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Oct. 25, 2022 - Viva & Barnes
09:04:04
Emergencies Act Live Stream with Comment Section
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Time Text
Where's the camera here?
I'm using an old computer.
The screen is all disgusting.
direct supervisor with superintendent chris that's a little better yeah and
and uh you you you you you you Thank you.
You became incident commander.
How did you come to serve as incident commander?
It was within the scope of my roles and responsibilities as the inspector of the operational support.
I'm going to move closer to the modem.
I'm going to remove myself.
I'm going to be running.
Share the link around, everybody.
Thank you.
I'll fix the internet in a second.
Hold on.
That is correct.
Thank you.
In your summary, you told us that Superintendent Rao was the initial event commander.
What was his role, and how did it differ from your role as incident commander?
So he had two different primary roles.
One was to provide strategic direction to the management of the event that was taking place, and he was to serve as a conduit between the actual operational side and the executive.
And you mentioned in your summary as well that Acting Deputy Chief Patricia Ferguson also provided strategic oversight.
What was her role and how did it differ from Superintendent Rayom's role?
So Superintendent Rayom was more involved in the daily operational oversight where the person would be involved more in the...
The bigger picture, strategic, how it interfaces with the public and our roles and responsibilities as one part of the overall operations that are happening across the city.
There were still regular operations that were still occurring.
Okay, so is it fair to say that both mention that You learned about the Freedom Convoy for the first time on January 18th, and that on January 21st, you began to act as incident commander.
And I'd like to explore with you what your understanding was of the Freedom Convoy as of January 21st.
So my first question is, what did you understand the Freedom Convoy's goal to be?
It was basically a protest that was driving across the country to raise awareness and to voice their displeasure with the current government mandates and what they believed was the overreach of the federal government.
Okay.
I would like to pull up OPS402876.
So if you could scroll down to page...
Yeah, that's good.
So Inspector Lucas, you can see that this is an email that Kevin Kennedy sent you on January 21st.
Do you recall receiving this email?
I do.
Okay, and then if you scroll down, you'll see that Staff Sergeant Kennedy...
Scroll further down, please.
...was forwarding an email from Sergeant...
Sean K. What was Sergeant K.'s role in the Freedom Convoy?
So he was the one who was actually doing the plan, writing the plan, and engaged in basically the meat and potatoes of it.
And Kevin Kennedy was providing the oversight and the guidance with his experience.
And if you scroll down just a little further, okay, that's, sorry, just up a bit.
Thank you.
So you see that Sergeant Kay writes, this convoy is to come from all the time.
Who is Ron DeSantis?
He's the kid who grew up right here in Florida, working his tail off, paying his own way through school, and then volunteering.
And specifically Parliament Hill in an attempt to force the government to repeal the COVID measures.
Does this align with your understanding of what the convoy's goal was at this point in time, Inspector?
So there was a...
Yes, it was talking about disrupting as a protest would, as you would normally see with the protests that we see every day.
But the context at this point is no convoys had departed at this point, and we were still talking about the context.
Thank you.
Do you recall forwarding the email chain to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson?
Is the video good at least?
I do.
And why did you forward the email chain to her?
I think it's important that there's communication within the organization and sharing of information so that they can be aware.
And make strategic decisions and be aware of things that are coming.
So it's fair to say you thought this was a significant enough event that the executive of OPS needed to be appraised at an early stage.
Yes.
Okay.
And if you could just scroll up a bit.
So we see that Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson shared this email with Chief Slowly and then Deputy Chief Bell, did you have any direct interactions with either Chief Slowly or Deputy Chief Bell during the Freedom Convoy outside of meetings or team meetings or briefings?
if Ferguson, that it was her role to relay information that you were providing to her to Julie and to the extent it pertained to intelligence to Deputy Chief Bell.
She would manage, on my assumption, she would be managing the information to determine what he needs to be advised to.
Okay.
You can take that email down now.
So I'd like to turn to the role Okay, and you mentioned that was the direction
we've been pivoting to.
Who gave that direction?
I can't say for sure.
I said I only returned into that role at the beginning of the year.
I'd worked in that directorate before in prior years, but three years prior to that I'd been working on the road.
Okay.
And so we've heard evidence at the Commission during the past week of hearings that intelligence-led planning was something that was important to Chiefs slowly.
Were you aware that...
The former chief wanted planning to be intelligence-led.
Yes.
Okay.
So, how did the intelligence directorate share intelligence with you and your special events planners?
So, it was more so at the working level.
So, the planning team members would work with the constables and sergeants in the intelligence directorate to make sure that they're getting Do you recall if the Intelligence Directorate shared documents titled Threat Assessment with you and your planning team before the Freedom Convoy arrived?
Not with me personally, but I know there was discussions.
They may not share the full reports.
They may vet them before they share the salient information with Okay, so could we pull up OPS 403085?
live.
So if you could just scroll down.
So we see this is email from Sergeant K to you on January 26th, and it says attached is the intelligence report from OPS.
And then if we scroll up, we see that you forwarded that report to Superintendent Ray Ohm and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson.
Do you see the title of that report?
Convoy Jan 22 threat assessment.
Thank you.
Mic check one two.
Can you still hear me talking?
I'm gonna put the question in the chat.
Can you hear me talking now or not?
I am currently speaking.
If you cannot hear me talking...
Nope.
Now it's gone.
Audio is gone.
You, yes, not the video.
Oh, that sucks.
Okay, I'm pulling out the earbuds.
Okay, top of page three.
Right there is good.
So in the second paragraph, we see, therefore we expect to see a huge volume of vehicles and large transport trucks clogging.
City roads.
Was it your understanding from this threat assessment that there would be large numbers of vehicles arriving in Ottawa as part of the Freedom Convoy?
I did.
So the intelligence was stating that I want to provide a little additional context.
So we knew the convoy was going to be arriving.
At this point, I believe it was only the Western convoy that was on route.
The other convoys were not yet.
And we were monitoring the actual size and the behaviors and their actions, which was included as part of our building our plan.
Okay.
And in your summary, I think you referenced a previous truck protest in Ottawa with somewhere around the range of 20 to 30 trucks.
Do you recall that?
I wasn't involved in it, but the information that was relayed to me by the planning team was that they had experienced this before, and we had experience with other summer vehicle protests downtown as well.
Okay.
So when you saw that the Intelligence Directorate was saying, we expect to see a huge volume of vehicles and large transport trucks, and keeping in mind that you didn't have an exact number...
Were you expecting it would be more than 20 or 30 trucks that you'd seen in the past?
Yes, because the core convoy that started out from BC, I believe, was around 50 with vehicles that would join it and then depart at various parts of the lake.
Okay.
And if we could just scroll down to page 5 of the document, right here in the section, what this means for event planners.
And I'll just give you a bit of time to review this before I ask some questions.
Okay.
Okay.
Okay, so...
So, from your understanding of this section, what this means for event planners, did you think the Intelligence Directorate understood the Freedom Convoy to be similar to or unlike previous events that Ottawa had experienced?
Well, it was going to be larger than what we'd experienced before.
Again, the intelligence is only one piece of the puzzle that they're using towards the planning process as well.
Okay, so specifically here, the first bullet reads this event is going to be bigger in crowd size than any demo in recent history, possibly on par with Canada Day events, but more disruptive.
So what you've understood from this, that the The Freedom Convoy was likely to cause more significant disruption than other significant events that Ottawa had experienced before.
So around the 25th, 26th, the primary focus, we originally planned this as a main portion of our planning was focused around how do we manage?
Because the number of vehicles that were potentially going to arrive, you were not going to stop.
So it was how do you work with them to mitigate the risks and the impacts to the community?
So with this, that statement, that a lot of the challenges and disruption would be around traffic.
But we also had to focus on, as well, the fact that the convoy organizers were actually cooperative and were not demonstrating disruptive behavior on their way there, the ones that were already, the one that was already under road.
Okay.
And you mentioned the number of...
Vehicles was such that you're not going to stop them, and I'm going to circle back to that number later.
But before I do, I just wanted to close off this piece.
The bullet starting within six years reads, in six years of working large demonstration events, from the intelligence point of view, the writer has never seen such widespread community action.
Did you understand?
The intelligence directorate to be saying that the level of mobilization and support for this protest across Canada was unprecedented.
So part of the context of this, and knowing the writer and knowing the people involved, is part of the challenge is the topic of mandates, the restrictions, vaccinations, is an extremely divisive topic.
I've seen it in my own family, and you see that those challenges arise, and it becomes a polarizing topic of discussion.
So yes, it does have the potential to create language and debate amongst people who are going like, what would have?
Right, and if we could just scroll to page three, the bottom of page three.
Further down, just slightly.
So we read in the last paragraph, the writer says these conditions create grounds for passionate emotions.
Is that consistent with what you were just describing about the divisive nature of mandates?
Yes.
Okay.
So...
I'd like to circle back now to...
The topic of numbers since you mentioned it.
As of January 26th, how many convoys did you understand would be traveling to Ottawa?
So on the 21st, I was aware of five potential convoys.
And by the time we got to the 28th, we were up 13 confirmed convoys.
Okay.
Do you have a specific recollection of how many convoys you were aware of as of January 26th, which is the date you received this threat assessment?
No, I don't recall, top of my head.
Okay.
Could we pull up OPS 14540?
Sorry, it should be OPS 30 is 14540.
Okay.
So, Inspector Lucas, do you recognize this document as your notes?
It's my duty book, yes.
Okay.
And if we could go to page 7. So, we see these are your notes for January 26th.
And scrolling down further down the page, we see there's a statement at 9.30 conference call with OPP.
RCMP and PPS.
Do you recall participating in this call?
I do.
And what was the purpose of this call?
To make sure that we were sharing information about the developments of the convoys across the country.
Okay.
And the second bullet reads OPP now 11 convoys.
Does this refresh your memory that As of January 26th, you knew that 11 convoys would be traveling to Ottawa?
So there was 11 convoy groups that we have identified.
Not all were en route, and they were looking at information about where they were coming from and who the leaders were, yes.
Okay.
And what was your understanding of how many vehicles were in the Western convoy at this time?
So it constantly changed.
So as they were traveling, They had the core group that originally left.
They would pick up people that would join with them in support through their areas where they resided or their province, and then they would break off.
So the number was inconsistent.
Okay.
And if we scroll down just a little bit further, we see a statement.
Actually, could you read the statement that starts with West Group to me, the last bullet?
Yes.
West Group stand until mandate lifted.
Okay.
And who?
Who told you that West Group was staying until mandates were lifted?
It would have been addressed by somebody else on the conference call that I made a note of.
Okay, so that was the intelligence you were hearing as of January 26, that the Western Convoy was staying until mandates were lifted?
Correct.
Okay.
And...
Could I just pull up OPP 3058?
Okay.
OPP3058.
Sorry, OPS403058.
Okay.
Thank you.
Thank you.
So you'll see this is an email that Peter McKenna forwarded to you, and it's titled ERPLT Convoy for Freedoms.
Do you recall that before the Freedom Convoy arrived, you were receiving updates from the Ontario Provincial Police liaison teams that were monitoring the convoy?
Yes.
Most of them are getting to me.
Okay.
And if we just scroll down a bit, a little further.
Right there.
So we see quick update for West Convoy from officer who counted 480 vehicles.
It spans 50 kilometers.
Does this refresh your memories to how many vehicles you understood to be in the Western Convoy as of the afternoon of January 26th?
And I said there was the core group, and they would have people who would join them for parts of the route.
Okay, and did you have a ballpark estimate of how many people might arrive in Ottawa as of January 26th?
As of this date?
Yes.
So the original information that came back was saying that we could see upwards of 100 vehicles per province.
We knew that those numbers would average out based on, we may not see as large numbers from some of the smaller provinces, but we would see larger ones from west and from Ontario.
Okay.
Could you scroll down to page three, please?
A little further down.
Just a bit further.
Right.
We see there's a bullet in this email saying OPS slash PPS are expecting 10,000 people for the event Saturday 29th at 12pm.
Does this refresh your memory as to how many people the Ottawa Police Service was expecting to attend the Freedom Convoy at this point in time?
That's how many people that they thought would show up for the events on the Saturday.
Okay.
So, fair to say that 10,000 people you were expecting would attend on the Saturday and you weren't sure how many people would stay on the Sunday and going forward?
That's correct.
But those are also local people as well and local supporters are coming from the nearby area.
Canada Day is, you know, 100,000 people at any given time.
10,000 people of a group that has demonstrated behaviour as peaceful and cooperative is not a concern at this point.
Okay.
And in your summary, you mentioned that by January 25th or 26th, your concerns about the Freedom Convoy were becoming heightened.
Do you recall that statement?
I do.
And there was concerns, and the concerns weren't necessarily about the convoy.
It was who was attaching themselves to the convoy and some of the online rhetoric that we were starting to see that was rising.
Okay.
So is it fair to say that your heightened concerns were about?
The potential for violence, or for instance, for people attempting to storm Parliament Hill.
There was a lot of references that were popping up on social media saying this was going to be there January 6th, and I believe this was the same day that we started reaching out to have other public order units from other police services to be in town to support us.
Okay.
And as of the 26th, Did you also have concerns or heightened concerns that convoy participants would remain in Ottawa beyond the January 29th, 30th weekend?
I knew that there was a potential for a group of them to remain behind.
The size and scope, though, it exceeded what we were anticipating.
Okay.
And so I'd like to just briefly pull up OPS 3215.
Sorry, four zeros, three, two, one, five.
So we see this as an email sent to you on January 26th from an Intersect account, and it says it's sent by Kim.
Do you recall receiving this email from an Intersect officer on the 26th?
Yes.
Okay, and so we see that you replied to it.
If we just scroll down a bit further down.
Do you see the text, do we want to commit to dates?
It could last much longer.
Do you see that that's in a different color from the other text?
Yes.
Is that because you wrote that text in a different color as your comments?
Yes, because I'm not sure who is getting those intersect.
There are different levels of intersect messages that go out.
So it depends on, is that a general public one, or is that one that's going to policing partners?
Okay.
And so the bullet you commented on reads, this will be a significant and extremely fluid event that could go on for a prolonged period January 28th to 30th.
And you wrote, do we want to commit to dates?
It could last much longer.
How much longer did you think the Freedom Convoy could last as of the 26th?
As of the 26th, I anticipated the vast majority would leave after the first weekend.
And as a matter of fact, I would say between 60 and 70% of them did leave after the first weekend.
The unfortunate part was the footprint remained the same.
And then we thought maybe a week or so for the remainder.
Okay, so a week or so, that would be up until February 4th.
Is that about right?
Correct.
Okay.
And to provide clarity to that, again, we weren't expecting the numbers that actually attended.
Okay.
And so I'd like to pull up OPS 403403.
Just for the record, this document was not in the list that was sent out to the parties because it was only posted to the party database this morning.
but I understand that my colleague, Mr. Brousseau has circulated it by email to the parties so that they have noticed.
So, This document is titled Meeting Notes Intelligence Directorate Intelligence Services Branch, January 27, 2022.
And do you see your name in the line that starts with R. Lucas?
Yes.
So do you recall attending a meeting with the Intelligence Directorate at 1230 on January 27?
I believe so.
Okay.
So, scrolling down to the, further down the first page, we see a comment by M. Patterson.
Is that Superintendent Mark Patterson?
Yes.
And so, he says, mentioned on Intersect Call, it would be prudent to bring to Jake, peaceful, friendly convoy demo has become Project Bearhug.
What did you understand him to mean by that statement?
Okay.
Is it fair to say that around this time there was concern that the Freedom Convoy was morphing from a peaceful, lawful protest to an event that could result in an unlawful occupation of Ottawa?
Well, in hindsight, yes.
But at the time of this, I would say no.
Because, again, we were fully engaged in PLT with the various organizers, convoy captains.
The demonstrated behavior of the convoys through their transits has been peaceful, compliant, and working with police, not against.
Okay.
And if we scroll to page two in the traffic section.
So we see our Lucas higher level, I think the second paragraph in this section.
Do you see that, Inspector Lucas?
I do.
So you say our message to everyone is that there will be traffic chaos in the city for Saturday and Sunday for sure.
Then it will come down to how many people actually leave or stay.
And you write, I'm praying for really, really...
Cold weather.
I said that.
Okay.
So fair to say that this time you weren't sure how many people were going to stay.
Correct.
To me, at that time, we believed the highest risk would be the core group that was coming from the furthest distance from out west.
Right.
And that was the group that, as of January 26th, had 480 vehicles.
With a core group of about 50. Okay.
And if we could just scroll down to page 3, the miscellaneous section, and further down.
Further down.
Yep, that's good.
Could you just take a minute to read that paragraph to familiarize yourself with it?
Yes.
Okay.
So, you wrote, the main group may leave, but we will see hundreds of trucks, if not thousands, who will stay here.
They don't have jobs to go back to.
They have a $5 billion kitty to drop from.
So, Inspector, as of January 27th, you were expecting hundreds of trucks to stay, and you thought that thousands of trucks might potentially stay beyond the weekend?
What we work towards, but you also have to be aware of what is our worst-case scenario, and that's what we were discussing.
What is the worst-case scenario?
What do we do if we go forward?
And when we cover the operational plan, I'll cover more of that off.
Okay, and so by worst-case scenario, do you mean violence or the potential for violence?
No, it's about the fact that they may stay.
Okay.
And then if we scroll down to the top of page 4, it says, our number one priority is public safety.
We will not put our members at risk as we have a finite number of resources.
What did you mean by this statement?
So we were still, at this point in time, we're still having initial discussions with the other services about what resources from public order units can be sent.
And that's what we're looking at.
So until I know what we're going to have for firm resources that are going to be available, we've got to make sure that what we do have is sustainable to achieve the public safety, which is our first and foremost goal.
Okay, and at the top of the page it says we will not be arresting people for breaking windows.
Is it fair to say that as of the 27th, you did not think that OPS had enough resources to safely conduct?
Enforcement activities once the convoy arrived.
So there's two parts to that.
The first part with regards to the broken windows.
So one of the standard practices that we push out for demonstrations that have the potential for violence.
A crowd that is very volatile and somebody breaks a window, we're not going to rush officers in to try and make an arrest that's going to agitate the crowd and escalate the event.
We will document, we will investigate, and we will lay the charges at a later time.
It's about the timeliness and how we're going to maintain public safety.
That's what the reference for the broken window is.
With respect to our resources, we are already short-staffed.
We have a hard time meeting our current mandate with the staffing levels we have in this organization, and we were already pulling from all the different directorates to be able to staff for this event.
And as previously mentioned by my deputy chief and the chief, it's been a long, hard two years for them.
Okay, so is it fair to say that as of the 26th and the 27th, You were concerned that OPS would be overwhelmed by the Freedom Convoy and that it wouldn't have enough officers to staff the response?
At this point in time, it wasn't about being overwhelmed.
It was about if we ended up where violence does erupt, are we going to have the resources to quickly regain safety and bring order back into the city?
Okay.
If I could just briefly pull up OPS403088.
So this is the email you sent to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson on the 26th, including draft speaking points.
And if we just scroll down...
We see there's a bullet that states that, quote, the sheer number of vehicles yet to be identified may still overwhelm.
Inspector Lucas, does this refresh your memory that you were concerned about OPS being overwhelmed as of January 26th?
Well, there is a yes, but again, context.
So depending on the convoys, if they arrive on their schedules and they remain cooperative, And they go to the places where we work locations out for them, then we would not have been overwhelmed.
Then we would have been able to manage it with the framework that we had in place.
But if they didn't stick to their schedule or they all tried to comment at the same time, then there was a potential for our resources to be stretched too thin.
Okay, so just so I understand, are you saying that...
If convoy organizers and the convoy participants honored the agreements they were making with the police liaison team, then OPS could manage.
But if those agreements were not honored, then OPS could be overwhelmed.
There was a potential, yes.
Okay.
I think now is a good time to turn to the January 28th operational plan.
which is OPP404262.
And just scrolling down to the
The first page, the bottom of the first page, it says the writer's name is Staff Sergeant K. So he's the author of the plan, is that right?
Correct.
And did you receive this plan on the 27th or the 28th?
I see that it's dated the 28th.
There was an email attachment on another document where I actually provided feedback and a few amendments, and that will tell you the date that I received it.
Okay.
And then if we just scroll down to page two of the plan, we see that it lists it as an authorizing authority.
So did you approve this plan?
With a few minor amendments to it?
Yes, I did.
Okay.
And in your interview summary, you stated that...
It was made clear to you that Chief Slowly's approval of this plan was required.
Do you recall that statement?
Yes.
How was it made clear to you that Chief Slowly's approval was required?
It was told to me by the planning team that that had become the standard practice that they would go to the Chief for final approval.
Okay.
And I think you said in your summary you...
That was a new requirement to your understanding.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Okay.
And I'll just put it to you, if you scroll down just a bit, so there's no line for Chief Slowly's signature here, is there?
No, there's not.
Okay.
And do you know why, if Chief Slowly needed to approve the plan, there's no line for his signature?
No.
Okay.
So I'd like to turn to pages 7 through 8 of the plan and scroll down to the threat assessment section.
So it says OPS SIS.
Do you recognize that as the OPS security intelligence section?
Yes.
Okay.
Who drafted this threat assessment?
So what I'm trying to understand is, did the planning team just copy-paste material that they received from the security intelligence section, or did they kind of read what they received from that section and include the points that they thought were relevant?
Usually, my understanding is the practice is it's a collaborative effort between the two.
Okay.
I'd just like to give you an opportunity to briefly read the bullets that appear here.
If you could just scroll down so the inspector can see all the bullets.
And just further down onto the next page.
And so I think...
Sorry, inspector, I'll just give you a...
review those plots.
So, Inspector, I think you had said earlier that in your mind...
Prolonged occupation by the Freedom Convoy was the worst case scenario for you.
Am I remembering that right?
Correct.
Okay.
And does the threat assessment section mention that risk?
No, it does not.
When you received the threat assessment, were you concerned that this risk was not recorded?
No, because it was built into the other components of the plan and how they were approaching it.
Okay.
But you would consider the worst-case scenario to be a significant risk?
Yes, because it did happen.
Okay.
And would you normally expect significant risks to be reflected in the threat assessment section of an operational plan?
Yes, it should have been there.
Okay.
And so...
I'd like to ask, how many days of operation did the operational plan address?
The initial plan, I believe, was three days, and it primarily rotated around the scheduled events that they learned was taking place with the protest organizers.
Okay, and if we could just turn to page 12, the top of the page, please.
So there's the paragraph that reads, the event will commence on Friday the 28th.
And current intelligence is not clear on the duration of the event.
This plan will address the first two days of operation and is adaptable so that it can continue into additional dates.
Is that consistent with what you were just saying, that the plan covers the first three days?
So part of the ICS model, when we set the incident command, there was a planning and stopping contingent.
On the Friday, the 28th, we stood up our service command center to start looking at resourcing, planning, and succession planning.
Okay.
What were OPS's contingency plans if participants in the convoy events remained in Ottawa beyond the January 29th, 30th weekend, if an occupation materialized?
It would depend on the size and scope and the footprint.
So, as I stated, at the end of the first weekend and into that Monday, Okay, to mitigate that, similarly seen to other protests that have occupied Wellington Street in the past.
If there is no volatility with crowd dynamics, you create a traffic plan and provide a robust police presence to ensure public safety.
so you mentioned that it would depend.
On how many people stayed and how many people left.
Was OPS, sorry, is it fair to say that OPS was waiting to see how many people would stay or leave and would that develop a contingency plan on the 31st once it had that information?
No.
So part of that discussion was already taking place about where would we be rediverting traffic if there was an extended presence.
It's not included in this plan.
No.
The plan was, again, you have to look at the short timeline.
This was the 27th, 28th.
And the event was arriving 28th.
We can't wait till we have a 100% solution to have a framework out that we can get troops on the ground to make sure that we're responding to the needs of the public.
And that's why the Service Command Centre was stood up to ensure that we were building succession planning to be able to go forward.
You have to work off of, you can look at different speculations on what could or could not happen.
But at this point, you have to take a look at if two-thirds left and we did compress and we were Wellington Street only, it would have been much more easier to manage with the resources that we had.
Or if they stayed where we asked them to park.
Okay.
So I just want to make sure I understand.
So is it accurate that the contingency plans were not included in this document, but were being developed primarily by the Service Command Center?
Based on dynamics and what was happening at the time.
Okay.
And so when Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson testified to the commission last week, she told us that the operational plan did not contain a contingency plan beyond the January deadline.
If protesters stayed beyond January 31st at noon, is that consistent with what you were just saying, that those contingency plans are not in this plan?
This plan does not have it.
Okay.
And as Superintendent Bernier, Robert Bernier is going to be testifying later today, he told us in his interview that he was concerned about a disconnect.
between intelligence and planning before the Freedom Convoy.
In your view, does the absence of contingency plans in this operational plan reflect such a disconnect?
act.
As with any event, there could be improvements.
I think there was good communication between the two.
Was it robust enough?
Obviously, we did not have as much as we needed in advance.
But I also want to point out that the context to this is a little different as well.
This is something that was very fluid that they were planning in a week.
If I were to use my previous planning experience working in the 2016 North American Leadership Summit where I was the lead planner for the Ottawa Police, which was about the same scope, maybe even a little bit smaller for a head of state visit, we had months to plan and prepare.
And months to get resources into place.
This was less than a week.
Okay.
And Inspector, in your summary you told us that starting on January 29th, so this is when the convoys are starting to arrive, OPS became progressively overwhelmed and that you and the National Capital Region Command Center were drinking from the fire hose as additional Freedom Convoy vehicles arrived in Ottawa.
Do you recall that statement?
I certainly do.
Could you unpack that for the commissioner just to help us understand?
Sure.
So on the Friday, for the most part, the arrivals were actually very, for the most part, were orderly.
People were, the convoys were going to locations that were pre-designated in areas that we, again, it goes back to, we were expecting a few thousand.
And it still exceeded what we actually truly expected, and my personal opinion is it probably exceeded what the organizers were expecting.
But on that Friday, most people were going to places we designated, where we were actually, if you look on the maps, on the parkways, and on Wellington, we were...
doing everything we could to keep them out of the residential areas.
The analogy I use is I have one load of sandbags and we're building a wall, but you see the waters are rising faster and you know you're going to get overwhelmed with the water that's coming.
So you use your sandbags to divert them to minimize and mitigate the damages and the impacts to the area that is going to be the recipient of those floodwaters.
And that's what we were trying to do.
But The Saturday, when the Western Convoy arrived, unfortunately, they're the ones that created this event and they didn't get the locations downtown.
It was other people that raced downtown to get that.
So what had happened was people who were frustrated that were individual...
Operators who wanted to take part weren't complying with the directions and we were redirecting them, trying to keep intersections, emergency roads clear, but they would start to weave through different side streets.
So that would, in those individual vehicles that were going off, the planning and the agreements that were in place originally with the various leaders and organizers of the convoys.
We're creating one office.
We're drawing one more resource here, one more resource there.
And it got to the point, we have to stop responding to those individual smaller ones.
On the Saturday, where are we going to get the biggest bang for our buck by deploying officers to go back to what is our key primary goal of public safety?
Okay.
Commissioner, could I just request an additional minute or two to conclude?
Sure.
Okay.
So, Inspector Lucas, I would like to jump ahead by 17 days in the interest of time to the February 13th, 15th period.
Do you recall that on February 13th, there was an agreement between city and Freedom Convoy leaders to relocate Freedom Convoy vehicles from side streets to Wellington Street?
I knew there was an agreement.
I wasn't part of the conversations.
Okay.
Do you recall if OPS assisted in implementing that agreement?
I know we, at that point in time, I was still at the National Capital Region Command Center.
Basically, I was providing command for live operations.
And we were doing what we could to facilitate some of those moves to the police liaison teams.
But at one point in time, it stopped because it was not having the intended effect.
Okay.
And as of February 15th, Do you recall if there was still space on Wellington Street to relocate convoy vehicles to?
There may have been.
I don't recall.
Okay.
Could I just pull up OPS 3014410?
OPP 3014410 OPS 3014410 Sorry,
11410.
I think that was a typo on my part.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Chateau Laurier.
And they were concerned about not only Parliament, but access to where the Senate was sitting.
Okay.
The only point I want to make is they were agreeable to an increased number of trucks on Wellington West at this time.
Begrudgingly.
Begrudgingly.
Fair enough.
Do I have time for one more question, Commissioner, or have I exceeded my indulgence?
If I have, I'll sit down.
If it's necessary, go ahead.
I can put it to Superintendent Drummond tomorrow.
Thank you very much, Commissioner.
Thank you, Inspector Lucas.
Thank you.
The OPP, please.
Oh, well, I could have been more generous.
The Ottawa Coalition.
What did I miss?
Yeah, the stream is back.
I'm on my good computer.
Good morning, Inspector.
Good morning.
My name is Christine Johnson.
I'm one of the council representing the Ottawa Coalition of Businesses and Residents.
She's going to go after pain and suffering trauma.
So just a few questions.
By the way, I think we're going to bring all this over to the main channel at 1130.
And we'll bounce in and out.
So just a couple of questions about the early planning that you told us a little bit about this morning, Inspector.
You mentioned that it was your view and your knowledge that the OPS had dealt with two previous trucker protests involving the same sort of mandate or issue.
And you mentioned that they were gone fairly quickly.
I believe you said that one...
A protest group was gone overnight.
One was gone the next day.
Is that correct?
I know there was two.
That was my understanding of how they transpired.
Okay.
You did acknowledge, however, that these previous protests involved local groups.
And I think I heard in your testimony this morning, there was an acknowledgement these weren't groups coming from far away, out west.
Oh, the people from out west, they don't have the right to come to Ottawa.
So you would agree that this time around, given that you knew the convoys were traveling...
Quite a great distance across the country.
It'll be a long time.
It could have been anticipated that they were perhaps planning to stay a while.
There was always a risk that some would be staying longer.
Not a risk, a certainty.
I think we heard earlier in this process from a layperson, the executive director of the Vanier business improvement area, Natalie Carrier, that to her as a layperson, it was quite obvious that these trucks weren't, you know, traveling, packing up their kids, packing up their supplies, driving all the way across the country.
This is amazing infighting.
Fair to say that was the police's understanding as well?
She wants to make it clear that they should have known it was going to be for a long time and they failed to act.
And again, like I stated, the evidence shows that between 16-70% of them at least left on that Sunday into the Monday morning.
The size and scope of the vehicles that came in exceeded everyone's expectations.
Right.
And you said that around January 25th and 26th, you developed heightened concerns about the convoy.
And you told us this morning that those heightened concerns were pertaining to the online rhetoric that you were seeing, concerns about who was attaching themselves to the convoy, and concerns that this could lead to a potential for violence.
Is that correct?
Correct.
So would it be fair to say that, and you noted that even though the convoy may have demonstrated peaceful behavior while moving across Canada, OPS was concerned that this might not be the case.
This peaceful behavior might not continue as they reach Ottawa, given the rhetoric that you were seeing online.
There were never any guarantees.
Can I just ask you to slow down a bit in your questions, because the interpreters, I think, are going to have a lot of trouble.
Absolutely.
I know there's not much time, but...
Thank you, Commissioner.
I will.
How's my lighting?
And sorry, sir, your answer to that question?
You'll have to rephrase the question.
Sure.
Repeat, not rephrase.
So you had mentioned that it was your understanding that the convoys, they made their way across Canada, had been cooperative, had been peaceful.
However, in light of these heightened concerns that you had from what you were seeing online...
Did OPS have a concern that that peaceful behaviour might not continue?
Oh, dear God, make the question longer.
And that's why we brought in the public order units from other police services.
Great, and that leads into my next question, Inspector.
How does the community impact fit into the planning that you are undertaking in light of these heightened concerns?
When you talk about the public order unit, is that where community impact would have been assessed in planning?
No.
So the community impact was actually part of the consideration right from the beginning.
So if you were actually to go to the original plan and take a look at where they were diverting the trucks to, they were away from residential areas.
And if you put them along the Sir John A. Macdonald Parkway and onto Wellington, we were trying to find places where they were trying to go.
That we would actually minimize the impact on that.
There was no plan to put them down the length of Kent Street.
Everybody's infighting here.
Ottawa needs to pretend they didn't think it was going to go on for so long so they're not incompetent.
Ottawa Police.
Ottawa Coalition.
To justify their suffering that they needed the Emergencies Act.
I'm trying to make the police say...
We knew this was going to be a long day.
It wasn't only going to be a day.
Those trucks that actually arrived on Friday night that went there, they actually car pulled to go downtown to actually minimize the impacts of downtown.
So there were a lot of wins.
But what happened was the size and scope, and I know I've said this numerous times, but it exceeded everybody's expectations.
And I would probably say even the organizers weren't expecting the volume that we ended up...
They knew that after.
You knew that a week before.
It was too thin.
To address those concerns.
Thank you.
But even diverting the trucks to an area such as Wellington Street, for instance, was there any consideration of the residential areas that are just south of Wellington or the businesses in that area?
What was that consideration?
When we're doing the planning, like I stated, we will never get where it's not going to impact anybody.
So it's about how do we manage?
They are going to Parliament Hill.
That is their focus of their event.
So how do we minimize and control?
In the planning process, as much as possible to mitigate those impacts on the local community.
And, you know, we've learned a lot of good lessons.
And again, if we had put barricades up, we would have pushed them further into the communities, which is what we did not want in the planning process.
So it's fair to say, even in light of these heightened concerns, the possibility of blocking access to Wellington was not revisited.
In the early planning stages?
In light of the heightened concerns that you had January 25th and 26th.
No.
Moving on to contingency planning for a moment, you told us this morning that there were contingency plans being developed, although they were not reflected in the pre-arrival operational plan that we looked at.
Correct.
The pre-arrival operational plan, and we don't need to pull it up, but there is a threat assessment section that noted that the convoy trucks could pose safety and logistical hazards because of their size and weight, and the convoy could shut down movement if it wanted to.
So I'm curious to know, sir, what were the contingency plans for the possibility of the convoy shutting down movement?
So our concern was when we talk about them shutting down movement is what if they blocked off certain intersections?
And if you look at the first weekend, we...
It's about mitigating it, managing it with traffic officers and our police liaison teams.
So, again, first weekend, I know it doesn't look like a success, and people at the end results are going to look at everything that went wrong, but there were a lot of things that went right.
The intersections were kept open.
The emergency lanes were kept open.
We had buses still running on the first weekend.
So, why did you call the emergency?
So, there were a lot of wins, and I know people don't see that.
With the amount of officers and the resources we had, Once they were overwhelmed, they did a phenomenal job.
And I will always give them the credit for the work that they did to try and mitigate the impacts of the community.
Thank you.
Those are all my questions, sir.
Thank you.
Next up is the Government of Canada.
Oh, yeah.
You couldn't have done it without us, eh, Ottawa?
You needed us to open those lanes that you just admitted were opened.
You needed us to...
Good morning, Inspector Lucas.
My name is Stephen Aylward.
I'm one of the lawyers for the Government of Canada.
In your witness statement, you noted that there was an issue with misinformation and disinformation and its impact on the policing of the Freedom Convoy.
Could I just ask you to expand on that?
Yes, and there's a couple of really good examples.
I've learned a lot.
And the power of social media has evolved, and it continues to evolve.
That's why the government wants to govern it.
Unrestricted in Canada.
We try to put out information from legitimate sources, and you try to make sure that they're verified.
So we always refer people back to our website to look for true information.
Oh, true information?
Like the time you said that the woman with a bike attacked a cop?
Oh yeah, true information.
Unintentionally wrong information.
And then it gets shared.
And then you're trying to put that genie back in the bottle.
And then the other issue was the disinformation, where people are normally putting out false information, which is drawing on resources or creating a different narrative that you're trying to deal with.
So, like, for example, the wooden fence that's up protecting the construction site on Parliament Hill.
It was being shared repeatedly over and over again, saying they're fortifying Parliament Hill in advance of the arrival of the convoys, and it was inflaming people.
But you're trying to get the information out through your PLTs.
It's there.
It's construction.
There's a big pit on the other side.
We don't want people to get hurt.
And that was a big challenge to try and stay ahead of.
Mr. Clerk, could we please turn up OPS402961?
I'm getting all my...
Inspector, are you aware of an issue with protest organizers showing that the police supported or backed the Freedom Convoy?
Is that me?
That is me.
Okay, sorry.
I know that there was messaging going out, and what happens is things start because they get taken out of context.
One of the pillars of policing response to events that have the potential to be volatile, whether they're a regular call for service in 911 or going to a protest, is about de-escalating.
You want to bring it with people running at a 9 or a 10. Emotionally, you need to bring it down a level.
So if that means being friendly with them and having a chat with them and taking a picture with them so that people are getting more relaxed and it doesn't turn into a confrontation, that's what traditionally we have encouraged our officers to do.
But then what happens is it gets twisted and gets shared, as I said, disinformation or misinformation.
Oh, yeah, because you said so.
I was there.
Cops were hugging people.
The third email in the chain is an email from you.
And under the fourth bullet that begins, it's difficult for everyone to differentiate fact from fiction.
There's my example, yes.
Yes.
And then at the end of that paragraph, there's a reference to social media posts and receiving some direct messages from protesters.
Sorry, from members of the public.
And it continues there.
So is the issue here that there was social media messaging online that the police were not only supporting the right to protest here, but were actually backing the protesters?
They have a right to protest.
We are not supporting any cause.
And part of it, if you go back to our operational plan, it tells them you can't wear symbols.
We tell them they cannot overly support or...
Not support an event.
They're there to be neutral.
But the issue here that you're identifying is that there's confusion that the police are, in fact, supporting the protesters.
Because they were allowing selfies to be taken with protesters, correct.
So would you characterize that as an instance of misinformation on social media?
Correct.
If we could call up OPS 3010498.
Inspector Lucas, do you recall there being an issue with protesters drawing up arrest warrants for health care workers?
I remember that tweet being shared, yes.
And can you tell us a bit more about that?
I don't remember the full details.
I do remember that there was concern that some of the participants were drawing up arrest warrants.
There was also another one where they were actually swearing themselves in as peace officers.
The one for the warrants was forwarded to our intelligence to review, to validate, and then assigned to investigators as applicable.
Thank you.
And Mr. Commissioner, if I may just have one moment's indulgence.
Okay.
So in your witness statement, you refer to there being a Farfata contingent at Rideau and Sussex.
Can you just tell us who Farfata are?
My understanding for the most part is that they are focused on anti-government, anti-mandate group based out of Quebec.
Okay.
And then if we could turn up OPS 3012285.
Are you aware of an issue with the convoy organizers offering to compensate truckers who were issued tickets?
The email that you're referring to, I am aware of that email.
So what happens, this is an important part about, again, having our officers that are on the ground being engaged, not only with local residents, but with the truckers.
So when they get that information, we provide it, we send it forward to intelligence to validate, is that information valid and is it reliable?
So there was rumors, but whether it was validated, I can't confirm.
But it was sufficient.
It was enough of a concern to include in this email, which is providing instructions to officers who are conducting briefings.
Yes, because they have a $10 million war chest.
Is it plausible?
Absolutely.
It needs to be further investigated.
Thank you.
No further questions.
Thank you.
okay next uh if i could call on the convoy organizers Good morning, Mr. Commissioner.
Good morning, Inspector Lucas.
Good morning.
My name is Bathsheba Vandenberg, and I'm Council representing Freedom Corps and the protesters.
You would agree that there was misinformation on social media being provided by those opposed to the protest, correct?
Correct.
You would agree that there were people in the OPS that supported the protest, correct?
Personally, but they should not be doing it professionally.
And that there were quite a few OPS officers who participated in the protest, is that right?
I can't say for sure.
You were just asked about your expectations regarding how long the trucks were to stay in Ottawa.
In particular, the ones that drove from the West, and that would take five days, that took five days for them to drive from the West to Ottawa.
Is that right?
Correct.
And you expected them to leave after two days being in Ottawa after the five-day drive from the West?
We anticipated the vast majority would leave.
You said in your examination-in-chief that you would not be charging people for broken windows.
Is that right?
And I believe I explained that in my earlier testimony.
Could we explain it for the record here for our audience, is that you're not actually talking about broken windows, but instead of the broken window theory, is that right?
No.
So what I'm referring to is, for example, if we have an emotionally charged crowd that is marching and protesting and going through the city, and somebody breaks a window in that crowd, we are not going to rush in to arrest them right away.
For that event, because it has a high volatility to escalate the crowd to more violence or cause injury to the people that are going to make the rest.
We will document, we will investigate, and we will lay charges as applicable for that broken window.
It just won't be an immediate action.
Do you mean an actual broken window?
Because what you're just defining right there does sound similar to broken window theory, where there's...
No, broken window theory says if you continue to ignore the broken windows, that nobody will care anymore.
So are you talking about an actual broken window?
No, you're referring to broken window theory.
That's not applicable in this case.
Broken window theory is not the same theory as this.
This is about timing your investigation and your charges of when you actually make an arrest.
There is no requirement for us to immediately rush in to arrest somebody who breaks a window or spray paints something.
That's something that can be investigated, follow up, and the applicable charges can be laid after the fact.
Now, if somebody were to pull a knife...
We are going into that crowd and that person will be arrested because we have a responsibility to ensure public safety.
So just to be clear, not talking about actual broken windows.
No.
Thank you, Inspector.
From February 10th, you switched from operation level to tactical level, correct?
That was my personal interpretation, yes.
And do you agree that tactical level means managing day-to-day tactical operations?
Yes.
Last week, Mayor Watson testified that a senior OPS official was assigned to be on the ground on Wellington to coordinate the implementation of the February 12th deal with the truckers.
Do you know who was that OPS officer assigned to coordinate the deal on the ground, particularly on February 14th?
I believe it was Superintendent Drummond was assigned to do the follow-up with respect to the negotiations.
Is it correct that Kelly Cochran is the coordinator of emergency management and business continuity for the City of Ottawa?
I know she works in that office, yes.
Do you recall communicating with Kelly Cochran on February 18, 2022?
She was in the NCRCC almost on a daily basis.
And do you recall Cochran referring to the arrested protesters as detainees?
No.
Do you recall what the weather was like on February 18, 2022?
The first day of the arrest?
That's correct.
It was cold.
Would you agree that it was?
Minus 24 with a windshield there, thereabouts?
It was cold because I actually remember watching the video of them lining them up and the officers giving up their own personal hand warmers to the people waiting in line to be processed on the bus.
Would you agree that if one was inadequately dressed and didn't have those hand warmers and were exposed to the cold element, one would be at risk from getting cold injuries such as hypothermia, frost mip or frostbite?
There is a risk.
You're familiar with the PLU tactical plan, which is a sub-plan of the February 17th plan that was referred to earlier today.
Is that correct?
I'm aware of the plan.
I did not see it.
Did you not see any of the plans then?
So at that point, the integrated command and planning group were planning and coordinating.
My focus was on getting our officers through the next three hours or the 12 hours that they were working under.
Those actual operations were planned and coordinated by a separate group.
But those plans would have been shared with you, the mission, the objectives?
The concept of operations, but not the minutiae or the details.
That being said, would you agree that there's nothing that you heard of that was in those operations plans, including the tactical plan, that after police arrested protesters and told them that they were not being charged?
That the police were permitted to drive protesters outside of the city core in the dead of winter without access to shelter or transportation or telecommunications?
I know nothing of that.
I can't speak to it.
On February...
You're out of time at the moment.
Can I ask one final question, please?
Go ahead.
Thank you.
On February 18th, do you remember Kelly Cochran raising the issue to you on how protesters, or as she described, detainees...
Would actually leave after being arrested and transported and you replied, well, they will find a way to leave.
Don't recall.
Thank you, Inspector Lucas, and for your service.
That's all my questions.
And thank you for the additional time, Mr. Commissioner.
Thank you.
Next is the National Police Federation.
Good afternoon.
My name is Warren Pierce.
I'm attending via Zoom.
Can you hear and see me, Inspector Lucas?
I can.
Okay, great.
So my name is Lauren Pierce.
I'm here for the National Police Federation.
I'm just going to ask you a few questions, primarily around the role of the Parliamentary Protective Service, or PPS, okay?
Okay.
So first of all, my understanding is that they're responsible for the physical security of Parliament Hill and the buildings on Parliament Hill?
Correct.
Is that right?
Yes.
Okay.
And my understanding is that that kind of extends to the gates of Parliament, and then thereafter it's primarily Ottawa's responsibility.
Is that right?
For the security?
Correct.
Okay.
And I also understand that during the convoy protests, I guess Parliament Hill has been undergoing some construction, so there was some construction cladding in that area?
Is that right?
Are you talking about the fencing in front of Centre Block?
Correct.
Okay.
And so, and I also understand that generally during the convoy protests, PPS officers were primarily located behind that construction cladding.
Is that right?
I couldn't say they weren't under my command or control, but there was a PPS element that was working with us in the NCRCC, which is the command center.
To your knowledge, we're...
Are you aware of PPS officers responding to the convoy protests on Wellington Street?
On Wellington?
No.
I know that they were dealing with the spillover that was coming onto the grounds.
Okay, okay, great.
And so you're a part of...
Thank you.
...degree of spillover of protesters onto Parliament Hill, maybe because of that construction cladding or fencing.
Is that right?
No, that's correct.
Most of them stayed on Wellington.
Okay.
And had there been a significant presence of protesters on Parliament Hill, and that protest activity had been unlawful, there had been unlawful protest activity on Parliament Hill.
Do you agree that it's likely that PPS would have required support from the Ottawa Police Service or other police partners?
Correct.
Okay.
Is it fair to say that PPS officers would require that assistance?
We would not leave them alone, no.
Okay.
My understanding is that the Ottawa Police Service had to actually plan for the possibility.
on Parliament Hill that PPS could not handle on its own.
Is that a contingency that Ottawa had to think about?
Correct, yes.
Okay.
And my understanding is that that plan was that the RCMP had a public order unit that was available to support.
So on the first weekend, the RCMP were...
Allocated to one in reserve, one at Harrington Lake, and one at Rideau Hall.
We brought in, I believe, six public order units, plus ours, and the two from the OPP were reallocated strictly to support PPS operations on that first weekend.
Okay, okay.
So it sounds like RCMP...
OPP, and then I think also Ottawa Police Service Emergency Services units were available for TPS.
Correct, as well as any of the rotating of public order units.
So we had support from a lot of services, London, York, Durham, and Toronto, and they were rotating.
They were available to provide support on Parliament Hill as required, but we were not sending officers up there as a routine basis.
Okay, okay.
Thank you very much.
Those were all my questions.
Thank you.
And next call on Alberta.
Good morning.
Can the Commission hear me right now?
Yes.
Maybe speak up a bit more, but we can hear you.
All right.
My name is Stephanie Bowles.
I'm counsel for the province of Alberta.
We have no further questions today.
Thank you.
Okay.
Thank you.
And now for the Ottawa Police Service.
Good morning, Inspector.
Good morning.
For the record, my name is Jessica Barrow, and I'm counsel for the Ottawa Police Service.
I just have a few areas that I want to quickly chat with you about, Inspector.
So, first of all, we heard from both you and other witnesses that initially the planning for this event was primarily traffic-focused.
Is that right?
Correct, on the early days.
Correct.
And in this respect, I want to circle back to something you said.
Earlier in your examination, you said that the reason OPS initially focused on traffic management was because the number of vehicles that were going to come, you were not going to stop them.
Do I have that right?
That's correct.
Can you tell us what you meant by that?
Just the sheer number of vehicles that had the potential to arrive.
If we set up roadblocks, we're going to set up...
On the basis of the fact that we think they're going to engage in criminal activity.
The original rival was to come to protest.
They've been cooperative, demonstrated behavior.
And we want to make sure we're working with them.
Because as this event grew, it would have been impossible to stop them.
So like I used the water analogy, it was about how do we divert them to places to minimize the impacts on the community.
If you had wanted to try to stop them.
And we look at sort of the resources and the logistics that would have been involved in that.
What would that have looked like from your perspective?
It would have been substantial because part of the problem is with the number of vehicles that were coming, where do you stop them?
And where do you prevent them from going to?
Because they're going to be displaced.
And where is that displacement going to be to?
Are we going to be pushing them out to Orleans or into Canada?
And those are the things we can't answer.
So it's about how do you minimize the risk with the resources you have?
What is your perspective on what the impact could have been on other communities had you tried to stop them?
I think my personal belief is we would have pushed the trucks further out into the community and the impact would have been significant for a larger part of the population and it would have been more difficult for us to contain and manage.
And why would it have been more difficult for you to contain and manage?
We were already spread thin.
We would have been spread thinner.
Great.
I want to just get some clarity on two plans.
We've seen two plans as it relates to the early period, and I just want to make sure that it's clear what the purpose of those plans were and how they relate to one another.
So could we please pull up OPS 4-2-2-1?
So this is the plan that's dated January 28th, I believe, right?
If we could scroll down.
It's difficult to see.
It says January 28th.
Right, okay.
And so I think you testified that this was the overall plan that you went into the weekend with, right?
Correct.
This is the one in the special events section under support operations.
And one element of this plan was traffic.
Correct.
That was a separate plan that served as a supporting document or an annex to this overarching plan.
So just to clarify, there's another plan that speaks to traffic.
Is that a completely standalone plan?
No, it's a supporting document to the overarching plan.
So this overarching plan has three components that I recall off the top of my head.
One is the traffic management plan, a tactical plan, and a public order plan.
Okay.
To what extent did this January 28th plan evolve in the week leading up to January 28th?
Daily.
As the information and the intelligence changed, we were trying to adapt the plan and really it came down to is at one point you have to put a plan out so the people on the ground know what they're doing and what the framework is and then we adapt.
And so we heard quite a bit of evidence both through you and others about the intelligence that was available throughout that time period.
What other sources of information is your team and the intelligence team relying on as we get to this final plan?
So a lot of it will be getting a lot of information dialogue with our partners.
Through PLT, having conversation with other police organizations, watching the impact, seeing what their plans and their schedules are.
As I said, their schedule events ran until, I think, Monday morning, and then there were no other planned events.
They would reach out to interactions of what their behaviors were along the way, what's the dialogue happening between the police liaison teams and the convoy organizers.
Looking also as well, what's the past history been?
What's been our best approaches for managing these types of events?
So you would say it's sort of multidimensional?
Multidimensional.
Okay.
And we heard a suggestion earlier with another witness that essentially OPS dusted off a template plan that it implemented for this event.
What would you say to that suggestion?
Completely.
That's not correct.
So what happens is people look at the cover and they think it's the same plan.
It's not.
We follow a template, but the data and the information is constantly changed for that specific event.
We use a template to ensure we are not missing things and it helps cover off the planning process.
Those with a military background or even an ad hoc incident command, we follow, they call it SMEAC, situation, mission, execution, administrative support, command control.
And that's a planning standard that's been used for.
50, 60 years as a NATO standard for planning.
And the reason is for interoperability to exchange information and that people know where to find data in a plan right away.
The template is the same.
The data is different.
So did you use a SMEAC template for this plan?
Correct.
Okay.
Something you said earlier, we can move away from this document.
Thank you.
Something you mentioned earlier is that, as it relates, I believe, specifically to the meeting that occurred on the 27th, that your concerns with respect to resources related to making sure OPS had the resources to restore safety if the tides were to turn from a violence perspective.
Is that correct?
Correct.
Okay.
And one of the subplans you indicated to this plan was a POU plan, right?
That's correct.
Okay.
What's the purpose of a POU sub-plan in this context?
So, the public order team is a trained group of police officers that we would use.
Their worst-case scenario is in their full tactical gear, where they're basically what we've heard of, you know, the riot control officers and shields.
And then they can go to a lower level of just the uniform presence as well.
But they're training crowd dynamics.
And after that meeting, the more we started reviewing things, that's where we really started doing the reach out.
And that's where I said we brought in, I believe it was five or six public order units from outside of OPS to supplement us on that first weekend.
Well, perhaps we can just get a little clarity on the numbers that would be associated with that.
to that end i'll pull up ops 3324 please If you could just scroll down to the email right there.
It looks like to be an email from Chief Slowly to a number of people on the 27th that lists the POU that was obtained in relation to the event.
Is that right?
That is correct.
So we see OPP, YRPS, DRPS, LPS, and then obviously OPS as well.
Can you give us a sense of...
The number of officers that we would be talking about when we combine all of those sections together?
So a full public order team would be anywhere between 80 and 100.
I am not a public order member, so I can't say for certainty.
But so even at the low end, we're looking at two from OPP, one from York, one from Durham, the one from London.
We had one from Toronto when we had ours.
So we had the seven.
So even that, we're, you know.
Close to 500 officers.
And did those officers all arrive prior to the commencement of the convoy?
They did.
And did we use them?
We did.
Did we use them for the, quote, worst-case scenario that you were referring to earlier?
We mobilized them, so we rotated them to deploy in large groups through the crowds for the first weekend.
Knowing that they also have a limited shelf life of how many hours they can work as well, to ensure that we had at least one or two on standby, and then we would rotate the others to give the appearance that we had a very robust police presence.
But in terms of the violence that you were associating with this worst-case scenario, did that ever occur on that first weekend?
We did not see any of that come to fruition.
Great.
So we talked earlier in your earlier testimony in relation to the level of cooperation that you had with protesters as the weekend unfolded, right?
And you testified that in the early days or early hours, I guess, they were cooperative and then ultimately that shifted, right?
That's correct.
And why were OPS officers not able to control the behaviors to make them comply with the traffic plan?
There was...
Just the volume and them wanting to get to a specific point.
The original people that arrived, and even on the Saturday, there was still a good percentage of them that complied.
There was frustration between the two groups, which led to some disputes.
But again, our focus was keep intersections clear, keep emergency lanes open.
I think I'm almost at the end of my time, so I'll only ask maybe one more question.
You indicated earlier in your testimony in relation to the shift in the level of cooperation and the footprint that that then created as a result, sort of the unintended footprint.
You indicated that there was an opportunity afterwards to shrink the footprint, but that that did not occur.
What did you mean by that?
So right after I said that when the first weekend was wrapping up on it, You know, into the Monday, and we're looking at two-thirds that had left.
We were holding the same footprint with not enough officers, and there was an opportunity to compress as many of those people into a smaller footprint onto Wellington.
There was an engagement with PLT working with the organizers.
The request went up through the chain of command, and the direction came back was, we're not giving them one inch.
Who did you understand that direction to have come from?
I was told I came from Chief Solely.
Okay, those are my questions.
Thank you very much, Inspector.
Okay, any re-examination?
Yes, a brief re-examination commissioner.
A brief re-examination commissioner.
And you'll re-identify yourself for the record?
Yes, I'm Nisha Boutilier, Commission Council.
Inspector Lucas, in the context of pre-arrival planning, Council for Chief Slowly asked you whether Chief Slowly gave you the autonomy you needed as incident commander.
Do you recall that question?
I do.
And you answered, I think your answer began with in the beginning.
Do you recall giving that answer?
I do.
Why did you say in the beginning?
Because it started to change after the first weekend.
And we just had the question about shrinking the footprint.
I knew there was a strategic and a political impact from that.
And it wasn't time sensitive.
And that's why that consultation, what I thought was going to be a consultation piece, took place.
But it turned out that it...
I didn't have the autonomy to make that decision.
And that was the first of a number of incidents where I realized I was more than just managing live operations.
And what specific areas of operations did you feel that you lost the autonomy to manage?
There was draw on our resources.
Again, and I appreciate the numerous demands upon the police service as a whole, but in the Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday time period, when we're trying to build a stability plan, and then what happens is where we think we have the resources to get us through that day, and then we find out a bunch of the officers are being pulled to do community engagement.
So we have the planning team that's sectioned off from our ICS model at Service Command Centre, starts rebuilding and redrafting the staffing and planning model for the next operational period, and then we get into the next operational period, and then our traffic officers are pulled.
Well, then, now we have to rebuild and look at that because the strategic direction was they needed to go do traffic enforcement.
What level of autonomy did you enjoy over the work of the police liaison team during the week of January 31st?
So the police liaison team, to me, and I don't think they get enough credit for the work they do.
So they successfully deal and they manage dozens of successful wins every day during the protests that don't make the news.
But what happens is...
They need the flexibility to make concessions because it can't be a one-way conversation, otherwise you're not having those negotiations in good faith.
So they need the autonomy, a bit of autonomy, to be able to do stuff that's not going to affect the overall operation to make those a certain level of decisions, which they just didn't have.
When they started getting some of it back, for example, at the Confederation Park, we saw phenomenal success.
It was slow, but it was great success.
And that's really what PLD does.
Okay.
I'd just like to explore one last point with you, rising from Council for the Ottawa Police Services re-examination.
Do you recall stating in response to a question from Counsel for the OPS that you deployed public order units on the January 29th, 30th weekend to project the appearance of a strong police presence or words to that effect.
Yes.
Okay.
Could we pull up WTS 6024?
And just go to page 8, please, the second paragraph on page 8. And Inspector Lucas, this is your interview summary.
I'd like to take you to the statement he sent POU officers stationed on Parliament Hill to patrol the protest site in Teams to project a strong police presence and attempt to conceal OPS's staffing shortages from protesters.
Correct.
So was that the purpose of sending the POU teams out to try to hide from protesters that OPS was understaffed?
That was one of the benefits, but that wasn't the only role.
The role is you need to ensure that the people feel that there is enough of a presence, that the police are out there.
The problem is...
We're not going to be asking Toronto Police or York Police or any of our other partners that are there have the ability to intercede on something, but if they do, the investigation is going to be turned over to the Ottawa Police.
So it's about ensuring the presence to mitigate and intervene at the earliest stages to prevent things from getting worse.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Those are my questions.
Dr. Lucas, I just...
Thank you for your evidence.
I'm just trying to understand one piece and the record may be clear but I'm not quite clear.
As I understand it, the plan which we saw did not encompass any plan for the post-weekend stay of truckers.
That was something that was discussed and worked on but there was no document at that time.
No, not at that time.
And I'm just trying to understand, you said there was a plan or a discussion of how you would deal with that, but you also said that there was a lost opportunity to reduce the footprint.
And I'm just trying to understand the play between those two and specifically what you meant by that, by what would have been done.
If you had been left to your own devices?
So there's two parts to that.
So the first part is, under the ICS model, there's a planning, logistics, finance, and what happens is we pull them out away from the operations in the incident command and let them work.
Offsite with information we're feeding them of what those operations and they're knowing preparing our next planning cycle and things like that that's going to exceed and that's what we'd be looking for because we're at this point the plan has changed multiple times based on the changing dynamics and again once we realize the size and scope of what we had was substantially larger than what we anticipated then we're adapting and we're trying to flex to that.
When we get through the first weekend and we're looking at options, because what we've done before is if you've had people stay behind and we go back to, I believe it was the Tamils, had their protests, you close, you compress your footprint.
So what happens is I only need to block off two ends of a street and they're only on that one street.
Where when we had that opportunity, and even if it was 500 trucks, and say it was the full length of Wellington, three lanes, but we could have blocked it at Wellington and maybe out to Bay.
And we would have been able to get the vast majority of those people in there.
And what happens is, instead of having all those vehicles that would push further out, Rideau Sussex, Sir John A. Macdonald, and other places, they would have been where they wanted to be to get their message out.
And we would have had, instead of spreading our...
Resources so thin to manage all those traffic points, because as soon as Rideau Sussex closed, your traffic perimeter has to be larger to divert people from getting caught at a roadblock.
So it just was a significant draw on resources.
And when we didn't get that opportunity to...
To use PLT to shrink that footprint, we would have reduced it to a smaller size.
I wouldn't have needed all those officers all through the Byward Market and on Rideau Street, and I could have pivoted them into other proactive engagement activities in the downtown.
So the lost opportunity you say is because you could not use PLT?
I'm just trying to understand.
What happened?
What was the lost opportunity and what caused it?
So, again, so when they had that first, again, this is the earliest days of the protests with Rideau Sussex.
If they had the opportunity to bring them out of Rideau Sussex, it would have freed up that whole side of the canal.
And the direction that came down was we're not giving them one inch.
So that's what we worked with.
And then, again, so then we're spread thin and now we're...
The next few days, it's just about building a stabilization plan so that we're not burning our members out and getting enough rotation of food and things like that before we can get into the next phase of an operation.
Thank you.
So, that terminates your evidence, completes your evidence.
Terminate sounds a little negative.
So, that completes your evidence.
Thank you very much.
So, we're going to take the morning break.
It's a little late, but I think it's still necessary.
And when we come back, we'll go on to our next witness.
So, 15 minutes, please.
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
Orwell, all of us.
The Commission is reconvened.
La Commission reprend.
Good afternoon.
Bon après-midi.
Okay.
Mr. Brousseau, we have another witness.
We do, Mr. Commissioner.
Eric Brousseau, Commission Council.
And I'd like to call the Commission's next witness OPP Inspector Marcel Baudin.
Inspector Boudin, if I may please confirm for the record that you'll be affirming using the eagle feather?
Yes, ma 'am.
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
Marcel Bowden, BEAUDIN.
Do you affirm that this eagle feather symbolizes your direct connection to the Creator and you hold it in the spirit of the truth?
Yes, I affirm that.
Thank you.
Good afternoon, Inspector.
Just to clarify, you pronounce your last name Bowden, not Bowden?
Bowden.
Bowden.
Okay, good to know.
Can you tell us your current rank with the OPP?
I'm currently the acting superintendent in the Indigenous Policing Bureau.
And was that the same rank that you held in January and February of this year?
It was not.
I'm doing a temporary assignment right now, and we'll be back to an inspector shortly, I'm sure.
Okay.
What was your rank in January and February?
Inspector.
Okay.
And I'm showing you, or I'd like to pull up your witness statement, WTS 6037.
And you recall sitting for an interview with myself and my colleagues this summer?
Yes, sir.
And you reviewed this interview summary, a draft of this interview summary when it was prepared?
Yes, I did.
Okay.
And the contents of that summary are accurate?
Yes, they are.
Do you have any corrections or changes or additions to make to it?
No, they're all good.
Thank you, sir.
Okay.
Can you just briefly describe for us your background and your role at the OPP?
As far as my role in policing right now?
Correct.
Okay.
So my role in policing right now is the Acting Bureau Commander for the Indigenous Policing Bureau, which oversees four areas.
So those areas involve the murdered and missing Indigenous women and girls.
Implementation team, the Ontario First Nations Policing Agreement, which oversees the administration of 18 police services, and the Indigenous Awareness Training Unit, and then also the PLT, which is I'm sure what we'll be speaking about today.
We will be speaking about PLT.
I'd like to show you a document, if we could pull up OPP 404566.
This is the OPP's Framework for Police Preparedness for Indigenous Critical Incidents.
Can you tell us what this document is?
Yeah, this is one of 19 critical policies for the OPP, and it ultimately works through conflict cycle when it comes to Indigenous critical incidents or non-Indigenous-related conflict-based conflicts.
And so when and why was this policy created and adopted?
So this policy was created as a result of Ipperwash.
So in 1995, obviously, there was the shooting death of Dudley George in a provincial park.
And obviously, lessons learned there was communication strategies mediate the importance of gathering mediators or people that couldn't.
Liaison or people of influence that would have influence on outcomes, as well as correcting misinformation is probably the big takeaways.
For us, obviously, it didn't necessarily start the PLT, but it definitely contributed to the part of the Aboriginal Relations Team program.
And I think you mentioned that this is one of 19 critical policies.
Can you tell us what is a critical policy and why is this one of 19 of them?
It's interesting when you talk about police language, right?
Because sometimes people will say, oh, like, this is critical.
And to me, that's bad as far as a community member.
But when it comes to policing, critical to me means it's of high priority.
It's something that we take very serious, and it has tremendous ramifications if it's not possible.
Okay.
And I think there's 19 of them out of how many policies across the OPP, roughly?
I'm not certain, sir.
But are critical policies a sort of subset of sort of important policies?
Does that mean that every OPP officer is sort of aware of them, is required to sort of read them and know them?
Absolutely.
Yes, sir.
If we go down to pages five, starting at page five, the policy is divided into three stages.
It refers to sort of three stages, pre-critical incident stage.
Critical incident and then post-critical incident.
So I'm wondering if you can, for a few minutes, just explain what each of those stages are.
Yeah, so when you look at pre-critical, right?
So we have an analyst or I think we've heard from intelligence talking about, okay, this is a potential conflict that's coming up, right?
So the number one predictor of conflict is real or perceived inequality.
So that's something that we look for, right?
And when you look at the province of Ontario right now, you have potentially...
You know, roughly 50 land claims up for negotiation.
Sometimes I remember Inspector Morris saying it's interesting that, you know, PLT sits within IPB, or Indigenous Policing Bureau, sorry.
But the reality is it's extremely important for us to have relationships with Indigenous communities as a result of that number one predictor of conflict.
And so in that, what our job is and what the PLT members' job is, is to when they...
When we see that there's going to be potential conflict, our job is to reach out, build relationships.
And by relationships, you know, sometimes people just say the word relationship and they don't necessarily break that down.
But to us, it actually means something like it means something to build a relationship.
So in there, obviously, you need trust.
So for me, when I talk about trust, I think it's really important to recognize the person knows that I have their best interests in mind.
You know, I'm competent.
I'm able to.
And then ultimately I do what I say I would like to do, right?
And so we build relationships.
And then we also get into agreements or ideas of what a protest, demonstration, occupation may look like.
So we have those, not verbal contracts, but pretty much, right?
Like, okay, so this is the law.
This is what you should avoid doing.
This is some alternative options to ensure that it's lawful, peaceful, and safe.
And then...
If there's any deviation from that, here's the potential consequences associated to that.
And the reason that we have those upfront conversations is because typically emotions and intelligence work as a teeter-totter.
So if someone's emotional in times of crisis, typically intelligence gets low.
So when there's no emotion involved, ultimately it's a great opportunity for us to have conversations that are meaningful and to understand what the objective is, what people are trying to achieve, and how we can facilitate that.
Okay, and so...
And so that would be pre.
Right, that falls into pre-critical?
Yeah, for sure.
And then during critical, so ultimately when protests are happening, you know, I think during the Freedom Convoy, the OPP-PLT took part in, I believe, from January to February, 222 protests provincially.
So when protests are happening, we're trying to ensure that they're lawful, peaceful, safe.
And so our job is to make sure that we are having open and transparent lines of communication with people to ensure that they know that they can be trusted with what we're saying and they can trust what we're saying to be true.
And then ultimately working through to ensure if someone's doing something that's not lawful, peaceful, or safe, obviously we would have to have some sort of police intervention and we would try and facilitate one that is lawful, peaceful, safe.
Ultimately, if they're on the roadway, hey, off the roadway, right?
This is a better spot for you, ultimately.
Okay.
And so, and then the third stage or the post-critical incident stage.
Yeah, it's ultimately what I think we're doing here, right?
Like, we're debriefing.
We're trying to learn best practices.
We're trying to understand what went well, what didn't go well.
Deconflict areas and perceptions that may be different.
And then just discuss it and take lessons learned from those and try and...
Do better next time.
And then also restore, rebuild relationships.
And, you know, sometimes, you know, you have people that don't necessarily get along.
And it seems interesting that the police would be such a contributing factor of that, but that's what we're called for, is for safety.
And so in there, we would basically, you know, try and mediate a strategy for people to coexist, right?
Recognizing the intersections of liberties that are out there.
Okay.
If I could pull up COM50666, what I'm pulling up on screen is the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police's national framework for police preparedness for demonstrations and assemblies.
And so to start, if you can just tell us how this document relates to the OPP's framework that we were just talking about.
Yeah, there's a lot of similarities, obviously.
So when this was created, there was...
It came from the Policing with Indigenous Peoples Committee for the CACP.
And one of the ideas or areas where the Policing with Indigenous Peoples, so I'll call it QUIP just for the sake of time, so what we're concentrating on was for, you know, a consistent, measured approach to large-scale demonstrations.
We recognized that there was...
Demonstrations that happened in British Columbia that had demonstrators at, that happened in Quebec that had the same demonstrators that happened in Ontario that had the same demonstrators.
And, you know, there's no jurisdiction for protest demonstrations occupations, but there certainly is for policing.
And a consistent measured approach is obviously something that was a priority to the Policing with Indigenous Peoples Committee, as well as the CACP.
And so I was asked to take part in just kind of...
Being one of the people that kind of put this together in 2018, and then with the Policing with Indigenous Peoples Committee, went through a variety of different steps.
So ultimately doing an environmental scan, so document review, issue-based review.
There was a questionnaire that went out to stakeholders, whether it be people that had been involved from the community at large.
With demonstrations, protests, or whether it was police officers, people that had been protesting in the past, and police leadership.
Just to come up with common tenets or themes that would be a priority to that group, recognizing that we all have to, you know, work together.
We live in Canada.
We have, you know, Charter of Rights and Freedoms, allow people to peacefully demonstrate, right, and to assemble, and ultimately...
Section 1 has limitations to those, but it's something that the police are continually having to deal with on a regular basis, right?
And so, can you just clarify for us, is this document intended to apply only to demonstrations and assemblies that touch on Indigenous issues, or is it for any sort of mass demonstration?
Yeah, any sort of mass demonstration, right?
Like, I think, you know, we looked at...
The way things were kind of growing when it came to demonstrations on a global scale, internationally, and then, you know, within North America and now in Canada, they're happening quite frequently, right?
I think you look at the numbers associated to provincial liaison team in 2012 compared to 2022, and they're tremendously higher as far as the OPPs area goes, and I can only imagine that that would be reflective with other police services as well.
And if we could go down to pages five to six, there are seven foundational principles here.
And I wonder if, again, in sort of 30 seconds for each, you can just walk us through.
And in particular, starting with the measured approach, what is that?
Yeah, the measured approach is probably the most important piece within here.
The most important piece for liaison people is relationship building, I would say, in my professional opinion.
But when it comes to the measured approach, we're talking about...
And I'll just read it for everyone, just because I think it's pretty important, right?
It's an operational philosophy that guides the strategies and tactics of the police and the measures to employ in the prevention of disorder or to achieve timely restoration of order.
This philosophy emphasizes deliberate employment of proactive engagement, communication, mitigation, and facilitation measures, while preserving the option to employ a variety of tactical responses as necessary.
And seeking to respect the lawful exercise of personal rights and freedoms.
And so to me, it means it's almost like the use of force continuum for a major event, right?
So we go, we have officer presence, we communicate, communicate, communicate.
As things escalate and we're no longer able to communicate, then obviously there's tactical responses as necessary that would come in.
And it's kind of on a floating scale, right?
Like, so it's not like, okay, negotiations are here.
Okay, stop.
Then public order is here and there's no communication within.
They actually coexist and there's a pretty quick ability to do both, right?
And then so when it comes to relationship building, we talked about trust between police and citizens remains essential.
Ongoing communication, right?
And so we look at a few things.
So respect, right?
Rapport, reciprocity, trust and empathy.
I spoke just briefly at the beginning about trust.
But at the end of the day, it's a matter of ensuring.
So this is the only unit that really is out there making sure that we are open, transparent, and we are trusted with what we are saying to be true, right?
And so it's so important for us to ensure that these, you know, these relationships are made a priority.
These relationships continue to happen.
Like, it's not as if, you know...
So, can I fast forward to, like, something that happened in the Freedom Cowboy or no?
You just let me know.
We'll get into what the sort of specific examples.
I just want to finish this sort of separate.
And then facilitating lawful, peaceful, and safe demonstrations.
So we recognize that obviously there's limitations to protest, right?
Demonstrations, occupations.
Can I just stop you there?
Just to say, you know, some people might be surprised to learn that the police were involved in actually facilitating protests.
So why is sort of facilitating a protest an important part of this?
Well, I think because you're managing it, right?
So if you have a protest that's coming to your area, or if I know a protest is coming to my street, right, so I would say, okay, what is your intention?
What are you trying to do?
Okay, you can achieve this by doing this, this, and this.
And if you deviate from that, then obviously there's an issue.
So we don't facilitate protests.
We don't facilitate any protests.
We facilitate lawful.
Peaceful and safe because it's our responsibility to manage.
Okay.
And then so, yeah, the next point, number four, impartiality.
Yeah, and impartiality is so big, right?
Because a lot of times, you know, especially in the past, police have been seen to providing two-tiered policing.
So the big thing is for us is to say, okay, regardless of what the protest is, it's our job to ensure that we are impartial, that we're treating all people with respect.
It doesn't mean neutrality.
Neutrality is you don't have any skin in the game.
Obviously, the police, our profession, has tons of skin in the game, and our job is to ensure that we are just doing what's best to ensure that the outcome is lawful, peaceful.
Okay.
The stages of conflict, I think we spoke a little bit about that.
Yeah, we did.
And then the next one is interoperability.
So interoperability is really...
What we saw here, right?
So we can go and we can ultimately the Ottawa Police Service, RCMP, SQ, OPP, whoever, can all work together, know that we're on the same page, increase consistency of response, and ultimately do it as seamless as possible.
Okay, and then the last point, education before enforcement.
Yeah, so this one was a big one when it came to...
The return on questionnaires for people that were involved in protests, wanting education, right?
Because quite often people will come to a protest and say, well, I'm here to protest and this seems to be going on good and I didn't realize it was unlawful or unpeaceful or unsafe.
And so in the absence of communication, you know, you could have people that are stuck in there recognizing they're, you know, they're thinking they're doing something that is okay because it's been going on or whatever.
So one, we do issue and incident-based, right?
And this is for our police education.
So we'll make sure that our officers are educated on all of that.
And then we do...
Sorry, can you scroll it back the other way?
And then frameworks.
So just so that everyone knows about the framework itself and how we work within it and how the measured approach fits, how we try and reduce the footprint, what we're trying to achieve and the strategies associated to it.
And then the culture-based, if it involves Indigenous protests or a variety of different other protests that are out there.
And then public education, obviously, to educate the public on lawful, peaceful, safe demonstrations and activity.
You know, how injunctions basically work and enforcement activities that the police would be responsible for in that.
And then messaging the difference and consequences of being arrested versus being charged.
Because some people will say, well, if I didn't get arrested, I'm off, right?
I'm good.
But the reality is that there might be charges that come as a result of your behavior, even though we may not, as we, I say we as the police.
The police may not be able to deal with that at the time because it's not safe to do so, or there's a variety of contributing factors as a result.
Right.
And I just want to ask you one further question about the measured approach.
You sort of described it as being on a continuum.
And how quickly or how much time do you need to kind of work your way from one end of the continuum to the other in the context of a protest?
Like, if I were to say to someone, okay, because these are the questions that typically the team would ask, right?
So, what are you trying to achieve?
What does success look like to you?
And what can I say or do to get you to do something that's lawful, peaceful, safe, right?
Whether it's get off the road, get off the rail line, whatever that looks like.
And so, if someone says, you know, like, this is what I'm really trying to achieve and it's very attainable, then it makes it really easy, right?
I've seen roadblocks where people say I want something that's very attainable and then it gets done and people leave and everyone's happy.
And it was very, you know, nothing to it.
But then I've seen some more people say, I'm not leaving until something, you know, unrealistic happens.
Like Marcel Bowden has to leave the country and never come back.
So if that's the case, we have nowhere to go with that, right?
So if that's the case, then obviously it's very easy to work through the measure.
Right?
And really, when there's that negotiation piece and there's opportunities, then they should probably be explored.
Right.
And page 11 has a section on the role of liaison teams.
And that's what we're talking about when we're talking about PLT, which is...
Provincial liaison team with the OPP, public liaison team with the OPS, and then the RCMP have their own.
I think DLT for some divisions.
But briefly, if you can just describe for us what role liaison teams across police services play in implementing this national framework.
Yeah, so I think the big thing when it comes to liaison teams is really the socialization of them.
And sorry I hit this mic, I'm talking with my hands.
But, you know, the socialization of them.
There's always been people that try and talk and get things done in a non-structured format.
That's always been the case.
Police have always tried to mediate or negotiate successful, safe outcomes.
But this is really to structure them so that you have people that are trained, so people that have an idea of interest-based negotiation, mediation techniques, crowd psychology, so you have experts that can say, okay, if we do this, this, and this, potentially...
You can end up getting to a successful conclusion.
And in the overall idea of the framework itself is really these officers are there to ensure that if there's a time where public order has to come in, there's the least amount of people there that would potentially cause harm to people, the public, to officers.
Becomes as safe as possible, really.
So, like, their job is to, you know, if their job is done by saying, hey, guys, get off the road and everyone goes home, that's amazing.
That's a 10 out of 10 home run.
But for the most part, some people want to stay there, exercise their rights to do different things.
And so it may take a little bit of time or some people will say, some people will just stay longer and some people are willing to leave.
It's important to recognize that, you know, in a crowd, and I think this is Eli Sopo's work out of the RCMP's doctor, and, you know, he said in a basic crowd, he was, you know, a crowd makes up 80% is law-abiding, right, and would probably, you know, listen to the police, be manageable, all that stuff.
You have 15% that are on the fence, and 5% that are potentially are criminal in nature, and would be hard to deal with and dig their heels in.
And so when you look at that, PLT's work isn't...
To make sure that everyone's out of there.
Like, if that happens, that's great.
But our job is to make sure that the 95% or those 15% don't swing over and turn into 20, right?
Because those people are on the fence, and it makes the public order job much more dangerous and harder.
And those 15% end up recognizing, okay, the police are reasonable, these are reasonable ass, and we end up leaving, right?
And so that's really the key function of the PLT is to reduce the footprint.
So when public order ends up going in, if and when they do, it's the least amount of people that are there and it sets them up for success.
The other thing that it does too is, so like when we're asking for small concessions and stuff like that, you're also recognizing leadership within the group, right?
So you're testing resolve, you're testing compliance, you're testing leadership.
Because if someone says, I'm the leader of this group, but they don't have the ability to move anyone, then it certainly...
You can see that right away.
You wouldn't want to wait until the last minute to try and get someone to do something, recognizing that they don't have any juice in the group to actually move people.
One term we've heard in evidence, and I'm hoping you can explain it a little bit, is the concept of PLT logs.
What are those and why are they important?
Yeah, so PLT logs are created so that way everyone has a general sentiment of what's going on there.
On the ground, the conversations that are being had between PLT protesters, protest organizers, the community at large, that's a huge component as well, right?
So when I talk about the community at large, it's people that aren't directly involved with the protests.
So the citizens of Ottawa, business owners, restaurant owners, people that are around there, and that's such a priority to find out, you know, what's the whole story there?
And what are the potential landmines that we'll have to...
You know, if you concentrate on the community at large and explain things to them and try and work with the community at large as well, then you're less likely to have counter-protests, we'll say, that would potentially, you know, put us back or bring violence to a group and also put the police in the harm's way.
So anyway, those logs are extremely important just for gathering information and making decisions.
Um, when it comes to command decision making.
And so they get shared, um, not outside of just the PLT group within the OPP or the OPS.
Yeah.
Yeah.
So we would, um, any partner that would be involved in the protest would be getting, you know, our OPS, OPP PLT logs.
So that way we're all kind of working on the same page.
Everyone kind of knows what's going on with the people that are involved in the protest.
And then, um, also everyone's, um, everyone just kind of has an understanding of what's happening.
Like, so.
In the PLT logs, you may see, okay, there's still no exit strategy, right?
So if you see that, then you know, okay, there's still no plan to leave, right?
So what do we have to work on moving forward so that that way there is a plan to leave, right?
And so those are the things that basically would be essential to consider when it comes to interoperability, as well as people working together and when people end up...
Going off because we need rest as well.
Then when new people come in, it's really easy to see what the sentiment on ground is.
Can you briefly describe for us the relationship between the PLT team and public order units or POUs?
How do PLT work with POUs?
Yeah, so to me, public order obviously has a job to do.
And so they would be the people that come in, move slowly, methodically, push people back, gain ground, whatever.
And our job would be to communicate.
I think basically it would be, okay, guys, obviously the public order people are here.
If you want to egress and leave, go this way.
There's a bus waiting for you.
It's warm.
Get on it.
Please, we encourage you to do so.
If you want to be arrested peacefully, please walk forward.
Don't want to do any of those.
Just stay there and we'll get to you at some point.
And the last sort of conceptual piece I want to talk about before we get into what happened in Ottawa is the concept, and Inspector Lucas testified a little bit about it this morning, is the concept of PLT autonomy and sort of the role that being able to negotiate and make enforceable kind of...
Agreements with protesters plays in the PLT's work.
Yeah, so, yeah, PLT is definitely essential when it comes to negotiating, mediating, all that stuff.
It's a matter of not necessarily autonomy in a sense where, you know, we're working independently and PLT needs to be the people in charge of their own stuff.
It's a matter of we need to seat at the decision-making table.
What we're saying should probably be valued at some point.
I think that's probably the whole autonomy thing.
Right.
And so in a typical situation, would you sort of have to go up the chain of command to get sign-off on?
Yes.
Okay.
Yeah, so it would be like every other program in an integrated response, right?
The incident commander is in charge, right?
So ultimately, PLT would say, these are seven things that I can do here today, right?
And this is what I would like to do.
Cool.
You can do this, this, and this, right?
Or whatever it may look like.
And ultimately, the autonomy would just basically be, you know, we are the ones doing the negotiations.
I can never explain every single word.
Look.
Head nod, whatever, to the incident commander.
But this is a great idea to help reduce the footprint, get us closer to our successful outcome, and carry on with our day.
Okay.
And so now I want to move into talking about PLT's role in the Freedom Convoy events and leaving sort of what happened in Ottawa aside.
Can you describe for us the role that the OPP's PLT teams played?
Yeah, so the OPP-PLT team was ultimately responsible for gathering numbers, reaching out to contacts.
I believe it was United We Roll in 2019 that came across with some of the same players, right?
So there was already existing relationships from 2019, so it was really easy to just reach out from a PLT perspective or a liaison perspective and ultimately...
Say, okay, I understand you're coming.
What's the plan of attack?
What do you plan on doing?
And then looking at numbers as they come across.
Because I think, you know, normally you can look at Facebook and see there's some numbers that are happening.
But in this case, there was a lot more people that were, you know, jumping onto it than Facebook would normally say.
So we just had PLT members, a couple of members, going in, checking on hotels and different areas as they came across.
Northwestern Ontario.
And then there was areas coming from the south as well.
And just kind of giving an idea of what those numbers were, passing them over to Ottawa Police Service, PLT.
I think there was a sheet of numbers that basically said, these are the leaders that we've been working with, talking to.
This is what it looks like now.
And I think there was...
I shouldn't say this, but I believe that there was a meeting even set up where people ended up going out to Russell parking lot and meeting with some of the leaders of the convoy from OPS as a result of the PLT work.
So that was kind of it, like setting up the scene.
And then in those, like as we were learning stuff in northwest region about how the convoy worked, as we were learning stuff in west region, we were sharing that with our policing partners as they were coming into their areas.
As well as sharing it with OPS.
And, you know, I think on every one of Diana Hampson's, not everyone, but most of them, of Diana Hampson emails, they would say, no, there's still not an exit strategy.
You mentioned the OPS PLT.
Can you tell us about their sort of team as of the end of January 2022?
So I don't really know the OPS PLT team intimately, right?
Help facilitate a CACP Policing with Indigenous Peoples course for large-scale protests, which is a liaison course, right?
And I would say probably there was 20 members on there.
I would say that the OPS PLT members were very driven.
They had unbelievable characteristics when you look at what we're trying to look for when it comes to a PLT member.
In 2019, I sat as the acting or interim commander for emergency response.
So I oversaw TRUE, ERT, K9, Tactical Paramedics Program, and Explosive Disposal.
And in there, like, there's a lot of men.
And I was asked by a doctor to say, you know, what are some barriers impacting women in policing?
And I didn't make the connection, but they said, well, in here, there's hardly any.
Women.
And in PLT, there's lots of women.
And I said, it's really a value system.
And when I looked at the OPS members, they were really following the same value system.
They were community focused.
They were compassionate.
They were empathetic.
They were unbelievable communicators.
They were everything that you would want in someone to represent an organization in a time of crisis.
I thought that they were really well chosen.
Now, I understand you arrived in Ottawa, I think it was February 2nd, so it was sort of after the first weekend of demonstrations and protests.
What was the sort of state of PLT work as of when you first arrived in Ottawa?
Yeah, so I believe I arrived on the 3rd.
On the 2nd, I was engaged in a conversation with Superintendent Mark Patterson surrounding the PLT logs and their use for evidence for an injunction.
And to me, I didn't think that that was good use of PLT logs.
And it would obviously potentially damage relationships that are out there too.
Because there's always this thing where people, you know, there's this thing where people think that potentially we're spying on them.
And that's not the case.
We're there to make things safer.
And we have a long road to go.
And I definitely didn't want it to look like we were spying on people, right?
Because that's not our job.
And so I just...
I cautioned him as to the use of the PLT logs, and he said that he wouldn't use them.
And then as I was talking to him, I recognized that they didn't necessarily have a good understanding of what PLT did.
We went through what PLT does, how they do it, what are some strategies, whatever.
And he was very thankful for the conversation, and he was an absolute gentleman at that time as well.
But on that, it just showed me that maybe we needed to assist with some leadership there for PLT.
And I was also getting grumblings from our membership saying, you know, things just aren't going as well as they probably could.
So on the third, I had said to our command, you know, is this something that would be beneficial having someone in leadership over there to help support that?
And they agreed to that.
The unfortunate part is, in my mind, I thought Giselle Walker was going, who was the PLT Provincial Coordinator, but she had a province to take care of, and so I ended up coming.
I inadvertently volunteered myself for that.
I want to ask you about a couple of specific incidents.
So the first one is the PLT's role in clearing the encampment at Confederation Park.
Yes.
So when I got to Ottawa, there was a couple key pieces of real estate that had been identified to get back.
One of them was Confederation Park.
The PLT in Ottawa, as well as OPP, had great relationships with the Algonquin leadership here, as well as the Algonquin leadership in Kitigan-Zibi.
And ultimately, they had reached out to try and mediate or negotiate a safe exit of that park.
And I believe that was on the 4th of February that the leaders...
And leadership and elders and community members ended up coming down.
And they ended up meeting for a long time.
On the 5th of February was an unbelievable day for me.
It was a day of great pride, and the encampment actually cleared out as a result of those negotiations.
It took a little bit of time, some nudging in the afternoon, but ultimately the camp ended up clearing on the 5th as a result of that meeting.
Right, without the need for any POU.
That's correct.
Now, we've also heard about the sort of Coventry Road Fuel Depot.
Yes.
We've heard a lot of evidence on it, so we don't need to go through it in detail.
But from a PLT perspective, what can you tell us about what transpired and why that might have been an issue?
Yeah, so ultimately in the morning, I believe, of the 6th, there was two...
Two priorities, I believe, for Superintendent Patterson, who was the new incident commander as of the 5th evening, I believe.
And so on the 6th, there was two priorities.
One was Rideau and Sussex.
The other one was Coventry Road.
And so the idea was to do some sort of public order hit on...
Rideau and Sussex and then potentially Coventry Road afterwards.
And then as the day unfolded, the messaging turned into we weren't doing Rideau and Sussex anymore.
And it was a matter of go to Coventry Road, tell them that they have to leave without gas or get out of there, take all the gas with them, or they're going to be arrested.
And I know there was some concern when it comes to Tough messaging.
Like I know my one sergeant reached out and said, you know, it's going to be tough because we don't really have rapport there.
But at the end of the day, it doesn't like that doesn't matter if you have rapport for that.
This is just messaging to get them out of there so that that way we establish this, the strategy of what's to go on.
And then ultimately, ultimately, if they don't, then they know we've educated them before the enforcement.
Right.
And then so while that was going on.
I ended up getting back and someone had said to me in the command, not in the command post, it was like a tactical planning area for public order people.
I think it was Mike Stoll, who was the staff sergeant at the time.
And he had said to me, you know that they're going to do a public order hit on Rideau and Sussex, which I never did.
And I think Diana Hampson called me at the exact same time and told me, or around that time, and said that they were going to do that and that would be problematic.
And so...
You know, I'd reached out to Mark Patterson, told him the consequences associated to that, because, again, when you look at PLT, there is one unit that's built for open, honest, transparent lines of communication, right?
And so we have just told them, if you don't leave, you're going to be arrested.
And then what ended up happening was going to be they were going to be arrested anyway.
And so to me, I thought, One that would damage PLT in the city of Ottawa, right?
Like you would have, because here's a place that I believe was supplying gasoline for a bunch of people or diesel for a bunch of people.
So you're going to damage PLT or the efficiency of PLT as being trusting.
And then also you're going to damage relationships with all the other trucker convoy leadership, right?
Because they're probably connected with everyone.
And the next time we say, you better leave.
Or you're going to get arrested, I would probably imagine there would be some doubt associated to that.
So if someone heard PLT in the future say, hey, if you don't leave, you're going to be arrested, like my concern would be, okay, well, I'm staying because I know I'm getting arrested anyway.
I think that was my biggest concern there.
The relationships were something different, but the big thing was to ensure that we remained with that trust and confidence in what our role was there.
And ultimately...
I think he said to me, that's not fair.
And I thought that that was a really interesting response to something that when we're talking about tactics or strategy or an operation, that that's not fair.
Because that seems to certainly personalize it.
But anyway, they ended up doing it.
And I had then sent him, I had called him, said, you know, I didn't realize that.
That was such a big thing as far as the gas.
And I said, you know, obviously this was a miscommunication.
Mike Acton is going to come in and replace me because he was replacing me that afternoon and I was going back home to Aurelia.
But because of this stuff, I ended up staying around.
And ultimately...
On my departure, or in that conversation, I said I would send him an email that would probably help him out just with some structure with five points on it that you should consider, and it's probably some pretty sage advice.
And then I sent that email and went about my day just trying to clean up the emotion that was attached to it.
There were some people that had some pretty hard feelings.
They're emotionally invested.
I ended up sending basically one person home.
Talked to another person.
Nothing was salvageable that night.
So I said, go home, rest, and get ready to work tomorrow morning.
And so did you observe or were you told about any negative effects on the PLT's work as a result of that?
Yeah, I think like right away there was people calling or reaching out to Andrew, where's Bickey, some of our PLT members from the OPP and saying, you know, this isn't great.
This is you've escalated this.
This is horrible.
And, you know, there's going to be potential consequences as a result.
Inspector Lucas testified this morning about sort of changing crowd dynamics throughout the sort of three-week period.
Was that something that the PLT team observed in terms of who was there, how many people, what it was like on the ground, and did that affect the PLT's work at all?
Yeah, so like obviously in any crowd, like on the weekends, crowds would become a lot bigger, right?
People would come in, they'd have days off, they'd want to support.
And then during the weekdays, things were a little bit, you know, not as many people there as it would be on weekends.
But ultimately, you know, there was ebbs and flows with conversation.
There was, you know, certainly towards the end, there was a lot more, you know, heels digging in and people, you know, in a more defensible position.
Leading into it, there was a lot of people that wanted to work with police and how could we safely reduce the footprint, easing some tension from the City of Ottawa while recognizing that we have to put the public order people in a successful position to potentially at some point take down an occupation within Ottawa.
You mentioned earlier part of the concept of PLT is you will test leadership and find the leaders and get them to assist you in disseminating messages.
One thing we've heard is that there were, you know, that was maybe a challenge here.
There were multiple groups, no clear leaders who had control over the entire protest, obviously.
You know, is that something that that PLT observed and how did you deal with that?
Yeah.
And so I like that.
You know, the unfortunate part was there wasn't a pile of it.
Of really strong testing of leadership and resolve and compliance.
You know, I think you have two relatively large events that end up happening when it comes to Confederation Park, which you tested leadership and resolve there and compliance, to which people, someone obviously had the leadership and compliance to move a crowd of people out of Confederation Park.
You have Coventry Road where some people are leaving.
I don't know the exact details of all of the stuff that happened there outside of the emotion.
But that day, like that afternoon, I walked into the PLT office to introduce Mike Acton to people because he would be replacing me and have a little meeting there.
And in that meeting with those guys, I walked in and I was shocked because there was all PLT people in there.
And to me, PLT people in a time of crisis.
Should never be sitting in a room together, right?
Like there's enough people to go and talk to.
There's enough opportunities for negotiation.
There's enough opportunities.
And really what I saw was a bunch of wasted opportunities in that room.
So I said, like, why are you guys here?
And they said they hadn't had any direction or any permission to go and do anything right outside the Coventry Road.
And so I said, okay, so if you guys were let loose.
Like, if you guys were unhandcuffed and able to go out and do your work, what could you do?
And, you know, I don't know the exact numbers, but the one gentleman who's an OPS member says, I could probably clear Rideau and Sussex by Monday or Tuesday.
And then another guy says, I can take care of this many people.
I could probably get this many people to leave.
I could probably open up a roadway, but we'd have to move them to a curb lane.
I could probably do this.
And so...
That was a common theme around that room.
And so I ended up reaching in, you know, like we're in middle management, right?
So there's an incident commander.
I reach over to John Ferguson and I say, hey, John, so like you're the staff sergeant here and John's, you know, been put into a really tough spot, right?
Like John's not a PLT trained member.
He's a crisis negotiator and he's an absolute gentleman too.
And so I said to...
John, like, so you're middle management.
You're in charge here.
You're hearing all this.
What are your thoughts?
Do you think that this can be done?
Whatever.
Because really, John's in charge of that team, right?
Like, I'm there for guidance, advice, suggestions, learned experience over, you know, since 2016 to current.
And then in 2005, I was dealing with protests or civil unrest.
And so I had that to draw on.
And so I was trying to get John to give me his opinion on it.
And he was saying, yeah, you know, I think this is really good.
So we tried to call.
Mark Patterson tried to call Mike Stoll because I thought they were together and there was no answer.
And so in the absence of any direction, I said, how safe do you feel of letting these people go?
And he said, yeah, I'd feel good about it.
And then we got into the other room and then he didn't feel good about it.
And, you know, good on him, right?
Because really they needed to ensure that it met with the strategic direction of OPS command.
But there was just so many opportunities that were there that were unexplored.
When you talk about, you know, testing, compliance, resolve, whatever, you know, we had very minimal opportunity to do that, I would say.
And can you just clarify, when you're talking about this conversation, we were in the room and a number of OPS, or sorry, PLT members were telling you what they thought they could get done.
Like, what day is this?
This is the day of Coventry Road.
So we just cleared Confederation Park on the 5th.
This is the 6th.
I'm doing a handoff with Mike, sorry, Mike Acton.
And then...
Just brought them down there, and then there's this group of PLT members that are sitting around, ultimately, waiting for direction.
Thank you.
Commissioner, I'm about to move to a new area, and I see it's three minutes to one.
I wonder if now is an appropriate time for the break.
Okay, thank you.
We'll take the lunch break till two o 'clock.
The commission is in recess until two o'clock.
The commission is at 14:00.
Thank you.
Order a lot.
The Commission has reconvened.
You ready to continue?
Whenever you are, sir.
Okay, go ahead.
Afternoon, Commissioner.
For the record, Eric Brousseau, Commission Council.
So, Inspector Bowdoin, I'm going to ask you now about your involvement in the Freedom Convoy.
I'm going to take you...
To some documents.
But before I do that, I just want to ask you one quick question.
At one point, you raised or someone on your team kind of raised a concern about the role that someone named Dr. Peter Collins was playing in Ottawa.
Can you just tell us who Peter Collins or Dr. Peter Collins is and what his role was and what the concern was?
Yeah, Dr. Peter Collins is a psychologist.
Police forces across the province.
He typically deals with Crisis negotiation is my understanding.
He's a great guy and a tremendous asset for policing in a crisis negotiation setting.
And there was one meeting that I happened to be in where he had said, in the presence of Chief Slowly and some other senior-level members for OPS, and I happened to be virtually just in the room in this planning room,
and he had said something to the effects, and I think, you know, We talked about it afterwards, and he said it was a bit of a misunderstanding, but he said that PLT had taken it as far as it can go, and really moving forward, we need a negotiation aspect to this.
And this was like February 4th, maybe?
February 5th?
Like around that time, right?
And to my understanding at that time, from the members on ground, was PLT hadn't been utilized appropriately to date, and there wasn't any, you know, as far as an integrated...
There was no integration today.
And the other thing that was mentioned was that PLT would gather intelligence for this negotiation team.
And so when PLT isn't gathering intelligence, one, that's fundamentally against what the role of PLT is.
And two, it provides me an overview of a general lack of understanding of what the role of PLT actually does.
And so for me, it wasn't necessarily...
Like, I like the idea of having Peter Collins engaged and involved in all that stuff.
For me, it was a matter of kind of a scope of practice issue as well as a confusion issue when it comes to, okay, who's dictating what a negotiation looks like with a crowd?
Because there's certain fundamental crowd psychology principles that you would typically manage.
And I'm not saying that I know more than Peter Collins, but there's some proven methods in policing that work.
And I just don't know if, you know, that's the right avenue when you haven't explored options yet.
Thank you.
If we could pull up OPP6080, please.
I think this is an email that you may have told us about this morning, earlier this afternoon.
Kind of a handoff email as you were leaving Ottawa, or the plan was that you would leave Ottawa, and you were handing...
The reins over to Mike Acton.
So if we can go down, I think you've written an email to Superintendent Patterson.
If we can just scroll down.
And so can you just clarify for us who Mike Acton is, what his role was with the OPP?
Mike Acton is the West Region Provincial Liaison Team Coordinator.
So West Region for the OPP is typically like west of Toronto, right?
And so he's the coordinator there.
And this was a...
Extremely large, complicated event.
I think people have said unprecedented, right?
So we just wanted the right structure in place so that way we would be able to achieve success from a liaison perspective.
So I'd ask Mike to come over.
I believe in the work that he does and his capabilities.
And I'd originally sent it to Mark Patterson.
On the top of this, I ended up sending it to Diana Hampson just because I wanted to ensure her that, you know, It's not like I left Ottawa and didn't provide guidance or direction or some sort of support to get things on track for the liaison team program.
So that way we didn't lose confidence in OPP management on ground, right?
Like I want to be in a position where I can support the people that are doing the work.
Right.
And so was Mike then the most senior OPP PLT person once you left Ottawa, like on the ground in Ottawa?
Well, Diana Hampson was there, and then Mike was there to support because I had a pile of things going on, right?
Okay.
So Mike came in and filled my role in just trying to give sage advice and guidance direction with his experience with West Region.
There's obviously a lot of larger scale events that happen around Caledonia that he has been involved in.
Got it.
The second paragraph, this refers again to the PLT logs for evidence, and so I just wanted to clarify that, to your knowledge, none of the OPP's PLT logs were used in evidence for any sort of injunction, correct?
Yeah.
If we go down to the next paragraph, the one that says, as discussed, The last sentence there, it says, I believe the overall goal at this time is to minimize the current footprint on ground while building trust and confidence with stakeholders, which the team has displayed they can do many times.
So the date on this email is February 6th.
So by this date, which is 9, 10 days in, had the PLT succeeded in minimizing the footprint of the protest?
So Confederation Park?
Yes.
And then no other, otherwise.
Coventry Road, obviously, is a success when it comes to looking at, you know, testing compliance, seeing that people are actually listening to police, stuff like that.
So, yes, they have reduced the footprint a little bit, but not to the extent that, you know, I would have liked to have seen at that time.
And probably everyone in this room would have liked to have seen.
And then the next...
A common theme on the wall in the PLT room is that the truckers want to be heard.
Any efforts for communication with MPs, DMs, or ADMs may allow the group to save face, get a win, and go home.
Many people are tired and probably looking for an exit strategy.
Hopefully, you can find some.
So, again, as of February 6th, what was the status of discussions about bringing in...
Political leaders, MPs, DMs, ADMs, and making them part of a PLT-led conversation.
So there has been an increase in interest, in my experience, when it comes to political people, especially at federal level, becoming engaged in protest talks with people that are involved in protests.
And so if you look at the Wet Sweat and Solidarity demonstrations in 2020, we had two federal ministers that...
Became involved.
So if you are looking at negotiation mediation techniques, obviously you would want to, you know, get ahead instead of ministers inserting themselves within a police setting.
You would want to see, okay, if you're planning on doing this, please let us know so that way we can maybe leverage this so that that way we can end up having a win of sorts for the protesters as well as an opportunity for them to be heard and then hopefully carry on with You know, their day, right?
And so to me, I just thought if there's an opportunity there where government is willing, wanting to come to the table, then we should probably capitalize on that opportunity.
Okay.
But as of this point, February 6th, that hadn't happened yet?
No, no, no.
And so there was conversations I had had in the planning room, but nothing of any concrete that I was aware of.
Okay.
But you were involved in that, you know?
Sort of conversation that went down that road.
So I want to take you to some of those documents.
But I guess before I do, just if you can explain very briefly kind of how you got word that there might be some government interest in participating in that, in a negotiation.
Yeah, so I don't exactly know what date it was.
It may have been the 10th of January, somewhere around, sorry, February, somewhere around there.
But I had been called by Deputy Commissioner DeMarco.
Saying that the Deputy Minister of Public Safety Canada was looking to reach out to Mia.
And then, I don't know how that came to be, but ultimately, that's how that came through.
It was from Deputy DeMarco to myself, a call at night, and just saying, this is going to happen with this system that you would be interested in assisting us with.
Okay.
And if we could pull up OPP five zeros.
1-0-8, please, and go down to page 2. I think this is an email.
I think your witness statement says you received that call from Deputy Commissioner DeMarco on the 9th, and then you got this email the morning of the 10th, which will be up on the screen.
If we go down to page 2, the first email.
So this is, if we keep scrolling down, I believe there's more.
This is an email from Rob Stewart.
Who is Rob Stewart?
Rob Stewart is the Deputy Minister of Public Safety.
Okay.
And so this is the sort of the reach out that Deputy Commissioner DeMarco had given you the heads up on the day before.
And did you meet with or speak with your team after receiving this email?
Yes.
Just tell us about that conversation.
Just wanted to make sure that we were in a good area as far as, you know, what are some opportunities for us to achieve success?
How can we capitalize on this opportunity if it comes to fruition?
And what are some ways where we can have a win for everyone and, you know, basically denounce criminal activity and set up a meeting under certain conditions where people go home?
If we could scroll up to about the middle of page one, it looks like Leslie Jean sent you this list here.
Who is Leslie Jean?
Leslie Jean was the program analyst for PLT for multiple years and does incredible work on everything she's ever done and someone that I consistently trust with work in this practice or scope.
The last paragraph that's showing on the screen, there's a final bolded sentence.
In Ottawa specifically, police have identified several leaders who are willing to engage with police.
Who are those leaders?
I'm not exactly sure the names that they had identified.
And I think there's an email afterwards that I asked Giselle Walker, the provincial coordinator, to determine what that list would be.
Okay.
But it was your understanding, based on information from your team, that there were people who were prepared, people on the protester side who were prepared to have this type of meeting.
Yeah, like I'm assuming like Tom Arazzo was one name that came forward.
Tamara Lynch was one name that came forward.
So there was people that had stepped up as being leaders and had people following them.
Okay.
The first bulleted point under governmental considerations, police are unable to solve the underlying issues.
There's very limited capacity for police to solve this situation without some movement by government to allow demonstrators to have a win of sorts.
Now, I expect that...
Former Chief Slowly will say that that's what he meant when he said there may not be a policing solution to this on February 2nd.
So, you know, is this sentiment, which is being expressed by your team member about eight days later, did you agree with it?
And did you sort of agree with Chief Slowly or former Chief Slowly that there wasn't a policing solution to some of the grievances?
So there's been one time, excuse me, there's been one time and My experience with protests where I've said the underlying issues that they are grieving are police-related, and that was during the defund police, police reform protests in 2020.
And other than that, typically, the protests have grievances to do with government.
The grievances have different...
Anyway, it's out of the realm of police to solve those issues as to why people are protesting, demonstrating in occupying places.
So, yes, I agree with that.
Okay.
But that doesn't mean, just to get back to it, that doesn't mean there's no role for police to play.
It's just that the police aren't going to deliver on the protesters' demands.
Yeah, I can't stop vaccination.
You know, like all the grievances and supports that were there is beyond my control as far as an inspector in the OPP, right?
Did you speak directly to Commissioner Karik about this email from Deputy Minister Stewart?
No, I didn't speak directly to Commissioner Karik about this email.
I briefed him after our meeting.
And, yeah, a couple times about different considerations around this.
Did you understand that the Commissioner was supportive of you meeting with the Deputy Minister?
Yes, I believe he was.
If we could pull up OPP50142, please.
I think this is an email exchange between you and the deputy minister.
And at the bottom of page one, it's clear that you've sent the Deputy Minister an email, and you've said, as promised, from our brief meeting.
And so if you could just describe for us what happened at that meeting.
Yeah, we just kind of gave a lay of the land of, you know, what potentially could take place, how things work in there as far as negotiations and stuff, and some of the considerations that he should be aware of coming into this conversation as a stakeholder.
Okay, so who, was it just you and the Deputy Minister, or who else was there?
Jeff Hutchinson from Privy Council, I believe.
Okay, and what did you understand his role to be?
Honestly, I don't, I'm not.
I'm sure what his role is.
I think he was probably there to support Rob Stewart, is kind of how I took it.
And what was the ask?
What did you understand Deputy Minister Stewart was trying to achieve or trying to get from you at that meeting?
I think Deputy Minister Stewart, like, I don't know, I'm not in his head, but I honestly thought that he...
Had great intentions of how he can try and help have some sort of safe resolution to a relatively chaotic, I would say very chaotic event in Ottawa.
I think he was there for the right reasons to try and support an exit of the protest to alleviate pressure on the residents of Ottawa.
Okay.
And did you understand?
Again, at this meeting that the government was interested in becoming involved and they were coming to you to find out how to make that happen.
Yes, I believe.
Yeah, 100%.
If we could scroll up, there's a response from Deputy Minister Stewart as discussed for your review and comments, trying to keep it simple.
Note that I dropped your last bullet point as I do not think the government would want police to be making public the commitment.
What was the commitment and what did you understand the concern about making it public was?
I'm not exactly sure to be honest.
I don't have that great of a memory on every bullet point, but I suggest that there was something probably in there about us delivering a letter or saying to the...
To the protesters, at some point we would have to tell people, you know, this could potentially be coming.
Is this something of interest to you?
How can you see this working as an exit for everyone, right?
And so I don't know exactly, but obviously it was something around that communication piece with protesters, I'm assuming.
Okay.
And if we could just scroll up to the very first email in this.
This is a response from Leslie Jean to you after you forwarded the chain.
And so I think she's expressing a concern here.
This piece, the deal would be leave the protest and denounce unlawful activity and you will be heard.
She says, I think the ask should be for the leaders to facilitate having people leave, but I wonder if asking them to leave themselves will be met with resistance.
So can you tell us about that concern and how that got worked out?
Yeah.
And I, you know, at the end of the day, this didn't get worked out, right?
Like there was nothing that came to fruition from it.
It was just a matter of Trying to find resolutions where there weren't any.
And so on this, though, we're basically trying to find what is the best possible outcome and solution for a potential meeting with protesters, leaders, whatever, and how do we get that to go forward, recognizing that there's going to potentially be some people that stay around.
There's going to be potentially, okay, how do we get people out of the city?
And get people to basically buy into this meeting.
Okay.
If we could go to OPP50143.
These are another series of emails connected to this.
If we go to the middle of page one.
There we go.
So this is you to, again, to Deputy Minister Stewart, Jeffrey Hutchinson, and Deputy Chief Ferguson is copied on this email.
Good afternoon.
Attached is a few considerations for the proposal.
It is the opinion of Deputy Chief Ferguson that the letter go to her, and she will ensure the letter is disseminated to the proper people within her organization.
So what conversations had you had prior to this email?
Deputy Chief Ferguson.
Yeah, I'd reached out to Deb.
Like, obviously, this is OPS, right?
Right.
So I'm there to support and assist her.
And so I'd reached out to her.
We had had conversations in the past about PLT.
I was basically working, whatever.
So I was trying to support her.
I understood that she oversaw the portfolio that PLT ran within.
And so I had reached out to her to talk to her about this, if she approved it, and if there was basically, you know, if there's anything else that I can do to support.
Told me to run with it, kind of.
I think it's in an email.
But basically, I just continued to go on the understanding that I was supporting.
Sorry, supporting OPS.
Okay.
And the letter, what was the contemplative sort of scope of the letter or shape of the letter?
Like at this point?
Yeah.
I'm not exactly sure what it looked like.
Like word for word, but the general idea would be there would be an opportunity for a meeting, if there could be a denouncement of illegal activity, an exit from Ottawa, and there would be a meeting with ministers.
Sorry, deputy minister or someone of their choosing, ultimately.
Was it...
Like, the actual people hadn't been worked out.
I just want to clarify that.
Sorry for interrupting.
No, no, that's exactly what I was going to ask.
Was it Deputy Minister Stewart who was going to be meeting?
Was it, there were no names being sort of thrown around?
No.
Okay.
If we could pull up OPP50's 150.
This is an email thread with RCMP Commissioner.
Brenda Luckey, as well as OPP Commissioner Karik and yourself.
And so the RCMP Commissioner has reached out to you essentially and said, I've heard from Deputy Minister Stewart.
So what can you tell us about your discussions directly with Commissioner Luckey at this point?
I just had an email conversation with her, right?
On this, I think she ends up sending me a piece where it's got red in it and there's some different considerations.
But I ultimately look at it, have my own opinions on that, and then I ask the Commissioner if I'm good to go to respond back kind of deal.
Okay.
And Commissioner Karik authorized you to sort of deal directly with Commissioner Lucky on this?
Yes, I believe so, yeah.
Okay.
Now, Commissioner Luckey's email says, I'm not the SME subject matter expert in this area, but my folks are a bit worried on a few items and needed to get your thoughts.
What were the issues that the RCMP was concerned about?
It's in another email.
I actually can't recall what specifically it was, sir, and I'm not trying to be, like, I just can't remember.
Let's pull up the engagement proposal and that might help.
It's the next one.
it's opp50151 Do you recognize this document?
Yes.
Okay.
And is this something that you drafted for discussion with the Deputy Minister Stewart the previous day?
I'm not exactly sure.
To be honest, I don't know.
Like, I know this is kind of our discussion.
I'm not sure if it came from me and my team or if it came from him based on our discussion, but this is representative of what our, you know, our spitballing of ideas kind of looked like.
Okay.
This was the proposal that was going between you, the Deputy Minister, Commissioner Lackey?
Yes.
Yes.
Under the principles, the second point says, listen and explain the government's position.
No negotiation.
Can you unpack that for us?
Was that something that, again, if you can remember, that you or your team had put in there?
No, so that was something from government, where they said that they would not have the ability to have negotiation authority.
So, like, they can't go there and meet with people and come up with an, you know, have a negotiated agreement at that meeting, but they would go there, listen, be heard, whatever the outcomes were, that was all up to them and the group.
But ultimately...
There was no negotiation authority for them.
Right.
Okay.
So the no negotiation was going to apply to PLT's discussions with protesters?
No.
No, it was...
It was going to be the government's...
Right.
My understanding is the government's meeting with protesters would be that the government would have no negotiation authority within that meeting.
Got it.
Okay.
Yeah, and that's why I wanted to clarify that.
What was your view on that?
The no negotiation aspect in the proposal, was that going to make it sort of difficult to sell to protesters?
I don't necessarily think so.
I think there was people there that wanted to be heard, wanted an opportunity to have a meeting with people in power.
And I don't know.
Like, you would have to ask the protest group if that would have flown with them.
But, you know, putting ourselves in that position, we were trying to explore opportunities to ensure success, right?
Okay.
And then just on the issue of timing, the last bullet point, in Ottawa, target Sunday, February 13th, which was two days after this draft, as the expected surge abates.
Why was that timing chosen?
Because during the weekends, there would be...
Large influxes of people and people would naturally be leaving the city on the Sundays, Sunday evenings, Monday mornings.
Okay.
And were you sort of generally supportive of this proposal as something that might work?
Yes.
Okay.
If we could pull up OPP 50171.
And if we can go to the bottom of page four.
So I want to just qualify that yes for a second.
Sure.
Just because, so when I met with my team, or not my team, I met with the PLT team.
And we talked about, you know, what is the potential of this working, whatever.
I think someone had said, you know, Tom Marazzo could potentially, you know, have 60% of the people would potentially follow Tom Marazzo, right?
And there's...
You know, and this is just people that have been talking to people on the ground.
There's no analytical run-through of, okay, these are the numbers here, right?
There's no equation to this.
This is social science, and we're best guessing, right, at this point.
And ultimately, you know, Diana Hampson had said to me that day, regardless of how this goes, there's still probably going to be protests that we will have to deal with.
Like, the police.
When I say we, the police will have to deal with, right?
Yes, it would work, I'm assuming, to reduce the footprint, get some people out of the city, which would then leave other people that would still potentially be there.
Like, I don't think that, you know, every single person in the city is leaving as a result of that.
Right.
But it would have reduced the footprint, as you say?
Yes, hopefully.
Okay.
If we can go to the bottom of page four.
This is an email exchange.
So now we're on February 12th, the morning of Saturday, February 12th, and you wrote to Deputy Minister Stewart again.
You should have another quick conversation tomorrow morning.
And it says, I have additional follow-up after consulting police partners.
Other than Commissioner Lucky, had you consulted any other police partners?
No, like, sorry, Deputy Chief Ferguson, obviously.
And then...
John Brewer, who's the Chief Superintendent in British Columbia, him and I typically talk on a regular basis as a result of just mutual friendship as well as our portfolios.
His is similar to mine in BC, much bigger, of course, as a Chief Super, and I have the luxury of learning from his experiences in BC.
And if we could scroll up on page three, I mean, essentially Deputy Minister Stewart.
Didn't want to wait until the next day because time was sort of of the essence.
So you wrote him back later that morning.
And you've sort of laid out some of the considerations and concerns that had arisen.
And so the first one there, it may cross the line between church and state.
I wonder if you can explain that for us.
Yeah, so in the Ipperwash recommendations, one of the big things is political interference or political direction to the police.
And so that's always a big issue when we look at protests, demonstrations, occupations for obvious reasons.
And there needs to be a division between incident command and political direction, right?
So that's why, you know, for a variety of reasons, but when there's incident in OPP detachment areas, an incident commander or major critical incident commander will come from another area.
So that way the detachment commander can run his office and work with...
Police service boards and other people that potentially may influence them.
So it's just this layer of insulation, right, from political interference.
And so that's obviously something that we wanted to make sure that I wasn't the case.
Rob Stewart never directed me, never gave me.
In fact, he went there asking for help.
He was by no means in any way politically interfering, and he was there to try and see and find ways to support.
Okay.
The next paragraph, page one, principles, second bullet, no negotiation.
I asked you about this before, but maybe this sort of refreshes your memory.
Negotiation should never be ruled out.
From past conversations with you, your team would not have negotiation authority.
It should be expanded as negotiation authority.
I take it there was an issue with just putting no negotiation in the document.
You wanted to see that language softened.
Yeah, and that wasn't necessarily me that brought that up and caught that.
That was the RCMP's team for catching that, and great job by them.
Okay, and then on the last point there, second, coordinated police messaging and action should occur in a unified manner.
This is unrealistic, particularly this weekend.
Why did you think that was unrealistic?
That was something that was sent from Commissioner Luckey to me.
Okay.
So you were passing on the RCMP's concerns?
Just please remove this portion is ultimately what I'm saying.
Okay.
And if we could go to the top of page three, Deputy Minister Stewart responds to you and raises a number of questions, essentially, in those bullet points at the bottom.
And if we could just go through those briefly and if you could tell me whether those were ever sort of addressed in a conversation.
Would the signatory of the letter or the person who goes to the meeting be putting themselves at risk?
Is that a big concern?
That wasn't a big concern for me.
Okay.
Why not?
Well, like we never, I think, you know, Inspector Moore or Superintendent Morris spoke to it as far as the violence and stuff in the And so to me, there wasn't a pile of risks there.
I personally wasn't concerned, but I know that there would be obviously some sort of assessment from someone before that would happen, right?
As far as who's identified from the protest group that would be in there.
And I'm sure there's people that the government probably wouldn't want to meet with as well, right?
Right, which which that takes us down to the sort of third point about POI sheets and there was a concern about who was going to be involved in that negotiation.
Did it ever get to that point where you shared a list of No, because I think the next day he called me in the morning.
Is this Saturday?
The 12th is the Saturday.
Yeah, so he called me in the morning the next morning and said that he was not able to make this happen, ultimately.
Okay, and why?
Because I understand you were on board on behalf of the OPP.
The OPS was on board.
It seems like the RCMP was kind of provisionally on board.
So what was the issue?
I definitely was not involved in the conversations that stopped that from happening.
So I don't know.
Okay.
Sorry about that.
No, no.
But as far as you know, you got a call from...
Deputy Minister Stewart the next morning.
Yeah, and he just said that he was not successful ultimately to getting this going forward.
Okay.
Did you have any further discussions with Commissioner Karik or Commissioner Lucky about this proposal, this strategy after that call from Deputy Minister Stewart?
No, I'm sure that there was emails.
I know I talked to Deputy Chief Ferguson.
And there were some emails.
I know in his response to me, it was a matter of if we still wanted this to go forward, there would have to be a letter from Brenda Luckey to the federal government requesting this.
And that was on this day.
So I'd explain that to Deputy Chief Ferguson.
Okay.
And as far as you're aware, that letter wasn't sent?
As far as I'm aware, it wasn't sent.
If we could pull up OPP50164.
We're going back in time by a day or two.
This is an email from Deputy Chief Ferguson to yourself on February 11th in the afternoon.
If we go to the bottom of page one.
She says, "Good afternoon, Inspector Bowden.
In light of some of the challenges and miscommunications that have occurred this far, I would like to provide you with the direction I received from Chief Peter Souleley yesterday afternoon, as I believe it will assist to reduce such issues moving forward." And then the next two paragraphs talk about integrating the PLT team and sort of more, I guess, to summarize, more effectively using the PLT team.
Do you know what I think it was just the conversations about Rob Stewart, Deputy Minister Rob Stewart, and me working on behalf of OPS to come to this resolution.
Okay.
And then, so after this date, this is the 11th, did you observe a change in the way that PLT was used in Ottawa?
So I wasn't there on the 11th in Ottawa.
I'm not exactly sure.
What that posture looked like, what, you know, basically what it was like there.
Was it reported to you that they were being used differently?
I can't recall.
I'm not sure if there was an integrated response team or commanding.
Like, I don't know when Dave Springer kind of hopped in there, because then when Dave Springer hopped in with Rob Bernier, or Superintendent Bernier, there was, so if you help me with that day, I could tell you that At that point, there was a change when Rob Bernier came in as an incident commander.
And ultimately, you know, from my experience, when I first got there to Ottawa, I started calling people before seven, like our PLT members, because I just assume the city is in chaos.
And as a liaison person, if you're awake, you should be talking to people, right?
And so I started calling.
OPS members, Tynanaga Police Service liaison member, as well as OPP PLT members, just to say, how's it going, whatever.
And I was told that, you know, people really didn't start getting assignments until 10 o 'clock or after.
And so when Bernier and Springer came, one of the considerations that I said to them is, you have the, you know, I think I said the world, but you have the province of Ontario helping you here.
We should be working longer hours and with purpose on every second basis, right?
And so if we can increase those hours.
So at that point, when Dave Springer came in, I know the hours increased and some of the identified issues decreased.
And then again, I know you weren't necessarily directly involved, but what can you tell us about...
How PLT was used in the sort of enforcement action towards the end when the POU plan was being put into place?
Yeah, so I'd been sent back to Ottawa on the 15th of February to assist with that messaging.
And I know there was conversations about, well, is this messaging really too hard?
We're telling people to leave.
In my experience, I was, you know, telling members, you know, we should be saying it.
It's time to leave.
The time to leave was yesterday, right?
Because the posture had changed.
We had public order on the way, and it was time to identify to people that there is going to be a movement coming.
It's coming soon, and we would be highly criticized, I think, if we didn't allow people to get out of the city, right, to get to leave, to pick up their stuff and go, and really reduce that footprint.
For me, it was extremely important, as well as Giselle and the rest of the team, to ensure that we were providing the most clear, accurate information as possible to ensure that people were on their way out.
Okay.
And even in that sort of final weekend, did that work?
Were people leaving as a result of that PLT messaging?
Yeah.
There was definitely some hostility towards the messaging and stuff like that.
Like some officers that were assigned to our PLT members to ensure that they were safe while delivering the message, right?
And so it was extremely important to have those frank and very succinct messages for people to leave ultimately, right?
And if they wanted to stay, then there would be consequences associated to that.
The last document I want to take you to is OPP50337.
And it's an email shortly after the events in Ottawa conclude on February 25th that you sent to Superintendent Morris, Alakis, and Mac Donnell.
And if we could scroll down.
This is, I guess, you set out two ideas, and so if you can sort of tell us.
Why you sent this email and just summarize the two thoughts that you included in this email.
Yeah, so one was protests for senior command, and ours included.
And there's no criticism whatsoever on anyone in this.
It was an unbelievable event.
But I found that, you know, there was a lack of understanding where we separated.
Liaison work from public order work.
When I was on the hostage rescue team, we had negotiators on the hostage rescue team because it's vitally important to create opportunities where you can resolve stuff with communication.
And so in this, it was ultimately an opportunity to say, okay, guys, we should probably take a look at streamlining the measured approach, socializing it.
In policing as an actual something that we do, so that way we can get to the bottom of stuff quickly.
And like, so you look at some of the stuff that happened on February 6th, right?
So there was a PLT request for Rideau and Sussex, right?
So we were going to go and, or we, the police, were going to go with the public order unit potentially and go and remove people from Rideau and Sussex.
We expedited an email to Mark Patterson to say, if it was me and this was going to happen, this is how you should use PLT right now, right?
So a communication strategy built into stuff so that people are aware that they can leave and that we're not just running in there and putting people in harm's way.
And so for this, there's opportunities where we could do a better job as senior management or senior commanders in policing on a national level to better understand the measured approach and how it can...
Impact outcomes for the better.
And then the second one was, I look at the CACP Policing with Indigenous Peoples Committee.
And, you know, there's John Brewer, who's a chief superintendent that sits on that with tactical background.
I'm not sure the tactical background of everyone that's on there.
We have an emergency management committee, which Mike McDonnell is, I think, co-chairs or chairs, and sits on.
And so you have all these merging CACP committees.
And maybe it's time to look at, okay, this is a relatively big event.
I would say it's a huge event, right?
It impacted our nation's capital.
And protests have just got bigger and bigger and bigger in the last few years.
How's it going, peeps?
I focused on 2012 with I don't know more, right?
And some of the stuff there.
Who do we have as a witness now?
200 peaceful protests in the province of Ontario in 2012.
And then in 2020, we had...
You know, multiple 200-type events in the province.
And then we had the largest display of public order in the history of the nation in 2022, and there's no slowing down.
So I just thought, collectively as a group, it might be a good idea.
Thank you, Inspector.
Those are my questions.
Well, it seems like I missed everything.
Damn it.
Oh, man.
First, I believe it's...
Counsel for former Chief Slowly.
Counsel for former Chief Slowly.
Who in Canada is not a coward except a few truckers and James Topp, says James Larry Bradley.
I'm going to give you a bunch of names.
Maxine Bernier, Brian Peckford.
Superintendent.
I'm Tom Curry.
Tamara Lich.
Chief Slowly.
Could I just pick up something you said to us at the end?
About the nature of the event that you have been describing in 2022 here in Ottawa.
I didn't realize Joseph was a vax shamer.
My bad for what you experienced.
Vax shaming is no better than...
Did you say it was the largest public order operation in our country?
Not vax shaming.
I believe it was, yes.
And the...
Chief Slowly has, and probably others involved in this, have described it as representing a paradigm shift in public protest.
A significant change in the way that public protest had been expressed up until that time.
Is that fair?
Yeah, I want to agree with you.
I want to clarify a couple things.
Obviously, there's been movements in the last five years.
I think this is probably...
The most centered in a very publicized area that involves government and all that stuff.
But there's been similar movements, but this one was definitely the biggest and had the most impact.
Right.
You have been involved, as you've told us, in attempting to resolve public protest in many other circumstances.
Can you give the commissioner a sense from your experience?
Of what made this different?
First of all, is it the scale of the protest that you observed?
Yes.
And would you say that the scope of it, in terms of its affecting an urban area, Outside of Parliament, paralyzing the city in the fashion that it did.
Would that represent a reason why this was an unprecedented occurrence?
Yeah, it was scale and scope, and it impacted a lot of people, right?
And so when you look at some of the different things that are happening, I always think, okay, if this is going to impact people negatively, how many people are going to be impacted?
And I can tell you there's some stuff that's coming up that I would be concerned about.
Well, and I want to come to the, my friend Mr. Brosseau has already taken you to the after-action memorandum that you sent, I think February 25th, in which you flagged for your command some issues that they should be thinking about, we should all be thinking about, as directly relating to this new experience that you had.
Okay.
In addition to that, just go back to your experience and this protest.
Would you say that the demeanor or attitude of the protesters was different than you had experienced, having regard to the scale and the scope?
Demeanor, attitude.
No, their demeanor wasn't really.
So to be fair, like there's certain things in crowd psychology or dynamics that you can do to prevent certain things, right?
Like when you look at crowd or like human decision-making processes, you look at risk, reward, effort, provocation, excuses.
You know, you have the same outcomes when it comes to those five things.
It's just a matter of...
I think the scale and the scope, but as far as the dynamic in that, I don't think it was too far different than other instances.
Is that clear?
Sure, it is.
And maybe I can get your help with this.
We have learned from other witnesses that this protest featured a lot of people protesting about different things.
That's new for you, too.
Okay, so there's typically divisions in protest groups.
Like, that's something that we actually teach on the course, is it's hard to...
Because people end up hijacking protests.
I don't know if that's the right word, but people will come in and hijack.
And sometimes when you ask people, what are you protesting on day one?
And then on day 12, you're like, okay, what is...
You know, if you ask, what are you here for?
What does success look like?
What can I say or do to get you to leave?
Sometimes that ends up morphing, right?
Because you have these...
You know, you have people that are dealing with each other.
You're dealing with a human capacity, right?
So things end up changing as a result as things evolve.
But there is, you know, there is division within protest groups on a regular basis.
This one was just so, like, I think the scale and the scope magnified that.
Okay, got it.
So then, in your experience, this one featured, although I take your point, or we all take your point about the idea that people might come to a protest with different things in mind as grievances.
This one amplified and magnified that phenomenon.
Yes, sir.
Okay.
Now, in advance of the protest, the commissioner has heard that the OPP and other police services were monitoring the convoys as they crossed their various geographic regions.
And your PLT team...
Was involved in that in some fashion?
Yes, I were.
I think you call it pre-planning.
Yes, sir.
And were you personally involved in any of that pre-planning or was it your team?
No, it was a team.
Like I would have updates and obviously check in and be as engaged as I need to be, recognizing I have an unbelievable team.
Got it.
Is it fair to say that when you were looking at the briefings that you were seeing from the folks out in the field, that...
You did not anticipate that this would be, what was coming, would be the country's largest public order event in its history.
I did not think the largest public order event in the nation's history was happening.
Right.
And we've learned from others, commissioners learned from others, that it was fluid.
People have used the word volatile.
There are a number of ways to describe it, but it was very hard to get a bead on this event.
Is that fair?
So, like, in my experience, anytime anyone says, I don't have an exit strategy, I would be concerned, right?
So I would...
I talked about the five decision-making processes, right?
So I would increase the effort.
I would harden targets.
I would do a bunch of stuff.
If someone was coming to my house and they said, I don't know when I'm going to leave, I would buy an uncomfortable bed, right?
And I'm just saying that jokingly, but in all honesty, I would make sure that I knew when they were leaving and what would happen.
And if I didn't know, I would put something in place to harden the target.
Or at least control or manage what was happening.
Right.
The uncomfortable bed, sticking with that metaphor, you would not welcome them to the community.
You would try to make certain that they were...
Well, you used the language of hardening the target.
Yes.
You would make it less pleasant rather than more pleasant.
Fair?
I would probably, you know, if you're looking at it, I would probably find a location where...
Large trucks with beds, you know, this is things that people live in, are parking somewhere outside the downtown core.
I would allow, you know, like this is all spitballing, but I think when you have information or intelligence or whatever, and everyone's guilty of this, right?
You want to trust the best interests of the people that are protesting to do something that's right and not, you know, how do I say that?
Not inconvenience a city and ultimately...
You know, there's rights that they have, but then, you know, it's balancing, which sometimes turns into a juggling act, as we saw here.
And one of the things that was, again, back to your team and the best information you had, nobody predicted or could have predicted that the protesters would get that balance so badly out of whack.
Is that fair?
Yeah, like, with them just not having an exit strategy, I would be...
A bit concerned as far as what that looks like.
Ben Rudman says, weren't the protesters waiting for Trudeau?
They were.
That might have been the exit strategy.
Around the 21st of January-ish that said, you know, I'm going to come there and paralyze the city.
And that was shared with OPS at that point for them to take into consideration, right?
Shared by OPP-PLT or up through...
OPP-PLT to their individual meetings because they have that group within...
Eastern region that basically share information with each other.
Got it.
Okay.
Now, when you got to Ottawa, I think you told us it was the 3rd of February.
Third night, yes.
And you participated in the events that you described to us.
You had a chance virtually, I think, to meet Chief Slowly and other people in the command.
I never met with Chief Slowly, sir.
Were you present at meetings with Chief Slowly?
So I was in this planning room, and so I was sitting off to the side, and then there was meetings happening, and I was off to the side.
So I never once saw him on screen.
Like, I'm kind of like this.
Okay.
And so from the information that you have directly, your own direct knowledge, you would tell the Commissioner that Chief Slowly didn't interfere with any of the OPP-PLT operations.
Is that fair?
Nothing that I saw.
Okay.
And were you told at any time by your team, or I suppose it would be the OPS-PLT team, that Chief Slowly had included them in those meetings that you're talking about having attended when you got there, for example, starting February 1?
Yeah, I was told that Chief Slowly had talked to the OPS-PLT sergeant, or sergeants maybe.
Before I had arrived.
Okay.
And in terms of what you learned from Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, can I just show you, get your help with one document?
This would be, please, Mr. Registrar, OPP-171.
So I think that comes with five zeros.
This is boring as hell.
Not getting anything new out of this guy.
You were asked, just while this is coming up, Superintendent, I think you were asked by...
Let's see this here.
That's the 12th.
If we could just stop there for a sec.
Let's see if they've redacted it.
Let's go down a little bit.
Sorry, please.
Dude, they're not redacting their email addresses?
And one more scroll down just to set the context.
You reviewed some of this with us earlier.
Or is that the bottom?
Then please, there we go.
So there you are, February 12th.
You see that 1147 to the Commissioner of the OPP, among others, Deputy Commissioner.
Please check the list of leaders.
This is the chain, of course, with Mr. Stewart that you talked about.
Commissioner, for the sake of time, I'm going straight to you for the below confirmation that you are approving of the following with Deputy Minister Stewart through conversation.
They could do this for a year.
Quick turnaround, respectfully.
And now please just go up.
There's something I forgot to do today.
That's the 12th in the morning.
Commissioner Creek says, thanks.
Good advice to me.
It does not bind the police to anything.
Is the deputy minister aware it is subject to Ottawa police supporting the overall strategy?
And then, please, just a little further up, and you write back to him, yes, he has been told.
That would be Mr. Stewart has been told that.
And you described you were in continual contact with Deputy Chief Ferguson, who has sent an email, I will forward to this group for awareness.
And then you did that.
Please, could I show the witness OPP 163 with all of the preceding zeros?
OPP, yeah, 163.
Okay.
They're moving at the speed of government, LOL.
I just want to get your confirmation, Superintendent.
What you did was you showed...
You see that in the middle, right just there?
I don't understand why it's so bloody complicated.
Just after that conversation electronically that you had, Commissioner, you said from OPS, and you forwarded Deputy Chief Ferguson's email of February 11th at 244.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And that's what you were saying to the Commissioner.
Yes, I've been in touch with OPS.
It's covered.
Scroll down, if you don't mind, please, just to confirm one thing.
What you learned from Deputy Chief Ferguson, Was that to the extent that there had been any doubt about anything as to PLT, Chief Slowly had confirmed that in the second paragraph, Chief Ferguson writes, I was directed by the Chief to ensure our PLT team is fully integrated to a level of my satisfaction.
In order for that to happen, I need an understanding from you, subject matter expert, and how that can be done.
And you had continuous dialogue with her.
The issues about the federal government's possible negotiation with protesters was run through OPS through Deputy Chief Ferguson, correct?
Yes.
And I expect Chief Slowly is going to say he had nothing, didn't know about it until now, but didn't need to know about it because that authority had been given to Deputy Chief Ferguson.
You didn't engage with Chief Slowly?
No, I didn't.
No, I saw the one briefing.
I cited earlier where he said, negotiate, negotiate, negotiate.
I was on one other call with him.
I was on another call, I believe, on the 12th of February or 13th.
These events in Ottawa, about which you've been speaking, affected other parts of the country.
Is that true?
Yes.
Not only in our province, within your authority, Of course, we had Windsor going on, right?
You were speaking to your command team, or involved at least, in PLT issues in Windsor at the same time?
Yes, sir.
Did you get down to Windsor?
I did not get down to Windsor.
Uneventful.
Did you also become involved in considering how this protest in Ottawa impacted other infrastructure in Ontario?
That's always something that I'm concerned about.
I'm always concerned about...
When they were doing the Windsor stuff, I'm always concerned about creating a movement out of a movement.
Do the witnesses all have the same raspy voice?
Say there's a protest in Ottawa and this protest goes up and they say, we're in support of Ottawa.
And then you get another group that says, I'm supporting Windsor in support of Ottawa.
In about five minutes, I'm leaving you all high and dry.
But I'll tell you, I had a conversation with...
I'll listen.
Chief Superintendent John Brewer, and he was saying, you know, what some of the restrictions ending in some of the other provinces, and ours aren't ending in British Columbia.
He had some serious concerns as a result of protests in relation to this.
I was going to say, we had issues, the OPP was managing issues outside of Ottawa in Ontario.
Yes.
Bridges, highways, other installations, correct?
Correct.
Worried, for one thing, that...
Perhaps if this convoy were to leave Ottawa, it might just settle in on another bridge or it might settle on a highway.
You had a thousand trucks or however many you had to try to manage across the entire geographic area of the province.
Is that fair?
Yeah, yeah, for sure.
And I guess that's the importance of making sure that you have had that great relationship with people and outlined, you know, this is the expectation, whatever, right?
So that they agree that when they leave, they're not going to cause another obstruction.
Yeah, and another really important thing, too, is really that off-gassing, right?
So as you have the ability, when people identify that they want to leave, to immediately provide that opportunity for them to leave, so that they're leaving in groups of eight and not in a thousand.
Were you made aware, the commissioner heard evidence from chief superintendent.
I was aware of those conversations, yes.
A significant problem.
Yes.
Fat Beaver says they've already established that they didn't meet the criteria.
I think you just told the commissioner you became involved in assisting, or at least in discussing with RCMP officials, how this Ottawa protest was impacting British Columbia and other areas within our country that are patrolled by RCMP.
And the Ottawa protest wasn't impacting British Columbia, but the general grievances and support would have...
Obviously, when this stuff starts happening, then people say, man, that's something I can get behind.
Significant drain on resources.
Call the Emergencies Act.
In terms of this, back to this one, it was obvious to you when you got here, into Ottawa, that the Ottawa Police Service had no possibility of managing this event with its own resources.
Is that fair?
Yeah, for sure.
I would say, you know, in the absence of the ability to do public order, right?
So, you know, there are so many plans to do public order intervention, right?
And in the absence of doing it, because we never had the ability to do it up until, what, the 17th or 18th.
So in the absence of that, you have to have an unbelievable negotiation and mediation strategy until that happens, right?
Until you're able to muster people to do something.
I believe everyone has a responsibility to that safety to ensure that that gets completed.
Right.
And a couple of things.
You told us that you were involved, you came back up here to, or across to Ottawa, and you were involved in the public order operation at the level of the PLT to give protesters the messages that this is coming and you should leave.
Yes, I was being, I was, I came here to support Giselle Walker, who's the provincial coordinator.
And was asked to come here to support her.
And part of the messaging that you gave was that the Emergencies Act had been declared.
Is that true?
I'm not sure.
Yeah, sorry.
You didn't take part in the drafting of the message that was being handed to protesters?
Oh, yeah, sorry.
Yeah, yeah.
So on that, that came across to PLT at some point to say, does this make sense?
Because basically we just wanted consistent messaging to go out, hand it out, so people were aware, and also go out on social media.
Got it.
And one of the consequences that you told the commissioner, you explained to protesters.
About the consequences of not leaving would have been all of the consequences that he's learned about concerning the Emergencies Act.
Sorry, I don't...
That was a terrible question.
You told the protesters...
Dude, you've only...
The worst part of that is it counts against my time.
Oh, no, sorry.
So does your comment.
You told the protesters that the consequences of the emergency...
That's a terrible question.
Okay, give them credit.
That's funny.
...would be applied to those who did not leave voluntarily.
Yeah, I believe that's in the message.
Okay, got it.
There's a bunch.
Sorry, go ahead.
No, no, no.
I didn't mean to interrupt you.
Last question.
Your interview summary refers to...
OPP Superintendent Dan, I hope I'm pronouncing it correctly, Alakas?
Alakas, yes.
Who advised you on the 8th of February that, words to the effect, you said that the OPP would be taking over operations in Ottawa.
Do you recall him telling you that?
Yeah.
And now you...
Did you know anything about how that was meant to happen or anything more about it than that?
No, like reflecting on it, like looking back, maybe it's Carson Party's team that came, went to assist or whatever.
Got it.
And you were part of those and you did appear at some of the integrated planning cell meetings.
I think there are minutes that show you.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
I went in and I think I spoke at two of them.
Yeah, okay.
Superintendent, thanks very much.
Thank you, sir.
Pointless.
Thank you.
Next is the government of Canada.
Next is the government of Canada.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Good afternoon, Superintendent Bowdoin.
My name is Andrea Gonsolves.
I'm one of the lawyers for the Government of Canada.
And I just want to first begin by confirming a few things around the role of liaison teams.
This may be a bit of a simplified version from what you've testified to, but the role of PLTs is to work...
With event organizers to ensure that events are lawful, peaceful, and safe.
Fair?
Yes.
And they may do that through a variety of strategies, including where appropriate, negotiation, de-escalation, trying to identify win-wins, right?
Yes.
And where demonstrations are not lawful, peaceful, or safe, PLTs may have a role to play in trying to steer them back in that direction.
Yes.
PLT strategies can also be helpful in reducing the footprint.
We've heard you say that several times, right?
It's like they're applying climate emergency nonsense to the protest.
And by reducing the footprint, again, perhaps this is simplified, but we mean using techniques to encourage as many people as possible to leave the protest zone voluntarily without police enforcement.
Yes, or, like to me, put people in a tactically advantageous position.
So that way, if there is a police operation, that there would be a better opportunity for success that would be safe for all the people that are there and for the police officers that have the responsibility to go and enforce that.
Right.
And success in that respect, meaning diffuse it, bring it to an end with no or minimal risk to officer or protester safety, minimal damage being done, that sort of thing.
Yes, ma 'am.
And reducing, I think we're agreeing here that reducing the footprint is especially important when public order units will be engaging in enforcement action to bring a demonstration to an end.
What the hell did that question?
Repeat that question again.
And sometimes that may be necessary, for example, when a protest has become illegal and there's a need to restore the rule of law.
Yes.
And so PLT involves an element of negotiation, but also you spoke about communication and education, ideally education before enforcement, right?
Yes.
PLTs build messaging around the potential consequences.
If they don't...
Protesters don't leave voluntarily because those consequences can act as an incentive to leave.
Repeat that question.
Yeah, for sure.
What I was talking about, like, obviously the risk, you want to increase risk, right, to remove people from doing stuff.
Right.
Right.
The stronger the deterrent, the greater the effect it's likely to have in getting them to go home.
Okay, I heard a beep.
And for those who might be thinking of joining an ongoing protest, messaging negative potential consequences can also act as a deterrent.
And freezing their banks and locking them up and beating them and pepper spraying them.
That can all act as deterrents.
In questions from my friend, Mr. Curry, you spoke about the scope and scale of these protests being quite unique in our nation's history, right?
Yes.
Others, and I think you two have used the word unprecedented.
I can't hear you.
Yeah, probably.
And there are several features of the Ottawa demonstrations that contributed to the unprecedented nature and presented challenges for the liaison teams.
You've spoke about a few of them, but I'll try and summarize them all.
It includes the size of the protest zone and the number of protesters.
Sorry, like is that something that would...
What are you saying, sorry?
One of the things that created challenges for The PLT teams and successfully going about their role in getting people to go home.
I think there are a number of them that you spoke about.
I want to take them one by one.
Is it fair to say that the size of the protest zone and the number of protesters contributed challenges for the PLTs?
It didn't, it didn't.
And I'll just qualify that for you.
So when you look at it, really you're just trying, like you have 35 block captains, I think, at one point.
So you have a certain amount of leadership.
You have the ability to manage that in individual pocket size.
My kid just said, our dog's paws are turning blue, and I thought the dog was dying.
Dog was just walking in blue chalk.
You'd think they were talking about landing a rocket on a moving meteorite.
If done appropriately and given the ability to do it properly, can still manage that.
Regardless of the size.
But it does add complications as far as you're not being aware of what exactly is in that crowd and potential conflict as a result.
And when you've got that sort of a scenario, the PLTs may be able to achieve some success in one area, but then the protesters there could move to another site, for instance.
So if you're doing hard tactics, right?
So if you're...
Taking over streets, right?
Taking them, and then you have to...
I'll be back.
I gotta walk a dog.
And so when you're looking at hard tactics, cool.
Go to the dentist.
Yeah, for sure.
People would have to potentially come back there or whatever, but if people voluntarily leave on their own through mediation and negotiation, and that's our world, right?
So if they leave on their own, the odds are they're not going to come back to that space.
In this case, though, we also had more protesters, more trucks coming in.
Every week.
It wasn't a static crowd the entire time, and that presented a challenge as well, right?
Correct, yes.
Described as a volatile, fluid situation, you spoke about the dynamics changing and evolving over time, right?
Yes, yeah, they were fluid, for sure.
Over time, the protesters become very entrenched, right?
This is one of the challenges that were faced by the PLTs.
Yeah, like at the very end, they were entrenched.
I think, you know, throughout the protests themselves, we didn't really actually test compliance or resolve a pile, right?
You're aware of OPP reporting about one Farfata member saying he will leave only once he has regained his freedom or when he is dead?
I didn't know that, but there was definitely some...
Very strong ideologies within the group.
And that certainly suggests, that kind of messaging suggests entrenchment.
Yes, for sure.
You spoke about where demands of the protesters, what they're hoping to achieve, where it's unrealistic, that presents a PLT challenge, right?
Absolutely.
And some of the demands here would be unrealistic.
Yes, very much so.
Not only outside of the OPP's authority to grant, but in some cases inconsistent with our constitutional structure, right?
Oh, absolutely.
There's limitations to the Constitution, for sure.
It was a disorganized group with different factions.
That was another challenge, correct?
Like, they were pretty organized in the sense that they got across the country to get to Ottawa.
Like, it's not like it was an unorganized group.
I think there was a lot of different...
And we've seen some reporting about the organization going so far as getting them to Ottawa, but once they got to Ottawa, there wasn't that same degree of organization.
You're aware of that?
Yeah, I guess, yeah.
Not all members of this crowd had the same objectives or had a common view as to how they would achieve those objectives, right?
Sure.
And I think I saw in the OPP's institutional report that there were 10 PLT members that were contributed by OPP.
Does that sound right?
Yeah, I think there was one.
Yeah, I saw one day where there was 10 for sure, so that's pretty consistent.
And there were thousands of protesters that needed to be dealt with, and so resources were stretched thin.
Yes, and that's the importance of identifying leadership.
You spoke about the interest that Public Safety Deputy Minister Stewart had in consulting with you about potential federal-level engagement with protesters.
You recall that evidence?
Yes.
And you understood that he was looking to you for this consultation so he could provide informed advice to ministers, right?
Yes.
It wasn't his decision to make.
You understood that?
Yes.
And in fact, no decision was made at the time he approached you about whether there would be this kind of engagement.
Absolutely.
And when you're looking at the idea of engagement or liaisoning with protesters, you're doing that from a police perspective?
Yes, ma 'am.
You spoke about the importance of not having government interference in these police operations?
That's correct.
Yeah, it's happened before in the past, right, where we were surprised by government.
Becoming involved in police operations.
So if you can head that off, that's probably the best way to do that, right?
And by the same token, you as a member of the OPP would not be trained in or fully understand the perspectives of the governmental decision makers.
Absolutely, yeah.
And you're aware, sir, that on February 13th, Mayor Watson of Ottawa had come to an agreement with one of the convoy organizers, Tamara Leach, to move trucks from the residential areas of Ottawa up to Wellington Street?
Yes.
I take it then you're also aware that that agreement, and if that had been followed through with, then they would have had a meeting, right?
Yeah, I don't know the intricate details about what the plan was there, but...
But you're aware that that fell through?
The meeting?
Yes.
Okay.
Yes, now.
At least in part, because some of the protesters who were parked on those streets did not want to comply with the agreement, right?
Sorry, I didn't hear your answer.
You're aware of that?
No, I'm aware of it now.
I just...
Yeah.
And that suggests that there was a problem of the purported leaders of the protests getting that buy-in, getting that compliance from the group, right?
Yes.
By February 15th, according to the OPP's Operational Intelligence Report, There was no clear pathway toward reaching a satisfactory resolution that would see the protest group voluntarily end their action and depart the Ottawa area.
You aware of that?
Yes, I believe on February 15th, for sure, that would be the assessment.
I think after February 13th with the mayor's stuff and then it not happening, there would be obvious, you know, like that's the issue with not testing, resolve, compliance, whatever, at the beginning, right?
You know, if you go to a group and you say, hey guys, just for the sake of it, can you move to a bus lane?
And then you watch and you see how much juice people have within the group, what this looks like, whatever, you have that ability to actually see if there's leadership there, if they're a unified group.
And then you have the ability to tactically deal with the people that are not in compliance or, you know, and it just kind of separates people, right?
And so what you're trying to do, Is have focused, targeted, strategic enforcement as opposed to a blanket enforcement of everyone that's there.
And I said the date, February 14th.
We don't have time to pull it up, but I'll just note for the record, OPP403427 is where that appears in the report.
Chief Superintendent Party testified to the Commissioner on Friday that by February 13th, police had exhausted all negotiation, that negotiation with the protesters had reached the point where it's proving to be futile, and you wouldn't disagree with the Chief Superintendent on that?
Well, him and I have different backgrounds when it comes to negotiation, mediation, whatever.
Like, I would say there was opportunities beforehand, I think.
Those opportunities weren't, you know, captured.
But ultimately, yeah, at some point, there needed to be some sort of intervention outside of mediation negotiation.
And so by the time the Federal Emergency Act measures come into place, the PLT role shifts from negotiation, etc., to communication and...
Education regarding the consequences of protesters sticking around Ottawa when the enforcement activity begins, right?
Yes, that's on, I believe, this 15th, 16th, something like that.
And you've told us you were involved in reviewing the notice to protesters to make sure that it was serving that function of education to get people to go home, right?
Yes.
And my understanding is that it was important not only to message the potential criminal offence consequences, but also measures that were specific under the Emergencies Act, like the prohibition on bringing.
Children, for instance.
That was part of the messaging.
Yeah, I believe it was.
I'm sure that it's, like, I don't have it in front of me, but it was tried to make it succinct, clear, so that people understood it.
It wasn't like, this gives you this authority, this gives you this authority.
It was a very broad, I believe, document.
And I see the commissioner looking at me, telling me my time is up.
If I may, Commissioner, one last question.
Superintendent, you're aware that there was another convoy headed to Ottawa on February the 16th?
Yes, I know it was in those dates, but yeah, there was another convoy from West Region coming over.
And one of the things you wanted to be sure of is that the information was communicated to that convoy about the consequences under the Federal Emergencies Act if they were to travel to Ottawa at that point.
Yeah, I wanted to make sure that they weren't coming.
There's obviously...
Tactical considerations for members on ground.
You know, one of the important ones is 360 defense and I didn't want anyone coming in on the back end.
Okay, those are my questions.
Thank you.
Okay next call on the convoy organizers.
Afternoon, sir.
For the record, my name is Brendan Miller.
I'm counsel for Freedom Corp, which is the organization representing the protesters that were in Ottawa on January and February of 2022.
I just have a few questions for you and thank you for your service.
So, if I may, I'm just going to refer to the documents that the Commission has already brought up earlier.
If I could have brought up OPP0000151.
Okay.
So, sir, just to clarify for everybody here and for folks at home.
This is the proposal, engagement proposal, that was worked on between yourself, the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, and Commissioner Brenda Luckey of the RCMP.
Is that fair?
Yeah, like there was, yeah.
Okay.
And this engagement proposal was essentially approved by the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, but of course...
It wasn't his decision whether it was going to be carried out, but he approved it.
Is that fair?
Yeah, I don't think that he approved it.
I think he was taking it as like for consideration to the ministers.
Like that's how, like he was looking for advice to forward.
Okay.
But he never indicated to you that it was something that he thought was a bad idea?
He never said that it was a bad idea.
And he never indicated to you that anything but taking enforcement action was a bad idea?
What's that, sorry?
Anything but taking enforcement action against the protesters in Ottawa was a bad idea.
He didn't say to you that you should cease engaging and that you should direct that there be enforcement actions taken.
No, he never directed anything.
Like, he did not direct anything.
Right.
And Commissioner Lucky of the RCMP, she reviewed this proposal as well?
Yeah, she had reached out to me.
Right.
And she thought it was a good proposal.
She had some issues with it.
Right.
And those issues, though, weren't with respect to the engagement issue.
It had nothing to do with that.
Is that fair?
I think it was some verbiage.
I think she talked about some people had some concerns, right?
Right.
And so in this proposal, of course, it says that upon an agreement to the proposal, you'd provide a police liaison in writing a commitment to government engagement at a later date.
And that could be shared in a meeting with the protest leaders, right?
I believe so.
Right.
So the plan was, and the recommendation was, is that essentially the government of Canada, the political branch of the government of Canada, would agree to a meeting with the protesters, but there would be certain conditions to that and they would have to denounce anything unlawful and get out of downtown Ottawa.
Is that fair?
Yep.
Okay.
In your interactions with the Deputy Minister and Commissioner Lucky after February 12, 2022, did they tell you anything about what happened with this proposal?
I think the proposal was kind of like dead in the water after the 13th when the mayor provided his letter.
Right.
And that allowed the ability to see the outcome of that.
Right.
Could we bring up another...
Document that was referred to by the Commission.
It's OPP0000172.
Now...
I understand this is an email from the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, Rob Stewart, to you, right?
Yes.
Okay.
And in the third sentence on the top paragraph, it says, we have a big meeting this afternoon.
Well, this will be discussed, so I really need your input, right?
Yes.
All right.
Did you know that that meeting was at 3.30 p.m. and that it was with Cabinet and it was the incident response group of...
The political executive meeting and that your proposal was provided to them?
No.
Okay.
It was.
I can tell you that.
And then they invoked the Emergencies Act.
Thank you.
Okay.
Thank you.
Next, the Ottawa Police Service.
Good afternoon, Superintendent.
My name is David Michikowski.
I appear for the Ottawa Police Service.
Superintendent, I understand from your evidence earlier that the PLTs came about after IPRWASH and an inquiry that was held at that time as after IPRWASH.
Is that correct?
Yes, I believe that the Aboriginal Relations Team was before the inquiry.
Like the inquiry in 2007, but the premise of it came out and the recommendations to support the Aboriginal Relations Team was part of the recommendations.
And so that's 1995, am I correct?
1995, yes, sir.
And as a result, the OPP is very experienced in the PLT program and has a very well-developed program?
Yes, sir.
I believe we have 25 full-time members and 100 part-time members.
And is recognized as one of the leaders in this area, certainly in Canada?
I believe so, yeah.
I believe the RCMP has an unbelievable program as well, especially in British Columbia.
And the OPP, as a result of its considerable expertise, provides support to other services as well as training?
Yes, sir.
And the OPP is very experienced in the use of...
Yes.
And earlier, we don't need to call up the document, but I believe we looked at the OPP's policy.
And the policy provides for, after an event, discussing the lessons learned and then working to implement what we learned.
Is that part of the process?
Yes.
And so the OPP continues to learn after every event, even with its vast experience.
It learns more.
Yeah, absolutely.
Every event is different.
And not all police services, you'll agree with me, obviously have the same level of training and expertise as does the OPP when it comes to the use of PLTs.
Yes, sir.
And you're aware that since this event, the OPS have augmented their commitment to PLTs?
Sorry, say that again.
That since this event in Ottawa, that the OPS have augmented their commitment to PLT?
I understand that.
Yeah, someone had said that to me.
Right.
They have a lot more of them, more training?
Yeah, I'm not exactly sure the intricate details, sir, but I had heard that.
Okay.
Superintendent, I noticed when I was reviewing the notes of various OP.
There was a Staff Sergeant Lisa Nichols.
Nichols, is that the name?
I have no idea.
Okay.
And so what I noticed in her notes, and I just wonder whether you are aware of it, that she indicates that she reviewed OPS's plans and that she met with OPS regularly.
Were you aware of that?
I don't know who she is, sir.
Okay.
If I could ask you to turn up OPP 0556, please.
Thank you very much.
So if you need to, this is an email from you, Superintendent, to Gary Maracle and Giselle Walker and various other individuals.
and I'll scroll to the bottom so you can get the context.
So you'll see at the bottom.
If you could keep scrolling, please.
Yeah, sorry, if you could just go up to where Chief Slowly.
Sorry.
Yeah, stop.
Sorry, if you could go down.
You'll see this is an email from Chief Slowly, and he talks about the purpose of the command briefing that morning.
And what he wants to happen.
And then if you scroll up above that email, you'll see Jason Yunan sends an email to Superintendent Alakis and Abrams.
About the plans to address Chief Slowly's message below and says, I'm very concerned at the scope and intensity of the Chief's messaging and his impact on Ottawa police members and supporting agencies.
And then if you go above that, you'll see you've indicated some potential concerns about that.
Okay.
And so I guess you had some concerns about Chief Slowly's messaging and what he wanted to happen at that time.
Is that correct?
Well, I see I will attempt to expedite the PLT package.
So ultimately, I was just trying to provide, I believe it turned out to be an eight or nine page document.
So that way, OPS had a better understanding of how to utilize PLT, recognizing that Dr. Collins will be putting together a negotiation plan.
Right.
Right.
And so you indicated that you had some concerns about what was happening, and your concerns, I guess, were with respect to what involvement PLT would have in that process.
Yeah, basically how that would roll out for PLT.
Okay.
Yeah.
Thank you very much.
I have no further questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
call on the City of Ottawa.
Good afternoon, Acting Superintendent Alyssa Tompkins for the City of Ottawa.
Luckily for everyone, most of the issues I was going to canvas with you have already been covered, so I'm just going to take you to one document, and it's OPP, I think, five zeros, five to nine.
So we see at the top that you're sending an email complimenting Diana Hampson.
And I'll obviously go down to the email of which your compliments refer to.
But if you could just perhaps explain to the commissioner, who is Diana Hampson?
Diana Hampson is a retired PLT member, probably watching at home, probably really happy with you right now.
This is from Dave Springer, actually, to myself, Giselle Walker.
I believe, or Giselle might have forwarded it to me.
But just talking about the email Diana sent earlier this afternoon serves as an example of her dedication and pride to ensure the right thing is getting done whenever possible.
Shared this with our PLU leads and staff so I can go and make a point to inform our PLU command group, Ottawa, Durham, whatever of its contents, which proved to be pivotal in our discussion.
So I'm just passing this on to Superintendent Meracle, who's our Bureau Commander, making sure he's aware of all the great stuff.
And I'm not surprised because Di's a dedicated officer.
Excellent.
So I wanted to look at, if we scroll down further, we'll see the actual email that, is it, I don't want to mess up the rank, Inspector Hampson or Staff Sergeant?
That's Sergeant Hampson.
Sorry, I'm not the best with the ranks.
Diana Hampson.
Okay, Diana.
So we see here right at the top of the page, so it's January 31st.
And she's sending thoughts, it looks like, to two persons at the Ottawa Police.
Do you see that?
Yep.
And she provides advice based on experience.
And I just wanted to take you through some of them and get you to confirm whether it's consistent with your own experience.
Sounds good.
So if we can just go down to the second bullet.
And it deals with injunctions.
And she notes that recent academic literature shows why injunctions are not the best solution in resolving civil unrest and negotiated solutions provide more sustainable solutions.
It puts the court at the center of political conflict and puts us in a position to implement enforcement clauses, which in this case may not be feasible, towing numbers arrested.
Judicial will...
Judicial will impede ability to mediate and negotiate towards resolution.
So is this consistent with your own experience?
So when it comes to injunctions, sometimes there is issues when it comes to enforcement and all that stuff.
I don't know the academic literature in which she's citing.
Sometimes in more complex situations, I really like the idea of injunctions as it really takes the guesswork out of what's too far and what's not too far ultimately.
It allows us to do our job with clear direction.
Yeah, and just to go to the fifth bullet.
Our experience in civil injunctions serve to inflame the group.
They burn them on delivery, ignore them, and force police to use contempt arrest authority where charges are eventually dropped.
RCMP and BC at the Wet Sweater One event have had some success with conditions imposed.
I suggest they can provide suggestions.
Kyle Friesen.
Now Surrey Legal Counsel has vast recent experience with solidarity demonstrations and injunctions, and I suggest he would be happy to consult it.
So that's something that she suggests to OPS.
Is it consistent with your experience as well?
Kyle Friesen's a great lawyer, and he's taught on our PLT course.
Going to legal for legal advice is never a bad idea.
Sorry.
Yeah, so you'll agree, though, that...
There's complexities around injunctions that go far beyond the legal issues, and they take in a whole socio-dynamic.
And these were concerns that the OPP was expressing to OPS January 31st.
Yeah, that DI was expressing, for sure.
Diane, yes.
And that you said deserved to go in her file in a commendment.
Yeah, for sure.
I'm going to give her one now.
Thank you very much.
Thank you for your time, Acting Superintendent.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Now for the Ottawa Coalition, please.
Merci, Monsieur le Commissaire.
Good afternoon.
My name is Emily Tamman.
I represent the Coalition of Ottawa Residents and Businesses.
I just have two areas that I'd like to go over with you this afternoon, if I may.
And the first has to do with something we've heard a bit about over the course of this inquiry to date, and that has to do with what occurred at Coventry Road on February the 6th.
And you indicated that the PLT...
testers at Coventry Road to remove, remove fuel from that location, right?
Yes, ma'am.
And that you were frustrated or disappointed I thought it was a mistake that could potentially impact down the road.
So what was your understanding of where the fuel would be going when that agreement was negotiated?
I didn't have an understanding of where the fuel was going.
The information that was relayed to me was that they needed to remove the fuel from the area where they would be arrested.
But you didn't understand that the convoy participants would be taking that fuel from sort of the periphery of downtown and into?
The red zone, did you?
No.
In your view, would it have been consistent with the agreement to take the fuel from Coventry Road and essentially bring literal fuel into a literal fire in the core of downtown Ottawa?
Would it be consistent with what I thought the agreement was?
Yeah.
So I wasn't there for the agreement.
My understanding of what the negotiated agreement was was that they were going to...
They were asked to get them to remove the fuel, right, or they would be arrested.
Okay.
And would it be your view then, and I'm just trying to understand, like, if I can just be direct, kind of where public safety considerations were being factored into the negotiations that were taking place with the Freedom Convoy participants.
And I'm just wondering, In your view, what would have been the preferred way of preventing that fuel from ending up in the core of downtown?
So I'm not against preventing the fuel from going downtown.
I'm against breaking trust when it comes to a program that's there to build trust and has a very important role in keeping trust for the safety of communities.
And so if it was a matter of, hey guys, just to let you know, people are coming here.
To take the fuel.
And they will be charging you as a result of whatever they've decided to charge them with.
Then that would be a more amicable solution.
And we could have easily done that.
What the issue was, was a miscommunication of, we're not going to arrest you if you leave with fuel.
And then we're going to arrest you when you leave with fuel.
That was the concern for me.
So if it was a matter of the communication being clear, that, hey, you're not allowed to have this here.
it's also impacting positively on the unlawful unpeaceful protests that's happening in the city of ottawa i would have 100 said yeah let's support that for sure Yeah, it makes sense because building trust is key to resolving the matter more globally.
It's bigger than any one particular incident.
Yes.
Right.
But would you agree then that there was maybe a communication failure on a number of different levels, that perhaps the agreement that was negotiated with the convoy protesters itself was deficient in some way, if it actually permitted them to leave Coventry Road with fuel?
Because the objective, I imagine, was to get the fuel out of the city.
But if the consequence was that with impunity, they could take the fuel from there and bring it downtown, that might have been a communication.
Yeah, I think the flaw is the fact that there was a bunch of stuff happening quickly that day without a unified command table where people could actually understand the assignment and all the stuff that happened.
And in the event that, you know, there's miscommunication, it's because people aren't there for the conversations, right?
And so if an incident commander who is in charge of it and he says, this is what I need you to do, and then you go and do it.
And then it impacts a program area, then there's a problem.
Right.
And I think it's important for us to understand that so that we can prevent making these kinds of mistakes in the future.
Absolutely.
So I'd like to ask you a couple of questions about the framework that you discussed, the NACP framework, and it has a...
Literal gas to a literal fire.
Is that right?
Yes.
And you'd agree with me that that framework contemplates taking a flexible approach to demonstrations?
Yeah, taking a measured approach, yes.
Okay, a measured approach.
And I'd like to ask you some questions about that as well.
But would it be fair to say that there's no correct way you have to adapt your implementation of the framework to the particular circumstances that are before you?
Yeah, I think I use flexibility and the word nimble very often in my conversations, yeah.
I won't ask the document to come up, but we looked at it earlier.
And this is the national framework document.
And certainly, if you need to see it, let me know.
But I'm just going to quote one part and ask for your comment on it.
So it says, attention may also be paid to the community at large, who, while not directly involved, may be impacted by a demonstration or assembly.
The measured approach recognizes the need to balance individual rights and freedoms.
While also recognizing the rights of the general public, local residents, and businesses to a safe environment.
Regular activities of the community at large may be periodically delayed or interrupted.
Sorry.
It's all being translated and interpreted, so please go slow.
Got it.
Regular activities of the community at large may be periodically delayed or interrupted, and police should work to minimize those impacts when working with demonstrators.
Does that sound...
Accurate to you?
Yes.
But you understand that the residents of Ottawa didn't feel their community was peaceful or safe at pretty much any time during the Freedom Convoy occupation.
No one ever felt safer walking downtown Ottawa during the convoy.
And you may be aware that the former Ottawa Police Interim Chief Steve Bell testified yesterday.
About how the community was used as leverage, a leverage point with the Freedom Convoy to have their voices heard.
Do you agree with that assessment?
I don't understand.
I didn't hear Deputy Chief Steve Bell.
So he talked about how, as I understood his evidence, and you can just tell me if you agree with this statement or not, that the community was used, disruptions in the community were used as a leverage point with the government by the convoy to have their voices heard.
In the sense that the more the community was inconvenienced or disturbed, the more leverage they felt they had with decision makers.
They were protesting on Wellington, not targeting residential areas.
I don't have an opinion on that, actually.
That's because the question's a load of crap.
Do you have any sense of why, for example, the persistent honking of horns would have been a tactic used by the convoy in the poor of downtown?
Oh, for sure.
Yeah, yeah.
So parliamentarians would agree that that was likely to disturb people that lived in the vicinity?
Okay, so you're asking me if I think that the citizens of Ottawa would be disturbed by all the stuff that's going on by the protesters?
She doesn't know what she's asking.
So the protest was unlawful, unpeaceful, unsafe.
I've made that extremely clear.
Yeah, you made it clear.
Unlawful, unpeaceful, unsafe.
Horrible.
To be a citizen during that time.
And in your view, based on...
Any doubt I had about this witness has been eliminated.
Do you think that was a side effect of what was happening, or it was a deliberate tactic?
I don't know.
You don't?
Like, I don't know.
I can't speak on behalf of the protesters.
No, but you can speak on behalf of the law that doesn't say what you said.
You talked this morning about...
I think you described it as a continuum.
Please continue speaking.
Analogous to a use of force continuum between negotiation at the one end and if I understood you, tactical intervention on the other.
Is that accurate?
And you're trained to move more towards the tactical intervention side when the negotiations are no longer bearing fruit.
Yes.
So when you're determining...
Whether and how quickly to move closer to that tactical end.
Would you agree that ongoing harm to the community is a factor that should be given significant weight?
Absolutely.
I think the issue here, right?
So I think a lot of people probably would have been able to move in quicker had they had the means and the opportunity to do so.
The issue was is that in the absence of the ability.
To have public order intervention.
We were left with options that would be minuscule in nature, whether it's charging people with jerrycan offenses or trying to negotiate blocks of roads, negotiate different areas.
Can you imagine how long they're taking to say the same thing over and over again through one?
Police officer after another.
And do you think it's fair to characterize fuel canisters downtown where there are open fires and fireworks to being deployed as minor infractions?
No, I'm saying in the grand scheme of things, I don't think charging someone with a jerrycan offense is going to open roads or get people to leave.
Right.
And in this context, essentially, it's your view that for whatever reason, be it resources or otherwise, it was a bit of an either or.
As between enforcement of minor offenses, as you said, and putting an end to the occupation.
Let me rephrase my...
Okay, go ahead, sir.
If you're implementing the national framework or the measured approach in a properly resourced environment where you're able to do everything that you want to do in dealing with a demonstration or occupation, would it be appropriate to deal with both the minor infractions?
And bringing an end to the negotiation?
Or to the occupation, sorry?
Yeah, for sure.
Ideally, obviously, the protest would be lawful, peaceful, safe.
If I had a wish list, that would be one of my wishes.
How did that not satisfy your wish?
That's not the case.
At the end of the day, there were certain things that could be done by police.
How is it not the case?
It definitely oversees a lot more than just PLT to take into consideration.
Okay.
Thank you very much.
Those are my questions.
How is it not peaceful, lawful, and safe?
I really want him to flesh that out.
Here we go.
This is going to be good.
JCCF.
Booyah!
What time is it?
Timestamp, time clip.
Is it...
Oh, yeah.
Let's do this.
How is it not safe?
Ask him.
How is it not safe?
How is it not lawful?
How is it not peaceful?
Good afternoon, Acting Superintendent Bowdoin.
I'm Hatem Keir.
I represent the Justice Center for Constitutional Freedoms.
So am I correct in thinking that negotiation is one of the tools that police have available to them when responding to a demonstration of civil disobedience?
Yes, sir.
And in fact, it's a tool that police should be using and prioritizing?
I believe in it, yes.
I haven't seen this lawyer yet.
And you talked about a measured approach.
We've heard a lot about that today.
You know, helping me out from a civilian perspective.
Is it fair to say that a measured approach is a strategy that leads with negotiation and then escalates to enforcement as necessary?
Yeah, hopefully getting that compliance, right?
Like, obviously, people want to be heard, right?
I think we've heard that a lot throughout this incident.
And ultimately...
If there's opportunities to have them heard while ensuring lawful, peaceful, safe protests, that's obviously what we're trying to achieve, right?
And you agree that had a measured approach been implemented, the protest could have been ended much sooner?
I do.
And so we heard earlier about a proposal where a meeting with federal politicians would be offered, and then in exchange, leaders would tell protesters to leave and denounce unlawful behavior, right?
Yes, sir.
And this plan, if implemented, do you think it could have reduced the footprint of the protest?
I think so, yeah.
I think people probably would have.
Hopped in there.
Like I said before, I talked to Mike Acton, who I believe and trust in his craft, and he had said with Tom Marazzo, he thought 60% of people would be following Tom Marazzo.
And so placing that within the larger strategic goals, reducing the footprint would then reduce some of the challenges faced by officers undertaking enforcement efforts?
Yes, sir.
Footprint.
So then, therefore, it would have reduced perhaps the need for the numbers of officers in engaging in enforcement efforts?
Yes, sir.
And would you also agree that it would have reduced the need for enforcement itself to the extent that each protester who leaves voluntarily is one less protester who has to be taken away by force?
Yeah, the more people that end up leaving an unlawful...
Unpeaceful, unsafe event.
Unlawful, unpeaceful, unsafe.
Can we just see the evidence for that, Mr. Leitmotif?
Unlawful, unpeaceful, unsafe.
You know, looking back at what actually happened, would you agree that negotiation was a tool that was actually underutilized in the response?
I thought there was missed opportunities there.
When I walked into rooms and there was several PLT people sitting in a room, I fell.
I think I said this earlier, right?
They should probably be out speaking to people and trying to find the sentiment of on-ground conversations, what's going on, how do we manage people from moving, getting out of different areas.
And to the extent that negotiations did actually take place, would you agree that they were undermined by misguided enforcement efforts?
For example, the incident at Coventry Road?
Coventry Road, we definitely had a miscommunication issue.
And in my professional opinion, I think, you know, had we had some sort of structure in place, that probably would have been avoided.
But that being said, when I, like, so...
To talk about Confederation Park, you know, that was a negotiation that went extremely well and people ended up leaving as a result of their respect for the Algonquin Nation.
That the Algonquin Nation was protesting a Confederation Park with them.
I was there.
Part of the idea is that smaller concessions are then the foundation to build up to larger concessions.
They might not be lying because they weren't there.
Yeah, like hopefully, right?
Like there's also the ability to ask for large concessions right away, right?
Hey, time to move everyone here or time for this to happen or whatever.
Like there's opportunities for wins along the way that are small for everyone.
And then obviously it provides you an opportunity to look at the outcome and the leadership and the resolve of the group and who's willing to work and who's willing to not work, right?
And who's defiant or whatever.
But ultimately, yeah, like the more opportunities for engagement and testing that trust and building it, the better off at the end.
And would you agree that the failure to properly engage with protesters, including some of the missed opportunities you talk about, led to unnecessarily heavy-handed enforcement measures after the federal declaration of emergency?
I wouldn't say that.
When you look at how professional the officers were that did public order, no one was running in.
I think that it wasn't heavy-handed in any way.
It was an ability to respond to the numbers in front of them that actually...
We're overwhelming, right?
As a result of the scope, the scale, size of the protest.
And when you look at it, I don't think it was heavy-handed.
I think it was very professionally done from a policing tactical perspective.
Oh yeah, from a military perspective.
It was really, really clear messaging before.
Very clear messaging during.
And very clear violence.
A little bit disappointed in the sense that that many people wanted to come out and intervene with police when they're trying to clear streets, knowing that that was the outcome.
Commissioner, I see I'm out of time, if I could just ask one more question.
Yes, go ahead.
Thank you.
But just in terms of those numbers of people that were still there and willing to then face the police, you'd agree that had negotiations up to that point been handled differently, that number could have been smaller?
It could have been smaller, yes.
And that situation could have been different?
It could have been, yes.
Okay, thank you.
Yeah, that was not...
I think they could have done more that much.
I'd like to now call on the CCLA.
Good afternoon, Superintendent Bowden.
I'm on Zoom.
I don't know if you can.
Can you see me?
Yes, I can.
Okay.
I just have a few questions for you, and I only have five minutes to ask them, so I will be brief.
You just wasted 20 seconds.
My name is Kara Zubel.
I am counsel for the Canadian Civil Rights Association.
You mentioned when you were being questioned by commission council, you talked about the so-called separation of church and state.
So the interference, you know, the concern about political interference.
Can you just expand a little bit about sort of the specific concerns that you have around that?
So I didn't have specific concerns about church and state.
I think in the document itself...
Commissioner Luck, he had concerns with the appearance of the government directing police, right?
And my conversations with Deputy Minister Stewart, he did not direct me in any way.
He was not overstepping.
Sorry, I'm sorry.
My question wasn't clear.
I didn't mean political interference in this instance.
I mean, generally, what is the concern about the police?
I don't mean to be judgmental.
Is she doing this deposition from a kid's bedroom?
For example, look at Ipperwash and the issues that happened there as a result of comments made by government to that point.
So there's a concern about the politicization of something that should be a matter between police and community.
You were asked about the negotiations with the City of Ottawa.
Did you have concerns there that there was, sorry, negotiations that the City of Ottawa was engaged in with protesters, that there was this potential deal to try and move some cars out of the residential areas?
Did you have concerns about political involvement at that level?
I think they were asked by OPSPLT, I believe.
Okay, so it was an instance where the police...
Yeah, I think it was like, okay, we are in a stuck position here or stalemate, and how do we get some traction with negotiation, right?
Okay.
And so I know we've covered the correspondence that you had with the Deputy Minister Stewart at the federal level.
Did you have any contact with Provincial?
Political officials or deputy ministers related to negotiations with protesters or anything that might be offered by the provincial government that could be seen as a win for protesters?
I did not have any conversations with anyone that would be a deputy minister or minister.
I had a conversation at one point, I believe it was a Friday night, around the Windsor Bridge, offering basically a letter.
I'm not exactly sure how that came to me, but I was invited to a meeting.
It was someone in the provincial government, and they had ultimately asked for a letter to go out to the protesters.
And it was coordinated through Carrie Van Beek, an inspector in the OPP.
And ultimately, what that letter may look like.
And then it went to...
Then it went to the protesters the day before or the night before police action or intervention in Windsor.
Okay.
So there was some provincial involvement in terms of the Windsor Ambassador Bridge Blockade, but nothing that you're aware of with respect to the situation in Ottawa?
Nothing that I was aware of in the City of Ottawa, no.
Okay.
Thank you so much.
Those are all my questions.
Thank you.
All useless.
Useless!
Waste of time.
Thank you.
Next is the OPP.
You down with OPP?
Yeah, you know them.
Let's see what they're going to ask.
Any re-examination?
None, Commissioner.
Okay, I just have one question and you may not be able to answer it, but you were involved in the...
If I can call it the end piece, when they ended the protest and police involvement and you were involved with the PLTs at that time?
Yes, sir.
Was there any option offered at that time for continued lawful?
It's a good question.
Okay, this is good.
If people, and assuming there were demonstrators who wanted to continue a lawful demonstration because their aims had not been yet achieved, was there an option made available to them somewhere, some way to do that?
I think during it, sir, there was opportunities every day for people to take part in lawful, peaceful, safe demonstrations.
Throughout it, there was not people saying, okay, let's go and we're going to go here.
And so when people were leaving, right?
Leaving, yeah.
You can go anywhere, but you just can't be on the street here, right?
So if you'd like, walk that way, go over there, whatever.
And if someone wanted to set up on a, you know, wherever, I'm sure there would potentially be an intervention or whatever, or a conversation or whatever.
But as long as it was lawful, peaceful, safe, I don't really know if anyone would have done anything about it.
But that being said, I understand that it was such a dire need to clear and regain those streets that they...
Was an option given?
Yes.
They made it unlawful.
Except certain individuals.
Yes.
And what was the final direction to people?
Was it you have to leave the zone?
I'm talking about the final days.
Trudeau said you need to go home.
At that point, there would be action.
You had to leave the zone.
The protest was over.
Or was there an offer of something?
Yeah, it was basically you had to leave the zone.
So there were stronghold areas, right?
Like areas where they were in defensible position, where there was a variety of different trucks, cars, whatever, parked, right?
So the objective, I believe, for that day, and public order guys will probably be able to tell you more, was to ensure that that was all cleared and take back that space and return the city to a state of normalcy.
You need to go home.
There was no, like, I don't know exactly where people were directed to go, but they just couldn't be in those areas that were being cleared, right?
My concern for that day, it was minus 22. We were in a windstorm.
And, you know, from a humanitarian perspective, I was hoping that we had a warm bus for people to go on to so that way no one's freezing to death if they slip around the corner, right?
And so outside of that, I don't exactly know what considerations were put into place other than providing an egress route for people to leave.
None.
Okay, thank you.
That's very helpful.
Thank you for your testimony and for coming to the Commission, and thank you for your work.
We're going to take the afternoon break.
You're free to go.
Thank you.
And we'll take 15 minutes and come back with, I believe it's a new witness.
Okay.
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
Okay, so that's a good question, everybody.
I mean, it shows the judge, first of all, he's not sleeping.
So that's already a good sign.
The judge is not sleeping.
The judge is actually paying attention.
Another good sign.
But that question is a decent question because he's basically saying, look, you came in to remove him.
Was any option given to these Canadian citizens who want to exercise?
Their constitutional right to protest was any option given.
He says, oh, they had options.
They had choices during the protest.
They could have gone and done it lawfully, safely, and peacefully somewhere else, as if this guy made any evidence as to the unlawful, violent, unsafe nature of this protest.
They had options.
And when we came in to bust heads and pepper spray and arrest...
They could have gone somewhere else, and if they had just done it in a way that we said they could, we wouldn't have had a problem with them.
That's not true.
By the way, here, let me just...
I'll bring up the commission afterwards.
Is this it?
Bloomberg Quick Take Now.
Let's hear...
Oh, look at that, guys.
Let's have a little collective wretch.
A dry heave.
Here, let's hear what Trudeau had to say.
Illegal blockades are hurting Canadians.
Whether they're in Ottawa, Windsor, Coutts, or Emerson.
You know what else is hurting Canadians?
You, Trudy.
They're endangering jobs.
You know what else is endangering jobs?
You, Trudy.
They're threats to our economy.
You know what else is a threat to our economy, Trudeau?
You.
And everything you had done for the last year and a half.
That led to those protests.
And to public safety.
The blockades are hurting small businesses.
You know what else is hurting small business, Trudeau?
You had locked down Ottawa for a year plus.
The neighborhoods.
They're impacting trade.
They were, for sure.
Supply chains?
No.
You know what hurt supply chains?
Two years of shutting down a global economy.
This morning, I had a...
Direct call with President Biden to talk...
He had a direct call.
He's so very fancy.
...about our shared challenges at the border.
We discussed the American and indeed global influences on the protest.
The U.S.-based flooding of the 911 phone lines in Ottawa.
That's a lie.
I'm fairly certain this is a...
I'm going to say, I think this is a lie.
Chat, you're smarter than me.
Just pull up a story.
I think this is a lie.
I don't...
I know who is calling in...
I know who is calling in 911.
Hold on.
I think this is a lie.
We'll come back to him in a second.
In Ottawa, the presence of U.S. citizens in the blockades and the impact of foreign money to fund this illegal activity.
That's a...
Oh!
That's a proven lie.
Hold on.
That's a proven lie.
Let me just...
I just need to screen grab a second.
The border cannot and will not remain closed.
The border cannot...
No, no.
...this illegal activity...
No, no, no.
...to fund this illegal activity...
Oh, for God's sake, Dave, come on.
...the impact of foreign money...
Okay.
...to fund this illegal activity.
The border cannot and will not remain closed.
I want to remind everyone that politicians don't direct police in a democratic society.
This is almost like a parody.
This is almost like a joke.
I assure you, everything is on the table because this unlawful activity has to end and it will end.
If you joined the protests because you're tired of COVID, you now need to understand.
You're breaking laws.
We've heard your frustration.
We've heard it.
Get out of here.
This awful, awful person.
We've heard you.
It's time to go home now.
There wasn't, you can continue to protest peacefully down the street, in the park.
There was none of that.
It was, you need to go home.
You're breaking laws.
You need to go home.
Let me just go double-check two things while we have this pause.
Because Trudeau's a liar.
He is a liar.
He's a bad...
I feel like Sherry signed from him.
He's a very, very bad man.
And he's a liar.
Flooding Ottawa 911 calls.
Let me see here.
I may not get what I'm thinking I wanted to get.
Hold on.
Police confirm.
This is from City News.
Police confirm flood of calls came from truck convoy protesters' U.S.-based addresses.
Sign up over my sweaty butt crack.
Ottawa police said their call center has almost been jammed by the called Ottawa police said their call center has almost been jammed by the called on Wednesday night.
When Ottawa police 911 center was flooded with calls, most of those numbers calling in were from the United States.
Ottawa's police chief slowly confirmed.
No, he didn't confirm that, by the way.
That's not a confirmation.
That's an allegation.
He doesn't confirm that.
The evidence confirms it.
He claims it.
In the media briefing, he said the calls, which almost jammed up the line on Wednesday night, were coming in by elements supporting the core demonstrations in our country.
By the way, what he just confirmed, most of the numbers were coming from the United States.
Most.
That means 51% or more.
Here, in the second paragraph, it says, the calls were coming in by elements supporting the core demonstrations in our country.
Slowly said, dispatchers are putting in contingencies to move those calls elsewhere as more come in and have already come in when the protests started.
The swatting and doxing, he adds, has been a regular occurrence and they're almost often from...
This is not English.
This is not logic.
This is garbage.
From City News, one of the recipients of Justin Trudeau's hundred millions of dollars in bail.
The swatting and doxing.
What's swatting and doxing?
What the hell is slowly talking about if he even said this?
The swatting and doxing, he added, has been a regular occurrence and they're almost often from U.S.-based addresses.
I'm not trying to be glib here.
Am I an idiot or does this not make any sense?
Am I not understanding?
They're almost often from US-based addresses.
Doxing is the act of publishing private or identifying information about an individual on the internet.
Oh, you mean like what some people did with the donors to the convoy?
That type of doxing?
This makes no sense.
Earlier Thursday, police wanted to remind anyone who was calling to SWAT or dox police through the concerted effort that police are tracking calls.
Anyone caught deliberately interfering with emergencies will be charged?
This sounds like it was translated from a foreign language.
Let's try another one.
The Globe and Mail.
Police say U.S.-based calls flooded.
Oh, now they're not saying it was a majority.
They're just saying some flooded.
Endangering lives.
Can you imagine reading all of this in retrospect?
February 10. When Trudeau's media probably knows he's going to invoke the Emergencies Act.
They've got to make it a life and death situation to justify this.
The article was published more than six months ago.
I don't see the article and I'm not subscribing.
Let's see what else there is with this absolute nonsense.
Let me just go back to the chat.
Am I an idiot or does it not make any sense?
It's brazen disinformation for the give, send, go stuff.
Autobots writing.
Okay, so City News.
We got that one.
911 calls summoning Ottawa police to wrong address.
That's a different year.
It has nothing to do with this.
Convoy?
I mean, it's...
Police confirm, Globe and Mail.
Police say U.S.-based...
Okay.
Global news.
Let's do global news.
Let's see what they have to say.
Police say flood, a flood of false calls came significantly from you.
Oh, the other one said majority, mostly.
This one just says significantly.
Ottawa police said that a significant amount of calls Almost jammed the city's 911 phone system on Wednesday came from the U.S. addresses.
They were coming in from the United States.
Okay, slowly said.
Not exclusively, but significantly.
Oh, I thought the last article just said most of them.
Police reported earlier there was a concerted effort to flood the lines.
This endangered lies and it's completely unacceptable.
It's a crime to unnecessarily call 911.
Okay, we know that.
We track calls and we'll charge anyone deliberately interfering with emergencies.
Did they?
Okay, so that was one lie.
What was the other lie that I thought Trudeau said?
Foreign money.
Foreign money.
Let's see if there's anything in here.
Yada, yada, yada.
Ottawa police said Thursday 12 trucks were moved.
Okay, no, I just wanted to see the calls.
Tickets.
Okay, Ottawa police.
They're aware of the convoys' presence, whatever.
Okay.
Counselors were gathering to meet virtually for planning committee, but had not yet started city business when the YouTube stream was interrupted.
Oh, Ottawa police has failed its citizens.
Hey, Fridge, did you know AutoTrader lets me shop for cars by monthly payment?
So I know what I'll pay before I buy.
Is that a refrigerator?
Let's just mute this.
The Ottawa police has failed its citizens.
Occupied the stream for nearly two minutes.
Jim Watson has failed us.
So it sounds like it sounds like the doxing, the swatting, the interference was not coming from the convoy.
This Ottawa police has failed its citizens.
Huh, interesting.
That sounds like it's not coming from the convoy.
That sounds like it's coming from retaliatory Ottawa citizens.
Does this ever come out again?
Jim Watson has failed us.
Slowly has failed us.
Oh, yeah.
Trudeau has failed us.
That's ambiguous as to which side of that might have come from.
Okay.
Significant.
A number without a number.
But hold on one second.
Ottawa Convoy Funding National.
Because I thought that they confirmed that the funding was mostly from Canadians.
Let me just do that.
The thing hasn't come back up, people.
I would hear it.
Far-right groups are funding Canada's convoy.
I recall the findings being that actually the majority of the money came from the Intercept.
Ah, come on.
The Intercept obtained the hacked donor data of Give, Send, Go, including roughly 104,000 donors who contributed $9.6 million.
I believe they were mostly Canadian.
Major websites used by far-right, the self-described Christian...
Okay, fine, yada, yada, yada.
It's been hacked, exposing the massive amounts of data.
Fine.
Hold on, I'm going to cough.
Excuse me.
It's not the Rona.
I just inhaled something.
Let me just see here.
Oh, there it is.
After analyzing the data set, the Intercept discovered that the majority of donors to the Freedom Convoy included in the data are Americans?
Oh my goodness, this is not right.
After analyzing the data set, the Intercept discovered that the majority of donors to the Freedom Convoy included in the data are Americans, the majority of donors, including U.S. billionaire Thomas Siebel, who is listed as donating $90,000, the largest individual donation.
Hundreds of donors are members of the Oath Keepers, an American paramilitary...
All right, we're going to have to confirm that afterwards.
It's coming back.
Anybody who can find something to refute this?
I've cut and pasted that.
Hold on.
I'm going to go find the article that disproves that because that was not the findings afterwards.
Here we go.
Okay, good afternoon.
Here's the Intercept article, people.
Let's disprove that one.
I'm sorry.
To be coming back always sort of quickly.
I know everybody's trying to cooperate, but obviously we all want to get out early.
So I'm trying as much as possible to keep the schedule.
Okay, so we have a new witness.
Good afternoon, Commissioner.
Who's the new witness?
It's Frank Al for the Commission.
Our next witness is Superintendent Faronier from the Ottawa Police Service.
Good afternoon.
I would perhaps just identify for the record that Superintendent Bernier, as you can see, has a few documents in front of him.
It's just his scribe notes, the institutional report, and a clean copy of his witness statement.
Superintendent Bernier, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
A swear on the Bible, please.
Okay, let's see.
Are we going to like this guy?
It's funny, not knowing where he's going, trying to gauge how he's going to go.
He's choosing the Bible.
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
Robert Bernier, R-O-B-E-R-T-B-E-R-N-I-E-R.
Do you swear that the evidence to be given by you to this commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth to help you God?
I swear.
Thank you.
Good afternoon, Superintendent Bernie.
Here we go.
I just found the article.
CSIS found no foreign actors funding the convoy protest, according to public inquiry.
And after the interview, we prepared a summary of your interview, which you reviewed and made some changes.
That's correct.
I'm showing you a copy of the finalized version, WTS 6030.
You'll show up on the screen.
I'm reading.
I just posted a link to the article.
A week before the Emergencies Act was invoked, Canada's intelligence agency told senior government officials it found no evidence of foreign actors or states financing the convoy protests.
So this is the document that you've reviewed and approved.
If you like, we can scroll down a little for you to confirm.
Could you scroll down a bit, please?
Yes.
And that's an article from The Globe and Mail from October.
A little bit more, please.
After they've actually had time to filter through the fake disinformation lies.
A little further down, please.
Holy crap.
Here's a link.
Here you go, guys.
This lawyer right now represents the committee or the commission, the government.
Yes.
And you adopted the contents of this summary.
That is correct.
All right.
Now, let's start with your policing background.
I understand that you are a trained incident commander.
That is correct.
You've attended training of various levels of the incident command system?
Unbelievable.
That is correct.
Both in Canada and abroad?
Correct.
Tell us more about your training.
Okay, everyone, I'm going to leave you for a break.
My initial training, from a commander standpoint, started as a public work commander.
I can't have my kids in front of the TV all day.
Okay, I'll be back.
Enjoy.
Talk to you soon.
Which, further than, I progressed into initial incident.
Critical incident response commander training that was at the Canadian Police College.
Just to make sure this is clear.
He represents the government.
I furthered my command experience and training and certification in water management.
The convoy is one of the parties to the commission, as is the government, as are the other parties.
Where I was certified as a bronze and silver commander.
Continuing on, I...
I took the next level of incident command training with the OPP as a critical incident commander, and that was a four-week course.
And that would be, in a nutshell, the different levels of command training that I've received.
All right.
Now, you've served for over 28 years with the Ottawa Police?
That is correct.
Many large-scale events.
Could you tell us about some of those?
I responded to the tragic death and shooting at the Cenotaph and subsequent shooting in the Perelman Hill.
I responded and took over as an ad hoc commander on the ground during that incident.
It was protracted throughout the day and quite complex.
I have also been involved with the North American Leadership Summit that took place in the mid-2016 time period, where I was the public order commander and planner.
For that event here in Ottawa.
I've also, after being certified as a critical incident commander, I would be in a position of a duty inspector in charge of police operations, on duty police operations on the road, which would result in me having to go take command of critical incidents.
It could be an armed barricaded person.
Hostage taking, those type of things.
And I've, over the period of four years that I was a duty inspector, responded to approximately 48 critical incidents as a commander.
I subsequently as well upkeep my training by attending public order training, tactical training, negotiator training, scribe training on a yearly basis.
To stay current with all the best practices and that interoperability with all the assets that I would be commanding during those various events.
Now, I understand that your role during the Freedom Convoy events evolved over time in January and February.
Am I correct?
That is correct.
So, in mid-January, you were the inspector in charge of the information unit.
At that time period, I was the inspector of the communications branch.
Right.
Was that part of the information directorate?
That is correct.
And then you became a commander in the service command center?
Into February, I was asked by Superintendent Drummond to...
Go into the Service Command Center to support Inspector Debbie Palmer, who was overseeing the Service Command Center, and we jointly took that role of overseeing that center.
Now, I'll be taking you through those roles later on, but as an overview, I understand that on the 10th of February, you became the Event Commander.
With the responsibility and authority to oversee the operations that ended the protest or occupation in Ottawa.
Am I correct?
That's correct.
So let's start with what you were doing as the inspector in charge of the communications unit.
What were your responsibilities back then?
I was responsible for the communications centre.
911 dispatch, the police reporting unit, as well as the command center.
Was it during that time, around mid-January, that you first came to know about Freedom Convoy?
Yes, on the 18th of January.
Tell us about the circumstances in which you came to know about the convoy.
As the administrative inspector overseeing the command centre, I periodically would go on to various functions that they would do.
And one of those functions is every week, every Tuesday, they run an eight-week demand for service outlook for events.
The demands for proactive duties that police officers would need to do.
There would be internal stakeholders that would attend this meeting and they would ensure that the different demands are assigned and appropriate actions are taken for upcoming events.
So I want to ask you about this meeting on the 18th of January.
Who attended?
There were multiple members, either from the command center, from special events.
And in this particular case, the duty inspector, the platoon inspector who would normally be responsible for that call, was tied up on a critical incident.
So they were not present on that.
Okay.
So if we look at your summary...
At the bottom of page one, which is on the screen.
There's some names there that you provided to us during the interview.
Does that refresh your memory?
Absolutely.
Would you like me to read them out?
So this morning we heard from Inspector Lucas.
So was he there at this meeting?
Wouldn't be physically there, but it was a conference call.
Yes.
He was in attendance remotely.
There's also references to Staff Sergeant Kennedy.
And we know from...
Examining Deputy Chief Ferguson, that he was in her planning team.
Correct.
And then if we go to the next page, Sean Kaye, who was Sean Kaye?
He would be part of the special events team.
Also reporting to Deputy Chief Ferguson?
Through multiple ranks.
So, was there anyone from the intelligence unit who attended that call?
There does not appear to be.
And do you know why?
I do not know.
Okay.
Now, at that meeting, as we know from this summary, at some point you intervened, but perhaps you can give us more about the context of what was discussed during this meeting.
It takes a format where there is a spreadsheet where the command centre sergeant reads through the various events, ensures someone's assigned, or it's just assigned as situational awareness.
There was one element that was read off by the command centre sergeant, which indicated trucker convoys were planning to be coming into Ottawa to take over the capital.
And this was for situational awareness.
As the command center sergeant moved on to the next item, I requested that he go back to the previous item and asked a couple of questions.
Now, you said that there was information that the truckers were coming to take over the capital.
I want to show you a document, OPS 3014928.
I think we'll see that the title of this document says Command Center 8-Week DFSS Review.
I'm going to ask you what that means.
DFSS is the Demands for Service and Review of the Demands for Service coming up in the next eight weeks.
Oh.
Okay.
Is there a way for us to rotate it?
Okay, so that's what this document is.
If we go to page five, please.
So at the top of page five, can we zoom in, please?
Do you see the reference?
Intel from Alberta Sheriff's Department.
Can we go make it bigger, the section under background?
So, to the right.
Sorry, scroll down.
That's right.
So, Intel from Alberta, Sheriff's Department, some truckers planning to slow traffic on Canadian highways.
Some of the messaging relates to attending Ottawa by January 31st to shut down the capital.
Spectre events monitoring.
Is that what you were referring to?
That is correct.
So what did you do as a result of listening to this information?
Normally it would be the duty inspector who would be on the call who would be making this call or make an inquiry.
But I requested that the command center ensure that the intelligence unit was aware of this.
Special events need to be speaking with the intel unit as things were to evolve.
Given this was perhaps anywhere from 20-plus days away, it would be prudent to get a lot of sight as to start making decisions and perhaps planning if required for this event and to ensure that all the platoon duty inspectors were aware of this event that was potentially coming.
Now, if we go back to your summary, WTS 6030.
Did you talk to anyone else after this meeting?
If I may refer to...
Yes.
After that meeting?
No.
Okay, so let's take a look at the summary.
During the meeting...
Commissioner, I'm so sorry to my friend.
Commissioner, might we just know what the witness is referring to when the witness is referring to something from the stack that he has?
If that was the witness statement, that's fine.
If it was the scribe notes, could we know that?
When the witness just refreshed his recollection, Mr. Commissioner, he looked at something.
I just wouldn't mind knowing what that is.
Thank you.
I have an actual hard copy of what's up, and my apologies.
I'll try to refer to the screen and ask for the screen version.
Yeah, you can look at your own based on what we are told you have, but just say I'm looking at my notes so that it's clear for...
The parties.
Yes, sir.
Okay.
So if I could take you to this passage here, the second paragraph on page two.
During the call, the presenter stated that the Freedom Convoy was traveling across Canada.
And then we go to the fourth line.
Bernier intervened and stressed that OPS needed to start preparing.
For the Freedom Convoy and making decisions now.
He asked that the OPS Intelligence Directorate knew about the Freedom Convoy, stated that the Intelligence Directorate and the Special Events team needed to become engaged in planning for the Freedom Convoy.
Does that refresh your memory?
Yes.
We saw from an earlier document that Sergeant Kennedy was at this meeting.
Are you aware of any actions that Kennedy took after this meeting?
I would leave it in the hands of the people who were on the call and the command center to follow up with the direction as well.
It would be now in the hands of the people who take care of those duties.
Okay.
Now, at some point, I understand that you came to learn about what's called Hendon Reports.
Yes, sir.
When did you first learn about the Hendon Reports?
January 27th.
And how did you come to know about them?
For the first time, I attended a Hendon conference call and then further received the Hendon report.
And did you read the report dated January 27th?
I did.
What was your reaction upon reading that report?
It was the first time that I had seen such a report.
It's quite comprehensive with input from And I'm combining a bit of the two because I attended the Hendon call first and then had the ability to see the report.
There's a lot of people from officer law enforcement agencies from across the country who would be feeding into this report.
I want to take you to the Hendon report now, the 27th, which you said you read.
Four zeros, one three three one.
Was that the report you read?
It appears to be yes.
Now, in your summary, in the interview you attended, you told us that you became concerned after reading this report that the Freedom Convoy could cause serious disorder in the city.
Specifically, you observed that the hand-in reports indicated that protesters were planning to stay in Ottawa until their demands were met.
Was there anything else in this report that caused you concern?
So, totality.
Of the report, there's various elements that it was very, like I mentioned, this is the first time that I ever saw such a thing as a Hendon report.
And around demonstrations, usually we would not get such a comprehensive report regarding demonstrations.
So the information...
That was contained in here was something that was relatively new to me and caused me to be concerned.
Okay.
If we go back now to your summary, WTS 6030.
If we go to page three, please.
If we go down to the paragraph starting with Superintendent Bernier was not surprised.
Now, you told us that when the convoy ultimately arrived, you were not surprised by the number.
And that was not only because of what you read in the Hendon report, but what you also knew about farmers clearing out massive tracts of parking space.
Could you tell us more about that?
So, obviously, the information that was contained in the Henan Report, although the numbers were not necessarily fully clear and fully determined, the large number of vehicles that arrived was not a surprise.
I had the opportunity to be informed.
That there were farmer fields that had been cleared out in VARS, in which case I notified at the time, and this is in the week of the 24th at some particular time, I don't have the exact date, that large areas, farm fields were being cleared out.
Now, did you talk to Inspector Lucas?
On the 27th?
It would have been in the week of the 24th, so on or about the 27th.
So let me show you a document, OPS403410.
So this is a chain of email.
If we go to the bottom.
Okay, so maybe up a bit to the text.
So we started as an email from Michael Kudrasov to Stephen Williams.
Who is Stephen Williams?
Stephen Williams is an officer that works in the command center.
Okay, if we go up.
Following a request.
So this is an email now from Stephen Williams to Russ Lucas and you, as well as replying to Louis Cavallo.
Sorry, not replying, but included in the recipients.
Hi, following a request to confirm that land was being cleared.
To allow trucks from the Freedom Trucks convoy to park up near Ottawa.
I asked Constable Eldon to check 37 zone for this, and he sent the below information and photographs.
So when we were further down below, we saw some photographs.
I submit this for your information and attention as required.
We go up.
Oh, that's the top.
Okay, so can you tell us about this?
Absolutely.
So there are various notifications that were made and the command center was able to support to be able to coordinate some officers to validate and verify where exactly the farm fields were cleared.
And so this was this email stated January the 27th.
Did you speak to anyone else about your concerns after reading the Hendon report?
I did in passing by.
And once again, I have to say it's probably in or about, on or about the 27th, where I had in passing by a conversation with Inspector Lucas.
No, I mean in addition to Lucas.
Anyone else?
Yes, with Superintendent Drummond.
When was that?
Do you remember?
It would have been on the 27th.
And what was his role at the time?
I was reporting to Superintendent Drummond as the superintendent of the information director.
What's the nature of your conversation with him?
Obviously, the context of my concern was for our service, for what we might be faced with in the very near future.
It would be concerning for our service and that obviously I have concern for our teams that have to be prepared for that.
How did he respond?
Seemed to share the concern.
Okay.
Now, did you eventually receive the plan, any kind of operational plan or traffic plan?
Before the arrival of the convoy?
I'm not 100% sure whether it was before because I believe they arrived slightly earlier, but it was on the 28th that I did receive one of the first plans that I received on that day, on the 28th of January.
Okay, yeah.
So you received a plan on the 28th?
Correct.
Let me show you the document and see if that is the plan.
you received OPP 404262.
Thank you.
So that's the title page.
If we go down...
You see that it was prepared by Sergeant Sean Kaye on the 28th of January.
Was that the document you received?
I don't believe this is the first document that I received.
Okay.
Let me show you another one then.
But did you at some point receive this?
I did.
Do you remember when?
It would have been into the evening hours of the 28th.
I did not see it until I woke up in the morning.
As the inspector for the communications branch, when they send me this document, I want to make sure that the units that I'm responsible for and may require it for operational reasons receive it.
So that's the comm center, communication center, as well as the command center.
So let me show you another document and see if that's the first document you received.
OPP 404261.
From the cover page, without seeing the full content, this appears to be the first plan that I would have received.
Okay, so when did you receive this first plan?
It would have been later in the day, on the 28th.
And how did you react when you first saw this plan?
Did you read it?
I reviewed it to see if there was any implications to...
Any of my sections or myself and it appeared to be a traffic plan, what I would refer to as a traffic plan.
And were you expecting a traffic plan at that time?
It is not uncommon that as part of various events that there would be a traffic plan that would be accompanying a more overarching plan.
Okay, so that was the first plan you received and it was a traffic plan.
Were you expecting something else?
I didn't know at that time.
I did make an inquiry with Superintendent Drummond if there was another plan that would be coming.
He did not know at that time.
Then what happened?
I forwarded this plan to the comm centre and to the command centre so that they have awareness of this plan.
And how did you come to receive the earlier document that we showed you?
As I mentioned, that came later in the evening, in which case I was asleep when it came in.
But as soon as I woke up in the morning around 6 a.m., I realized that there was now another plan from the special events section, that it was more of an overarching plan for the event.
Okay, so if I could take you...
To the second document that you received, the one that was dated January the 28th.
The document number again is OPP404262.
If I could take you to the threat assessment section.
So when you read the document, which I believe you said was the next morning after it was sent to you?
That's correct.
Did you have an opportunity to read this part?
Yes.
And what was your assessment of this?
It is a standard section that we would find in one of our operational plans, consistent with what would be there as part of the threat assessment from our intelligence unit.
And did you have any concern?
The concern was that having a day before viewed the Hendon report, which was an information intelligence report containing a lot of detail, there didn't seem to be elements of the Hendon information as part of the threat or more so risk assessment.
Now, if I could take you back to your interview summary.
By now, Mr. Clerk will know the number well.
And I want to take you to page four of your summary.
So page four, in the two paragraphs that we see here on the screen, you describe what you...
Just told us about the sequence of events and how you came to receive these two plans, right?
Correct.
We scroll back up.
And so there is also referenced your conversation with Superintendent Drummond on the 27th.
I want to ask you something that you told us during the interview.
On the 27th, when you spoke to Superintendent Drummond, you told him that there seemed to be a bizarre disconnect between the intelligence contained in Project Hendon reports and the OPS preparations.
What did you mean by that, the bizarre disconnection?
So, on the 27th, I participated in a conference call with the Henning Group, which was something I've done for the first time.
That has never been part of my experience in the years of policing.
It was quite an interesting experience being...
Having the collaboration of intelligence to that magnitude and the sharing of that information.
Second of all, having received the Hendon report, which was a comprehensive intel or information report specific to what we might be facing in Ottawa.
And finally, there was a teams meeting between intelligence special events and the information directorate, myself and Superintendent Drummond were invited to attend to listen to.
So that all took place on the 27th.
That's an overwhelming amount of information for myself.
There seemed to be a lot more than when we often get regarding these events.
Notation of a bizarre disconnect is that there seems to be so much of this intelligence going around.
How is it going to tie into our planning?
So if I scroll down the page to the last paragraph on this page around the middle there, do you see Superintendent Bernier was concerned that the plan appeared to be planning for a two-day event?
Because the project hand-in reports indicated that protesters were intending to stay until the demands were met.
Could you explain your concerns?
At the point, and not being privy to all the planning from the planning team, as that is not the section that I'm working in, and perhaps other plans that may exist, that was the sentiment that I had at that time.
As to the what if.
When you read the plans, both documents that you've received on the 28th and that you read on the 29th, did you see any contingency planning?
So I didn't actually see contingency plans, but there was indication that plans existed.
And what were those indications?
Appendix plans that would be attached to the overarching plan.
Were they actually attached?
I did not see them.
So when you said indications, do you mean like the index or the table of contents tens referring to the existence of those plans?
Correct.
Okay.
Let's move on to...
Well, so you got these on the, you read them on the 29th, and that would have been a Sunday, right?
Sorry, a Saturday.
Correct.
And you said you were looking at the documents with a view to determining whether there was any references to you or your role?
Correct.
Why did you do that?
It's good practice to do that, to make sure that there wasn't any requirements from either myself or any of our sections.
And was there a role for you?
No.
Then what did you do?
I was off for that weekend.
I did have plans for the weekend.
What were your plans?
Skiing.
Okay.
Did you go skiing?
I did.
I wouldn't ask you how the skiing went, but when did you come back?
The Monday.
And what did you find when you come back on Monday?
At this point, the convoys that did arrive in town.
Although some may have left, there was a large quantity that had remained on the footprint, Wellington and the cross streets.
So at this time when you were the inspector, who were you reporting to?
Superintendent Drummond.
What, if anything, did you say to him when you came back on the 31st?
I offered if there's anything I can do to help.
And?
There wasn't a need for me at that time.
So not on the 31st.
Did you ask again?
Sorry.
All subsequent follow-up.
I came back on the 1st, I believe.
Oh, sorry.
I came back.
So the 1st would have been, was that a Tuesday?
Tuesday, yes.
Okay, so you came back on the 1st and you asked if there was a rule for you and he said no?
Correct.
So you just carried on your regular work?
My apologies.
I did come back on the on the Monday so the 31st there was a conversation as well as the first which was the Tuesday.
Okay and did he give you the same answer on both times?
That's correct.
So you asked on the 31st and the first.
What about the second?
Yes same.
You ask again?
Yep.
And you got because I'm reporting for duty.
Right.
Is there anything that you require me to do with the with the event that's going on?
Were you eventually asked to do something?
Yes, I was.
When was that?
On the 3rd.
And what was the ask?
The ask was for me to attend the Service Command Centre to support Inspector Debbie Palmer, who was overseeing that centre.
So that's your new role during this convoy period that you told us a little bit about.
But let's talk about the Service Command Centre.
What is it?
Service Command Centre is more so of a support centre that supports the organisation when we're dealing with extraordinary circumstances such as a big event that has either become protracted and that it supports the event but also supports the rest of the business continuity of the organisation to ensure that we maintain policing.
In the rest of Ottawa.
So what was your role going to be now that you're assigned to the Service Command Centre?
Inspector Palmer had been working very long hours.
They were faced with challenges of staffing the continued event that protracted for days beyond the actual event.
And she needed some relief.
So at the start, we both worked together so that I would have some time to get familiar with what was happening in there.
And my role was to support her at the onset with the expectation that we would be able to spell off and have a little bit better sustainability and able to get some rest.
Right.
Now, I understand through the interview we had with you before that while you were at the Service Command Center, you took a number of steps to try to improve the organizational response.
And we can see those at the next page.
But can you tell us what some of those steps were?
So we can go back to the top of the page.
No, no, sorry.
The top of page six, yeah.
You can also tell us from your memory what you did, certainly.
To put into context, though, the Service Command Centre, the various functions that it takes care of, is it has a team of staffing officers, they'll have a team of logistics officers, a team of planners, a finance element, a team of briefers, people who would brief resources going out on deployment.
When I arrived, and this is by no fault of anybody, Their main focus was staffing, trying to staff a relatively large-scale event that was continuing on a 24-hour basis.
That was their biggest challenge.
So I start to implement some as a new, fresh person into that position.
Adopted some structure into their staffing and started breaking off people to work specifically on logistics, people that specifically are going to be focusing on if there's plans that are going to be required, as well as bringing in a finance officer.
Due to the magnitude of various expenditures that we were going to be facing, it was time to bring a finance officer in to support and track that element.
All right.
If we scroll down to the next paragraph.
So at the end of the first sentence, it starts, when he arrived, there were numerous plans in circulation, but many of them were not signed, and it was unclear which had been approved.
There were also delays in locating plans due to the lack of a filing system.
Superintendent Bernier observed that the event commanders were not aware of what plans the SCC, is that Service Command Center, SCC?
Service command service.
Some lawyers would know that as the Supreme Court of Canada.
So Bernier was not aware of what plans SEC had prepared.
He noted that during Superintendent Patterson's service as event commander, he was based at, and then you went on and talked about the different locations.
But let me ask you about these plans.
When you refer to the numerous plans, what kind of plans were you talking about?
There was a request, and in that position, I would report to the event commander.
And at the time when I first came in, there was Superintendent Rayome, who was the event commander.
There was a transition through that period where it went to Superintendent Dunlop.
And then finally, the point that I'm talking about with regards to the plans, I was reporting to Superintendent Mark Patterson, who was coming to the Service Command Centre to request what plans exist.
So as in my role, I tasked the planning team to find what plans are in existence and that had been approved.
Because we have a new event commander, it would be prudent to be able to get them all together to present to the event commander for review.
But I also noticed that there seemed to be a lot of plans.
It was time to implement a file coordinator to be able to manage that the intake of the plans, the delivery to...
The event commander and the filing of it so that we'd have a structured filing system.
Right.
So since we're talking about plans, I want to take you to the next page of the summary.
The third paragraph where you said Superintendent Bernier stated that he was not aware of any overall operational plan.
With various supporting plans between February 3rd and February 10th.
What did you mean by that?
First of all, what's the overall plan and what are the various supporting plans that you had in mind?
So the initial plans that we received was specific to the event on the weekend.
I was not aware of any other plan that was developed that would now take us into the next.
If I could call that, that now they are remaining and not leaving.
There was no overall plan in place on, if I could use a term, and the occupation of the protesters in that area.
Okay.
And you spoke earlier about the changing event commanders.
So I want to take you to another document, OPS.
407898.
I believe these are scribe notes, your scribe notes, but you can confirm whether that is the case.
Thank you.
Are these scribe notes?
Yes.
What are scribe notes?
So generally speaking...
It is best practice, and I'm going to say actually critical, to when you're in a command position that you have a scribe, which is a person who's trained to be a specific scribe for an incident commander, whose responsibility is to keep your notes.
The scribe notes, although written by another person, are the incident commander's personal notes.
To have decision-making information, whether we have to do an assessment through an NRA process, is it necessary, risk-effective, acceptable, that it can be all captured.
Very difficult as an incident commander to be doing all of that and being able to write it down.
It creates effectiveness and efficiency in being an incident commander.
So we'll be referring a fair bit to these scribe notes.
And just to understand the format, there are two columns recording names.
And on the left is who gave the information, right?
If it's a conversation, it's the one speaking, I assume.
And then the next column is who was receiving the information.
On this page, we see that the date is February 7th.
By this time, who was the event commander?
Mark, Superintendent Patterson.
Okay, so we go to the next page.
Do you see the reference at 10 o 'clock, creating new command model?
What is that about?
So as the event commander, at this particular stage in his involvement, He wanted to adopt a new command structure under him.
Okay, and then if we go down further, there are references to strategic operational tactical levels need to be managed.
Was there some discussion about the command structure employed previously and what the OPS wanted to move to?
You would have to speak to Superintendent Patterson to understand what he was doing at that time.
My role at this time was not involving command of the event.
I see.
Okay, so now we saw earlier your statement that between the period of February 3rd, On February 10th, there was no overall operational plan.
Were you aware of any attempt to create such a plan during this period, between the 3rd and the 10th?
At the tail end, I was privy to participate on a Teams meeting with the executive where there was some direction from the chief to develop.
An overarching plan.
So, do you recall what date that took place?
That would have been the 9th, I believe.
Okay, let me take you to a document and see if that refreshes your memory.
OPS 408420.
0. And I'm going to take you to page 6. So if we go down to 1530,
is this...
Okay, so do you see the reference?
D.C. Ferguson expressed plans to create an eight-point plan and SMEAC based on Chief's comments to media and command and present this SMEAC tonight.
To outside agencies.
So a couple of things.
Sorry, did we look at the date?
Maybe we scroll back up a bit to the 8th.
So now when you refer to an attempt to create something like an overall plan, was this the date when the meeting took place?
I would need to read through if I could a little bit further.
But before we do that, we see a notation that Incident Commander IC stands for Bernier, right?
These are standard instant command scribe sheets.
Yeah.
So I was not the instant commander for the event.
Right.
But just so we understand when we read the notation in these notes, when we read I slash C, so we take that as a reference to things that you said?
That's correct.
Okay.
So we go back down to 1530.
Take a look at the content.
So this was a phone call between myself and Deputy Ferguson.
Tell us about that phone call.
If I can just review to refresh my...
So at this particular point...
She was calling to look to have a plan made up.
And my recommendation to the deputy, Deputy Ferguson, who at this point would be the strategic commander, I recommended that she go through Superintendent Patterson, who was the event commander.
And they should have that discussion.
And then the event commander could provide the direction.
For making up that plan through the Service Command Centre.
Right.
Just to put this in context, we have heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson that February 8th was also the day when the integrated planning group arrived in Ottawa.
And they had a meeting that day and the following day.
And so here, there's a reference to an eight-point plan, right?
Now, there's also the word SMEAC.
What does that mean?
That is a term that's used in both planning and plan writing.
SMEAC stands for Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration, Command and Control.
So these notes suggest that Deputy Chief Ferguson wanted to create this eight-point plan, and it was based on the Chief's comments, right?
And with a view to presenting it tonight to the outside agencies.
Why did you recommend something else?
It was not necessarily recommending something else.
It was recommending that this request should be coming from an operational command level.
That if that was requested, that conversation should be going to the operational commander who will figure out the How to do it.
So just so we understand, was she asking you to do something at this time?
That was the impression from the phone call that she was going directly to me to attempt to get a plan written with her comments that outside agencies that are wanting to come and help us need to see this plan.
And you redirected her to the event commander who was Patterson at the time.
Reason being, it's best if the strategic and the operational level are aligned.
Why were you so concerned about who should be developing the plan?
And I take it it's your view that Patterson, who was the operational commander, should be doing that?
So the request for the plan should be coming from the event commander.
All I was trying to do is ensure that the proper flow of discussion from the strategic level to the operational level Was that something you learned from all those incident command training, that this is what was supposed to happen?
That is correct.
And did they teach you as to why that would have been important?
It's an understanding of what the difference is between strategic and Operational and tactical.
Strategic establishes what needs, in simplest terms, what needs to be done.
The operational level determines how it's done, and the tactical level does it.
Right.
Okay.
Let's go to the next document.
Actually, staying at the same document, let's go down a few pages to page nine.
And we go to the time 1903.
And we go to the time 1903.
Do you see the notation met with Big 12 commanders?
They're asking for our plans, asking what the plan is to use these resources in Ottawa.
And then we continue to the next page.
OPS chief went public.
Asking for 1790.
Commanders need plan for phase three.
Commanders ask why 1790?
Where will they be deployed?
What are they expected to do?
Tell us your understanding what this was referring to.
This is very common, especially when you're dealing with large-scale events, multi-agency response.
When the requests are made for services of another agency to come and support, whether it be the Ottawa Police Service, there should be a plan that outlines exactly how many of what type of resources you need to somewhat justify who is going to go.
And why they're going to be there.
There are many questions here.
Were these your questions or questions that others put to you?
Like where will they be deployed?
What are they expected to do?
Who's asking these questions?
This was...
Could you scroll back up, please?
So this is Superintendent Patterson.
That's speaking to me or in the group, to the group of us with what is, he's explained what he's learned.
So I would imagine that following my conversation with Deputy Ferguson, she has had now a conversation with the event commander and now the event commander is coming to make the ask.
So they're asking for a plan.
Was there a plan in existence at that time to show them?
If we go back, this is what date again?
This is the 8th.
This is the 8th.
There would not be one that I would be familiar with, except for the original plan for the weekend event.
Okay, now I'm going to take you to another plan, OPP 401889.
This is something that this is a document that we've shown to other witnesses, and we've been calling it the February 9th plan.
Thank you.
Let's zoom out and take a look at the cover.
Sorry, go back up the title.
It says version 3.0.
Are you familiar with this document?
I'm familiar that it exists, yes.
So tell us more about it.
As I mentioned, there was various direction given that a plan needed to be developed that was an overarching plan that was going to support the numbers that were required from the ask from the chief, as well that was going to align with what he publicly announced as being his eight-point plan to resolve the situation.
There were people who were requested to attend our central station at 474 Elgin, where they were to work on and develop a plan.
Okay, I want to take you to the mission statement, which is section 2.1.
I believe it's page 6. Take a look at the mission statement.
To end the unlawful elements of the Ottawa truck demonstration and restore safe and open neighborhoods and businesses.
When you eventually became the event commander on the 10th, I understand that you rewrote the mission statement.
Am I right?
That's correct.
So what is your view about the adequacy of this mission statement?
It is a mission statement, and the purpose of a mission statement is to give clear direction to everyone who is going to be engaged on this, and every activity or action that they do needs to align with the mission statement.
It is supposed to be short and concise.
It is short and concise.
It would not be...
A mission statement that I would write.
Why not?
There would be elements in there that I would want to make sure that are very clear, as you will find in the mission statement that I wrote.
Okay.
Apart from the mission statement, what else, if anything, in your view, was missing?
From this plan.
Could you please scroll down a bit so I can just kind of review again?
Yes.
Continue down, please.
Continue down.
Continue.
Continue down.
Continue down.
If I could please ask to go to the index.
I believe there was an index on here.
Let's go back up the table of contents.
A couple of things that I would be including in a plan would be a commander's intent.
The commander's intent?
Correct.
So that usually comes from the event commander who explicitly sets out expectations based on the mission.
What the expectations of all the people.
So that is missing.
Without dissecting it too much, there are elements that maybe are not in the right category.
All right.
Can we go to the witness's summary, please?
And if we go to page 8, that's right, the second paragraph.
Superintendent Bernier received a copy of this plan on February 9th, which was titled Phase 2.1, Version 3.0, Ottawa Truck Demo 22. The February 9th plan incorporated the organizational chart that Superintendent Bernier prepared.
Did you prepare an organizational chart that went into this plan?
I did.
Okay.
It also included tables listing the numbers required for maintenance staffing, enhanced staffing, and interdiction and enforcement staffing.
So are these things that you have provided input into as they were organizing this plan?
I did not personally.
But there are certain staffing elements based on our experience in the Service Command Centre doing the staffing for the various support elements, the maintenance elements, whether it be the static points or quick response team elements, that they were in a good position to provide to the group that was developing this plan numbers for that.
All right.
It goes on.
Superintendent Bernier and his SEC team supply these numbers in response to a request for how many officers OPS required to maintain his response to the Freedom Convoy on a 24-hour basis.
Superintendent Bernier maintained his response, sorry, indicated that the tables in the February 9th plan did not include a tactical support element and that it was unclear to him whether there was a mass arrest and processing plan.
What's a tactical support element?
It would be more better to say all the specialized elements that you would need.
So in a public order operation, you need public order units, you need tactical team support, perhaps a CBR&E team, which CBR&E stands for Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive Unit.
Which would make up all the true numbers that you would need for a significant operation of this magnitude.
So you told us earlier that between the 3rd and the 10th, you were not aware of any overall plan.
And since you received this on the 9th, did you consider this to be an adequate overall plan?
This was being developed, and I don't know what time I received it at, and at what point it was actually completed.
This is, I would say, moving in the direction of the overall plan.
I would like to go back to the plan again, to once again look at what elements were still missing in it.
Because in the execution piece, That would be telling me whether there was an actual plan on how they were going to carry out the removal of the occupation.
Did you not review this plan in preparation for this?
I would like to, if I could, please review it.
Let's do that.
Mr. Clerk, do you still have the number?
Thank you.
So if you can scroll down, please, if we can go to the execution.
Thank you.
Please scroll down.
Please scroll down to the next page.
Again to 3.2.
3.3.
The next point, please.
The next point, please.
A lot of this information in this is really more of a situational element versus how you are going to execute the plan.
So if you were to ask me about whether this is an overall plan, there are missing elements.
We talked about appendix plans.
Or additional plans to support the overarching plan.
At this point, there would be requirements for multiple public order plans, arrest, detention, processing plans.
What's the PLT plan that's going to be?
When I say PLT, Police Liaison Team plan, there's a lot of elements that would be required to be, say, on the 9th, we're ready to go with something.
Okay.
Let me ask you then, if we go back to the witness summary, what is the impact on the OPS response to the convoy events?
Because these elements that you are now telling us were missing from this plan.
What's the consequences?
If we go to page 7, During the interview, he told us...
So, sorry, go up a little bit.
So this paragraph that starts with Superintendent Bernier also observed, in the absence of an overall plan, OPS prioritized low-level enforcement activities such as ticketing and few seizures during this period.
First of all, just to be clear, this period...
Does it refer to the earlier paragraph as between the 3rd and the 10th?
That's correct.
So here you said the OPS lacked an overall plan and was prioritizing these other things.
Was that an accurate description of what happened during this period?
That, amongst other smaller operations that were being attempted or tried to be planned for, But the overarching was ticketing, seizure of gas, and various levels of enforcement.
Okay, so let me ask you first about ticketing, because there is at least a perception that the OPS did not encourage ticketing because of concern about volatility and so on.
So how much ticketing was actually going on during this period?
In my role at that time, that was not in my purview.
That would be within Inspector Russ Lucas, Superintendent Patterson, to be monitoring and tracking that.
But I knew, based on our conference calls and our updates, that there was a focus on that.
I'm not aware of whether they were having issues at the tactical level of what you...
Just explained.
And what other kinds of enforcement activities did you have in mind when you made that comment?
Whether it be the bylaw, honking, the open fires, maybe liquor consumption, which is all...
So if we go down that paragraph, he characterized OPS's focus on enforcement and messaging about enforcement as an emotional response to public sentiment that OPS was not doing enough to address community concerns.
He noted that he felt the enforcement messaging was counterproductive because the public realized that enforcement efforts were not causing The protesters to leave.
Can you explain what you meant?
Pretty much what's outlined there is that our strict messaging that we were putting out was surrounding how many tickets, what enforcement measures were being done.
Unfortunately from day to day that was not showing the community that It was resolving the issue.
That's somewhat my sentiment on that.
And then when was it going to be enough?
How many tickets do we have to lay?
How much enforcement do we have to do that will actually result in them going out, leaving?
And at this point, it seemed very apparent that day after day after day of enforcement.
Albeit that you're saying it may be limited.
It was not having the desired effect.
All right.
So if I can move now to a different document.
OPS 408850.
Okay.
So can we go down?
So can we go down?
I'm not sure this is the right document.
Let me check again.
Let me preface this next line of questioning with this.
In terms of...
Enforcement efforts.
We've heard from other witnesses, including WG Bell yesterday, that some of the things that happened during this period included what was done at Coventry Road.
Are you familiar with what happened at Coventry around this time?
Generally, in my role at that time, I was not involved in tactical level command, public order command.
Or event command.
My role was still as that support element within the Service Command Centre.
So, I believe this is your notes or described notes.
OPS 407898.
I believe the date is February 7th.
at page 1. We go to 941.
That's right.
Do you see information from Bernier to Patterson?
Information from NCRCC?
POU are planning on attending Coventry.
What was that about?
So there, as you can see, the scribe was coming in at the...
While I was participating on a conference call.
So information must have been received that I received on that conference call that public court are planning on re-attending Coventry.
Let's go down, I guess, to the next page.
Can we go further down and see what's there at 11:05?
I'm looking for that.
Okay, let's move to another area.
Can we go to your summary?
Okay, let's try again.
OPS 408858.
Okay, page two.
Now, at 11.05, do you see a reference to Patterson has decided that...
Can we enlarge it?
Patterson has decided that Coventry...
It's to be emptied out.
And then if we go down to 1116, Patterson did not know that info, that OPS directed them to go to Coventry.
Do you remember what this was about?
Sorry, which line are you referring to?
So 1116, and then you go down, there's information from Patterson, right?
That starts with did not know that info.
Not quite sure.
Okay.
Do you know something about Vito Sussex operation?
Yes, I'm familiar with that as well.
Of the similar nature, because at the time, my role was not at the tactical or operational level command.
I was a support element.
Can we go to the witness summary at page 10 please?
So it says here on February the 7th, after 4 p.m., Superintendent Pedersen informed Superintendent Bernier that OPS was planning to use POU officers to clear the Rideau-Sussex intersection.
Do you remember having that conversation?
Yes.
And what was your involvement at that time, if any?
The request came from the event commander to me that he was going to require various plans in order to affect this, although I would not have any involvement with the public order plan that's taking place elsewhere.
There was a request to develop an arrest traffic in towing plants for that specific operation.
Were you involved in requesting a traffic plan?
Yes.
Let's go to OPS 40.8575.
Thank you.
So we go down, I believe this is an email you sent to Dennis Hall.
Who is Dennis Hall?
Dennis Hall worked in the traffic as staff sergeant for the traffic enforcement section.
So what was your request to Dennis?
As per our discussion tonight, I have two requests in relation to potentially planned operations set for later this week.
Could you please assign a sergeant to work with Andy Jasiak?
For a removal of vehicle plan, that would be similar to what we would refer to as a tow plan.
This is time sensitive.
Your team will need to liaise with Kevin Kenny, who has started something on this, but will be with the planners for POU.
So what I'm trying to do is get all the different groups that are trying to make a plan for this operation at least talking to each other.
And then the second request is to develop a traffic plan in order to, whether it be closed down streets, to support the public order plan.
What did you think of the Widow Sussex operation at the time?
At this point, I would not be fully privy to all the discussions from the strategic level and at the event commander level.
It'd be hard for me to make a judgment on that, not knowing what the strategic direction was and how they were going to do it and what the intended outcome was going to be.
Well, in the witness summary, you stated that the contemplated Rideau Sussex operation was a typical example of the lack of proper structure, command and control that characterized OPS operations up until February the 10th.
Are you still of that opinion?
So when you're asking about at this particular time in the event, that was my answer to this specific event.
If you're talking about the various situations that we saw, whether it be the Coventry Road operation, the multiple attempts at Rideau Sussex, and somewhat...
Not necessarily a wholesome approach with all peace internal stakeholders for all these plans.
That's what I was referring to in my statement.
It was a totality of the circumstances, not the specific event.
Explain the totality to us, please.
I believe that's what I was talking about, how I was saying all the different events that were going on, whether it be we have to enforce, we have to ticket, on one level coming perhaps from executive level, and then various, and I cannot speak to where the direction's being given, but I would imagine from a strategic level that something...
Actions need to be taken either at Coventry or Rideau Sussex from either the strategic or the event commander where they were not all aligning and it did not appear as if it was going to have a successful overall resolution to having this end.
There's risks with implementing various plans without knowing the cause and effect.
I'd like to talk to you next about the kind of communication within the OPS at the time, as well as communications between OPS and its external partners, starting first with internal communications.
what do you remember of The kind of communications challenges or successes around this time?
So communication happens on multiple levels.
And if we're talking about communication at briefings to ensure that everyone is aware of what's going on and what's expected of them, we were working very hard at trying to get that right because there was different groups of officers with getting different information.
We have to be realistic in this.
This was an unprecedented situation that we were in, and everyone was doing their best to try and do what we needed to do.
So it's not laying blame or fault.
It's just those were some real challenges that we were experiencing.
There were so many things that need to be thought about and implemented.
There was also a communication piece internally to our members.
In general, as to what's happening.
And that was something that we heard very loud and clear that there wasn't a lot of internal messaging within the organization to understand what we're trying to do.
What's the objectives?
What do we need from our members?
Let me take you to your summary and see if that's something you said at the interview reflects what you just told us.
If we go to page 12. The very last sentence, he stated that they were demoralized because they were not informed.
Can we carry on?
They were not informed that there was an overall plan and were not provided clear instructions, such as instructions concerning their authority to seize fuel and what to do with seized fuel.
He stated that members in the OPS had limited knowledge on what was going on and what was happening next or who was in charge.
Is that accurate?
Yes.
Does that relate to what you were just telling us?
Yes.
Now, you went on to say he had been informed that Chief Slowly confused members by going down to the OPS parade room and telling members to get out onto the streets to deal with problems.
Superintendent Bernier observed that many OPS officers were attempting to do the right thing and come up with solutions.
But that they may not have had the proper background and training to do what was needed.
Well, first of all, you said you had been informed.
Who informed you about what you said about Mr. Slowly?
Word does get around in the organization.
So that is something that I had heard that transpired.
You don't remember who was the source?
I don't.
What was the context, do you remember, in which this, like, what's the parade room?
So every division, we have three divisions with the Ottawa Police.
Every division and station within a division has something called a parade room where officers are briefed at the start of every shift and given their instructions for the shift, what unit they'll be assigned to and any taskings that they have.
What about communications between the OPS and its external partners?
I cannot speak to that.
I don't know what communication was happening externally.
I don't have any particular access to that information.
Can we go to page six of the interview summary?
Do you see the paragraph under OPS use of RCMP and OPP officers?
Superintendent Bernier observed that between February 3rd and 10th, OPS was using RCMP and OPP officers to relieve OPS officers who were exhausted and not as part of a plan to end the occupation.
He stated that he was aware that OPP officers were often not receiving instructions or assignments from OPS during this period.
Was that an example of a communication issue?
So, yeah, there was a bit of a breakdown, and that's something that we had to adjust even within my purview.
That we, the Service Command Centre in liaising with whatever agency was coming in as part of that briefing element.
That was something that we had to, we recognized and had to adjust to ensure.
Once again, this was quite extraordinary circumstances where we had officers coming from maybe a handful of officers from various municipal services.
We had...
OPP officers who were going to different locations.
We had RCMP officers who were briefing out of another location.
So it took us quite a while to get that coordinated piece to ensure that the messaging that they were getting was consistent for all officers that were being deployed.
It unfortunately was a reality at the early onset of this, and we made every effort to correct that.
Right.
So up to now, we've been talking about events before you were appointed event commander, and that happened on the 10th.
Am I right?
Correct, in the evening.
So you told us during the interview that there was a condition to your acceptance of this appointment.
Can you tell us about that?
Yes.
The one condition is that I wanted to...
Have some separation between myself and the chief and to just be directly liaising with my strategic commander.
Why did you make that a condition of your acceptance of disappointment?
Through observation and experience that I've been seeing throughout.
Some challenges with both at the tactical level and the operational, the event commander level.
Albeit intending to try and resolve the situation, it was causing a breakdown of the instant command structure.
I wanted to ensure that I was going to go into a model that was going to respect the instant command model.
That I've trained under, that I know, that I recognize and tried, tested and true.
So you referred to observations and experiences.
Tell us more about those observations and experiences that caused you concern.
So throughout the period in my involvement in the Service Command Center, I was able to be privy to various conference calls, different Direction being given, where there was the involvement of the chief in very operational level and even to the point of tactical level directing,
which somewhat caused challenges within that incident command model.
Can you give us any examples?
Redirecting groups of officers to...
Do particular taskings such as in the community enforcement teams, redirecting traffic officers to do something different.
These are, once I said, I tried to explain the differences between the strategic operational and tactical.
The event commander's role is to ensure that the entirety of the plan or entirety of the operation is Somewhat all in cohesion and working in an effective way.
If there's different people who are drawing different things or assigning different things, it will cause the rest of the operation to go off the balance.
So that's somewhat what I'm referring to.
So with whom did you discuss your concerns?
Deputy Ferguson.
Was she the one who approached you to be the event commander?
She did.
When did that conversation took place?
In the afternoon of February 10th.
Okay.
So she came to you and asked you to be the event commander and you said what?
I asked to think about it and I just wanted to ensure...
That I was going to be in the right mindset and that I'm prepared to do this.
I didn't want to hastily jump into something if I was not prepared.
So I had to quickly do a self-check and ensure that I was ready to do this because I understood the magnitude and the complexity of what I was embarking on.
But I advised her that I would do it.
So when did you reply to her?
Later on in the afternoon.
And did you get any assurances from her about your concerns?
Yes, and I also made a couple of other requests from her as well.
What other requests?
One of the requests that I wanted to have is that given the, as I mentioned, the complexity and the magnitude, I would want to have a deputy event commander working with me, given what I knew was going to be needed.
To get us out the other end, in which case I requested a specific person.
Who was that?
Inspector Dave Springer.
Why him?
He's from the OPP.
He is a major critical incident commander that I know have worked with before.
He was actually one of my instructors for the critical incident command course in Aurelia, the OPP.
And I knew that I would be able to have a valuable support element with Inspector Springer.
What did Deputy Chief Ferguson say?
She said she would ask to see if that would be possible.
Any other requests from you?
Yes, that I would need some autonomy with regards to decision-making and implementing plans and that to trust me.
That I was going to find the solution and lead us out the other end of this.
What did she say?
She said she'll do her best to provide me with what I needed.
So there were quite a few conditions that you made.
Any others?
They're conditions, but I really did want to line this up for success.
I did see that we've gone through multiple event commanders and I just did not want this to be the next one.
So before you were appointed event commander, I suppose you made these observations and did you make any attempt to correct anything that you saw problematic during the earlier period?
It's somewhat difficult to do that.
I would offer any advice or recommendation, no different than as we reviewed in the scribe notes when the deputy was asking me for something.
I tried to realign that to follow the proper channels so that the right people are informed and making the decisions, making those requests.
There are odds and ends that I would have provided recommendations, but at the end of the day, to not undermine the autonomy and authority of the various levels of command, we respect that and allow them to do what they feel is what's needed.
And did you feel sufficiently assured by Deputy Chief Ferguson to take on the job?
Yes.
So when did you accept the appointment?
Did you accept it on the same day?
That's correct, on the 10th in the late afternoon.
That was with Deputy Ferguson.
And what became your immediate priorities?
So what I requested was that I needed to take some time the following day.
I need to get some rest and then take some time the next day.
If I was able to get Inspector Springer, I would need some time with him to sit down, evaluate everything that we had, and re-establish a mission statement, a main action plan, objectives, and a command structure.
Okay, so let me take you to describe notes again.
OPS 30's OPS 30's 0050.
So we go first to page 3. Scroll down.
Now you see the part where it says scroll up again.
Also express concern about taking on that role and it goes on and talks about some of the concerns you just told us about.
We go further down to page 4, the next page.
You advise her that you would consider taking this on but would need to discuss a rest period.
Assign a proper command control model.
So you told us about the command control model.
What about the rest period?
I did go home and I did sleep that night and came back in the next morning.
So I got some rest that night.
All right.
And then further down, as well as building a proper team.
Is that what you talked about?
That is correct.
So establishing that command and control, I had a vision as to how I would want to set up an integrated command table team and who I would need around it.
And I wanted to discuss a little bit more wholesome with Inspector Springer to ensure that I was not missing anything or get his input as well to this as we were going to be a team moving into this.
Right.
I wonder if it's earlier on the page.
You talked to us about wanting some distance between yourself and the former chief, the former chief slowly.
How was that concern in particular addressed?
At this particular time, I requested that Deputy Chief Ferguson be the go-between.
And that would be appropriate.
If she's the strategic commander...
The chief would be dealing with the strategic commander for any of his wishes or direction.
And it's up to the strategic commander then to filter to the event command level, the operational level, as to what is needed to be done.
And what I'm saying, what is at a very high level.
What are the high level objectives?
And so you started by saying at this time.
That she was the go-between.
Correct.
Did that change at some point?
Yes.
As we built out, and once again, I talked to you about that structure, we incorporated an executive liaison person to...
There was a lot of meetings and a lot of requests to attend meetings, which, as long as I have the strategic direction...
I need a lot of time to get the job done to do the work.
And having an executive liaison as a go-between would create that efficiency and effectiveness that the executive would still be informed and have an avenue to be able to be in touch with me.
And who was that person?
Superintendent Drummond.
When did that happen?
It happened relatively quickly.
It would be within probably somewhere between the 11th 11th and the 12th.
I would say maybe the 11th or the 12th.
Okay.
Let's see if this will help refresh your memory.
OPS 3010371.
At page 4. Actually, let's stay there.
We'll note the date.
February 12th, and then we go to page 4. Do you see the first line?
Yes.
Drummond, to keep the position of executive liaison.
Is that what you told us just now?
Correct.
And so he would become the new go-between, so to speak.
Yes, because I'm wanting to quickly align the people.
If Deputy Ferguson was going to be the strategic commander, That is her role.
So I want to ensure that I wasn't having her in a position where it would not allow her to do her function as well.
Okay, so you accepted the appointment.
You had a good night of sleep, I hope.
And then the next day, what happened?
I went to my office, which I hadn't been to in quite some time, and arranged to meet with my scribe.
And as well as with Inspector Springer.
This was around mid-afternoon.
I met with my scribe around noon just to set some ground rules, expectations of what we were going to be embarking on.
And I'd lined up a meeting with Inspector Springer for mid-afternoon, which we met in the Comm Centre boardroom.
I want to take you to your notes where you set out a whole list of priorities.
This can be found at OPS 3010050.
Page 7, please.
So, we see a list here.
We agree that the command post would be set up in the NCRCC objectives of today.
So, I'll let you take a look at the list.
We can scroll down when you're ready.
So, would you like me to say what they are?
Sorry?
I agree that these are the objectives that I...
Right.
I'd like you to take a look at the whole list and then explain to us.
What they are and why they were important to you.
Can we scroll down?
I think there are six listed there.
There's quite a few there, yes.
So tell us about these objectives.
And did the number suggest their importance?
Level of importance?
I'm going to say they were all very important.
And this is what I was doing, was somewhat trying to do a bit of a reset, setting up a solid foundation that we were going to be based on to move forward.
All these elements are key elements from an instant command standpoint that is required that needs to be in place and formalized and adhered to to promote success in your mission.
Was this an attempt to course correct when you said reset?
Yes.
So why did you start with the mission statement, which was number one?
For any operation, a mission statement is that foundation piece that everything is built off of.
Everything that you do, everything that you, when you're making a decision whether to take action or not action, it needs to align with the mission statement.
That's why it's a very important foundational piece.
And what about the second one?
The new command control structure.
Correct.
Can we go back up to the number two?
Yeah.
Tell us about that.
In order to have success, it is not one person that is going to bring you success.
In an instant command model, you do have to surround yourself with some key subject matter experts that are going to be able to properly inform you.
To make proper decision making.
What was the third point?
We were going to pick who we needed at that table to have success.
And then pick incident commanders because of the protractedness of this.
We want to make sure that whoever was running the NCRCC From an operational to tactical level, that there's a rotation of people who will be effective in maintaining that level of operation day to day until we come up with our ultimate solution to end this.
Okay, so let's talk about some of these priorities.
First, with respect to the...
Mission statement.
It may be the same document.
We go down to page 11. It should be in my notes, sir.
Page 11. 1501, I think is the time I'm looking for.
So is that what you decided upon as the mission statement?
That is correct.
Can you read this to us?
Using an integrated response, the Ottawa police and policing partners will keep the peace, enforce legislation, maintain public safety for the duration of the Ottawa truck demonstration with the utmost respect to the individual's Charter of Rights.
To peaceful assembly, freedom of speech, officer and community safety and well-being.
Now, we might have seen the same mission statement before on what we call the February 13th plan.
Do you know the one I'm referring to?
That's correct.
So we may look at that a bit later, but this statement, as currently phrased in your notebook or the scribe notes, was it the same as what was put into the February 13th plan?
So it's definitely...
I would say very accurate.
If there might be a word here or there, if we want to do a comparison, I'd be happy to do a comparison with the plan, just to ensure if you'd like to.
I'm quite satisfied that the gist of everything that I was trying to outline this is there.
Okay, so given the importance you attach to mission statement, let's unpack this a little bit.
If we go back up to the beginning of this statement.
First, you said using an integrated response.
What is an integrated response and why was that important to you?
Integrated is meaning that we're going to be depending on various different specialty elements to come to a successful resolution.
It's not going to be necessarily one particular section that's going to resolve this.
In other words, it's just not public order.
It's not just PLT.
It's going to be an integration.
But it even goes beyond that.
It's going to be an integration with many of our policing partners that are going to be part of the solution.
And the next element I want to turn your attention to is the utmost respect to the individual's charter rights of protest.
Well, freedom of speech and freedom to assemble and so on.
Why is that?
Important.
We can never lose sight as to lawful protests that may be part or lawful peaceful assemblies.
And we have to respect everyone's charter of rights with everything that we do in the operation.
So, and then the third element, I think if we go scroll back up.
There is a reference to enforce legislation, right?
But to do so in a way that ensure to keep the peace and safety and so on.
Tell us the importance about that.
They're all high-level guiding principles.
Keeping the peace.
Enforcing legislation, and that comes at legislation at multiple levels, right up to the federal level, provincial and municipal.
Maintaining public safety, so everything we should be doing should be moving towards ensuring public safety for the duration of this event that's taking place.
Now, we know that you also developed a main action plan, right?
Correct.
What was that about?
So, the main action plan is a high-level statement of where do we want to get to.
Now, in the interest of time, I won't take you to another document, but it's found in your witness summary, and it basically says to de-escalate and negotiate a peaceful resolution and demobilization of the Ottawa truck.
Am I correct?
Correct.
Can you elaborate on that?
Ideally, the best resolution is a peaceful resolution and have everyone leave peacefully.
But in the event that that's not going to happen, it is going to be demobilized at the end of the day.
Okay.
Now, so that was your priority, number one, to develop the mission statement.
You also mentioned the importance of clarifying command and control structure.
So I want to take you to OPP402163.
Thank you.
I believe this is an organizational chart.
Okay.
So, if we go further to the right.
Now, is this what you developed on the 11th?
Yes, I'm seeing parts of it, but the parts that I'm seeing is, yes, accurate.
So, explain this to us.
How did you come up with this structure and why did it make sense to you then?
So, I don't know if you're able to...
Reduce it so you can see the bigger picture.
So it starts to delineate who's at the strategic level and who the strategic commander is.
Can we go to the very top?
That's right.
So at the top, the OPS command team.
Who's that?
That would be your chief deputy's CAO.
So he'd be at the strategic level?
He is at the highest strategic level that would be reporting to the, or who would be responsible for the strategic commander.
Between the former chief and the deputy chief Ferguson, there are these two boxes, the legal and the communications.
what's the significance of putting them there?
So that is fed through the strategic command and belongs at the strategic level with regards to legal advice.
Not to say that corporate communications doesn't exist down at the operational level, but those are the key support elements that are found up at the executive level.
Right.
When you were working on this organizational chart on the 11th, and this chart suggests that it is only the OPS command team at the top.
There's no reference to the OPP or the RCMP.
So when we read earlier in your notes and your mission that this is supposed to be an integrated approach, did integration to your mind then Refer to integration with external services such as the OPP or the RCMP.
There's a difference between integrated and unified.
Explain the difference to us, please.
So in this particular case, this is a single event commander with an integrated command team, command table that's supporting it.
When you're talking about a unified command is that you're going to have multiple commanders of equal value forming the top event command positions.
That's what we did eventually move into with the RCMP and the OPP.
But this is the model that was implemented upon me taking command and for the next few days.
Right.
Now, you...
You told us that based on your observations and experiences in the earlier part of the convoy events, there were issues that you observed.
And when you are now the event commander, did you make any attempt to, like when you said reset, what was that reset?
Like how were you correcting what you thought was not working before?
Once again, as I mentioned, I think there's a lot of people trying to do a lot of good things.
So what I'm trying to establish here is getting all those people around the table to work together to come up with the final plan because it will not be successful without those elements around the table with me.
And that's why, as you can see, my command table has key elements to ensure...
That everyone has the voice and feeds me right information to be able to make informed and proper decisions.
So I apologize.
I realize I wasn't specific enough.
So, for example, taking the Coventry or the Rideau Sussex incident, how would this command structure be able to improve on what was problematic?
As you've described before.
So we're going to be getting feedback from whether it be the police liaison team, could be the public order commanders, it could be a resourcing piece from the service command center liaison that everyone would be able to feed into.
This is what we were wanting to do.
This is how we're going to try and do it.
Who has what to say about this?
And this is where we might find where there's risks or issues that need to be, and I'll use the term again, NRA.
Is it necessary?
Is it risk effective?
Is it acceptable what we're going to do?
I have everyone around the table from the investigations, from the intelligence, feeding us all the proper information we need to make quick and proper decisions.
So, for example, we see a drill command table.
POU chief, right?
Is that public order unit?
That's correct.
And now next to the POU, there's a small redaction.
Yeah, I'm not quite sure why that's redacted.
And it should be PLT chief.
Okay.
So Wallace?
So Wallace was a mistake in spelling.
But Wallace was...
Walker.
Oh, okay.
And I see.
And Walker was part of the OPP PLT team.
Correct.
So, and then we see further to the left, executive liaison, acting superintendent Drummond.
Yep.
And that speaks to your concern about keeping some distance?
There's a combination of things.
It's establishing a healthy communication channel.
So, to ensure that the executive being properly informed, properly kept up to date, as well as an avenue to be able to feed something to me if I needed to know something to me.
And the intelligence part is also represented at this table by Inspector Bryden.
Correct.
Now, going back to the blue box near the top, how does putting the communication piece there Help ensure or improve communications.
So communications is, and if you want to scroll down, there's another piece to it that's down at my level, the far right with the media.
And media chief was not necessarily a proper term.
It's more of a general corporate communications that assisted me with all messaging.
Anything that would go out to the media would be drafted up and sent to me for approval before it was to be sent out.
And similarly, messaging internally, messaging to partners, and messaging with PLT would be worked in unison with that piece.
Okay.
And then for both you and for your deputy, there are scribes who record things while you are busy doing things.
Correct.
All right.
So this is what you achieved on the 11th of February.
We've heard that this integrated planning group has arrived in Ottawa since the 8th.
And when did you first have a conversation with anyone in that group about Your new plan?
I'd have to refer to my notes to know exactly, but it would be either the following day.
Either the following day.
So this is the 11th.
So I'm thinking it's the 12th.
Could be the 13th that I actually had a conversation with a member of the integrated planning team.
Okay.
Perhaps before we talk about...
About your work with that group, let's first talk about what you did with this plan that you started to develop yourself on the 11th.
What was your next step?
Once you've had this command structure clarified, your mission statement and main action plan at least outlined, what else did you do?
There was a check-in that needed to take place.
And it's my understanding that Deputy Ferguson was taking some time off and that Deputy Bell was taking over.
So I felt it probably appropriate to brief up to my strategic commander who Deputy Bell was taking that position while Deputy Ferguson was off to provide.
An update as to the work that had been achieved that day in establishing the foundation that we're talking about here.
So did you touch base with Deputy Chief Bell on the 11th?
That is correct.
Do you know what time?
I would have to refer to my notes if it was later in the afternoon.
It was around dinner time.
Did you also meet or talk to the Chief?
My recollection says that there was a conversation with the Chief.
Okay, let me take you to your notes, OPS 3010050.
I'm going to take you to page 17. If we go down to 18, looks like 1820.
Actually, go up a little bit.
So 1814, recorded information from you to the Chief, just to point out.
Can you read that to us, please?
Yeah, just to point out other services are sending.
But with strings attached.
What did you mean by that?
From what we were getting from the Service Command Center team is that there were requests for if they were going to come, they would like to have static positions, not necessarily want to get into other quick response teams.
And there was sometimes challenges with getting them to do enforcement pieces that would be required if that was the case.
That was historically what we were seeing in my previous role.
So during this discussion with the chief, were you talking about this new plan that you're trying to develop?
Correct.
I'm not sure what time it is after 1814.
What's the next entry?
1815.
1815.
And there's a notation that the chief said to you, I'm okay with everything you said, requested, with your email ad org chart and mission.
Tell us your best recollection about that conversation.
I presented the whole background reasoning of what I was doing and why I was doing it.
This affirmed to me that the chief was understanding what I was saying and that we were doing that reset, so to speak.
Now, when you call it a reset, how much of what you were doing was based on or derived from the February 9th plan, the 3.0 plan?
I'll have to be honest.
I did not necessarily...
At this particular point in time, know what portion of it is, what portion I perhaps would use or adopt.
This is quite in the infancy, where there is going to be a bit of work to be done over the next few days, not discounting any good ideas that may be out there and analyze everything.
Because at this point, I wasn't aware that there was an integrated planning team.
I was preparing myself to have to put together a strong planning team to come up with an eventual final plan to get this done.
So at this point, as I mentioned, I was going to be directing somebody to start, based on clear expectations, developing a plan, but perhaps not discounting some good elements that would have been in there.
Now let me take you to the next document OPS 3014454.
I believe these are notes taken by legal counsel of the OPS, Ms. Hanot.
If we can go to page 160, please.
If we go down a bit.
So we see a reference to the chief saying, want LS.
Is that legal services?
I can only assume you'd have to ask Christiane, but I would say that that would make sense.
Do you recall having a discussion with the chief about this, that the chief expressed a desire to have legal services to look at the new proposed mission statement?
And whether we need to change the current one?
No.
Okay.
Can I take you to...
Moments indulgence.
Do you know when will be a good time to break?
Because as I understand this witness, you're going to be quite a bit longer, so it's going to carry over in any event?
That is true.
It may make sense to break now and to carry on tomorrow.
Okay.
Is this a convenient time?
As good as any.
Okay.
Well, I'd suggest then we break till tomorrow, if that's agreeable to you also.
Absolutely.
I'm sure you're happy to end the day at 6:30.
Okay, so we'll break till tomorrow morning at 9:30 and we will complete the in-chief and then go to cross-examinations.
Okay, thank you.
The Commission is adjourned.
La Commissar Gaggioni.
The Commission is adjourned.
Wow, I don't even know when it ended.
All right, I don't know when that ended.
I got stuck on a...
Not stuck, rather.
I was on a call.
And now I missed the end of the hearing.
All right, anybody who's watching, that was painful.
I actually tuned out for a bit to go watch the Daryl Brooks trial on Mercatus stream.
That is obviously more exciting, more interesting.
Oh, man.
How long ago did this end?
So let's get on the phone.
How long was I on the phone for?
Come on, phone.
Oh my goodness.
They're not even accomplishing anything other than show...
It's just...
How long was that call for?
No, that's not the right call.
I was on the phone for 23 minutes and it ends.
24-7 chat.
No, we're not doing that.
All right.
See you all tomorrow.
The kid didn't want to go fishing.
Kid has no idea.
No idea.
I don't even know if I'm alive anymore.
Am I still alive?
All right.
Go, everyone.
Enjoy the evening.
I'll see you tomorrow for more inquiry.
Something else.
We'll do something.
We'll also have a nice fun stream tomorrow.
Go.
Peace out, peeps.
Five minutes, two minutes.
Good.
I didn't miss much.
I'll go back and watch now.
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