asked to send a formal request and I don't have any recollection nor any record of a formal request.
Okay.
On February 6th, just very briefly, there was a blockade at the Blue Water Bridge in Sarnia.
Is that correct?
Not exactly.
There was not a blockage at the Blue Water Bridge.
There was a blockade on Highway 402, which was some distance from the Blue Water Bridge, approximately 30 to 40 kilometers out from the bridge.
Okay.
But that fell into OPP jurisdiction?
That did, yes.
Okay.
And how was that resolved?
That was eventually resolved through PLT.
Actually, my belief is the EMCPA, so the Emergency Measures and Civil Protection Act, that was invoked by the province that provided police with some additional tools as it related to being able to seize vehicles, seize commercial motor vehicle permits, to be able to seize vehicle permits.
Those tools assisted us in being able to resolve that.
There was a lot of very expensive farm equipment that was part of that blockade that was legitimately required for operational farms.
So I believe the risk of those pieces of equipment being seized by the police and them seeing the action that had been taking place around the province enabled our PLT to resolve that particular issue.
Going back to Windsor.
Deputy Chief Crowley told us that he attended an OACP meeting on February 7th.
OACP being the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police.
Correct.
And that there were RCMP and OPP officers there.
I don't believe you were at that meeting.
I think it was Superintendent Macdonald.
Does that sound accurate?
If I wasn't there, I couldn't say I'm sorry.
He told us, this is Deputy Chief Crowley, told us that he raised the possibility of the blockade, which hadn't yet happened.
It started that evening.
And that he was told by his RCMP and OPP colleagues on the call that Ottawa was the priority at the time and there essentially weren't any resources for...
For Windsor.
Is that an accurate representation of what was available on February 7th?
I can't say it is an accurate or inaccurate representation.
Had there been a request for public order resources, that would have been examined through what we call the public order hub, and they would have determined what was available to be deployed or not.
But we certainly were able to amass the resources required later that week.
And you'll note that there were over 400 police officers that attended to assist Windsor.
But not being party to that conversation, I don't think I can accurately comment on the contents of it or the accuracy of it.
Okay.
Prior to the blockade occurring, which was sometime on the 7th, Did you have discussions with the Deputy Solicitor General about whether there would be a need to prioritize Windsor over Ottawa if a blockade did occur?
I can't say at what point in time I would have had conversations with the Deputy Solicitor General over the need to prioritize.
I can tell you that I did have open conversations with the Deputy Solicitor General over how we...
Prioritized operationally our resources and once the blockade had occurred in Windsor and we had been asked for formal assistance, there was a request for 100 OPP officers and 100 RCMP officers that came into our possession very similar way as the Ottawa request.
It was forwarded directly to the province as opposed to me and it had come in only I believe hours after I had already spoken with the Chief of Windsor and offered support and was advised that there was no additional assistance required.
And certainly throughout that entire period, I made my decisions known to the Deputy Solicitor General where appropriate.
When it was time to deploy public order to Windsor, that we did not have a defined plan in Ottawa yet.
Therefore, we did not know exactly how many resources were required, that the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor was something that we felt we could clear up in two to four days.
Ottawa would be five to ten days, at least once a plan was established.
We also had concurrent events happening in Toronto, Queen's Park.
We had attempts being planned to put blockades at the Peace Bridge in Niagara.
We still had Highway 402 on the go.
We had plans emerging to attempt to block the bridge in Cornwall.
We had things happening in Nipigon.
So it was a priority to resolve.
First, we had the resources available ready.
We had a plan ready to go.
And there was an enormous, enormous national financial impact on the closure of that bridge totaling $700 million a day in my understanding of two-way trade.
Did the financial impact of the blockade affect the fact that Windsor was a priority?
Not merely the financial impact, but economic security is something that needs to be taken into consideration when you look at the totality of national security and quality of life in our communities.
If $700 million a day in trade is not able to take place, what are the ramifications of that?
I would suggest that perhaps factories start shutting down, people start losing employment, people may...
Start to lose their homes, etc.
That's a significant economic impact that affects quality of life in community and in those conditions can affect crime in community.
So it is something that needs to be considered in and amongst all of the other factors that we need to weigh as it relates to public safety, quality of life in community, and the bigger picture of national security.
I don't know if it is the most active or relied upon.
CBSA would be in a better position to share that.
But this is a significant international crossing, which is a concern, obviously.
And you said that that is something that needs to be considered.
But I just want to be clear.
It is something that was considered in the need to quickly clear the blockade in Windsor.
Is that fair?
One of many factors.
How many officers were required, the existence of a plan, how long it would take, proximity to other events that were going on.
We also had plans that we were aware of for the Peace Bridge.
So by having public order assets in Windsor, we can quickly pivot between the Ambassador Bridge and the Peace Bridge.
We can pivot over to the Blue Water Bridge.
That's a big difference from being in Ottawa.
Make no mistake about it.
I believe that it was by intent and design that we had activities happening at the furthest points from each other in southern Ontario.
It is not circumstance that we had an occupation in the city of Ottawa and we had blockage at the Ambassador Bridge at the exact same time.
That was intentionally designed to challenge the capacity of our police.
So that had to be very strategically and methodically managed to ensure.
That when we took action, it just didn't disperse a problem and make it so it was unmanageable.
This had to be surgical, this had to be strategic, had to be well thought out, and it had to be planned.
I want to go back to working our way through what happened in Windsor.
I think you referred to this earlier, but similar to what happened in Ottawa, the mayor of Windsor, in fact, had conversations directly with...
Solicitor General Sylvia Jones and Minister Mendicino.
You're aware of that?
I am aware that there was conversations.
I'm aware that those conversations resulted in a letter.
I'm not privy to the details of those conversations.
Okay.
And again, does that strike you as sort of an odd way to request police resources in the circumstances?
It is not the typical way nor the preferred way that police resources would be requested.
In particular, when just hours earlier I had spoken to the Chief of Windsor, had offered additional assistance, I was advised it was not required at that time, and then an independent request came in seeking additional resources, which caused me to then follow up and ask again and confirm that that...
Did you ever ask at former Chief Mizuno why you had been told they didn't need anything and then very shortly thereafter, there was this public request for additional resources?
I was under the impression and understanding that as a result of having further conversations subsequent to my conversation with her, That those resources were now being requested and would now be required.
But I would suggest it would be most appropriate to ask her that question directly.
Okay.
And did you ever ask her why, again, you had a contact with her, so did you ever ask her why she didn't just come to you and ask, and instead the mayor, well, she sent a letter ultimately, but she never made that request directly to you?
She did not, no.
Sorry, did you ever ask her why that was the case?
Yes, and she said the request was subsequently being made as a result of having further conversations with the mayor, and she was now asking me for my assistance.
Okay.
I'd like to go back to your exchange with Deputy Solicitor General, OPP404580.
uh if we can go to page 72. If we scroll down, we see here, so the Deputy Solicitor General says, also, what's the latest on Ambassador Bridge?
Fed DM Stewart asking also impact on Stellantis.
What is Stellantis?
I don't know what Stellantis is.
I can't say I have any.
Knowledge of Stellantis.
I would be interested in my response, whether I followed up to find out what Stellantis is, but I don't have a recollection of what it is without looking at what my response was.
Okay.
and there's your response I'm guessing that that's perhaps a company or something otherwise.
I've obviously done some follow-up to say that there's no direct mention of Stellantis being intentionally targeted, but I can't tell you today what Stellantis is.
I'm sorry.
Okay.
Stellantis is, you know, if I were to tell you that it's an automaker, essentially, a manufacturer of parts, does that sound accurate?
That would absolutely sound accurate, yes.
Thank you.
And do you know...
Do you know why the Deputy Solicitor General was passing on a sort of question from a federal counterpart about a private business, essentially?
I can only estimate that it was significant to international relations, but that would be me surmising that.
Okay.
Can you tell us what assistance was provided in response to the letters seeking 100 additional officers from each of the OPP and the RCMP?
So again, similar to the situation with Ottawa's request, there were more officers provided than were requested.
And there was some confusion.
One of the conversations that I did have with the chief from Windsor at the time was, was it a request for 100 each, totaling 100, or was it 100 in total?
Because they went independently, that request went independently as well.
But again, we ended up deploying over 400 officers to Windsor.
Again, showing that the plan drives the number.
The number doesn't drive the plan.
Did the OPP deploy officers to Windsor in the absence of seeing the operational plan that they were going to use to clear the blockade?
So, like Ottawa, we did have officers deployed to Windsor.
And as you pointed out to me, we obviously had officers deployed assisting Windsor.
Leading up to the blockade.
So those would have been frontline officers.
We would have been assisting with traffic management.
We very likely would have even had a quick response team in the area.
But we would not be deploying public order and taking positive action in the absence of a plan.
It would be wholly irresponsible to do so.
Not only operationally, but ethically as well.
There are many factors that need to be articulated and described in a plan to ensure the rights of those that may be lawfully protesting, to ensure the safety of officers, the safety of community, the sustainability of a plan.
You can't overemphasize.
You simply cannot just send an arbitrary number of officers to a location to deal with something so complex.
And I understand on February 9th, OPP Superintendent Dana Earley was appointed sort of in charge of the OPP's Windsor presence.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Yes, she was.
And did you appoint her or was she appointed by a deputy commissioner?
In conversation with Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins and I, we identified Superintendent Early to be the commander in that particular event, and he was the one that had the conversations with her, assigning her that role and responsibility.
Then she built her...
Critical incident command team out from there.
And Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins was also the one to have communication and direct contact with the deputy from Windsor, subsequent to my conversation with the chief, to say that we would be assisting and we would be sending whatever was required.
Okay.
And now I want to return to the issue of Windsor being a priority because, again, this is something that came up with the deputy solicitor.
And so his summary records that it was his understanding, the Deputy Solicitor General, that the occupation in Ottawa was limited to the red zone with a main impact on Wellington.
And he calls it a significant inconvenience, but not an overriding public safety risk.
Whereas in Windsor, the blockade had a significant and substantial impact on economic security.
Resulted in plants shutting down, loss of jobs, and that law enforcement had finite resources and could not effectively address both situations, essentially.
And so I want to understand if you agree with these sentiments about what Ottawa represented, what Windsor represented, and the fact that law enforcement couldn't clear both at the same time.
So it's absolutely true that law enforcement could not clear both at the same time.
I don't think it's fair to try to separate them in terms of assessment and /or necessarily in terms of risk.
We have to separate them in terms of prioritizing where we can take action first based on the level of risk and the amount of resources available.
I think for an accurate description of what was happening at the time, you truly need to go to the Hendon Report of February the 7th.
And in that report, in the Hendon Report, the assessment is taking into consideration the totality of all events around the province and the country that it posed a possible threat to national security.
That was clearly defined in the Hendon report.
So it is impossible to separate all of these events and say, I'm going to deal with this one in isolation, and when I'm done this one, I'm then going to move to the next.
It couldn't be managed that way.
And if you look at the evolving increase in police resources in Ottawa at the time, during that same time period, the 12th to the 14th of February, I think you will find that...
the number of OPP resources in Ottawa almost doubled during that time period.
Thank you.
All right, people, you're going to deal with my ugly mug until I get the stream back.
Public publications.
Public emergency order.
Order.
Oh, I said order.
Okay, I've got it here now, Rob.
Sorry about that.
Flipping computer.
For some reason, the camera just decides to stop working and I got to reboot.
Twice.
Twice.
Again, I don't want any confusion or threat to the security of Canada.
Going live on the main channel, we're talking about a strategic approach to overall national security.
Transportation, critical infrastructure, border crossings, economic security, all of those things, cybersecurity, all of those components encompass a multifaceted approach to national security.
And are identified by Public Safety Canada as being important to national security.
Okay.
I want to go back to Windsor now.
By the way, focus on the amount.
Is it fair to say?
Did you ever receive a direction from the Deputy Solicitor General's office that Windsor ought to be prioritized as a result of its economic importance?
Absolutely not.
Never.
But it's fair to say that the OPP did prioritize it in part.
The answer started with so.
In part.
I think I provided a very detailed description into all of the factors that needed to be considered and how that was identified as an operational priority, not at the expense or at the cost of other operations that were maintained and enhanced simultaneously while we were dealing with Windsor.
You say not at the cost.
Again, just returning to Deputy Solicitor General Di Tommaso, and I will say he sort of speculated, but it was his opinion that Ottawa might have been cleared sooner had Windsor not been prioritized, essentially.
Would you agree with that assessment?
No.
No, I would not.
What I would say is that Ottawa may, may, Have been cleared sooner had we not had to deal with the blockades in Windsor, had we not had to deal with the protest in Toronto, the blockage on the 402, the blockage at Cornwall, and the attempts to block the Peace Bridge in Niagara.
That may have allowed Ottawa to be cleared sooner if there was a plan in place ready to go.
The plan...
To my understanding, was not in place and was not ready to go on February the 12th.
It's not until February the 13th that there is a plan in place agreed upon by all the stakeholders that is a safe and viable plan to proceed with.
And we were done in Windsor.
With positive action at that point we were in a maintenance phase and all roads were opened up I believe on February the 14th.
So I don't think that that is a fair assessment as you have proposed to me.
Okay.
Is it fair to say that resources went from Windsor to Ottawa?
Just wait for the answers starting with the plan in Ottawa once Windsor was cleared.
That would be fair to say.
And just for a point of clarity, I can't say that specifically Tom Kareek went from Windsor to Ottawa.
What I can say is I know that there were some public order assets that when done in Windsor were able to reposition to Ottawa.
But I can't commit to you that level of detail that specific people moved from Windsor to Ottawa.
I understand.
I want to take you now to notes of a call from February 10th with the Deputy Solicitor General.
The peacefulness of this lawyer's voice is irritating me.
These are not your notes.
These are Deputy Solicitor General's notes.
And it's hard to tell if it's a 7 o 'clock or a 9 o 'clock call.
You might remember.
It says call with Commissioner Karik, OPP.
Okay, I'm going to get my stuff lined up.
Direction to CIC that they are in removal mode.
Do you know what is being referred to there?
No, I don't know what that would refer to, being in removal mode.
We don't commence.
Operations in Windsor as it relates to public order activity until the 12th of February, I believe, without having that information in front of me.
But from my recollection, I believe it is the 12th of February.
Right.
And that is accurate.
I'm just wondering if as of the 10th, which is the day after Superintendent Early had been dispatched to Windsor, there was a direction that, you know, we have to...
Clear this blockade.
I take from removal mode, like we're removing the protesters.
We were certainly planning for that as we were in Ottawa, but that does not alleviate the responsibilities of trying to negotiate a peaceful resolution.
And I think you will have been provided information as it relates to...
Negotiations that were attempted through PLT, including a letter from the Solicitor General.
So there were ongoing efforts to de-escalate this before we would ever move to enforcement.
But you need to be...
Building that plan while those activities are ongoing.
You ought not to wait until all opportunities to de-escalate have exhausted themselves and then turn your mind to an operational plan to utilize public order if that is eventually going to be required.
All operational plans require contingencies.
Okay.
I want to take you now to Superintendent Early's notes, scribe notes, I believe.
OPP 404543, if we can go to page 8. Again, these are her scribe notes.
You're not part of this call, but I want to ask you about what is transcribed.
It's a call again the morning of February 10th, 8:30 AM, with Deputy Commissioners Harkins and DeMarco.
And, yeah.
So this is what's recorded.
Deputies advised whatever is needed for plan will be available.
And we go down a little bit more.
Harkins advised there is an urgency to get this resolved.
Had you communicated to Deputy Commissioners Harkins and DeMarco that there was an urgency to getting Windsor resolved?
I wouldn't have necessarily used that terminology, but I think it was well known and agreed upon, and certainly my intent, that there was some urgency to get this resolved.
We needed to be able to minimize the number of protests that were going on around the province simultaneously.
We've already discussed the impact that the Ambassador Bridge had, as well as we needed to be able to...
Deal with what was going on in Ottawa at the time.
So absolutely, I would agree that there was some urgency to this.
The longer it was left...
The harder it would be to resolve.
We were at risk of people moving from Ottawa, which was some of the information that we were managing at the time, that people that were actively protesting in Ottawa would be making their way to Windsor.
We know that's a day's worth of travel.
So the quicker we could resolve Windsor, we also mitigated that risk of a protest just dispersing itself, as opposed to us being able to resolve those matters.
Now, I understand on this day as well, February 10th, Superintendent Early actually sort of established a proper joint command with WPS.
Is that correct?
It appears to be correct, yes.
I do see that, yes.
Can you explain for us the concept of joint command and why it's so important in a situation like this?
Joint command isn't necessarily a technical term, so a lot of times we'll refer to an integrated command or a unified command.
And again, those aren't defined in law, nor are they necessarily defined in procedure.
But an integrated command is one where one police service provides the other police service with a level of subject matter expertise within the command structure to assist them with developing and executing an operational plan.
Overall command and control remains the purview of the police service of jurisdiction.
So they have final say on the plan.
A unified command indicates that it is just that, that the decision-making is equally shared amongst the participating police services.
Okay.
And what was the status of a joint or integrated or unified command in Ottawa at this time on February 10th?
On February the 10th?
I would say we had not arrived at the point of a unified command.
We had introduced the integrated planning team, but I would say that there was not even an integrated command at that point in time.
The plans were still being developed.
There was an operational plan, or what I've heard referred to as a concept of operations, I believe, that was established on February the 9th.
That was provided to the integrated planning team, which they built upon, and they had submitted their inputs to that to Ottawa on or about the 11th of February.
And then I believe by the 13th of February, that integrated team had come to agreement that that was the plan that would move forward.
There were some obstacles from the 13th through to the 15th with operationalizing that, but that was the sequence of events.
And we'll get into those obstacles.
But in Windsor, on the 11th, this idea of a letter to the protesters comes about.
Can you speak to us about that?
Yes, in general terms, I can.
More specific evidence would probably be best to come from Provincial Liaison Team, Inspector Baudouin, but certainly it was brought to my attention as a proposed strategy through Deputy Commissioner Rose DeMarco, who...
Ultimately, oversees the provincial liaison team as a way of de-escalating the activities that were going on in Windsor.
I supported the idea.
I thought it was appropriate.
And it was certainly worth the effort of trying to de-escalate those activities.
Okay.
And did you understand that there was a POU plan or a sort of plan to clear the blockades that was ready at that time as well?
Whether it was ready or still in development, I certainly knew that we were working towards that with the intention of activating that plan on the 12th.
So, thank you.
And were you the sort of point of contact with the government in getting their sign-off on agreeing to the letter and agreeing to this proposal in general?
Point of contact is probably a fair description.
There's many people that assist with the administration and the flow of information, but essentially the request would have been made at my direction, with my support, with my endorsement.
Absolutely.
Just so I understand, when you said the request, the request of government to sign off, of the provincial government to sign off on this idea.
The request of the Solicitor General to sign the letter extending the invitation for further discussion or a meeting if the blockage blockade was to end immediately.
Right.
And did you personally make that request through the Deputy Solicitor General, for instance?
Ultimately, yes, it's my request, yes.
I can't say whether I personally emailed the request, but ultimately that is my request, yes.
Okay.
If we could pull up that letter, it's ONT50858.
believe this is the letter if you can just if you can confirm Yes, I recognize that letter, yes.
So, who made the decision to have it be directed towards you as opposed to directed to the protesters, for instance?
Ultimately, that would be my decision.
Okay, and so why did you ask that it be addressed to you?
Well, we were presenting that on behalf of PLT, and it would be important, I think, for PLT to be able to speak with some sense of authority, that they are carrying the message that was relayed to me, and it created that appropriate separation between the minister.
And the protesters and allowed PLT to have that empowerment.
PLT needs to be able to build rapport, establish a relationship, be able to create win-win situations to try to de-escalate the situation.
That's, I think, in part why it would be most appropriate to come from me.
That was the request that I received.
More detail on that and the philosophy and the theory behind that, a PLT would be in a much better position to describe in more detail, but certainly my understanding.
Now, this is February 11th.
It's the same day of the Provincial Declaration of Emergency, correct?
It would have been, yes.
And are you aware there was also an injunction that went into effect that evening as well?
I would have been aware.
I can't say at what time I became aware, but I certainly am aware and was aware at some point in time of that.
Yes, absolutely.
Okay.
And so can you just sort of speak to, you've got this letter from the Solicitor General, it's got the injunction, which has gone into effect, I think at 7 p.m.
that evening.
And the...
Provincial Declaration of Emergency.
How did those three interact together?
And which of them, if any, did you believe were the most effective in that circumstance?
Well, the letter proved not to be effective.
It did not have the desired outcome.
The injunction...
I can't say that that was effective because we still ended up moving forward with deploying public order, certainly a helpful tool.
But I can't say that any of those were effective in isolation.
What was effective was a holistic, complete plan to deal with the situation.
Incident commander having the discretion as to when they would execute that plan.
Okay.
The scribe notes for Superintendent Early, and we won't go there, but they record some concern that delivering the letter or taking action in Windsor would have an effect on what was going on in Ottawa.
Do you recall that concern being raised in any of the calls on the 11th?
I can't say I independently remember that specifically being brought forward.
But as I've shared with you earlier, these are all intertwined and connected and you can't make a move at one location without it impacting and affecting the other.
So that's exactly the type of thought process and discussion that ought to have taken place.
These are not isolated incidents.
Did the OPP see any effects of taking action in Windsor on the 12th and 13th on what happened in Ottawa or elsewhere?
I don't have that level of detail.
I can't say that I personally noted anything.
I don't think I can answer that question, honestly.
And so, did you participate in the drafting of this letter with the Deputy Solicitor General's Office?
I approved this letter.
So we provided, PLT provided the recommended wording in the letter.
This was a request.
By us to the Solicitor General to assist in trying to de-escalate this situation.
This was driven and born from our provincial liaison team.
This was not something that independently came out of the minister's office.
This was a request that we made of the minister and was granted.
Okay.
Was there a similar, was any similar request made?
To have a letter delivered to the protesters in Ottawa, for instance.
I can't speak with great knowledge on that.
I know that there was discussion.
I know Inspector Baudouin, who's already provided evidence.
I know he had discussion with Ottawa police.
He had discussion with Deputy Minister Stewart.
There was discussion around it, the details of that discussion.
He is in the best position to provide you with a first-hand account of that.
I also know that there was communication that took place between the mayor in Ottawa and protest organizers or those that were identified as such.
But I don't know that I can say with any level of knowledge what letters may have been provided.
But there was certainly dialogue.
And I believe at one point in time, they had an agreement for partial components of the demonstration to move, which would have moved them into OPP jurisdiction, but cleared up some of the area of concern in Ottawa.
And that did not come to be either.
Right.
But I guess what I'm trying to understand is why this letter came about as a result of, as you say, an OPP request, essentially, that it be delivered.
So I don't understand your question.
This letter was the result of a request to the Deputy Solicitor General's Office.
So it was a result of a request to me?
Right.
Yes.
Which you passed along to the Deputy Solicitor General's Office.
Correct, I did, yes.
And this letter is drafted four days after the blockade starts in Windsor.
Yes.
But by the 11th, it's two weeks into what's happening in Ottawa, and there wasn't a similar request for a letter in Ottawa.
That's what I'm trying to understand.
Why not?
That's a question you would have to ask of Ottawa police.
That's not a question that I can answer.
We were not in charge of the operation in Ottawa.
One of the slight differences with Windsor, we did agree to assist, but it was with a clear understanding that although it was a unified command, that we would be in charge of the development and execution of the plan.
Okay, and why was that important to you?
That was important to me given the situation that we found ourselves in with all of the activity taking place.
I felt it was absolutely crucial that we maintain the trust and confidence of Ontarians and that we absolutely needed to succeed with the development and the efficient and effective execution of a plan.
And I felt that we were in the best position to take responsibility for that, not to push.
Windsor Police aside, it was something that they would have to agree to, but that was something that I had requested of Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins in his initial discussions with the Deputy from Windsor, and it was something that was agreed to.
So our Major Critical Incident Commander was ultimately responsible for that operation.
Which is why this request would come to me.
We were never ultimately responsible for the operations in Ottawa up to this date.
Therefore, I can't speak to why a request would not have come to me of this nature.
Did provide access to Inspector Baudouin on multiple and numerous occasions to provide advice and guidance as it relates to PLT strategies.
But why I did not receive a similar request, you'll have to ask that of the Ottawa Police.
I'm sorry.
Okay.
You mentioned there that, again, I'm paraphrasing, but you felt that public trust in the police We couldn't suffer another blow, essentially.
When you say that, you're referring to the fact that the situation in Ottawa is entrenched and it's not being resolved by police action at that point in time.
Is that fair?
That is fair to say.
There was all sorts of public and political attention on what was happening in Ottawa police, in Ottawa, sorry, and with the Ottawa police, and there was all sorts of public...
comment.
This was an opportunity to work in a coordinated and collective way to resolve a matter and to ensure that public trusting and confidence in their police was maintained.
And then from Windsor we we look forward to doing the same in Ottawa which was ultimately accomplished.
Now, I understand that the Saturday, February 12th, Was one of the busier days for the OPP in terms of responding to protests.
Is that accurate?
It was.
I believe we had approximately 20 protests that we responded to around the province.
And without referring to records, going by memory, I believe during the whole duration of what we would define as the Freedom Convoy, we responded to 137, approximately, demonstrations or protests across the province.
And so on the 12th, one of the busier days, were there places or protests or requests for assistance that the OPP just couldn't fulfill?
Not to my knowledge, no.
And it's important, I think, to speak about the amount of integration and cooperation that was happening at this time.
There's been reference to the calls that included the police chiefs of all of the affected jurisdictions, included Canadian Border Services Agency, included the RCMP.
So at this stage in activity, everybody is pitching in, leaning in, propping each other up.
All of the resources are coordinated by the 8th of February.
We have what we called the Public Order Hub officially established.
They are making decisions on where public order assets need to be when and what amounts and when they can move.
So this is a very coordinated, integrated effort that I think policing across the province deserves to get some credit for the coordination at this stage of the events and activities.
Now, going back to Ottawa, the integrated planning group sort of starts its work on the 8th or the 9th, but there isn't a sort of fully developed plan until the 13th.
It was fully developed and signed off on.
So why is that?
That direct evidence is best to come from those that were actively participating in the development and the approval of the plan.
Anything I can share with you is from my arm's length viewpoint and his hearsay.
And I think you've already heard from Chief Superintendent Carson Party.
You've heard from Superintendent Bernier.
You've heard from a number of witnesses that I think have been able to provide you with their detailed account of those events.
Did you receive and review and sign off on a copy of the integrated plan?
No, I did not.
I participated in a meeting where I was connected by phone.
I believe there was a PowerPoint presentation of an overview of the plan delivered in Ottawa.
Those members from RCMP in that meeting, I listened in on the briefing.
I did not see, nor did I approve the plan, nor would I be expected to.
We had a chief superintendent there that was given the autonomy and the responsibility for the development of that plan in an integrated format.
That's not something, as the commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police, I would be involved in.
It was up to Chief Superintendent Party.
He would have had final kind of approval on it without the need to escalate it any higher.
Absolutely.
Whether he chose to escalate that higher to his deputy commissioner, that would be his choice.
But he had full authority and autonomy to approve any plan that was binding the Ontario Provincial Police.
He certainly kept us informed and updated and made us aware of the intentions of the plan, but that was his responsibility that he fulfilled exceptionally well.
Now we heard evidence.
On Tuesday from Inspector, now Acting Superintendent Baudin, about this proposal from Deputy Minister Stewart, in which Commissioner Luckey was involved as well.
So I appreciate you weren't involved in the back and forth, but I want to ask you what you knew about it and sort of what you reported to the Deputy Solicitor General's office about it.
Yes, so as you've indicated, certainly aware of it, endorsed it, approved it in terms of Inspector Baudouin having those conversations and determining whether there was a de-escalation tactic that could be used through encouraging a meeting, encouraging correspondence, whatever that would look like.
And of course, I absolutely would make the Deputy Solicitor General aware of that.
Granting permission or supporting one of my members to meet with a federal deputy minister, my provincial deputy minister needs to be aware of that.
Okay.
And what was the provincial deputy solicitor general's view on it?
I can't share with you what his view on it was.
I certainly don't recall him expressing any concern.
Would have been thank you for the update.
I can't specifically say.
You're best to ask his viewpoints of him, I think, with all due respect.
And sorry, when I ask for his view, I just mean as it was communicated to you, obviously.
He was supportive of it as far as you understood?
I can't say that he was supportive.
He certainly was aware.
He didn't express any concerns to me.
It wasn't something that I was seeking permission on.
This was an operational activity, but out of respect for the deputy and his position and ensuring that he has the appropriate level of situational awareness, it was something that I felt he needed to know.
Okay.
I want to take you to OPP40's 1585, which is an email thread about lining up tow trucks.
I believe it's dated February 13th.
if we can go down to page three when we pull it up so i believe
I'm not sure if you're on this initial chain, but it's ultimately forwarded to you.
Yes, there's a lot of activity in and around the coordination of heavy tow trucks at this point in time.
There was a lot of challenges with identifying the number of tow trucks that were available, those that would willingly provide those services, those that were looking to be compelled or indemnified.
There was a lot of work that went into the administration of this, yes.
Even prior to the invocation of the Emergencies Act, there were tow trucks and towing companies looking to be compelled?
Not looking to, well, I shouldn't say not looking to be compelled.
My understanding was that there were some of them that were reluctant.
There may have been some that were refusing to assist.
But there had been some identified that were willing to assist.
There were concerns that they may back out at the last minute, which could present a risk to moving forward with the plan.
The biggest concern was around indemnification.
So one tow company in particular was seeking indemnification.
Which is not something that we would normally provide.
And we were trying to determine the best way forward through the province and how, if, and if so, how we could provide some indemnification.
Okay.
And you're talking about prior to the invocation of the act, is that?
That's correct.
This is all happening simultaneously.
And as you can appreciate.
We are not paying any attention to the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
There was no pre-warning to me.
There was no heads up.
There was no consultation.
Learned of it as it was happening.
And we are adjusting in real time.
So this is work that is taking place concurrently.
So it's not as easy as stopping and starting with a demarcation point.
Right.
And so I was going to ask you.
After the reference in the February 5th text message exchange with Commissioner Luckey, had you heard anything about the possibility that the act would be invoked, or was it, as you say, a sort of surprise?
I don't know that I'd categorize it as a surprise.
It was just something that was not known to me, nor was it something that I had turned my mind towards.
It had nothing to do with the Ontario Provincial Police.
It was something that the federal government chose to do.
I wouldn't have necessarily expected that I would get a heads up, but it was not something that I had at forefront of mind, nor did we ever contemplate if it happened, how would this impact us?
Okay.
So I want to go back to sort of February 15th.
Mm-hmm.
Which is the day on which the former chief slowly resigned.
You had two calls with Commissioner Luckey and other members of the OPS on that day.
Is that correct?
That is correct, yes.
Yes, one was with RCMP and OPP, and then the subsequent one included Ottawa Police.
So it was the difference in those two meetings, yes.
And the first one, which was just RCMP and OPP, was prior to Chief Slowly's resignation.
That is correct, yes.
Okay, so I want to take you to the minutes of that call, which is OPP 50787.
Just while that's getting pulled up, you referred earlier to sort of a plan being ready by February 13th, but not...
Being operationalized by the 15th.
To your understanding, what was the delay?
What was the problem?
So what became increasingly known or reported was that there was confusion over whether the plan had been approved or not, who was required to approve the plan.
And that was creating a delay and actually operationalizing all components of that plan.
Okay.
And we can kind of scroll through these minutes, but I want you to tell us what was discussed on this first call, which was just RCMP and OPP.
It was the concerns over being able to move the plan forward, the perception that that plan needed to be approved by the Chief of Police, and if not the Chief of Police, then by the Chief's Council.
And there was confusion within, it appeared, OPS, certainly within OPP and RCMP in relation to that.
So the discussion was in relation to that confusion.
Certainly on the 13th, the email is clear from Chief Slowly, which I thanked him for.
I was under the understanding that the plan was ready to be operationalized.
And as we move towards the 15th, we're now in a position where we appear to have challenges that are preventing that integrated plan from being realized.
Okay.
And what was, into recollection, we can go through the minutes, but what was the solution that you and Commissioner Lucky were, how were you going to deal with this essentially?
Yeah, so we got to the point where I was going to speak to Chief Slowly post the Police Services Board meeting.
So I knew that he was tied up in a Police Services Board meeting.
We had offered or agreed to lend the support of Superintendent Morris to assist him in communicating with the board, as well as Chief Superintendent Carson Partey was supposed to attend that Police Service Board meeting.
So I had undertaken...
The task of speaking with Chief Slowly when he was free to ask if he would consider if he needed or was willing to allow us to assume command and control if we were not able to move the plan forward.
Had we got to that point that there were enough barriers in place that the plan was not going to move forward.
And I was planning on having that conversation with Chief Slowly.
You told us, as we saw the text message from Commissioner Luckey previously, where she was relaying that the Government of Canada had lost confidence in the OPS by February 5th.
By February 15th, had you lost confidence in the OPS's ability to manage the situation?
Lost confidence is a harsh and strong way of putting it.
This is a police service that is in a very unenviable position, is struggling to move forward with an operational plan.
My job was to support them, provide whatever assistance was required to see that plan succeed, and to have that further dialogue with Chief slowly determine whether he felt that could be done under the current command structure or whether Us taking command and control of that incident, allowing them to focus and he to focus on the policing responsibilities for the entire rest of the city may be a resolution to that.
Subject to the outcome of that phone call, I would have then had to make a determination as to whether I had confidence or did not and whether I escalated that to the ministry.
But at that point, I needed to have that conversation with Chief slowly.
All of the information that we were receiving about the obstacles and challenges were not firsthand.
I owed it to him to have that conversation and to offer our support.
As you are well aware, he's able to make the request of the OPP legitimately through the Police Services Act for that assistance.
Did you feel that it was time for that request, that the OPP be asked formally to step in?
Yes.
Based on what we were hearing in that meeting and all of the events that had taken place or had been reported to take place up to that point in time, I felt that we were at that point that I ought to be offering that assistance and making sure that he was aware that if that was what he wanted, we were willing and able to take that on.
Okay, but isn't, I'm just trying to understand, isn't that another way of saying you had lost confidence in the OPS's ability?
I mean, you wanted to be asked to step in and take over.
It may be semantics.
They needed our assistance at that point in time.
There was no question about it.
They absolutely, in my opinion, needed our assistance to succeed.
If you want to describe that as lost confidence, I certainly wouldn't describe it as that way.
In need of our assistance, was our assistance required to succeed?
Depending the response to that request, that may further clarify whether I was at a position to say I had lost confidence.
This was a police service and a police leader that was in need of assistance.
And we were able to provide that assistance, willing to provide that assistance.
If that assistance was not received, then I may have been in a point where now I've lost confidence and would have to escalate that for further consideration.
And you say if that assistance was not received, I take it you mean sort of willingly welcomed.
Yes, absolutely.
I'm not in a position to say...
I'm coming in and taking over.
I don't have that authority or that ability.
That is not the role of the commissioner of the OPP.
So the appropriate, the lawful, the professional next step was to have that conversation.
And then to be able to make that determination.
Were we going to be able to move this forward in a collaborative way by taking the lead?
Was it actually necessary?
Maybe Chiefs slowly had other information that would cause me to reconsider where I was at at that point in time.
But that's where I was at.
I was at that juncture that had we not been asked to assume command and control of this operation.
That I would have felt obligated to make that known to the minister for consideration to be known to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.
Okay.
You never had occasion to have that conversation with Chief Slovely, correct?
I did not, no.
He resigned.
Sometime after or maybe even during this call.
Is that accurate?
Sometime between us having this call and plans to seek a meeting with Chief Slowly.
Okay.
And then you had a follow-up call with Commissioner Luckey and this time with members of the OPS as well, right?
Correct, yes.
And if I could get OPP50788, I think these are the minutes.
From that second call on that day.
But while they're being brought up, can you tell us about what was discussed during that call?
It was confirming that we were in a position to operationalize the February 13th plan.
There were no obstacles standing in our way.
Articulated and described command structure.
There are various forms of describing incident command.
So we wanted to make sure there was a clear understanding.
So we diverted to a model most commonly known to the RCMP, gold, silver, bronze.
And at that point came to agreement that it would be an absolute unified command.
And that we would be sending Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins and the RCMP would be sending Deputy Commissioner Mike Duhem to represent our services on the gold level, which was on the same level as the Chief of Ottawa.
And had you not had success in achieving Unified Command until this call with You just described that, okay, we're going to have unified command.
We've got this plan and we are going to action it.
What had been the impediment to doing that on the 14th or on the 13th when the plan was completed?
I think Ottawa Police Service is in the best position to answer that.
You know, not having had the opportunity to have that conversation with Chief Slowly, I can't say that I'm in a position to sit in judgment as to specifically what prevented that plan from moving forward from the 13th to the 15th.
You're going to have to discern that from the evidence provided by Ottawa Police and your discussion with Chief Slowly.
But I had yet to have that conversation with Chief Slowly.
Okay.
But the result of this second conversation, the resignation and the second conversation in the plan for a unified command was that you no longer had concerns to escalate to the Deputy Solicitor General.
Is that correct?
That is correct.
Okay.
And did you, on the 15th, before, between, or after these calls, did you...
Speak to the Deputy Solicitor General about what had transpired.
On the 15th, yeah, I can't say exactly at what time, but we did have communication throughout the day, and certainly by the time we had concluded things, he was well aware of the way forward.
I did have some concerns over the resignation of Chief Slowly.
And what the board would be doing for an interim chief.
My concern was that if an interim chief was appointed that was unfamiliar with all of the work that had been done, and we were in a position that we had to start from ground zero and do a briefing and seek commitments and agreement, that was a concern of mine.
And I did have that conversation with the Deputy Solicitor General just to make him aware.
That I was concerned as to how the police service board would choose to move forward.
And again, that was for his situational awareness.
As it turned out, somebody from within the police service assumed that position.
So we did not have to start from ground zero.
Was your concern because you had heard that there was going to be an external interim chief?
That's correct, yes.
Okay.
And?
And you relayed that to the Deputy Solicitor General?
At some point in time throughout the day, we had that conversation, yes.
And not concerned in terms of the board exercising its authority, but it would need to be clearly defined in that if somebody new was being introduced to the relationship, it would have to be exclusive to the day-to-day operations of the Ottawa Police Service outside of this event.
We needed to be able to move forward seamlessly with this plan without having to start from the beginning.
And did you specifically mention Steve Bell as an appropriate interim chief or did you just reveal the concern?
No, I just relayed the concern in the event that the ministry was going to be providing any advice.
There are policing advisors that advise police service boards.
So should that discussion be taking place, I thought it was appropriate that my concerns be relayed.
In the event that that would have any impact on decisions that would be made by the Police Services Board.
But at no point in time did I recommend anyone or oppose anyone for that position.
It was not about the individuals.
Thank you.
Commissioner, I see we're at one o 'clock.
I'm glad to change gears.
Now's an appropriate time.
Okay, so this is time for our lunch break.
So we'll take an hour and come back in an hour to continue.
Thank you.
The Commission is in recess for one hour.
La Commission ne ve pour un heure.
La Commission ne ve pour un heure.
La Commission ne ve pour un heure.
La Commission ne ve pour un heure.
Thank you very much.
The Commission has reconvened.
Are you prepared to go on?
I am.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Good afternoon, Commissioner.
We have about 20 minutes left, and then we'll be open to the other parties.
Just want to pick up on something that you mentioned.
Before the lunch break, I think you referred to a public, in talking about national security, you referred to a Public Safety Canada definition of national security, which you distinguished from that sort of CSIS Act definition of national security.
Do you remember that?
Yes, I don't think I called it a definition.
It's in reference when they reference national security.
I'm not familiar with an actual definition.
As it relates to Public Safety Canada, and of course, the CSIS Act refers to the security of Canada.
But in the context of speaking to national security, there are many components that Public Safety Canada refer to, and refer to it as a multifaceted approach that is required across various programs, initiatives, and considerations.
Okay, and when you say Public Safety Canada, are you talking about your dealings?
With Public Safety Canada, like their website?
I guess I'm trying to understand where this...
Well, there's all sorts of materials on Public Safety Canada website for anyone who's interested.
There's various acts.
There's been reviews of the CSIS Act.
There's all sorts of material that references and responsibilities in reference to national security.
Okay.
Is there anything non-public about what you're referring to, or is it just public?
Public Safety Canada material.
This is Public Safety Canada material.
I cannot point you to a specific document.
There's certainly lots of reference to it in the various materials, and that is my understanding.
Okay, thank you.
I'm not going to pull up the document, but the Commission has seen an email from Commissioner Lucky to Mike Jones the evening of February 13th.
And I want to read to you what Commissioner Lucky wrote and ask you if you agree with it.
She wrote, "This said, I am of the view that we have not yet exhausted all available tools that are already available through the existing legislation.
There are instances where charges could be laid under existing authorities for various criminal code offences occurring right now in the context of the protest." The Ontario Provincial Emergencies Act just enacted will also help in providing additional deterrent tools to our existing toolbox.
Do you agree with the sentiment that Commissioner Luckey expressed there?
Sorry, what was the date on that?
February 13th, the evening of February 13th.
Yes, I would agree with that sentiment, yes.
If we could pull up OPP401580, please.
This is an email that you wrote to Deputy Solicitor General DiTomaso on February 16th.
Yes.
And the second paragraph, a good portion of the demonstrators don't care about being charged criminally or they would have left already.
However, if they live in Ontario, they will care about losing their vehicle insurance and or license.
Can you explain that view to us and how and why you formed that view?
Yes, absolutely.
In reference to trying to de-escalate the situation, not only in Ottawa, but elsewhere around the province.
This had been going on for a considerable amount of time, and those that felt a jeopardy to being charged criminally, I feel, would have left through negotiations or discussions with PLT, and having the additional tools in the emergency EMCPA of the province provided encouragement for those to discontinue their illegal activities, as was borne out on Highway 402.
And this was in relation to public messaging that was going to be distributed through PLT on Ottawa letterhead.
And I felt as if we moved forward and considered the larger impact across the province, we could word it differently and get different inputs, for example, from a forensic psychologist as to how best that should could and should be structured, not only to prevent additional disruption, but to disperse it and deescalate.
OK.
Now, the.
The tow truck issue, if I can call it that, we've heard evidence on it.
And so I believe you told us in your interview that the OPP did not compel the provision of tow truck services.
Is that accurate?
Yes.
Okay.
So I would like to pull up a document, pb.nsc.can407378.
With the REL 001 suffix.
This is a letter that you wrote to Deputy Solicitor General DiTomaso on February 22nd.
Have you seen this letter recently?
Not recently, no.
But I do recognize it, yes.
Okay.
If we could just scroll down to page four.
I understand the power to compel.
Tow Truck Services was delegated to you.
Is that correct?
Correct, it was.
And it formed part of the negotiations that took place with the tow operators that were done by other people other than me, yes.
Okay.
And if we could go...
Sorry, what's on screen is the actual delegation of that authority?
Yes.
If we could go up to page two.
So that last paragraph, while this situation is unprecedented, the OPP worked with legal and determined that because we are engaging companies under the provisions of the Emergencies Act, not as a procurement contract or agreement, that we should work within the reasonable compensation provisions consistent with the terms of the regulations.
And so I just, is that not...
Are you not saying in that paragraph that you have, in fact, compelled companies under the Emergencies Act?
And if not, can you help us understand what that paragraph means?
Yeah, this is correspondence that was pulled together with assistance from a legal team trying to satisfy the requirements of our procurement policies as it relates to engaging these services.
Not compelling them, I think, is somewhat semantic in that tow trucks were coordinated, they were organized, they appeared willing to proceed.
Many of them wanted indemnification, which was not something that we could provide them with without making additional arrangements through emergency provisions with the province.
So when the Emergencies Act was invoked, that ability to provide that indemnification was extremely helpful.
We were concerned at the time that those that had agreed to provide their services would back out as we got closer to the operation.
So technically, could we have compelled them?
Did we provide them with information in writing that would insinuate they were compelled?
Quite likely.
Did we actually have to direct them?
No, they had willingly agreed to assist.
It was the indemnification that was the issue.
And we were trying to make sure that with new legislation and procurement processes, that everything was done appropriately and legally.
So, it's fair to say then that they were indemnified under the Emergencies Act, but they were not actually compelled under the Emergencies Act?
That's how I would describe it.
You would be best to speak with those who had direct contact with the TOE providers.
They were provided correspondence under my signature and the authority to disseminate that correspondence.
My understanding is they did not have to rely upon that to compel anyone to provide their services.
It was the indemnification that was the critical part.
And if we actually scroll down, I think that correspondence is attached.
To this letter, passed the authorization to all identified towing companies.
That's the correspondence you're referring to?
That's correct, yes.
Okay.
Commissioner Karik, in my last sort of 10 minutes, I want to ask you a few bigger picture questions.
Yes.
And the first one is about incident command.
You are one of very few people who are going to testify to this commission who has sat atop.
I'm sure the Commissioner would be interested in your thoughts on the proper role of a police chief when it comes to the incident command system.
So a proper role of a police chief depends on the situation.
It depends on the circumstance.
It depends on the size of the police service and the capacity of a police service.
For a small police service, a chief of police may fulfill many roles, some of which will be very operational.
To mid- and large-sized police services, where the larger the police service, the more distant the chief of police becomes from operations.
Ideally, your chief of police would be that of a strategic level if they have the necessary qualified people within their command to fulfill the other operational roles.
But what is most important...
There's clarity on command and control.
When embarking upon any situation, planned or unplanned, there needs to be that clarity of command.
And you will likely have heard reference to SMEAC, which is the Operation Planning Format, Situation, Mission, Execution, and Communication or Command and Control, depending on what form you use.
And those terms need to be clearly defined who is in charge, who has what roles and who has what responsibilities.
There are various forms of incident command structure.
What would be very helpful is having a consistent incident command structure that is relied upon by policing right across Canada.
We looked at Section 9 of the Police Services Act earlier, and that set out the situations under which the OPP might be called on to assist.
Should that be revisited or should there be other mechanisms by which the OPP could become engaged when an event overwhelms a local municipal police force?
I think given all that we've experienced as of late, I think that's very worthwhile being revisited and appropriate consultation taking place with the affected police leaders, with the affected police boards.
I don't think it would be fair to suggest that I, as the commissioner of the OPP, would necessarily have the authority to go in and take over operations, but I think there is value in examining a mechanism by which a threshold could easily be identified that would allow that to happen seamlessly.
And more integration as it relates leading up to these events.
So if we can take one lesson away from this, it would be absolutely ideal that we had one central repository of how many police resources are on duty at any given time and project it out for a period of time.
So if we found ourselves having to plan something...
That integration is able to respond and react much more quickly, efficiently, effectively.
And we do manage what's called the Provincial Operations Centre, which would make good common sense to house that type of information as to the resources that are available and accessible.
Looking at Ottawa and what happened in Ottawa, you told us and we've seen emails that you offered whatever support was necessary, whatever you need to slowly OPS.
We've also heard, again, from witnesses who have testified that, and you've said this yourself, that it wasn't, it's not possible or it's not advisable or feasible to send resources without, in the absence of a plan.
And so, and I know we've touched on this, but I just want to I want to put this to you, that there's sort of a contradiction there, that we will do anything we can to help you, versus we really need to see a plan from you before I send one more OPP officer to Ottawa.
Can you help us understand why that's not a contradiction, if it's not a contradiction?
I think it's a really good question.
And on the surface, it may appear to be a contradiction.
But I think to be fair to the proceedings, that contradiction is mitigated by actually looking at the data and the evidence.
A look at the number of officers that were deployed.
On each and every day at various intervals, look at the requests that were made and how they were responded to.
And it's only till we get to a point in time where we need to be able to manage the availability of those police resources for a protracted period of time.
Cross the province and manage all of the logistics that are associated to that, that there needs to be a more defined plan.
So I don't think they're contradictory in any way.
There's a point in time where we hit a threshold where it's just not possible to provide 1,700 police officers and 100 civilians.
On any given day, as I've mentioned, we may have a little over 1,000 working with the OPP and we're managing on a daily basis on average.
Approximately 3,400 calls for service, 20% of which are what we call priority zero or priority one.
So those are emergent 911 calls that warrant an immediate response.
To manage all of that across 330 municipalities and a critical event, you need to have a plan.
And in the absence of me being satisfied that there is a plan to deploy those resources, I and every other police leader would be negligent in their duties.
Turning to Windsor for a moment, I believe OPP Council in their opening referred to it as a success story in terms of how it was handled, which may be true in terms of the amount of time it took to clear the blockade, but based on the fact that there was The intelligence that this blockade was potentially coming for several days, if not a week before it happened, and the importance of Windsor, was it preventable?
Was Windsor preventable?
I think you'd have to ask Windsor police that.
I think they felt prepared to respond to the intelligence that they had before them.
I think you would have to ask them what prevented them from being able to mitigate the blockade.
It's a very tenuous situation.
We have to allow the environment for lawful protest.
So, you know, it sounds easy to those that may be listening to the police evidence to say there's a clear demarcation and delineation between lawful assembly.
And criminal activity, and it's not always that case.
So although there may be rhetoric, there may be very good intelligence that some parties are planning on participating in what we would describe as an unlawful protest, we have a responsibility to facilitate lawful assembly under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
So how do you find that demarcation?
It's not the difference between saying on this side of the road is long distance and on that side it's not when we had old telephone networks.
It is extremely difficult to decide in some cases at what point this is going to become a lawful assembly and how do you prevent that in that moment of time.
Sometimes you cannot prevent it.
When presented with it, I think the important question is how do you de-escalate it?
And that's where the framework, the national framework that this commission has spent some considerable time hearing about, I think that's really where the focus needs to be.
How do you leverage that framework that once you find yourself in that situation?
That you can de-escalate.
And if you do have to move to enforcement, how can you do that in the most efficient, effective, and primarily the safest way to those that are involved in the protests, to the officers, and to the community?
So that is not a straightforward question, nor have I provided you with a straightforward answer.
I apologize.
That's okay.
My final question.
You told us this summer that there's a limited...
Formal role for the OPP to kind of coordinate resources across Ontario.
Do you think, looking back in hindsight, that a more active and early engagement by the OPP in bringing resources together could have prevented certain protests or shortened the protests that did occur?
I think that's an unfair question.
I don't know that I could say earlier active engagement of the OPP.
The information was there to the police services of jurisdiction to build the plans as they saw was appropriate.
The intelligence was provided.
We're there as a willing policing partner.
And as in my previous very long-winded answer, I apologize, Commissioner.
I don't know that it's always possible to prevent these things.
Are there mitigation strategies that could be put into place and maybe should have been put into place?
I will concede that, but I don't know that I can say that there would be a different outcome if the OPP were put in a different position.
Thank you, Commissioner Karik.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
So, I'd like to call on the government of Canada to go first, please.
Thank you.
Good afternoon, Commissioner Karik.
My name is Brendan Van Nienhuis, and I'm one of the lawyers for the Government of Canada.
I'll have some questions for you today.
Thank you.
Good afternoon.
Good afternoon.
I'd like to start with an issue my friend was just asking you about after the lunch break, and that has to do with the issue of towing.
Actually, before I start, I want to take you to a document he'd taken you to, which is OPP40, it's 1580.
This has to do with the messaging to the demonstrators.
Okay.
Could you look at the third paragraph?
You see there that your advice to the Deputy Solicitor General is that the messaging to the demonstrators should start with the Emergency Measures in Civil Protection Act.
Right?
Yes.
And secondly, it should go to the FA.
I take that as a typo for the EA.
Is that fair?
I think that is very fair, yes.
And the EA would be the Emergencies Act, correct?
Yes.
Because it refers to the enforcement of the designated restricted zone, right?
Absolutely, yes.
And the prohibition of children?
Yes.
And those were measures that arose under the Emergencies Act?
Correct, yes.
And your point there is that you want to emphasize the Emergencies Act consequences and the EMCPA consequences ahead of emphasizing the criminal charges, right?
That is the way that I've articulated it, yes.
Because those messages will be more effective than the ordinary available charges under the criminal code in reducing the footprint of the protest site before the POU operation took place in earnest.
They may be more effective, depending on the situation, depending on the circumstances.
They were definitely an effective tool for those three areas that I've highlighted.
We have common law authorities to prevent.
Prevent entry into restricted zones.
That is available to the police.
But the messaging that went along with the Emergencies Act about those restricted zones, specifically being able to highlight prohibiting children from entering into those zones, which was a concern for the police, was an effective tool, I believe.
Also, being able to message the other consequences, that is an effective tool that was available to us.
Absolutely.
Thank you.
could we go now please to pb.nsc.can.407378 I want to take you back to the letter that you wrote on February the 22nd to Deputy Solicitor General Di Tommaso.
Do you recall being asked about this a moment ago?
Yes.
Yes, and I just want to make sure that we read the whole of the letter.
If we go down to the first paragraph, please.
You say this is further to an original letter you'd sent him on February 15th, right?
That's correct.
We had sent initial correspondence on February the 15th regarding a non- Competitive procurement process while we were procuring the services of tow operators.
Yes, and you say at the time you thought that the best approach would be the provisions of the Ontario Public Service Procurement Directive and the emergency provisions underneath it, which allow for non-competitive procurement, correct?
Correct, yes.
And you say as matters unfolded operationally in real time, the OPP learned that the vendor community was highly reluctant to assist the police.
Yes.
And initial conversations with them revealed that they required unusually broad and high-risk indemnification from the province, right?
Correct, yes.
Secondly, a commitment not to reveal their name, correct?
In some cases, that was a concern by tow operators, yes.
Yes, and you were advised by the Solicitor General's legal.
That the OPP could not provide such an indemnity absent the approval of the Minister of Finance or the President of the Treasury Board Secretariat, correct?
I can't recall the specific advice, but that advice that we received was what generated this letter that was constructed for me.
And that's what you conveyed to the Deputy Solicitor General?
Can you point me to that paragraph, sorry?
This third bullet point, you say, as advised by the Legal Services Branch, the OPP could not provide an indemnity.
Do you see that?
I do see that.
Thank you, yes.
All right.
And you could not promise confidentiality, if you look at the fourth line there, because of the obligations the OPP has under FIPA, correct?
Correct.
Next bullet, if the OPP were to enter into such agreements, a separate agreement would be needed to be negotiated each time you retained a vendor, and there simply would not be enough time for that to be achieved when services had to be in place by Feb 17, correct?
That is correct.
Okay, next page.
You continue and say, on February 15th, we learned that the Government of Canada announced the declaration of a public order emergency under the Emergencies Act, correct?
Correct.
And you point out in the next paragraph that the emergency measures regulations include provisions whereby the Minister or the Commissioner of the RCMP or a person acting on their behalf can require a person to render essential goods and services, right?
That's right.
That includes towing services, as noted there.
Correct.
And if you look at the next paragraph in the second sentence, you say, additionally, the regulations were supported by legal as the appropriate way to address the need to have services available quickly, right?
Yes.
And that's because they concluded provision for, first of all, compensation, right?
Yes.
Secondly, compensation for any loss, injury, or damage suffered as a result of performing their...
That is correct, yes.
And lastly, protection from personal liability, which would serve the function of an indemnity, correct?
That's correct, yes.
And then you enclose, you tell the Deputy Solicitor General, you're enclosing the letter and fee schedule that you provided to all of the identified towing vendors, correct?
That is correct.
All right, if we can go to the next page, please.
I'm sorry, the fourth page.
My friend showed you that.
That's designating you as a person who may exercise the authority of the Commissioner for this purpose, right?
Correct, yes.
Signed by both myself and the Commissioner of the RCMP.
Signed February 17th?
Correct.
Okay, next page.
If you look at the second paragraph there, This is a letter that's signed by you.
It says, the OPP thanks you for your willingness to engage in discussions to date to determine a solution that will help us move forward in this emergent situation, right?
That's what it says, yes.
And there had been discussions at least to help determine whether a solution could be found that would protect the towing companies.
There had been discussion with the towing companies, many of which had agreed to provide services.
Some were concerned over indemnification, some were concerned over identity, and there was a concern that some of them may back out as we got closer to activating the operational plan, yes.
Yes, and in view of that concern, what you say here is that pursuant to Section 7 of the regulations, the OPP is now requiring you to make available and render...
The essential goods and services needed for the removal, towing, and storage of these vehicles, correct?
Correct, yes.
And if you look at the next paragraph, you confirm then this letter is written confirmation of verbal instructions from the OPP to provide these services from the date the regulations came into force on February 15th.
And notice that you are required to continue to comply and provide them, right?
Correct, yes.
Okay.
And so, yes, you said it's a bit of a semantic issue, but in fact, sir, the OPP did require towing companies to provide the services under the auspices of the EA, correct?
Yes, we had provided that written direction, and had they failed to provide those services, we would have been able to compel them to do so, absolutely.
And you appreciate that under the emergency measures regulations, where this authority came from, That the power is to request them to provide the services, correct?
Yes.
And if they do not do so, then that creates an offense under Section 10 of the Emergency Measures Regulations, correct?
I am aware of that, yes.
Could we go now to...
Well, actually, go to the next page.
You see there's a note about compensation, right?
Correct, yes.
And then if you go to the next page, there's a second letter that also goes to the towing companies that sets out the compensation levels, correct?
Yes, yes it does.
And it's got a schedule on the last page of the document, page 9. And that sets out the hourly rates for these services, right?
Yes, it does.
Ranging from $175 or so dollars an hour up to $750 for the really big 65 ton.
Rotator trucks, right?
It appears that's the range, yes, absolutely.
could we go now to pb.can.00001628 Sir, it's showing you what appears to be an invoice from the Government of Ontario.
And the Ministry lists an OPP there among the notations.
Do you see that?
I do see that, yes.
That's a form of an invoice that comes from or on behalf of the Ontario Provincial Police?
I'm assuming so.
I have never seen this or another invoice like it, but it certainly appears to be yes.
You appreciate you advised the Deputy Solicitor General that, of course, you'd be seeking recovery of compensation from the RCMP for the money you paid out under that schedule to towing companies, right?
Yes.
Okay, if you just go down the page to the amount, you see there that there's been a bill issued in the amount of $666,000 and change to the RCMP?
Yes, I do see that.
And sir, am I correct that that accounts for the amounts that were paid by the OPP to towing companies and then billed back to the RCMP?
It appears so, but I would not have that level of detail.
That would have to be determined by our Business Management Bureau, but it certainly appears so by virtue of what you've presented to me.
I have no reason to dispute that.
It indicates service is received as of February 27th, and that accords with the general timeframes that we're speaking of, yes?
Yes, it does.
Yes.
Thank you.
All right, I'd like now to go to your text messages with the Deputy Solicitor General there at OPP 404580.
And we'll begin at page 16. First, sir, a general question.
If we just go to the bottom of this text, you see there on the bottom right, it's got a time and date stamp, right?
I do, yes.
And so this says 26th of January, 3.19.58pm UTC plus zero?
That's what it says, yes.
And you understand that UTC is Coordinated Universal Time, and that refers to a time that is during Eastern Standard hours.
I didn't know that, but thank you for the explanation, yes.
Is that right?
I will accept your explanation.
Okay, so it's five hours.
It's basically subtract five and you get the correct time.
So you're looking here at 3.19 p.m.
This is a text message actually sent at 10.19 a.m.
Okay.
Okay.
In fairness, you'll see in other texts that you talk about the time that it is that will assist in confirming that.
Okay, thank you.
If we could just go with that, that'll help us orient what happens when.
Thank you.
So in this text message, I understand and I'll represent to you that this is the first indication of you reporting, at least via text, about the incoming convoy to the deputy.
Does that appear reasonable?
It appears reasonable, yes.
Via text, yes.
Yes.
And that's what we have to work with in the productions, at least.
Yes, absolutely.
But you'll see that they're already the largest convoy to date, you estimate as being approximately 830 vehicles.
Yes.
And then you note below that there's convoys anticipated from the east in Quebec, right?
Correct, yes.
And other southern-based convoys from southwestern Ontario.
Yes.
Okay.
And if you just move down the page to the response from...
Deputy DiTomaso, you'll see he thanks you, right?
Yes, I see that, yes.
And he would like an early morning report as he'll be reporting into SOC.
You see that?
I do see that, yes.
Is that the Secretary to the Cabinet?
That would be Secretary of Cabinet, yes.
We go to the next page.
This is now the 27th, if you go down to the second text on the page, and you're providing a further update on the progress of the convoy?
Yes.
If you go to page 21. You'll see there on the bottom text on the page on the 28th again, you're providing a further update.
Sorry, that's 21. A further update on the 28th now, right?
So this is dated the 27th, sorry.
Oh, you know what?
You've got me.
You're right.
There's that UTC issue.
So you're saying the 27th, but this is actually five hours earlier.
It's 9.40 p.m. on the 27th.
Okay, thank you.
Does that make sense to you?
That does.
It's helpful because I had put the date at the top.
Otherwise, I would have fallen victim to the same timestamp.
Thank you.
Easy to do.
You look at the bottom entry in your report that there's a focus by OPS.
If you just go to the bottom of that text.
That OPS is focused on access and egress routes to hospitals and any risks associated to vaccine clinics, right?
Yes.
That's because there's a concern about the purpose of the convoy and the potential for disruption of vaccination sites, right?
Correct, yes.
Go to page 23. At the top of the page, you'll see...
You're reporting now on the 28th, and we know now that that's approximately 11 o 'clock a.m., and you're indicating that there's convoys now commencing their travels to Ottawa from Huntsville, Owen Sound, Kingston, Innisfil, Hamilton, Sault Ste.
Marie, Cochrane, Little Current, and Quebec, correct?
Correct, yes.
And you're expecting crowds of demonstrators all along the various routes, and the leader of the opposition, in fact, you note there.
Yes.
And if you go to the bottom of the page, you're providing an estimate on this date, and if you could just scroll so we can see the time stamp.
Thank you.
So about 345 in the afternoon, 1,350 estimated vehicles at this point, right?
Yes.
And you're reporting on flatbed trucks with heavy equipment, utility vehicles, seating, portable toilets, and a boat with graffitied...
With graffiti directed at the Prime Minister spray-painted on it, right?
Yes.
Social media messaging indicating that demonstrators intend to stay beyond the weekend?
Yes.
Some extremist views and comments encouraging unlawful protests are being posted on social media?
Yes.
And you note that $7.1 million have been raised now on GoFundMe?
Correct.
Correct.
I also note there, for your attention, the belief that OPS will not be allowing any trucks carrying heavy equipment or other items of concern to travel into the city.
I know that was a topic of discussion earlier.
I do.
Thank you.
Thank you.
If we go to page 25. The second text on the page, please.
This is a 29 January update.
Yes.
You note here that yesterday, an hour and prior, Was this destination 65 kilometers west of Ottawa for over 600 convoy participants, correct?
Yes.
And Arnprior became a site where a sort of an encampment ended up persisting.
Is that fair?
That is fair, yes.
And the OPP did not have full visibility into the content of the encampment in Arnprior.
Is that fair?
We would have to seek that clarification from those that were actually deployed there to see what type of visibility they had.
I can't say.
Okay.
You're not aware.
I'm not aware.
Sorry.
Go to page 26, the text at the bottom of the page, please.
You see there now you're reporting to the Deputy Solicitor General.
That a farmer's field has been cleared on Route 200 in Embrun for parking.
Do you see that?
Yes.
A site that could hold 400 trucks?
Yes.
And a shuttle had been arranged, I guess, to shuttle protesters back and forth to the city.
It appears so, yes.
And again, the site in Embrun, and maybe you don't know, but the site in Embrun was one in which the OPP and other police services did not have visibility as to what was set up there and what was occurring at that site.
I certainly do not.
Those that were operational during the time could answer that with more accuracy, sir.
Do you know where Embrun is?
I think about 40 kilometers to the southeast of Ottawa, yes?
Generally.
Commissioner, if I could just interject quickly.
I've got a request from the translators that Council slow down, especially when reading.
They're having a hard time keeping up.
I apologize.
I will do better at that.
Can we go to page 28?
The third last text on the page, if you see, there's an indication there you're giving it, it would be 744, so 244 in the afternoon on the 29th, right?
Yes.
And that is that a private helicopter is flying over Ottawa with an anti-government sign on it, correct?
That is correct, yes.
And Deputy Solicitor General Di Tommaso responds to you.
If you move down.
I saw that on the news.
How is it permitted to enter into restricted airspace?
Yes?
Yes.
Was that a concern to you as well?
Not at that particular time.
I had not thought of that as a concern of mine with a provincial mandate, no.
Okay, fair enough.
At any rate, you thought it was a sufficient concern that it should be brought to the attention of the Deputy Solicitor General?
Yes, I did.
It was all part of providing accurate situational awareness as to what was happening at the time.
Yes.
Okay.
If you go over the page, you've got a 3 p.m. update, and you're indicating to the deputy that some protesters have exhibited aggressive and threatening behavior towards uniformed police officers already on the 29th, correct?
That's correct.
If you go to page 30, the top of the page update of the 29th at around, it would be 4.30 in the afternoon.
You've indicated that protests have concluded, in other words, they've occurred, but they've concluded in Bracebridge, Huntsville and Thornbury, correct?
That is correct, yes.
And they're ongoing at Capuscasing and Cochrane.
That's correct, yes.
Moving down the page, you continue in the same update.
Your police have been managing incidents of fighting amongst crowds, tractor trailers driving around or through police barricades, right?
That's correct, yes.
Windows have been smashed in the Rideau Centre.
Yes.
And sorry, when you say, did you say your people?
I said, I'm not sure which police, but police.
Yes, yes.
Okay, no, thank you, yes.
It's not clear as to which police, whether they're Ontario Provincial Police or OPS in this case.
No, thank you for the clarity.
Go to page 31. The middle text on the page, 30th of January update.
That's the Sunday, I believe, of the first weekend.
Yes?
Yes, yes it is.
And you note there that in Waterloo, 100 vehicles are expected at the Wilmot Recreational Centre.
From a convoy traveling through Baden, New Hamburg and finishing in Stratford, correct?
That is correct, yes.
And the organizer there was concerned that with growing numbers that other participants might not feel the same way about having a peaceful event, correct?
That is correct, yes.
Can we go to page 33?
Bottom text on the page, please.
This is a 3 o 'clock p.m. or so update again on the 30th of Sunday.
Okay.
Correct?
Yes, it is.
Yes, sorry.
And the second last item in your report, you indicate that as a precaution and for special attention, we are in the process of messaging all police services in the province with vaccine clinics in their respective areas for the coming week, correct?
That is correct, yes.
You were concerned about possible obstruction or other criminal or concerning at least activity occurring near vaccination clinics because of the apparent motivations of the protesters.
I was, yes.
Go to page 36. The bottom two texts on the page, please.
Or the bottom three, rather.
This is initiated by Deputy Di Tommaso.
And he says, Good morning, Commissioner Karik.
I take it as CC?
Yes, that is me, yes.
Can you ensure that the issue of healthcare worker access and egress to hospitals and clinics is raised, correct?
Yes.
The Minister of Health.
That's the Ontario Deputy Minister of Health raised the issue this morning with the Secretary of Cabinet.
Yes.
And he committed to the Secretary of Cabinet that we would make Ottawa Police Service aware of this issue, right?
That is correct, yes.
You then respond and confirm you'll do that and you say there's no change from the 7.37 a.m. update in the city, correct?
That is correct.
This is on Monday the 31st, the day that everyone hoped the convoy would leave?
Yeah, I'm not going to suggest that.
I would say, yeah, everyone hoped it would leave, but certainly was not expecting it to leave.
Okay.
And you see that Deputy Solicitor General Di Tommaso has his fingers crossed that that will indeed occur, right?
I...
Yeah, there's not enough information there for me to assume that that's specifically what he's hoping for.
It may have been that things do resolve.
Nobody gets injured.
It could have been a number of things, but obviously he's wishing good luck and doesn't want to see any harm come to anyone.
Well, I think he's being more specific because he's responded to your message, which says we're experiencing traffic congestion outside of the city, which is hopefully associated to people leaving the area, right?
Yes, yes, yes.
So he's hoping for it too?
I would hope so, yes.
Thank you.
Go to page 39. In this update on the 31st, you now say that the OPS estimates A thousand trucks remain within the city.
Yes.
Page 41. And if you just go to the timestamp, this is, it says 1st of February, but we know now that that is about 8 o 'clock, or sorry, 7.38 at night on the 31st.
Yes.
Okay, and it indicates in your last...
Report in your bullet that OPSPLT is advising that all hotel rooms in Ottawa are booked for the next weekend due to additional convoys attending the area, right?
Yes.
So the hope was not really materializing?
No, it was not.
Page 43. You're giving a status update on the 2nd now, which is the Tuesday, or sorry, the Wednesday, I think, of that week.
Correct?
Yeah, it's February the 2nd, yes.
And now you're reporting that a group from Quebec, 10 to 20 protesters known as FARFIDA, formed at Sussex and Rideau, right?
That's correct, yes.
And that group became quite a concern to the OPP, right?
Yes.
To all the police services, not to single yours out.
And that was a group that was noted in some of the later intelligence reports that we see with respect to the situation on the ground, correct?
It has been noted in various Hendon reports, yes.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Okay, let's move forward to page 47. You're now giving a national picture.
This is February the, well, I guess it's February the 3rd in the evening.
It's time stamp 2.53 a.m., so it's about almost 10 o 'clock at night.
Yes.
And you're now reporting to the deputy that the ongoing truck blockades in Ottawa and now in Alberta have the potential to develop into a national civil disobedience movement, disobedience movement that could extend to maritime transportation and potentially other major transportation sectors, right?
Yes, I am.
And you confirm, as you said today, that the strategies relied upon by various levels of government and or police to resolve matters in one province are likely to influence the actions of the protesters in other provinces.
Yes.
Some events are likely to be well organized Others may develop organically or spontaneously with little warning.
Yes.
And you are seeing that in various locations in Ontario already, right?
That is correct.
Go to page 48 to the top text on the page, which is sent by you at approximately 9:40 in the morning.
You list...
Events planned for the weekend outside of Ottawa and Toronto at Iroquois Falls, North Bay, Cochrane, Sudbury, Hearst, and Echo Bay, right?
I do, yes.
And so you have to make provisions or your officers in these detachments need to make provision to be able to police these events as well as what's going on in Ottawa.
That is exactly what would be happening across the organization.
Yes, not me personally, but absolutely our team would be making those provisions.
If we can go to OPP 404579.
These are your text messages with your Deputy Cox.
Okay, thank you.
It looks like you didn't text as frequently with Deputy Cox as with Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Solicitor General DiTomaso.
Fair?
No, very fair.
So, Deputy Cox oversaw the Provincial Operational Intelligence Bureau.
So, he was in receipt of all of the Hendon information.
He was also in receipt of the situational reports that we were receiving at various intervals.
Not even comparable.
My communication with the Deputy Solicitor General is to keep him informed and provide an adequate level of situational awareness.
Deputy Cox would have access to all of that same information.
So a different relationship.
But very fair to say not near as much communication.
Can we go to page four?
And he's reporting to you here on the 29th about the continuation of the daily Hendon report, right?
Yes.
And then down the page, you thank him.
And then he texts you again on the 5th of February.
You see that?
I do.
He said, I had an interesting call with Pat Morris this evening.
He had a call with Mark Patterson, Intel Superintendent for OPS.
Indicated his chief had a vastly different view over the nature of the protest than he did.
Pat and Mark share similar views on the protest.
I'll call you to provide more detail in the morning.
Do you see that?
I do see that, yes.
He's sending that to you about quarter to 11 at night.
Yes.
And you respond and thank him and you say we'll talk in the morning, right?
Correct, yes.
And it looks like from the text on the next page, you did speak sometime after 9 o 'clock or after 9:30.
Yes.
Do you recall that conversation?
I do recall having that conversation with Deputy Commissioner Chuck Cox, yes.
What do you recall?
The concerns that were relayed, which could be more accurately relayed by Superintendent Morris, but in general sense, the concerns were that the description to the extent of the protest and those who were involved and how it was being represented in the media was not consistent with the intelligence.
Can we go to OPP404579?
Counsel, I believe that's the document we're currently on.
Sorry?
Oh, it's the same document.
I've got the wrong document number.
Shoot.
Just give me a moment.
I've got to get the correct document number.
OPP 40s 3444.
I've got to get the correct document number.
and it'll be page seven.
This is an email from Pat Morris to Chuck Cox, right?
And that's Deputy Cox?
Yes, it is.
And you'll see here that Deputy Cox's twigs to him earlier that day on February the 2nd to send...
Him an email as a follow-up to earlier conversation so he can raise it with CCT.
Do you see that?
I do see that, yeah.
Is CCT you?
Yes, I lead CCT, so that's an abbreviation for Commissioner's Command Team, which I previously described who comprises of that.
And I can re-explain that if it's helpful, sir.
And if you go down the page to the next page, it's the email.
That comes in response from Superintendent Morris, okay?
Yes.
And this has to do with requests for intelligence with respect to various individuals, correct?
Yes.
And if you could just go to the third last paragraph on the page.
This is, of course, February 2nd.
It's occurring in the context of the convoy, right?
Yes, it is.
He says there appears to be an incredibly heightened appetite for any and all information on entities that cause discomfort to the status quo, right?
Yeah.
Yes.
And then the next paragraph, I'm concerned that success is seen as satisfying intelligence requirements and requests quickly, right?
That's what he says, yes?
As opposed to satisfying the correct ones to the correct actors, right?
Yes.
He says, I have acted to prevent slash slow down these requests and or responses to them, right?
Yes.
And is that the topic that was raised with you by Deputy Cox?
So we talked about this as well.
He certainly was concerned about individual requests coming in outside of the channels of Hendon and what those requests were.
But also about the dis and misinformation that was out there as well.
Did he refer to you about slow walking effectively or preventing requests from being fulfilled?
Not in the sense that I think it's being portrayed here.
In relation to making sure that all requests are prioritized, they're ethical, they're in keeping with standard operating procedure.
This is not about slow walking or not responding to requests that should not be happening.
And Superintendent Morris, I think, goes on to cite his reasoning for that.
Yes, and he's suggesting that it's inappropriate for this intelligence to be.
You know, gathered and passed along outside of channels that he characterizes as correct.
To be being reported in the media, and there had been some Hendon documents that had made their way into hands to people that should not have been in receipt of them.
So he was concerned about protecting the integrity of the Hendon reports, yes.
Can we go to OPP 403443?
This is another email from Superintendent Morris, dating to August of 2021.
Do you see that?
I do, yes.
It appears to have been circulated to a number of different police services across the province in the Big 12. It does, yes.
If you look at the second paragraph, here he's indicating that he's reflecting on the hate crime and hate bias-motivated crime occurrence having spiked by approximately 37% in the previous year.
Yes.
And he says here, That there has also understandably been a significant appetite for this information from government and the public, right?
Yes.
And that suggests, does it not, that that's an appropriate appetite to, you know, in consequence of the significant spike in these type of crime occurrences?
Sorry, did you say inappropriate?
Appropriate.
Appropriate.
Yeah, I don't see anything inappropriate about it.
Yes, he says Hendon has these matters in our intelligence collection plan.
And he's been capturing much of this information from all of our services.
And he references the White Lives Matter movement, Patriots movement, anti-government activity, and extremist entities engaged in anarchism, environmental issues, etc., right?
Yes, he does.
And the appetite for that information is therefore understandable in the view of Superintendent Morris of 2021.
That's what he's communicating, yes?
Thank you.
Can we go back to your text with the Deputy at OPP 404580?
And we'll go to page 99. Commissioner Kurik, I'm going to skip ahead to February the 12th in terms of your updates.
At page 99, you're asked at the top of the page by Deputy Solicitor General, he's referring to Windsor here, the Windsor clearance operation.
Have we started as planned or did the minister letter have an effect?
Yes.
And that's the letter we saw earlier from Solicitor General Jones, correct?
Yes, it was.
Correct.
Which I think was Ontario.
No need to go to it, but 50858 for the record.
And you respond to him that your proceeding is planned, no effect, right?
Correct, yes.
The letter had no effect.
The offer of negotiation had no effect on the determination of the Windsor protesters to stay.
That is correct, yes.
And neither did the injunction that had been ordered the previous day, correct?
That is correct.
And neither had the invocation of the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act by the province of Ontario, which had occurred the previous day as well, right?
It actually didn't come into effect, I believe, until the morning of the 12th.
But no, it would not have had any effect at that point.
It was later effective for us on Highway 402, but that's a different date and a different situation.
And that's fair.
But in this crowd, these three instruments did not...
They certainly did not, no.
And I know you'll have Superintendent Dana early before this commission in the future, and she can speak in more detail, but from a strategic level, no effect.
You are correct.
If you go to the next entry on this page, we're at 1.15 p.m. roughly at UTC, so that's about a quarter past eight in the morning.
Yes.
You're now reporting to him that the port of entry in Cornwall has been blocked by 50 to 70 vehicles?
That's right.
And there's conflicting reports about that, but it now adds Aquasasne to the mix, right?
That is correct.
And that was a significant concern for you, right?
Yes, it was.
Let's go to OPP404584.
These are your texts with, is it Superintendent McDonnell?
It could be.
We'll see the text.
Where are they, sorry?
I'm just trying to get the rank right.
Oh, okay.
Sorry, yes.
It's Superintendent Mike McDonnell, yes.
Thank you.
And he texted you information much more frequently than, for example, your Deputy Cox.
Yes, he would have.
I'd like to go to Page 57, please.
And if you look at the 12:58 p.m., so about 8:58 or 7:58 in the morning, he says it's totally different dynamic referring to Cornwall.
The Mohawk community of Akwesasne gets a vote on this one.
This is their lifeline.
Reliance on health care top priority.
All residents of Aquasasne, Ontario, Quebec, and New York rely on Ontario health care, right?
Yes.
And if you go down the page, the further report you get is, if you just go down to the very bottom here, it's being reported to you by your individual on the ground that this could cause the territory to react unfavorably towards the protesters.
Yep.
Sorry, this is blocked out.
Is this a text message to me from the superintendent?
That's correct.
Yes.
You go over the page.
He gives you some background about the connection between Akasasne, Kanesatake, and Kanawaki.
Yes, he does.
They'll be quick to mobilize if the ask is made.
First level is a community ask.
Next will be a warrior ask, right?
Yes.
And that's reflecting the possibility, as he saw it, of violence inflaming that particular convoy blockade in Cornwall.
Yes.
That's a very jurisdictionally complex place.
Is it not probably even more so than Ottawa?
It certainly is.
Go to the top, page 59. He's reporting to you that in his view, first there will be messages of support from Kanesataki and Kanawaki, and then an ultimatum from the warriors, right?
That's what he's communicating, yes.
And he's concerned, and you're concerned about the possibility of serious violence erupting from that scenario?
We are concerned about violence erupting from that scenario, yes.
Can we go to page 51 of these texts?
Sorry, 52. Second text on the page.
You see that he's reporting to you that on February the 11th here, about 7.40 in the morning, that Customs and Border Protection at the U.S. Embassy has been in contact with RCMP, probing Canada's law enforcement plans, right?
Yes, I do see that.
Jess?
Next text on the page.
He's reporting that in Windsor, the autoworker's anger and intent to counter protest today is no doubt influencing the attitude, right?
Yes.
Openly expressing anger on mainstream and social.
Yes.
And if you look at the bottom text on the page, he reports to you that the U.S. call went well, cut to the chase.
They're watching the Thousand Islands Bridge, right?
Yes.
So they're very concerned as well about the situation in Akwesasne.
That is the information that the superintendent has provided, yes.
Of course, you relayed that to the deputy as well.
I can't say whether I did or not.
I would have to review my reports, but certainly this information was very helpful to me, and it informs a lot of the thinking that I've already provided to the Commission in relation to potential threats to national security and the need to coordinate all of our efforts.
This is all in relation to that fateful day that we talked about being the 12th of February.
All this activity is happening simultaneously.
Windsor, Cornwall.
Ottawa, Toronto, Fort Francis.
It's happening right across the province.
If we go back one last time, I think, to OPP 404580, page 114.
This is back to your text with the deputy.
Oh, right.
At the second text here, you're reporting about the protesters.
Apparently, this is the 13th, so Windsor has been cleared or sort of in the process of being cleared?
Yes, in the process of being cleared.
We stood down operations there from a public order standpoint on the 14th.
And you're receiving information that protesters are talking about going to the tunnel instead of the bridge, yes?
That's correct, yes.
And that would have been a problem too.
That would have been a problem.
In the bottom of the page, you refer here to, for further discussion, you say to the deputy, you say, best step for government.
I would rather not see the Canadian Armed Forces playing a role off of government properties, but we could use special constables controlled by police for unarmed patrols and immediately long-term commitments to adequate policing resources to both prevent and respond to these events?
Yes.
You're actively considering whether or not the Canadian Armed Forces should be involved from the Ontario perspective?
No, I was not.
That was a discussion that was taking place and you can clearly see from my communication that that was not something that I was recommending.
Oh, I thought you were suggesting that the CAF should not play a role off of government properties, but that you could use special constables controlled by police from the CAF for unarmed patrols.
No, absolutely not, sir.
Not special constables from the Canadian Armed Forces.
We employ special constables within our police services.
And I was specifically talking about police-controlled assets.
at no point in time that I ever support, suggest, or recommend the deployment of the Canadian Armed Forces.
Thank you.
Page 121.
This, if you just go to the timestamp, you'll see this is at about 2.40 in the morning, so about 9.40 at night in the actual Ontario time on February the 13th.
Okay, so the night before that the Emergencies Act was invoked.
Okay, thank you.
Okay, and just a few highlights of what you're reporting.
If you can go a bit further up on the page, you note under Ottawa...
A 300-person counter-protest disrupted a convoy attempting to enter the city?
Yes.
The prospect of counter-protests increasingly occurring, whether in Cornwall, Akwesasne, or in Ottawa, was an increasing safety concern, was it not?
Counter-protests were a concern throughout the duration.
They were.
The anger of the autoworkers you described in Windsor from the blockade of the bridge, that was a concern about generating counter-protests that could become violent?
That was a counter-protest concern, yes.
In Niagara, you say two attempts by demonstrators to disrupt the Peace Bridge were prevented, right?
That's correct, yes.
At Fort Francis, OPP secured the bridge and border in anticipation of a demonstration that was attended by 230 protesters in 92 vehicles, right?
Yes.
And you identified four outlaw motorcycle gang members there?
Yes, we did.
And you have a national report that Peace Pacific Highway in BC was blocked by demonstrators, convoys in Vancouver, right?
Yes.
The Coutts border remained blocked at that time?
That's correct.
The Emerson border in Manitoba remained blocked?
Yes.
In New Brunswick, you had two demonstrations with two arrests?
We didn't, but they did, yes.
Excuse me.
We Canadians did.
Yes, thank you.
And in Prince Edward Island, we experienced a convoy attempt to block the Confederation Bridge that was fortunately disrupted.
That's correct, yes.
Now, you've told us that the OPP's Intelligence Bureau commenced reporting to its policing partners on January the 13th through Project Hendon, right?
That's correct, yes.
And as the convoy crossed over the Manitoba-Ontario border, That's correct.
You'd agree that in support of the police service throughout the occupation, Yes, I would agree.
That consistently and repeatedly emerged in communities across Ontario?
Yes, I agree with that.
This was a provincial and national emergency that garnered international attention?
Yes.
And the OPP and more than 20 other police services from across the country worked collaboratively to address public order emergencies that were unmatched in recent history.
Yes, these are all statements that I have made.
I believe you're reading an actual statement that I have delivered.
I'm trying to be careful not to do so in an impermissible way.
The illegal Ottawa occupation was accompanied by numerous other high-risk freedom convoy-related protests and blockades across Canada.
Yes.
Yes, I'm not sure whether you're asking me a question, asking me to confirm your reading of my previous statement, so there's a little delay when you look up at me.
Well, I know nothing of previous statements, but I have you under oath, so I would like to ensure that I understand your answer to these questions.
Okay, thank you.
So you are asking me questions as to whether I agree with each of these statements?
That's correct.
Okay, thank you for the clarification.
Sufficiently trained public order officers were amassed from throughout Canada.
Correct.
Yes.
That resulted in the collapse of the occupation.
Correct.
It required unprecedented national collaboration to prevent injury, preserve life, and protect critical infrastructure.
Yes.
The Emergencies Act was an extremely valuable tool Yes.
Yes.
So we've talked about that, yes?
In fact, through the collection of intelligence right across the country, with the simultaneous events going on and the events in our nation's capital, you and other law enforcement agencies collectively identified a risk to national security.
Yes, that is my opinion, that they're collectively, based on everything that was going on around this country.
That posed a risk to national security.
Yes, that is my opinion.
Thank you.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Mr. Commissioner, I think I have four minutes left.
I'll give them to Mr. Curry.
Yes, well...
I think you should give them to the interpreters, but I will call on counsel for former police chief, slowly.
Commissioner Karika, I'm Tom Curry.
Pleased to meet you, sir.
Pleased to meet you, and thank you for your help with the work of the commission.
Thank you.
Chief Slowly, you have known him for a long time.
I have, yes, sir.
And if I understand, you've known him in the capacity of a police leader, correct?
Correct.
So we were both deputy chiefs at the same time for neighboring police services when Chief Slowly was with Toronto Police Service and I was with York Regional Police.
And in that...
In that capacity, as I understand it, you had interactions, professional interactions, dealing with matters of mutual interest.
Sometimes you came to his jurisdiction to help the Toronto Police Service, and sometimes he was in York Region to help your police service.
Absolutely, yes.
And you know him to be a professional of the highest integrity.
Yes.
and a person who has devoted his professional life, as you have, to public service and the pursuit of improvements in policing.
Yes.
Among other things, as I understand it, you know him to have worked on improving the provision of policing Yes, correct.
Absolutely, yes.
As well as for the commissioner's purposes, you also have had experience with him working in major police investigation and incidents and the hardcore work of policing.
We were never assigned together to a specific investigation, but our services were involved in what we would call joint force operations.
Yes.
You talked a little bit about the role of a chief or a commissioner and the obligation to provide or to ensure that there is adequate and effective policing in the community.
Yes.
A shared responsibility.
Sorry, sir.
In the case of a municipal police chief, that is a shared responsibility between the chief and the board.
Right.
And in yours, the Ministry of the Solicitor General provides that oversight.
Provides that oversight.
And as the commissioner, I've got some additional responsibilities with regard to that that a municipal police chief does not have.
Right.
And you reviewed them with my friend, Mr. Brousseau, I think, for us.
When we speak about providing adequate and effective policing or the role of a chief or commissioner, it is to provide all of the elements for the police service, resources, training, and to ensure all of those.
Equipment, all the policies are in place.
Is that right?
That is right, sir.
And of course, as you have explained today and gone through some of it with us, the police chief or the commissioner in your case is also the face of the service to not just the community, but also to government.
Yes, that's fair.
In your case, to the Ministry of the Solicitor General, as we've described, providing situational updates and the like?
Yes, there's a lot less interaction between the Commissioner of the OPP and...
In this case, me and the ministry or provincial government than there would be with a municipal police chief who has monthly meetings, committee meetings, and various intervals of reporting that are required, where mine is an annual report and interaction on an as-needed basis.
Right.
I was going to say, and you've played both roles in your work previous to your appointment as commissioner when you were a deputy in York Region.
You would have had...
Much more contact with your police services board than you do perhaps as a commissioner in respect to the Solicitor General.
That is correct, yes.
And that, as we have understood it, that doesn't mean that you take political or take direction from the political sphere, but nonetheless, in the case of a municipal police chief, that chief is employed by the police services board, right?
So, two answers if you don't mind.
No, I do not take direction from any political entities.
And two, yes, the police chief is a direct employee of the Police Services Board.
In fact, under the Police Services Act, there is only permissibility to have two identified positions employed directly by the board.
That is the chief of police and the deputy chief of police.
And you have attended Police Services Board meetings, and you probably observed as these convoy events were The protests were ongoing.
The public statements and other issues raised by the Ottawa Police Services Board as they struggled with this problem.
Some of which, yes, I did view one online Police Service Board meeting.
I believe it was February the 6th, but certainly had been pervert to...
Privy to other comments that were circulating around via media and social media.
Right.
And the Police Services Board, in trying to exercise its authority to ensure adequate and effective policing in the community, was applying tremendous pressure to the police service and to Chief Slowly.
Do you agree?
From your observation of that meeting, I've seen that one too.
So from that meeting?
I would agree with that.
That meeting, the questions that were being asked, the level of detail that was being requested, that would have been most appropriately conducted in an in-camera private session.
The board has the ability to ask the chief information, but those particular questions, I felt many of which should have been done in-camera.
And you also observed probably as this was unfolding, because it had some relevance to the...
to your role in respect of this resource request.
You probably also observed the attendance by Chief Slowly at meetings of the Ottawa City Council.
Or did you become aware of those?
I can't say I became specifically aware of those.
I did not watch or participate in any of those meetings, but I would not be in any way, shape, or form surprised to learn that he was participating in those.
Fair.
And similarly, you wouldn't be surprised to know that at the level of City Council, there was tremendous pressure on Chief Slowly in respect of the protest that was ongoing in this community.
I would not be surprised at that at all, no.
And you know from what you saw at the Police Services Board, the board was demanding action, effectively.
When are you going to end this illegal occupation and the like?
You observed that?
I would hesitate to say that I specifically observed demanding action, but certainly observed the questions, and I've shared my opinion that I felt that should have been done in camera.
So back to the...
Command structure, if I can for a minute.
Chiefs you've described have, back to a municipal police service, chief of police would have deputies, usually responsible for certain functions organized, as in this case we've learned.
operations and intelligence separated between two deputies?
Yes, the command structure for the benefit of the commission is clearly defined in the Police Services Act as it relates to a municipal police service.
There are specific ranks identified that the chief can choose to utilize.
Chief, deputy chief, superintendent, inspector are the senior officer ranks, and then staff Got it.
And then below that, the executive command, the...
Chief and deputies, the chain of command that you've described branches into the organization all the way down to constables with specialized services and the like.
That's usually the organization?
That is usually the organizational structure, yes.
And as a police leader, you rely and Chief Slowly would rely on those deputies and the chain of command, including subject matter experts, to provide and deliver police services.
I rely heavily upon my chain of command and police experts as a command team.
We often like to refer to ourselves as.
So, yes.
Got it.
And they would, for example, be responsible for the development in a situation like this of plans, operational plans, in order to provide the kind of operation that we saw played out here.
Somebody other than the chief of police would be responsible for the development of that plan.
Ultimately, the chief of police is responsible to ensure that there's a satisfactory plan in place.
That equates to adequate and effective, but a chief of police would never be writing that plan.
No.
Right.
And the only time, I think you mentioned this in your examination earlier this morning, that assuming that the police service has personnel with the experience and expertise to If a chief would rely on those people to deal with the matter, if those people lacked experience or required additional direction, then it would be appropriate for the chief to provide it.
Would that be fair?
To provide it to the extent that they are qualified and capable of doing so and or to request the assistance of another police service to provide that assistance.
They are responsible for ensuring that that level of expertise is present and available.
And if the level of expertise is not demonstrated in one or another role, the chief or a deputy chief could substitute personnel, for example.
An incident commander or an event commander, as appropriate?
Yes, as appropriate, yes.
Okay.
Now, a couple of things, if I can, first of all, just to go back to the time that these events unfolded, and you've talked to us and others have about the Hendon reports, and the Hendon reports have really provided...
Quoting something that Chief Slowly has said, they've really filled a void in intelligence.
And the OPP has, through the Intelligence Bureau, taken on the responsibility to provide intelligence that was not being provided otherwise to policing communities.
Do you agree with that?
I would agree that we satisfied a need for intelligence, as Superintendent Morris had articulated in relation to the shutdown Canada movement, the patriot movement, a need for intelligence that we saw existed in this province and for collaboration and intelligence sharing across the country.
And I think Superintendent Morris described, not going to get the right words probably, but he...
I told the commissioner, this isn't a silver bullet.
The Hendon Report provides intelligence, but it is for others to receive it and interpret it and take action as appropriate.
Is that fair?
That is fair, yes.
And in respect of the Hendon Reports that were produced in advance of the Freedom Convoy, as you know from your experience with your own service and observing what happened elsewhere across the province, Different people took different things from the Hendon reports.
Fair?
I would say the information was used differently.
In some cases, it was not used.
In other cases, it was not even known.
In the case of Ottawa, were you aware that...
That some members of your service had seen and understood what the Ottawa Police Service had planned for the demonstration starting on the weekend of beginning, I suppose, January 27th.
I was aware, specifically Superintendent Craig Abrams was engaged with the Ottawa Police Service and did have a level of awareness over the planning that was taking place, yes.
And knew?
More than you would be expected to know, obviously, about that matter, correct?
Correct.
He's the OPP's, as an East Region commander, he was deployed here to Ottawa in order to monitor that situation, provide whatever support was required.
Fair?
Not to monitor the situation, but to lend the assistance that was required.
Right.
And he was responsible for picking up the convoys that traveled through the East Region.
And ensuring that they were, and he described it, that OPP assets were around the convoy to make sure that their passages were safe.
Is that fair?
He was part of an overall operational plan that was overseen by a major critical incident commander, Inspector Varga.
And then there were various incident commanders along the way.
Fair to say that Superintendent Abrams was the strategic superintendent that was overseeing the operations in East Region that had responsibility for the convoy as it And no consideration came to you from anyone in Ontario?
Within your service, that the convoy should somehow be stopped outside of the, either at the Manitoba border or the Quebec border, or outside of the city of Ottawa.
Is that fair?
That would not be fair.
That was considered.
That was discussed.
But there were no provisions in law to stop that convoy anytime while en route to Ottawa.
There was no way to determine that any of those participants were going to be engaged in any unlawful activity.
We have a right to ensure a lawful assembly.
Respect the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
And had there been any criminal infractions along the way, I'm confident my officers would have dealt with that.
Got it.
And in respect of what might have been described in the Hendon report as the absence of an exit strategy or that kind of language, that would not have provided a basis for the OPP to deny the protesters the right to access the municipality.
We would not have had sufficient authorities to deny them the right to access the municipality.
I think as you get closer to locations of concern, there are ample authorities in common law, as well as in the Highway Traffic Act, to prevent access to certain areas.
Got it.
And the same was true, obviously, in Windsor.
Based on what was known...
The OPP did not ever come to the conclusion that it should block access to the Ambassador Bridge, for example, prior to that blockade taking place.
Ambassador Bridge is actually in the jurisdiction of Windsor Police and not in OPP jurisdiction, but certainly not.
Prior to that, and a different situation as well, not hundreds of trucks traveling at one point in time together.
That was a slightly different situation.
But to directly respond to your question, sir, we did not have the authorities to stop any of that movement while on the King's Highways or within our jurisdiction.
Right.
Even after the Ottawa protest was underway and had started by that time, I suppose, to become labeled as an occupation.
That's right.
You know, there's nothing saying that even though the Ottawa protest is on way, that does not mean that somebody wishing to engage in lawful protest should be stopped from doing so.
So it's determining that demarcation point that I talked about earlier.
When does it become unlawful?
When does it become necessary for the police to exercise their authorities, which I believe they manage very judiciously.
A couple of quick things.
I'm not going to pull up the document, but are you aware that a situation report dated January 27th from the OPP described the Ottawa Police Service as having developed a robust plan that would allow for the capacity to accommodate 3,000 commercial vehicles?
I am aware of that, and it was my understanding that Ottawa Police did have a plan to deal with the enormous amount of vehicles that were arriving.
And did you know that Superintendent Abrams knew that they were going to be allowed to go downtown?
That I did not know.
No, sir.
And one quick thing, if I could, just in terms of the...
Of the timing.
Is it fair to say that some folks in the OPP felt that this would likely be over by the end of the weekend?
I can't say what folks within the OPP would have opined on.
I would hesitate to say that.
I was just trying to take a shortcut, but let me help you with it.
Mr. Registrar, do you mind showing us, please, OPP 4582?
And when you get there, it's page 13. These are just some additional messages.
This one from, I think, Deputy Commissioner Harkins.
Should be the 27th of January.
Yeah, it's the middle blue one.
Yeah, just stop there.
So, and I'm not...
Leaving aside the time of day, 27th, do you see it says just FYI, I was to be off on a vacation.
It says V-Day, must be vacation day tomorrow.
But with this protest, I can't, too much on the go.
So I switched it to Monday.
And he was taking, he was subbing out a day off on Friday for a day off on Monday.
Yes.
Do you see that?
In the expectation, do you agree that whilst there would be business to do on Friday, it would probably not be interfering with his vacation on Monday?
I would not agree with that, no.
Deputy Commissioner Harkins...
As indicated here, he's going to work remotely from the house in Aurelia.
He had a construction project on the go where he would have had to be at another location, I believe, on the Monday.
He was also not directly supervising this particular operation.
As we talked about the rank structure and the distance between a command officer and operations, Deputy Commissioner Harkins is responsible for...
Almost 6,000 people in field operations spread over five regions.
He has other responsibilities other than this.
This, at this point, was being managed by East Region with oversight from the Emergency Operations Center through the Major Critical Incident Commander.
So a long-winded way of saying, I don't find that this indicates in any way, shape, or form that he thought it would be concluded on Monday.
And who knows whether he got his vacation day Monday.
Might not have.
I don't know.
I can't say.
I somehow suspect he didn't.
And even if he tried to, I'm pretty sure I would have interfered with it.
Yeah, got it.
Okay.
Because very quickly, the Ottawa Police Service was overwhelmed with this protest.
Fair?
Very quickly, they were overwhelmed with this protest.
And they were never going to have had the resources themselves to manage the numbers of people, the numbers of trucks, and the...
The nature of the protest as it turned out to be.
Not on their own, and as it turned out to be, no, they definitely required assistance.
And the resource issue was identified very early on as something that was going to be required.
Is that true?
You know, generally I would say yes.
I think Ottawa Police can more specifically identify when that was identified.
But I was aware that Ottawa Police had made provisions with other police services as well for additional resources.
So OPP was not the only police service in Ottawa that first weekend and throughout.
And that's where it became even more valuable to coordinate all of those resources.
And so far as you learned, they needed, by the time it was said and done, I think you told us they needed around the 1800 that Chief Slowly had identified.
Actually, in excess of 2000.
I think it's closer to 2200.
Please don't hold me to that number, but an approximate number.
And when Chief Slowly first raised the need for resources, and I think you told us you had early contact with him and consistent contact with him through the piece.
Is that fair?
Yes, that would be fair.
And when he asked for those resources, was it flagged with the service that those resources would have to be organized to come along to Ottawa to help out?
So not 1,700 police officers and 100 civilian members.
The OPP could not facilitate that.
It was absolutely flagged with the service to provide the resources that we could, that were required for identified tasks.
And you see the numbers build throughout the duration of the convoy that exemplify that.
Right.
And the resources that were required...
That were set out, and my friends asked you about the table that set out specific roles and responsibilities and so on, would have allowed your team, I assume that that got to the right people in the sense of the Resource Center, so that they could know that those resources will be required at some point soon.
Is that fair?
They started to work on amassing the availability of resources.
That is fair.
And at the same time that a plan is being made, resources can be mobilized.
Is that true?
It can be coordinated, and the mobilization would depend on the phase of the plan and the timing of the plan, but certainly you ought to be starting to coordinate the availability of those resources.
And you had Chief Superintendent of Party on the scene by, I think, the 8th of February?
Correct.
So I received the request on the 7th of February.
We assigned Chief Partey the assignment that day, that evening, actually.
He met with us first thing on the 8th, and then he made his way to Ottawa immediately.
And Chief Slowly had, you reviewed with us an email, I think, that Chief Slowly sent to you in the first...
I won't pull it up in the time that we have, but recall that he had identified some frontline officers required, and he had identified, I think, as well, some command structure that he required.
Is that true?
Yes, that is true.
So we had a conversation on January the 31st.
And then on February the 1st, he gave me a heads up via text that a request for resources would be coming.
And then I believe that that formal request came on February the 2nd.
And it was actioned immediately.
Right.
And some of those resources were already on ground in Ottawa.
Right.
Now, in the case of...
I understand from the, and I won't take the time to pull the document up, but just for your reference, Commissioner, and for my friends, the witness statement of Superintendent Early, which is WTS 22, identifies that she had, well, maybe I better show you, just so that we have it.
Please, WTS.
22. And when you get there, if you could go to page six, please.
This goes to the question of when Superintendent Early got resources in relation to when her plan was finalized.
Yes.
Essentially two tracks there.
Is that fair?
I'm not sure I understand the statement there.
Sure.
In terms of two tracks.
Well, resources are being mobilized while the plan is being drawn.
Yes, as was in Ottawa.
If you look at the number of resources that we had on any given day, on average 135, building up to over 400 resources on any given day before the plan had been finalized.
And when we speak about a plan, we're talking really about a public order plan.
It's much more than that.
The public order component is one piece of an overall operational plan.
Is it the piece that requires the most resources?
It is typically the piece that requires the most resources.
I believe the initial assessment when the integrated planning team arrived to provide assistance in Ottawa was that they would require 800 public order member units and that would require initiating requests from outside of Ontario from other provinces to assist us.
Got it.
Okay.
Just look, please, at the February...
Sorry, that is page six.
And there it is.
See the paragraph, second paragraph at the February 10th planning meeting.
Superintendent Early selected a February 12th end of day deadline.
Thank you.
She would have received and approved Inspector Yunin's public order plan and all required resources would have arrived.
So the 10th.
At the 10th planning meeting, very different Operation Windsor, much easier than Ottawa, correct?
Different, not as complex.
I hesitate to use the term easier because of the connectivity to all of the other activities happening nationally across the country.
I'll take complexity.
Thank you, sir.
Much less complexity.
Thank you.
So at the planning meeting on the 10th, and I think that may have been when Superintendent Early arrived, she had...
She had already by then initiated the resource request.
Is that true?
It appears as though she has and she has also identified specific date in which the plan would be operationalized.
So there would need to be...
Significant amount of detail in terms of how many resources were required on what date and for what anticipated duration.
And I believe they were estimating a two to four day duration on this event.
Some of those resources came from Ottawa.
My understanding is there were two public order sections of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that did reposition from Ottawa to Windsor.
I do not believe that there was a single OPP officer that was moved from Ottawa to Windsor.
And in fact, our numbers increased by almost 200, I believe, between the 12th and the 14th.
In Ottawa.
We also had to rely upon public order units from other jurisdictions.
London, for example.
So this is where the public order hub that we activated on February the 8th formalized.
They were able to analyze and determine what public order units were required when to mitigate what threats within what time period.
Understood.
It was RCMP assets that moved from Ottawa to...
That is my understanding, yes.
Could we go to page 9, please?
Second paragraph.
This is just a little bit up, please.
Thank you.
Do you see it says Superintendent Early discussed the relationship between requesting resources and planning when she took command February 9th.
I was wrong.
It's the 9th, not the 10th.
Windsor Police Service did not know the specific numbers and types of officers it required and that the on-the-ground situation on February 9th dictated bringing in additional frontline and traffic officers to ensure public and officer safety.
OPP accordingly sent as many officers as possible.
As we did in Ottawa.
So, you will recall from Superintendent Abram's message, we initially deployed frontline officers to assist with traffic management and traffic points.
That started with 18 officers that built to 30, and then when it built to 60, it went beyond the capacity of East Region, and we started moving resources from around the province, and that was done in the absence of an overall and overarching operational plan to bring an end to the demonstration.
So, very similar.
I've only got a few more minutes.
I'm going to just move really quick, if I can, to the plan, the operational plan, and this question about whether Chief Slowly had impeded the finalization of the plan.
You had some dealings with him throughout, you've told us, and with Commissioner Lucky.
If I could show you, please, OPP 4580.
And Mr. Registrar, when you get there, could you go to page 109, please?
Just while that's coming up, Commissioner, there were, as you were receiving, you were receiving information from a lot of different people, right?
Some of it turned out not to be reliable, that be fair.
In terms of relationships within the Ottawa Police Service or just in general?
Yes.
Well, I could say in general, but take your example.
There were a lot of rumors circulating around that turned out not to be true about Chief Slowly's attitude towards this issue or that issue or what he was doing or not doing.
And you went sometimes straight to him to get things corrected.
Is that true?
Where I felt appropriate.
I was not also going to be bothering the Chief with rumors that I did not think were relevant or were impeding or hindering the operational progress, compromising officer or community safety.
Right.
One of the problems that you observed, you agree with me about this, that in a number of areas, owing probably to the unique nature of this event, Chief Slowly's ability to...
to deliver a solution here was impeded by rumors and, and unreliable information.
Thank you.
Can I give you an example?
Yes, yes, please.
The miscommunication about 1,500 OPP officers on the ground caused, I think you told us, it caused an unfortunate...
and caused issues for Chief Slowly because he then had to answer to people as to why he wasn't making effective use 1500 OPP officers.
Yes.
And that turned out to be an unfortunate situation.
Yes.
And equally, the idea that on the 5th of February, the government of Canada, in whatever that means, because the note isn't so obvious, I suppose, Had lost confidence in Chief Slowly by February the 5th made it more challenging for him to succeed.
Is that fair?
It was definitely challenging.
And he had a lot of...
One of the things that you talked to us about was Superintendent Abrams' comment that Chief Slowly's estimate of the number of...
Resources that he needed had been the result of simply a random doubling of the actual number he needed.
That turned out not to be correct.
That turned out not to be correct.
Whether the statement was made or not, I have to accept Superintendent Craig Abrams at his word, and Chief Slowly can confirm or deny that.
But we certainly determined that.
The number was not far off what was required.
And I won't trouble you with what the record is about that, but suffice it to say it might have operated in the minds of others.
I appreciate it didn't operate in your mind.
You disregarded it, but others might have imagined that there was something unreliable about the number.
Is that fair?
That is fair.
And it would be unfortunate if they had.
Yes.
Real quick, you see this 12...
Oh, this is February the 12th.
This is a text message from you to the deputy just updating him.
And if we take Mr. Van Nienhuis's calculation, we back that off.
That's about 458 on the 12th.
Do you see that?
Yes.
Chief Slowly has accepted the plan.
Hope to have it signed tonight.
Correct.
Yes.
And you had that directly, I suppose.
From Chief Slowly.
Is that fair?
No, that would have either been through Deputy Commissioner Harkins or through Chief Superintendent Carson Party.
So at this point, Chief Party is the primary contact with Chief Slowly there to support him.
Okay.
So that at least from the afternoon, late afternoon of the 12th, so far as the OPP was concerned, the plan was approved by Chief Slowly.
Or at least there wasn't any further requirement for him to do anything about it.
Correct.
Now, can I ask you, please, to look at OPS 14454, just to get your help with a couple of other things.
We're out of time, as you know.
Thank you.
I'm going to wrap this up.
So I have taken us to the wrong document.
Oh, no, I have not.
I guess it's 160 page 164.
Page 164.
Scroll down, please.
And.
OK.
I'm going to leave it.
I'm going to...
Oh, there it is.
Thank you.
Just scroll down if you don't mind.
Just up a little bit, please.
Chief is Chief Slowly.
Sorry, sir, whose notes are these?
These are scribe notes from a meeting that you had with Carson Party and Chief Slowly, Commissioner Luckey, I think, and a number of other people.
On what date, sorry?
12 in the afternoon.
But I think essentially it is the plan approval discussion.
So I'm going to leave it there.
I'm out of time.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
I think next, well, we can take the morning break now or a bit later.
I think there's a sense we should take it now.
So we'll take a 15 minute break and continue on our return.
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Order allowed.
The Commission is reconvened.
La Commissaire.
Okay, just before we continue, I just want to, for the record, I should have noted that when the matter came up in questioning from Mr. Curry, he made reference to the witness statement of Superintendent Early, and for the record, that Statement will not be marked as an exhibit until Superintendent Early comes to testify.
So just so the media and public don't look for it on the website, our practice is if we're calling the witness, it normally will not be made public until the witness adopts it.
So with that precision, I think I'm now calling on the...
Ottawa Police Service.
Okay, so there's been a trade.
Time.
As long as they trade in time.
And are there future considerations?
Okay, so just so I'm clear, you're giving up your time to the City?
No, I'll clarify.
We've agreed to swap.
I just have a couple of clarifications that I anticipate being quite brief, and I will cede the remainder of my time, should there be any, which I hope there is, to my friend, Counsel for the Ottawa Police Service.
Okay.
So it's Alyssa Tompkins, for the record, Counsel for the City of Ottawa.
As I said, Commissioner, Just a couple of little precisions, not much from us today.
So just in terms of the number of resources on the ground, I'm just going to take you to the witness summary for Superintendent Abrams.
This one is in evidence.
So it's WTS 6013.
Okay.
Thank you.
And it'll be page nine, clerk.
Thank you.
So if we could just scroll down a bit.
And Commissioner, if you see in the paragraph starting with after the February 9th meeting, when we get to...
I think it's a very long sentence.
So the second sentence, by February 14th, OPP support to OPS had increased from 60 officers per day to 150 per day.
On February 15th, Superintendent Abrams was informed that 400 additional OPP members would arrive by February 17th.
So just in terms of the resources on the ground, do you have any basis to contradict Superintendent Abrams here?
Not to contradict, but I have been made available to me specific numbers of resources in various charts, which are not necessarily consistent with that.
And if it's permissible to the commissioner, I'd be more than happy to share those through future evidence.
Okay, I don't think much turns on it.
We just wanted to track that.
Are those charts, were they provided to your council?
You would have to ask my counsel that.
Okay, well, I'll assume that your counsel is going to deal with this issue.
We just want to know what the numbers are, like I said, whose evidence to prefer.
So we'll leave that to your counsel to clarify and explain whether or not these numbers are accurate.
So one more small precision.
Yes.
In terms of the letter from the mayor and chair deans.
I don't think I need to bring it up.
You recall which letter we're talking about, the one to the Solicitor General?
Yes, I do.
We just wanted to clarify.
So when a copy of that letter was forwarded to you, is that the first time you had received the request from Chief Slowly?
I believe so.
So we had spoken.
I knew there was a request coming, but that was the only formal request that I had received in relation to the 1800.
Chiefs slowly had made previous requests of me informally.
Okay, but in terms of the sort of larger ask, you did not receive a letter from Chief Slowly.
They reflected the same ask as is in the letter that the Mayor and Chair Dean sent to the Solicitor General.
No, I did not receive two copies of the same letter or what would resemble a similar request.
Okay, that's perfect.
Thank you so much, Commissioner.
Thank you.
Okay.
For the Ottawa Police Service.
Good afternoon, Commissioner.
My name is David Michikowski.
I appear for the Ottawa Police Service.
How are you?
I'm good, thank you.
How are you?
Not too badly, thanks.
I want to talk about the Hendon reports, and I understand from your evidence that you're very familiar with those reports.
Yes, I hesitate to say I'm very familiar.
Sounds like a leading question, Councillor.
That's what we aim for.
Yes.
The amount of information...
That the OPP obtained about the convoy and its plans for Ottawa.
I take it was something that evolved with time.
Is that fair?
Yes, it evolved with time.
It was a constant process of collecting the information, analyzing it, and disseminating it, which is all part of the intelligence process.
And so if we looked at, we know that the first reference to the convoy coming was on January 13th.
But at that point, there was little known about it.
In fact, even the dates of arrival in Ottawa were not yet known.
Is that right?
I would like to refer to the intelligence report to say specifically what was in there, but that was the first formal communication through Hendon about the convoy.
Okay.
And so as time passed, I think more information became known, correct?
That is correct, yes.
And so on January 20th, I understand there was still more information, but at that point there were no numbers with respect to the number of demonstrators or vehicles.
Is that right?
I can't say that there were no numbers with respect to demonstrators or vehicles.
I wouldn't categorize them as demonstrators at that point in time.
Numbers would have been in relation to the number of vehicles in the convoy.
So if that information was available, it would have been contained in there.
And so I can call it up, although I think it's already in the record.
But if you'd like to see the January 20th one, I can.
I have no reason to dispute it.
I just can't say for certainty without having it in front of me.
Okay.
And as the convoy grew closer to Ottawa, there was more information obtained.
And the type of information...
And the reliability of the information also changed, correct?
I wouldn't say that it changed as much as it evolved.
And I believe on the January 20th Hendon report, there was information about it being a long-term, no exit plan, unresolvable requests were being made.
So there was a substantial amount of information in that report.
And so there's a constant evolution, correct?
Correct, yes.
And so when I looked at the Hendon reports on January 22nd and 23rd, for instance, the information that I see there will be more current than the information I see on the 13th through the 20th, correct?
That is correct.
It would be more current, but you cannot dismiss the information you've received previously.
A one Hendon report does not replace a previous report.
Right, but sometimes there's contradictory information.
Something is in one hand in report that is not in another, or there's different information because there's social media that's being monitored in those reports, correct?
There can be new information in those reports, yes.
And so...
I see, sir, that on January 23rd is actually the first time that we learn in the Hendon reports of an arrival date in Ottawa of the 28th, which is the Friday.
Do you recollect that?
I can't say that I recollect that without having the Hendon report in front of me, as you've identified they're coming out on a daily basis, so I hesitate to say specifically what was in what report to that level of detail, but happy to review it if you'd like to show it to me, sir.
Okay, well, it is in the record, so I don't want to waste time by taking you to it.
But what I understand...
Is that the very first time we see an indication of numbers in the convoy is on January 21st.
5th, I'm sorry.
And those are very preliminary numbers.
And so if you can accept that you do recall that there was a delay until numbers of vehicles in the convoy became known.
Is that correct?
I would not agree to categorizing that as a delay.
Once that information was known, that information would have been disseminated.
Sure.
I'm not suggesting, I apologize, I'm not suggesting that there's any fault.
I'm just saying you get more information as you get closer in time and the information evolves, right?
That is correct, yes.
And so I see...
That on when numbers do appear, and there's some more numbers in the Hendon report on January 26th, I see there's always a caveat that you can't be certain about the numbers.
That's something that's unknown at this point and can constantly change, correct?
That would be subject to constant change, and at various points throughout the travels of the convoy as they went through OPP jurisdictions, there were other products produced over and above Hendon reports.
There were situational reports that would have been shared at a command level, made available to East Region, and therefore at the point of integrating in any form or fashion, I would hope would have been made available to Ottawa Police as well.
So I just wouldn't want to leave you with the impression that...
That Hendon was the only source of information or interoperability.
And so what I see when I looked at the January 26th Hendon report is I see something called intelligence gaps.
And an intelligence gap means you don't have information about the subject matter.
It's listed under intelligence gap, correct?
That is correct.
And I believe Superintendent Pat Morris did a nice job of explaining what an intelligence gap is.
It's where information is being sought to create a clearer picture.
And so what I see on the January 26th Hendon report is there is an intelligence gap as to plans for departing.
And so what that means is there is no information about whether they're staying.
or whether they're leaving or when they're staying until, correct?
Because it's a gap.
I would hesitate to say that that is correct.
I believe there was information contained previously in the Hendon reports that there was no date that they would be leaving and that there was a commitment to staying long term.
The specific dates, no, were not identified, but there was evidence or there was information that was available to indicate this would be more than a weekend.
Well, I think you've just agreed with me that an intelligence gap means you don't have information about it.
So I'm happy to turn up the January 26th one just so that you can see where I'm taking that from, okay?
Absolutely, and I think it would be helpful to reference any previous Hendon reports that may have indicated what they knew at that time.
Okay I wonder if we could just because we've referred to it see OPP 40 0811.
And so if we could scroll towards page six or seven, say.
Okay, yeah, sorry.
Perfect.
Thank you.
And so you'll see intelligence gaps.
And then an intelligence gap is the last bullet.
Plans for departing Ottawa.
Correct.
Okay, so that tells us we don't know when they are...
Departing Ottawa.
We don't know whether it's Saturday, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, or in a week from now.
Correct?
Correct.
Correct.
Thank you.
Because it's a gap.
And in fact, it's actually, we don't see the colors on this version, but there are certain things that are shown as priority intelligence gaps, which means it's even more important to get information about those things.
Correct?
Yes.
And so you would agree with me that the last bullet, the gap as to the plan for departing Ottawa, what you don't have information about, is not a priority, correct?
I can't say that that is not a priority.
No, I would not agree with that.
Okay, so we don't unfortunately have the, but my understanding is the bold print is what is in red.
And so I'm simply suggesting that the print, the last bullet, which is not bolded, was not shown as a priority intelligence gap.
If that is the case, I will take your word for it.
Okay.
And I...
Take it from this Hendon report, there's no indication that some are staying or some are leaving or some may be staying for a period of time and some may be staying for longer.
We don't find that in this Hendon report, do we?
I would have to reference the report.
You're asking me to comment on the content of a report that I can't see the content of, so I hesitate to do that, sir.
Okay.
Let me move on.
There was an email.
If we could turn it up, please.
It's OPP-40-1007.
And so that's an email on the 28th.
Yes.
If you just want to scroll down to the bottom from Deputy Commissioner Cox.
Deputy Commissioner Cox reports to you.
Is that correct?
That is correct.
He does.
And so Deputy Commissioner Cox says on the 28th, which is on the Friday.
That there's been great collaboration among our Intelligence Bureau units, as well as with our policing partners along the route to Ottawa.
And the established integration and cooperation between the RCMP, Ottawa Police, Surdité du Québec, Parliamentary Protection Services, and the OPP, along with the planning undertaken by the OPS, have positioned us well to maintain safety.
And security throughout the weekend, correct?
That's what he has cited, yes, sir.
Right.
And then if you scroll up, and Superintendent Morris is the one who's in charge of intelligence at the OPP, correct?
That is correct, yes.
And so I believe that what Superintendent Morris does is he concurs with that, correct?
Correct.
Okay, thank you very much.
So, as a point of context, I think it's important to note that Deputy Commissioner Chuck Cox is solely overseeing the POIB initiative in this, the Provincial Operational Intelligence Bureau, and he would be referencing to the integration and information sharing taking place across intelligence units, and he would not be inferring to any of the other operational entities that he would not have any insight into.
And as I understand it, the OPP had individuals embedded at the NCRCC in the days leading up to the arrival of the convoy?
That's correct, sir.
Yes.
And would have been working side by side with the Ottawa Police, the RCMP, PPS, etc.
I'm not sure how they were situated in there, but they were certainly there to ensure that the deployment of our resources were done in accordance with our operational objectives and to lend whatever support was necessary.
And your officers would have also been integrated into the JIG, the Joint Intelligence Group?
You would have to ask that of Superintendent Pat Morris as to specifically where the officers were positioned.
I'd hesitate to mislead you with not knowing that for certain.
Okay.
And you would assume that the individuals at the NCRCC who are working together would be sharing information with each other?
I would assume if they're working together, they're sharing information.
But if you're citing specifically intelligence reports, these are going directly into the Ottawa Police Service, directly into identified members of Ottawa Police, directly into the intelligence unit within Ottawa Police.
It would not be the responsibility of an OPP officer sitting in the National Capital Region Command Centre who has other responsibilities outside of intelligence to ensure that Ottawa Police is...
My understanding, sir, and I take it you won't disagree with me because you simply don't know, is that the information was then fed up into the jig.
I will take your advice on that.
If you have that information, I can't disagree with that.
And I take it that the OPP recognizes the right to peaceful protest?
Absolutely, sir, yes.
There's a recognition as well that peaceful protests can result in severe inconvenience for residents of a city and a neighborhood.
It can, yes.
And significant traffic disruption.
Peaceful protests can result in significant traffic disruption, yes.
And Superintendent Cox noted, and I won't take you to the document.
Sorry, sir, if I can.
Superintendent Cox or Deputy Commissioner Cox or Superintendent Morris.
I just want to make sure I'm orientating myself to the right individual.
Sure.
I gather in the document that I think Mr. Curry took you to, we saw the OPP.
was of late receiving requests for intelligence and open source information on societal actors and many of those are social movements that diverge from the mainstream.
There was some concern expressed about requests for information that did not relate to intelligence operations.
Do you recall that?
I do recall that, yes.
And the concern was potential targets who may not be engaging in criminal actions but oppose government policy and engage in protest.
Yes.
And so we have to distinguish there are those individuals who are not engaged in criminal activities but support peaceful protests.
The OPP would support their right to exercise, their right to protest.
If involved, we would certainly facilitate the lawful right to protest.
And certainly the information that was available prior to the arrival of the convoy was that, by and large, it was expected to be peaceful, correct?
There were comments about potential weapons, there were reference to civil war, but there was nothing that empowered anyone to take enforcement action prior to the convoy arriving in Ottawa.
Right.
There was a need to address those sort of fringe elements.
And in fact, that was planned for.
There was a POU plan.
The OPP was available to assist in case there was going to be a January 6th type event.
We did have public order assets on ground.
The extent of a public order plan, I'm not certain.
But we did have public order assets on ground, as did other municipal police services in the aid to Ottawa, yes.
We therefore expected that the rest of the protesters were going to be, for the most part, peaceful.
Can't say that we would expect that the rest of the protesters, I'm not sure if you're referring to those that we had concerns about as a possible fringe movement?
No, I'm talking about we had plans for the fringe movements and for lone actors.
Okay.
But for the most part, the intelligence that was coming was that the majority were professing to be espousing peaceful objectives.
Certainly, the contact that was had between PLT and those that they perceived to be protest organizers were indicating that it would be peaceful.
Sure.
And because it was expected to be peaceful, you wouldn't stop them from coming.
Is that fair?
we would not stop anyone that we didn't have lawful authority to, meaning that we would have to have reasonable and probable grounds that they were about to or had committed a criminal offence.
And Commissioner Carrick, in a statement I believe you issued to all OPP members, In which you were putting them on notice of operational deployments, you referred to the need in Ottawa for unprecedented resource deployments, and you described Ottawa as an ever-evolving major event.
And I take it you would agree with that characterization?
Oh, yes, I would.
Can I ask that we turn up, please, OPP401550?
And so if we can just scroll down, please, to page 2 of 4. And if we can continue to scroll down, please.
Thank you.
I'll just go up a bit.
Just a little bit further up.
Thanks very much.
And so what we...
Sorry, if we just want to go a little bit higher, I apologize.
Chief slowly asked certain questions.
This was with respect to one of the weekends that was coming up in Ottawa.
Do you recall that?
Yes, I do.
And so one of the questions that was being asked of the deputy commissioner was there were five questions, correct?
And question two was what will be the exact number of trucks on Saturday?
And three was the number of protesters in each location currently.
Do you recall those questions being asked?
I do, yes.
And so if we could then just scroll down a little bit to where it says row two.
Thank you.
And so what we see in row two, in terms of the number of trucks to arrive on Saturday, this just cannot be known.
Correct?
Correct.
Because it's impossible to have that kind of advanced information.
To exactly know how many trucks would be arriving, it would be impossible, yes.
And with respect to number four.
The question about the number of people that Chief Slowly was asking about.
The answer is the number of people to attend at any of these locations tomorrow is not the subject of confirmed intelligence.
It's a matter of inductive logic and extrapolation based upon precedent and social media organization and also weather conditions and actions taken elsewhere.
Do you see that?
I do see that, yes.
And we see if we scroll up to that email.
Go up, please.
Continue, please.
You'll see that was then forwarded to you from Deputy Cox.
And he's asking you, here's how we, like, seeking your guidance on how we send this to Chief Slowly, correct?
Yes, it appears so, yes.
And then if we just go up to the very top of the email, you'll see if you're in agreement as indicated, please.
And then if you keep going.
Yeah, and so you'll see, sorry, at the bottom, he's asking you if you want to send that along and you indicate at the top to go ahead and send it, correct?
To go ahead and send it, yes.
And so it's a matter of logic and extrapolation based upon precedent and social media and weather, predicting that information, correct?
That is what Superintendent Pat Morris has cited, yes.
And prior to this demonstration, Ottawa had a considerable experience with demonstrations and special events.
Yes.
And obviously had a lot of precedent to draw upon.
Yes.
And you would agree with me that this demonstration was unprecedented?
In many ways it was, yes.
And so in future, Ottawa would be able to rely upon this demonstration as a precedent for what it does in the future, correct?
Yes.
Thanks.
You can take that down, please.
I understand that things were...
There was a lot going on on the ground in Ottawa.
And we've heard that there was an incident where I think there were 18 OPP officers and there was a concern that they had been there and some of them had not been deployed.
Do you remember that?
I remember concerns over OPP officers being there available for duty and had not been deployed, both from a frontline perspective but also the provincial liaison team.
I do recall that.
And so there is an OPS situational report, and I don't need to take you to it, but that talks about a situation on February 14th where OPP officers by mistake let vehicles into the red zone, but fortunately they were caught and turned back by the RCMP and the OPS.
And those kinds of mistakes can sometimes happen in chaotic situations like what's happening in Ottawa.
Yes, they can, yes.
Okay.
I understand that Toronto dealt with a convoy that was expected on, I believe, two weekends in February, correct?
The 5th and the weekend of the 12th?
The 12th, which was the same date as the email you just reviewed with me, yes.
Right.
And when we looked at some notes, I saw that Chief Rammer, is it Chief Rammer?
Rammer.
Toronto Police Chief James Raymer, yes.
And he referred to the first weekend, and I'll just turn up the document.
It's OPP401132.
You too.
uh And it's on page nine.
Oh, I'm sorry.
I've given you the...
I'm sorry, it's...
Sorry, I've lost the reference, but maybe you can...
11.32 was actually the time in the notes.
But in any event, Chief Raymer referred to the first weekend, and what he said was, and I quote, using Ottawa, they locked down the city.
Had Ottawa not happened, TPS, Toronto Police Service, tactics would not have been accepted.
Do you recall that?
I can't say I recall that word for word, but I certainly had conversation with Chief Raymer, and I know that he would tell you that he benefited from the experience in Ottawa to be able to respond in Toronto.
He would also share with you that they have a predetermined lockdown plan for certain areas of Toronto, which is exercised on a regular basis and built in coordination with the city.
And I understand that the OPP, with respect to at least the second weekend, I'm not certain about the first weekend in Toronto, provided some assistance in locking down Toronto and preventing the vehicles from coming to the Queen's Park area.
Is that correct?
We did, yes.
And in that case, I believe in Toronto, the vehicles for the most part were not large trucks, correct?
That is correct.
For the most part, they were not.
And they were not in the numbers that Ottawa had dealt with either.
Right.
And so we've heard that you assisted Toronto in taking some preemptive steps to prevent the Ottawa situation, correct?
Correct, yes.
And so we also heard that in Ottawa, before the convoy arrived, that the OPP assisted in getting the vehicle safely into the city, correct?
We have heard that, yes.
And we heard that on the weekend of February 5th, when Chiefs slowly talked about closing all 417 exits because there were more convoys coming, He was told that the OPP would not permanently close all exits unless there was an immediate public safety risk, which there wasn't, correct?
I can't say that there wasn't an immediate public safety risk.
I am aware that there was some resistance to closing the 417 exits.
That was brought to my attention, and I thought, in my opinion, that that was a reasonable and lawful request and that we would facilitate it.
You're out of time, so if you could try and wrap up, please.
You indicated that you were going to have an uncomfortable discussion on February 15th with Chief Slowly.
Is that correct?
I don't recall describing it as an uncomfortable conversation.
It was a professional conversation that I felt needed to happen, and one that I was confident that I could have with Chief Slowly.
Right, but you obviously had concerns at that point, and I'll just, if I just may ask a couple of questions just to finish this up.
You had some concerns about the state of the operational plan and what was going on at OPS at the time, correct?
About the challenges that were being reported with operationalizing and activating the plan, yes.
And so if I may just refer you to the last document, which is OPS 404578.
Eight.
Oh, um.
If you can keep going.
Sorry, I'll try to do this faster.
Would you agree with me that Chief Bell took over immediately after Chief Slowly resigned?
That he took over immediately after Chief Slowly resigned?
Yes, I would agree with that.
And I believe two days later, you didn't need to have that conversation with him?
With Chief Slowly?
No, I did not.
The conversation you're going to have with Chief Slowly, you didn't need to have with Interim Chief Bell.
No, we did have a conversation with Interim Chief Bell, a very similar conversation, to determine that there were no obstacles in moving forward with the plan.
We clarified command and control lines of communication, and we moved forward.
So it would have been a very similar conversation with Chief Slowly.
I just can't indicate at this point what the outcome would be.
I would be, you know, not in a position to do that.
Sure.
And just to finish it off, what you said to him a couple days later was it was an outstanding job and you thanked him.
And a couple days later, you told him he knocked the ball out of the park and things seemed to be going very well.
Is that fair?
That is fair, yes.
Okay.
Thank you very much, Commissioner.
Thank you.
Okay, next I'd like to call on the convoy organizers.
Good afternoon, Commissioner.
Good afternoon.
My name is Brendan Miller, and I am counsel to Freedom Corp, which is an entity that's representing the protesters and truckers that were in Ottawa in January and February of 2022.
First, thank you for your service, and it's nice to meet you.
Thank you.
So, to begin, I understand, I'm just going to go through some of your background.
I understand you have a Master's in Leadership from Royal Roads University with a focus on justice and public safety.
Is that correct?
That is correct, yes.
And you also have a certificate in terrorism studies from St. Andrews University in Scotland, right?
That is correct, yes.
And you've been in policing since 1990.
Yes, I have been.
So 32 years of experience and an education in that area to boot, right?
So you testified that you heard the evidence of Superintendent Morris.
Portions of, yes.
And you said that he's, in your chief, the foremost authority in the province of Ontario regarding intelligence.
Is that right?
That is my opinion, yes.
And I take it you agree with his testimonies and the opinions he gave.
I take it that's correct.
I have not listened to his testimony in totality, but I would have no reason not to agree with anything that he would provide as evidence.
Right.
And I'm sure you might have heard the answers he gave to the questions I put to him with respect to threats under Section 2 of the CSIS Act.
Do you remember hearing that?
I can't say that specifically I remember that interaction.
Right.
Well, he testified that essentially, in summary, that there was no intelligence of a credible threat under Section 2 of the CSIS Act.
Would you agree with that?
There was no intelligence.
There was no credible intelligence.
There was no credible intelligence of a threat.
Yes.
I would agree with that.
Right.
And so it's fair to say that based on all OPP intelligence and the intelligence provided by the RCMP and federal intelligence agencies to the OPP, to your knowledge, there was no credible threat to the security of Canada as defined in Section 2 of the CSIS Act?
That would be my understanding, yes, as determined by Superintendent Pat Morris in consultation with CSIS and the RCMP.
Thank you.
I'm sure you're aware that to invoke the Emergencies Act, that sort of threat is supposed to be required.
So I do not have intimate knowledge of the threshold that's required for invoking the Emergencies Act.
That's not something that I have any responsibility for.
Thank you.
And in my next question, when I say federal civil service or federal civil servant, I just want you to understand that I mean anyone from Deputy Minister Down, who is a non-elected, non-political actor working for the Government of Canada.
Is that understood?
That's understood, yes.
Now, in your interactions with the members of the Federal Civil Service prior to 11.59pm on February 13, 2022, isn't it true that no civil servant ever said to you that there was a credible threat of the nature of that defined in Section 2 of the CSIS Act?
That is correct.
And they never said to you that they had reasonable grounds to believe that such a threat existed, did they?
Nobody ever said that to me.
Everyone's given various catchphrases to what was happening in Ottawa, but no one's really going through what is a protest or, you know, essentially a lawful demonstration, etc., and you seem to have an understanding of that, so I'm going to walk through that with you if that's okay.
Certainly.
Can you agree that in general protest law and sort of criminal offences that you essentially have three...
uh types you have your lawful protest protected under section 2b and 2 uh all section 2 really of the charter yes yeah and then you have unlawful assembly yes and then you have riot yes right so those are really the three sort of categories of these assemblies is that fair demonstrations that's fair all right So I just want to start with lawful protest, and you touched on that.
And lawful protest, as you said, is protected by the Charter, and that's primarily Section 2. And can you agree that the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of association, they collectively essentially protect people's right to assemble and protest?
Yes.
Right.
And people are entitled to gather in groups and public spaces and protest government action as long as they don't essentially move into an unlawful assembly.
Correct?
Correct, yes.
Right.
And they can get together in large numbers, go outside Parliament, and protest.
I can't say to what extent they can go outside Parliament.
There's the Trespass to Property Act that has to be taken into consideration as well, and I'm not familiar enough with what is permitted on those grounds to say yes or no.
Right, but they can go in public spaces.
Yes.
Okay.
And then Unlawful Assembly.
Police have the power under Section 63 of the Criminal Code to arrest and charge people for the offense of unlawful assembly, right?
Yes.
And you don't need any form of special order for that.
That can just be carried out by a police officer.
That is correct.
Right.
And I take it that you're aware that unlawful assembly is where three or more people with a common purpose assemble in such a manner and conduct themselves to cause persons in the neighborhood of the assembly.
Slowly when you're reading.
Yes.
Sorry, I'm now fast, Brendan.
I thought I was slow, Brendan.
After hearing my friend, but I'll try to get onto that.
So, it's when they assemble in such a manner that conduct themselves to cause persons in the neighbourhood of the Assembly to fear, on reasonable grounds, that they will disturb the peace tumultuously or needlessly cause or provoke other persons to disturb the peace tumultuously.
You're aware of that.
I'm aware of that.
That sounds very familiar with what is in the criminal code.
I hesitate to agree word for word without having it in front of me, but it sounds very reasonable.
Thank you.
And I take it you're aware that to disturb the peace tumultuously requires there to be more than a boisterous or noisy disorderly conduct.
It has to be something a little more.
Yes.
Right.
And you know that...
Causing an actual disturbance of the peace tumulturally actually isn't required to even arrest people for unlawful assembly.
It just has to be that there's a reasonable fear that it's going to happen.
That's what really differentiates it from a riot, right?
I would agree with that.
Right.
And that an unlawful assembly, you know, a lawful assembly can at times, of course, become an unlawful assembly when it becomes unruly and gets into the riot category, right?
Yes.
Okay.
I understand and you probably understand that a riot, in order to get into a riot under the law, it requires actual or threatened force or violence in addition to, you know, the public disorder.
Right?
Yes.
And even without this, if you don't even get to that threshold...
You're aware, and we've heard about the Riot Act and the Criminal Code, that a mayor, a sheriff, or a justice of the peace, or a justice of the Ontario Court of Justice can come out and read the Riot Act and invoke it and demand people disperse.
I'm familiar that that is contained in the Criminal Code.
I don't have intimate knowledge of that, though.
Right.
And then, of course, outside of all of this, you have injunctions.
And any individual or the city can run off and make an application for an injunction before a court of competent jurisdiction.
And if they meet the test, the court can grant an injunction.
And then once that injunction is granted, if it's not followed, the police then have jurisdiction under Section 127 of the Criminal Code to charge individuals with violating a court order.
That is correct, yes.
So those are the general things that exist outside of the Emergencies Act, right?
They're there always.
That is correct, yes.
So I now want to talk to you about Ottawa in particular, now that we've gone over that.
Now, regarding the truckers and the protesters in Ottawa, I understand they rolled in here and did so at the direction of police officers once they arrived.
None, of course, didn't.
They weren't invited.
But when they arrived here on January 27th and 28th, you're understanding that they parked where they were told to originally, and everything was essentially coordinated originally about where they were going to go.
I don't know that I can comment with accuracy on that, because as you will recall from my previous testimony, I was under the understanding that there would be designated parking which would not facilitate any form of protest out in front of the Parliament buildings.
Okay.
So that would best be posed to Ottawa police who were in charge of the operation at the time.
And we can agree then that, you know, parking on streets and highways in a way that would usually violate the law, right, where they're essentially...
Blocking everything.
That could be considered an unlawful assembly.
That could be, yes.
And there are authorities to deal with that.
Right.
And I take it, though, you're familiar with the doctrine of officially induced error, where the government official tells you to do something that may be illegal, but because they tell you to do it, you don't believe it to be.
You're familiar with that from your studies.
Sorry, can you repeat that?
The doctrine of officially induced error, where a government official tells you to do something.
That may in fact not be legal, but you do it because the government official tells you to, and therefore you believe that it is legal because they told you to do it.
Are you familiar with that doctrine?
That's very complex law that is beyond my education and comprehension.
I'm sorry.
It's okay.
So now you do know that after these vehicles arrived in the city...
That there was construction equipment as well as eventually, I believe the following day, cement barriers put up so that no one could come in, but no one could also go out.
You're aware of that.
The vehicles.
I was aware that there were cement barriers in place, but I was not on the ground to observe where they were or what impact they would have had.
Right.
But you can agree with me that if there's barriers on both sides of a road where individuals have parked their trucks.
The truck can't drive through the barrier, can't drive over it, can't really drive around it.
Is that fair?
That sounds reasonable, yes.
If I could bring up document SSM.nsc.can.000000209-REL.0001.
It's the incident response group minutes from February 10th, 2022.
Thank you.
Okay, and could we just scroll down to page five there, please, and zoom in on the first paragraph?
Big one there.
Scroll down, please.
Perfect.
Okay, so I just want to take you to the fifth line there, and I'm just going to read it out to you.
And this is Commissioner Lucky's sort of summary to them on February 10th.
And she says the RCMP Commissioner added that the engagement continues with the Ontario Provincial Police and the Ottawa Police Service.
The RCMP has provided all resources requested by OPS.
OPP resources have also been provided and there is good consideration, good cooperation between the OPP and RCMP.
There are indications that some of the protesters would like to leave but are unable to do so, given physical barriers.
An integrated planning cell is developing a plan of action and the preference remains to continue moving forward with negotiations, with enforcement actions to start early next week if negotiations remain unsuccessful.
A surge and contain strategy will be employed for the upcoming weekend.
Summary, as of February 10, 2022, is that summary accurate of where things were at with OPP and your understanding of everything?
I would say that that is accurate.
Save and accept, surge and contain are not terms that are generally used within the OPP.
And as it relates to your previous question around physical barriers, those could be barriers put in place by police, could be put in place by protesters.
I know there were some concerns that people did want to leave, but they were boxed in by other vehicles.
And they did not feel as though they could leave of their own accord without the assistance of the police.
Right.
And so I'm going to first, there's two aspects in there I want to discuss with you.
The first is enforcement.
So on February 10th, 2022, in those minutes it says, and this is of course before the Emergencies Act was invoked, it says that enforcement was going to start on Monday, February 14th, 2022, if negotiations did not work, right?
That was going to happen anyway.
Yes, that was going to happen anyways.
They were on a timeline focused on de-escalation and negotiation.
With the anticipated approval of the plan, there was the intent to move forward, yes.
And as you already said, that could have all been done without the invocations of the Emergencies Act, much like Commissioner Lucky of the RCMP said in that email that you agreed with earlier.
Yes.
Right.
And now I want to talk to you about the issue with the barriers, and we'll sort of address that.
That summary there, you said there's physical barriers preventing people from leaving, whether it be put there by the city or whether it be other trucks.
That's a fact.
People couldn't go and take their trucks and leave.
That was a fact, yes.
So once the concrete barriers went up and people were stuck, they're stuck there.
They can't move their trucks.
They can physically walk away, but they'd have to leave it there and go away.
Fair?
I will take your explanation on that.
Is fair?
Now, prior to these barriers being put up and prior to not being able to leave, you're not going to hear me argue otherwise, those trucks are an unlawful assembly.
But once a government entity like the City of Ottawa and everything is all stuck and they can't move...
Can you agree that those individuals and those trucks that were stuck there, and I know this is not a question of law, but is it something that you would charge them with, in your opinion, when they can't actually leave?
Are they assembled intentionally?
Are they someone there that they would have grounds to lay a charge where these individuals who the only reason they're unlawfully assembled is that these trucks are stuck, but it's not their fault?
So, would you agree that once the barriers went up and once these individuals' vehicles were stuck, that there was no unlawful assembly?
I don't think I could agree that there was no lawful assembly.
And it's what came first and what came second.
Were people trapped and couldn't get out because the barriers were up?
Or were they trapped and couldn't get out because other trucks and heavy equipment were blocking them in?
But I think what's fundamental to your question is the discretion as to whether the reasonable and probable grounds to lay a charge rests with the police officers who would investigate that unlawful assembly.
Right.
And I can tell you already in evidence is the charges that were laid.
And would you be interested to know that there's not a single charge of unlawful assembly that was laid in this case in all of Ottawa during the protest?
Thank you for sharing that.
Yeah.
You're out of time, so if you can wrap up.
Yes, I will.
So just on the issue with Inspector Bedoyne, if I could just scroll down to page seven of the document on the screen.
Page 7 and the top of, for the bottom of page 7. Nope, sorry.
Apology.
Bottom of page 6, top of page 7. Okay.
So here, this document is, again, the same one from before, but this is the actual plan that Inspector Boudouin had approved and you approved.
With the PLTs, it was actually put to Cabinet.
Did you know that?
So a point of clarification, I did not approve a plan.
I did authorize Inspector Baudin to have conversation with Deputy Minister Stewart.
I did not approve a plan, nor did I approve anything that went to Cabinet.
Right.
But is it fair to say, of course, no one knew it went to Cabinet, and I understand that.
But is it fair to say that the plan that Baudoin drafted, you supported that plan as an action plan?
I did not see that plan, but I have all the confidence in the world.
Inspector Baudouin, he is an absolute national expert as it relates to provincial liaison teams, negotiation and de-escalation.
So I would have no reason to question his advice that he provided.
And were you aware that Commissioner Luckey also supported that plan?
I was aware that Commissioner Luckey had insight into the discussions that had taken place between the inspector and the deputy minister.
Right.
And the Deputy Minister, of course, he had input into the plan.
It was his final approved plan that he put before Cabinet, of course, right?
I can't comment.
I didn't see a plan.
This is the first time I'm seeing any documentation in relation to it.
Can you agree with me that when it comes to law enforcement in this province and with the federal apparatus, that the three most senior individuals in law enforcement would be yourself, Commissioner Lucky, And the Deputy Minister, Rob Stewart, with respect to individuals in the civil service.
Is that fair?
I'm not a federal civil servant.
I wouldn't indicate that the Deputy Minister is part of law enforcement and policing is not a hierarchy.
I am not above a municipal police chief and a rank structure, so I wouldn't disagree with it.
I would not agree with that.
Right.
But in the provincial apparatus, you are the most senior law enforcement individual.
Within the Ontario Provincial Police, I am the highest-ranking police officer.
Right.
And then Commissioner Luckey, is that for the RCMP?
For the RCMP.
And the Deputy Minister, of course, is the highest civil servant in public safety that sort of oversees and looks at for the political branch and manages those sort of areas.
Is that fair?
That's a question best posed to the Deputy Minister, I think.
Yeah.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Okay, we're on a bad run for overstaying.
Windsor Police Service is next.
Thank you, sir.
Good evening, Commissioner Karik.
My name is Tom McCray.
I'm here for the Windsor Police Service.
Can you hear me?
I can.
Good afternoon.
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
I only have a couple of questions, I think.
First, my friend Mr. Curry, representing former Chief Solely, took you to Superintendent Early's witness statement prepared in this proceeding.
Prior to today, had you seen that statement?
It would have been available to me.
I would have reviewed that as a cursory review, yes.
Thank you.
I think your evidence was this morning.
That the Windsor Police Service was the service of jurisdiction in the area of the Ambassador Bridge.
Is that correct?
That is correct, yes.
And the Ambassador Bridge, if I recall your evidence correctly, is a very important international border crossing within Canada, correct?
Yes, I would agree with that, yes.
Your evidence, as I recall, you said it both this morning and to Mr. Curry, was that on February 8th.
The OPP established what I think you refer to as a POU hub.
Is that correct?
Public order hub.
We formally established that.
It had been operating since February the 4th at an operational level amongst superintendents.
And we coordinated it at a chief level and made it official on February the 8th.
Yes.
Thank you.
And the purpose of the public order hub was to ensure the fair distribution of public order units to areas of importance throughout the province.
I don't know that I would categorize it as the fair distribution.
This wasn't a case of being fair or equitable.
It was ensuring that the right resources were in the right place at the right time to mitigate the threats that were before us.
Thank you.
Of jurisdiction at the Ambassador Bridge, is it correct that the Windsor Police Service and or the City of Windsor would have to assume certain costs regarding the disposition of things like public order unit officers attending in Windsor, such as their food and lodging?
So sorry, sir.
Are you asking me if they would be responsible for the financial cost of deploying OPP officers?
No, the other units that were sent through the POU hub.
So, I can't speak to whether there are any charges from other municipal police services to Windsor Police.
I can assure you that there has been no cost back sought from the OPP from any other police service throughout the Freedom Convoy.
Those costs have been borne by the Ontario Provincial Police.
All right.
Thank you very much.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
If I could next call on the City of Windsor.
Good evening, Commissioner Karik.
My name is Jennifer King and I am legal counsel to the City of Windsor.
Good evening.
Good evening.
Commissioner Karik, are you familiar with the City of Windsor and the location of the Ambassador Bridge?
Generally, I've never policed in the City of Windsor.
I have visited the City of Windsor, but I am not intimately familiar with the locations.
So I will ask the Clerk to pull up a map to orient you and those who may not be familiar with the City.
WIN 402248.
And when it comes up, Commissioner, you'll see that it's oriented so that the Ambassador Bridge is marked at the top or north of the map.
I don't see it yet on my screen.
No, it's not here yet either.
We'll give it a moment.
So if you can read the markings, the Ambassador Bridge is marked at the top north side of the map.
Do you see that?
Yes, I do.
And at the bottom of the screen, which is south, you'll see EC Row Expressway.
Do you see that?
I thank you for the assistance of the cursor.
Without my glasses, that's helpful.
I see that.
Thank you.
And although it's not marked here, the road from E.C. Row Expressway to the Ambassador Bridge is Huron Church Road.
Are you aware that this is a local municipal road, not a highway?
I would not be aware of that based on looking at the map and my lack of specific jurisdictional awareness.
No.
All right.
Well, I assume that you don't disagree if I tell you that this is a local municipal road and not a highway.
I would not disagree with that, no.
Thank you.
And you'll see that, perhaps you won't see it, but you'll see marked, there's the College Avenue, which is marked just south of the bridge.
Just north of that is the entrance to the Border Plaza.
You aren't familiar with Windsor.
You may not know that the area of the bridge itself and Huron Church Road is surrounded by residential areas on both sides, educational institutions and businesses.
Are you aware of that?
I am aware of that, yes.
Okay, and the University of Windsor is right beside the bridge.
Okay, thank you.
Okay, so and you are aware that the Ambassador Bridge is a privately owned international border crossing that spans the Detroit River between Windsor and Detroit?
I know that it goes over the river.
I did not know that it was privately owned.
Okay.
And you will agree with me that this is critical infrastructure to both Canada and the province of Ontario?
I agree with that, yes.
You'll see that the bridge enters, as we've just discussed, it enters Windsor connecting to this municipal road here on Church Road.
And you'll see that there is no direct provincial highway connection between the bridge and Highway 401.
Are you aware of that?
Yes.
Okay.
Highway 401 is under the jurisdiction and control of the Ministry of Transportation and is patrolled by the Ontario Provincial Police, correct?
Correct.
So traffic between the Provincial Highway moves through local roads for several kilometres to get to this international border crossing.
Sorry, can you repeat that?
Traffic between the Provincial Highway 401 moves through local roads for several kilometres to get to the international border crossing, right?
Yes.
And you'll agree with me that the blockade of the Ambassador Bridge in February 2022 had a significant and substantial impact on provincial and national economic security?
Yes.
And we know that the Windsor Police, and you can take the map down.
Thank you very much, Clerk.
We know that the Windsor Police, with OPP and RCMP, cleared the Ambassador Bridge blockade on February 13th.
Correct?
Correct.
There were other municipal police service that lent some assistance as well, but theoretically, yes.
Thank you.
The Ambassador Bridge was reopened for traffic just after midnight on February 14th, right?
On February the 14th, yes.
But this was not the end of police operations in Windsor, was it?
No, it was not.
Police resources, including OPP police officers, remain deployed in the area to prevent further blockages of Huron Church Road.
Correct, I believe until on or about February the 28th.
Okay, and this was to ensure the flow of traffic from Highway 401 to the Ambassador Bridge, right?
In part, it was to ensure the flow of traffic.
It was to ensure that there were no further unlawful demonstrations that resulted in the bridge being blocked again.
Okay, so the purpose of it was to prevent another blockade of the bridge?
That is correct, yes.
And to protect the millions of dollars of trade crossing this international bridge every day?
Well, I wouldn't say they were specifically assigned there to protect the millions of dollars worth of trade, but as I've shared previously, I think that is an important part of overall security in this country, is economic security.
Thank you.
The OPP and WPS put a traffic plan in place on February 13th.
Were you aware of that?
Yes, I was aware there was a traffic plan in place that formed an appendix to an overall operational plan, yes.
And so let's go to OPP 6-0-11, which is the traffic plan.
And if you could take us to page three when we get there.
I'm not sure.
If the clerk got that number, if you need me to repeat it, it's OPP 6011.
Thank you.
Page 3, please.
Thank you.
You'll see here, if you can read it, Commissioner Karik, that here we see execution planning and the first paragraph states: All east-west traffic from College Avenue and EC Row will be blocked by Jersey barriers running the entire length of Huron Church Road.
Do you see that?
I do see that, yes.
And so the result of this plan was that Huron Church Road was only open for U.S.-bound traffic, and all east-west intersections were closed to local traffic.
Okay.
Okay.
I could show you a map, but I think that it's fair that that's the result of the plan.
And you just had mentioned that Huron Church Road remained limited to bridge traffic for some time, for several weeks after the blockade was cleared?
You'd have to go to the details of the plan to determine how long it was limited in traffic.
My reference, sorry, was to the amount of time that we had dedicated resources assigned to the activities in Windsor.
That was not specific to the control of traffic flow.
Well, we can speak to some other witnesses, including Superintendent Early, if we need to get into those details.
So you might not be aware of the exact number, but would it not surprise you if I told you that it took over 1,600 concrete barriers to implement the traffic plan?
I would not be surprised at that.
And these barriers had to be sourced quickly?
Yes, they did.
And the traffic plan required support from the City of Windsor, including by sourcing and moving vehicles and Jersey barriers.
Superintendent Early would be the best to speak to the interoperability there, but it would obviously have required the support of the city.
And as I understand it, there was great cooperation.
Yes.
And it would not surprise you, Commissioner, that the police operations and implementation of this traffic plan was expensive?
That would not surprise me.
And it cost around a million dollars for the Jersey barriers alone?
Okay.
Okay.
And as a result of the blockade and then the police traffic plan, would you agree with me that access to businesses along Heron Church Road would be limited and commercial traffic would have been reduced as a result?
That does not seem unreasonable.
However, I think it requires some context to say as a result of the actions of the police, the police are responding to...
Unlawful protests to make the area safe and maintain a reasonable flow of traffic and community safety.
So, I don't think it's fair to categorize it as a result of the police actions.
Well, the operations to preserve or maintain access to the bridge had an impact on businesses and residents in Windsor.
Okay.
You'd agree?
I can't dispute that.
So would you agree with me that Windsor municipal taxpayers should not be asked to shoulder the cost of securing this international gateway alone?
I would not agree with you on that.
That's not something that, as the Commissioner of the OPP, I have any responsibility for, and I think there's other people that should be providing that advice to you.
Okay.
I just have a few questions to hopefully assist in clarifying the circumstances that led to the OPP's deployment to Windsor.
Commissioner Karik, this morning you discussed a number of the individuals within the OPP who reported to you during the protests.
And one of them was Superintendent McDonnell, who coordinated public order unit hubs during the protests, right?
Superintendent Mike McDonnell.
Mike McDonnell.
Okay.
And he reported to you daily?
He reports to me daily on a regular basis.
This was some additional responsibility that he undertook.
The hubs did not report directly to me.
They reported through the appropriate major incident and critical incident commanders and our emergency operation centers.
I was not providing direction as to where those public order units would be, when, and what amounts for what length of time.
Thank you for that clarification.
It was Superintendent.
Mike McDonald, who coordinated the public order units then during the protests.
Superintendent Mike McDonnell was the representative of the Ontario Provincial Police that coordinated that in cooperation with the other leads or representatives of the public order units across the province.
Okay.
If I could please show you WTS 6026.
This is Superintendent McDonald's witness summary.
Superintendent Macdonnell?
Macdonnell.
McDonald, thank you.
Commissioner, it's Eric Brousseau, Commission Council.
Just a reminder that Council require leave to cross-examine on a witness statement.
Ms. King made us aware of this, but just for the record, leave is required.
Yes.
Sorry, go ahead.
No, go ahead.
I was just going to add that Superintendent MacDonnell is a witness whose statement the Commission intends to enter into evidence.
He is not a witness who will be called to give evidence or that the Commission intends to call to give evidence as relevant background for the question of leave.
Thank you.
Commissioner Karik, did you have an opportunity to review the Superintendent's witness summary?
No, I have not.
Commissioner, I am seeking leave to refer Commissioner Karik to this witness summary.
He's advised that the Superintendent has reported to him daily.
As Commission Council has advised, they've identified the summary as one that they intend to admit in the view of oral testimony.
Okay, well, perhaps we could put it up.
You could ask the question, but this probably should have come earlier in your examination because you're already over time.
So if you could put it up and see what the question is and then I'll see what the witness can say and I'll rule on it.
Okay, thank you, Commissioner.
could scroll to page four please To the second paragraph from the bottom of the page.
And you'll see here, Commissioner, that on February the 4th, Superintendent Mack Donnell started working with the Windsor Police Service after receiving a call from then-Superintendent Jason Crowley of the WPS.
Do you see that?
Yes, I see that and I was aware of that.
Okay.
And you'll agree that Superintendent Crowley advised Superintendent Mack Donnell of the possibility of traffic slowdowns too and potential blockade of the Ambassador Bridge?
Yes.
Okay.
And if you could scroll to page five, please, under police response in Windsor.
The second paragraph, Superintendent MacDonnell, indicates that on the evening of February the 6th, then-Superintendent Crowley requested help, and the OPP immediately sent about 35 cars with accompanying personnel to come up with a traffic plan.
Do you see that?
I do see that, yes.
And were you aware of that at the time?
I very likely would have been aware of that at the time, and the hesitation that you're observing is in relation to documents that were put forward before me earlier today where I had to orientate myself as to where those requests might have come into the organization.
So this was not a formal request that came into my office, but a good example of how those connections are made at an operational level, and that assistance is provided.
This is not something that the superintendent would have had to seek my authorization.
He is completely empowered to make that type of decision.
Okay, so we can take that.
You're now well over time, so you're going to have to wrap up.
I have two more questions, Commissioner.
That document can be entered as an exhibit so that it's available to the public.
Thank you, Commissioner.
So I just wanted to confirm that Superintendent Early was assigned as of February 9th, correct?
I believe that was the date.
And so you'll confirm that by the time you became aware of the Windsor Chief of Police's formal request for resources, WPS had already requested resources directly from the OPP, including POU assistance, correct?
It would appear so from the evidence that has been provided here, but there was no formal request.
Made of me and when I inquired whether anything else was needed, I was advised that it was not.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Okay, the next I'd like to call on the...
Mr. Commissioner, Paul Champ for the Ottawa Coalition, I'm sure inadvertently, but I think we were missed in the series of questions, questioners.
Yes, you were.
uh if you want to go ahead now that's fine Commissioner, my name is Paul Champ.
I'm the lawyer for the Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses.
I just have some questions for you following on your testimony.
Thank you so much for coming to Ottawa to answer these questions for us.
Thank you, Paul.
The first question I have for you concerns the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police National Framework for Police Preparedness for Demonstrations.
There is nothing in that framework, Commissioner, about a threshold for seeking and obtaining resources or assistance from policing partners.
You'd agree with me?
I would agree with you.
I'm not familiar with anything in there that would define that.
No.
But with a threshold or a criteria for that, it would make it easier for a chief to cede command to another police service or a unified command, I gather.
Would that help that decision-making?
I don't know that the framework would be the right place for that.
We'd have to go through the framework in its totality, I think, for me to give you an honest opinion.
I would just like this, Commissioner.
I've looked through that.
Framework a number of times, and it looks like it's a very good document, very good guidance on managing a regular demonstration, but there's nothing really in there about how to deal with a demonstration that's much bigger or much larger or more difficult for the police service of jurisdiction to manage.
There's nothing about how you get policing partners to come help you.
No, there would be nothing in that document.
That's not what that document was intended for.
But wouldn't you agree with me that if you have a framework for police services to look to for being prepared for demonstrations, if it happens to be a very large demonstration, it would be helpful to have guidance or criteria in there for how or in what ways a police service should reach out for assistance from policing partners.
That varies from province to province, and I don't know that police leaders need direction on that.
And here in Ontario, it's very clearly defined in the Police Services Act, how to request assistance.
It's also clearly defined in what's called adequacy standards, where regulations state that police services must have agreements for certain abilities and services if they're not able to provide them on their own.
Well, okay, we can stick with Ontario.
So Section 9 of the Police Services Act, it doesn't have criteria for when a chief should reach out or a police service board should reach out or the Ontario Civilian Police Commission should reach out, correct?
There's no criteria.
No, but there's a framework and how it is done.
So I may not be interpreting your question correctly in terms of a threshold.
How would you propose that that threshold is defined?
Well, I guess what I'm trying to say, Commissioner, is I understand that how this event unfolded in Ottawa, many people have testified here today being critical of Chief Slowly that the Ottawa Police didn't have an effective plan for a prolonged period.
They should have given in to a unified command earlier in the demonstration.
But really, it was up to the subjective or ad hoc decision of Chief Slowly, you know, absently going to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.
But essentially, it was up to him to decide if he wanted to cede command to a unified police command.
You would agree with that?
It was up to him?
Yeah, I don't know that I would categorize his decision as ad hoc.
These decisions are based on the experience of the chief, the advice of their subject matter experts.
If there was a way to quantify a threshold for an integrated or unified command, that would obviously be of assistance.
Well, or some criteria.
Yes, I'm sorry.
I'm not trying to be difficult with you.
I just think you're...
Convoluting it for me to be able to provide you with a very direct and clear answer.
There's the framework that deals with the use of provincial liaison teams and lawful assemblies.
There's adequacy standards that deal with how we deploy our public order units, what their qualifications are, what their training needs to be, requirements for a police service to maintain certain capacities as core responsibilities in the Police Services Act.
So there's a number of components to this.
Commissioner, what I'm trying to get at is that by, well, what we do know, you've already given us testimony that by February the 15th, you were ready to have a conversation with Chief Sloatley to suggest to him that it's time for him to cede responsibility to a unified police command, correct?
You were going to have that conversation with him?
To have a conversation with him to determine whether the obstacles that had been communicated to us...
We're seen by him in the same light and to determine whether it was that time, whether we should be assuming command of that, whether that was something he was seeking our assistance with.
And based on that conversation, I would then have to make a decision as to whether it was something that I felt should be elevated or it was something that could be managed by Ottawa police with our assistance.
Yeah, that's right.
You gave us a testimony that to elevate it, you would have spoken to the Deputy Solicitor General to perhaps raise it to the Solicitor General.
Correct, yes.
So that was on your mind when you were thinking about having that conversation with Chiefs Loley.
That could be the inevitable outcome, yes.
Yeah.
By the 15th, it was two and a half weeks on.
That was a consideration that you had.
You were losing confidence that...
Whether the Ottawa Police Service, on its own, could make the decisions to manage the situation, correct?
It was a conversation that needed to take place based on the description of what was happening with the activation of the plan.
And you spoke to Commissioner Lucky from the RCMP that day, and she also shared the view that you had that you were losing confidence in the Ottawa Police Service and its chief to manage the situation, correct?
So, you'll have to ask Commissioner Lucky her opinion in terms of losing confidence.
I hesitate to say that we were losing confidence in the Chief of Police.
We were certainly concerned about the ability to move the plan forward, and it required our assistance, and it may have required us to take command and control.
You're aware by February 15th, it had been 18 days.
Of the streets in downtown Ottawa blockaded, people being unable to access groceries in some cases, people with disabilities, difficulty getting out of their homes.
There was horns blaring day and night.
There was open fires.
There was propane tanks and jerry cans.
There was 300 to 400 commercial vehicles idling 24 hours a day.
You're aware of all those conditions, Commissioner?
I am, yes.
And that would have been very difficult every single day for the people and businesses in downtown Ottawa?
That would have been very difficult.
And no doubt that's a situation that, in your view, could have or should have been ended earlier.
Is that right?
That's going to be something, I think, for this commission and others to determine.
Perhaps it could have been ended earlier with more engagement through PLT.
I would suggest that that was likely the evidence of Inspector Baudouin yesterday.
I have not observed his evidence, but earlier engagements and more robust engagements of PLT, it is possible that the protest could have been ended earlier.
Possible, yes.
Yeah, and you've given us that testimony earlier.
Yes.
And if there had been a proper operational plan prepared earlier, that also perhaps could have led to the protests being ended earlier, correct?
It could have, yes.
Just because of the operational plan, just to put it into context, sorry.
Just because an operational plan is prepared and ready to go, that does not mean that we immediately move to enforcement.
We're bound by the Ontario use of force model, and de-escalation is always going to be the first and foremost priority.
But it is important to have the plan and the assets ready to go, should the decision be made by the critical incident commander.
Deploying the public order unit is the appropriate and responsible next step.
But Commissioner, we've heard evidence in this commission from a number of different witnesses that policing resources from the OPP and others were delayed because there were concerns that the Ottawa Police did not have a proper operational plan for the deployment of those resources.
Would you agree with that?
There was a delay in the OPP sending resources to didn't have confidence that the Ottawa Police had a plan.
No, I would not agree with that, that there was a delay because we did not have confidence in the plan.
We were providing resources for tasks and job descriptions that were required.
We needed to define the resources that were required, and to do that, we required a plan.
Right.
So until you had a plan, you yourself couldn't identify the resources and you weren't prepared to have OPP resources go until you've seen a plan where you felt those resources be properly deployed.
So we had a plan, yes.
That's right.
So there was a delay until we had a proper plan, correct?
Yes, not an intentional delay to say we're not sending resources.
I think it's really important to put it in context because there has been some concern and some reference to not enough resources being there for functions that were required to be performed.
And I just want to be clear that that was not the case.
Believe me, Commissioner, people in Ottawa knew what the context was at that time when there was that delay.
Because it was February the 7th that the mayor and the chair of the Ottawa Police Services Board asked for 1,800 officers and a significant number of OPP officers didn't arrive in Ottawa until about approximately February 17th.
Is that right?
That is not right.
I would describe a significant number of OPP officers being there prior to that.
I would describe over 400 OPP officers being in Ottawa prior to that as a significant number.
When we only have just over 1,000 on any given day deployed across this province policing our communities, more than 400 in the city of Ottawa is significant.
Right.
And while we're on that, it's my understanding from your interview summary that there was approximately 400 OPP officers deployed to Windsor.
That was officers in total.
That was not specific to the OPP.
I apologize.
I didn't bring your interview summary up.
That was my understanding.
It said it was 400 OPP, I thought.
Now, isn't it fair to say that the OPP could not have sent the numbers of officers that were ultimately sent to Ottawa?
To bring the protest to an end at the same time as dealing with the Ambassador Bridge crisis in Windsor?
That is fair, yes.
So you couldn't manage both of those events at the time?
You simply didn't have the numbers?
We did not have the numbers to deploy public order units simultaneously in both locations.
That is correct.
All right, just one last point, if I could, Commissioner.
On the letter that went from the mayor and the chair of the Auto Police Services Board on February 7th asking for 1,800 officers, you've testified you didn't think that public request was helpful, correct?
It was not helpful operationally, correct?
Yeah, because then there could be a perception publicly that the OPS didn't have the resources to manage the situation.
Making OPS vulnerable as well as other jurisdictions across the province.
Right.
But don't you think it was already obvious to everyone on the city streets of Ottawa, whether it's the residents or the protesters themselves, that the Ottawa police did not have the resources to manage what was happening?
That was likely very obvious to a number of people, but getting into a specific number of officers that is required is not best practice.
You will note that we never discussed the number of officers that we're deploying publicly in relation to an operational plan.
Well, but Commissioner, is it not the case that one day before the mayor and the chair sent that letter, it was the Solicitor General of Ontario that announced on February the 6th that they'd already sent 1,500 officers, right?
That was publicly stated one day before, right?
I don't know if it was one day before, but it was publicly stated before, and that was not the Ontario Provincial Police that released that number.
Right, because that wasn't helpful either.
That was not helpful.
They were politicizing things.
Who was politicizing it?
Well, the Solicitor General.
You'll have to talk to the Solicitor-General about why that was released and in what context.
Well, on that question about the Solicitor-General, we're going to move on to the next, which is the CCF.
Commissioner.
Good afternoon.
It's been a long day, and so I'm going to try to make my questions very brief.
Thank you.
Could you start by introducing yourself, please?
My name is Sujit Choudhury.
I am counsel for the CCF.
Thank you.
And so I'd first like to begin by confirming some testimony you provided this morning while being examined by my friend, Monsieur Brosseau.
And I believe you said the following.
If the request came...
Under the Police Services Act to take over policing in Ottawa, the OPP would have been absolutely willing to move forward and fulfill our responsibilities.
Did you say that or words to that effect?
Words to that effect.
We would have had to assess the request and our capabilities, but the willingness would have been there.
So I'd like to ask you some questions about the legal mechanics whereby that would have occurred.
And so if I could ask the clerk to please turn up.
Commissioner Carrick's witness interview summary, which is WTS 6039.
Thank you.
And if you could go to page three, please.
And I'd like to, if you could just scroll up a little bit more, that's great.
So, Commissioner Carrick, I'd like to take you to the paragraph that begins, there are a limited number of ways.
Yes.
And so, would you agree that in that paragraph you state that there are three ways in which the OPP could have taken over policing in Ottawa?
One is by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission to direct it to do so.
The second is on the request of the Crown Attorney, and the third is on a request from the Police Services Board of the Chief of Police.
Yeah, so really there's the four, because you could get a request from the Board, or you could get a request from the Chief of Police.
And as it relates to the Crown Attorney, that is normally specific to a very specific investigation or incident.
Good.
So I'd like to focus on the first of those mechanisms, if we may.
Could we please call up CCF?
And I think it's six zeros, 11. And I'd like to go to page 15. This is the Police Services Act, sir, which I'm sure you're familiar with.
Yes.
Yes.
Thank you.
So if we could go to page 15, please.
So this is section 9 that we've spent a bit of time on today.
What I'd like to take you to is subsection 2. And would you agree that subsection 2 says that if the commission were to find that the OPS was not providing adequate and effective police services, it would have first communicated this finding to the OPS board.
And directed the OPS board to take necessary measures.
Yes.
And then after that, subsection 3 provides, if the board does not comply with the direction, the commission may request that the commissioner have the OPP give assistance.
Yes.
Okay, thank you.
And the word assistance isn't defined in this statute.
Would you agree?
I would agree.
Don't know anywhere where assistance is defined.
Well, that's an interesting question.
But in this statute, it's not.
But you are interpreting assistance to include a takeover.
Is that right?
It could.
So normally OCPC would provide direction in circumstances like this over the administration of a police service.
So they can appoint a temporary chief.
They can ask the OPP to provide policing services.
They can appoint an administrator.
There's various forms that this can take place.
But it could include a takeover.
I wouldn't call it a takeover.
It's providing the policing services in the municipality.
It doesn't mean that the police service becomes defunct, but we would be relied upon to provide the services that the commission felt were not being provided.
So I'd like to talk a bit about the commission, because it's a bit of a mysterious body.
Could we go to page, could we go please to section 22?
So, Commissioner, on this page of the next page, we have a list of the Commission's responsibilities.
I'm assuming you're familiar with this provision?
Generally, that's not something that I deal with on a day-to-day basis, so I'm not intimately familiar with it, but somewhat.
And so, and just for the sake of time, I was wondering if we could please call up CCF 6041.
And so, Commissioner, this is a printout or a PDF from the about...
Pardon me, can you just go up?
Regarding the Ontario Civilian Police Commission that's on the Public Appointment Secretariat website.
And if you could scroll down, please.
There, if you could stop there, I'd just ask you to read to yourself how it describes the function of the agency.
Thank you.
Yes, thank you.
Continue to the next page, please.
You can stop at the end of this top paragraph.
Yes, thank you.
So would you agree with the following, that the Commission's mandate is mainly to conduct investigations and inquiries into the conduct of chiefs of police, police officers, and members of the police service boards, and to hear appeals on police discipline?
That is a general description of their responsibilities, yes.
They're twofold.
There's the adjudication piece, and then there's the investigative piece.
There's the two mandates.
And would you agree that the commission's mandate is very different than that of a municipal police board?
Of a municipal police board?
Such as the OPS board.
So the OPS board has responsibility for recruiting and appointing and directing a chief of police, but the commission doesn't have that role in respect to you, does it?
No, it does not.
And the OPS board establishes objectives, priorities, and policies of the OPS, but the commission doesn't have that role in respect of the OPP, does it?
No, it does not.
And the commission is not exclusive to the OPP.
Their responsibilities are overarching over all police services in the province of Ontario.
So it's not a province-wide police board, is it?
It's not a police board, but they have province-wide authorities.
There's essentially three independent oversights.
There's the OIPRD, the Office of Independent Review Directorate.
There's the Special Investigations Unit.
And then there is the Ontario Civilian Police Commission that are defined in the act.
And so it's correct that you wouldn't have had reason to brief the commission on a daily basis about the Ottawa protests, would you?
I have no interaction with the commission on a daily basis or a pre-determination.
Okay, well then, let me ask you this question.
So as a practical matter, under Section 9.2 and 9.3, for the Commission to exercise its power to provide direction to the OPS Board and then request you to take over or assume responsibility for policing in Ottawa, if you don't interact with the Commission, and if it's not a police board, how does it make that decision?
Would you have to recommend to it?
Did it take that decision?
Or would the Deputy Solicitor General have to recommend to the Commission that it take that step?
That would be a question to ask of the Commission.
And this is one of a number of ways that you have highlighted.
So the Police Services Board can also ask for that level of assistance.
So you didn't make that recommendation to the Commission, did you?
No, I did not.
And I don't make recommendations directly to the Commission.
Thank you.
Commissioner, can I ask the Commissioner a couple of questions about Ontario's emergency legislation, or are we out of time?
You're not out of time as of yet, but you're working on it.
Okay.
So could we quickly turn to CCF 6038, please?
And so, Commissioner, I take it you're familiar with the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act?
Yes, somewhat.
Could we go to the bottom of page 6, please?
And so, I'd like to direct you to subsection 4 at the bottom of page 6 here of section 7.02.
Maybe you could scroll up just a little bit so the Commissioner can see the beginning of this.
So these are emergency powers that are vested in the provincial cabinet in the event of a state of emergency.
And so we could please go down to the bottom of this page, if we could stop there.
Would you agree that under a provincial state of emergency, the provincial cabinet can make an order regulating or prohibiting travel or movement to, from, or within any specified area in Ontario?
Sorry, can you point me to where that's articulated?
That's Roman 2 under subsection 4, the very last line on that page.
That's what that reads.
Thank you.
Could we go to the next page, please, and stop there?
Could you please look at Roman 4?
Would you agree that the provincial government, pardon me, Roman...
Excuse me.
Pardon me, point three.
Would you agree that the Provincial Cabinet could evacuate individuals and remove personal property from any specified area in the province under a state of emergency?
I would agree with you that that's what's written here.
Yes, and so do you agree that pursuant to this statute, the Provincial Cabinet could have created a red zone around Parliament Hill?
That's a fairly technical question in law.
Would have had to seek legal advice on any such order.
The EMCPA that we dealt with dealt with identifying critical infrastructure, which was legislation that was enacted on February the 12th, that did provide very specific locations or descriptions of locations where activities were prohibited and then gave us the tools to deal with those activities.
And would you agree that under these provisions, the premier...
Pardon me, the cabinet could have restricted the movement of heavy trucks into downtown Ottawa.
That's a legal question that as a police officer, I'm not qualified to answer.
Those conclude my questions.
Thank you.
Next is the JCCF.
There you are.
Okay, go ahead.
Yes, good evening.
Commissioner Kirkreek, my name is Alan Hodder, and I am a lawyer for the Democracy Fund.
For who?
Sorry, the signal cut out.
I apologize.
Oh, pardon me.
For the Democracy Fund.
Thank you.
Commissioner, as regards the Ambassador Bridge blockade, I understand that the Windsor Police Service were the police of jurisdiction, but the OPP took the lead in coordinating enforcement.
Correct.
In cooperation with Windsor Police, yes.
Right.
And you told us that part of the reason for that was public trust, but wasn't another reason that the Windsor Police Service were not experienced with large protests?
I can't speak to the extent of Windsor Police Service's experience, but they certainly would not have the experience of a large city like Toronto or Ottawa.
And this protest at the Ambassador Bridge, it was obviously a large protest.
It was what, sorry?
It was a large protest.
I can't specifically state the numbers, but I would define it as a larger protest in terms of impact.
There were a number of motor vehicles, there were a number of people, and it took over 400 police resources to deal with that protest.
I just want to ask you some questions about how the OPP and their partners managed to clear that process, that protest.
And so I understand from your evidence earlier today that the injunction, while it was helpful, it wasn't effective in isolation.
Correct.
What was really effective was the operational plan of February the 12th.
Is that right?
Yes, it was the operational plan of February 12th that enabled the police actions to successfully disperse the blockade, yes.
And they were able to successfully disperse the blockade at the bridge on February 12th.
Does that sound right to you?
Between February 12th and into February 13th.
It was a two-day operation.
So can we pull up OTT 40689?
Sorry, Council, could you repeat that document ID?
Yes, OTT 406819.0001.
Oh, you know, I apologize.
It's OPP401554.
Sorry, if you see...
This document is an email from Commissioner Lucky to you.
Sorry, from you to Lucky.
And you say here on February the 12th that the OPP, the RCMP, the London Police and POUs cleared the blockade at the Ambassador Bridge.
So I'm just talking about at the Ambassador Bridge, not in the city.
Yeah, so there was a large piece of geography that the officers had to contend with, so the specific blockage at the bridge was cleared on that date, and they still had more protesters that had to be cleared out of the general area to ensure that that was secured.
And that happened on the 13th?
The second portion of the operational plan happened on the 13th, yes.
Yes, thank you.
And then in the early morning of the 14th, The Ambassador Bridge opened to traffic.
Is that right?
That is correct, yes.
Okay, and obviously that was before the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
Yes, it was.
The next day, on February the 15th, the bridge was fully operational.
I believe so.
I believe so, but that's best to come from the local police service of jurisdiction or Superintendent Dana Early, but that's my understanding, yes.
Thank you.
We'll confirm that with Dana Early.
Earlier today, my friend from the City of Windsor brought you to a document.
It was a traffic plan and it was OPP 6011.
Did you have a chance to review that plan before coming here today?
No, I did not.
The first I have seen of the plan is when it was presented to me here today.
So I'm going to suggest to you that if you did look at that plan, you would see that...
The powers which are listed in that plan to control traffic deal with federal legislation such as the Criminal Code and provincial legislation, but they don't make any reference to the Emergencies Act.
And it's for the obvious point that the plan was created on February the 13th, 2022.
That would be correct.
There would be no ability to reference legislation that did not exist.
I understand that there were police officers in Windsor for quite a while after the bridge was cleared, but they wouldn't be required to be there to control traffic.
Their specific duties, I would suggest, should be provided by Superintendent Early or specifically the Windsor Police.
I'm not familiar with what they had them doing day to day.
I'm sorry.
That's fine.
Thank you.
Earlier today, you told us a little bit about the economic impacts of the blockade at the Ambassador Bridge.
And I think you said it was $700 million per day?
That was my understanding, yes, of two-way trade.
That's not your specialty.
That's just something that you were told.
That's just something that I'm aware of, yes.
Certainly not my specialty, not anything that I have verified or confirmed, but certainly my understanding.
Understood.
You cannot tell us then whether...
That financial impact was mitigated by traffic being diverted to the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel or to the Blue Water Bridge.
That's not something that I could comment on, no, sorry.
Earlier today, when you were telling us about the Blue Water Bridge, you said that the blockade wasn't actually at the Blue Water Bridge, but it was some 30 to 40 kilometres away.
That is correct, yes.
Do I understand correctly?
That the OPP were able to clear that blockade by February the 14th?
I don't recall the exact date, but we were able to clear it in and around that date, yes, in very close proximity to clearing the Ambassador Bridge.
And in any event, when you cleared that blockade, what was very useful was the PLT teams and the risks caused to the protesters by the EMPCA.
Thank you.
One last question, just about Cornwall, because that came up in your evidence today, too.
And you said that there was a point of entry in Cornwall, which was blocked on February the 12th, and that there were significant concerns there.
Among other things, you said it was jurisdictionally complex.
You said there were concerns of violence.
I was wondering, can you tell us, was there a lot of farm equipment at that protest?
I believe there was farm equipment at that protest, yes.
And when you talked about the Blue Water Bridge protest, I know it wasn't at the Blue Water Bridge, but I'm referring it in that way, the 402 protest.
The provincial emergency powers were effective because that was farm equipment.
Was it also effective at Cornwall?
I can't say that it was effective because it was farm equipment, but it was an effective tool that we relied upon.
I can't say in the case of Cornwall what effectively enabled them to de-escalate that situation.
That was a momentary blockade, a momentary demonstration that did not last for any prolonged period of time.
In fact, I think it cleared by the same day, by February the 12th.
It did, correct.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Next, I'd like to call on the National Police Federation.
Hi there.
I'm Lauren Pierce.
I'm counsel for the National Police Federation.
Hi.
Just a couple of very quick questions for you.
This morning, in response to some questions from Commission Council, you referred to having heard concerns about the underutilization of RCMP resources.
Some folks may be sitting around waiting for assignments.
Are you able to tell us a little bit more detail about what you remember hearing?
Not specifically.
I believe there may have been reference to up to 250 RCMP resources that were available that were not being utilized.
But that's just going by memory, and that's evidence best shared with you by the RCMP.
I was aware of the concern, but not something that I was intimately involved with.
Okay.
And do you remember approximately when those concerns were conveyed to you?
No, I don't remember.
It would have been very early on, so I would say within the first week of February.
And it wasn't so much that they were conveyed to me as much as I became known of it.
So you would have to verify that information.
I don't have first-hand direct information of that.
Okay, absolutely.
So moving on to another area.
I understand the Ontario Provincial Police is responsible for the security of Queen's Park?
We have responsibilities, some responsibilities for Queen's Park, but there's also LPS, Legislative Protective Services, that has responsibilities for the protection of individuals within Queen's Park.
We have responsibility for the physical security aspects of it.
And at a high level, are you familiar with the Parliamentary Protective Service and their being responsible for the physical security of Parliament Hill?
Somewhat.
I don't have intimate details as to who has what mandate and responsibilities.
I know that they exist and that we work in collaboration with them, but I can't provide any direct insight into mandates or responsibilities.
That's fair.
I saw in your witness statement that you identified one of the key issues for this inquiry to examine as the ability and responsibility to lock down the parliamentary precinct.
Yes.
Are you able to elaborate for us a little bit about why you identify that as a key issue?
Well, I think if we look back at the events that have transpired and we look forward, part of our responsibility is to mitigate something like this happening again in the future.
This is the parliament for our country.
It's extremely important, critical infrastructure, and there ought to be a predetermined plan that can be exercised to shut that area down if there is a threat relying on hard security features and interoperability between the various security agents that have role or agents.
Thank you very much.
I have no more questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Next call on the province of Saskatchewan.
Good afternoon, Commissioner.
It's Mitch McAdam from the government of Saskatchewan.
The matters that I was going to ask this witness about have already been covered by others, so I have no questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Next to call on the province of Alberta.
Good afternoon.
It's Mandy England for the government of Alberta.
We similarly have no questions this afternoon.
Thank you very much.
Next, I'd like to call on the OPP.
Good evening, Commissioner.
Christopher Diana for the OPP.
Good evening.
We heard some evidence earlier, and you were taken to a series of text messages with Deputy Minister Di Tommaso.
You remember speaking about those text messages?
Yes, I do.
And I believe your evidence was that your role in this was to provide him with, I think your words were, situational awareness.
Is that correct?
That is correct, yes.
And there were, if I remember, there were a lot of text messages.
In that exchange, is that unusual that there would be that many text messages?
This whole event and series of events were unusual, so it would be extremely unusual that there would be that amount of communication required back and forth between myself and the Deputy Solicitor General.
And all the communication that you had with Deputy Tomasso, the text messages, the phone calls, did the Deputy ever try to direct you to do anything?
Absolutely not, no.
Did the Deputy ever suggest that you ought to be pursuing a certain course of action?
No.
Did anyone from the Government of Ontario try to pressure you in any way?
Absolutely not.
Were you ever asked by the Deputy at any point if there were any tools that the OPP could use in helping you resolve this issue?
I was certainly asked by the ministry, which is under the supervision and direction of the deputy, whether there were any tools that would be of assistance.
And I believe the first meeting where those conversations commenced was on February the 10th.
And ultimately, I made suggestions towards the...
Emergency Measures and Civil Protection Act that resulted in the ability to seize permits, seize vehicles, and there were charges related to not following the direction of a police officer.
Right.
So when you were asked for your views on the tools you could use, kind of what do you recall asking for?
I mean, I think you mentioned a couple things, but what do you remember?
Asking for the ability if somebody was engaged in unlawful activity that was posing a risk to critical infrastructure, and in this case, border crossings and other ports of entry, that officers have the ability to...
Put an end to that by being able to seize the vehicle, seize a permit for the vehicle, what's called a CVOR, which is in relation to a commercial motor vehicle, and be able to seize a driver's license and impose fines.
Were you provided with the tools that you requested?
We were provided with the tools we requested, yes.
And were those tools useful to the OPP?
I believe that they were useful to the OPP and not so much in that there were ample charges laid, but as a deterrent, being able to, as has been previously indicated, rely upon the framework to discourage or disrupt any would-be illegal activity or anything that is currently ongoing.
Right.
And I recall you mentioned Highway 402.
Was that a context where those tools were used?
I believe that those tools were effective in the Highway 402 blockage, yes.
Switching gears to talk about the Federal Emergencies Act, did you know that the federal government was going to declare or going to invoke the Emergencies Act?
I did not, no.
When did you find out?
At the time that it was invoked.
It was made known publicly, and I think in and around that time as well, Commissioner Lucky and I very likely would have connected on that, but I received no official notification that it was going to be or that it had been invoked.
Were you consulted by anyone within the federal government or on behalf of the federal government as to whether any of those tools would be useful to the OPP?
No, I was not.
Did RCMP Commissioner Lucky ever raise the issue with you as to whether those tools would be useful?
No, we didn't have a discussion around specific tools that would be included in the Emergencies Act.
We may have had discussions in and around what is required for policing in general, but never in the context of the Emergencies Act.
I did make her aware of what the advice I had provided in relation to the EMCPA, but no, no discussion specifically to the Emergencies Act or the contemplation thereof.
Obviously, a big part of what we're doing here is kind of looking at what happened, but the other part is looking forward.
My question for you in that respect is, would it be useful if the federal government, in such a context down the road, perhaps through the RCP Commissioner, consulted with the OPP Commissioner about whether such tools would be useful?
I think that would be appropriate and useful, yes.
Or whether the tools would be necessary?
Yeah, certainly if it relates to activities that are ongoing in the province of Ontario or could be going on in the province of Ontario, I think it would be nice to have the opportunity and to provide any insider guidance that may be applicable.
Now, obviously, you have a number of different types of relationships.
You report up to the Deputy Minister, you have discussions with the RCMP Commissioner.
How do you think such consultation could take place?
I think it could go either and both ways.
If the commissioner of the RCMP is the one that is providing that advice to the federal government, then that's an appropriate conversation to have between commissioners.
If the federal government is asking for inputs from a provincial ministry, then that request should throw through the deputy minister to me if he or she deems appropriate that I provide such advice.
Right now, switching over to intelligence and Hendon reports.
Yes.
There was a little bit of discussion and evidence about the origin of Hendon, but my question is, considering Hendon looks almost at a national picture, an OPP is a provincial police service, how is it that the OPP ended up taking this on?
We were dealing with a number of events and activities in 2001, and it was extremely important to us at the time that our decision-making considered impacts that may be felt nationally to decisions that we would make locally.
And we required additional intelligence to be able to make those informed decisions.
Hence, Hendon was born through the cooperation of our partners, which include the RCMP.
But the RCMP did not have a similar program?
There was not a similar product that I was in receipt of, no.
Not as it specifically related to the activities that were of interest to us.
We heard evidence yesterday from Superintendent Bernier of the Ottawa Police Service, who, when he saw upon seeing the Hennon reports, remarked upon how comprehensive they were.
In your role as Commissioner, did you receive any feedback on the quality of Hennon reports?
Regularly and often, yes.
Lots of positive feedback on the quality of the Hendon reports, the timing of the Hendon reports, the briefings that were provided to the intelligence bureaus by the Provincial Operational Intelligence Bureau, and also very positive feedback on the briefings that Superintendent Pat Morris provided to the affected chiefs of police.
I do want to go into another area, which I think...
There may be some confusion, and I want you to try to clarify this so that everybody understands your perspective on it.
My friend from the Commission took you through your thoughts on whether this was a national security threat.
You talked about the word potential, what that means.
On cross-examination, the two Brendons each asked you to look at different aspects of this.
One asked you about a definition under the CSIS Act.
One asked you whether there was a risk or a threat to national security.
And I guess my question is, just to avoid any confusion, at any point did you become concerned that the situation in Ottawa and elsewhere gave rise to a national security threat?
Yes.
And what was your basis for that conclusion?
For the contents contained in the Hendon Report, specifically on February 7th, that caused concern for the combination of events and activities that were taking place, that as was articulated in that report, it posed a possible threat to national security.
Right.
And you also referenced the description by, I believe, Public Safety Canada and various criteria.
Is your assessment based on...
The Public Safety Canada criteria?
And I wouldn't call it criteria as much as I would reference in various materials.
I think national security is much more complex and broad than the threat to the security of Canada that's confined in the CSIS Act.
National security has a number of components.
It's the extent to which that poses a threat should determine how that is mitigated and how that is dealt with.
All right, and there is a document which I don't believe has been referred to in the evidence that I think I'd like to ask you about, and that's a handling report dated February 19th.
It's document ID OPP1634.
This is the one that refers to foreign influences, I believe, Councillor?
It does indeed, yes.
And so, obviously, you've reviewed this heading report, consistent with your evidence, correct?
Yes, I certainly can't provide you much more detail than that without examining it further, but I know that there were concerns raised in this report as well in relation to national security or the security of Canada.
So, let's go to page six.
And scroll down.
All right, you see under assessment, you scroll down a bit.
Okay, that's good.
If you could just take a moment just to read the first paragraph to yourself, and I want to ask about that.
Thank you.
Thank you.
I've read the first paragraph.
In the context of this, of course, on February 19th is during the operation in Ottawa, but what's your understanding of what that paragraph is trying to convey?
I think it's fairly clear, and at the risk of just reading it back, it is conveying that it is almost certain that the freedom movement blockades and protests represent a long-term threat to public safety and security domestically.
Certainly, there's a cause of concern for the OPP.
Yes, absolutely.
All right, can you go to page seven, please?
And if you could again read that last paragraph to yourself.
Thank you.
So when you look at this paragraph and you look at the previous one that I read, what's the time horizon in this kind of assessment?
Sorry, what do you mean by the time horizon?
In terms of potential threat or risk to Canada, is there a time frame identified in those paragraphs?
I don't see a time frame specifically identified in those paragraphs.
It would range from at that moment in time and looking forward.
All right, that's fine.
If we can put up, I'd like to address the concern raised by my friend Council of the City of Ottawa in terms of the numbers that are at your disposal.
If we can put up the OPP's institutional report, that's OPP.IR.
probably a bunch of zeros and one.
Probably seven.
All right, so you're familiar with this document, I expect?
I am familiar with this document, yes.
All right, can we go to page 36, please?
All right, if you scroll down.
Okay, that's good there.
All right, so do you see that chart?
Yes, that's representing the number of frontline officers, which would be separate and apart from the number of public order officers that were in Ottawa and other specialties that were there.
So that's one component of the deployment that was there.
To your knowledge or understanding, are those numbers accurate when it comes to the number of frontline officers?
To my knowledge and understanding, yes.
All right, and you'll see on the top of the chart, it says OPP frontline officers provided to Ottawa Police Service and then a footnote 50. If we can scroll down to the footnote.
That footnote tells us that these numbers only refer to frontline officers.
It does not refer to the large number of OPP members and OPP-POU.
OPP Logistics Support Team members, OPP PLT, FOI members, OPP Auxiliary and Special Constables, and Aviation Services members.
Do you see that?
I do see that, and I see reference to a number of 463 over a 24-hour period.
Right.
And you have, again, no reason to be concerned about the accuracy of those numbers?
no i do not Thank you, Commissioner.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
okay any re-examination Eric Brousseau, Commissioner of Council, for the record.
Commissioner Karik, just two very brief points and one slightly longer point.
The first is if I could get your witness summary up, which is WTS.
6-0 is 3-9.
And if we go to page 5, in the middle of that page, this is just to clarify in response to a question from my friend, Mr. Champ, about the number of officers deployed to Windsor.
So if you see there at the last sentence of that paragraph, in total, the OPP deployed 410 members to assist WPS.
The minimum number of members deployed in a 24-hour period was 38, and the maximum was 263, and it actually cites in footnotes to the institutional report.
Yes.
Is what is in your summary accurate in terms of the number of officers deployed to Windsor?
Yes, and this is ranging from the time they arrived on ground to the end of February, or February 28th.
Okay.
And so it's not 410 at any one time.
The maximum, as we see, is 263.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Okay.
In total.
In total, OPP deployed.
Okay.
A second document that I want to put to you is OPS 401547.
In fact, sorry, Mr. Clerk, as you're doing that, I think it might be OPP, 401547, a mistake the parties make often on their witness lists.
This is, when the Clerk pulls it up, it's an email from Chief Slowly to you and to Commissioner Luckey the evening of February 13th.
And I asked you, and you were cross-examined sort of about the calls that you had.
The two calls that you had with Commissioner Lucky on the 15th, do you recall that?
Yes.
And I think you said one of your concerns was the delay in sort of moving forward.
Is that fair?
Yeah, so there were reports of obstacles that were preventing the planning team from moving forward.
We had had this email exchange on the 13th of February.
It was consistent with the communication on the 12th of February that the chief was in support of the plan.
However, by the time we got into the 14th of February and the morning of the 15th, we were receiving reports that there were obstacles preventing the plan from moving forward.
And some of those obstacles were perceived that the chief had to approve the plan, which was inconsistent with the communication we had previously had, which was part of the need to...
Chief Slowly myself to determine what was actually going on.
Okay.
So I just wanted to clarify, you received this.
You were still hearing after the 13th that Chief Slowly was, there was an impediment and that Chief Slowly might be part of that impediment.
Maybe.
Maybe, yes.
Okay.
Which was inconsistent with what you had received from Chief Slowly the evening of February 13th.
Correct.
That was inconsistent with the email that I had received from Chief Slowly on the 13th.
Okay.
And the last issue I want to address is the issue of the tow trucks, because I think it's important that we all understand sort of the order and the sequence of events.
So if I could take you to OPP401585, which is a document that I took you to this morning, this is the email.
From Deputy Commissioner DeMarco, which ends up being forwarded to you.
If we go down to Deputy Commissioner DeMarco's initial email at the bottom, which is dated February 13th at 2:29 PM.
So Deputy Commissioner DeMarco reports to the group Companies who would provide service, seven companies with 34 total heavy tow units.
Is that consistent with what you understand to be the case as of that time?
Yes, I can't specifically recall the numbers, but it's consistent with what I recall.
Okay, and if we scroll down, sorry, just at the bottom of that email, actually.
The last paragraph, as you suggested, it may be very helpful to have the immunity emerge order ready for community members to assist with land slash facilities if Do you know what the Deputy Commissioner is referring to here?
So that may have been in relation to where they were going to stage the tow trucks, how they were going to maneuver the tow trucks, and where they were going to remove the seized vehicles to.
What's the date of this email?
I've been watching and listening for the better part of the day.
There was a lot of times that the EMCPA was being referenced.
I'm happy everyone from the chat is having a good time.
I've got a friend who came from Canada who's here for exactly 30 minutes.
Correct.
I've been listening to this.
It's more of the same.
As I think you just pointed out, it's a reference to The staging areas for tow trucks.
To Brownbeard925, admit that they're wrong and be over tomorrow.
This is supposed to hold the government's feet to the fire.
No, I don't perceive that as a concern on behalf of the towing companies themselves, although there were concerns from the towing companies about the pandemic.
I'm popping in to say goodnight, everybody.
Enjoy.
We'll be live tomorrow with someone.
Something awesome.
On February 14th, the emergency measures regulations are published on the 15th, and particular where those required either a written request to render services or a verbal request followed up in writing as soon as possible.
That is correct.
It was a bit of a scramble to get orientated with the provisions in that legislation, not having any advance notice that it was coming.
There was no ability to provision in our planning for the utilization of those tools.
We required legal assistance to determine what was possible and then to be able to look at how we might be able to use those tools.
And I won't take you to it in the interest of time, but your February 17th letter, which we saw this morning and this afternoon, you've actually written in there, this is the one that goes to all identified towing companies, says this letter is written confirmation of verbal instructions from the OPP acting on behalf of the RCMP to provide these services from the date of the regulations coming into force, which was the 15th.
And notice that you are required to continue to comply and provide these services.
So your letter, just so we understand, your letter was that sort of after the fact written confirmation of the verbal direction to provide towing services.
Yes.
We had had officers dealing with the tow providers directly and through the Ministry of Transportation.
My understanding was they were all coordinated, organized, and ready to go.
See you tomorrow.
Okay.
And my friend for the Government of Canada took you to your letter to Deputy Solicitor General Di Tommaso on February 22nd.
And part of that letter, again, in the interest of time, I will just read it to you.
You updated the Deputy Solicitor General and said, as matters unfolded operationally in real time, the Ontario Provincial Police was made aware of the following.
And the first bullet point, which you may recall, the vendor community was highly reluctant to assist the police.
Correct.
And so my question is, if you can assist us in terms of what transpired and the timing, because it appears from Deputy Commissioner DeMarco's email that as of the afternoon of the 13th, there are tow truck companies lined up.
But at some point, you have compelled them verbally and followed up with confirmation in writing.
What changed for the towing companies between the 13th and...
The 17th when you sent the letter.
Yeah, for direct evidence, Acting Staff Sergeant Kirk Richardson was having the contact or coordinating the contact with the towing companies, but I can certainly share with you my understanding.
There was concern that tow operators were becoming reluctant.
They wanted to have some protections, that there would be no retribution or retaliation leveraged against them for participating, and there was still the ongoing concern over indemnification.
So, yes, they had been lined up.
Yes, they had been coordinated, but there were still concerns being expressed by some of the tow operators.
The plan had a contingency that they could execute the plan.
Okay, and...
Was the concern sort of unanimous across these seven companies and 34 trucks?
Or were there companies, to your knowledge, that would have participated without being compelled?
I can't say what the proportion of concern would have been, but I was assured that with or without, they would have been able to get the job done.
It would have taken more time.
It would have required potentially our officers having to operate tow trucks, but we still wouldn't move forward with the execution of the operational plan.
Thank you.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Thank you.
It leaves me with the possibility to ask a few questions.
Given the hour, I'm going to try and be relatively limited and just a few bits of information.
Towards the end of your testimony, you were asked about the Hendon reports and if there's anything similar from the Federal Police Service.
And I think you said Not to your knowledge?
Not specific to this, Commissioner.
So, there are a number of products that are produced federally in relation to threat assessments, in relation to national security, but there was nothing specific that dealt with the issues we were managing in 2001, specific to rail blockades that were happening around the province.
So, that filled that need by constructing this particular product.
Now, given the progress since then and the rail blockades are not something limited to Ontario and the issues that are being dealt with in Hendon from my reading are not limited to Ontario, is this something that should be taken up by the federal authorities to provide a national Hendon report?
It's certainly something that could, and we would need to be an active contributor to that, as would all other police services across Canada.
But that is something that would provide substantial value, having a national picture.
I have a note that I'd like you to complete for me.
You talked about, and I may have the note wrong, that...
You thought the protests at the two different ends of the province, being Windsor and Ottawa, were, I have a note, something that they're coordinated or planned.
Did you say that and could you explain, unpack that for me?
Yeah, so my thoughts on that are I did not feel it was merely circumstance that we had two challenging demonstrations at the furthest points in the southern part of the province.
We had protests going on in Ottawa that were challenging the capacity of police to respond, to then have a demonstration at the Ambassador Bridge to be going on at the same time, knowing the distance that it takes for police to mobilize and...
Look after both locations.
Well, at the same time, there were demonstrations taking place in Toronto.
I believe that there is a possibility that that was organized and coordinated by somebody or a group of people.
And so that's your belief, but I think you said you don't have any concrete evidence of that in terms of any documentation or something to support that other than you as a...
Police officer who's been involved.
Absolutely no evidence, Commissioner.
Just a suspicion, let's say, and something that I think strategically you had a responsibility to consider and be aware of.
Okay.
Another clarification, and I may have missed it.
You recall the February 5th exchange you had with Commissioner Luckey where there was mention of the Emergencies Act?
And you were asked whether...
You had any other, and I know you had testified you weren't aware when they declared the Emergency Act, but between the 5th of February and the declaration, did you have any other exchange where the Emergencies Act was raised with Commissioner Luckey or anyone else?
With Commissioner Luckey, not to my recollection, and certainly not with anybody else.
No, sir.
And then again, you talked about an incident command structure, the need for a consistent incident command structure across Canada, and I don't know if I didn't make a note as to whether one exists or does not exist, and if you could help me with that.
There are defined command structures, but it is up to the individual police services which command structure they follow.
So there would be some value in ensuring that all police services are following a consistent command structure.
So in cases like this where it warrants moving police resources across the country with more than 20 police services engaged, if we ever have to engage in something like this again in the future, having that consistent command structure would certainly be helpful.
Okay, that's helpful.
Thank you.
There's one last area I want to, and again, I'm trying to just get a little more information, and this deals with the discussions you had with Council for the OPP, and it's your inquiries about tools.
And I'm trying to understand, did you say you had some input about what would go into the...
Not into the declaration of emergency, Commissioner, but there was legislation that followed that through the EMCPA, and I was asked for my professional advice from a law enforcement perspective whether there were any tools that would assist us with managing and protecting critical infrastructure.
Now, did you have any input into the Ontario Declaration of Emergency and what went into it?
Not into the direct declaration of emergency itself, but into the legislation that flowed through the ECMPA that gave police officers those enforcement tools.
I had input into that.
Yes, sir.
So, not the declaration, but the legislation that...
Implemented it if you implemented the tools?
They gave us those authorities, yes.
And in that discussion, did you ask for authority with respect to towing of vehicles?
For compelling, for towing, that was definitely discussed.
There were a number of things that I asked for that could not be supported by the legal team, and we did have discussion around compelling service providers, but the results of those discussions did not bear out in terms of tools that were made available to us.
And is that because you understood the Act would not...
Could not empower the province to do that, or that it was a decision not to include it?
Yeah, there was lots of discussion that happened in my absence, and the decision did not appear in the Act, so I can't honestly say why it did not, or to what extent that was considered.
There was lots of discussion around it, lots of ideas proposed, and then we were grateful to receive the legislation when we did.
I guess I'm simply asking, was that one of your requests and then it went into the black box and you don't know what happened after?
Yeah, there was no written request, Commissioner, so this was done through a series of meetings and discussions.
So I wouldn't want to honestly say how far that discussion went, but that was certainly on the table and something that had been discussed.
And we had talked about a situation whereby we did have trouble getting a tow truck to lend assistance when there was a blockade that had emerged in and around the Peace Bridge, and we had to challenge getting tow trucks to provide the necessary assistance.
These types of things were discussed, but I can't say to what extent, given that it wasn't a written submission.
It was merely discussions where I had an opportunity to provide some input.
I guess, to be clear, was your input this would be helpful?
For the best of my recollection, I would say yes, because it was an issue that we were experiencing, but I can't state with certainty how much discussion we had on that.
We also had some evidence you gave about exclusion zones and common law power about exclusion zones and in fact there were powers given certainly about the Ambassador Bridge and Interprovincial Bridges under the EMPCA as I understand it, that's correct?
Yes.
Were there discussions or do you have an understanding as to whether the exclusion zones around Wellington were discussed in your input that you had?
I can't say that specific locations were discussed in and around Wellington.
It was more the categorization of critical infrastructure.
So I can't say that Wellington was discussed specifically.
Was your understanding from the EMPCA and the legislation that followed that you could create an exclusion zone around Wellington under that emergency legislation?
My understanding was that the officers could have exercised the authorities contained within to use those enforcement tools, which wouldn't have been the same as communicating an exclusion zone as defined under the Emergencies Act.
But if they were asked to disperse from the area of critical infrastructure, the officers had the tools to proceed with charges or seize vehicles, licenses, permits under the EMCPA.
That was a tool that was available to officers in Ottawa, in and on Wellington.
Critical infrastructure?
Critical infrastructure.
So I don't have the legislation in front of me, but I believe that that would have fallen into the definitions of the types of locations that would be covered by the EMCPA.
If it's helpful, the OPP did do up a chart that explained to the officers where we felt the various powers would...
Would apply.
It became very complex for officers to try to navigate their way through these new powers that they weren't used to in real time.
So it may be very helpful to walk through that chart at some point.
So just to be clear, your understanding is Wellington was declared to be critical infrastructure like the bridges and so on?
Yeah, so I think I can be much clearer.
So it contained in the EMCPA was the not to block any highway.
So the definition of a highway would include...
Any roadway.
So that would include Wellington.
So highways were deemed critical infrastructure, which addresses the concern on Wellington out in front of the Parliament building.
So the roadway itself is deemed to be critical infrastructure.
So blocking any roadway would be critical infrastructure then under the Act?
Yes, at that point in time.
And as time went on...
Those authorities were narrowed to a much narrower scope to be specific to borders.
But at that point in time, it was blocking access to any highway, as I understand it.
So it would be...
I guess you're explaining that that declaration prevented blocking.
Any roadway in Ontario, essentially, you had the powers under the Act to clear that.
Absolutely, yes, sir.
That was my understanding.
Okay.
Well, thank you very much for your testimony.
Obviously, we've gone over.
It shows how your testimony was important to the parties, and with our thanks.
Thank you very much, Commissioner.
Thank you.
So we're going to adjourn until tomorrow.
I just wanted to make one additional point.
As I understand, we're starting with former Chief Slowly tomorrow and his evidence will be in chief tomorrow.
It's scheduled to take the day.
In the unusual circumstances where he will go over to the next day, I've been asked whether there...
Is any difficulty with his counsel speaking to him over the weekend before he enters cross-examination?
And I just wanted to see if there were any issues being raised by counsel.
It seems to me reasonable in the circumstances, but if there's any objection, I'd like to hear it.
If not, then I will be giving that leave, given the circumstances.
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