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Oct. 26, 2022 - Viva & Barnes
08:49:47
Emergencies Act inquiry LIVE With Chat - Oct. 26, 2022
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Time Text
Alright, I was late.
9.50.
It was 9.15 Newfoundland time.
Alright, so setting up the stream.
I'm going to let this run throughout the day on Viva Clips and on a separate stream on Rumble.
I will be going live at some point today, but need to take care of some emergency vehicular stuff this morning.
Not emergency bad, but just can't wait anymore.
What was I going to say?
Yeah, so Moab's Washpot.
This is not a mistake.
I'm going to put a pinned comment to explain why we're running this live.
Ease of accessibility.
Open chat.
I pop in as often as I can.
I'm listening to this as I do chores around the house.
But the other thing is there's no rewind on the official public inquiries website.
So you can't rewind if you miss something.
They put up the videos the day after so you can go snip and clip, but it's grotesquely inconvenient that you can't rewind on the public website for the public hearings.
And also, there's no chat.
And also, I can't pop in and out to periodically commentate, express my dismay, express my rage, my political rage.
And that's it.
Now, let me make sure that we're live on Rumble.
I don't know when I'm going to be able to go live today, but there's what to talk about.
My goodness.
Anybody who watched the Oz-Fetterman debate last night, not something to make fun of, but something to feel bad about.
Order alert.
Okay, order alert.
Hold on, the earplugs are not plugged in.
These things are useless if they're not in.
Come to order.
The public order emergency commission is now in session.
The woman's constantly congested.
Okay, we're good.
We're live.
So now I'm going to run and do some house chores.
Superintendent Bernier, please.
Order.
All right, good.
Look how empty that room is.
Maybe it fills up as the day goes along.
Moab's Washpot.
We talked about the New York decision yesterday.
We're definitely going to talk about it Sunday with Barnes in greater detail.
John S. Morning.
Let me put the explanation here.
running inquiry live Oh, I'll get a live chat going in Rumble, in Locals as well, on Viva Clips Rumble.
Morning.
Morning, Superintendent.
Morning, sir.
You recall that we ended yesterday by talking about your priorities on February 11th as you embarked on what you described as a reset.
Is this the guy that went skiing?
No, this is not the guy that went skiing.
You made a new mission statement.
Clarify the command and control structure, and you presented that plan to the executive team, right?
That is correct.
So I'd like to take you now to your efforts to further integrate that plan with the OPP and the RCMP.
You down with OPP?
You explained to us yesterday that the chart, the grand chart, had OPS at the top because it was integrated but not Fully unified.
It was not a unified command.
Do you remember that?
That's correct.
And by unified command, I took it that you were referring to unified with the OPP and the RCMP.
That's correct.
Now, you talked to us about when they first came to OPS back on the 8th of February.
I don't...
I was not aware that they were in town at that particular time.
Okay, so let me take you to some notes that may refresh your memory.
Can we go to OPS408420, please?
Where's the live chat that I just created in Locals?
It's right here.
12 seconds, go join chat, and I'm going to put the link here.
So stay at this page.
You see that this is dated February the 8th.
The incident commander is you.
And then if we go to page 4, please.
We go down to 1329.
Here we go.
Okay, good.
Enjoy.
I will be popping in and out as much as possible.
Exchange recorded between Palma and yourself.
Who's Palma?
Inspector Palmer.
She was the inspector who I was working jointly with in the Service Command Center.
Right.
So there's a notation from her to you that outside agencies who are attending to assist are requesting...
It's a pain to watch.
We're documenting.
If people need to skip back and forth, snip, clip, share.
You spoke a little bit about your involvement in trying to gather all the various plans to assist in that process.
From my experience, I had an appreciation that if outside agencies were coming, they would be requesting to see the plans.
So were you aware that this group, these outside agencies, were coming to Ottawa as of the 8th?
Coatside agencies refers to all the different police agencies that were already assisting us in town, including the OPP and the RCMP, as well as other municipal services that were in town.
I did not know that we were talking about an integrated planning cell.
Ah, I see.
So if I take you now to your summary, the witness summary.
Yes.
at page 16, please.
Okay, so this is the paragraph at which you describe how you first came to know of this particular group's existence.
On February 12th, OPP Chief Superintendent Carson Party and RCMP Superintendent Phil Liu phoned Superintendent Bernier and informed him that an OPP RCMP integrated planning team was in Ottawa to assist.
Superintendent Bernier learned from them that the integrated planning team had been in Ottawa.
Since February 8th, was based at RCMP's National Operations Centre and was assisting OPS to develop operational plans.
Superintendent Bernier was surprised to learn of the integrated planning team's existence.
So were you surprised because on the 8th, you were aware only of some outside agencies coming to assist and you didn't connect that group with the integrated planning team until...
You made contact with party in lieu on the 12th.
That's correct.
All right.
So if I could take you now to another document,
OPS 3010371.
So these are again scribe notes, I take it, and you are now the event commander, designated with EC.
If we go to page 11, please.
So this is dated February the 12th.
If we go to 1158, we see it on the screen.
There was a call between you and RCMP.
Officer Liu said, slide up prepared by Darwin.
Understand NOC stood up.
What you're proposing is what we're doing here.
You would be able to give situational awareness, direct line of communication.
Tell us about this conversation.
So during this conversation, I had my first interaction with Superintendent Liu from the RCMP.
I had an understanding of what their role was here to help us.
And based on the conversations that I'd had and gave them a briefing on the new mission statement, the steps that myself and Inspector Springer were taking as part of the command table and understanding that it was going to take a day or two to get the proper people around the table that we were looking for.
Some were coming from other parts of the province.
That based on what...
I was proposing and telling Superintendent Liu that it was aligning with the framework that they were setting up at the RCMP Leakin Building, which they're referring to as the NOC.
So we've heard evidence from other witnesses that they were starting to work on a plan, and by now you have also started working on one.
Including the main action plan and the mission statement, as we heard yesterday.
So is it fair to say that when you connected, you found some alignment?
Yes.
So that would be on the 12th.
And on the same day, if we go to a different set of notes.
Actually, same set of notes.
If we go to page 12, please.
Next page.
At 12.33.
We see a notation, sorry, 1235, the next page.
Go down.
So there is another conversation between you and Lou.
This is from you to Lou.
Once I have legal approval, we'll send it to you with main action plan and objectives.
See how you can fit this into a plan.
Tell us what this is all about.
In this particular case, language is very important, and I understand that the word approval is in there.
My ask regarding the work that I had established with the mission statement, the main action plan, the objectives...
Just before I go, by the way, drinking game, but don't play it.
Play it with coffee.
Every time someone asks a question, is it fair to say?
And every time he starts an answer with so.
Coffee, drinking games.
You'll be caffeinated up the wazoo.
If that answers your question.
Sorry, I wasn't listening to your answer.
I'm out.
I'll be back soon, peeps.
I understand that later that day, around 3.10pm, there was a meeting between the OPS command team.
Including yourself and the former chief with other members of the integrated planning group.
Am I right?
That's correct.
So let's talk about that meeting.
If we go to your interview summary at page 16. You see the paragraph starting with following that call.
Superintendent Bernier participated in a 3:09 p.m. call with Chief Slowly.
Deputy Chief Bell, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, OPS General Counsel, Ms. Honnold, and RCMP and OPP members of the integrated planning team.
At the start of the call, Chief slowly discussed the role of PLT.
He demanded that OPP send its PLT program lead, Inspector Marcel Bodang, who we heard from yesterday, to sit on the IECT.
Superintendent Bernier had already informed Chief Slowly that OPP PLT Officer Giselle Walker would be serving as PLT representative on IECT.
And Inspector Springer ultimately appeased Chief Slowly by dialing Inspector Bowden into the call.
Chief Slowly next asked if OPS had integrated its PLT strategy with public order planning, and Superintendent Bernier reminded him that both POU and PLT were members of the IECT.
Now, is that accurate?
That is accurate.
What is the IECT again?
It's the Integrated Event Command Table.
Okay.
And that represents that organizational chart that represents who's sitting at that table.
The one that we saw on the screen yesterday.
Correct.
So the next paragraph, as the meeting progressed, Superintendent Bernier repeatedly asserted his autonomy as event commander and attempted to limit Chief Slowly's interference with that role.
What kind of interference were you getting?
I may need to refer to my notes for specifics if you're looking for specifics, but it was starting to direct more operational.
And tactical level decision making.
And I just, I could appreciate where everyone was at.
We were evolving into this new state.
We're trying to do a reset.
There's a lot of people who were in a particular frame of mind at that particular time.
And I just wanted to reassure and instill confidence in everybody that I did have it at hand.
And to trust what I was going to be doing and what I was going to be putting into place.
Right.
Now, if we keep reading, for instance, when Chief Slowly attempted to establish timelines for immediate action within the next 24 to 48 hours, Superintendent Bernier responded that he was working with Chief Superintendent Party and Superintendent Liu to develop a plan and that they would implement the plan once it was finalized.
Was that the nature, general nature of the interference?
Yes.
And it's also a part of a bit of an, I guess, an education piece to say that I am using the resources that are available to me from the RCMP and the OPP to integrate, to use that planning cell to support me.
And we have a bit of work to do.
We can't start establishing timelines just yet because we're at the infancy stage of that.
I understood the importance of proceeding quickly, but we had to make sure that we followed the proper processes.
Right.
And the proper process was for the event commander to develop that plan and to ensure that everything worked well in the overall context.
Correct.
So we keep reading, later in the meeting, RCMP Sergeant Darwin Tetrod presented his thoughts on strategies to take to address the situation downtown.
When Chiefs Lowly asked Sergeant Tetrod to send documentation on his proposal, Superintendent Bernier interjected and informed Chiefs Lowly that he had created an IECT and had the people he needed to develop a plan.
Now, does that accurately reflect what went on at that meeting?
That is accurate.
And it ended with the last paragraph.
Superintendent Bernier also observed that Chief Slowly was tense with his OPS command team during the 3.09 p.m. call.
He noted he had not observed this behavior by previous OPS chiefs.
Could you explain that, please?
Once again, the situation that we were in, it had been a long, drawn-out period where, obviously, People had been stretched to their limits.
I don't think Ottawa police has ever been in a situation like this.
So everyone was pushed to their limits.
There also is probably an appreciation that we're dealing with outside agencies coming in and starting to propose how we're going to resolve this.
That could be probably very...
Strenuous on a chief.
Yes, there was tension on that call.
Can I say specifically what happened?
I was pretty much very focused on what I needed to do and I had to stay focused on that.
No different in the final statement in that final sentence in the previous paragraph.
I was reasserting my autonomy again with Sergeant Tetrault proposing something.
It may be very valid and very good, but in due time, I will process that piece of information and with the integrated command table, make a decision as to what will be decided on as far as moving forward.
Now, you told us yesterday that you've served over 28 years with the Ottawa Police Service.
That's correct.
And what you're saying here is that you had not seen this behavior under any previous chiefs.
I had not witnessed with any of the previous chiefs that we've had with the Ottawa Police.
And by this behaviour, what were you referring to?
The level of involvement and direction at the lower operational and tactical levels.
And I have not witnessed perhaps the intensity or the...
The behaviors that Chief Sloan was showing amongst the command team.
Now, this was a meeting attended by many, and there were different sets of notes made by different people.
And in fairness, I want to put to you another set of notes taken by someone else.
This is OPS 3010638.
Do you know anyone by the name of Vicky Nelson?
Yes.
Who is Vicky?
She's in our legal services at the Ottawa Police.
Okay.
So it appears that these may be her notes.
So if we can call up this document and go to page six, please.
Can we make it larger?
I'm looking for...
Can we go down?
Right.
So you see that these are notes of that meeting.
And do you see the part where it says, it talks about PLT.
PLT team is here for you, 100% committed.
Key messaging is going out to all members.
Review of presentation, PLT.
And earlier, you see a reference to Sergeant Darwin Tetrell presenting.
So it appears to be describing the same meeting.
But then we have the notation.
Chief, good with everything so far.
Is unified command under OPS or OPP?
It is OPS.
Do you remember this part of the exchange?
Not particularly, but I can speak to...
It's the improper term being used.
If there's one service that's in the lead, then it's an integrated command.
If there's multiple...
Services that have come together to share the command.
That's a unified command.
Okay.
But what about the comment that chief good with everything so far?
Well, he says, I think there's a typo, but I take it.
The word means everything.
My recollection is when I did assert myself and essentially saying that I've got this and this is what we're doing and this is how we're going to be operating.
I got the sense from the chief that he was okay with that.
All right.
If we go further down to the next page, do you see at the top?
Chief gave approval two weeks ago.
Need to get going on this.
Petrol, it will work.
We're doing this with the full confidence in your team.
Let's implement the plan.
Do you know what was being talked about here?
Once again...
This is stepping outside the boundaries of regular incident command where there's things that were taking place when I was not in the position that I was in that I'm not privy to and that I would not be able to speak to.
But obviously there were other things going on behind the scenes that they would be referring to.
They'll need to speak to those pieces.
So do I understand?
Your position is that this is not part of that meeting that you were at?
Oh, it would be part of the meeting, but the content of what they're talking about, about Chief gave approval two weeks ago, need to get going on this.
It looks like by these notes, and they're obviously not my notes, that Sergeant Darwin Tetro was saying that it will work.
Let's implement the plan.
I don't know who is saying that.
It's not me.
So you're not clear as to what approval was given two weeks ago?
Correct.
All right.
Now, we've heard from Chief Party from the OPP that there was agreement on the 13th that the plan was now approved.
And I want to take you to your notes.
OPS 3010635.
At page 20. So at 15:51.
This seems to be a conversation between you and Chief Party, and you told him at around this time, no issues with plan, can't find overall execution piece.
I'm not sure the next word you know, heavy.
Heavy PLT, negotiations reducing footprint.
So do I understand correctly that around this time, you spoke to Chief Party and told him that No issue with the plan.
So if I can put everything into context with this, the integrated planning cell, based on the information that they had, the conversations that we had had with the mission statement, main action plan, and that overall phased approach had been discussed.
I was very appreciative that we had that integrated planning cell with some very experienced plan writers to be able to create a document very quickly.
But there needs to be an appreciation that although the overall strategy is going to be a heavy PLT negotiations and communication piece, we have to prepare right now and start putting all the pieces together for a public order action.
If that was not successful.
So in this comment that I make that the overall execution piece is missing, it's a fair statement and it's not any criticism on Phil Liu or Chief Superintendent Carson Partey.
It's because we had just put this team together and there was a lot of discussions that need to take place.
Between all the people at the table, whether it be investigations from an authority standpoint, public order to what they need and propose as possible action plans, what does PLT need to do in the meantime to hopefully negotiate and communicate them out of the area.
There's a lot of pieces that, but I really wanted to work towards a meaningful execution piece that's going to lay out From start to finish, how we were going to return Ottawa to a normal state.
Right.
So we scrolled down a little.
After you said that to party, he said, this is coming next, commander's intent.
And you said, good with approving plan with some minor changes.
So was that where it was left that afternoon?
That is correct.
My conversation with Chief Superintendent Party, we were very much aligned.
He understood that although there may have been some planning and discussion with Darwin Tetro, that he understood and appreciated that we were taking a pretty large or wholesome approach to this and that they will be supporting us moving on to building out that execution.
So the plan that we agreed upon is how we are now going to be integrating everything moving forward, and that was going to be the concept of operation and the framework that we were going to be operating under.
And just so we're clear which plan we're talking about, can we go to OPP 401851?
OPP 41. So the title is Convoy for Freedom Ottawa Integrated Mobilization Operational Plan.
Can we scroll down a little?
Next page.
So it's stated, well, document version, February 13th.
And a plan written by, and then there are some, here are the components of the group.
It was signed by Chief Party, it appears.
On the 12th, is this the plan that we're talking about?
That is correct.
Okay.
I want to ask you now about the former chief's perspective on this plan as compared to the earlier plan that we saw yesterday, the one labeled 3.0, I believe, dated February the 9th.
How did you view these two plans, or if they are different at all?
So the difference, the main difference between the two, With the 3.0 plan, at the time that was developed under the event commander of command of Superintendent Patterson, I am not aware that there was any sign-off approval on the document that that document was adopted.
The difference between the two is that this document is under the event commander Has the approval on this document as we are adopting this.
Right.
Now, you told us about the mission statement that you drafted on the 11th.
Was that now reflected under this plan?
Yes, it was.
There are other differences, too, that we don't have time to get into.
But in terms of the former chief's perspective, you told us the following during our interview.
Can we go to page 20?
Sorry, page 20 of the interview summary.
You see this paragraph that starts with on February 14th, we go down to about the sixth line.
Sorry, no, I mean it's at the same paragraph.
So do you see the part that starts with the third word in?
A few lines from the top.
Superintendent Bernier also observed that Chief Slowly was happy with the February 9th plan and that it may have been challenging for him to accept the February 13th plan because it threw the February 9th plan out the window.
What did you mean by that?
Probably speaking a little bit freely with terms of out the window, the sense is that Chief slowly gave the direction of building that February 9th plan.
So as a Chief, I would imagine this was very difficult to have another organization come in and develop a new plan.
I am not fully aware of the integrated planning team's use of the February 9th.
They may have been aware of it, used it, took portions of it, and adopted it into their plan, which is completely fine.
Because at the end of the day, the plan that I approved for the integration piece was that 13th of February plan.
But I think the chief was challenged with, why was my plan not used?
And that's what I'm referring to.
So when we think of the February 9th plan and the February 13th plan, what's the best way to describe them?
Should we consider the February 13th plan as an evolved version of the February 9th plan, or would you characterize them as different?
I would characterize them as different plans.
Why?
In the structure, the content, what was placed in that SMEAC format that we discussed yesterday.
Things were aligning a lot more with the proper structure of an operational plan, as well as I indicated that I had identified.
That we actually had to build out that particular section, the execution, because it was not to my satisfaction at that point.
Right.
Now, I think we saw when we had the February 13th plan up on the screen that on page two, I believe, there were signatures, signature lines on that page.
And do you agree that this plan was signed off, approved on the 13th?
Yes.
And we've heard from Chief Party that on the 14th, notwithstanding the sign-off and approval on the 13th, that they identified ongoing issues with the integration or the working of the unified command.
And he identified three issues in particular.
I want to ask you about each issue and get your perspective on it.
The first one is that Chief Party told us...
That the key issues dealt with through the day on the 14th related to the OPS need to have their lawyer approve the plan.
So we saw earlier an example of legal review.
That was on the 12th.
But Chief's Party is now speaking of a legal review issue on the 14th.
Are you aware of that?
Yes, and I think...
In appreciation of where everybody was at on the 14th and the evolution that was taking place, there was a lot of changes happening and we are trying to develop the proper model, proper people in the right positions.
A lot of transitioning was taking place.
So I can appreciate where a team that would be at Leakin and on this particular day, I was at the...
RCMP building, which we call the NCRCC, National Capital Regional Command Centre, which is in Orleans, and we were not actually co-located.
Things were happening within our own sides, and as well, you have to hopefully also appreciate that we're coming out of a period where there was that insistence on chief and legal approval.
Those terms were terms that we're trying to transition out of and change that framework.
My full intent and may not have been fully communicated to a chief superintendent party, which no one is to blame, that my reason for asking for legal advice is to get a set of eyes.
On that, just to ensure that I'm not creating risk for the organization.
There were a few things going on that day and in the days prior between a state of emergency in Ottawa, a state of emergency in the province of Ontario, as well as some negotiation and some agreements being made from politicians at the municipal level.
That's a lot of moving parts that I wanted to make sure that I brought some good people in to ensure that we're not putting our organization at risk.
And to be clear, who was the one seeking the legal advice?
It would be myself.
Okay.
So I wanted to get some clarification on that because if we take a look at the summary on the screen, it says that on February 14th...
Superintendent Bernier learned that Chief Slowly wanted Ms. Honnold, the OPS general counsel, to review the February 13th plan, and that Chief Slowly wanted to approve the plan after Ms. Honnold's review.
Could you clarify that, please?
Once again, as I mentioned, we were coming out of a framework where that was what was happening within the Ottawa police.
Everything was escalating to that level.
So it's probably very hard to break that framework and that thought process.
And I was trying to change that to bring it down to the level that it needed to be at, at the operational level.
So that's, if you continue on, that I was frustrated with this continued attempt to try and have approvals up to the chief level.
So there appears to be two parts to this, and just so we all understand.
There was the legal review, and then there was what you referred to as the chief's desire to approve the plan.
The summary reads that you learned that Chief Slowly wanted Ms. Hunnot to review.
Is it more accurate to say that it was you who wanted the legal review to be conducted?
So in this particular case, Chief Slowly is referring to the plan.
The review that I had asked was for the items that I had developed at that particular time.
At the end of the day, on the 13th, I had approved the plan.
Okay.
So we're talking about different things here.
Correct.
So it was Mr. Slowly who wanted legal review related to the approval of the plan.
Correct.
Whereas you were seeking legal advice on...
What you described earlier about the different legal authorities that may or may not be available as you develop the plan.
Correct.
Okay.
And it also spoke of the need for the former chief to approve the plan.
Is that accurate?
Is that what he wanted at the time?
I'm sorry, where do you say?
So the second line, and that Chief Slowly wanted to approve the plan after Ms. Hunnold's review.
Correct.
So if Mr. Slowly were to say that to the extent any approval was required, he already approved, he had already given those approval as of the 9th of February, what would you say to that?
It would not be an approval on this plan.
It would probably be the approval for another.
Plan that had been developed.
And you understood at the time that he wanted to approve this plan, to have the decision making power about approval of this plan.
That's correct.
Okay.
Now, so that was the first concern that the Chief Party raised, the need for legal review.
The second concern he raised on the end of the 14th was that you were being pulled away continuously to brief your chief.
And that this was creating frustration within the planning group, especially as it related to the POU component.
And he said he tactfully addressed this concern with the OPS.
What is your perspective on that?
I would have to agree.
As you can well imagine, there was quite a bit going through my head.
A lot of work that needed to be done.
A lot of coordination and a lot of planning, thought.
We need to go into our next steps.
The frequency and the length of these meetings that I was being called to was becoming very challenging and not necessarily something that happens in normal incident command.
Hence the reason why you have a strategic level commander as well as an executive liaison to be able to mitigate that aspect.
But there was still an insistence on the event commander to be present at this.
So understanding that we're transitioning and trying to do this reset, it's hard to turn the switch right away.
And it was kind of trying to steer it away from that model.
But I can fully appreciate Chief Superintendent Party's frustration with that because...
He was wanting to support me in moving this forward as quickly and as efficiently as we could.
Right.
And the final concern he raised on the 14th was when the group learned that the mayor of Ottawa had engaged with the protesters and negotiated them to all move to Wellington Street and that the OPS was making some decisions on action.
I understand that there was a briefing that you gave the group at around 6, just after 6 o 'clock that day.
Is that correct?
PM, that's correct.
And so you briefed them that due to the mayor's decision, it was a good time to take positive action on those who stayed outside of Wellington.
Was that what happened at the briefing?
That's what you told them?
That is correct.
And Chief Party told us that as a group, they challenged you.
On the intelligence and the tactical advice received to allow them to pivot quickly and support it.
Tell us about the issue.
There's quite a bigger picture to this.
And once again, I will preface it with we're in a transition phase and we're not co-located.
And I had met that team for a brief moment that morning and were contemplating and making decisions to...
Transition our command posts at the operational level to Leakin to be co-located with that integrated cell.
There was a lot happening between the 13th and the 14th that was unexpected, challenging, and we're trying to manage.
The one piece that we have to remember is that, yes, there is the integrated planning cell.
That is one component that's supporting me.
We have to remember that I have an integrated command table that I have set up.
So it is not being done in isolation.
It's not one person that is proposing or brainstorming ideas.
Yes, the decision lies with me as the event commander.
But on this particular day, there was the mayor's agreement.
That had transpired, which was resulting in potential movement of vehicles.
Specifically sticking to the point that you're asking for, given the fact that we're potentially going to be having areas that protesters were going to be clearing their vehicles and leaving.
My command table had some conversations between myself, Inspector Springer, public order, police liaison, investigations, intelligence, with regards to figuring out if they leave, how do we keep those areas from being reoccupied again?
So when we're talking about the positive action, is that we wanted to, if those areas were freed up, we just want to make sure...
That they weren't going to be reoccupied.
That conversation, that brainstorming took place at that integrated command table at the operational level.
That's an appropriate conversation to take place given the situation that we were in.
Fully utilizing all the resources at hand, we had to come up with a...
Egress plan for any of the vehicles that wanted to leave as a result of that agreement to ensure that it was safe and non-impeded to get those vehicles out of the downtown core.
We as a group discussed then what do we do with those areas that either get thinned out and maybe down to a couple of vehicles and how do we hold it?
At the time...
And based on the infancy of our group, we brainstormed that it would probably be a good idea to try and implement some strategies to hold those areas.
That was communicated to Chief Superintendent Party and Superintendent Liu by phone.
And I definitely sensed concern on their part.
They voiced their opinion, and I took that away.
Once that call was completed, we actually somewhat put a pause on that, given the advice, recommendations, food for thought.
I do have to say that Chief Superintendent Party, regardless of perhaps his strong conviction of maybe this was not a good idea, he still...
Reassured me that I had his full support and that full team support on the decision that I'm going to make.
Which was very reassuring.
But I was utilizing the integrated model appropriately and listened to the people who were talking to me.
When we met face to face the next day.
By the next day, do you mean the 15th?
The 15th.
Where now we've moved our command posts and setting up our command posts.
We had a meeting with the strategic level and had a wholesome conversation with us, which resulted in a change in direction.
What was the change?
The change in direction is that we were perhaps utilizing resources not to the most effective use in order to preserve the right resources to have in place for the bigger picture action plan within the next.
set of days nothing determined at that point but to refocus ourselves on that maintenance race stabilization phase in order to get the focus on the communication Focus on the PLT action, getting our officers rested, getting other resources in town and develop the plans we need to if the negotiation communication does not work.
Now, let me take you back a day or two to the 13th, because I started by asking you of the events on the 14th, and you started giving us the context and how it developed into the next day.
But am I correct that it was on the 13th of February that you first came to know about these negotiations between the mayor and the protesters?
That is correct.
If I could take you to the document OPS 3010635.
Do you recall a meeting at around 1 o 'clock or 1:15 on the 13th regarding this issue?
So if we could go to page 10, please.
The date, as you see, is February 13. 13.15.
I'm looking for the reference where...
At 13.20?
Yeah, can we go there?
So meeting, city manager.
Perhaps you're better than me.
Sure.
So City Manager basically stated that Mayor involved in negotiation to someone who has ability to communicate with core organizers.
If we keep going, I'm looking for the part where I think there was a comment from you that this actually accelerates what we wanted to do.
Yes.
Do you remember that discussion?
Correct.
Tell us about that.
So essentially, if I can put into context, what I'm being informed at this point is that the mayor is wanting to develop a letter to present to organizers to say, if you leave, and I think there was some concession to remaining on Wellington for a period, that if they were willing to leave, that he would have a meeting with the...
This aligned with what was taking place in other parts of the province and the country at the provincial and the federal level where the public safety ministers were offering to draft a letter to protest organizers to denounce their protests and to leave.
And if they did so, that they would have a meeting at a later date with them.
So that's somewhat very much aligned, which was happening on the provincial and national level.
And based on the information I had on the 13th at this time, and having that plan in place with wanting to reduce the footprint and have negotiating protesters out of the area, it aligned with our plan.
It was...
Potentially challenges that come along with this when you're talking about political agreements with protesters.
However, I can only control what I can control.
And if this happens and people leave, then that is a benefit to the operation.
And that I would be there.
And in your interview summary, you explained that neither the city nor the OPS executive had informed you of the negotiation before this.
Is that correct?
Correct.
From this point on, I was not really aware of that dynamic going on.
Right.
And you told Inspector Springer that OPS should stay clear of the negotiation because...
Because political influence and political negotiation could adversely impact the police operation that OPS was preparing.
The optics of the police involved with politicians in negotiating with other parties, the optics could pose challenges to us.
And in the interview summary, you went on and gave several other explanations as to why you were concerned.
About this.
But in the interest of time, I won't take you to all of those.
Do you agree that those contents in your summary is accurate?
Yes.
Okay.
So let's move now to an area that I really want to ask you about.
And the context is this.
You've told us that the plan was signed off on the 13th.
That's before the federal government invoked the Emergency Act on the 14th.
But when the final operation was launched, as I understand, on the 18th of February, that was after the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
So I want to ask you about to what extent the invocation of the Emergencies Act was considered in the process of planning and how it affected the way the operation was carried out.
So let's take it step by step.
It may be that we can start with what you told us in your summary.
If we go to your summary to page 22. So you remember that during the interview, we asked you about your thoughts on both the provincial emergencies measures, the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, as well as the Federal Emergencies Act.
So if we look at this paragraph here, Superintendent Bernier stated that the February 13th plan did not rely on powers granted under the EMCPA.
That's the Provincial Act, right?
Correct.
And that the Federal Emergency Declaration did not significantly impact his planning process.
Superintendent Bernier did not know.
That the federal government was going to declare a public order emergency on February 13th.
I take that to mean that on February 13th, you did not know that the federal government was going to declare a public order emergency.
And you stated that you would have carried out the police operation whether or not the federal government declared a public order emergency.
Explain that to us.
The plan that I was developing was based on existing authorities.
Whether it be under the provincial, federal, or common law authority, to act.
This is what takes place on a daily basis on those larger type events.
We have to leverage those particular authorities that exist.
The plan that I was building with my integrated command table...
And the advice that I was getting and having the right people from the right backgrounds providing their input, I was satisfied that we were going to have all the authorities we need to take action if the communication and the negotiation piece of our stabilization plan was not successful in having that area cleared and the city returned to a state of normalcy.
And in this paragraph, you actually refer to some of those authorities that existed apart from the emergency powers, such as, you said, authorities under common law, municipal bylaws, and provincial and federal statutes.
You also noted the criminal code and common law authorize police to control access to an area during an ongoing police operation, and that the Highway Traffic Act permits police to seize and tow vehicles.
That are abandoned or obstructing roadways.
So I wanted to ask you about, first of all, the so-called exclusion zones.
We heard from Deputy Chief Bell that the Emergency Act was helpful in allowing the police to establish exclusion zones.
What's your view on that?
I would agree.
Although that we were planning under the common law authorities to create a zone where we could operate safely for both the police and the public, the secure zone options that were offered through the Emergencies Act was a benefit.
It somewhat provided a framework.
A legal framework that would be a lot more understandable for our members, for the community, and in fact the protesters as well, understanding what was taking place when we were going to put that secure zone into effect.
So is that why you would consider it helpful to have those measures under the emergency?
Anything that's going to contribute to mission success is a benefit.
Were those measures necessary for ending this occupation or protest?
Hard for me to say.
I did not get to do the operation without it.
So it would be very...
I don't know what complications I would have had had it not been in place and I utilized the common law.
We have used it before.
We have used it since without the Emergencies Act, and it has been effective.
But I cannot speak for this particular date or that weekend operation.
Had I not had it in that fashion, what would it look like?
Hard for me to say.
And the other area I wanted to ask your thoughts on, related to the ability to tow trucks, if we go down the page a little bit.
So this paragraph that starts with, Superintendent Bernier stated that he did not need to rely on powers granted under the Emergencies Act to compel towing companies to supply trucks or drivers to the police.
He stated that this was unnecessary because by February 13th, OPP had assembled 34 tow trucks with willing drivers.
He noted that police guaranteed the companies and drivers anonymity and placed police crests on the trucks and covered company markings to ensure anonymity.
He stated that he had no knowledge of whether the power granted under the Emergencies Act to compel towing companies to assist protected those companies and their drivers from being blamed by protesters.
Now, is all of that accurate?
That is very accurate.
Now, those 34 tow trucks that you referred to here, were they available for use by the police when the final operation was launched on the 18th of February?
They were.
And in terms of the arrangement to secure those tow trucks, Were those arrangements made before or after the 14th of February?
Majority of the arrangements were all done by the 13th because they were actually in transit to Ottawa.
That being said, there was some final obviously contract and finance work that needed to be taken care of in the days that followed.
But to my knowledge, we did not have to adopt any processes under the Emergency Act to compel any of them to follow through on their actions.
Right.
Now, going back to the exclusion zone, there was something I meant to ask you, but I forgot.
Can you tell us whether under the emergency measures regulations, Like Ottawa, was there any area in Ottawa that was designated a secure zone?
Are you talking under the Emergencies Act or the Emergency Measures?
I believe it was the EMR, the Emergency Measures Regulations.
So the provincial?
No, it's the federal.
So the Emergencies Act was invoked on the 14th and then there were regulations.
Regulations, okay.
So my understanding is that under Section 6 of the EMR...
There was the ability to designate a secure zone.
Are you aware if such zones were created in Ottawa, designated?
They were.
They were.
Let me put to you this document.
P.B. Can.
four zeros 12:09 So, pb.can.401209.
So, these appear to be speaking notes regarding the emergency measures regulations.
I believe it was a date at the top of February the 25th.
So, if we go down to page three, please.
Under the headings, it pressed on why Ottawa was not designated a secure zone.
There was a bullet.
A destination was not required in Ottawa because the assembly was already unlawful.
As a result, the police were able to establish a parameter relying on the emergency measures, regulations, and other existing legal authorities to secure and maintain control of the area.
Does that refresh your memory?
Well, I'm not quite sure.
I might not fully understand what a designation, if that means that the Public Safety Minister had to actually sign off on a particular area.
We did have some discussions on a particular date.
I'm going to say on or about 16th, probably, where we had a meeting following the...
Understanding of the regulations and the availability of a secure zone and the need to get the public safety minister to sign off on a particular actual area.
That may be what the designation means.
After further review and discussion with the minister's office and legal, it was determined that the police should have the flexibility.
To designate, expand or contract or move based on as the operation goes, as opposed to have a fixed area with no flexibility.
So that decision was made in the subsequent 24 hours that there would not be an official document from the Public Safety Minister that this area, as per the Public Safety Minister, is a secure area.
We were able to have the flexibility to, like I said, expand or contract as the operation dictate to minimize the impact on the community.
And that was, in fact, what happened.
That is correct.
And if we could go now to your summary on that point, page 22, the interview summary.
We look at the last paragraph on this page.
After the federal emergency declaration.
Superintendent Bernier explored whether destinating downtown Ottawa as a protected place under the emergency measures regulations would be a better option than relying on common law authorities.
Chief Superintendent Party informed him that the Federal Minister of Public Safety, Marco Mandicino, was willing to approve a designated exclusion zone in downtown Ottawa.
Superintendent Bernier conducted a tabletop exercise with Ministry of Public Safety staff to indicate that the exclusion area would look like Does that accord with what you just described to us?
Yes.
allowed for the police to determine the exclusion area on an as-needed basis.
Superintendent Bernier supported the minister's decision.
He noted that powers granted under the Emergencies Act did cause police to be more willing to ask people entering the exclusion zone where they were going, but that police continued to permit people to enter the exclusion zone for lawful purposes.
Does that accurately reflect the reality at the time?
That is correct.
Now, I want to turn finally to how the plan was executed.
First of all, the February 13th plan continued to develop over the next few days until the final plan was signed off on or around the 17th.
Am I right?
That is correct.
and just so we are all clear what plan there was I want to show you February 17th Thank you.
So if I can take you to OPS 3013798.
So you see the date on this page says February 15th till to be determined.
But if we go to the next page, then there's the date February 18th till to be determined.
And the document version says February the 21st.
Can we scroll down a little?
Can we keep going?
So, this is the only plan we got from the OPS, and we understand that this is the final plan.
Can you take a look at the table of contents and confirm whether that is, in fact, the case?
This is appearing to be the one that I would prefer to, yes.
Right, okay, thank you.
So, this plan described in four different phases.
How the final operation will be carried out.
Can you explain the four phases for us?
That's why it's important to understand that the dates to be on the cover page from the 15th on, that's including the four stages.
The four stages are stabilization, actions on, maintenance, and demobilization.
Well, in the interest of time, I guess we'll rely on your description of those four phases in the witness summary and move directly to how that plan was carried out.
When was this plan launched in the final operation?
So it was launched, as indicated by the plan, by the 15th.
I have to explain somewhat a bit this plan because...
We were under a lot of duress and a lot of time constraints and a lot of moving parts.
This was a massive undertaking, something that an operation this large would often take perhaps a month plus to plan for.
So we were having regular meetings with the command table when it was the integrated command, when it transitioned to a unified command.
We were having meetings about this plan.
We were meeting with the plan writer, Brad Taylor and Carson Pardee and their team, continually to be feeding them as we were evolving information from the command table from our subject matter experts on what we require.
And that was evolving right up to phase two of our plan.
But it's important to note that we...
We're in agreement with the concept of operation, and we were in agreement that it was not realistic to actually have a completed actual nice with a bow plan by the 15th.
It was going to be evolving.
But by the time that we got to the 17th night, that was what we pretty much were going to have to stick with as we went into phase two.
So the maintenance period, as I mentioned earlier, involved...
Stabilizing the operation.
Getting more resources in.
Allowing Ottawa police officers to rest.
Enhance a communication and PLT strategy on the messaging.
And the messaging was very clear.
It's time to go.
It's time to leave.
No more talking here.
You have to leave.
That's the only options that you have here.
It's over.
And that messaging during that stabilization period intensified to a set date where we're determining that if they have not left, we're going to move on to an actions on phase, which is now a more tactical public order supported by tactical CBRNE, which I mentioned was chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive team, with a very enhanced arrest plan, transportation.
Processing housing plan with many intricacies that need to be thought of, whether it be children that were going to be involved because we knew children were on scene at the protest.
We were aware of potential risks in vehicles, whether it be from unknown devices.
We were aware that we were going to maybe be faced with people who are going to barricade themselves in vehicles.
So it's quite a complex plan with many moving parts that we had to focus on those key pieces.
And that was the actions on piece where we had multiple presentations from the various experts from public order where the unified command had to make a final decision on This is what we're going to go with, with the integrated between public order, tactical CVR&E, plus the support from the arrest.
Once that, and we were going to go until it stopped, until it was over, until it was fully cleared.
And we didn't know if that was going to be one, two, three, four days, but we had to have the resources in place to sustain a long duration of a public order operation.
Once it was cleared, we moved into the maintenance phase, which was we had to make sure that it stayed clear of protesters, allow for rehabilitation of the streets, inspection of the streets.
And then once we were satisfied that the protesters were not returning and that we can start demobilizing resources, that meant that Ottawa is back to a state of normalcy.
If that answers your question.
That's very helpful.
Thank you.
So I understand that all of the resources that would enable the OPS and the Integrated Planning Group, the help that you were getting from elsewhere, were ready by the evening of the 17th.
Am I right?
That is correct.
And so tell us what happened on the 18th.
At what time did the action start?
Following probably one of the biggest snowstorms that we got in a while.
I gave myself, and I should not be saying I, myself and my two co-commanders, Phil Liu and Dave Springer, did a final check, made sure that we had all the resources in place, and my hat's off to all the officers that stood up that day after very long days, long weeks.
To put their best foot forward from all the elements, we launched the initial, if I can say, phase again within a phase of the clearing of the demonstration.
What time did the action start?
If I can refer to my notes, I think it's around sometime in the 0700 hours that we started, but I'd have to look on my day of notes for that.
And within this final period of the operation, there were also different phases in terms of locations.
Correct.
What was the first phase?
Nicholas and Waller, the final decision.
After many discussions on how we were going to proceed through it, we decided we were going to do a movement from east of the affected area all the way through to the west and then deal with some satellite areas at the tail end.
And how long did it take to clear that first phase area, the Nicholas Waller area?
It took the better part of the morning.
And when that area was cleared, what was the next area the officers were moving to?
We were going to be moving to Rideau and Sussex.
And how was the reaction of the people there at the time?
What was experienced was there was some passive resistance.
there was some active resistance and there was some assault of behavior that we experienced at Rio and Sussex.
As the officers moved from Phase 1 to Phase 2, was there a sense that things were about the same or was there an escalation, de-escalation?
What was your sense?
The tension definitely increased.
However, we adopted a I could use a philosophy of slow, methodical, lawful in our approach because we did not know what the cause and effect was going to be.
And we had to be ready to adapt, pivot, make decisions.
And we did not want to rush through this.
And we did not want to force a confrontation.
Every phase that we went through, no different than the messaging that was taking place The start of our operation through the stabilization, telling them to leave.
If you don't leave, you are going to be arrested.
Everyone who wanted to leave was free to leave.
They were asked to leave.
It was communicated through what we call LRAD long-range acoustic device.
That aligned with messaging that was developed through our PLT, our police liaison team, our corporate communications, and our investigations to ensure it's a very clear, succinct message.
And we did both in English and French.
So this was all slow and methodical.
Anyone who wanted to leave had the opportunity to leave.
They could walk away.
Anyone who choose to remain by, as we slowly, methodically went through, that would mean they would either be...
Passively resisting or actively resisting the lawful order to leave.
Now, you mentioned an escalation in the reaction of the crowd as we move from phase one to the phase two.
How did the police react in response?
So this is obviously happening at the tactical level with the tactical commander levels, but I'm being kept very much informed with myself, Inspector Springer, and Superintendent Lou.
We're being kept informed live as to what's happening.
We do have some video feeds from drones and as well CTV and everyone else who's provided us some good footage as well.
But we could see that the cause and effect, that they had the resolve to stay.
They were either wanting to be arrested or they're refusing to move, refusing to leave, and then being subject to being arrested for mischief.
Now, we've seen some images where police had batons and there were horses.
Could you tell us more about those?
The use of those?
Yep.
So the one that you're referring to where we're now somewhat increasing our presence and having to increase our presence based on the actions of the crowd, and that's moving into day two on the 19th.
Sorry, no, this is still on the 18th in front of the Chateau Laurier once we had transitioned.
And holding the Rideau Sussex area in front of the Chateau Laurier.
The cause and effect was that we had the massive group, the larger group from Wellington Street, now descending down onto that area.
It was definitely an aggressive crowd, volatile crowd, where we had to make some decisions to increase our...
Usage of force in order to protect ourselves and properly deal with the situation at hand.
When did the operation end that day, on the 18th?
The operation actually never ended.
Paused?
It never did pause.
We had to maintain public order action presence 24 /7.
Until it was completely cleared.
So reduced and a pause on movement took place later in the evening.
And we held that spot in front of the Chateau Laurier.
And believe it or not, that part of the operation, there was a lot of work to do.
There was the towing of...
Multiple vehicles from that site is very time consuming.
Some of the vehicles were perhaps disabled or in a fashion that would be difficult to tow.
So we had all the right resources and time in place.
However, it took time to remove those vehicles.
So we did not want to get too far ahead of ourselves.
Once again, slow, methodical.
What was controlling a lot of the progression was how fast.
We can manage the arrested individuals, which we did get very over capacity through that second portion.
But it's also the time that it takes to actually tow and clear those areas and then install some fencing to ensure that area remain clear.
Now, you mentioned fencing.
Was a decision made to hold the line and to secure the area with more fencing at some point that day?
So that's a decision that was made at the command table once again and between Superintendent Phil Liu and Inspector Springer and I. We had to realize that the effect of putting police officers on the line sometimes has an effect in the crowd too.
And antagonize the crowd.
And we were wanting to de-escalate the situation.
If we can have the same effect with fencing to keep them out of that area, with minimal police presence to ensure and have reserves on hand, that will more than likely de-escalate the situation.
And that's what, in fact, what took place.
We replaced the officers with fencing, reduced the footprint of officers.
And it actually de-escalated the crowd, and a lot of the crowd returned back up into the Wellington Street area.
At roughly what time on that day did that occur?
It would have been probably in the midnight time frame, give or take.
At that point, if you can...
Appreciate that I would not be able to, neither could Superintendent Lou and Inspector Springer operate for 24 hours a day for three days.
We implemented a reserve event command to supplement a day and a night shift to have a sustained command and a functional command team during that period.
Part of the operation, which I am fully briefed on and know about, was under the command of three other commanders during the night period.
But my understanding was around midnight.
And what happened during the night?
We held those areas secure and they were not taken over and there was no major incidents to report.
The execution of the mission continued the next morning?
Correct.
At about what time?
Given the usage of, at that point, we had 14 public order units and we had to utilize every single member.
It was a little bit of a later start.
Once again, I'd have to refer to my notes for exact times, but it was in the neighborhood of the 0900 time period where we progressed.
With moving on to our next phase of starting to clear Wellington.
You referred to these POU units, the public order units.
In what direction are they moving now?
Continuing with the east to west.
And there's a bit of a south movement too on Elgin Street.
So what area, like what street were they beyond now?
Wellington.
Okay.
Tell us what happened that morning.
Once again, after...
Checking with the three commanders and verifying that everyone was ready to go.
Made some adjustments on lesson learned from the day before.
We progressed with and further, based on what we had experienced and seen, that the level of aggression towards the police, we increased our protective level.
To move on with that operation that day.
And when everyone was in place, ready to go, with the full arrest, tactical CBR and e-support, public order was ready.
We moved and progressed westbound on Wellington, slow and methodically, to clear the protesters.
Once again, full messaging.
Leave anyone who...
Got caught there by chance or came to visit.
They were clearly informed it's time to leave and anyone who wanted to leave was free to leave.
There was no one boxed in during any of the operations.
How was the reaction of the people that morning?
They were aggressive as anticipated and confirmed the reason why we increased our level of protection on our officers.
They were met with confrontation, assault of behaviour as they progressed into the Wellington Street corridor.
Did the police use any tools such as smoke grenades and gas at any time?
Once again, that is elements that would have been used at the tactical level, sometimes in exigent circumstances.
There were, at the onset...
Smoke that was used by the protesters.
But to your knowledge, did the police ever use those tools during...
There had to be the use, there was the need to use some of those tools during this operation.
And by the end of the day, we're speaking of the 19th now, how did the downtown core look like?
Different.
We had cleared all the way westbound on Wellington.
Just the Wellington corridor, not the north-south streets, except for Elgin.
We secured Elgin Street.
And we progressed all the way down to clearing protesters that were remaining.
We're moving back, but we're still staying in the area, but never met the threshold of being arrested.
There was a large group that still remained on Bank Street towards the evening hours at the end of the day.
It took the full day for anyone who did not leave with their vehicle to...
Clear and tow those vehicles.
And when I say clear, once again, we did not know what to expect in vehicles, whether it be devices or challenges with their vehicles being disabled.
It took a long period for the teams to clear the remaining trucks from Wellington Street with our towing plan.
Now, we've heard a fair bit about the Coventry area.
Being used by the protesters at a kind of staging ground.
When was that area demobilized?
So that was now moving into the third day.
The 20th?
The 20th.
That would be the Sunday.
Right.
We spent a good portion of the day clearing the remaining north-south streets and any of the other areas.
But the actions of both...
The Friday and the Saturday, the 18th and the 19th had the effect of clearing of those areas.
Anyone who remained in those areas, I think, realized that it was over and most left.
We are just doing some various cleaning up of abandoned vehicles that may have been left there that were protest vehicles or illegally parked vehicles to ensure that that was...
Once again, the vehicles are properly cleared, and if they were disabled, that they were rendered able to be towed.
Later in that afternoon, we were satisfied that we were prepared to finalize, go to the final phase of clearing Coventry Road, which is a large parking lot adjacent to a baseball field and a couple of hotels, where was somewhat of a...
When did the OPS and its partners enter the third and fourth final phases, the maintenance and demobilization phases?
So we transitioned to the maintenance phase as of the 21st, which would be the Monday, where we maintained public order.
Elements ready to respond.
I'd like to note that we continue to have lawful protests in follow-up to this.
We were perhaps securing the downtown core, but we were having daily protests at the War Museum of Freedom protesters, but they were acting and they were present in a lawful matter.
We kept...
A minimal presence, as we do in most demonstrations, but we had to manage that and keep an eye on that.
Various convoys throughout that maintenance period, we would get intelligence or information that they were trying to come back to Ottawa, and we would be preparing and staging in order to act on that.
To prevent them from coming back down with vehicles to protest.
So that following week, as we progressed out of the Emergencies Act, out of all the states of emergency, which once again moved us into a phase of trying to assess what does this mean, what has changed, that by the end of that week, the Sunday...
I was satisfied to go to a demobilization phase and turned over operations to regular Ottawa police operations and all external agencies had been demobilized.
Well, we're quickly running out of time.
So my final question to you is if there's anything else that you'd like to tell the Commissioner that we haven't yet covered.
I'd be happy to answer any of your questions, sir.
I don't usually ask questions until the end, and usually it's well covered by everyone, but I may.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Okay, so we're going to move to the cross-examination phase.
If I could ask Council for former Chief Sloley to go first.
Thank you, Superintendent.
I'm Tom Curry.
Sir.
A couple of things, if I can get your help, please, for the Commissioner.
Prior to these events, you told us that you were an inspector, first of all.
You had a promotion between then and now.
Is that right?
Not officially yet.
Okay, so...
Well, we'll have our fingers crossed for you.
You were an inspector in the communications branch within the information directorate.
Yeah?
Correct.
Reporting through what we learned were the three I's, you're one of the I's, to Deputy Chief Bell at the time.
Correct.
And just assist us, if you can, with the chain of command in your regular...
Not incident command now.
In your day job, were there personnel between you and the deputy?
Yes.
And who lay between you and the deputy?
Superintendent Rob Drummond.
Okay.
And is there a chief superintendent in the structure at the time, or is it just Superintendent Drummond to the deputy?
We do not have that rank within the Ottawa Police.
Understood.
And then within the information directorate, and you told us that's 911 dispatch and the like, right?
Police reporting unit and the command center.
Got it.
And within that directorate, can you give the commissioner an idea about the number of personnel?
Within the whole directorate or just my branch?
Just your branch, please.
my branch.
I would have to say in the neighborhood of slightly under 200 officers.
Thank you.
And does that include civilians?
Yes, a large portion of civilians.
Understood.
And then if I follow the way that incident command works, event command works, in the case of an event or an incident, Then a person with your training can be deployed to assume the role of event commander or incident commander, as you have described.
Is that right?
That is correct.
And then, this is an extraordinary event that occurred here, isn't it?
Unprecedented.
Unprecedented, and not only I understand in the...
History of the Ottawa Police Service, but as we've learned from witnesses from the Ontario Provincial Police, in their history as well, in terms of the size of this deployment.
But you told us, you gave us an example of another kind of event, a shooting here in Ottawa on Parliament Hill.
That was an event that you ran, is that right?
I did not run, so I would have been a tactical ground commander.
If you're understanding the, as I explained, the tactical operational end, I was an actual tactical level commander on the ground running hundreds of men and women who are on contact teams.
Understood.
Reporting to an incident commander who reported to an event commander?
Correct.
Who reported to?
Would be, so in this, and on that particular day, the...
The strategic level would have been reporting up to the chief.
Understood.
So in every case of an event, there is an executive level or a superior officer ending with the chief.
Is that fair?
The chief, at the end of the day, is in command of all policing.
Right.
And so when we speak about, come to speak about...
Incident command and incident command models, and you've explained the various forms of those.
All roads lead to the chief, or in the case of the Ontario Provincial Police or the RCMP, to a commissioner.
Is that fair?
That is very fair.
Because when we speak about, when you've told the commissioner about autonomy and the wisdom of autonomy, autonomy should be understood.
To fit into a framework that has ultimate authority in the chief.
Fair?
So autonomy in incident command at a certain level exists at all levels.
So there is a certain level of autonomy at the tactical level.
That is bestowed by the event commander down or the instant commander down to the tactical level.
That they have the authorities to act and decide and do certain things.
They also have limits as to what they can do where they may have to pause and go up to seek authorization.
So that level of autonomy exists at each level.
And as an event commander, the autonomy that...
I was referring to is I wanted to ensure that I was given the autonomy of the decision-making that is appropriate in line with most instant command models.
In other words, do I have it that within the execution of the role, you wanted the autonomy that is bestowed under those models to an event commander?
Correct.
That does not mean, and we should not understand, It to mean that you are completely autonomous.
That is correct.
Okay.
Because the chief of police or the commissioner of the police service, if it's organized in that fashion, remains responsible to provide adequate and effective policing in the jurisdiction.
That is correct.
Okay.
And so when we...
Come to look at and listen to the questions that my friend Mr. Al asked you about your interactions with Chief Slowly.
You would tell the Commissioner that Chief Slowly had a role to play in respect of this event, correct?
Yes, sir.
And that the issues that you spoke to us about concerning Chief Slowly's In operation,
generally speaking, that interaction is somewhat quite limited because there is a strategic commander that...
Anything of the wishes or requests or concerns from the Chief would be managed through a strategic level commander.
In this particular case, at one point it was Deputy Chief Ferguson, that that would be the avenue to go with concerns.
What I've experienced previously in other larger scale events...
You may get a visit from the chief into a command center or to the operational level is just to say hi, thank you, and that type of thing.
Keeping in mind that there is a particular avenue for the chief to exercise his authorities through that proper chain.
But we're not talking about, we should not understand that the limit of the authority of the chief of police, whether in this police service or when Commissioner Karik shows up tomorrow, is limited to saying, hi, how's it going?
How are you?
We're not talking about that, are we?
It is not, go back to my question, please, if you don't mind.
It is not wrong for a chief of police or a commissioner of a police service to interact with an event commander.
Correct?
He can, yes.
Yes, and not only that, they have a responsibility to set strategic direction, correct?
Yes.
And so when we look at the specific things that you have spoken about, we begin with the idea that the role of the chief of the police service under the event or incident command model...
Includes the responsibility to set strategic direction and to give lawful orders.
True?
True.
Incident commanders have operational autonomy within the framework, and we'll come to speak about the specifics, but the operational framework to carry out those strategic objectives, right?
Yes.
And equally, right down the chain, you were on Parliament Hill as a tactical commander.
You had autonomy to do certain things and to instruct and direct the team that you had.
But there were limits on what, I presume, there were limits on whatever you could do.
You sometimes had to go up to the incident commander or event commander.
Are you referring back to October 22nd, 2014?
Yes.
That is correct.
Okay.
And these categories, strategic, operational, tactical, are not watertight, right?
That is correct.
There is a kind of border zone between each of them, and what you rely on is the kind of dialogue that you spoke to the commissioner about so that each person playing their role can understand what is going to happen in trying to fulfill the operation and the mission.
That's accurate.
And I know that one of the things that you've spoken about is how, coming to lessons learned, how that structure should be implemented in the future in the case that another event of this scale and magnitude occurs.
There are lessons to be learned about the way this worked, correct?
There are lessons learned after every event.
Fair.
Now, go back if you don't mind then just to a couple of things about Chief Slowly.
Chief Slowly, had you been an event commander prior to your...
Being tasked or deployed in this case, February 10th, 2022, had you been an event commander or an incident commander under Chief Slowly, i.e.
when Chief Slowly was the chief from October, just to orient you, that's October 2019 until 22. Yes, in the capacity of a duty inspector, that platoon duty inspector role that I was talking about, which is the operational.
On-duty commander and dealing with critical incidents, various other incidents.
And if I understand that your relationship with him on those previous occasions when you served in that role, and I appreciate they're not like this.
This is something completely different.
But in those previous experiences you had with him, you and he had a good, productive, functional, working relationship.
Is that true?
That is true.
You are...
Probably aware from your dealings with him directly that he was an Inspector Bernier, now Superintendent Bernier fan.
He thought you did good work.
You knew that.
I appreciate that.
Did you know that?
I didn't have anything to the contrary.
Okay.
Well, that's fine.
You had the kind of relationship in which you could speak frankly and directly to Chief Slowly, and he similarly to you, right?
There weren't many interactions that had taken place, but yes.
Okay.
Well, I don't know.
You're smiling, so I don't know where that goes, but put it this way.
You had no...
Issues with Chief Slowly previously.
No.
You agree with me?
Yes.
Okay.
And you knew him to be, the short time that you interacted with him, you knew him to be a police leader with a national reputation.
Fair?
Yes.
And who had come to Ottawa to...
Deliver on the vision that the Police Services Board had set to embrace certain kinds of changes in the way policing services were delivered here in Ottawa.
Is that fair?
Yes.
Now, when I come to the period of time when you came back to Ottawa, I think you said January 31, and you began to...
You came back to your regular duties and you spoke with Superintendent Drummond about whether and how you could help, correct?
Correct.
And you had no assignments other than your regular duties until February 3rd.
Correct.
Right?
And on February 3rd, you get deployed to the Service Command Center.
Correct.
Between the 3rd and the 10th of February, am I right that you did not have any direct dealings with Chief Sloan?
Direct, maybe not face-to-face.
However, through Teams meeting and some requests directly from him.
Towards the end, he was requesting.
I was recommending that an organizational chart needed to be established to set clear command and control.
And he was interested to hear what I had, and I presented it to him.
Fair enough.
Thanks for reminding me of that.
Between the 3rd and the 8th, would I be right, you did not have any dealings with Chief Slowly?
Minimal, with the exception of any.
Teams meeting that I would be participating.
Okay.
And during that period of time, the event commanders initially were, I believe, Inspector or Superintendent Ray Ohm.
Superintendent Ray Ohm.
Thank you.
And then that...
A change was made, and you understood that change was made by Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, correct?
Correct.
And Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, you understood, was responsible for operational planning.
True?
At that point, if we're going to be actually talking about operational level planning, she would be accountable for it, but responsible would be the event commander.
Understood.
Thank you.
A better word.
Just like Deputy Chief Bell was accountable for intelligence, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson is accountable for operational planning.
Correct.
So that the event commander would report, as we previously discussed, would report eventually to the chief, but through the Acting Deputy Chief.
That is correct.
And you understood when we speak about that responsibility that Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson had.
And she has appeared here.
Did you see her evidence?
No.
Okay.
So she explained that that was her mandate included the plans that you saw, I suppose, before the convoy arrived.
But her requirement would be to continue to be accountable for the delivery of operational plans right the way through.
Right?
That is accurate.
Okay.
And she makes the change from Superintendent Rayoum.
And by the time you came on, on the 10th, and that was at the direction of Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, correct?
That is who I got the phone call from, yes.
And you knew that she had made the decision to replace Inspector Patterson?
Right?
I don't know who made the decision to have Superintendent Patterson removed, but if you say so.
Fair enough.
Well, did you know that it arose, that change arose, as a consequence of an interaction between Inspector Patterson and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson?
I've heard.
All right.
I have no direct knowledge of that.
Okay, fair enough.
And that acting...
Deputy Chief Ferguson had placed Inspector Patterson into the role in place of Inspector Dunlop.
You knew that?
That is correct.
That's the right sequence.
Superintendent Dunlop and Superintendent Patterson.
Thank you for the correction.
And during that time, each of those event commanders would have responsibility within The structure of Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson for operational planning, correct?
That is correct.
And as you did when you came on to the scene and drew a plan, so too was it their responsibility for planning?
That is correct.
And although you were not involved...
Directly between the 3rd and the 10th, other than in the way that you described, just thinking about your direct involvement now for a moment, you were not requested to be involved by those event commanders in drawing or writing plans, operational plans, correct?
That's correct.
And would it be right to say that if operational planning...
That acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and ultimately Chief Slowly would have a responsibility to ensure that some attention was paid to operational planning, right?
That's accurate.
And I think you told us that Chief Slowly took the step of requesting plan writers Write an operational plan.
I think you said maybe on the 8th, right?
Correct.
And in the absence of an operational plan to the 8th of February, you agree with me that it would be the responsibility of the chief to ensure, or acting deputy chief, to ensure that that was being done.
Correct.
Now, when you looked at the, when you came on, You received a plan.
I think you told us the plan of the night, 3.0, I think it's called.
Am I right?
I was aware of it, but in my role was just somewhat as a conduit to ensure it gets to whoever it needed to get to, in this particular case, the event commander.
Got it.
And the plan, the 3.0 plan, the February 9th plan, you were asked by my friend Mr. Au, how could we understand the February 9th plan in relation to the February 13th plan and then the evolution of the plan you talked to us about this morning.
Do you recall that?
Yes.
And you thought they were different plans.
They were written in a different structure or content.
The elements of them, they contain common elements.
Is that fair?
And I would agree with you that there may be some elements that were drawn out of it as good elements, as good pieces.
And that's what I was going to get to.
You might not have seen that Inspector Lou...
I think I got that rank, right?
Superintendent.
Superintendent.
I'm going to call everybody superintendent, so I can't go under.
From the RCMP?
Yes.
Superintendent Lou, the commissioner has seen a communication from him to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson in which he referred to their work, his work at least, the integrated team's work, as building on the OPS plan of the 9th.
And you would accept that?
I was not privy to that conversation, but I would assume, I would expect that that integrated planning team would not discount existing elements in order to build the most effective plan.
And you told us that writing a plan for a mission of this kind would normally take a month.
Yes?
This complexity, we're talking that if we had the opportunity to know, we had to compress a lot of work into a very short period of time.
And in order to...
You know, it would be nice to have had a month to know that we were going to have something similar to a presidential visit that's going to result in disorder, a G20 visit that we know that there's going to be protests in disorder.
We would have that time to plan and have the resources in place.
And you did not have that luxury here?
We did not.
It nonetheless evolved.
By the time you came on to your role on the 10th, you had a final plan.
It was probably still evolving right up until game time, but you took from the 10th to about the 17th or 18th.
Is that fair?
So the actual, the 10th, let's have to say that I was put in place the 10th at night.
I slept through the night.
The 11th, I had to get myself organized and establish that foundation piece with those.
Points that I had outlined and then by the 12th, I'm now assembling my command team to get the people around me to be able to start feeding me the advice and the information and their subject matter expertise in order to start building the plan.
So I'd say by the 13th, we would be now in That plan-building mode.
Understood.
And the plan of the 9th had its own history that preceded your work, correct?
Could you clarify your question?
Sure.
The plan of February 9th, the 3.0 plan, you were not involved in writing that plan.
Correct.
And am I right?
Correct.
That it would have taken its own length of time or an amount of time would have been required to write and develop that plan, obviously.
I would agree with that.
And you were not involved in it, but you now know that people were involved in writing that plan.
Yes?
Are you talking about the subsequent element?
I knew that a group got together at Elgin Street to write that plan.
Yeah, got it.
The issue of the plan approval for a moment, if I could speak about that.
You clarified for my friend, Mr. Al, that sometimes the word approval appears in your notes, but it means we should understand it to mean review or briefing, right?
The legal approval wasn't an approval, for example.
Yes.
And you took the step, and it sounds like it's a practice that you have followed previously, to ensure that the operational plans that you're developing, particularly in a case of this complexity, did not pose some legal risk to the OPS or protesters.
Correct.
And so the Ms. You Know or the OPS legal Was never required to approve the plan, but you did want them to have an eye on the plan and to review it, correct?
Yes.
And in the same way, am I right that in regards to what Chief Slowly had requested in terms of briefings from you to the executive team or otherwise, that what he was That
was not my take on what was transpiring.
Well, can we put it this way?
that Chief Slowly did not ever impede the approval of the plan that you developed with your integrated planning cell colleagues.
There is an interaction that did take place between myself and Deputy Chief Ferguson, where the Chief was insisting that he needed to approve the plan.
And I advised Deputy Ferguson if she could have the conversation with the Chief saying...
I don't think he needs to approve it.
I have approved it.
We're moving forward with it.
Yes.
Please share it with him.
And yes, and you did.
Yes.
And he didn't hold you up, correct?
At that point, he didn't.
Right.
And can I show you, tell me whether you've seen this.
I'm just going to show you real quick.
I think you're on this email chain.
For Mr. Registrar, if you could help me.
I think it's probably four zeros, but one, five, four, seven.
So could you go to the bottom, please, for me?
Is this the last one on the chain?
Thank you.
So, thank you.
So, do you see this?
This is from Chief Slowly, Feb 13, to Deputy Ferguson, you and others?
So, this is referring to his February 9th plan that he approved?
Yes.
Please send me the latest version of the operations plan I approved on Wednesday.
Scroll down, please.
Please advise if the plan has received all official approvals, signatures, etc.
There seems to be some concern about this from the RCMP.
Again, slowly.
Sorry.
Sorry to the translators and everyone.
Please advise if the plan has received all official approvals, signatures, etc.
Okay, just scroll up.
And then...
In checking with Rob Bernier, he finally had a chance to review the plan from the integrated planning team and has sent it back with his comments.
He would prefer it be completed and signed off and will then share the plan as he is the final approver of it.
And then scroll to the top of that, please.
And then just thank you.
I appreciate and support the need for Acting Superintendent Bernier to make adjustments to the plan that he inherited.
That said, please ensure the plan is finally signed off at the earliest possible opportunity.
This is a priority need expressed by our integrated partners.
And that...
Do you receive these emails?
I remember reading this email.
Yeah, got it.
Okay.
And what Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson conveyed to you was that you were a go all the way through, correct?
Correct.
Now, the...
That's fine with that document.
Thanks so much.
Now, the issues that you spoke about in terms of your interactions with Chief Slowly, if I understand them, across the board, his requests for information.
Or his request that you attend briefings of the senior command to inform the senior command of what was happening in terms of the integration.
That those did not constitute, in your opinion, interference with what you were doing.
Is that fair?
Are we talking from the point that I'm the event commander?
Yes.
So there...
During some of those meetings, there were topics that were being brought up that were becoming more operational, even tactical decisions that need to be made during those briefings.
I just had to ask that trust be bestowed on us, that we're going to be doing, taking care of those things, and that as a chief, he did not have to worry about those level of things.
Right.
And you expressed that view to him?
Yes.
And he accepted it, correct?
Yes.
And you expressed to my friend, Mr. Al, that what you observed was an adjustment as between the two of you.
Yes.
Because, and I can't recall exactly how you described it, maybe as a reset, but you were trying to assure Chief Slowly that...
You had this.
Yes.
And I'm correct, am I not, that he accepted that.
Yes.
And the discussions that you had were around that concept of that border zone, strategy, operations, tactics.
You said when you felt that he was raising an issue that was within your authority, you told him so, and he moved back to his authority.
True?
I would agree.
And do you agree with me also that throughout this, your experience with him, your direct experience, I'm not talking about what you heard from some guy in the parade room.
I'm talking about what you had directly with him.
That during the time you worked with Chief Slowly, he worked in good faith and to the best of his abilities on behalf of this police service and the community?
I would say yes.
And that when you were listening to his wish to express his view about what you should consider or should not consider, that what you were observing was a person who was passionately trying to do the right thing for this community and the police service.
I would agree.
And as the chief of police, You understood also from your observation that he was dealing with the unprecedented crisis that you described, first of all, right?
Yes?
Yes.
So when my friend Mr. Rouse says to you that you gave a comment that you hadn't seen a chief do this or hadn't seen a chief do that, you'd never seen a chief in this situation before, right?
Agreed.
And you'd never been in that situation before, of course.
Yeah, definitely not this type of situation, no, but I've been in stressful situations.
And so he had to manage the turmoil and chaos that the community was experiencing, right?
That was his responsibility?
Yes.
City Council?
Yes.
Police Services Board?
Yes.
Chief to Commissioner?
Yes.
chief to chief.
You were down resources Resources in a magnitude that is very hard to even comprehend.
The entirety of this police service could not have managed, if it were all deployed, every single person could not have managed this protest without help.
Is that true?
I agree with that.
And so it was imperative that you get...
In the end, how many personnel did you roll out on that operation?
I think the numbers were in the neighbourhood of, in the 2,200 officers.
And that's going to be give and take, because I'm sure there may be some inaccuracies with forgetting this little element, that element.
Now, a couple of other things, if I can, very briefly.
You talked to us about what you observed.
When you saw the operational plan and you got introduced to Hendon, which I understand you didn't know anything about previously.
Correct.
Now, I have looked, and I may be wrong, so I have not seen a note that you made during that period of time, 26th, say, to the time that you returned from your weekend away, in which you expressed any of your concerns in writing to anyone.
Or made a note of them.
Would I be right about that?
It would have been verbal.
Verbal?
And so, could the commissioner understand that whatever your concern was about what was coming, and you used strong language, you said it was a bizarre disconnect between what you read on the operation plans that the OPS had prepared, your colleagues had prepared.
And what you thought was coming.
If I can maybe just correct that the official plans were not out yet.
There were no plans out yet when that reflection was.
That was on the 27th of January after I was exposed to the Hendon call, the Hendon report, and a meeting with the intelligence special events and the information group.
That's when that observations made.
The plans only came out late on the 28th, once the truckers had arrived.
Fair enough.
But either which way, you would now say to the Commissioner that you thought that the plans weren't adequate, that that was the disconnect.
I didn't see all the plans.
So the plans that we received, they spoke to appendix plans, which I never saw.
Can't speak to if it was something that was going to be adequate to manage that.
Okay, got it.
So then maybe I misunderstood your evidence then.
You're not critical.
Do I have it then that you're not critical of your colleagues, Deputy Bell and his team, who were looking at the intelligence, the same intelligence that you had, and assessed that this was on balance, a protest that did not require a different response than the one that they made?
So the disconnect is I've never seen the level of engagement of intelligence units, especially with the OPP, on previous events to this magnitude.
So that's where it seemed we don't have the plan out yet.
And what I was understanding that we were planning to have from the briefings that we had on the 27th.
Was that there was going to be a two-day and that there's nothing to indicate necessarily that they're going to stay, but there may be some that's going to stay.
That's where I was kind of wondering.
They've ramped up a lot of resources from an intelligence piece across the province and at a national level for how things were seeming to be.
If that answers your question.
I'm sure it's my poor question.
What I'm trying to understand is whether you thought that the Ottawa Police Service had missed the mark before you went away.
Did you think that they were going down the wrong path in terms of their response to this?
Not being privy to all the Information, all the plans, because not only is there a hand in, I'm sure that the teams were of access to a lot of other, to inform their decision making.
I can tell you the right people from the right sections were engaged because I knew that Mark Patterson was part of the intelligence team with his team and the special events team were all engaged.
And these are people who've been put in those positions for a reason.
So the right people in the right sections were engaged to plan for this.
I'm not privy to everything.
So I think I even said in my statement that the right people are engaged, that need to be engaged to plan for this, and I had to leave it at that.
Got it.
And therefore, can I put it this way?
You would not have gone away on the weekend on a short ski break if you thought that they had missed the mark.
You deferred to their superior position in assessing the intelligence in the aggregate.
Is that fair?
I was away skiing, but I was not far.
I was only about 45 minutes away, so I would be able to come back if I had to.
No, but a slightly different point.
You didn't record anything in writing that said that you thought that the intelligence or the operational plan was inadequate, and you went away for the weekend.
I can only assume that you did both of those things because you were content to, under the leadership of Deputy Chief Bell, to defer to their judgment about the planning for this weekend event.
I believe it would have been under Deputy Chief Ferguson.
Sorry, the intelligence assessment.
Yes.
Okay.
One last thing I had a note about.
Let me see.
The statement February 2nd.
February 2nd, Chief Slowly made a statement in a presentation to City Council and the Police Services Board that there may not be a policing solution alone to this.
To the extent that he was describing the need for additional resources, you would agree with him?
It is a policing solution.
Not a policing solution that the Ottawa Police Service alone could provide, correct?
Well, I wasn't saying it's not an Ottawa police solution alone.
It was a policing solution.
So when I see policing, there's many times that...
A lot of our operations currently going on even this weekend where multiple agencies need to come together to do that.
That's a policing solution.
In addition to that, and you told my friend this, of course you've spoken about the Emergencies Act and two other levels of government declaring emergencies.
Those are not policing.
Police use those tools, but those are not policing solutions, correct?
So they're policing tools.
So, no different than the Criminal Code of Canada, no different than the Highway Traffic Act, the various municipal governments put these acts in place as tools for policing to use.
Were you made aware of the approach that the Commissioner learned about from the Government of Canada?
To the OPP to possibly engage in a dialogue with protesters and arrange a meeting on certain terms?
I think, are you referring to the letters that the public safety ministers were wanting to draft?
Yes.
So I was informed, and I did speak to that, I believe, today with regards to that.
I had knowledge through the OPP shared at one of my first meetings with Staff Sergeant Giselle Walker.
Who informed that at the provincial level, as well as the federal level, that the ministers were drafting letters.
If they were to denounce their protest activity and leave, that they would honour a meeting at a later date.
That's not a policing solution?
That is not a policing solution.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Thank you, Superintendent.
Thank you, sir.
Okay.
Perhaps this is a good time for the morning break to give everyone a little time to stretch their legs, including Superintendent Bernay.
Okay, so we're taking 15 minutes, and we'll come back at just after noon.
The commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
La commissione va pour 15 minutes.
La commissione va pour 15 minutes.
La commissione va pour 15 minutes.
La commissione va pour 15 minutes.
La commissione va pour 15 minutes.
La commissione va pour 15 minutes.
La commissione va pour 15 minutes.
Order alert.
The Commission is reconvened.
La Commissione reprend.
Okay, next up for cross-examination is for the convoy organizers.
Good afternoon, Mr. Commissioner.
Good morning.
Good afternoon again.
It just became the afternoon.
Superintendent Bernier.
And good afternoon, everyone here online.
My name is Bathsheba Vandenberg, and I am representing Freedom Corps and the protesters.
Mr. Commissioner, I have 25 minutes allocated, and there was some information that came about from this morning.
That requires me to ask a few more questions, and therefore I ask for leave for five additional minutes.
What I'd suggest is go ahead.
Assuming you're efficient and effective in your 25 minutes, I'll consider giving the five.
If you're not, I won't.
How's that?
Sounds fair.
Thank you.
Okay.
Superintendent Bernier.
You talked about CBRN units being chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear.
Was that the OPSC-CBRNE combined with RCMP?
That's correct.
Are you aware that the military unit, which is called Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit, which is part of CANOSCOM, assists RCMP in that capacity?
Perhaps they have agreements on certain types of events that they would be And so, do you agree that this military CBRN capability unit may have been used during the protest after the Emergencies Act invocation to assist the RCMP?
I have no knowledge of that.
In your testimony yesterday, you mentioned that when you were assigned to the Service Command Centre on February the 3rd, you noted that there were problems with OPS staffing.
Is that right?
There are challenges in meeting the staffing needs.
Okay.
And I also understand that OPS COVID-19 vaccine mandates took effect on February 1st.
Is that right?
I don't have specific knowledge on that.
But they took effect around that date.
Is that right?
There were specific ones you want to refer to that I don't know what you're referring to.
A COVID-19 mandate?
A COVID-19 vaccination mandate, to be clear.
What was the change or that they went into place?
That anyone in the OPS force that did not take the COVID-19 vaccine would no longer be able to serve in the force.
Are you talking about the internal policies, not globally on that?
You're talking about Ottawa police?
Yep, that's correct.
Correct.
Thank you.
And that as a result of the mandate coming into effect, that OPS lost around 200 members?
I don't have exact numbers on that.
Okay.
Given the staffing and resource issues that have been identified by OPS, did OPS consider waiving the COVID-19 vaccination mandates and allowing unvaccinated OPS officers to return to work?
That would be outside my...
Can you confirm that prior to Superintendent Patterson's position as event commander between February the 6th and 10th, that he was working in the Intelligence Directorate?
That is accurate.
In your testimony, you mentioned that Superintendent Patterson told you on February 7th that he wanted to use public order units, also known as POUs, to clear the Rideau-Sussex intersection on February the 9th?
I'd have to refer to my notes specifically if I could confirm if you'd like.
Is what you mentioned yesterday in your examination and cheat.
So once again, you're referring to a specific date.
This sounds right, on or about that date.
I would have it in my notes.
Okay.
He did have a conversation with you around that time to use POUs.
And that he wanted to clear out with POU action the Rideau and Sussex intersection in the same way that he used them on February 6th to effect arrest and seize fuels from protesters in Coventry.
Is that right?
I wouldn't say that the conversation would be that in the same effect there are two different operations, two different styles of operations.
That's right.
The POUs were used on February 6th, were they not?
Where?
Coventry.
That would be, I honour about that day.
I know that there was some operation not involved in my responsibilities, but I was aware that something of that nature happened at Coventry.
Okay.
Inspector Baudet testified that the use of POU action at Coventry undermined the PLT's work of negotiation with the protesters.
Do you agree?
I'm not.
Privy to all the information of what PLT was doing at the time, what the arrangements were, what the integration was.
It would be hard for me to have an opinion on that.
Would you agree, though, that POU action would undermine PLT work in negotiations?
They each have their role and integrated properly and used appropriately.
They should be working in unison, if that helps.
Superintendent Abrams testified that Superintendent Patterson spoke to him about wanting to use a snatch-and-grab method on protesters and mentioned that that is a method used by OPS and not OPP.
Is that right?
Is this something that I was privy to?
Because I'm not sure I heard the snatch-and-grab term used.
Is there notes to this?
It would only be privy to you if you listened to Superintendent Abrams' testimony last week.
I did not.
But is it a method that OPS use?
So a term snatch and grab under what context?
Meaning that police officers lined up on a horizontal line or in ranks in riot gear and they snatch and grab a protester in order to place the protester behind the lines or behind the ranks to effect an arrest.
So the term snatch and grab is not...
A term that I am familiar with, but I do have extensive experience as a public order commander and in charge of our public order unit for five years that there are arrest techniques that we use in a public order fashion that all public order units utilize across the province for effecting a lawful arrest on a public order line.
That's right.
And do those arrest techniques involve the physical maneuvering of...
Snatching or grabbing a person?
There are techniques that are going to be, arrest techniques that are going to be used.
And like I said, the snatch and grab is not something that is something that I'm familiar with.
Now, I want to ask you a few questions on the phased integrated approach, the February 17th plan that you discussed at length already in your examination in chief.
Could I ask the Commission to bring up document OPP401852?
Could we go to page seven, please?
So here you'll see, Superintendent Bernier, the mission statement and that it includes a reference to individual charter rights and freedoms.
Is that correct?
Yes.
And yesterday you mentioned that the mission provides guiding principles and that respect for everyone's charter is what is with everything you do in operations, correct?
Correct.
And that in fact it is critical that everyone understands the mission and objectives and commander's intent, correct?
Correct.
Isn't it true that not all OPS members knew of the objectives of the February 17th plan?
I implemented a measure to mitigate that well in advance where every officer who was deployed on the ground received a sticker.
That went into their notebooks prior to briefing that outlined exactly all this information with their authorities.
When you say well in advance, his plan is February the 17th.
Correct.
So officers briefing, there was various officers that would be briefed during the various stages of the operation as early as the evening of.
The 17th and into the morning and so on so forth, 24 hours a day, where there were briefing periods where any new officer coming in for a briefing would receive a sticker that would go into their notebook that outlined the mission statement, main action plan, and their authorities.
Inspector Lucas, who testified yesterday, reported and who reported directly to you during the implementation of this plan.
Sorry, that wasn't phrased properly.
He reported to you directly, right, Inspector Lucas?
Inspector Lucas would have reported to me directly with regards to the, as the incident commander in the NCRCC.
Right.
And he testified that he only knew of the concept of operation, so not even the high level or the brass within OPS understood the plan and mission, despite your sticker.
Could you please repeat your question?
Well, yesterday, Inspector Lucas testified that he actually only knew of the concept of operations and not the objectives or the mission statement per se of the February 17th plan.
And so, therefore, wouldn't you agree that not even the high level or the brass within OPS understood the plan and the mission insofar as the objectives?
I can't speak for Inspector Lucas.
But I had an operations chief directly linked feeding all the information as it was taking place within our operational level command and fed Inspector Lucas with all the details of this plan.
I even emailed out to every member of the Ottawa Police the mission statement and the main action plan on master distribution list.
And kept everyone abreast of what was taking place through email.
As far as the executive goes, the strategic commander involved, which is Deputy Chief Ferguson, involved all the way along and fully informing.
Okay, thank you.
Could we scroll down to page 9 of the February 17 plan?
There you can see that the POU operational plan is a separate plan.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Can I please call up OP40s, or rather OPP40s 1873?
You agree that this POU tactical operations plan is a tactical operations plan for the Integrated Public Order?
Units responding to the protests in Ottawa, right?
Can you scroll down a bit, please?
Some more.
Some more, please.
Again.
Each three, please.
So from what I can see, this appears.
Here's to be the plan.
Without going into every single page to see, it is aligning with the plan that I would have approved.
Okay, thank you.
And you agree that you were the overall event commander for this operation?
That is correct.
Who was the critical?
Sorry, I should qualify.
We're in unified command.
That's right.
So we are three unified commanders approving this plan.
And moving forward at this point.
Inspector Springer, Superintendent Lou, and myself.
And who was a critical incident commander assigned with the POUs on the ground?
There were multiple.
There wasn't one particular?
No, because of the magnitude of the event, we had to have the ability to manage multiple situations, critical incidents at the same time.
And who were the three reserve event commanders that you mentioned earlier?
So I would have to refer back to my notes if I could, but could I go back to my notes?
Please, on the 18th, probably.
I'm going to continue with the questions for lack of time, but if you can remember a name off the top of your head, one of the names.
Superintendent Mike Francis, or at the time he was Superintendent Mike Francis, OPP.
Thank you.
I would like to take you down to paragraph 34, the mission statement.
And there is state to ensure the removal of protesters in the area of the blockades in relation to the Freedom Convoy 2022.
This will be achieved by securing, isolating, and evacuating persons within the designated blockade zones to ensure the safe detention and arrests of any participants taken into custody.
Ensure public and police safety.
This mission statement does not include a reference to respect for individual charter rights and freedoms, does it?
This is a sub-plan.
Everyone still has to adhere to the overall plan.
So regardless, any member still has to adhere to the overall plan.
That's right, but it is absent from this plan and this plan would have been used to brief the tactical units.
Is that not right?
This plan is inclusive of the other plan.
And was it used to brief the tactical units?
This plan as well as my mission statement, which is no different than all the other officers, would have both the overall mission statement and the public order mission.
That's right, but this mission statement does miss the word's utmost respect for charter rights and freedoms, correct?
It would be a duplication.
And then further down at paragraph 37, it states, "Take down of each location to commence in phases as dictated by the critical incident commander." Take down of each location, in effect, means take down of the protesters.
Is that right?
Clearing the area.
As well as there's vehicles and rendering infrastructure safe.
And any protester who refused to leave or caused an action that resulted in arrest would be detained.
And you refer to POUs being used for kinetic action during operations.
Is that right?
That is a term that is used.
Would you agree that the origins of the word kinetic action means warfare and use of lethal force?
I'm not aware of that.
Now, I want to ask you about the arrests.
With regards to the arrests and processing plans and the PLU tactical operational plans, there's nothing that states that after police arrested protesters and told them that they were not being charged, that the police were to drive the protesters outside of the city core in the dead of winter, the biggest snowstorm in a while, as you describe today.
Without access to shelter or transportation and telecommunications and leave them in parking lots or other areas, correct?
Not the way I would explain it.
Are you aware that that happened?
The plans that were put in place, which involved the ability to remove protesters who were arrested, detained, to a secondary processing site, there were two that were identified.
One was approximately less than 10 minutes away from the arrest zone.
The other one was approximately 15. To 20 minutes away from the arrest zone, where there were a full infrastructure of investigators in order to properly process, run, allow phone calls to lawyers, and where they were advised exactly of the next steps of what was going to take place.
They were located in close proximity to, and when I say close proximity, maybe 200 metres from public transit and even restaurants and gas stations.
To be able to find their way back to where they need to go.
Well, we will most likely learn later in this commission that that is not exactly the case of the circumstances, Superintendent Bernier.
Were you the one who authorized these movements?
I'd authorize the plan and the secondary processing site.
At the end of the day, the unified command between Inspector Springer, myself, and Superintendent Lou, we would have to be in agreement.
And it was the investigations branch that, along with our custody branch, that came up with that arrest and processing plan.
And you know who Tamara Leach and Chris Barber and Danny Bulford and Tom Morazo are, don't you?
Yes.
And at no time did any of those four individuals not cooperate with the OPS?
Not to my knowledge.
I have no direct involvement with them.
Superintendent Abrams testified that irrespective of the February 17th plan, that there remained integration issues between various police forces.
Do you agree?
Could you repeat the question again, please?
That irrespective of the February 17th plan, that there remained communications and integration problems?
Following the 17th, I think the plan went as well as it could in any operation.
Comes with challenges.
Operations of this size and magnitude and police services.
From across the province, and in fact, across the country, all come with their own structures, their own procedures.
That's right.
I'd actually like to pick up on that.
Because I understand that you've gained the bronze and silver certification in major civil disorder management in the United Kingdom, and you've also trained with the RCMP and OPP.
And you're just now mentioning that every force uses different structures.
Is it true that every police force across the country has a different set of 10 codes?
That is a possibility, yes.
And there's also a different set of codes for major civil disorder management.
I don't know what you would be referring to there.
Communication codes.
And managing a major incident.
There's only one set of 10 codes that we use to communicate on a radio.
I'm referring to your training in the United Kingdom.
Okay.
I didn't have to use 10 codes in the United Kingdom.
A different set of codes or...
Terminology?
Yes.
For communicating.
They may have different terms that they use in the UK.
Okay.
I note also that the February 17 plan does not include any reference to communications.
Is that correct?
Which plan are you referring to?
The February 17 overall master plan.
There is a communications plan.
Well, I put it to you that the only reference to communications is that at the stabilization phase, the first phase, that there would be a provision of integrated training and communications interoperability.
Is that right?
So are we moving away from whether there was a communication plan?
Because there is a communication plan.
We can pull that up if you'd like.
Within the master plan?
It's an appendix plan.
You're talking about the command?
No, a communication plan.
Using agreed set codes?
There's a corporate communication as well as communication with what radio channels and radio system that we would use.
I'd like to move on to asking you some questions with regards to the POU tactical operational plan.
So I'd like to pull up OPP401873.
OPP401873.
At paragraph 7. The Rules of Engagement Decision Matrix there superseded all other police forces, policies, and SOPs.
Is that right?
Correct.
Could we call up document OPS 30-12-550?
0. I'll scroll down to page two.
It states that all police officers, including PLUs, must have an up-to-date use of force qualification with the last 12 months.
Is that correct?
Correct.
And Superintendent Abrams testified that a decision was made that this requirement would be suspended for the purpose of getting boots on the ground on February 18th, and so that some officers would be beyond their qualification period of maybe over a year.
Is that right?
That was under the decision of a chief of police or commissioner under the COVID situation.
But it did happen, is that right?
There potentially were officers who would be given an exemption.
And if they had an exemption, that would still qualify.
Next.
It reads that every officer who draws their firearm in the presence of the public, use of any weapon or improvised weapon other than a firearm on another person or use of physical force on a person that results in an injury to that person requires medical attention, shall complete a use of force report.
Is that correct?
Correct.
And do you know how many use of force reports were recorded after the tactical phase?
I don't have that.
We would have to then find those records from follow-up from that, but the records were kept and use of force reports were filled in.
Did you not receive an email on February 20 that only four use of force reports were recorded and that a number of arrest sheets didn't indicate yes or no for use of force?
Would you be able to pull up that email?
Because it doesn't seem to...
Not at this time, but I can assure you that it was sent to you on February 20th.
I would like to call up a document HRF four zeros one five five nine
In the far left, do you agree that the person in green is carrying what looks like a 5.56-millimeter caliber carbine rifle with 30-round magazine capacity?
Where is this picture taken from?
Do you know when?
It's taken February during the protests between the 18th and 20th.
Okay.
What is your question?
Which officer?
Just having a look at the person on the far left, identifying that it appears to be that they are carrying a 5.56mm caliber carbine rifle with 30-round magazine.
It is definitely a rifle, and I would say yes.
Okay, next to him is a person in green carrying a 40mm multi-launcher.
That appears to be it.
The person in blue is carrying a wooden dowel-style baton.
That is correct.
And the person on the right in green looks to be carrying a.300 caliber carbine rifle with 30-round magazine capacity.
That appears right.
And would you agree that at first glance that these persons in green appear military-like?
I would not say that.
I'd now like to call up video HRF.
Four zeros, one five six zero.
And I'm going to just warn that there's distressing images.
And I'd like to pause at 0.29.
I'd like to pause at 0.29.
I'd like to pause at 0.29.
All right, so do you agree that the OPS officer in this video in the back behind the ranks, the line is using what is actually the muzzle and not the butt of what looks like a 40 millimeter chemical munition launched to beat a protester with?
Not enough for me to see what exactly is going on.
But you can see that there is a police officer in the back beating a protester with a rifle.
There is not enough for me to see what is actually happening behind bodies.
video please.
Thank you.
Now, I just have three further questions, Mr. Commissioner, and thank you for the time.
This is going back before the invocation of the act regarding the deal, and we're talking about February 14th.
So you knew that the protesters, organizers, had established base camps at farms outside of Ottawa that could accommodate a large number of trucks.
Is that right?
So, you said a lot very quickly, so I'm trying to figure out what is, could you just, if you could speak a little slower, it's a bit like, too fast.
In February, you were aware that there were base camps at farms outside of Ottawa that could accommodate a number of trucks.
At what point in February are you talking about?
Yes, we were aware.
So when I was involved, I was aware that there were multiple locations on the outskirts of Ottawa and actually quite good distance from Ottawa as well.
And that on February 14th, approximately 100 trucks and protest vehicles left the downtown under the mayor's deal, and only 23 trucks moved up to Wellington.
And then the remainder left Ottawa, right?
I actually have no records of vehicles leaving.
The footprint did not change all that much.
There was movement up onto the hill.
Sorry, onto Wellington.
But from the information that I was receiving on the...
would have been...
Whichever day the movement would have taken place, February 14th, there was very minimal departure of vehicles.
Right.
But there was some, and this is my final question, is but for the lack of the OPS cooperation in implementing that deal and obstruction of movement of vehicles out...
of the downtown residential areas at the rate at the rate that the truckers were actually moving and vehicles moving outside on February 14th most of the downtown but for Wellington would have been cleared by Wednesday February 16th correct?
We developed a quite robust Highly staffed with both our police liaison and our traffic unit and cleared egress routes that were going to be very well communicated with all the protesters as to if they wanted to leave for a 24-hour period, we had those routes clearly open and facilitating the departure of vehicles.
They were not leaving.
Some of them did move, though.
You did say that on February 14th.
And had they had a bit more time, they would have fully cleared out the area.
Thank you for your service, Superintendent Bernier.
And thank you, Mr. Commissioner, for the additional time.
I appreciate it.
Next is the Government of Canada.
Good afternoon, Superintendent Bernier.
My name is Donna Rean-Agar and I'm counsel for Canada.
I just have a few questions that I would like to ask you.
First, starting with the time period in which you were Moving into the integrated command with the OPP and the OPS, you are the OPS, sorry, and the RCMP, and developing the plan that was eventually implemented.
Can you tell us a little bit about what the situation on the ground was at that time?
As I understand from reading some of the Hendon reports at that point in time, There was increased volatility in the protest zone.
Would you agree with that?
I agree, yes.
That was the reports that I was getting.
And that the protesters were becoming more adversarial and confrontational with police?
They were.
And that there were violent elements within the crowd?
Yes.
And there was, as a result of all of this, increasing concern.
For the possibility of violence within the protest, the longer it continued on.
Is that correct?
That is obviously a possibility, yes.
And there was also some concern about firearms and other weapons within the Crown, correct?
That is something that was continually monitored, assessed, and leveraging our intelligence teams with various information or intelligence that was coming in, Possibilities of that.
And in fact, if I can have OPP 403427, please.
This is the February 14th Hendon report.
Did you see that?
On the 14th, I would have had an intelligence officer at my command table with the responsibility of reviewing and briefing the group on this information.
So although I'm not reading it, I should be getting key information from it.
And if we can go to page five, please.
Scroll down just a little.
Just right there is good.
Just beyond the bolded section there, you can see there's a reference to represent potential volatile elements.
They both espouse sovereign citizen ideals.
And in the case of redacted, early information suggests he may have brought firearms.
His interaction with police were notable when approached by the action as to openly wearing a sheath but sizable knife on his person.
He rejected the idea of moving it.
Were you aware of that situation in particular and other situations like that?
Yes.
Thank you.
So at the end of the day, the plan that the integrated team developed worked, correct?
Yes, ma 'am.
It was very successful in clearing what I believe you described as the largest and most complex police operation in Canada.
Yes.
And the success of that operation depended on a lot of different moving parts, but I'm just going to focus on a couple of them for a moment.
One of them was the ability to shrink the footprint down from where it started, correct?
Smaller footprint would be easier to manage.
And in fact, in his testimony, a chief superintendent party indicated that at the original size, it probably would have taken 10,000 officers to execute the same kind of plan.
Would you agree with that?
I don't know.
But it would have taken a lot more people if you hadn't been able to shrink the footprint down, correct?
It would have been a lot longer operation if we...
And once again, it wasn't a speed thing.
It was more safe, methodical, lawful, and ensuring that we took care of everything.
So in other words, if areas such as Sir John A. Macdonald or Sir George Etienne had to be cleared as well, it would just take a lot longer to clear.
And even within the footprint, if there had been more people and more vehicles still there, that would have also taken you longer, correct?
Exactly.
And it would have been a more volatile situation?
Potentially, yes.
And that increases the risk of violence or riots or people getting hurt, correct?
I would agree.
And the other...
The first thing that this plan was dependent on was the ability to move the large trucks which were parked all over the downtown core, correct?
Correct.
And that required heavy tow capacity?
Correct.
And going back to the shrinking footprint for a moment, you described the phases of your plan and the first one I think you described as stabilizing and that included It's consistent messaging to the protesters that now was the time to leave, correct?
That is correct.
And as part of that messaging, there were pamphlets that were being handed out to the protesters and news releases for printing in media so that everyone would be aware, correct?
Yes, as well as putting flyers on every vehicle.
And if we can have OPS 4013798.
This is the plan that has the February 15th date on the front cover.
I know there's a number of iterations of the plans.
One of my friends took you to this earlier.
And if we can go to page five, please.
And scroll down to the bottom of the page.
Yeah, that's good.
You'll agree with me that the plan, in fact, reproduced the content of the messaging that was being given out to the protesters.
You can see it there just after the start of it there, just after the bolding?
Correct.
And that...
If we go on to the next page...
There's a number of these items, and I'm going to go through a few of them, but that were powers that were provided to the police services under the Federal Emergency Act and the regulations associated with it, correct?
That is correct.
And even the powers that were given to you under the provincial legislation, such as the ability to suspend certificates, that required the towing of the vehicle first, correct?
Correct.
So you had to be able to tow before you could do that suspension?
I'm not 100% sure on that.
I don't know if there was abilities that if you're able to identify a driver within that it could be done retroactively.
I just want to make sure that I'm not fully clear if it required the tow of it first.
Well, perhaps we can refresh your memory.
If we can bring up OPS.
Three zeros.
Oh, I guess it's four zeros.
One, one, eight, one.
Thank you, if you can.
This is a flow chart.
There's a lot of information.
understandable.
Oh, I'm sorry.
I gave you the wrong number.
It is three zeros.
One, one, eight, zero, one.
And this is an OPP.
Flow chart that was produced for the suspension.
And you can see if you go down to the third box, it's remove vehicle from the highway.
And then after that is the administrative action, correct?
If I can just take a minute to read.
Absolutely.
So I think this was somewhat of a flowchart to give instructions with the fact that we were doing the towing and that they're not, you know, we weren't necessarily doing intervention action prior.
This was part of our phased actions on portion and just so that there was clear instructions of what was happening with the vehicles and as part of the end part was that process that was going to take place.
And once again, I'm not 100% sure if there was not the ability to do something with the CVOR, whether we towed it or not.
But in this particular case, we were towing all the things.
You were, and you're just not sure.
Correct.
I have to do a little bit more.
Fair enough.
I could take you to one more place, but we'll move on.
If we can go back to the previous document, OPS40.
13798.
And back to page six, please.
So just going through some more of these bullet points, one of the things that was pointed out was the ability to have personal bank accounts.
Subject to examination and restriction, that was a power that was provided under the federal EA, correct?
Yes.
And then the next one about bringing minors to protests, that was also an EA power.
And that was something that if children could be removed from the scene would make enforcement safer, correct?
It would hopefully discourage people to bring their children to this protest, yes.
And the other thing, just the second last bullet that I want to highlight there is persons traveling to the unlawful protest site could be charged.
And that helps to shrink the footprint in that it stops more people from arriving.
I guess it helps to stop the footprint from increasing because people are not continuing to arrive, correct?
That would be the intended effect.
You had some discussion with my friend earlier about, and you confirmed that you had used the Federal Emergencies Act powers in order to put in place a secured area in the downtown core, correct?
That's correct.
And in fact, that is reflected in your plan further on down that page in the second paragraph under situation, correct?
And that was already in place, I take it, from the use of the has established as of February 15th, it was already in place?
No, it has not.
It was not.
When was it put in place?
So we placed a soft, secure area in the evening of the 17th, and then it went in full operation.
At midnight from the 17th into the 18th.
So, and I understand there was a news release that was put out announcing the secured area.
I think that went out at 440 on the 17th, is that?
Correct.
Correct?
Yes.
And that announced that a secured area was being put in place under the Federal Emergencies Act, correct?
Correct.
There are a lot of people, community members who live in that area who've been...
We want to minimize the amount of impact and restriction that they would have had in their own community.
And prior to that time, you didn't have an exclusion zone in that area, correct?
Nothing used under common law or any other form of, how would you say it, authority to shut down an area.
Sorry, I just want to make sure I'm understanding your answer.
Are you saying there wasn't anything that would have allowed you to do that or you didn't use anything?
No, there were.
If we needed to apply under common law, we could have.
But it was nothing that we actually utilized because we didn't go into a police operation and maintaining public safety and restricting access to an area under the common law authority.
So that there was nothing in place until the 17th into the 18th at midnight.
Okay.
And how long did you have that secure area in place?
So the secure area, as the operation progressed and was met with success, we shrunk that area gradually over the days.
And we maintained a...
Very shrunken, small footprint of restriction, secure area to the Wellington area until the Emergencies Act was lifted.
And you spoke about the common law ability to have an exclusion zone.
And you also spoke earlier about how the Emergencies Act made it very clear what you were allowed to do, correct?
Absolutely, yes.
And that's because the common law...
Authority for exclusion zones lacks a certain amount of clarity.
Would you agree with that?
I don't necessarily say it lacks clarity.
It just comes down to the articulation of why and what you are doing and for how long.
So the ancillary powers that exist, there needs to be certain things.
That exists and needs to stop as soon as that does no longer exist.
So, and I think I mentioned, sometimes may be hard to understand or to explain to the various groups, whether our own officers, the community, or protesters.
Right.
And that's what I meant by it lacks a certain amount of clarity.
Yes.
And you can never know for sure, in fact, Whether your use of an exclusion zone will hold up in court until after the fact?
Correct.
Under the common law?
Correct.
And so you kept it in place until the 23rd when the Emergencies Act was revoked, but you weren't conducting active police operations after, I think you said, the 20th?
Is that correct?
So there was a heavy police presence still.
There was still police operation going, but not necessarily that action on phase.
So as of the 18th, 19th, and 20th, into the 21st, it was more of a security posture that we held.
So from that point to the lifting of the Emergencies Act, which we'd shrunk down to the area just surrounding Parliament Hill, that's the area that was...
Maintained.
So I'd like to move to the issue of tow trucks for a moment.
You said in your earlier testimony that the OPP arranged for the heavy tow trucks, correct?
So as part of the integrated group, one of the first things we did was ensure that, and through Inspector Dave Springer and Kirk Richardson from the OPP, who has a wealth of knowledge in that world, Focused at least a team working on that because that was a shortfall.
That was a challenge that we were facing all the way through.
And it was a big challenge because it was a big job to do.
And we were having different challenges with tow companies not wanting to be engaged on this.
However, through Kirk Richardson's work and from across the province, we had success.
Quite quickly with that.
And you mentioned that there were 34 tow trucks that were found and were available for your use, correct?
Correct.
And you received that information from Mr. Richardson, I assume?
Yes, and Dave Springer.
And that was around February 12th and 13th, correct?
Around that time, yes.
And I assume from your testimony that you then weren't later informed that many of those fell through and that, in fact, Mr. Richardson was not able to obtain the services of any tow truck companies without the use of the Emergencies Act?
I was not informed of that.
If we can bring up, please, PB NSC CAN 407378.
Thank you.
And if we could just start on page four, please.
So were you aware that the powers provided under the Emergencies Act regarding compelling tow trucks was delegated from the Commissioner of the RCMP to the Commissioner of the OPP?
I was not.
And then if we can go to page 5. You've obviously not seen this before, so I'm going to give you a chance to have a look at it.
I was not aware of that.
But you would agree with me, having seen this now, that, in fact, the Emergencies Act was used to compel tow trucks?
I don't know what the process...
I understand that there was a process that needed to be actually utilized with...
I know that the tow trucks were working with our legal services and our financial services for contracts and that type of...
But you weren't, you, is it fair to say that after the 12th or 13th, you left the tow truck details to other people?
Correct, but reporting back on the 13th that we had the, as I was told, and if this is inaccurate, I ended up seeing tow trucks arrive at the Leakin station in the back parking lot with our OPS cresting and everything on, so I was not informed differently, and Inspector Springer...
From the OPP had not informed me about any of this, so I don't know if he was aware of what was going on.
But you just weren't informed of any of this?
Correct.
But you don't read the decree?
This is new to me.
Yes, fair enough.
And just your comment on the OPS branding on the tow trucks, that was because...
Of the drivers' concerns about anonymity, correct?
That's correct.
And that's because they were concerned both about threats that they had received and their business reputation as well if they were seen to be cooperating in these actions.
Is that correct?
Concerned that that could happen, yes.
Those are all my questions.
Thank you very much.
Okay, well, not sure I want to waste three minutes, but maybe I'll...
Commissioner, I have 20 minutes, I believe.
I'm wondering, and Tardif, pardon me, for the record, for the City of Ottawa.
You're looking at me because I think I'm next.
I'm not sure it'll make much chance to do two minutes and then 18. But I'm in your hands as to whether you want me to start now or wait after lunch.
I'll be magnanimous today.
We'll have an hour and three minutes for lunch.
And come back at 2 o 'clock.
The Commission is in recess for one hour.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
Order a lot.
The commission is reconvened.
La commissora prend.
I'm just a commissioner here, so there's no need to stand.
I know it's bad habits, but we've got a different procedure.
They're now used to it.
Okay.
Are we ready to continue?
I guess we're now on the City of Ottawa, I think, who didn't want to use my two minutes.
Thank you.
Good afternoon, Superintendent.
My name is Anne Tardif and I represent the City of Ottawa.
I'd like to ask the clerk to pull up OPS 3014932.
And these, Superintendent, I understand, are your handwritten notes, is that correct?
Yes.
And the date there, February 3rd?
Yes.
I'm going to ask the clerk to please turn to the bottom of page 5 of this document.
Oh, right there.
Now, Superintendent, you'll have to help us if you need us to scroll up for context here.
But the words or the passage I want to draw your attention to is, lost confidence of the community have to take it back.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And is that an accurate assessment of the situation at that point in time, February 3rd?
That was the sentiment that I think within OPS that those were big concerns.
Thank you.
Now, you told us that there was no operational plan with complete supporting plans in place between February 3rd and February 10th.
Is that correct?
During that time period, the service did not have a complete operational plan with supporting plans.
Is that correct?
That is correct.
And up until February 10th, the date you took over, I think you took over in the evening, to be fair, as event commander, the service lacked an overall plan to restore normalcy to Ottawa, correct?
At that point, correct.
Up until that point.
Fair?
Yes.
And I take it you're aware of the...
The miscommunication concerning the arrests that were made after certain protesters removed fuel from the stadium at Coventry on February 6. You're aware of that, correct?
I'm aware of that operation taking place.
And you're aware that there was a miscommunication insofar as PLT was not advised of those arrests prior to them being made?
I'm aware of that now.
Okay.
So you're aware of that now.
Fair enough.
And you knew, obviously, by the time you took over as event commander, that PLT was demoralized and, to a certain extent, ready to leave.
Is that fair?
That is correct.
Now, can I ask...
Actually, sorry, not yet.
We can take that down, Mr. Clerk.
By February 7th...
And to help you out, that's a Monday, if that helps.
I think of it in terms of weekdays.
You knew that PLT was attempting to work with leaders of the Rideau-Sussex group, protest leaders at the Rideau-Sussex intersection.
You know what I mean by that, right?
Yes.
To convince them to move to Wellington Street.
Is that correct?
In my role at that time...
I was not involved with operations, either at a tactical or operational level.
On February 7th, I would have been in the service command center and pretty much removed from what daily operations were going on.
But you mentioning that, I had heard of that.
Okay, and I actually took that.
I'm looking at my notes from your witness summary.
So you knew.
Whatever capacity you were in.
I know you weren't event commander, but you knew that PLT was attempting to work with the group at Rideau Sussex to remove vehicles from that intersection, right, up onto Wellington Street.
You knew that.
I was aware of that that operation was in works.
Okay.
And I take it the benefit of that would be twofold.
One, that it would allow the service and the city to open up.
That intersection again, right?
It's a very important intersection.
It was impacting the Rideau Centre being closed and a lot of businesses that were affected in that area.
So I would have to agree that shrinking the footprint and allowing some of the area to be able to open, yes.
So two benefits there.
One, shrinking the footprint and two, the benefits that you've described to the community.
Is that fair?
Correct, yes.
Okay.
Now I'd like to ask the clerk to pull up please OPS 3010549.
And as it's coming up, there we go.
This is an email that was sent February 12th to you, correct, Superintendent?
That is correct.
And it was sent by Sergeant Ferguson, who I understand is a crisis negotiator, but who was leading the OPS PLT at this point in time.
Is that fair?
Yes.
And if we could scroll down so we can see the body.
Yeah, that's perfect.
Thank you, Mr. Clerk.
You'll see that Sergeant Ferguson is notifying you.
Because by now, February 12th, you're event commander, of a possible future decision point.
Now he says, counsel, and do you see how it's redacted there?
The name's actually in the next sentence, Wilson, and the metadata associated with this document indicates that it was in fact Keith Wilson that he's referring to.
So it's counsel Keith Wilson, who is one of the lawyers representing one of the convoy groups, reached out to PLT members.
Wilson indicated that he was working with the convoy leadership in an effort to get buy-in from the truckers for a proposal to relocate the trucks from all residential streets in the downtown core and to consolidate them on Wellington Street and Elgin starting Monday.
And Monday, of course, was February 14th, right?
Sorry, it's a verbal transcript.
We actually need a yes, even though it's obvious.
He indicated that the balance of the trucks would potentially camp out of town and the drivers could be shuttle, bused, down to Wellington Street.
Wilson said he would update PLT on progress later today and a potential meeting is scheduled to be determined.
And then it goes on from there.
The commission has heard evidence that Keith Wilson was actually involved on behalf of protesters in the negotiation with the mayor's office.
I don't know if you were aware of that at the time, but that's the evidence that's been heard by the commission to date.
Are you aware of that now?
No.
Well, until you've just told me.
That's fair enough, and I'm just asking that.
But this would appear to be, and you can just correct me if I'm wrong, but the description of...
The potential deal is what you actually found out the city had negotiated on February 13th at some point in the day, correct?
Correct.
And the substance of that deal was communicated to you as event commander on Saturday, February 12th, correct?
Through this email?
Through this email.
Correct.
I will have to say that the flow of emails were quite abundant, and I really did count on my command table around me to be feeding me.
But on the 12th, to be fair, I was somewhat in that transition phase where trying to get things set up.
So there were some emails that were perhaps not fully digested.
I acknowledge that the discomfort did come to me.
Okay.
And you won't get, you know, a number of the lawyers in this room will feel your pain about the number of emails that we've been receiving.
So you've got lots of sympathy on that.
But the only point I wanted to draw to your attention was that at the very least, PLT was aware on February 12th that the substance of the negotiation that was ongoing.
Is that fair?
Yes.
Okay.
Thank you.
If we could turn up now, please, OPS 30-11039.
Okay.
Now, according to the title of this document, Superintendent, these are the scribe notes for Chief Slowly.
And if you scroll down to the bottom, very bottom, Mr. Clerk, just out of fairness to the witness.
Actually, it might be on the bottom of every page.
Do you see they're prepared by Vicki Nelson?
And I think you told us earlier she's in the legal services group at the service.
That's correct.
Okay.
So if I could ask you to go back up to the top, Mr. Clerk, I apologize for the gymnastics.
These are Ms. Nelson's notes of February 13th, 2022.
You see that, Superintendent?
Yes.
And I'm going to ask you to turn to page six, Mr. Clerk, if you will.
Okay, right there.
So this is the meeting that occurred shortly after 1 p.m. on Sunday, February 13th.
And you'll see there it says negotiating update meeting, right?
Yes.
And now, notwithstanding the February 12th email that I just took you to, you told us that the first time you were advised by the executive command that these negotiations were taking place.
With the mayor's office was on February 13th, correct?
Correct.
And I believe it was during this meeting.
Is that correct?
We would have to probably scroll down through to read to see if I am...
Of course.
Because it doesn't show who's in attendance.
Sorry, there you are, where it says Bernier.
Yes.
Okay.
Perfect.
If we could just come back up a little bit, that's perfect.
Now, I take it you weren't aware at the time that the Chief and, at the time, Deputy Chief Bell had information about ongoing negotiations the day before, on Saturday the 12th?
No.
Okay.
Now, you'll see here there's a comment attributed to you, and can we scroll down just a little bit, Mr. Clerk?
Thank you.
And I think to put it in context, I would start with Trish, and that refers to Acting Deputy Chief Trish Ferguson, correct?
That is correct.
And she says in relation to the negotiations, this does not change the operations.
We can make this work to our advantage.
There's a next bullet.
Those remaining behind will be there of their own choice.
And then jumping down to you, Bernier, the plan aligns with what we planned and accelerates it.
No concerns.
You see that?
And the chief continues and says there was an expression that there were no trust confidence in PLT.
They want a senior member to be involved in the next movement.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And that turned out to be Superintendent Drummond, correct?
Correct.
And then you say, and I think in fairness to you, Superintendent, you explain victim of circumstance over the last two weeks, meaning this AM gave them a clear focus of where we are going.
And do I understand your statement there to basically be saying, look, to the extent there's a lack of trust or confidence in PLT, it's unfair to put that on PLT.
They're a victim of the circumstances over the last two weeks.
Is that a fair interpretation of that remark?
Yes.
Okay.
Thank you.
Can we turn Mr. Clerk to OPS 3010635?
Okay.
Now, these are your scribe notes.
Is that right, Superintendent?
That's correct.
For February 13th?
Yes.
And can we just go to the bottom of the first page, Mr. Clerk?
Okay, and stop right there.
Now, I just want to make sure I understand this.
You explained earlier the process for scribing and that it's intended that the scribe notes are the commander's notes.
Is that correct?
Is that right?
Could you say that again, please?
You explained yesterday that, you know, the intent in having a scribe is to maintain an accurate record of all decisions and communications while you're in command, correct?
It's as if I was writing them.
They're my personal notes.
Thank you.
You got there much more quickly than I could.
I appreciate that.
Now, at the end of every page, there's a sort of initials on the left-hand side and a signature on the right-hand side.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And is the signature on the right-hand side yours?
Yes.
And I take it it's the scribe's initials on the left-hand side of the page?
And am I correct that this is on every page, basically?
Yes.
And when do those signatures, when do you sign it?
We're to review them and make sure all the information is accurate and the signatures.
And we try and do it progressively to stay on top of it, depending on the momentum of everything, but as soon as possible that you can after.
Sure.
And if you need to make an entry after the signature has been made, do you identify it as such as a late entry, for example?
Yeah, you would have to do a notation or you do a supplemental.
Okay.
Thank you for that.
If I could turn to page 12, Mr. Clerk.
And I think we were here earlier.
Now, do you see we're still on February 13th, the time there, 1328, Superintendent?
Yes.
So this is during that, just to situate you, that same meeting that we were looking at, except previously we were looking at the chief's scribe's notes, and now we're looking at your scribe's notes, right?
Correct?
Yes.
Okay, so if we could scroll down a little bit, please.
Still going.
A little further down, please.
Sorry, and you can scroll to...
There is...
Thank you.
At 1331 is Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's comment.
This is a good move in right direction.
PLC's...
Sorry, can you turn to page 13?
Let me just make sure I'm in the right spot.
Yes.
Okay, perfect.
That was Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's comments.
And then your comment, EC at 1334.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And you say, I support what DC Ferguson...
There's a word missing.
I assume it should be said.
Going through plan now to approve.
This actually accelerates what we wanted to do in the next couple of days.
No concerns from my end.
And that's the comment that my friend, Mr. Odd, took you to earlier today.
And that's what reflects what you said in that meeting, correct?
That's correct.
If we go to the bottom of this page.
Stop right there, Mr. Clerk.
Thank you.
You'll see there's an edition here at the bottom of the page, and it's jammed in right at the bottom, seems to be a different pen.
Handwriting looks slightly different, and you have to write around your signature.
I don't know who wrote it, but do you see what I'm saying?
Yes.
It goes all the way around.
Whose handwriting is that?
That is still my scribe, the same scribe.
And can you explain why it appears to be a different pen and appears to be writing?
Around the signature and it's crammed right at the bottom of this page.
Yep.
So upon review, when we're reviewing it, I'm initialing it and realizing, so I get to that page, I go to the next.
It doesn't have the part that I'm looking for with regards to that comment.
So it has to be placed in there at the time.
Pen-wise, scribes will have different pens, but...
Okay.
I can't explain why it's a darker color.
Okay.
So, you'll agree with me that it appears this comment was made after this page was signed, right?
The way that it's kind of coming around your signature on the right-hand sign.
Do you accept that, sir?
After I signed?
Well, after that signature.
Oh, thank you, Mr. Clerk.
He's got his cursor right there.
See how you're writing around the signature?
To initial it?
Well, that's your signature.
That's correct.
Right?
So this is what I have.
The question I'm asking you is, looking at this, the impression I'm left with is that the signature was placed and then afterwards this comment was added.
I'm not saying that that's the case.
What's happened here is probably the comment is missing.
I need to have that comment put in and then I'm initialing it.
Okay.
And this would happen, you said, at the time.
If I accept your evidence or if I'm understanding you correctly, you're saying this would happen whenever it is that you're reviewing this note.
That's correct.
So it's not at the time the comment is made, but at some point later.
Correct.
And there's no time stamp next to when this comment would have been made.
Do you see that?
It would have been at that time.
At which time, sir?
The same time at the 1338 time period.
Okay.
But my notation...
Excuse me.
My notation that I wanted to have captured was not there.
So I asked my scribe to please put that notation in.
Okay.
And you believe you would have done that at the end of that day or possibly the following, given how busy you were at the time?
Absolutely.
Right.
And this comment here does not appear in the chief's scribe's notes.
So will you accept that this was not a comment made in the meeting with the chief and the deputy chiefs?
It's my comment.
It's my notation.
It's not a verbal comment.
It's a note that I'm making and an action that I would have taken.
Keeping in mind, I'm not in the same room with them.
We're having a Teams meeting, I believe.
What's up, people?
Getting ready to go live on the main channel for non-inquiry stuff.
Although there will be Canadian stuff in there.
Role.
Role in movement of trucks.
Can you read that last bit there?
I can pull up my...
I can refer to my...
What is this on?
This is the 13th.
And Mr. Clerk, can you just scroll down a bit and go to the left?
Like, go that way.
And scroll back up.
Sometimes there's page numbers, but there aren't on this one.
So it's the 13th, and it's the time, and page 13 of 38, if I'm looking at Police can only be present for safety.
Okay, so obviously here you're identifying a concern that you had articulated to yourself.
That this might be a ruse and that police should not be involved?
No, this is actually witnessed and can be confirmed by my whole command table who's present, including Inspector Dave Springer.
Sorry, Inspector Dave Springer is not being called to testify, and we don't have his evidence in this proceeding.
So unfortunately, I'm not able to do that.
But what I meant, okay, so you said this is not something that happened in the meeting with the chief.
That's what I was getting at.
So this happened at a separate meeting.
Is that right?
No, this is at that same time, but it's a notation that we're having a conversation between Dave Springer and myself.
I see.
Okay, so at the same time that the comment is only shared to Dave Springer, who is an OPP-POU commander, correct?
Yes, but he's now the deputy event commander in the position that he's in.
Okay, perfect.
I just wanted to make sure I had the right person in mind.
So you did not, and this was really the point I was trying to get at, I apologize if we got a bit offside, you did not share this concern with the chief or the deputy chiefs at the time.
At the time, it would not have been articulated at that time.
I believe I did have conversations with Deputy Ferguson at some point of saying, this is a risk with this.
Okay.
Just help me understand, though, because in the meeting you said, I support this, and then within a half hour, in a sidebar with Commander Springer, you say you're concerned that it's a ruse.
Right.
So it's a risk.
So I support it.
You support it, notwithstanding this comment.
And if it happens, that's very good.
There is always the chance, though, that that's not going to happen.
Fair enough.
And in fact, I think, and I'm coming to this, that the PLT's negotiations with Rideau and Sussex to move the trucks ended up, for example, not yielding any movement of trucks out of that intersection.
Correct?
I think there are probably multiple factors that potentially led to that, but yes, that did not happen.
It did not happen.
Okay.
It's open and it's gonna be icy.
So after you block it, the first step is to turn on the stone.
Can we go to page 21 of this document, please?
Okay.
Timestamp 1556.
Perfect.
This is a conversation between you and Chief Superintendent Party.
I just have a few minutes indulgence, Commissioner.
My apologies.
I just want to take you.
You're explaining to Chief Superintendent Party that you want increased PLT and negotiation on this date, correct?
on February 13th.
Thank you.
Yes.
Oh boy, five minutes.
Getting my notes in order.
Just give me one second so I can figure out what I can reasonably take you to.
This day's hearing, from what I've heard, has been more of the same from yesterday.
Alright, everybody, over to the other stream for the mainstream.
I will see you there.
Leave this one running so you can all...
Anybody who wants to continue watching this can do it.
Yes, because I believe there needs to be a good coordination piece from my standpoint with regards to the logistics of ensuring that it can effectively happen.
Yes.
Right.
And so that there were issues internally with communications to the service.
Is that fair?
At this point in time, respecting this.
Right, and having full appreciation of everything that is going on and the transition that I'm just coming into this new role trying to get things set up, there were some challenges, yes.
Okay, thank you very much.
Thank you.
Okay, thank you.
Those two minutes would have been useful.
The Ottawa Coalition.
Thank you very much, Commissioner.
Superintendent Bernier, my name is Paul Champ.
lawyer for the Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses and I just have some questions for you further to your testimony.
Just a couple of small things.
Superintendent, you were talking about the capacity of the Ottawa Police Service to monitor social media and gather intelligence in real time, so to speak.
So from social media, we may be talking about gathering information at that point.
But yes, I just wanted to clarify that it doesn't necessarily mean it's intelligence through social media.
Intelligence is a broad term.
You're gathering information.
Yes.
And that's done through generally the OPS Command Center at Green Bank.
That's where you guys do that?
At the time, that was one of our...
Only options to be able to gather that information is through the command centre.
They had some capabilities to do that.
We have evolved since then.
At that time, you had like a number of screens on the wall and people were what?
Monitoring social media?
No, I'm talking about how we look at social media within the Ottawa Police.
So how do you do it now?
How do you monitor live what's happening?
If there's something on Twitter or some other social media channel that could have important information to the Ottawa Police to respond to events or monitor events, how do you do that?
Post-convoy, we've stood up a team of investigators who are assigned to that open-source tasking.
So at the time of the Freedom Convoy...
The practice of the Ottawa Police was maybe not up to the event.
Is that fair to say?
Yes, sir.
Now, I want to ask you just a couple of questions about how the people of downtown Ottawa are feeling.
You, I think, suggested that the public sentiment throughout much of the convoy demonstration was that the Ottawa Police Service was not doing enough to address community concerns.
Would you agree with that?
That was what it seemed to be the public feeling?
I would say that's fair.
And you would have understood, I gather, Superintendent, that residents and businesses were feeling a great deal of frustration during that convoy demonstration?
Yes.
And those frustrations were completely understandable?
Yes.
Around the enforcement messaging, the Ottawa Police for a period of time was putting out messaging like, oh, you know, this many tickets this day, this many tickets.
You disagreed, it's my understanding, with that enforcement messaging because you felt it was counterproductive because the enforcement really wasn't having an effect on the convoy demonstration.
Is that right?
That's correct.
So what kind of messaging to the community would have been appropriate?
In the circumstances during that period, like, I don't know, hold on tight, we'll see what we can do?
Or what would have been the proper messaging to the public who were experiencing those daily stresses and horns and trucks and threats and harassment?
What was the proper messaging from the Ottawa Police to the community they serve?
So my comments with regards to that surrounds the approach that I was taking when I came in at that time.
That because we're going to be transitioning away from that type of messaging and being very clear on it's time for you to leave and focusing the messaging around that this is over.
And obviously that combined with our PLT approach, that is because it aligned with the plan that I was bringing into place.
Unfortunately, prior, there was no plan.
To end it.
Right.
So that would potentially lead to some frustrations within the community.
For sure.
I've got a few questions for you, but I'll just maybe ask the hearing clerk to get a video ready for me.
We'll ask a question about it in about three or four questions, if you could just pull it up and have it ready.
It's HRF000274.
So, during the final operation, the final plan that was finally started being executed on February 16th, 17th, through to the 20th, Superintendent, it started out with messaging.
That was the first phase of messaging to the protesters that it's time to leave.
Messaging and PLT outreach.
Right.
There was a notice to demonstrators that you started circulating.
Is that right?
That is correct.
Advising them that they're going to be arrested at some point in the near future if they didn't depart?
Yes, that was potentially an option.
There was also language in that notice to demonstrators about, I think the wording is this, the Federal Emergencies Act allows for the regulation or prohibition of travel to, from, or within any specified areas.
This means that anyone coming to Ottawa for the purpose of joining the ongoing demonstration is breaking the law.
I gather that the purpose of that messaging was also to advise others, because I think that was the Wednesday, if I recall, or the Thursday.
Don't come into Ottawa this weekend.
The party's over.
Correct.
And that if people did come in, they very likely would be arrested.
Yes.
Now, as you moved closer to that final week into the Saturday when the major enforcement action began, Was the Ottawa police sort of monitoring social media to follow what the protesters were doing or how they were responding to the Ottawa police messaging, the notices and so forth, that they should be leaving the city?
We unfortunately at that time didn't have a maturity level of that capability of open source monitoring.
And that's hence the reason why I said that we have made some adjustments since.
So the Ottawa police at the time didn't have the capacity to do live monitoring of social media in an effective way that could assist operations.
We were probably doing it in a very relatively immature level.
It was not a great capacity to do that.
Fair enough.
We heard evidence on the first day of hearing Superintendent Bernier from Miss Natalie Carrier, who was the executive director of the Vanier BIA, saying that she had been following social media and saw that the truckers were getting together to go down and do a drive-by at the Ottawa airport.
And so she contacted her, Ottawa police contact, saying, do you guys know this is going on?
They're like, why are you hearing that?
And she's like, well, I'm looking on social media.
So at that time, that was, unfortunately, the level of capacity at that time.
Yes.
Mind you, the information, whether it came from the citizen or another avenue, did get to us.
I was aware of that.
Okay.
You were able to, excuse me.
No worries.
So then getting, going to the end of the protest again, the last week and the days coming up to the last weekend, the auto police is doing the messaging.
Clearly, through the PLTs, the notice to demonstrators, it's time to leave or else there'll be enforcement action.
Was the Ottawa police contending with or observing that there was a lot of counter-messaging, I guess we can say, online by the protesters or those associated with the protests saying, don't leave, hold the line?
Through our media section, they were able to capture some sentiments, some because I did have a media person with me every day, every time of the whole time that I was there.
And every so often I would be asking, what is the sentiment?
What are you seeing out there?
So what that citizen would have been able to monitor, I would ask that our media person do the same thing to the best of their ability.
She had a lot of other taskings at the same time.
Right.
And I gather, Superintendent, that any messages that protesters or anyone else who was saying to protesters or others to come into downtown to come I was wondering if we could put up HRF 000274.
So this is a TikTok video that was put out late February 16th, after the notice of demonstrators.
It was a message sent out on social media to the demonstrators by...
Mr. Barber, who's one of the individuals I believe we'll be hearing from, and his counsel, Mr. Wilson, if we could just...
Keith, this is our legal representation out here.
He's got a little bit of info for you for the letters that have been being left on everybody's doorsteps by Ottawa City Police today.
This is important information everybody needs to get this out.
Keith?
Hi there.
I'm legal counsel to the not-for-profit Freedom Convoy.
The federal government released a new...
Proclamation last night under the Emergencies Act, and the legal wording of it is clear.
It doesn't say what the police are telling you, it says.
It clearly, the legal proclamation that was issued by the federal government continues to allow for peaceful protests.
It allows for peaceful assembly.
It allows for Canadians who are concerned about their charter rights and who want to bring their children to participate in the restoration of their future rights to come to Ottawa.
The order says that you can only not come to Ottawa if you're going to disrupt international trade, disrupt critical infrastructure, or engage in acts of violence.
No one involved in this freedom movement, none of the truckers, support any of those things.
So if you're thinking about doing those things, don't come and give your head a shake.
We're about peaceful protests.
This emergency order from the federal government.
Does not restrict Canadians' rights of peaceful assembly.
However, what we can see on the ground here is the police look to be gearing up.
It looks like the federal government is going to tell the police to go and use violence against lawful protesters.
And one way to stop that from happening is Canadians who are concerned about their rights and government overreach to come to Ottawa as soon as you can get here and stand with the truckers.
We believe the police are reluctant to follow this.
If they follow what the federal government's telling the police to do, it will be an illegal order.
It will be unlawful.
So if you come and stand with the protesters, it will make it harder for the police to act on what they're being told to do.
And it's really important that freedom-loving Canadians get to Ottawa as soon as possible to stand with the truckers.
We'll be here, guys.
Remember, peace is the only way.
So, Superintendent Bernier, messages like that, that telling people to come downtown to confront the police, stand with the protesters, to make it harder for the police to do their jobs, I gather that kind of messaging was making it much more difficult for the police to do their job.
I don't know what impact this had.
I don't think there was necessarily a surge of influx of people in lead-up to the 18th.
But our investigative teams would be reviewing all this stuff now and doing a thorough investigation to find out if there are any follow-up action that could be taken on such.
But at the time?
It may have been nice to be able to track that information.
We may have.
I can't say one way or another.
Thank you very much, Superintendent Bernier.
Thank you.
Next, call on the Ontario Provincial Police.
Okay, next call on the JCCF and Democracy Fund Group.
Sorry about this.
I'm a little taken by surprise by a second or two here.
I'm just trying to pull up my questions, which is taking its time.
maybe i'll just grab my laptop All right.
Good afternoon, Superintendent Bernier.
I'm Rob Kittredge, counsel for the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms.
Police have common law powers to exclude the public from an area in which a police operation is underway.
Is that correct?
Yes.
And those powers could have been used in the clearing of the protests in Ottawa, couldn't they?
Yes.
In fact, you planned on using those powers to clear the protests, and the federal emergency declaration did not significantly impact your planning.
Is that right?
I wouldn't exactly say that.
Very hard to know what it would have been like without it.
Right.
Your interview summary does say that, but I'll leave that answer as is.
You would have carried out the planned police operation, whether the government declared a public order emergency or not, though.
Isn't that right?
Correct.
The planning and the concept of operation was already in place, and I didn't have any knowledge that an emergency act was going to be put in place.
Council for Canada earlier on today put it to you that, and I'm paraphrasing a bit, Do you remember that question?
Yes.
That is correct.
Would you agree that the federal emergency power to create exclusion zones may have been helpful to police, but it was not necessary?
Once again, I think it was beneficial.
Beneficial, but not necessary.
Correct.
Thank you.
Council for Canada showed you a letter dated February 17, 2022, earlier on today, which appeared to be a letter from OPP Commissioner Karik to tow truck drivers.
You had never seen that letter before it was shown to you today, is that right?
Correct.
You have no direct knowledge of whether that letter was ever even sent to tow truck drivers, do you?
Correct.
And until you were shown the letter today, you didn't believe that the police had used the powers granted under the Emergencies Act to compel towing services, isn't that right?
Correct.
Myself and my whole command table.
Right.
Your planning to clear the protests didn't rely on the emergency power to compel tow truck services, correct?
That was my belief at the time.
All right.
And in fact, tow trucks were already on their way to Ottawa as of February 13th, weren't they?
That was the information that was provided through Inspector Springer from Kirk Richardson.
Great.
You briefly mentioned when speaking to Council for Canada that you personally saw tow trucks arriving in Canada.
When did those tow trucks arrive?
Definitely well before the 17th, before the final day before going to action Right.
So by the time that February 17th letter was sent, if it ever was sent, the tow trucks were already in Ottawa, weren't they?
That would be my observation because I would look out and I'd see the trucks out there.
Right.
Would you agree that the federal emergency power to compel towing services may have been helpful to police and may be beneficial to police, but it wasn't necessary to enable police to clear the protests, was it?
Yes.
However, with a caveat that we were having challenges.
We were having a hard time up until that time on the 13th.
So prior to the 13th, I would have said we could have used...
Some help with that.
But as things materialized on the 13th, I was satisfied that we were good.
And you were satisfied that we were good.
You're satisfied that the federal emergency power to compel tow trucks wasn't necessary.
Correct.
Thank you.
Interim Chief Bell testified pretty emphatically, and I quote, in the absence of the invocation of the Emergencies Act, the OPS, the OPP, the RCMP, as part of a unified command, were going to clear the protest.
Would you agree with that statement?
Could you repeat that question again, please?
In the absence of the invocation of the Emergencies Act, the OPS, the OPP...
The RCMP, as part of a unified command, were going to clear the protests.
Do you agree with that statement?
Yes.
Numerous other OPP and OPS witnesses have testified that the federal emergency powers may have been helpful to police in various ways, but they were not necessary.
Would you agree with that?
Yes.
Thank you very much.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
next call on the CCLA uh yes good afternoon commissioner I'm not sure if you can see me.
My name is Eva Krajewska and I'm Councillor for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
Yes, we can see you.
Go ahead.
Perfect, thank you.
Superintendent, when you took over as Event Commander on February 10th, that's what I understand from your evidence today?
Yes.
And your task was to prepare an operational plan?
Yes.
And at that time between February 10th and February 13th, when you were preparing the operational plan, was it your assessment that the OPS had the necessary legal tools and powers to execute that operational plan?
Yes.
And it was not your assessment that you required any additional legal tools or any additional legal powers?
I would say they were beneficial, but to say necessary, I would say no.
And at no time prior to February 14th did you communicate to any of your superiors that you required additional legal tools or legal powers?
That is correct.
Okay.
Thank you.
Those are all my questions.
Thank you.
Now I'd like to call on the National Police Federation.
Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
We have no questions for this witness.
Okay.
Next to the province of Saskatchewan.
Good afternoon, Commissioner.
My name is Mitch McAdam, and I'm one of the lawyers for the government of Saskatchewan.
The areas that we were going to question this witness about have already been covered by others, so we have no questions.
Thank you.
Province of Alberta.
Good afternoon, Commissioner.
Good afternoon, Superintendent Bernier.
My name is Stephanie Bowes for the Province of Alberta.
One of the consequences of being later on the list is that all my questions have been asked and answered.
Thank you.
Okay.
the Ottawa Police Service please.
Good afternoon, Superintendent.
Good afternoon.
For the record, my name is Jessica Barrow and I am counsel for the Ottawa Police Service.
We heard evidence yesterday from you, Superintendent, about your extensive background in incident command.
Does that background involve planning for large-scale events?
As part of the command training, yes.
Okay.
And we've heard testimony from both you, I believe, and others that gathering intelligence is an important part of that planning process.
Do I have that correct?
Yes.
Is there more than one source of intelligence that would be relevant to the planning process?
Yes.
Could you tell us a little bit about what those sources might be?
So once again, there's a difference between information and intelligence.
A lot of information can be gathered from multiple sources, from human sources, open source social media, other police techniques of gaining information.
It's the processing and analyzing of that information that will turn it into intelligence.
And once again, intelligence can be gathered from multiple agencies and then all brought together.
to provide hopefully the most wholesome picture of what you're going to be faced with with risks and challenges and threats that could help you in your planning appropriately.
Great.
We've also heard considerable evidence about the use of PLTs as well.
What is your understanding with respect to their role in assisting planners leading up to an event?
Often used proactively early, as early as possible to connect with groups that would be involved, organizers, to open the dialogue and share information from our side to ensure that they're well informed as to what is lawful, what's not lawful, and as well as hopefully garnish some information to facilitate.
Those lawful event, a protest or demonstration that they would like to hold.
And it stands true to demonstrations as well as events.
Because not every event downtown Ottawa or in Ottawa is a protest or a demonstration.
There's a very big benefit to engaging PLT to develop that relationship.
Okay.
I want to take you through a couple of the concerns that you've identified both in your witness statement as well as during your testimony, specifically as it relates to the planning process leading up to the convoy's arrival.
I believe you indicated, and obviously correct me if I'm incorrect, that you developed those concerns about the scope of the event after reading the January 27th Hendon report, attending the January 27th Hendon call.
As well as the internal OPS meeting that occurred on that date as well.
Is that right?
That's correct.
Prior to the convoy's arrival, did you read any of the other Hendon reports?
Prior to the convoy arrival, not on the weekend.
And upon the return back to work, I would be having a look at them when they came in.
As of the date of the 27th, when you expressed the concerns that we noted earlier in your testimony, had you read any other Hendon reports besides the one on the 27th?
No, it was the first one that I received.
And once again, it was something new.
I did not know that this existed.
Right.
And had you attended any previous Hendon calls prior to the 27th?
No.
Did you have any involvement in discussions with PLT at that time?
No, not in my role.
What is your understanding about the level of information Inspector Lucas would have had at that time as compared to the level of information you had at that time in relation to the convoys arrival?
I would imagine it would be relatively the same because on the call that you referenced on the 27th of the afternoon, the whole intelligence team Was on that call with Inspector Lucas and Staff Sergeant Kennedy.
So my sentiment was, or my feeling was, that they more than likely are sharing all that information.
Were you privy to the information that they were discussing specifically?
No.
Okay.
You indicated in your witness statement that there appeared to be a disconnect between the intelligence and the planning.
And that the intelligence may have been impacted by the fact that intelligence is not usually involved in gathering intelligence on protests.
Is that right?
From my involvement and my experience within the Ottawa Police, our intelligence unit has been more focused on that higher-level terrorist threat, national security level of threat assessment versus a risk assessment.
So it's I would say the Hendon report is an amalgamation of open source, a lot more information, as well as intelligence, a mix of the two.
So that's why it was somewhat kind of a different perspective than what I'd been used to seeing in previous events in Ottawa.
Right.
Do you have any direct knowledge about whether that was in fact impacting the Intelligence Department's ability to connect the dots?
I don't know.
Okay.
In relation to your examination with former Chief Slowly's counsel, there was an issue as it relates to whether former Chief Slowly was...
Issuing operational directions during your time as event commander.
Do you remember that discussion?
Yes.
Okay.
And I think the suggestion that was put to you was that you were free to voice any concerns you had around those operational directions to Chief Slowly and that he would be receptive to that.
Is that a fair assessment of that exchange?
Yes.
Okay.
I just want to bring you to...
OPS 10443.
I just want to, just to situate you, it looks at the top like there's a list of attendees and it appears that your name is on it.
Is that correct?
Yes.
And I know it doesn't have a date on it, so perhaps if we just scroll down a little bit and we look, yeah, that's great.
Where you're under at NCRCC now, there's a statement, an update from you.
Does that situate you in terms of around what time frame this would have been?
So I'm going to think this is around the 12th, 13th.
So were you the event commander then at the time of this meeting?
Based on what I'm reading here, the fact that I'm in progress of setting up the command table, I would be the event commander.
Okay.
Can we scroll please down to the bottom of page two?
That's perfect.
Thank you.
And just if we start under the first redaction, there's a question being posed by John Steinbeck about closing bridges.
And then under it, you see Lucas is saying not going to close it right now.
Do you remember this conversation?
Yes.
And do you remember what Lucas's plan was in relation to the closures that we're seeing being discussed here?
So, what it had to do is coming up with mitigation strategies because of the lawfulness of, at the time of closing down a bridge, we had a plan that we were working with our traffic section to reduce the flow in and control and divert away from the downtown core.
Okay.
And if you look under that, we see a comment.
There's one by Bell, and then under that we have slowly...
It says bridge closed, wants it done, close everything, not debating.
Do you recall that comment being made during that meeting?
Yes.
And what did you take that comment to mean?
That he wanted the bridge closed.
Irrespective of Lucas's plan?
Okay.
Correct.
I want to move on.
Thank you, Mr. Clerk.
We can take that down.
We heard in your earlier examination about the steps that you took to set up an integrated command table.
I wonder if you could just explain to us a little bit about how you selected each of the experts, I think you called them, at that table.
In terms of the qualifications that you were looking for to select that person.
So the different elements, do you want me to go through the different elements?
Perhaps you could just give us a general idea of how you decided who to put in those seats.
So I know the people who are in our service and within the different sections.
And when I'm talking about the intelligence, when I'm looking at investigations, when I'm looking at public order, when I'm looking at media, I know people in the organization that are...
Very effective and good in their job and have the ability either in a position or through their own personal abilities to carry out what I'm going to be expecting from them.
Some of it may require rank and some others require just the KSAs and the abilities to do it.
Perhaps you could just explain what KSAs are.
Knowledge, skills and abilities.
Great, thank you.
Were all of the officers you selected from OPS?
No.
So why did you select officers from other services as well if at this time there was no unified command?
I was trying to get the best.
To be around.
And at the end of the day, a police officer is a police officer and we were doing an integrated model.
So as far as I was concerned and the direction that I had, or sorry, what I'd requested in approval from Deputy Chief Ferguson was get who you need.
Hence the reason, the choice for the deputy commander that I had.
I looked at the province for looking for who I'm going to need to have next to me.
What was your view at that time, once the integrated command table was set up, as to the quality of the integration between the various services that were present?
From the point that I had come in as event commander, it was obviously an adjustment period, but it was a very cohesive group and very high-functioning group.
Okay, those are my questions.
Thanks very much, Superintendent.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Okay, any re-examination?
I have a few, if I may.
Okay, go ahead.
Superintendent, my friend, counsel from the Acting for Canada asks you about the availability of tow trucks after you made the initial arrangement on around the 13th of February.
There's a document I want to show you and ask if you can tell us what it is.
It's OPS3014453.
If we go to page 59. So could you take a look at this document?
And if we go, first of all, if we go down to the bottom of the page, do you see three signatures?
That is correct.
Do you recognize these signatures?
Yes.
So if we go back to the top of the page, what is this document?
It's the concept of operation of the tow action, escort, and security and identification of vehicles.
Is this one of the towing sub-plan to the main plan?
On the 17th?
Yes.
Now if we go to page 65, please.
So this appears to list some equipments.
Can you tell us about this?
Yes.
Listed towing resource equipment, 12 heavy wreckers, ability to remove highway tractors, two tilt and load, ability to remove farm tractors, utility trailers, equipment materials.
Two highway tractors, bobtails.
Can we go further down?
Equipment prep truck contains equipment necessary for tow and recovery.
Three front-end loaders.
This will assist with the movement and positioning of trucks for tow.
Ability to assist with loader equipment and materials.
Sorry, go ahead.
No, sorry.
What is your understanding of the availability of these equipments listed for the action starting on the 18th?
We're ready to go.
Now, did you understand those vehicles were drawn from the 34 vehicles that you told us about earlier?
That was my understanding.
This was all prepared with Kirk Richardson and our Ottawa police traffic.
In cross-examination by counsel for the former chief, Mr. Currie asked you why, aside from your verbal conversations with Inspector Lucas and Superintendent Drummond, that you did not take further steps to escalate your concerns about the bizarre disconnect.
Remember being asked those questions?
Is this having to do with the totals?
No, no, sorry.
I'm moving on to a different topic.
Okay, then rephrase the question then, please.
I'm now asking you about questions put to you by counsel for the former chief.
Mr. Curry asked you why, apart from your conversations with Inspector Lucas and Superintendent Drummond, you did not take further steps to escalate your concerns about the bizarre disconnect between the intelligence and planning.
Do you recall being asked those questions?
Yes.
And you said...
Sorry, go ahead.
And you said that you didn't have complete access to intelligence and you deferred to those who did have access and were assigned to respond.
Correct.
You also said that Deputies Ferguson and Bell were accountable to the former chief.
Is that what you said?
Is this when I was testifying with counsel from former chief slowly?
That's right.
Yes.
So I want to ask you in the context of responding to a major event.
Why did you think it was appropriate for officers who were not assigned specific duties to defer to those who were assigned?
I'm not quite sure I understand what your question is.
Could you...
Okay, let me try again.
I understand your response to Mr. Curry's question to be that you defer to those who were assigned specific duties to respond.
Those who had access to complete intelligence.
Those are the sections that are responsible for doing those duties within the Ottawa Police.
That did not fall within my purview at the time.
So I believe in previous testimony, I may have spoken to this, that we have sections within the Ottawa Police that have the responsibility for these events.
And I deferred to those sections.
Trusting that they have all the information, intelligence, and all the right people are in those sections for that.
Thank you.
Those are my questions.
Okay.
Well, thank you.
I just have a couple of short questions that some of it is just clarification.
In response to questions of the Ottawa Police Service, you talked about a...
The intelligence teams being more concerned about certain kinds of threats than other kinds of threats?
I just want to make sure I've got that correct.
It would probably be best articulated by an intelligence officer from the section, but traditionally our intelligence unit is at the higher level of...
Matters that they would be looking into.
National security, organized crime, you know, threats of that nature in the lines with ITAC and that type of thing.
And that, your observation was with the...
Reviewing the Hendon report, you saw that it was broader and covered areas of, and I don't know if I got my note right, more public order problems.
Is that what you were saying?
No.
So I think what I was referring to is that it seemed to be a combination of open source.
And I think maybe if I can qualify your previous question as well, is traditionally our intelligence unit was not necessarily very much into the open source.
Whereas now, we've learned a lot and we are moving more into that to ensure that we have that aspect.
I found that the Hendon Report was a broader source of information and intelligence.
Okay, and then the Another question I had, this was an answer, I think, to the GCCF, and you were talking about, you were asked about whether a common law of powers, it was in respect to the common law of powers being less well-defined,
and even if you, a court found after the fact that you exceeded your powers, you still would have.
Dealt with the occupation.
Do you remember that answer?
Yes, I do.
And I guess, what's your concern about having exceeded your powers?
Is that a concern to you if the courts, after the fact, find you've exceeded your powers?
What does that mean to you?
So what I would be saying is that based on all the information...
In the situation at hand, that we would be operating in good faith.
And I would not have done it if it exceeded our powers.
If we were doing it, it's because I felt that we were well within our powers to do it.
I guess the conversation with regards to courts is that after the fact, it may come under scrutiny.
To determine if it was lawful to do based on all the circumstances, I would have a very big responsibility and I would need to be accountable for articulating all the reasons why so it could withstand reviewing court afterwards.
And I take it you wouldn't have been happy if a court found you had exceeded your powers?
It would defeat the purpose and bring us to disrepute, yes.
One of the things again at the beginning of your testimony and this goes back to your position you held or the function you held before you were the incident commander.
You talked about processing or cataloging the plans.
Yes.
Did you, and I think you answered this, but did you ever find a plan or an element of a plan that would encompass the possibility of protesters overstaying the weekend?
No, I did not.
And we heard a testimony earlier from another witness about whether there was an opportunity after the weekend.
I believe it was reduce the footprint that was missed.
Do you have any knowledge or comment about that, or do you agree or disagree?
I'm not quite sure what they're referring to.
If it's the week following the actual weekend event, initial weekend event, I'm not familiar with the window that would have happened.
I think it referred to the ability to reduce the footprint if they had acted then.
You don't have any knowledge of that?
I do not.
Okay.
Thank you very much.
It's very helpful.
So that completes your evidence.
Thank you, Your Honour.
Thank you.
So we're now ready to proceed with the next witness.
And I think probably we should get started and have the break later on.
And who's going to be leading this witness from Commission Council?
We'll just have five minutes to get the witness settled, if that's okay.
Okay, five minutes to get the witness settled.
Okay, five minutes.
We'll rise and come back in five minutes.
The Commission is in resource for five minutes.
La Comisión de Véper, 5 minutes.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Order a lot.
The Commission is reconvened.
La Commissione apprend.
The commission would like to call Superintendent Robert Drummond.
Superintendent Drummond, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
I wish to affirm.
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
Robert Drummond?
D-R-U-M-M-O-N-D.
Do you solemnly affirm that the evidence to be given by you to this commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
I do.
Thank you.
Welcome.
Good afternoon, Mr. Commissioner.
Go ahead.
Thank you.
Good afternoon, Superintendent Drummond.
How are you?
How are you, Mrs. Rodriguez?
Good.
Nice to see you again.
You had several interviews with Commission Council in September and October.
Do you recall that?
Yes, I do.
And we generated a witness summary from those interviews, and you've had a chance to review that summary, correct?
I did.
And do you have any corrections to make to your summary at this time?
No.
Okay, great.
And if we can just pull it up, it's WTS 6050.
And can you confirm that is your witness summary?
Yes.
Okay, wonderful.
So we will have that entered into evidence.
Thank you.
And I understand you're, in fact, acting superintendent.
Is that correct?
Correct, yes.
Now, for simplicity, is it okay if I just refer to you as superintendent, Drummond?
Yes, that's fine.
And my understanding is that the rank of superintendent is one below deputy chief.
Is that right?
Correct.
And how many superintendents are in the OPS?
Approximately.
Eight.
Eight of them.
Okay, thanks.
And I understand you assumed a formal role in the response to the convoy on February 7 when Superintendent Patterson asked you to be the PLT and POU representative within the incident command system.
That's correct.
Can you explain what that role entails, the one that you took on that day?
It was to oversee the two units and oversee their operations.
And whatever logistical requirements they had as well.
And I had the lead for both sections reporting into me, Michelle Mary from the POU unit and John Ferguson from PLT.
And is it fair to say that the role also entailed ensuring coordination between those two groups?
Correct.
And to also coordinate with the event commander, Mark Patterson, Superintendent Mark Patterson.
Right.
So you reported to Superintendent Mark Patterson, is that right?
Correct.
Now, I want to start first with February 8, which is the day that Mr. Kanellakis, City Manager of the City of Ottawa, met with some protester, with actually Mr. Morazo, at City Hall.
And you're aware of that meeting, correct?
Yes.
Okay.
So I want to start there.
We'll start at OPS 408527.
And this is an email thread.
And if I can go to page two of this document.
So you see there on February 7th at 8:48 p.m.
There we are.
And it's an email from Superintendent Patterson to Acting Deputy Chief Bell, sorry Deputy Chief Bell, and saying PLT members continued their conversation with, and that's redacted, but I understand that's Tom Razzle.
Correct.
This evening, he has requested a meeting with an elected official or city manager level member.
He has indicated that if we coordinate a meeting around noon tomorrow, that he could facilitate the removal of trucks unknown number.
These conversations will continue tomorrow morning.
May I ask given your relationship with city officials that you provide a name that would be willing to participate in this discussion.
I know this is a vague ask, but this is what Rob was provided.
Rob, hope I captured this properly.
Now, you'll see you're cc'd in that.
So when Superintendent Drummond says Rob, he's referring to you, right?
Yeah, Superintendent Patterson.
Sorry, Patterson.
That's right.
And he says, and if we go up a little bit, and right, so then Deputy Chief Bell responds, I will contact the city first thing this morning to see if they will sit down with the group.
So you were provided this information, according to that first email that we saw, you were the one who was provided with this information, right?
That Mr. Morazo wanted to meet with a city official.
Yes, from John Ferguson, Staff Sergeant John Ferguson.
Okay.
And so this was a sort of, you know, if he's able to meet with a city official...
Then he will attempt to negotiate movement of trucks out of the Rideau and Sussex area.
I don't know if it was necessarily defined at that point as Rideau and Sussex, but the request was to meet with the city official in exchange to try to help move some trucks out of the area.
Okay.
And in the witness summary that we just looked at, you provided a bit more background and you said that moving these trucks was being considered because there was space available on Wellington.
Is that right?
Yes.
Okay.
Why did you understand the protesters at Rideau and Sussex wanting to move to the Wellington area?
They wanted to be closer to Parliament Hill.
And it also, from our perspective, would have helped shrink the footprint and open up that road.
And why was that important to open up that road?
It's a main artery in the City of Ottawa at Rideau and Sussex.
It's the main access.
It's a bus route.
It's emergency access for emergency vehicles.
It's access to the Rideau Centre.
It was a main area that we wanted to try to get opened up but equally there were lots of other areas we wanted to get opened up as well.
Our goal was to try to help the move and by reducing the footprint that would also help us.
And is it fair to say that this move would have been seen as helpful to OPS?
Yes, I mean ultimately we wanted people to leave and to vacate those roads period.
But in the meantime, as part of a negotiation strategy to try to reduce the footprint, yes, we were interested in moving them.
Okay.
And if we can go to the first page.
Up more, please.
Keep going up to the very top.
Oh, I see.
Do we know what they want to talk about, Mark?
Okay.
Yeah.
So there is another email in which...
You say that this was the ask and you're going to see if you can get a private meeting.
So this was seen as being helpful to the PLT group that wanted to essentially clear that area, right?
Yes, there's also a negotiating strategy and a good faith move to negotiate with them.
And Mr. Kanellakis testified last week.
That when PLT attended City Hall for this meeting, which did eventually take place, that he was told by the PLT officers who were there with Mr. Morazzo that communications had broken down with protest leaders and that they weren't communicating anymore with the PLTs.
And he said that this was a significant issue in their ability to continue to try to negotiate on the grounds in terms of the things that they needed to do and that they had asked to meet with someone from the city as a show of good faith.
Were you aware that communications between PLT and protest groups had broken down at this point in time?
No, we were continuously communicating.
They might have been referring to the group specifically at Rideau and Sussex.
There were challenges with that group, but the PLT group still went daily to talk to them.
Okay.
And we talked to all, like we talked to as many groups as we possibly could during that time period.
Okay.
But this was still seen as something positive for PLT to build trust with the protest.
Okay.
And I want to take you to Staff Sergeant John Ferguson's notes.
And you were saying he was the head of the PLT at the time and he reported into you.
Is that right?
Correct.
Okay.
So if I can take you to OPS 3014568.
And if I can take you to page 36. So these are his notes of the discussions.
And actually, we can go up to 35 so we can see a little bit of the context.
So he says at 1929, contact Superintendent Drummond advises him of the request to meet.
Time sensitive.
He asked what city official meant.
And then if we see at 1933, contact Superintendent Drummond.
If we go down a little bit more, I clarified the request with Sergeant Lee.
Marazzo wanted the city manager or an elected official.
So that's the context in which now the notation at 2044 happens.
At 2044, it says contacted by Dr. Collins.
And who did you understand Dr. Collins to be?
He's a doctor with the...
OPP, Behavioral Science Unit.
So he's with the OPP?
Yes.
Okay.
I believe he has a private practice as well, but he does work with the OPP.
Okay, so he works with the OPP.
Okay.
And it says, update provided, discussions about city official strategy, agreement that this was win-win, also face-saving.
Do you know...
Do you recall Staff Sergeant Ferguson conveying to you that he saw the city's involvement as a win-win?
I think it was a win in the sense that we were acting good faith to move forward with negotiations.
So if we didn't assist them with negotiations, it wasn't a win for either side.
PLT is to try to bring both sides together to come to a solution.
And that's what we were working on there.
I don't know the specifics.
I didn't speak to Dr. Collins at that point myself.
Right.
I did run into Dr. Collins during the protest, but not specifically about this.
Right.
But you were in contact with Staff Sergeant Ferguson, right?
And so he's saying that there's agreement that this was win-win between him and Dr. Collins.
Yes.
So did he share those views with you as well?
I don't recall.
Staff Sergeant Ferguson's telling me at that point about Dr. Collins.
He may have.
I just don't recall.
And did he ever convey to you that he saw the city's involvement as face-saving for the OPS?
I think it was a positive thing, yes.
It was a positive thing to move forward with the negotiations, yes.
Okay, and do you have any sense for what he means by that?
Well, I think prior to that, there have been a number of scenarios with PLT where they had not been able to move forward due to various reasons.
I think this was something they wanted to show good faith and move forward on an agreement with the protesters.
Okay.
And at the bottom of page 38, if we can go to page 38, it says meeting occurring.
So this is now the meeting is taking place and Staff Sergeant Ferguson is making notes that the meeting is happening.
Meeting occurring, group looking for a possible exit strategy.
Is that what you understood the purpose of the meeting with Mr. Kanellakis to be on February 8th?
I don't know if I would refer to it as an exit strategy.
It was a meeting to discuss options for them to move out of certain areas.
Okay.
And specifically, when you say certain areas, we're talking about the Rideau and Sussex area here, right?
Yes.
Okay.
Because we heard Mr. Kanellakis say last week that the meeting was about trying to see if the protesters could get a meeting with the mayor.
That's what he understood the meeting to be.
But for OPS, the meeting was in exchange for facilitating a meeting with the city manager.
Mr. Morazzo would agree to try and get those areas cleared and move to Wellington.
Is that right?
Correct.
Okay.
So the meeting did take place, and according to your witness summary, you indicate that on February 8, you and Superintendent Patterson had a call about these negotiations and that this was reported up to Deputy Chief Bell and possibly Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson.
Correct.
And in your witness statement, you also say that you do not recall whether at the time PPS was notified of these negotiations, although it may have been brought up at the NCRCC where the PPS had representation.
Correct.
I personally didn't contact PPS at that point, but we did have a PPS representative at the NCRCC.
Okay.
And did you receive any correspondence about any concerns that PPS might have had at this time, February 8, about moving vehicles to Wellington?
The 8th, no.
Later that week, yes.
Okay.
So, well, maybe I can refresh your memory.
If we can go to OPS three zeros.
Actually, we're in the same dock, 14568, just on page 39. So Rito-Sussex contacted by Sergeant Lee, Morazo-Canelakis meeting complete.
Morazo to attend Rito-Sussex to work on moving, opening that intersection.
Contacted Superintendent Drummond, updated re-meeting.
Advised him that Morazo was working on Rito-Sussex.
He asked if we were going to get other roadways, Wellington.
I indicated that I understood the priority was Rito-Sussex.
Will if City promised anything.
And then if we go to 1538, rather 1554, email received from Superintendent Drummond re-PPS response to Wellington Street vehicle relocation plan.
Do you see that there?
I do.
I do see that.
Do you recall receiving an email?
From PPS regarding the response to the Wellington Strategy Vehicle Relocation Plan?
There were a lot of email during that time period.
I don't remember that specific one, but if there is an email, I don't doubt it may have occurred.
I just remember being later with Superintendent Larry Brookson reaching out and speaking to us closer to the day that we did the moving.
There may have been an email at that point.
Like I said, it may have come through the NCRCC and then come back by email.
Okay.
Is there an email?
I haven't seen an email.
There probably is, but in the thousands of documents, it may be hard to pinpoint the email, but it's very possible.
And if we just go down a little bit more, 1606.
Staff Sergeant Ferguson says, contact Inspector Lucas, read PPS email to discuss their concerns.
So this seems to suggest that the email that was sent to you had concerns from PPS.
Do you recall any concerns being expressed by PPS at this time?
The ones I do remember were about more vehicles being on Wellington closer to Parma Hill.
They were not in favour of that.
But I'll be honest, I remember that happening later in the week.
I don't remember it that day, but I could be wrong about that.
Maybe it was that day.
Okay, so if there were any concerns, it was about the trucks being on Wellington.
Yes.
And what was the concern specifically about trucks being on Wellington that you recall?
I don't think they wanted more of them there.
They were concerned about having more vehicles close up to Parliament Hill.
Okay.
They were not interested in having more protesters closer to the hill.
Okay, and why was that?
Because they've been there for a period of time.
We were trying to shrink the footprint that may not have met up with their, you know, their goals at that point.
Okay, so they didn't raise any specific security concerns about that arrangement?
I don't remember this email that you're referring to, so I'd have to look at the email to know what was written in it.
But you know that eventually PPS did express concerns, right?
And so did those concerns include any safety concerns?
Well, they had concerns about protesters, period, being close to the Hill.
All of those issues were security concerns for them.
Okay.
Now, in your witness summary, you indicate that OPS facilitated but did not attend the meeting with Mr. Kanellakis and Mr. Morazzo.
Correct.
What's the basis for that understanding?
That's what I was told by John Ferguson.
Okay.
So Mr. Kanellakis testified that he initially met one-on-one with Mr. Morazzo, and then afterwards the PLT members joined that meeting, and there was a meeting with everybody together.
I have no information that occurred, and I know from the PLT members that I spoke to, we don't know who he's referring to.
Okay.
But you don't have any specific information to the contrary?
No.
I know that Sergeant Lee Fung didn't participate in that meeting, so I don't know who.
Steve Kanellakis is referring to.
Okay.
I believe it includes Sergeant Lee and others.
I think there may be a mistake on that part.
Okay.
I'm not sure.
So the understanding is that this meeting between Mr. Morazzo and Mr. Kanellakis took place.
It was facilitated by OPS, and in return, Mr. Morazzo was to speak to the Rideau and Sussex group to get them to Wellington.
Correct.
Now, in your witness statement, you say that you were advised that Mr. Morazo left the meeting to go to the intersection of Rideau and Sussex to move the trucks at that location pursuant to this agreement, but that he was not successful.
Correct.
And what's the basis for that understanding?
That's what was reported back to me by John Ferguson, and we ultimately didn't see any movement at the intersection either.
Okay, and what was the reason why there was no movement at that time?
It sounds like...
That particular group didn't want to move, ultimately.
I don't think that Mr. Marazzo was successful in negotiating with them to leave.
And is that your understanding for why the Rideau and Sussex group didn't relocate to Wellington as had been anticipated from this deal?
That group was maybe not aligned with...
All of the other convoy protesters.
I think there were differences in their goals or their values.
I know that Tamarazzo went there to speak to them.
I think he was hopeful that he could get them to move and unfortunately he wasn't successful.
Okay, so that's your understanding for why that move didn't happen.
He wasn't able to get them to move essentially.
Correct.
Okay.
And what about the fact that the move was not approved higher up in the chain of command within OPS?
Well, at that point, we had been negotiating to do that.
But ultimately, if he had been able to get to the move at that point, I think we would try to see if we could get them to move.
We hoped that some of them would leave, not just move to Wellington, but some of them would leave.
There were groups sort of behind or east of that location that we believe wanted to leave, but were effectively boxed in.
But the move was not approved higher up.
Is that right?
If he had been able to get permission, if they had agreed to move, we would have had a discussion about seeing if we could have gotten them to move.
Okay.
But at that time, there wasn't approval?
Correct.
Okay.
And my understanding is that there was some sort of miscommunication between you and Staff Sergeant Ferguson about allowing them to move to Wellington.
Do you recall that?
On that particular day?
Yes.
I think we felt that we could move, and then I followed up with command later, and they weren't in agreement.
Okay.
So we can stay on this document at page 40, just at the bottom.
This might refresh your memory as well, at 1739.
And this is, again, Staff Sergeant Ferguson's notes.
And he says, contact Superintendent Drummond, vehicle relocation to Wellington.
He indicated...
That there had been a miscommunication.
When I said clear Rideau Sussex, he was under the impression, and we can keep going, that they meant they were leaving.
I described the impact of this on the relationship with organizers and our ability to continue to do our PLT job.
He said that the plan to relocate the trucks to Wellington had not been approved.
I asked if that was at the chief level.
Believed so.
Yes.
So can you explain this discussion?
What is the exchange happening here?
That's John and I speaking about that move.
And we had hoped that some people would leave on their own.
That didn't pan out.
And then ultimately, I think I believe I had a conversation at that point and it wasn't approved for them to move further west.
Yes, further west.
So when he says...
When I said clear Rideau Sussex, he was under the impression that they meant they were leaving.
Correct.
So you didn't...
That changed during that conversation.
At the beginning, we had had a conversation where I did believe that they were going to leave, but then ultimately I learned afterwards that it was about negotiating just moving up the street on Wellington, and then ultimately that didn't get approved.
Sorry, I should have clarified that that changed during that conversation.
I see.
So your understanding at the beginning was that if the meeting was facilitated with Mr. Kanellakis, the Rideau and Sussex group would leave.
Is that right?
In the beginning, yes, but then that changed and then we didn't have approval for that.
Okay.
He says that...
He says he described to you the impact of this on the relationship with organizers.
Can you explain what he described to you there?
Well, this is the ongoing PLT relationship with working with both sides, trying to come to a mutual agreement.
And this was one of the areas where we were, you know, I think this was also a communication gap as well about what was understood.
And we were...
We were also hoping that people would leave, and that didn't occur.
And there may have been a miscommunication between us and Tom Miraz about what we understood was happening.
So when you explained the impact, I assume that means the negative impact that it would have had.
Is that correct?
Yes.
And then you told him that the plan to relocate the trucks had not been approved.
Yes.
When did you seek that approval?
I can look at my notes if you like.
Sure, you can look at your notes if that's helpful.
perhaps if you can try to recall whether it was before or after the meeting took place The meeting with with uh the between yeah that's right would you have sought approval to have them move to Wellington before that meeting or after the meeting?
I think we were at before it I believe we thought they were going to leave I think was maybe our understanding and then afterwards when it wasn't I advised there wasn't approval to move.
Okay so sometime between the time that um You were briefed on the outcome of the meeting, that it happened, that it was a successful meeting.
And then the time when you're having this discussion now at 1739 with Staff Sergeant Ferguson, you would have sought approval to have them move on to Wellington because at this time now you understand that the quid pro quo, so to speak, is for them to move to Wellington.
Is that right?
Correct.
I'm just looking at the we're talking about the 1738 timeframe.
That's right.
Thank you.
Yes, that's when John asked for approval for to move west.
I advise that there was not approval at this time and that was I did know that earlier.
Okay.
Because we'd had that conversation earlier I believe with probably on the 7th.
Okay, and who would have denied the request?
That would have come through Superintendent Patterson.
Also, the Chief would have been involved in that decision.
Okay, how do you know the Chief would have been involved in that decision?
Did you speak to the Chief about this?
No, but I think there was a conversation I had on the 7th with Mark about that.
So the meeting happened on the 8th?
But I think we had discussions about it the day before.
Okay, I understood your evidence to be that before the meeting took place, you thought they were leaving altogether.
When we asked, it was about to move.
And then when he came back to say that they wanted to move west, I told him there was an approval to move west at that point.
Okay, so you had sought that approval, you're saying, on February 7th, the day before the meeting.
I believe we've had a conversation about it.
I just want to look back here.
Mr. Commissioner, excuse me, I wonder if we could just confirm for the record that the notes Superintendent Drummond is referring to are his notes at OPS 3014455 on the record?
Yes.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Okay, so maybe you can try to refresh your memory at a break.
We'll keep going.
Okay.
So if we just go down a bit further, Staff Sergeant Ferguson then writes, I indicated that we were just continuing with the relocation plan from before and that if we were aware that it was not approved, we wouldn't have moved forward.
Miscommunication slash misinterpretation.
So what was your understanding?
What was the relocation plan from before?
What was your understanding of that?
I think John's referring to moving west onto Wellington.
Okay.
And then...
He says, this provides us the ability to open that intersection without force.
Do you understand what he means by that?
Yeah, we're not using POU actions to move them.
Okay.
And then at 1814, update Superintendent Drummond that we have shelved the Rideau Sussex plan or put it on hold due to darkness.
Correct.
And at that point, I assume it had gotten too dark and there was no approval in any event.
Is that right?
Correct.
And if we go to the next page, 41, he said that he would reopen the discussion with the exec about the move to Wellington.
Correct.
Okay.
So the plan to move the vehicles from Rideau and Sussex to Wellington on February 8 was shelved because there wasn't approval and because it got dark afterwards.
Is that right?
Correct.
And the exec never approved this move.
ultimately the move was never carried out.
Correct.
And, And if we can just go to page 43 here.
I believe this is now the next morning at 11:07.
Contacted by Sergeant Lee, and he was the PLT officer that had been involved in this meeting.
Is that right?
Correct.
Yes.
Rito-Sussex move.
He advised that there was a loss of momentum after last night.
And if we go to 1150, contacted by Sergeant Lee, he now advises that the group at Rito-Sussex are no longer listening to Tom Marazzo after last night, and they have galvanized.
Were you aware of this?
I knew that Tomarazo wasn't having any further luck getting the move.
I knew that much.
And did you understand that that was because they weren't able to move the night that they wanted to move because there wasn't approval?
Yes.
Okay.
But that was a common theme.
Okay, so ultimately the move to Wellington didn't happen.
First, because that request wasn't approved, and my understanding is it was never approved, right?
Correct.
And then because Mr. Morazzo had lost maybe any good faith he would have had with that group after the move didn't take place.
Is that right?
Correct.
Okay.
Now, after that meeting on February 8, the PLT team and Staff Sergeant Ferguson briefed you that the city had discussed With Mr. Morazzo, a meeting with the mayor in exchange for protesters moving trucks onto Wellington.
Is that right?
Sorry, say that question again.
So after this meeting took place with Mr. Kanellakis and Mr. Morazzo on that date, February 8th, the PLT team and Staff Sergeant Ferguson would have reported back to you about what happened in that meeting, right?
Except they weren't present in the meeting.
Mr. Kanellakis testified that they were.
I mean, he was there.
My information is they weren't, so there seems to be a gap there.
Right, but you would agree with me that the person at the meeting would be in a best position to say who was in attendance, correct?
Did Steve Kanellakis say which officers they were?
He said it was Sergeant Lee and other PLT officers.
He didn't know all of their names.
Unfortunately, you'd have to ask someone who was in the meeting because the information I received from John Ferguson is that there were no OPS members present in the meeting.
Okay, so did PLT or Staff Sergeant Ferguson debrief you after the meeting about the content of the meeting?
No, because they told me that they didn't know because they weren't present.
Okay, fair enough.
So I want to turn now to the deal with the protesters that was made later on.
By the mayor, the letters exchanged with Tamara Leach, you recall those events, right?
Yes.
Okay, so we're moving forward a little bit in time.
And my understanding is that you learned through an executive briefing on February 13 that the city had been negotiating with a group of protesters.
Is that right?
Correct.
Okay.
And what did you understand at that time the deal to be?
But the city had negotiated with the protesters to move vehicles out of the residential areas on the streets that ran north-south to Wellington, and to move vehicles to Wellington, and then hopefully any ones that didn't move would leave the area.
Okay, so your understanding was the trucks are going to leave the residential areas and move on to Wellington?
Is that right?
Correct.
And if we go to OPS 3014455, these are your notes.
And at page 43...
Yeah, if we can go to...
Let's see.
Okay, if we can keep going down.
There we go.
So at 1315, you see that's the exec meeting where you're informed about these negotiations, right?
Correct.
Okay.
And it says, City has been negotiating with protesters directly.
Protester, representative, and lawyers.
Remove of all trucks south of Wellington involved an SJAM.
We'll no longer keep staging area, Coventry and other staging areas.
So your understanding at this time was that the staging areas would also be relocated.
Is that right?
Correct.
Okay.
And was it understood at this time that the trucks would be relocating onto Wellington Street?
Maybe not in that meeting, but once I met with them in person, that was the understanding.
Okay.
So you're saying at this point in time, 1.15 on February 13, it was not understood that the trucks would be relocating onto Wellington?
That was always my understanding.
I may not have written into these notes, and I may have just been from my memory when I met with them a few hours later.
But certainly when I went to the meeting with them in person, with the city, with Kimayat and Steve Kanellakis, it was about consolidating vehicles onto Wellington.
Okay, so at this meeting, what would have been the discussion?
They're going to leave the residential areas, and where are they going?
Well, I may not have made a note of it, but my understanding had always been that they were going on to Wellington.
Okay.
And I'm going to take you to Acting Superintendent Bernier's scribe notes at OPS 30106.
And these are his notes of the same meeting.
So sometimes when we see different people's notes, we get a clear picture of what was said in the meeting because everybody seems to think different things are important to write down.
So it can be sometimes a helpful tool.
If we can go to page 11. Yeah, keep going.
Okay, we'll have to go up a bit because it's somewhere in here.
Yeah, we'll keep going up.
Yeah, there we go.
So the second part of that, so we'll just go up to see the timestamp.
Oh, okay, we'll go up to the other page.
So it's around 320.
It's between 320 and 335.
So let's keep going down.
Sorry, 135.
Keep going down.
Okay, right there.
So it says mayor.
Would then agree, so now this has been, the discussion has happened to take those trucks out of south of Wellington, and then it says Mayor would then agree, prepare to meet and listen to their concerns and pass them along further up in, I think that says government.
Do you recall this part of the discussion, that the Mayor would agree to listen to their concerns and pass them along further up in government?
I believe that was the case, yes.
Okay.
Now, if we go back to your notes, OPS 3014455.
And if we go to page 44. Okay, and if we go down.
Okay, we'll keep going down a bit.
Okay, we'll keep going up, I guess.
Oh, sorry, page 44. We're at 34. 44. Yeah, that's better.
Yeah, so see that fourth dash down?
There may be some groups that don't move.
Rideau Sussex.
Yes.
And then it says chief requests.
And there are, if we go down a little bit.
Four, five, keep going down.
Let's see.
Yeah, we got five points there.
So what was your understanding then about the Rideau and Sussex group being part of this negotiation, being part of the deal to leave?
At this point?
Yes.
I just, you know, I just made that there may be some groups that don't move because we'd already dealt with Rideau and Sussex a number of times and they hadn't moved before.
Was it your understanding that in accordance with the negotiation, all of the staging areas, including Rideau and Sussex, had to be cleared?
Yeah, I believe the city was hoping to get Rideau-Sussex as part of that agreement.
Okay.
And then we see the chief has indicated some requests.
And what was he saying here with respect to the negotiations?
What were his concerns at this time?
He wanted to know what the impact would be.
If this happened, would it free up more resources for us?
Because we had a lot of officers going through those areas, working, controlling those road access.
Would that shrink the footprint?
How many things would that free up?
Can we plan to deal with the groups that don't move?
And Rio Sussex was one of those groups that we were concerned about.
And we need a traffic plan to facilitate that.
And we want to protect the neighbourhoods that once we do move trucks out of them, we don't want them to come back in.
And Superintendent Bernier today testified that he generally did not have concerns and that it would accelerate his plan to have this deal go through, but that he was concerned.
He privately told Inspector Springer that he was concerned that this could be a ruse to get more trucks onto Wellington.
Do you recall any concerns being raised at this meeting?
I mean I think we you know we didn't know what this exactly how this would work out.
I mean they were we knew that the the convoy groups were fractured and did would they all move if they agreed or not?
I think that was something we've seen and we'd also certainly seen the the Rideau Sussex group had been very difficult to deal with.
Yes, I think there were some concerns whether they would all cooperate, whether it would work out the way we had hoped.
So in your witness statement, you say that Acting Superintendent Bernier expressed concerns about the city negotiating an agreement separate from OPS.
But if we see the notes in the meeting, he says he has no concerns.
He adopted that today in his evidence with the caveat that he had this side discussion with Inspector Springer.
But it sounds like in the meeting itself, he did not express concerns.
But you indicate that he expressed concerns.
So did he express them privately to you outside of this meeting?
It might have been outside of the meeting, but I thought it was in the room.
I think we're still at...
I still think we're at...
This is the 115 exec demo meeting on the 13th.
I think we're out at TPOF at the NCRCC.
He did express some concerns to me.
I thought it was in the meeting.
Okay.
And what were those concerns?
Just that we didn't know whether all the groups would cooperate.
And we knew for certain that the Rio Sussex group was a difficult group to deal with.
In your witness statement, you said that he had concerns about city negotiating separate from OPS.
What can you tell me specifically about that?
Well, that they were negotiating.
We didn't know.
Now, to be fair...
Superintendent Bernier and I weren't aware, but I've since learned that members of the executive had been speaking with the city.
Okay.
And did you share any concerns about the city negotiating separately from OPS at this time when you learned about it on the 13th?
Well, it would be ideal that we would know while we were doing planning and police operations that that was in the works, but we weren't aware.
But, I mean, ultimately the goal was to try to shrink the footprint.
So if it was something that would assist us, we were interested in pursuing it, but there were some risks attached to it, if not all the groups agreed.
Okay, so generally you were positive and supportive of it, even though you saw some risk.
Is that fair?
Well, we were interested in doing anything that would help shrink the footprint.
And reduce some of the pressure on a lot of the residential areas.
I mean, not every one of those scenarios was ideal.
Right.
And I understand that at that time, shortly after this meeting, you were asked by Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson to be the police liaison with respect to these negotiations.
Is that right?
Yes, to go represent the police service.
Okay.
And what did you understand your role as liaison to be?
To speak to the city, to find out what the arrangement was, attend the meeting, ultimately.
And then report back any concerns that I found.
So attend the meeting and report back with any concerns?
Yes.
Did your role include ensuring that the deal was in accordance with OPS's overall strategic plan at that time?
I think there was an expectation that I would raise questions if it was going to be a problem for us.
And I reported back after the meeting to Deputy Ferguson and to Rob Birney about...
What the outcome was, what the plan was that the city and the protesters had reached.
Right.
And at this time, though, the deal was kind of a little bit high level.
Is that fair?
Yes.
So at this time, two letters had been exchanged, I believe, at 3 p.m. on that day on the 13th.
It was made public.
And so you were also there to assist with the details.
Is that right?
We wanted to ensure public safety and wanted to see what the logistics of doing what they proposed.
Like you said, the letters were very high level.
I wanted to know sort of the nuts and bolts about, okay, how do you want to do this?
What is your plan?
Okay.
Now, were you aware that at the time the Integrated Planning Group were working on a plan?
Yes.
Okay.
And so were you asked to ensure that whatever deal was finally struck would fit within that plan?
I think I was...
The expectation is I was going to report back about what so this was an arrangement separate with the city we were not part of that arrangement at least we myself when I talked to the integrated team and Rob Bernie myself we weren't aware of it at that point so when I I went to the meeting it was to find out what what the deal was between the city and the protesters and what were the logistics behind it.
Right, but it sounds like at that meeting there was general enthusiasm for the arrangement because it would assist in the OBS's plan.
It was cautious optimist.
Okay.
Caution.
We were cautious about it.
Okay.
Did your role as liaison include negotiating terms?
No.
And who were you to report back to?
Robert Bernier and Trish Ferguson.
Okay.
And by this time, had Superintendent Bernier expressed concerns to you?
Well, I believe during the meeting, we had concerns that one, we weren't aware that our group at the NCRCC weren't aware that the city had been negotiating.
Okay.
And we wanted to find out more details about what their plans were.
Okay.
And I understand that after you informed Staff Sergeant Ferguson and OPP PLT Giselle Walker about the letters, and you sent those letters to them so that they would have awareness.
Yes.
And did they express any concerns back to you that you recall at that time?
I believe they did.
No, it would have been, I think it was the next day that we expressed concerns.
It wasn't that day.
Okay.
And then your notes also indicate that at 4.46 p.m., you were asked by Chief Slowly to attend a meeting.
So at this time, you had been asked by Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson to act as liaison.
Yes.
And then a little bit later, you got a call, I believe, from Chief Slowly asking you to attend this meeting with Steve Kanellakis and Kim Ayuk from the city.
Is that right?
Correct.
Okay.
And at that time, did the Chief express any concerns to you about the arrangement?
No, it was a very short conversation.
Okay.
Did he explain what your role in that meeting should be?
No.
He just asked me to attend.
Okay.
Did he ask you to report back to him when it was done?
I don't remember specifically asking me to report back, but it would be understood that I would report back through the chain of command.
Okay.
And what did you see as OPS's role with respect to these negotiations?
To go and listen to what they proposed and raise any concerns and look at whatever logistical implications are for us and any safety concerns.
Right.
So then you would be involved in the logistics, is that right?
Well, the safety part of it, if we were going to have to, I mean, ultimately there would be some form of a traffic plan to make that happen.
Yeah.
And to see what we could do.
And you would need to allocate resources to carry that plan out.
Is that right?
Yes, there would be PLT and traffic resources.
Okay.
Now, my understanding is that meeting took place around 5.30 on the 13th of February at City Hall.
Correct.
Is that right?
Correct.
And according to your summary, in attendance were Steve Kanellakis, Kim Ayotte, Tom Marazzo, Chris Barber, Joe Jansen, Eva Chipiak, and Ryan Olson.
Is that right?
Correct.
Okay.
Now, at page 47 of your notes, you say, yeah, right there.
They stated that their plan was to move all the trucks onto Wellington.
So was this the first time that this move to Wellington was raised?
I realize that's the first time I've seen my notes, but that was my understanding the whole time.
Right.
And was this because the letters talk about...
Leaving the residential areas and maintaining only on onto Wellington Street.
Okay, so based on the letters it was your understanding that they would be relocating.
Okay, and then...
I can help you there.
My writing is not the best.
Sorry?
I can help you if you have a...
I think I got it.
Group explained that they didn't control the Coventry location that...
Yes.
That was controlled by Mike Clark.
Is that right?
Correct.
They didn't feel that they had any control there.
They also didn't control Rideau Sussex Group, Farfada.
You see that?
Correct, yes.
Okay.
So then it sounds like those were now being excluded from the locations that were going to be moved.
Is that right?
Well, the protesters advised that they didn't have any control over those areas.
They didn't have influence on them.
Okay.
And then I asked what happens to the trucks that don't fit on Wellington.
And then it says, agreed to West Limit is Bay Street and East Limit as South Lane of Elgin.
See that?
Correct.
Okay.
So...
First of all, what was the answer to what happens to the trucks that don't fit on Wellington?
That they would leave.
Okay.
And where would they go?
I believe they talked about vehicles leaving the city, going out to you, a location out in the east end or a location in the west, like Armprior.
There was a place down in Richmond.
There was sort of out by Herb's trucking out in the east end, going towards Vantleek Hill.
There was a location a lot of vehicles went to, too.
But they were agreeing to leave the Corps.
Okay.
But you knew that they wanted to, a lot of them wanted to be closer to Parliament Hill to have that kind of photo and to be kind of in that area, right?
Yes.
Okay.
But it was thought that maybe some people would go to Arnprior.
Is that right?
Okay.
And so here, when we look at the limits, it's Bay Street on the west side.
Right here, right outside.
Just out here, correct?
And South Lane of Elgin on the east side.
Is that right?
Correct.
And the letters actually state that the western limit would be SJAM.
Isn't that right?
Correct.
So why was it restricted to bay?
We, in the room, when we had a discussion, I think we looked at a map and we had a discussion about going to bay so it would open up more lanes west of that location.
Particularly the...
Having the whole intersection of SJAM with trucks in it created other issues.
Again, same sort of problems at Rideau Sussex.
It's a main artery going across the border into Quebec.
It accesses the Civic Hospital turning if you're going west.
So there was an interest to try to open up more area.
Okay, and you mentioned a map, so we might as well go there.
OPS 3014929.
And I believe this might be the map that you're referring to.
If we can zoom out a bit.
Yeah, okay, let's maybe zoom in a little bit now.
Yeah, okay, so does that map look familiar?
Yes, it does.
And is this the map that you took to the meeting with you?
I believe Kim Ayut had the maps there.
Okay.
I think there were maps on the table, if I remember, right?
I don't.
Don't quote me on that.
I don't remember bringing maps.
I think the maps were there on the table.
Okay, and if we look closely at the map, we can see there's some markings in Penn at around Bay Street and Elgin.
Do you see that?
I do.
And who made those markings?
That was the map that I was referring to.
That was my map in the room.
Okay, so you made the markings.
Yes, I did.
Okay.
And if you can go back to your notes.
OPS 3014455.
And we're at page 47. We go down.
And then it says, Freedom Convoy Group needs to sort out who is staying on Wellington and who is leaving.
Now, is this because it was understood that not everybody could be on Wellington?
Well, I certainly understood they wouldn't all fit in on Wellington, and I kept highlighting that with them.
Okay, and what was the group's response?
I think they truly believed they could try to fit in as many trucks as possible, and that the trucks that didn't fit would leave.
But I wanted to get sort of a clear response about how that was going to work.
And you said that your understanding was that some people wanted to leave but were blocked in by other trucks.
Can you explain that?
So during the course of the first couple weeks there, PLT had met groups that wanted to leave, but unfortunately were effectively blocked in.
And some of them felt intimidated that they couldn't leave.
And we'd seen some of that activity particularly at Rideau Sussex.
There were groups that were blocked in.
I can think of there were groups that I think had come from the Maritimes that were...
Sort of trapped in there and they wanted to get out and they couldn't get past the group that was holding the intersection.
Okay.
And then in your witness statement, you said that protest organizers wanted to be allowed to bring in more fuel to keep trucks running.
And I believe there is some notations to that effect in your notes as well.
According to you, you would not agree with this.
Can you explain what they were looking to do?
I think, if memory serves, they asked about bringing a slip tank, which is a tank that you put in the back of a pickup truck.
They talked about how that would be safer than bringing small, like, 25-litre cans up.
And I told them I would not agree.
Like, I wasn't in a position to agree to bring any more fuel up.
Okay.
So you were putting some constraints on this deal, it sounds like.
Yes.
Okay.
Well, there was a safety concern.
Fuel was a safety concern.
Right.
I mean, yes, obviously they needed fuel to keep trucks running and stay warm.
But fuel, you know, there's a lot of rules around how fuel is handled.
And we always had safety concerns about whether a fire would start or someone would get hurt with fuel.
Right.
So we were very cautious about allowing people to use fuel.
We want fuel in a very controlled environment.
Right.
And then even though the letters said that the Western limit on Wellington would be SJAM.
You indicated that no, it was going to be bay, right?
Was that a safety issue as well or what was that?
It was more about trying to keep that lower intersection open.
And when I asked him, I said, look, that intersection is a problem for us.
Can we move back a block or two?
And I think, I believe Steve Kanellak has shared that.
I think it was, they understood when I brought it up that, you know, ideally we would like to not have that intersection blocked as well.
Okay, so you're sorting out some of the details and negotiating some of the nuances of this deal.
Is that fair?
Okay.
On page 49, I ask the group what the exit strategy for them to leave Ottawa and open up all streets.
And then it says, meeting with federal government.
They have been ignored by federal government and prime minister.
So what was that discussion?
Well, I asked them, like, I mean, you know, yes, you're going to move to Wellington, but what's the end?
What's the strategy?
What is your plan after that?
I mean, I had been with them in the room for a couple hours.
We'd eaten some pizza.
I was talking to them a little bit.
I just asked, you know, what is your long-term goal here?
And then they told me it was to meet the government.
Okay, so then this deal was not meant to bring an end to the demonstrations.
Is that right?
No, no, but I just asked them.
I was in the room with them for a period of time.
I asked them, what is your goal here?
How long are you going to try to stay here?
What is it going to take for you to leave the street?
And I think if you read further on to my notes, I do tell them you can't stay here indefinitely.
Right.
There's going to be consequences if you stay.
Right.
And actually, you say that just the next point.
I explained that even if the group moved to Wellington, they can't stay there forever.
At some point, there will be a line in the sand and will require action by the police.
Protest group understood.
Yeah.
Is that right?
Yeah.
Yes, it is.
So they understood that this negotiation was not meant to bring an end.
was a meeting with the prime minister, right?
And you also explained to them that at some point you will have to leave Wellington.
We're not going to just allow you to stay there indefinitely.
Is that right?
Okay.
Did anyone at the city, any of the city reps, Mr. Ayotz or Mr. Kanellakis, ever say that the trucks could stay on a Wellington indefinitely?
No.
I don't remember.
No.
No.
I think I made it clear that our expectation is that they weren't staying.
Okay.
So my understanding is that once this meeting ended, the protest group was to go out and speak to the truckers on the ground to get buy-in on this deal.
Is that right?
Correct.
Okay.
And what's your understanding of those discussions?
Were they successful?
Was there...
Resistance?
Was there acceptance?
Do you have a sense for...
There was some resistance.
We learned in the morning that not all the groups had agreed, that there were groups that weren't moving.
Okay.
And I understand also that after the meeting, you called Acting Superintendent Bernier and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson to update them about the meeting that had just transpired, right?
I did, yes.
Okay.
And what was their response at that time?
I briefed them on what had occurred.
We had more discussions later that night.
You know, they were cautious.
Same thing as, you know, let's see what they can do.
Can they really do this?
I don't remember there being any, you know, I explained what the concerns were and that they couldn't all fit on the Wellington.
And I also had concerns about whether they could, would the trucks actually leave?
Because we already knew that there was fractures within those groups.
Right.
So you think that your understanding was that some groups would nevertheless stay.
Is that right?
Well, we already knew about, you know, the Coventry Road situation.
And they were up front with us to tell us that, you know, they didn't have influence over Coventry Road.
They didn't have influence over Sussex and Rideau.
And we suspected there would be other areas that they wouldn't necessarily have.
But we were interested in seeing if it would help shrink the footprint.
And now Chief Slowly had been the one to ask you to attend this meeting.
Did you also report back to him?
No, I reported to Trish Ferguson and Rob Bernier.
I was following the chain of command and I expected that Deputy Ferguson would have then notified the Chief.
Okay.
Now we expect Chief Slowly to say that he did not know at the time that trucks would be moving into the red zone.
Rather, he thought they would go to areas south of Wellington, go home or to areas outside of the city.
What's your response to that?
I read the letters and I went to the meeting.
It was pretty clear to me what the arrangement was, that they were going to stack vehicles up onto Wellington and then try to clear the residential streets from the balance.
And we also expect him to say that...
He was not aware that any trucks moved on to Wellington in front of Parliament and that that would have been contrary to his understanding of the negotiations.
We expect him to say that relieving pressure in the residential areas was beneficial, but adding additional trucks to the red zone could have increased public safety issues.
Did he express anything along those lines to you?
No, I didn't speak to him directly about that.
But he was in the meeting the next day in the morning.
There was a briefing in the morning where we discussed what was going on.
Okay.
And so is it your understanding then that he would have understood that that was the arrangement?
I believe so.
I don't know how you would have.
That was my understanding.
I think it was pretty clear from the letters, and I think it was pretty clear from what I reported back up through the chain of command, what we were doing.
And then the next morning, it physically was happening.
Okay.
And he said that moving trucks to Wellington could, or we expect him to say, could increase public safety issues.
Did you share in any of those concerns?
Well, it was lesser of two evils, yes.
We were, yes, more vehicles on Wellington would create a problem later, but we were trying to relieve pressure on the residential areas and try to reduce the footprint.
Now, earlier we saw that the Parliamentary Protective Service on February 8, when they learned about a possible move from Rideau and Sussex to Wellington, had expressed some concerns.
At this time, did you indicate to anyone that we should notify PPS, or did you notify Mr. Brookson at PPS?
I didn't directly know, but I would have expected that he had a representative at the NCRCC that would have been advised.
Okay.
I would expect that the Integrated Command team would have had some contact with them as well.
Okay, and my understanding is at 8:30 that evening, so the meeting happens with the protesters and Mr. Kanellakis and Mr. Ayotte at 5:30, and then at 8:30 there's a meeting in which you're updating and briefing several people on teams.
Is that right?
Correct.
Okay.
Is this a good time?
It is a perfect time, yes.
Thank you.
So we'll take a 15-minute break, give you a chance to stand up and move around, and we'll come back in 15 minutes.
Thank you.
The commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
La Commissione et Vé-pouques minutes.
Thank you.
Why, hello, everybody.
I've popped in, but it appears that we are on break.
When did we go on break?
We need a class action lawsuit.
Canadian mom, 1997.
Legalese was created to confuse and bamboozle, and the legal maritime admiralty law system is meant to extract your resources.
Your rights are given by God, not other men.
Reinstorm?
I can agree with a portion of that.
If laws were made, were drafted clearly and concisely, we wouldn't need lawyers, which is why there might be something of a vested interest for lawyers to make sure that we retain a monopoly on the practice, if only a monopoly through understanding.
How long ago did we go on break?
Do you want to know something funny?
Break two minutes after ended last stream.
So if it was two minutes, when did they say they were breaking until?
Oh!
Well, looky, looky.
I can go back and see when they went on break.
Okay, so they're there.
They went on break, it looks like.
Okay, hold on.
I can't hear.
Where's the audio?
What the heck's the audio?
They went on break right there.
Well, typically they went on break for 15 minutes, and that was about 15 minutes ago.
But why am I not hearing anything?
My headphones are plugged in.
Hold on.
I'm not understanding why I'm not seeing myself.
Oh, they're back.
Okay, I hear audio, as I think everyone does.
Am I on the wrong stream here or something?
No.
Okay, they're back.
I am so confused.
I don't know what window I'm looking at here.
Okay, that's me right now.
Okay, I see myself now.
Oh, I'm sharing it on incognito window.
Okay, fine.
And then the window that I was looking at was in the chat.
So, by the way, we've been on break for 10 minutes now.
I see you.
I'm having a cold brew right now.
This is how much I'm having with two ice cubes in it.
And this has 190 milligrams of caffeine.
Jesus, that's too bad.
I've been having twice as...
I was filling the cup and wondering why I was having palpitations in the afternoon.
Sweet, merciful goodness.
You're okay to continue?
Yes, we are.
Thank you.
I was drinking like probably 350 milligrams of caffeine.
That's not good for anybody.
So, Superintendent Drummond, I want to take you now to the following day, 14th of February, Monday, which is when the movement of the trucks actually started.
Now, I understand on Monday morning there was a bit of confusion about what the deal was going to be and what OPS's role would be.
Is that fair?
Robert Drummond.
I understood it myself, but there may have been some confusion with some other groups, yes.
Okay.
And to your understanding, what was the...
What was the confusion or the misunderstanding there?
I think one of the confusion was whether it was a 24-hour arrangement or a 72-hour arrangement.
Okay, and so that concern or that misunderstanding or confusion, that was brought up the morning of February 14th?
No, the 15th.
On the 15th.
Okay, so let's go to February 14th.
Okay.
13th in the evening, we know that the meeting that you attended took place.
And the following Monday, February 14th, Was when the movement of the trucks, according to this deal, was going to start.
My understanding is that on that morning, there was a bit of unclarity about what the deal was.
In fact, the trucks didn't start moving until about 1 p.m., right?
Not all the groups understood the arrangement.
And they were, I believe, that different convoy representatives were going around trying to get different groups to agree and understand what was going on.
And I think there were some groups that weren't in agreement.
It was one of the problems.
Okay, but within OPS, there was some confusion about what the deal was as well.
Is that right?
No, I think the traffic plan, the traffic units and the PLT groups understood what we were going to do.
Okay.
Well, maybe you can help us out then.
If I can take you to OTT 3010455.
You probably haven't seen this before.
This is a chat with members of the NCRCC reporting to city officials about what's going on on the ground.
Can we see that in native form?
It might be easier.
There we go.
Thank you.
And if we can go to page 22. And if we go to, let me see here.
Okay, so we see there Todd Piper.
Do you know who he is?
I'm familiar with the name.
I can't put a face to him right now.
Okay, but he was...
He worked for the city.
He worked for the city, and he was on NCRCC, right?
And so he's giving an update here to other city officials and EOC representatives, and he says, good morning all, here's the latest.
Work beginning on the deal negotiated between the mayor and the Freedom Convoy president to move trucks from residential neighbourhoods to Wellington and SJAM.
Confusion unfolded into the evening over whether the deal was on.
And here, Mr. Piper is describing what you were referring to, some confusion within the protest groups about whether the deal was on or not on.
Is that right?
Correct.
Okay.
And if we go further down.
He says these conflicting directions are likely to hinder progress and cooperation by those trucks aligned with the official Freedom Convoy group, not to mention the challenges in dealing with the numerous independent splinter groups.
And then at the bottom, he says no specific details have been shared with us by OPS.
Re-traffic management at this point, but they have confirmed that once the vehicles start to move, side streets and exits will be fully blocked to prevent vehicles from deviating from their planned route.
And then at 926 there, he says, correction, OPS has shared their draft plan, still not formally approved by their commander, with city staff here at the NCRCC.
Their focus this morning is on getting vehicles to leave the Corps, not on repositioning trucks along Wellington and SJAM as originally thought.
Keep going down.
The draft plan appears to focus largely on diverting vehicles eastbound on Laurier Avenue West to Nicholas and then to the eastbound off-ramp.
Once all willing vehicles have left, the PLT will then work with the organizers at a later time to reposition the remaining vehicles along Wellington and SJAM as part of a separate phase or operation.
But this is a bit different from what you had discussed with the protesters the night before.
Isn't that right?
Yeah, I'm not sure.
I wasn't in that room.
You may not be familiar with the NCRCC, but there's multiple rooms.
I'm assuming he's in one of the main rooms there, but that is not my understanding how things went.
We had delays in the morning with getting contact with Chris Barber and the PLTs connecting with him about getting some of the trucks moving.
I know that was a delay in the morning.
I was there when they were moving the trucks.
I remember one of these cops taking pictures of all the license plates as they went out.
That's what he's referring to.
I presume to know whose bank accounts to freeze.
We started moving trucks.
It did take a number of hours to get that done, but the main impediment was that there were a number of groups who didn't seem to be on board and the protesters were still dealing with them.
Okay, so you're not aware of any other issues that arose that morning within OPS?
It was the protest?
Well, there may have been some logistical on-the-ground things that may have occurred that I'm not aware of.
Maybe they were moving a barricade.
So when we do things like that, and I'm just, this is hypothetical, I don't know, but an example, to move those big cement jersey barriers, you need a special loader with a clam device, and sometimes there's issues with getting heavy equipment in or moving things or opening up barricades, and sometimes there are little bits.
There was a confusion about, you know, we were running, you know, there were three or four different police services where all they're working and getting everyone to understand what the instructors are.
There may have been, I can't say that there wasn't some glitches along the way, but ultimately we got vehicles moving later that day.
My understanding is that morning at 11 a.m. there was a meeting that you were in attendance.
It's not in your notes.
If you're going to look at your notes, there seems to be a gap in your notes between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m.
For February 14, but we have other people's notes that seem to indicate you were in attendance.
Okay.
So I'll take you to OPS 3011045.
And these are Acting Superintendent Bernier's scribe notes for February 14. And I'll take you to page 13. The meeting started at 11. It's...
Further down, but if you go to page 13, so if you want to see the beginning of that meeting, it's further up, but this is now in the middle of this meeting, and it goes until a little bit after 1 p.m., and you can see there at 1312, the event commander, which would be Superintendent Bernier, is that right?
Yeah.
At the time, says something to you that says Drummond there at 1312, right?
Okay.
Yeah, it could be Drummond.
Well, if you look at the notation, it says, Tasking Drummond to advise DC Ferguson about PPS, potential concern that they have with this.
Okay.
So do you recall being in attendance at this meeting?
And maybe we can go up to 11 a.m., the timestamp, just to show kind of the beginning of the meeting.
Seems like it was a long meeting.
A lot happened there.
Okay, yeah.
So if we go up a little bit more.
So there's an end of meeting at 1025, and then there is a meeting starting at 1050, and it kind of goes on from there.
It looks like Giselle Walker is there, the event commander, if we go down.
And then more people are seen there in that meeting.
You can go down, please.
Does this refresh your memory about this meeting at around 11 a.m.
on February 14?
Okay.
Does it actually title a meeting at the top of it, or is it just ongoing conversation?
It's an ongoing, it looks like it's an ongoing meeting.
Well, this is boring.
But it looks like they're speaking about this issue, and you do seem to be in the room.
Since that is attributed to you, that the event commander says to you that he's tasking you to advise D.C. Ferguson about PPS and potential concerns.
I don't have notes of it being a meeting, so it may have been an ongoing conversation in the room.
I don't have a recollection of that.
Okay, so you don't recall being asked by the event commander to advise the deputy chief about...
potential concerns that PPS would have with the move?
I don't have an independent recollection and I don't have any notes about a meeting occurring at that time.
Okay, if we can go back to page 13. It looks like they're making arrangements there.
And if you go down to 1327, right there, it looks like you're saying to the event commander, Prime Minister is considering an emergency act.
Do you see that?
Okay.
Yes, I see that.
Okay.
So this was something that would have been discussed with this group?
I just want to get my stream from the last day of the protest.
Thank you.
This is the 13th we're talking.
This is the 14th.
That's from my house.
If you don't recall.
No, and I think you've seen a pattern with my notes about meetings, so I'm not sure that this is a meeting.
I'm wondering if this is just being captured with the scribe and Rob Bernier.
Well, there's certainly discussions that seem to be happening, correct?
Correct.
Okay.
And, you know, if you have a chance...
I know the Emergency Act was coming out, yes.
Yes.
And so do you recall having this discussion with the event commander on the 14th about the Emergency Act potentially being invoked?
I don't remember.
It was the 15th that it actually gets invoked, correct?
The next day?
The 14th.
The 15th that gets invoked.
Oh, okay.
My goodness, I forgot when...
I think it was the 14th.
I think the 19th is when they cracked everything down.
Yes.
Okay.
Yep, 19th.
Okay.
And do you know who told you this?
How you got this information?
No.
Okay.
And so did that indicate that there was likely some significant POU action that would be...
Commencing shortly thereafter.
Is that what you understood from this?
From the Emergency Act being involved?
Yes.
No, but there was POU planning going on, but I don't know that one followed the other.
Okay.
So I'll take you back to your notes, OPS 3014455.
And we'll go to page 55. And by this time, this is 3.40 p.m., the movement of trucks has started.
Your notes indicate it started at around 1 p.m.
Correct.
So this is a few hours in.
So if we go to page 55, yeah, update meeting with integrated command team at NCRCC.
And you say 26 trucks moved to Wellington from O 'Connor.
And then you write issues on Bank Street with group not wanting to move.
Traffic slash PLT on Kent tried to move to Wellington.
And then you say no movement of trucks off-site or to Embram.
Correct.
So what are you indicating here?
That there were trucks that weren't moving.
There were groups.
Guys, I'm going to give you the link to my last group on Bank Street that didn't move.
Go to an hour and a half of this trip.
They had sort of started going east to west, working the side streets, and they basically left Bank Street and then were trying to work over on Kent to try to move trucks.
I'm going to check out for a bit, people.
We haven't seen any vehicles leave to go off-site.
Coffee hit the beans, baby.
I'll be back soon.
Protesters.
So is it your understanding that no trucks left the city, not relocated, but just outright left?
Yes.
So there would be vehicles, like from a weekend to a Monday, there'd be a bit of a, you'd see an ebb and flow.
We saw a certain, like there'd be more vehicles coming to the city on a weekend than there were on a weekday.
So there would be the natural Monday.
We didn't see a marked departure of vehicles leaving the residential streets as we had hoped from the arrangement between the city and the protesters.
Okay.
And if we go further down, looking for POU options on areas outside of Wellington.
Why not on Wellington?
We just moved vehicles there.
We felt that we would have to give them notice that we were going to be doing POU options.
Okay, so there were POU options being considered at that time?
Yes, there always were POU options being considered.
Okay, and so now you're saying that the POU options are going to be restricted to areas outside of Wellington, right?
For the time being, yeah, at that point.
Right, and that was because, as you say, you had just relocated them.
Yes.
So you couldn't then just take them out?
No, that would be bad faith.
But I had made it clear to them that going to Wellington was not a long term.
So how long could they stay there without POU action?
I couldn't give them a timeline.
We would give them notice and ultimately later that week we did give them notice.
Okay.
But certainly on the 14th you didn't feel or the call that you had or this meeting, it wasn't felt that at that time a POU action could take place on Wellington.
We didn't have enough resources to do that at that point.
Okay.
And if we go to the next page 56, at 5pm there, exec demo update.
So here's another update.
And we know from other people's notes that Chief Slowly was in attendance.
Deputy Chief Bell was in attendance.
Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson was in attendance.
Superintendent Bernier, Inspector Lucas.
I believe Superintendent Patterson was also in attendance based on the chief's notes of this meeting.
Does that sound about right to you?
That sounds correct, yes.
Okay.
Now, if we go to the middle of that page, it says, plan enforcement for vehicles south of Wellington.
Correct.
So, again, this is, there was concern then that having put these trucks onto Wellington, POU action could not take place at that time, right?
Yes, we weren't going to do POU action after we just moved the trucks there.
Did you see this or did anybody in the meeting express any view that this was tying OPS's hands with respect to the options that they had now?
Yes, it could be conceived that way, but you can only do one piece at a time.
The idea that we would...
Start on Wellington first was unlikely.
We would work our way to Wellington.
Okay.
And I think that's ultimately what you're going to see later in the week.
So when did trucks stop being relocated onto Wellington?
We know it started at 1 p.m. on the 14. When did it end?
Later that evening, I think we'd stopped moving vehicles by the time it got dark.
Okay.
So once it got dark and that was it, and that never resumed.
Is that right?
The next morning, there were some issues about...
Both the city contacted me about whether we were going to move more vehicles.
The PLT traffic units thought there was only a 24-hour move.
We had some more discussion about that, but ultimately there wasn't really much room left on Wellington.
Okay.
That topic had been brought up on Monday night, that we were running out of room on Wellington anyways.
Okay, and I'll take you to the Chief's notes of this meeting, OPS.
Three zeros, one, four, five, six, six.
And we'll go to page nine.
Okay, so we actually just go up a little bit to show what this is.
Oh, sorry, page nine at the bottom.
Sorry, let's keep going down here.
All right, there it is.
So 1701 Demo F-22 Briefing.
So this is the same meeting that we saw your notes about.
Correct.
Okay.
And if we look at the second bullet point, it says Trish, and I assume that's Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson.
Yes.
It says PPS not happy with trucks on Wellington.
You see that?
Yes.
Okay.
Do you recall that being part of the discussion in that meeting?
There was a...
I don't know if it was that...
If it's there, it would have happened.
I mean, yes, I know Larry Brooks reached out to us while we were doing the truck movements, wasn't happy about it.
Yes.
And I understand why.
Okay.
Yes.
And actually, he reached out to the chief about half an hour before this meeting started.
Did the chief relay that in this meeting?
I believe Trish brought it up and brought it to our attention.
I don't believe I made an independent note about that.
No, I don't think so.
But I would agree that that would be one of their concerns.
Okay.
And if we look at the last bullet point there, had to pivot due to new, and unfortunately it's cut off there.
Do you have any sense for what that may be referring to?
It might be referring to the Emergencies Act being invoked that day.
Okay.
Was that part of the discussion in that meeting?
Well, it was sort of going into the next day.
We had discussions about that going into the 15th where we were concerned about we didn't have the, I think the proper term is orders coming from the Emergency Act.
I wanted to see what the outcomes would be.
And if we go to page 10 of this document on the third bullet, it says we are drawing on the resources given to us.
So was this an expression?
It seems to me, maybe I'm reading this incorrectly, but...
Somebody reading this seems to suggest that implementing this deal is taking up resources.
Is that how you read that as well?
In the short term, yes.
It would require us to use PLT and traffic resources to make those moves.
But the hopes is that we would shrink the footprint and then require less officers to hold the footprint.
But ultimately, the footprint did not shrink as much as we had hoped.
And the next bullet says we need some significant legal advice regarding the mayor's position that they can be on Wellington.
Now, this wasn't just the mayor's position, was it?
That's how it's written.
Right.
But you would agree with me that OPS seemed to support this plan and certainly gave a lot of resources to make that happen, right?
We helped these.
Creating the traffic plan and facilitating moving the vehicles.
And in this meeting, why was it felt that legal advice was needed?
What was the issue?
We sought legal advice on a lot of topics during that time period.
A daily event, to be quite honest.
So I don't know what...
I mean, I understand we would be looking for advice on that topic.
If there was an issue raised and they wanted to see what the mayor's position was and get an opinion on it, I assume they would have talked to Christiane, you know?
Right, but what was the issue?
It doesn't say at that point, and I don't have independent notes about the legal issue.
Okay.
So, in this meeting, it sounds like the...
The issues that PPS had raised were discussed, correct?
Correct.
And did the chief indicate at all that he had had a call with Steve Kanellakis right before this meeting, and it's in these notes, but I won't take you to it, where he told Steve Kanellakis that it was over?
I can take you to it.
It's on page 9 at 1652.
Yeah.
Call with Steve Kay.
Got off phone with Brookson.
He's from PPS, correct?
Yes, Larry Brookson, yes.
Two concerns.
Does the level of government have ability to negotiate and direct police?
So I think this is indicating the concerns that perhaps Brookson identified.
Correct.
Are they directing you?
No, they are not.
And then it says, we weren't involved in negotiation.
We don't have a say in it, but it fits in our plan.
The devil is in the details.
How many trucks?
How close are they going to be?
If you want to be involved, you should have been briefed.
I briefed our people and our CMP.
And if you go just to the...
They have more discussion about it.
I don't think he is going to throw a crowbar into this, but he wants to be at the table.
He gets it, that it is done.
I think he means that the arrangement between the city and the...
And the protesters was done already.
That's how I read that as well.
Yes, that's how I would read that.
Okay.
And was that discussed at the meeting that you had later on, that 1701 demo brief?
I don't remember.
I mean, Trish obviously brings up that PPS is not happy.
Or the comments aren't attributed.
Well, some of them are attributed to people and some of them are not.
But fair to say there were concerns raised at this demo meeting at 5 p.m. on the 14th, right?
Yes.
So is it fair to say that by this time now, no more trucks are being relocated?
This is kind of the end of it, is that right?
Correct.
Okay.
And now the next day, on February 15, there's a call at 9.30 a.m., and I think you talked about that.
This is the meeting where they're discussing also the issues that are here.
And if we go to your notes, OPS 3014455.
And we go to the 12 p.m. mark.
There's a meeting on 9.30.
Then there's another meeting.
At noon with the integrated command table.
Correct.
And it's page 59. Okay, let's keep going down.
Let's keep going to 12. There it is.
Meeting with integrated command table.
And it lists people that are there, representatives from the RCMP, OPP, and OPS, correct?
Correct.
And some of the members of the integrated command table.
The Integrated Planning Group, rather, Inspector Springer is there too, right?
Correct.
Dave Radu is an RCMP officer.
Okay, perfect.
And if we go to the next page, page 60, and the last bullet point there.
So now these are discussions that are being had.
If we go down.
Okay.
So if we go up a little bit more just to the one before to get some context, PLT need to clarify what OPS is doing with the providing safe movement of trucks to Wellington as per the city agreement with Protester Freedom Convoy.
Not facilitating.
Agreement is with city, only to provide safe movement.
Correct.
And then it says, problem is the change with Emergency Act and not orders yet.
Moving trucks to area that we may want to do enforcement on later.
Can you explain that note?
Well, that was an issue we faced the whole time.
Ultimately, it goes into the conversation I had with them at the meeting on the 13th that they couldn't stay there forever.
The police would, at some point, be coming to deal with that issue if they didn't want to leave.
We brought up the same issue there.
We were concerned about what the orders were going to be from the Emergency Act, and would we be then going there at some point to enforce them?
And with order, you mean the regulations that would come with the invocation of the Act, is that right?
Correct, yes.
I know I refer to it as orders, but regulations might be the proper term.
Okay, so the invocation of the Act then seemed to imply some POU action enforcement, which is what is noted there.
And that moving the trucks to that area may not be a good idea if you're looking to do enforcement now that the act has been invoked.
Is that fair?
Yeah.
We weren't going to be doing enforcement immediately, but at some point we thought we probably would go there if they wouldn't move.
We were still very hopeful about resolving it using PLT or other means at that point.
Okay.
So we can agree then that the reason the relocation of the trucks...
From residential areas to Wellington, the reason that stopped was because the invocation of the Act changed OPS's priorities and objectives.
There were many things.
There was the Act, there wasn't a lot of real estate left on Wellington, and not all the groups were prepared to move, and a lot of them weren't moving as per the agreement.
Right, but there was room on Wellington.
It was not full at that time.
It wasn't full, but ultimately we were going to run out of room sooner or later.
Whether there was room for five more trucks or ten more trucks, it didn't really change the outcome.
There wasn't enough room for all those vehicles.
Okay.
Now, your witness statement indicates that Wellington was full in your witness statement.
So I'm just trying to marry that with your evidence right now.
Okay.
So I had told them that it was full, but whether there was...
Room for a few more vehicles, I can't say.
I wasn't on the ground to see it myself, but from the view from some of the camera systems and some of the information I was receiving from officers on the ground that we were running out of space there.
Okay, so I'm going to take you to Superintendent Bernier's scribe notes from that noon meeting on February 15, OPS 3011410.
And so this is the same meeting at noon on February 15, and if we go to page 19 of those notes, at 1238, see there it says, Drummond, do we even still have room left on Wellington, Elgin Bay?
And then Inspector Lucas says, I think there is, but we'll check cameras and assess.
And then who's Hodgkins?
Hodgins.
Tim Hodgins.
Says, are we complicating the problem on Wellington?
No more room on Wellington.
Go home.
No room.
Stay here.
Not helping us.
So what's the discussion there?
It's about that we don't think there's enough room left.
Maybe there is some room.
You know, we're not going out there and measuring.
Right.
Exact amounts on how much room there is.
But ultimately, whether we move a few more trucks or don't move a few more trucks, we can't fit them all.
Fair enough.
So if we go to page 22, at 1309, yeah, at the bottom there, Lucas reports back gaps on Wellington, and he indicates where the gaps are there.
You see that?
Yes.
Okay.
So, um, really, Really, the trigger for stopping the relocations was not that Wellington was full.
You would agree with me on that?
It was one of the factors.
Okay, but we can see there that it was not full, right?
Not all of it, no.
Okay, so OPS made a decision on the 14 in the evening to stop facilitating that deal, correct?
It would have been on the 15th.
That meeting would have been finalized on the 15th.
Right.
But on the 14th, the chief is telling Steve Kanellakis it's done.
Right?
I think he was telling Larry Brooks on that.
Was he not?
That was the meeting with Mr. Kanellakis.
He gets it that it's done.
I'm not sure.
So that, is he saying that the deal's done?
I thought when you showed me that it was about him speaking to Larry Brookson.
That was earlier he had spoken to Larry Brookson.
But in any event, in that meeting on the 14 in the evening where there was that discussion, it was essentially decided that OPS was no longer going to facilitate the movement of trucks onto Wellington.
Can you bring that back up?
I don't know that we have a lot of time for that, but sure, I will see if we can bring that back up.
If we go to OPS 3014566.
So if we go to page 9. Okay, so call with Steve Kaye at 1652 if we go down.
So this seems to be a discussion with Steve Kaye, and the Chief is relaying a discussion he had with Larry Brookson, but he's also speaking to Steve Kaye.
Correct.
And he says at the bottom, he says he gets it that it's done.
Like, I'm assuming that means that the deal's done, like they've made the deal.
Okay, fair enough.
And if we go to the meeting that happens right after, if we go further down to the demo briefing, okay, had to pivot due to new.
And we know at this time PPS is not happy with the trucks on Wellington, according to what Deputy Chief Ferguson is saying on the second bullet point.
And if we go further down...
If we go further down...
Okay, let's go further down.
Yeah.
And...
Before that point was where they wanted to get legal advice about the mayor's deal.
If we just go up a little bit.
Yeah, there we go.
Now I lost it, but there was a point about seeking legal advice.
Yeah, I know the point.
Yeah, exactly.
So are you saying that there was still a consideration at this time to continue moving vehicles?
Well, the next morning, the city is contacting us about whether we're still moving vehicles or not.
So I think that wouldn't have been clear between Steve Cantalakis and the chief the night before because they were reaching out in the morning to see if we were going to continue to move vehicles.
Right, because they had heard that the movement had stopped.
Yeah, but I don't think that they would have gotten that from that meeting with the chief because I think that was in the morning.
With the PLT and the traffic units.
I guess I'm asking about your understanding of this meeting that happened at 5 p.m. on the 14th.
Was it decided at that time that OPS would no longer be facilitating the movement of the trucks?
We know they didn't move after that.
No, we didn't move any more trucks after that, but I think it was in the morning when we weren't going to move anymore.
The totality of all the events, the space.
The invocation of the Act, the fact that a number of the groups weren't moving, and they hadn't left, and other groups who we didn't see a marked departure.
So it was a totality of all those issues coming up on the morning of the 15th.
Okay, so it was on the 15th, it was decided that that would be the end of it.
Yes.
I communicated that with Kim Ayyut.
So I think we agree that there was room on Wellington, but eventually...
It would have run out.
Is that right?
Correct.
Okay.
And this deal was not meant to end the demonstration, was it?
No, it was to shrink the footprint and relieve pressure on some of the residential areas.
Could this have been a first step towards a negotiated end to the demonstration?
It could have been, yes, depending on how it worked out, but I don't think it worked out the way the city had hoped because they didn't see...
Not all the groups were aligned, and the groups didn't leave as they had hoped.
The ones that couldn't fit onto Wellington didn't leave.
Right, but the meeting notes seem to indicate that the primary concern here was the invocation of the Act, POU action on Wellington, potential future POU action on Wellington, the use of resources, and PPS concerns.
Those are all factors, yes.
Okay, thank you.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
So first up is the City of Ottawa.
Good afternoon, Superintendent.
My name is, here we go, a little taller than Ms. Madriguez.
My name is Anne Tardif and I represent the City of Ottawa.
So you were tasked on February 7th with overseeing PLT and POU, correct?
Correct.
And at the time, event commander was Superintendent Patterson, right?
Correct.
And February 7th, that's the date after the events that this commission has heard a fair bit about at Coventry.
Involving PLT, correct?
Correct.
Just to close the loop on that, I'm going to ask Mr. Clerk to bring up OPS 408055.
Okay.
We might need that a bit bigger.
And then can we scroll down, please, Mr. Clerk, all the way to the bottom.
Perfect.
Right there.
This is an email from Peter McKenna.
I apologize, I don't know his rank.
Peter's a staff sergeant.
Staff Sergeant McKenna to Inspector Lucas, dated February 6th, right?
Correct.
And here, Staff Sergeant McKenna is explaining what occurred at Coventry, right?
Correct.
And in the second paragraph from the bottom, he says...
Oh, not second.
It was the second.
Third paragraph from the bottom, he says, PLT have made incredible headway, but they now feel absolutely betrayed.
Work needs to be done to reassure them and explain what happened.
These members are chosen as they have a high level of emotional intelligence that goes along with a very determined work ethic and goes on to say what pride they take in their work.
Staff Sergeant McKenna continues, what has happened is an incredible blow to them and the program's future.
And provides more detail.
It even refers to an individual explaining that they're ashamed to wear this uniform right now.
Now, this was the day before you took over responsibility, but I take it you were aware of this.
I was aware of it the next day, yes.
Right.
And so it's fair to say that by February 8th, while PLT may have been communicating with the protesters, certainly there had been a breakdown in trust.
At that location, yes.
And we've heard some evidence that it may have affected other locations.
Is that fair?
It may have.
Right.
Now, you've explained that PLT was working with the group or discussing with the group at the Rideau Sussex intersection to move from that intersection on to Wellington, correct?
Correct.
And we can take this down, Mr. Clerk.
Thank you.
And it's my understanding that...
The goal was to move 38 trucks from the Rideau Sussex intersection to Wellington, correct?
That's how many trucks were there.
We had had hopes that some would leave.
Okay.
Some of them might not all want to go up there, move on the road.
Let me put it differently.
We're dealing with 38 trucks at that intersection.
Is that fair?
Fair.
Okay.
Now, I just want to get the sequence here.
With the request for approval and the involvement of PPS.
So I'm going to turn up your notes.
And that's OPS 40s, 1-4455.
I apologize.
OPS three zeros, one four four five five.
One four five.
And I'm going to go to page 11 of the document.
I know you have a hard copy with you.
Superintendent.
Perfect.
Okay.
There we go.
If we can just scroll up the top so the superintendent can see the page in his notebook, page 50. Do you see that, superintendent?
Okay.
So if we scroll down about halfway through the page, right there.
So this is February 7th.
Can you just confirm that for us, superintendent?
Yes, that's the cell phone.
Okay.
And it says, spoke with...
John Ferguson, that's Staff Sergeant John Ferguson who leads the PLT unit, correct?
Correct.
Negotiations with truckers by PLT, working arrangement to get the trucks to move out of Rideau Sussex, move vehicles west on Wellington to the...
You're going to have to help me with that one?
To be closer to groups on Wellington, is that right?
Correct.
Some may leave...
This would open up the Rideau-Sussex-McKenzie area.
Okay.
And then need discuss option of PLT option versus POU plan to clear intersection, correct?
Correct.
And we've discussed already that that POU operation was delayed to allow negotiations to proceed, correct?
Correct.
So that's the first note that I can find in your notes of this request by Staff Sergeant Ferguson to get approval.
To move trucks from Rideau Sussex to Wellington West, and that's on February 7th.
Does that accord with your recollection?
Yes.
Okay, let's jump ahead to page 11 of this, sorry, page 12 of this document, the next page, right at the top.
Sorry, scroll down a bit.
Keep going.
Right there.
Same day.
So it says, call from John Ferguson, PLT.
Now we're still on February 7th, correct?
Correct.
Looking for a decision on allowing the trucks at Rideau and Sussex to move up on Wellington.
Advised I would discuss with Mark Patterson, who's the event commander.
Discussed with Mark and want more info on truck numbers.
Correct?
Correct.
It keeps going.
Following up with John Ferguson.
38 trucks involved.
No...
What's the next word?
Number?
No number.
On how many would have...
Would leave?
Yeah.
On how many may leave the demonstration, think they can all fit on Wellington, and may be able to open access to Elgin, we'll discuss with Mark Patterson, right?
So this is all occurring on the 7th.
Let's scroll to the next page, page 13. Still on the 7th.
Call from John Ferguson, PLT, asking to get a meeting with city manager or elected official.
We've talked about this, and that was the meeting that occurred involving Steve Kanellakis on the 8th, correct?
Correct.
And if you scroll down...
Thank you, Mr. Clerk.
Keep going.
So, a little higher.
Stop right there.
Thank you.
It says, on the PLT request, are you with me, Superintendent?
Do you see that?
Yes.
On the PLT request to move trucks from Rideau Sussex to Wellington, need to notify and discuss with PPS for impacts on Senate.
Do you see that?
Yes.
So that's all occurring on February 7th, correct?
Correct.
Now, I can't put the document to you now because I did not seek leave, but I can tell you that on Tuesday, which it was yesterday, Inspector Lucas testified that PPS agreed, albeit begrudgingly, he said, to the additional trucks moving on to Wellington provided certain conditions were met.
So that approval was obtained, according to Inspector Lucas, from PPS on February 8th.
Okay, were you aware of that at the time?
I don't remember that at that point, but I obviously have notes about that.
I don't remember the feedback from Russ Lucas, but it sounds right.
Okay, I couldn't find that in your notes, just so you're aware.
And the reason that's relevant is I'm going to jump ahead to page 31 of your notes.
And if you see, it's page 70 of your notebook.
And I'm just going to ask you to confirm that that's February 10th.
I believe it's five pages earlier for you to confirm the date, Superintendent.
That'd be the 10th, yes.
Okay, so we're now at February 10th.
Can we scroll down a little bit?
Right, and there it is.
Oh, right there.
Requests.
I don't know the next word.
Continued?
Continued POT negotiations.
To go ahead with letting the Rideau Sussex Groove move west on Wellington.
Mark, and that's Superintendent Mark Patterson, right, who's event commander at the time, correct?
Yes.
Agreed to suspend the POU action for tomorrow and let PLT move the Rideau Sussex group west on Wellington to shrink the red zone footprint.
If we could just scroll down a little bit, Mr. Clerk.
Spoken with John Ferguson, head of OPSPLT, authorized PLT to move the Rideau Sussex protester west on Wellington to shrink footprint to get the intersection open up.
Approved.
So on February 10th, then, you got the approval from Event Commander Superintendent Patterson to allow the trucks at Rideau Sussex, up to 38 of them, to move on Wellington Rest, correct?
Correct.
And it's reasonable to assume, and indeed we heard from Inspector Lucas, that PPS agreed to that beforehand, correct?
Correct.
Okay.
And last question.
I don't want to get back into the reasons.
You've given evidence about the reasons why the movement of trucks stops.
The only question I have for you in that respect is this one.
When you finally told the city, and I believe it was Mr. Ayotte, who's the General Manager of Emergency and Protective Services, when you finally told him that the movement of trucks was stopping and you explained why, he understood?
I believe so.
Yeah.
And there was no pushback from him at that point?
No.
Thank you very much.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Next are the convoy organizers.
Okay, we'll move to council for former Chief Sloane, please.
Hi.
Good evening.
Hi.
I'm Rebecca Jones and I'm counsel to former Chief Sully.
Nice to meet you.
Nice to meet you too.
I'm going to start off my interest with my few minutes with you this evening is just to deal with a few issues particular to my client.
So I want to confirm some of the evidence that we heard this morning from Superintendent Bernier and confirm your agreement with that evidence.
Okay.
Superintendent Bernier testified that Chief Sully had a role to play in managing the Freedom Convoy.
And you agree with that?
Correct, he did.
And he has ultimate oversight over the police?
He does.
And his role, with respect to the convoy, would be seen as a strategic role?
Correct.
And we heard from Superintendent Bernier and from Acting Chief.
Bell, that there are not perfectly clear lines between strategic, operational, and tactical decisions.
Correct.
Is that fair?
Oh, that's fair.
Okay.
And we also heard from Superintendent Bernier that these issues are dealt with through dialogue.
Correct.
Okay.
And that he did have dialogue with Chief Slowly about these borders and they would come to an understanding.
I would say yes.
Okay.
It would depend on each topic.
Okay.
Well, his evidence was when he was acting as the event commander, he would have these discussions.
He would tell the chief what he was thinking and that he had the operation under control and the chief would accept that.
Okay.
I wasn't privy to those meetings, but...
Okay.
No reason to disagree with that.
No.
Okay.
Rideau and Sussex, I'm going to touch on just very briefly.
My friend for the City of Ottawa did a very good job clarifying the timeline.
My only interest is with respect to some evidence in your statement about approval for moving vehicles onto Wellington.
Correct.
The approval you were not sure whether you had on February 8th would have been the approval of the event commander, Superintendent Patterson, correct?
Correct.
But there were periods where he was getting direction from the chief there as well.
Okay.
And when you give that evidence, you never spoke to the chief about that, right?
No, but Superintendent Patterson made it clear that the direction was coming from the chief.
Okay.
And so if we wanted to have information about...
Any discussion Superintendent Patterson had with Chief Slowly about Rideau and Sussex, we'd have to ask Superintendent Patterson.
Correct.
Okay, so you can't assist us with any information about when any such discussions occurred, the details of these discussions, whether any direction was given.
You can't assist with anything.
No, I can only tell you what was relayed to me by Superintendent Patterson.
Okay.
Now, I'm going to touch on the mayor's...
Deal.
And I think it will be of most assistance if we can pull up your interview summary, which is WTS 50, please.
Page six.
Superintendent Drummond, you see the first paragraph under the city's deal with protesters.
And in that paragraph, you advised Commission Council that at the February 14th, 1-15 meeting with the city, there was no discussion about where the trucks would be moving.
Correct?
At that meeting, no.
Okay.
I don't have it in my notes.
Right.
And if you don't have it in your notes?
You can't say that it occurred?
No, but the letters made it clear that they were going to be going on to Wellington.
Okay, so your interpretation of, and you're talking about the mayor's letter?
Yes.
Okay, your interpretation of the mayor's letter is that it made it clear that the trucks were going to move on to Wellington.
Correct.
But you have no other information to assist the commissioner with, with respect to Chief Slowly's understanding.
Is that fair?
I can't speak to Chief Slowly's understanding, but that was my understanding from the letter.
That was certainly my understanding when I went to the meeting with the City, and that was what I communicated back.
That was what was done at the update meeting.
So it was clear to me that that's what was going on, and that was what was being communicated through my chain of command and at the next meeting the next day where Chief Slowly was present.
Okay, so let's break that down because I'm not suggesting to you that it wasn't clear to you in your meetings with the city officials.
Okay, so my questions are only relating to what was clear to Chief Slowly.
Okay, so if I can ask you to turn.
We go to page eight, please.
Thank you.
And we see.
The paragraph beginning, the deal was to move the trucks to Wellington.
And we have your belief that Chief Slowley would have known this as it was clear from the Mayor's letter.
And it was discussed with, as you said, Acting Superintendent Bernier and Deputy Chief Ferguson, correct?
Correct.
So it wasn't a discussion you had with the Chief directly?
No, but we had those discussions.
There were updates and there were operational movement happening at the NCRCC, on the ground, on the video.
So you could see it on the camera systems that were set up.
You're saying once the trucks were moving?
Yes.
Okay.
So we're not at the trucks moving yet.
And then you see the next paragraph at 9.30 a.m. on February 14th, you provided an update.
Correct.
And you didn't advise my friends for the commission that you, during this meeting, specifically told the chief that trucks were going to be moved on to Wellington, right?
I think we gave a briefing that that was the planned intent, that the trucks were going to move on to Wellington.
Okay, so you didn't mention it to my friends when they were interviewing you for the commission, but that's your evidence today?
At that briefing, yes.
I would have said we were moving trucks onto Wellington.
Okay.
So your notes of that meeting do not contain any reference to that?
No.
It may not have written down the notes, but it's clear to me throughout the whole process that that was what was happening.
Again, I have no doubt that it was clear to you, and my interest is only with respect to Chief Slewitt.
And it's fair that your meeting, your memory rather, of the details of these meetings...
You're relying in large part on your notes?
Correct.
Okay.
And when my friend took you to things about the Emergencies Act and all of those sorts of things, you couldn't remember them without reference to your own notes, correct?
Some would, yes.
Okay.
I'm gonna ask you now to turn to page nine Oh, just go a little.
That's great.
At 11:20 AM, then Deputy Chief Bell called you to direct you to continue moving trucks onto Wellington, correct?
Correct.
And this was after you had made a decision to stop that movement, right?
Correct.
And that decision that you made was an operational decision?
Correct.
Okay.
And what Acting Chief Bell was doing was he was Directing you on an operational decision, correct?
He was providing input, yes.
Well, he told you to continue moving trucks onto Wellington?
Correct.
Okay.
And is it fair to say that for Deputy Chief Bell, now Acting Chief Bell, we can assume that there was a larger context he was operating under when he gave you that operational direction?
I would agree.
Okay.
And that in these extraordinary circumstances that you all were facing at the time, the lines between strategic and operational directions were blurred.
Yes.
Okay, no further questions.
Are the convoy organizers organized?
Okay.
Mr. Champ, on behalf of the Coalition.
Thank you, Commissioner.
It's Paul Champ for the Auto Coalition of Residents and Businesses.
Superintendent, I can't recall if we've crossed paths.
Yes, we have.
Yes, we have.
Apologize.
It's all good.
Too many OPS files.
A few questions, Superintendent.
First of all, Tom Maratzo, did you know him prior to the convoy demonstration?
No, I did not.
Or we know that there was a recently retired RCMP officer, Danny Bulford, who was involved in the Freedom Convoy organized.
Did you know him at all?
No, I did not.
And did you know of any retired police officers who were participating in the protests?
No.
There was a concern at times, was it not, Superintendent, that some police information or police operational information was being leaked to protesters?
Isn't that so?
Yes, we had some concerns.
And...
There was non-retired members that were...
Pardon me?
There were members that were not retired.
Right.
Yeah, there was a concern that there's some active members or current members might be sharing information with the protesters.
Yes.
Fortunately, though, there was no operational compromise, we don't think?
Is that right?
Yeah, true.
There was some concern that possibly an operational plan around the potential plan to clear Rideau Sussex might have been leaked.
Is that right?
There were some concerns about information flowing out of the organization, yes.
And was there any investigations into that by the auto police service to find out if any officers did in fact leak information?
I believe there was.
There was one member that I was aware of, and we shut down his access to his corporate accounts.
But I don't know what came of that investigation.
Just at the time, as a precaution, we shut down.
He wasn't currently working.
He was on leave absence.
Right.
At the time, you were worried about the operation, what you're trying to do, discipline issues.
You guys were facing challenges on every level at that time.
Yes, we were.
Just a couple questions about the negotiations and the Mayor's deal.
Oh, wait, hold on a sec here.
No, you know what?
I'm not going to ask you any questions on that.
I just want to ask you some questions about the conditions on the ground in downtown Ottawa at that time, Superintendent.
One thing we had heard about, about a fuel truck had parked in the Rideau Centre parking lot.
You would agree with me, Superintendent, that would be very dangerous?
Yes.
And we also have heard evidence and seen images of big hay bales piled around downtown and also open fires and so forth.
Those were dangerous, was it not?
Yes.
Many propane tanks, large numbers of propane tanks up together, as well as large numbers of jerry cans.
That was very dangerous.
Yes.
And in addition to the hay bales and the propane tanks and the open fires and the jerry cans, in the evenings, there were fireworks going off very close to and banging off of apartment buildings.
You're aware of that?
Yes.
And that was very dangerous?
Yes.
Yes, it was.
And, Superintendent, the convoy protesters were free.
To do all of this downtown, in downtown Ottawa, because at the time, Ottawa Police Service did not have capacity for enforcement.
Is that fair?
In the beginning, certainly we had a resource problem, for sure.
Absolutely.
Well, but those kinds of activities were going on right until the final operation, correct?
There was some efforts around the jerry cans.
There were efforts on all fronts.
I mean, I went out on the street on foot and was involved in some enforcement.
Particularly with a firework situation.
But they were difficult scenarios because there were large crowds and there were officer safety issues when we did some of that enforcement work.
And you would agree with me, Superintendent, we are all very fortunate here in Ottawa that no one was seriously harmed or even killed, including the protesters themselves, because of these dangerous activities.
Yes, there could have been injuries.
Serious injuries with all that flammable material?
Yes.
And so the fact that the Ottawa police couldn't prevent much of that activity, the convoy protesters were free to engage in those activities that created that risk.
We tried to take efforts to curb those things, and we did do enforcement where possible, but it wasn't perfect.
Wow, Superintendent.
There wasn't any serious effort to enforce to stop that.
And not to be critical of the police, my understanding from previous evidence is that when Ottawa police would try to take that kind of enforcement action downtown, they'd end up sometimes being swarmed by the protesters, they'd be outnumbered very quickly.
Yes.
And it'd become a matter of officer safety.
I would agree with that.
So again, there wasn't really any serious efforts to be able to stop those kinds of dangerous activities in downtown Ottawa.
We tried to do enforcement in a lot of areas, and it was met with mixed results.
There was no serious progress on those issues.
Ottawa was basically unsafe throughout the entirety of that process.
Or, pardon me, protest.
I don't know if I'd go that far.
We certainly did take a stance, and once we got more POU units on the ground in the evening on the QRT teams, we did...
We did try to do enforcement and try to stop some of those things.
But we weren't successful on all fronts.
I agree with you.
And with the protesters generally being free to do this, at some point they could have been injured themselves and become victims of their own freedom.
Would you agree with me?
They could have been injured, yes.
Thank you very much, superintendent.
Thank you.
Good evening.
For the record, Brendan Miller.
I'm counsel for the Freedom Corp, which is the entity representing the protesters that were in your city in January and February of 2022.
So first, I want to talk to you about February 7th, 2022.
And at that time, I take it that OPS was well aware of who Tom Marazzo was?
Yeah, that was the first time I heard his name.
I can't speak for the entire service, just myself.
Right.
And I take it that, in fact, a PLT report was sent around about who are the key players and leaders within the protesters.
Is that correct?
There were various reports.
Right.
Over the course of the...
And there was a list of whom PLT had identified as the leaders, and he was one of them.
Was that right?
Yes.
And in fact, in that list, it said that Tom Marazzo had somewhat control over 322 trucks.
Do you remember that?
The Freedom Convoy Group is how I would remember that.
Would you agree it was about 322 trucks?
That was one of them.
That came up on a document, yes.
Right.
All right.
So on February 7th, you have your PLT team engaging with Tom Marazzo.
Is that right?
Correct.
Right.
And are you aware, and Tom Marazzo made this clear, that on February 7th you'd lost confidence in your liaison officers in trying to deal with this?
I was not aware of that.
All right.
Did your police liaison officers ever report to you that on February 7th Tom Marazzo specifically requested of both OPS and OPP that an inspector-level officer be made available for the negotiation to move the trucks because he wasn't getting anywhere?
No.
We had made arrangements for him to meet with a city official as he had requested.
I don't know about the other comments that you've made.
All right.
So the PLT officers that were working under you never reported that to you?
No.
All right.
Now, I want to talk to you about February 8th.
There was discussions.
That was one of the first discussions with respect to removing the concrete barriers, etc., and moving the trucks took place.
It was the first attempt to clear Rodeo and Sussex.
Do you remember that?
At Rideo and Sussex, yes.
Yeah.
And all of the concrete barriers, both in the residential area as well as on Wellington, they were all still in place at that time?
Yes.
Well, I'll be honest with you.
I can't confirm that.
We may have moved some.
I wasn't keeping track of every Jersey barrier in the Corps.
Right.
And Tom had essentially met, Mr. Morazzo had met with these individuals from the city and from OPS to negotiate moving the trucks on to Wellington.
But I understand it from your notes, etc.
You knew at that time that wasn't going to happen.
So there was some confusion, I believe, about whether they were leaving or moving.
Right.
And at no time did you have authorization from the city, not the OPS, on February 8th, 2022, to move the barriers, did you?
No.
Well, we hadn't requested that yet.
Okay.
So wouldn't it have made sense in trying to deal with this, to discuss with the city prior to meeting with Mr. Morazzo?
That you're going to move these barriers to get these trucks out of the residential area and we're going to go into this negotiation with the plan?
Wouldn't that have made more sense?
Well, if we had reached some sort of agreement, we had city crews available to us 24-7.
That wasn't difficult to move a barrier.
Right.
And you're aware that Wellington is well within the City of Ottawa's jurisdiction.
It doesn't belong to Parliament.
Correct.
Right.
So at any time, on February 8th, 2022, there was nothing stopping OPS in the city from moving the barriers, letting the trucks leave the residential area, and letting them go on to Wellington, was there?
You're referring to Rideau and Sussex?
Correct.
That's not necessarily a residential area.
That's a commercial area there.
Right.
So you agree that there was nothing stopping you, or the city, or OPS?
From allowing that to happen on February 8th, 2022.
It could have been done, but we didn't reach an agreement.
And the group there didn't want to move.
I understand that may be the evidence.
Where did you...
You didn't ever hear from anyone from that group.
You didn't speak to them, and they didn't say to you that they didn't want to move, did they?
I had had dealings up at that street.
I'd been up to Rideau and Sussex during the course of the events.
Right.
And did they just go and tell you, someone approached you, you're saying, and said, no, we're not moving?
They made it clear on a number of occasions they weren't too happy.
But you knew from your PLT work that Tom Mirazzo had apparent control of 322 trucks.
And that was on February 7th.
That's in your own document.
Correct.
And so, if you move the barriers and the deal went through, as discussed on February 8th, right, it could have been done.
I think there were some issues about whether they were leaving or moving, and I had spoke to Superintendent Patterson earlier, and we didn't have approval to do that.
Approval?
To move west.
Okay, and whose approval did you need?
The event commander, Superintendent Patterson.
Superintendent Patterson.
So you're saying that Superintendent Patterson didn't permit the February 8, 2022 deal?
So at that, so around 1738, I have notes about that when I talked to John Ferguson, that I had talked earlier to Mark Patterson, and the Chief was involved, and we didn't have approval to move west at that point.
Okay, and you said you didn't have approval.
Whose approval again?
Was it Patterson?
The event commander.
The event commander.
So you're saying that Patterson's approval was required in order to move the barriers?
Correct.
Now, with respect to the February 14th agreement, if I can just have you direct your mind to that, that's the deal with the mayor on a Monday morning.
Yes.
So, Mary Watson and the city manager, Steve Kaye, they testified already in this proceeding that senior OPS officials were tasked to be on the ground to help facilitate the movements of trucks on February 14th.
You heard that testimony, I take it?
I didn't hear that piece, no.
All right.
Can you agree that you are the OPS official that the Mayor and the City Manager were referring to?
Is it referring to me coming to the meeting on the 13th at City Hall?
Yes, that would be me on the 13th.
I wasn't on the ground on the 14th.
Right.
And you weren't on the ground and you weren't attempting to carry out the move that was agreed to?
We were attempting.
We moved 30 to 40 trucks up onto Wellington.
Right, and then it stopped.
It stopped for a number of reasons.
Right, okay.
At any time during the February 14th move, did Tom Morazo or any of the leaders you had identified in your PLT report from February 7th say to you, "We're going to renege." They didn't, did they?
No, they just couldn't seem to.
Finish the deal in the sense that there were groups that they couldn't get to move.
There were groups that weren't on board.
So, which groups?
There was a group on Bank Street.
Okay, but again, you were dealing with Tom Marazzo.
Correct.
Bank Street wasn't in those 322 trucks, was it?
See, that was something we didn't have, it wasn't clear who belonged to what groups, right?
People didn't wear team jerseys explaining who belonged to.
Which team, so to speak, out there?
But they were trying to do it, and we've already seen evidence of this, and the barriers weren't being moved, so they could.
We allowed trucks to move that agreed to move.
We moved those trucks.
Okay, so you're saying that the trucks that agreed to move and go on to Wellington, you pulled up the barriers and allowed each and every one of them out of where they were and on to Wellington, and that you didn't stop anyone?
No, we didn't stop anyone on the Monday, no.
Okay, thank you.
Thank you.
Next is the Government of Canada.
Good afternoon, Superintendent Drummond, Commissioner.
Good afternoon.
My name is Andrew Gibbs and I'm part of the Council team representing the Government of Canada.
You've already answered many of the questions that I had prepared for you today, so I'll focus in my examination on just a couple of areas.
I'll use my time for that.
First of all, we heard earlier this week From Interim Chief Bell, who has also testified that this demonstration was exceptionally challenging for our PLT members from the perspective that there were so many different people and so many different organizations and so many different groups.
Do you agree with that assessment?
Yes.
And in fact, I think he estimated the number at 8 to 10 different groups.
Representing 50 to 100 political agendas.
Does that sound like a fair estimate?
I'd have a hard time putting a number on it, but there were a lot of different groups here.
And he in fact said that those leaders, organizers, and groups changed on a regular basis, and many of them had different agendas.
And he concluded by saying, there probably could not have been a more complex and challenging environment for our PLT members to work in.
Would you agree with that?
I would agree with that.
Thank you.
For the record, those references are to the transcript WTS 8 at page 97, line 13 to 21, and page 194, lines 4 to 8. So there were a large number of factions involved.
Correct.
And we've heard in your testimony today that there was a group at Rideau and Sussex.
Yes.
And I believe you said they were very difficult to deal with.
They were.
The documents refer to Farfada.
Yes.
Are you familiar with Farfada?
I wasn't up until then.
That was the group that was there.
I don't have a lot of detail about their background or their beliefs or goals.
Are they subject of attention of the police force for criminal activity?
During the events on the Actions On days, yes, when we were dealing with them on the 18th, yes.
Thank you.
There was a group known as the East Convoy, is that correct?
Are you referring to the group that was out of Coventry Road?
No, there was another group at Coventry Road, and I believe they were led by Mike Clark.
Yes, that's the name that was provided to me as well.
And that's also referred to, the Coventry Road is also referred to as RCTG.
Jet Form Park, yes.
And Jet Form Park.
The East Convoy Group, I believe, was the one that put forward a request for a meeting with the Governor-General Simons, the Prime Minister, and the Senate Speaker, George Furry.
Do you recall that?
I remember that was in an email, yes.
Then you have the Freedom Convoy Group, which was led by Tom Marazzo and Chris Barber.
Correct.
You met with them as part of a deal with the city?
Yes.
Was Tamara Leach at that meeting?
No.
Was Pat King at that meeting?
No.
So did the Freedom Convoy group, they told you that they don't have control over the Rideau Sussex group during that meeting?
Correct.
And they told you they don't have control over the Coventry group?
Correct.
And it was unclear who else they would be able to control, but that they would try?
Correct.
So in the end, the deal falls apart.
Correct.
And there are references in the documents to Ms. Leach on Twitter, apparently stepping away or trying to clarify that you're not leaving, they're just moving to Wellington.
I'm not familiar with her tweets, to be honest.
Okay, that's fair.
Were you aware that there was a separate video posted?
By another organizer, suggesting that this agreement was a lie.
The letters were a lie and that it was fake.
Again, I'm not familiar with that, but that doesn't surprise me that that would have occurred.
Okay, if we can turn to document OPP 403427.
And this is an OPP, Operational Intelligence Report.
And it's dated February 14th.
Are you familiar with these reports?
I have seen some of them, yes.
Okay.
If you turn to page 3, it states that the organizer blacked out, posted a video on the 13th of February 2022.
The following is a summary.
The letter is spreading around that trucks will move is a lie.
Blacked out, advised the truckers that no one leaves.
It is part of the counter-protest shit.
It is all a lie.
Do not leave Ottawa.
Do not leave the residential areas.
Do not back out.
You are good to go.
Stand your ground.
And it continues.
Do you see that information?
I do.
So would you agree with me then that this video being posted by an organizer Coalescence or agreement amongst the list of organizers that my friend Mr. Miller mentioned to you a few moments ago.
I would agree that there was some dissension amongst the groups.
Dissension amongst the groups.
And so, in fact, thank you, Mr. Clerk.
Your witness statement mentions that the protest leadership clearly had not achieved the consensus they claimed they were going to have.
Correct.
So, in fact, there was no core group of organizers.
PLT was just doing what it could with whoever would talk to them.
We tried to identify the larger groups when possible.
That didn't always pan out as we had hoped.
There was definitely some fractured.
The groups were very fractured and had different views on things.
And is it fair to say that part of the challenge in moving all of the trucks was that everybody wanted to go downtown onto Wellington?
Yes.
And we'd heard there were potentially 322 trucks from one of the organizers?
Yes.
Ultimately, I believe most of the, particularly, you know, I would say that the people who came from out west, I suspect that they would have liked to, had a chance to be on Wellington.
Yes.
And there was no room for everybody on Wellington?
Correct.
And so did it become a safety issue with them all trying to come down to Wellington?
Yes, we had to do a traffic plan to divert some of them.
And you stated that there was no movement of trucks off-site?
We didn't see a noticeable move.
Some may have moved.
The problem is we don't have a system in place where we're like...
Marking a truck and saying this is truck 105, this is 110, things like that.
So vehicles come and go.
You know, it's hard for us to keep track of every vehicle.
And there was a group on Bank Street who refused to move.
Correct.
And that was a new group that developed that day.
Yes.
I believe they were already there.
They weren't new that day.
They just didn't move.
They weren't identified to you perhaps as an organizer or as someone with influence to prevent people from leaving.
Thank you.
So.
So, is it fair to say, and you'd mentioned earlier, that this was a very challenging protest to manage?
And that, I believe you said there were weekend surges?
Yes.
So, the groups were fluid?
Very fluid.
And there were various camps just outside of Ottawa?
Yes.
Where people would go and then come back?
Yes.
And you didn't really have a line of sight of what was happening in all of those camps?
We had some information.
There were different...
OPP were keeping an eye on some of the ones that are outside the City of Ottawa, the one in the East End.
Okay.
They were sharing intelligence on that.
And so the situation was fluid?
Yes.
It was volatile?
It was at times, yes.
And it was unpredictable?
Yes.
And you'd mentioned that there were some current serving police officers that were in and supportive of the protesters.
Yes, unfortunately.
All right.
I'd like to turn then to another issue on the nature of the protest.
And so again, turning to Interim Chief Bell, he testified that over the weekend of February 11, 12, 13, so this is going into the third weekend now in Ottawa.
Yes.
He had extreme concerns for the safety of our members.
For the safety of our community based on volatility and escalation of violence, indirect confrontational interactions with our members.
The situation at this point was becoming exceptionally more volatile, and you could see it escalate almost on an hour-by-hour basis.
Would you agree with that?
Yes, it was volatile.
Thank you.
Now, just a couple of quick documents.
It'll have to be very quick because your time is up.
Okay, thank you.
I would like to just refer you in particular to ask you, were you aware that there were elements of right-wing extremism involved in this protest?
Yes, I read that in the Hendon reports.
And in fact, you were sent a report that had been prepared by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
It was sent to Chief Slowly and you were copied on that.
And the report was called An Online Environmental Scan of Right-Wing Extremism.
And in particular, they had done a draft intelligence report on the convoy in Canada, in Ottawa.
Is that correct?
I know the document you're referring to, yes.
So for the record, that's OPS 000, or four zeros, 9428.
OPS 409429.
And in particular, I would just ask you about the last page of that report.
Okay.
The last paragraph.
In summary, just because I'm short of time, but I would recommend to the Commission to read the entire report.
There are comments and posts online stating that organizing and planning for a proposed D.C. convoy, that's Washington, D.C., is beginning to cement.
Taking into account the events in Ottawa, the anger and hostility driving much of the campaign, the protest movement's acceptance and support of conspiracies and misinformation, an implicit...
and explicit links to extremist groups which are identified in the report or in the draft intel report.
There are some glaring comparisons to the capital insurrection on January 6th, 2021.
Did you agree with that at the time?
I see the comments are made there.
This is a private company.
It's not a recognized intelligence group that we would have dealt with back then.
I know that company had sent documentation to us.
I think they were looking for us to get involved in their product.
Were you concerned of the similarities?
Well, I mean, you know, there were people who made comments between us and what had happened in the U.S. State Capitol.
You know, there were similarities to what occurred.
I mean, we didn't have the same storming of the hill that the Americans had.
We had, you know, vehicles camped out on roadways.
So there were differences.
We didn't have the same level of violence and mischief that had occurred down in Washington.
And we know that now.
We know that now, exactly.
We know that now.
It was a risk that was on your mind at the time.
Yes.
Thank you.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Next is the OPP.
Okay, and JCCF.
Good afternoon, or I suppose good evening.
My name is Hatem Kier.
I'm representative for the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms.
Did you have the opportunity to hear Superintendent Morris' evidence given to this commission?
I saw parts of it.
I watched some of the video.
I was away last week.
Are you aware that Superintendent Morris indicated that he had no indication that there was a national security threat posed by the protest?
I don't recall that, no.
I didn't see all of his evidence.
Do you have any reason to doubt the intelligence that Superintendent Morris had received?
No, I don't.
And just to confirm, you were just showed an intelligence report from a private company.
Are you aware of any of the potential information?
That went into forming that report?
No, I don't.
I'm not familiar with that company.
I had seen that email and I think we maybe had had a presentation from them earlier in the year through Chief Slowly, but I think they're a US-based company.
I'm not really familiar with them.
No further questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Next is the Ottawa Police Service.
Good evening, Superintendent.
For the record, my name is Jessica Barrow, and I'm counsel for the Ottawa Police Service.
Mr. Commissioner, I just want to ask for permission to replay a video that played earlier today with Superintendent Bernier in cross-examination.
It only became relevant as a result of his cross-examination, and so though it's not on the list of materials I intended to bring Superintendent Drummond to, I would appreciate leave to do that with this witness.
In the circumstances, I don't see a problem unless any council finds anything out.
So, seeing none.
Sure, go ahead.
Thank you.
The number for that is HRF1560.
The number for that is HRF1560.
The number for that is HRF1560.
Superintendent German, have you seen this video before?
Yes, I have.
And are you able to tell us, based on what you're seeing here, where this video was taken?
Rideau and Sussex.
We're looking southbound here.
That's the Westin Hotel on the left.
Before I continue the video, can you give us some context as to we've heard already about the...
The group of protesters that were located there, but can you give us some additional context about the type of behavior that was seen throughout the protest at this location?
They were very anti-government, anti-authority.
Farfada was one of the groups that was there.
We had had conflict there and called for service there to try to deal with even problems within the groups with each other.
I think you've heard today that the Freedom Convoy group also was not successful in trying to reach any resolution with them trying to move or do things differently there.
And this video, I believe, is shot on the 18th of February when we are doing what's called actions on for a positive action with the public order units.
We're clearing out that intersection and clearly there are people that are not being the direction from the police officers on scene.
And are entering into altercations.
All right, perhaps we could just continue the video.
Don't forget our cool and cool and cool.
Don't be selfish.
Thank you.
What do you observe happening there?
So there is a fellow with a backpack.
You can see that at the beginning, the public order officers, the ones that have the yellow one, are trying to get that person to keep moving on.
And he's hanging on to a, I think it's a parking sign, but he's hanging on to a sign there.
Ultimately, he's being combative and not listening to direction.
And remember, behind, you see the officers that are not in yellow.
The darker clothing, they are what we would refer to as less lethal officers.
They have weapons with them that would fire like a rubber bullet or gas if required.
And they are behind the line that you see in yellow.
And I believe one or two of them become involved with that individual.
You can't see enough, but obviously they are on the ground.
I researched this incident.
And I know that what happens is the person on the ground places a kind of a hole on the officer's leg and won't let go.
And the officer believes that his leg is going to be broken.
He delivers strikes with the tip of the Arwen gun to get him to release.
Were any reports filed in relation to this incident?
Yes.
The subject was arrested.
There was an injured on duty report filed for the officer.
He had medical treatment after that with EMS.
And the subject was processed for charges.
He said that the officer received medical attention?
He was seen by paramedics.
In relation to this incident?
In relation to this incident, yeah.
Okay, those are my questions.
Thanks very much, Superintendent.
Thank you.
Any re-examination?
I have a few more questions for you.
Now, in relation to what you were asked by counsel for former Chief Slowly, you indicated that your reason for believing that Chief Slowly knew that the deal was to move trucks on to Wellington and that the move actually happened was the letters exchanged between the Mayor and Tamerile.
Did you recall that?
Correct, yes.
Okay.
So I just want to take you to OPS 3014566.
And again, these are Chief Slowly's notes from February 14. We looked at them earlier.
And if I can take you to page 8. We go down.
So we see here, we talked about the call that he had with Larry Brookson, and Brookson says, trying to get understanding the meeting to completely fill up Wellington Street.
Chief briefed his team, understood that the Intersect team would then brief everyone, including PPS.
And if we keep going down, and then he says, Brookson says, prefer...
For an administrator to reach out on their own and then permit the vehicles to sardine in on Wellington Street, this was purely political.
And the chief says, we were not given any level of details.
Rob Drummond is our liaison at the table with the city.
We advise him that Brookson will have full access to Rob Drummond.
Now, first of all, Did Larry Brookson reach out to you after the 14 at all?
No.
Okay.
And if we go down to page 9, right before the redaction, if we keep going, now this is the 5 p.m. demo briefing, and we know that Chief Slowly is there because these are his notes.
And if we look in the middle there, we need some significant legal advice regarding the mayor's position that they can be on Wellington.
So does this refresh your memory about whether the chief knew that trucks had been relocated onto Wellington at least by the 14?
I believe so.
Okay, so that was explicitly stated at this 5 p.m. meeting, as we can see here.
I believe so, yes.
Okay.
And I want to take you now in response to what my friend Mr. Miller asked you about regarding whether any protesters who wanted to move were prevented from moving.
For moving, exactly.
If I can take you to your notes, OPS 3014455.
And I want to take you to page 60. And so this is the meeting where the...
The issues are being discussed on the 15th.
It's the noon meeting on February 15th with all of the people that we had indicated.
And if we go actually to page 62, and then we're going to go back to page 60. So at 1329, after the meeting, you say, I called Trish Ferguson and notified her of the integrated command table's position on the truck movement to Wellington and the reason why to stop.
And you have four kind of bullet points there.
PLT position.
Advice from Dave Springer.
PPS issues and concerns.
And then lastly, Emergency Act.
No orders yet, but is concern may contravene.
See that?
Yes.
Okay.
So you will agree with me that it doesn't say in any of those four points that the reason to stop is Wellington is full.
Correct?
Correct.
And it doesn't say there that the reason to stop is because protesters no longer want to move, right?
Correct.
We had discussed this before, though.
I realize it's not in those bullet points, but yes, I agree it's not on the bullet points.
Right.
Well, that's not a notation that you made in any of your notes, right?
There's no notation in your notes that protest groups are no longer moving.
There's not one more truck that wants to move, right?
Correct.
Okay.
And I want to take you now to OPS three zeros, one, four, four, five, five.
and then we'll take a knife.
Oh, sorry.
I'm there.
Sorry.
I want to take you to, I wanted to take you to John Ferguson's notes.
And I thought that's where we were.
You said you wanted to go to page 60, but I don't know.
Yes.
Well, he's acknowledged.
I don't think I need to go back.
but I do want to go to John Ferguson's notes and I just need to make sure I have the reference here for that meeting.
I had taken you there earlier, so I'm just going to find the reference in my notes.
Council, if it helps, I think it's 14568.
Thank you.
That is probably what it is.
Yes, thank you.
I'll know it when I see it.
Yes, that's it.
Thank you very much.
And if I can take you to page 75. At the bottom of the page, right before the 1330, right, it says, room for additional trucks on Wellington Street, security concerns expressed by PPS slash Supreme Court.
And these are Staff Sergeant Ferguson's notes of the same meeting at 12 p.m.
You see that?
Okay, yes.
Okay, so he's acknowledging here that there is room on Wellington to move more vehicles, right?
It is, yes.
And finally, I want to take you to Superintendent Bernier's scribe notes from this meeting as well, OPS 3011410, at page 22. At 1305, the event commander...
Superintendent Bernier says, deal was, I think, that may be bartered before the PM declared Emergency Measure Act, and see there's an arrow, will no longer support agreement.
Correct.
And so you agree with me that in none of these meetings, and certainly not in this meeting at 12 noon, because I've read everybody's notes that was at this meeting, it was not indicated.
That protesters were no longer moving vehicles, correct?
That they weren't willing to relocate.
That was not mentioned in this meeting.
So are you referring to the groups that didn't want to move or the ones that did want to move?
I'm not sure I understand the question.
That the issue was that you could not find any more trucks to move.
That was not the issue here, right?
There likely were other trucks that were willing to move.
There was room on Wellington, but it was OPS's decision to stop implementing the deal, as it indicates here, will no longer support agreement.
Deal was bartered before the PM declared the Emergency Measure Act, as it says there, correct?
Yes, that was one of the factors.
I have those listed in my notes too.
Okay, thank you.
Those are my questions.
Okay.
So that ends here.
Testimony will be pleased to hear.
Thank you very much for coming.
No problem.
And for your evidence and for staying so late.
I know it's...
I'm used to it, it's okay.
I imagine you are.
Okay, so we're going to adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9:30.
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