All Episodes
Previous Next
Oct. 21, 2022 - Viva & Barnes
03:54:56
Emergencies Act Inquiry LIVE STREAM!
| Copy link to current segment

Time Text
Okay.
So I had to set up everything again because I'm an idiot.
I accidentally ended the wrong stream on Rumble.
Now I think I've got everything set up so that we can actually...
Oh, I'm going to go flipping.
I'm going to lose my temper.
It doesn't look like it's live on Rumble yet.
Waiting for stream.
Recording live.
Okay.
Refresh.
One watching.
Okay, good.
We're live on both.
You can't see the schvitz.
Maybe you can, but I'm schvitzing because I'm getting frustrated.
Okay.
Good.
We're here.
Sorry about that, everybody.
I'm going to share the links now.
All right.
Moist Noodler.
How's Florida?
Life is life everywhere.
You can't escape the madness.
Now, are we on?
We're on YouTube as well.
Good.
We're live everywhere.
Now I'm gonna go get something to drink.
It's gonna be coffee or...
I think I might be doing Red Bull today.
Red Bull today.
Okay, I'm gonna go share the links on Twitter.
All right, everybody.
What I wanted to do was when I disable camera, stop cam, I wanna edit.
I wanna edit that avatar.
Edit name.
Edit audio avatar.
Oh, here we go.
Good.
It's going to be Red Bull.
I'm listening to myself in the past now.
Okay, desktop.
Folder.
Go to this folder.
That's what we want to see.
All right, I'm going to go.
Everybody enjoy the chat.
I will pop into the chat as I go walk the dogs.
It's 1.30.
Okay.
Share the link around, everybody.
Let everybody know where they can watch this and chat at the same time and comment and interact with other humans so we can understand what's going on in the hearing.
I haven't been watching it for the last two hours because I've been live on the main channel.
This will be on for the rest of the day.
I can't escape life for the life of me.
Green tea.
I'll tell you what I've been having.
I've been having cold brew, but it's espresso cold brew, and it's got 190 milligrams of caffeine per eight ounces.
And I think I've been drinking more than eight ounces, and I've been flying after that.
I don't want to do it again today, so.
All right, I'm going to disable my camera.
I will follow the chat.
I'll pop back in as much as I can.
Everybody, enjoy it, and I'll see you soon.
I'll be around.
Stop camera.
Now, can you still hear me?
Can you still hear my audio as I stop the camera?
Can you still hear my audio?
You can still hear.
Yes, we can hear.
So I've got to go mute.
Good thing I didn't.
Let that gas out.
I'm joking, people.
I'm joking.
All right.
See you soon.
See you soon.
See you soon.
See you soon.
See you soon.
See you soon.
See you soon.
See you soon.
See you soon.
See you soon.
See you soon.
Order, El Otro.
The Commission has reconvened.
Good afternoon, Commissioner.
Good afternoon.
Okay.
Are you ready to go?
I am.
Okay.
Go ahead.
Chief Party, just before the lunch break, I was asking you questions about the meeting.
On February the 9th.
Yes, sir.
And I just want to finish that off by taking you to one more document of that meeting.
This is not your notes, but someone at the OPS was also taking notes.
So if I could call up document number OPS 3014454, please.
138.
So, page 138, please.
So if we So if we go to the bottom of the page, please.
Do you see a reference from the chief that starts with...
There we go.
We can...
So the chief, the former chief of the OPS, Mr. Slowly, apparently asked the question, we can add the info that was provided by the RCMP, but we haven't agreed not to proceed with our plan.
For tonight?
And then he asks, are we still separate entities?
Or are you folding into our incident command system?
There's a notation that the OPP said, yes, we should, I think it's probably, yes, we should probably fold into the OPS command structure.
Do you recall having that kind of exchange?
I do recall an exchange about working under their command in an integrated command structure.
That's kind of how it does work.
But there were some clear differences of opinion, I think, in terms of what integration would look like, which I'm sure we'll get to as we go through.
But I had no issues.
We had some very loose talk around where we would work.
The location that we were situated at has significant capacity to expand.
And that also became a contentious issue because it took some time to even get us to work in the same area, which proved that it had layers of difficulty to it.
Eventually it did happen and it became quite seamless.
Right.
And this is also consistent with what you've been telling us all along that you were there to offer help.
But not to take over.
We were apt, explicitly, I was directed from my commissioner that we are not going to Ottawa to take over.
The chief and the police of jurisdiction still have primacy over this event.
We're there to assist them, hopefully in an integrated and unified fashion.
And this may be a question that's unrelated to the February 9th meeting, but since we've heard so much about the Hendon reports, I'm just curious, were you...
One of the recipients of the Hendon report around January, February of this year?
As a regional commander, I was receiving the Hendon reports.
Were you reading them?
Reading them, and just oftentimes there was aspects that were just repeat, going through the changes, because I knew it was internally produced by the OPP Intelligence Bureau and attended briefings as required on significant changes that would occur.
Okay.
So with that, if I could now take you to the event in the subsequent days following the February 9th meeting, did work continue on February the 10th in terms of working on this plan, a new plan from the Integrated Planning Group, or making improvement to the OPS plan that you were shown on the 9th?
I appreciate that when you look at it from an appearance perspective, they look like very different plans.
At its core, however, the plan that we developed was a build on and support of to complement the plan, the concept that they had in place, which was all strategically directed in the same way about ending the protests and bringing Ottawa back to a state of normalcy.
And that makes sense because you came to offer support and you asked what they had so that you could build on it.
Correct, sir.
So if I could...
take you to the next document OPP 404283.
So if we could shrink the page so we can see the entire page, please.
So this is a document that we received from the OPP.
It looks like a draft document of some sort.
At the bottom, it says it's prepared by the Integrated Planning Cell, RCMP, OPP, you know, those police services that you talked about earlier.
And I want to take you to Section 3.1 of this document.
So now, if we can enlarge it.
So this part of the document appears to be an assessment of the current situation as you found it on February the 10th, which is the date of this draft document.
You see that under current, the first bullet says not intelligence-led.
Do you agree with the assessment that the OPS operation at that time was not Intelligence-led?
Not in the way, certainly, that I would have anticipated.
No, I do not believe.
You know, when you look at intelligence-led policing, you're looking at your threat assessments, your risk assessments, and how you can affect some positive change using that intelligence.
They were in crisis mode.
And in crisis mode, I did not feel that they were using the intelligence to look at the broader event to see about how they could dismantle this event.
Peacefully.
And when your group was trying to build on whatever plan that you saw on the 9th, what was your objective, like in terms of incorporating any available intelligence that was available to the group?
Well, two of the key things that we did as a team as I arranged intelligence and PLT briefings for my team at the highest level.
Superintendent Morris and his entire team joined us.
Inspector Marcel Baudin and a number of both, I believe, OPP and OPSPOT joined us.
We wanted their perspective on the lay of the land, the current intelligence, what we know, what we don't know, what are the gaps.
And likewise with the PLT, in terms of how are things going, what can be improved upon.
What levels of authority that they have to engage?
What is the plan moving forward?
Is there opportunities that we can capitalize on to persuade some of the protesters to leave on their own court, etc.
So we received those briefings.
I wanted my planners and my team, all the tacticians, I wanted them to be fully aware in that point in time what we were dealing with.
We did have subsequent And additional briefings throughout from those entities just to make sure that if there's any change that we might need to pivot to adjust to those changes.
Right.
And I think I saw some references in your notes that on the 10th, you got some input from Marcel Bodang.
Was he the person from the OPP in charge of the PLT group?
Marcel, he's got a background.
He's the inspector with our Indigenous Policing Bureau.
And he has a background, yes, in provincial liaison.
Right.
So on the same document that's on the screen, if we go down further, we see a section with the PLT.
So there we go.
And Chief Party, you see there's not complete, I assume, because it's a draft document, but there's some...
Information incorporated under this section.
if we scroll down slowly so that the winners can have a quick look.
Now, does this capture in broad terms the kind of information you were looking for in order to inform the new approach?
It does.
You need to know the sentiment of the community, what the desired outcomes are.
PLT do amazing work at ensuring that they understand all sides, and that's what good negotiators do, and they are just that.
They are negotiators.
They're trained to do what they do, to understand the perspective of all sides, to ensure that information around expectations around the law are properly communicated to all sides, and to do their best to improve and gain.
Build those relationships, build that trust with people so that what they say, they know that they can take what they say to the bank that they're going to be following through with what they say.
Now, if I could take you back to your will say, Madam Clerk, OPP 450792.
I believe it was on this day, February 10th, Chief Hardy, that one of the...
Subject matter expert from the RCMP, Darwin Ketrode, prepared a concept of operations that was based on the information that you were gathering.
So if we go to page five of this document, I want to go down to the bullet that starts with on February, on the 10th of February.
There we go.
Do you see this bullet that tells us that Sergeant Tetra was preparing this concept of operations based on the totality of the information that you were...
Getting from the OPS, but more importantly, intelligence that would support a systematic and safe action plan to dismantle the entire protest zone.
So does this also refer to something you told us earlier about not doing things block by block, but to have start to finish of the entire protest zone?
That's correct, sir.
If I could take you to the next document.
I believe this is your notes.
OPP.
four zeros 1792.
So this is still February the 10th.
And if we go to page 28, the time I'm looking for is 1925.
There we go.
You have a telephone call with looks like Deputy Harkins and there's a Can we make the look at more of the page?
Oh, there we go.
I think go down a little bit, please.
Obstacles with OPS still.
Can you read this?
These are your notes, right?
Obstacles with OPS still exist at the chief level.
However, we're working effectively with his rank and file.
So first of all, why are you saying that there are still obstacles at the chief level?
Well, at this point, we still don't have their plan.
It was a frequently made request to get what they had, to get access to their people.
And the replies were all, we're waiting for the chief.
And the second part where it says we're working effectively with the rank and file.
Yes.
Who are these rank and file?
Everyone from their...
Command team, their strategic command, Deputy Ferguson, Chris Rayome, those that were sent to our unit to assist with the planning.
We didn't have their planners embedded with us until some days later, but we were back and forth with them as well.
If we go to the next day now, so on the same...
These are your notes, but we go to page 32, please.
And the time I'm looking for is 12:30.
So there are two points being made here.
Perhaps you can read those better.
Yeah, so the first point says we don't know what resources are deployed here before and beyond any request that we have been coordinating.
That bullet is, in essence, in reference to silos.
Others are doing something we all need to be out of those silos.
If we're asking for something, you're asking for something, are we asking for the same thing?
We need to break those down.
It was a constant pressure.
We're asking for a lot of resources here.
So we needed to ensure that we were effective in our requests.
The second bullet says, "Anything sent to the OPPOC from the Chiefs?" Executive Office, can we get that please?
And those were some requests that the Chief had made.
So can we just please get access to what requests have been made, what replies have been received?
He just said he too was very frustrated.
I asked if the Chief's Executive Officer was looking after resources.
He advised that he was working on getting that information for me.
Okay.
Now on that day, February the 11th, You also attended a meeting with the group, the Integrated Planning Group.
That might have happened actually earlier that day.
And I want to take you to the document, the minutes of that meeting.
It's a document provided by the OPP.
So OPP, four zeros, 1837.
And I want to take you to page five near the top.
It's just not enough memory.
Maybe while...
Oh, there we go.
Okay, so if we can go to page five, please.
Right, so there's a reference to something you said at that meeting.
We're here to build a plan to support our partners, but we have no information.
Can deploy...
When we don't know what we're deploying to.
We have an OPS plan, but it does not give us enough information to deploy 500 officers without a more comprehensive plan.
Intelligence picture will inform this and so on.
There's a reference to 500 officers.
Tell us more about that.
Back on our February 9th meeting, I think it was Sergeant or Staff Sergeant Leblanc from the OPS did provide us a bit of a breakdown.
In terms of their plan and intersections, what the numbers they needed.
And that number was 516, if I'm not mistaken, from the February 9th meeting.
We were trying to understand that.
We later learned that it was based on a three-shift rotation.
Most organizations work on a two-shift rotation.
So the needs, again, I mentioned earlier, we corrected some of the math, but it's around that number at that time.
And that was based on their concept.
Without duties assigned, but based on their concept of operations, we would need approximately, not approximately, they would need 516 officers to maintain this on a 24-7 cycle.
I see.
Now, let me take you to your will say at page six, please.
You notice that I'm taking you to lots of documents.
Sometimes these contemporaneous records help to tell the story.
So if we go to page 6 at 1645, so scroll down a little bit, please.
So 1645, that's 4.45 p.m.
Our team presented our proposed plan to senior command in the RCMP and the OPP with significant support.
This plan was a detailed concept of operations for which our team would build the entire POU plan.
However, it still relied heavily on inject from the OPS planning team.
I suppose that goes back to something you told us earlier, that you were building on what was given you, that you thought was inadequate for the purposes of resolving the protest situation.
And by this time, at 4.45, you had something to present to the senior command.
What was that proposed plan?
Well, it was the plan that we actually executed in the end.
That concept of operations was developed at that stage.
And with a PLU plan, that was going to be very detailed in terms of the number of resources that were going to be needed, which came to fruition, that same 800 number I mentioned earlier.
We talked about everything from communication to restoring trust and confidence in the Ottawa Police to...
Responding to the narrative to change the narrative, because the narrative certainly was not reflective of what was actually going on on the ground, what we could see on the ground.
So it was that all-encompassing concept of operation and plan to dismantle the protests effectively, start to finish.
Okay.
If we go further down on this...
Okay.
So you see the bullet that starts with Superintendent Liu and I. Presented the plan at a high level to her.
Her referring to the person in the bullet before, which is Deputy Chief Ferguson.
You presented it to her and she immediately voiced her full support.
She preferred, however, that she be permitted time to present it to the chief.
And we agreed to prepare and forward a slide deck for her use, which was completed and that we could be available.
We would be available regardless of time.
To answer questions.
So you're making yourself available to answer questions, but you're waiting for her to get an answer from the chief.
Is that your understanding?
Yes.
So we presented it and her response was very, very favorable, which we felt good about.
And I was prepared to go to the chief myself if necessary.
But based on the dynamic that we've been seeing and the feedback, you know, we trusted her judgment.
And she felt that it would be best for her to present it.
It was late into the evening, about 9.30ish, when we finally got a deck to her.
Hoping that we would get a response, probably not that night, but certainly by first thing in the morning.
Now, you may or may not know this, but we heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson yesterday that she was actually off that day.
I didn't know that.
You didn't know that.
I think I found out during the process that she was, but...
But she still spoke to you.
She answered our calls always.
So that was February the 11th, late at night.
And then the next day, so we're going into February the 12th now, at 11:45 a.m. on the 12th, You placed a phone call to Chief Slowly.
So the two of you had a conversation.
Tell us about that conversation, please.
Well, if I could, just prior to that, I mean, I put in the salient points here, but earlier in the day, I made an outreach to see if we've gotten any response back from Chief Slowly on the plan and whether or not it would be a good time for me to call him.
And I was told it was an ill-advised time to call because he was in a meeting with...
I believe he was in a meeting at the time with Bernier, Rob Bernier.
So I said, well, fine.
I left until a little later.
And yes, I did make a phone call.
It was a short conversation.
Right.
But I made that call to him.
And, you know, when I reflect on my notes and how quickly I was writing, it was contemporaneous in that I was writing the note as I was speaking with him.
And, yeah, that was the context of the conversation.
You know, Trish got the slide deck and you had an opportunity to take a look at it, your thoughts on it.
His concern was around what does integration look like?
Where do we fit?
How does it fit in other theaters of operation and whatnot?
And he really felt that a follow-up meeting would be beneficial to answer some of those questions.
So once again, we're at 12 o 'clock on that date.
Opened that we would be green-lighted to move ahead with implementing the plan that we were working on.
And we then started preparing for this meeting that we ultimately had later in that day.
Right.
But staying on this call for the moment.
So if we look at what is said in the in the we'll say on the fourth line.
I advise we were looking to work in a more integrated fashion that ensured resources were strategically placed where needed that I had provided Deputy Chief Ferguson with that plan.
He advised he wasn't sure what was agreed to yet as to how that integration was to happen.
So he suggested a call.
I want to ask you...
If you have specific recollection about what he said to you that day?
Well, I certainly have it from my notes.
And at that time, I was using the scribe.
I mean, my notes are...
You can't get beyond your notes in an event like this.
I had over 400 pages of notes.
You would never catch up if you weren't doing them live.
I wrote my notes at the time.
It's been my best tool in my 36-year career to ensure that I capture the essence of what was said.
And I'm going to suggest that that is the tone of the conversation.
Okay.
So this accurately captures the nature of the conversation.
So if we go further down...
Oh, by the way, so at around the time that you were having this conversation with the former chief, I suppose other members of your team were having a conversation with Superintendent Bernier.
Yes.
And what did you find out from other members of your team about...
What they spoke to Bernie about?
It's just that we're good to go.
Okay, so they got the message that they were good to go while you were speaking to the chief who asked for a further meeting or briefing.
Right.
So I felt that maybe there was some obvious miscommunication going on, that we did actually require that meeting with the chief.
I'm going to lean to...
The response that I got directly from Chief Slowly that a follow-up meeting was required and that follow-up meeting did occur with a detailed overview of the plan.
So I just felt that maybe Superintendent Bernier misunderstood or it was obviously inaccurate.
Right.
So if we go further down that meeting that that finally happened.
It took place in the afternoon.
So first of all, at 1400, so 2 p.m., you placed a call to Deputy Chief Bell upon learning that the former chief would like a briefing on the plan.
Yes.
And so you suggested, at Chief Party, you suggested a 3.30, right?
Yes.
And then at 3.04, you got a call from Deputy Bell, who apologized, but said that the meeting has already started.
And the chief was insisting that it happen now.
Is that still your recollection?
It is, sir.
And then a few minutes later at 3.10, you and I guess you joined, when you say we, I assume it's you and the members of your team.
The key members of our planning group.
Specifically, I wanted the subject matter expert to present the plan.
I introduced it and then had the subject matter expert present the plan.
Phil Liu was on the call.
I can't remember exactly who without looking at the meeting invites.
So I'd like to ask you what you wrote here at 1510 about the third line down, the end of the second line.
The tone of the Chief's comments during this meeting was very troubling to the point that I asked if the Chief wanted my team to leave the call.
To allow him to speak privately with his team first.
He was blunt in saying no, he would get to us momentarily.
What was this about?
He was having discussions that were separate and apart from our purpose to be at that meeting.
And it was really direct.
Eds were down.
You could sense, you could feel the tension over the video link in the room.
And we just felt that, I mean, Phil Liu also spoke up.
We just felt that perhaps it's not our time to be in this meeting if he needed some privacy to deal with his people.
And he said, no, I'll get to you next.
So I'm getting to you next.
And then eventually they got to you and your will say tells us that there was a presentation of the slides, right?
Yes.
And so if we scroll down a little bit.
So boring.
The last sentence of this bullet.
So dry.
Key in the plan was reducing the protesters' footprint through compliance and that ensuring safety above everything was factored in at all stages.
So it looks like when you said key, some emphasis was put on that point.
Can you elaborate?
It was.
I mean, this obviously was a significant event in our nation's capital.
It was having a significant impact on its residents, on the policing.
But we also were working hard to ensure that what our actions do help rebuild that trust and confidence in the police.
It goes back to our mission of ensuring that safety is built into your mission.
And that was a key component for us.
We wanted to reduce the component.
To the footprint of the protest zone to the utmost extent possible.
You know, when you talk to planners in major events like this, they'll say, we're not going to arrest our way out of this.
We're not going to.
It's going to be impossible.
Justin Trudeau disagreed.
Appeal to the better senses of people that are involved to get them to want to voluntarily exit the zone.
And that was a key component of our plan.
Because we knew that from a capacity perspective, if we had to start putting bracelets on everybody there, we'd need 10,000 officers to do that.
So we had to put a plan in place that was scalable, but one that we could accomplish with the resources that we intended to bring.
Did any of that involve listening and actually just hearing the grievances?
Chief Slovy was obviously there.
Who else do you remember was present from the OPS side?
I guess the disadvantage of video, right?
We're on video.
I do believe his command team, his counsel, was there.
Was Bernier there?
Yes, because Bernier was very vocal and spoke up in support of our plan.
Okay, so he was supportive.
What about the former chief?
Well, he was there.
No, no, but sorry, in terms of how receptive everyone was.
Well, a few things happened during the presentation, and it speaks to what I think integration and or unified command brings to the table about taking this off the shoulders of one individual and spreading it around and bringing the collective expertise to bear on the problem.
But during the presentation, Darwin uttered a statement about a single point of failure.
And admittedly, it kind of came out that the chief was a single point of failure.
It was not the intent.
It was meant to show that, you know, because he was, Darwin was very passionate about the fact that all eyes are on you, chief.
What you do, what you say, etc.
You are the face of this for the Alba Police Service.
We're looking to bring a plan to you so that you're not going to be seen as a single point of failure.
The chief responded, and understandably, he responded very quickly that he was not a single point of failure in this.
Unless he had confidence in what his team could do, he's not going to support it or approve it.
He went on a bit of a talk in that regard just to...
I actually, on behalf of our team, apologize because it was not the intent of our being there that day.
Our intent was to go there and walk away with kind of support that we were unified and let's get this done.
So at the end of that afternoon meeting, was anything agreed on?
Russell Lucas?
We still did not have an approved plan.
We did not?
There was no...
Implicit, explicit approval of the plan that day.
That did not come until...
I'm sorry, was this the...
This was the 11th?
This was the 12th.
That did not come until the 13th.
Okay.
Now, if we go down on your will say to page 8, there is a bullet that starts with...
That's right.
We had discussion about integrating the command.
Location of CP.
What's CP?
Command post or integrated command center.
Right.
So this is in reference to discussion about where to set up the command post if there is to be an integrated command, right?
Yes.
And you said there's some apparent momentum being gained with a new IC.
What's the IC?
Instant commander, Rob Bernier.
Okay.
So nothing was agreed as of yet on the 12th, but you were sensing...
Apparent momentum from the new commander, who was Rob Burney.
That's correct, sir.
And then if we go down further, I reviewed and signed off of our detailed ops plan.
By the end of the state, as did the RCMP, all that was required was approval by OPS.
What do you mean by that?
Well, we had given them the plan, and we had hoped that they would approve it.
Again, as supporters of the OPS, we weren't in a position to start action in a plan without their approval.
Okay.
So let's go to the 13th.
February 13th.
Oh, my God.
Yeah, I don't know who the lawyer asking the question is.
We still did not have approval from Chief Slowly yet.
It's just so boring.
In consult with OPP Senior Command, Fortra ahead with developing roles of senior and strategic command and the absolute importance of these roles in support of the incident commanders.
Could you explain that to us?
That's one of the significant benefits of integrated command.
So the way that we set it up, we had a senior's table, which was deputy commissioners and deputy chiefs with the Ottawa Police Service.
We had our strategic command, which I then, after we went kinetic, became a member of the strategic command, again, with the RCP and the OPS.
And then we add our incident commanders to three guys.
So the whole goal there is to give them objectives, be a sounding board.
We're able to effectively keep anything and everything political out of it.
They are able to strictly focus on operations.
We're able to give them feedback, report up, report down.
They're never jumping over a rank.
They're reporting to us, and we're updating the seniors' table to ensure that they're aware of everything that's going on and the progress that we're making with their daily objectives.
So you were forging ahead at this time, even though there wasn't a final approval yet.
You know, our team remained incredibly optimistic throughout this in spite of the adversity that we faced at times.
And I'd like to say this because I think it's important to be said.
There was still amazing collaboration and support to get things done.
Everybody in Ottawa from the Chief down wanted this to be over.
And we were with them in that.
So there was a lot of tremendous work.
At no time did we just do a full stop and say, well, until we get approval, there's nothing else we can do.
There was tons more that we could do.
So we never stopped from day one until I left there on the 27th or 28th, whatever it was in February.
So by 3.50 that day, it appears as though your optimism was justified because you received a call from Incident Commander Bernier.
Who was accompanied by the major critical incident commander, Springer.
And then if we go down two bullets, sub-bullets, you see that, yes, the plan is approved, right?
Yes.
So he approved it, as the incident commander was entitled to do.
And then at 6.05 p.m. that day, if we go down further...
You discussed the above with Deputy Chief Ferguson.
She advised that she fully agreed with Bernier's authority to sign off, that we were good to go.
Was that accurate?
It's accurate.
I made that call because of concerns in all partner organizations that we don't have proof from the chief yet, which is what we have been expecting all along.
So that call got made to Deputy Chief Ferguson and following that call.
I forged an ad and was completely confident we're going ahead.
We're moving ahead.
So with both Bernier and Ferguson confirming the authority to sign off, was that sufficient for you on the 13th?
I accept that it moved on.
And I remember telling my boss, are we certain that the chief is on board?
I'm good with it.
I'm moving ahead.
I've got someone, I've got a signed document in my hands.
I'm moving forward.
Right.
So there was optimism as of the 13th, but as we read on in your will say, it appears that on the 14th, the next day, there were still a few more issues to iron out.
So I want to take you first to...
So page 9, February 14th, the bullet starts with key issues.
Do you see?
So scroll up.
Yeah, that's right.
Key issues dealt with through the day.
Related to OPS need to have their lawyer approve the plan, which was understood based on everything they had been going through, however, was unusual in the context of a lawyer approving an operational plan.
Now, we spoke about this a little bit, and during our interview, you clarify...
That perhaps approval was not the best term and you said maybe review was a better word.
Could you explain that?
Well, I challenged this a couple of times with some other people.
Can you help me out here?
Can you intervene?
Can you, you know, give me some better context?
And I know that Chris Rayom made a call to the lawyer and that's what came back.
Well, no, I'm not approving the plan.
I've been asked to review it before it's actioned.
In my view, however, as much as approval may not be the right word to use, if a plan cannot be actioned before it's reviewed, then it's not approved.
It's funny about all this testimony.
It certainly lets you know certain things.
If the protest is big enough, they can't arrest their way out of it.
The bullet that starts with, furthermore, it was determined throughout this date That incident commander Bernier was being pulled away continuously to brief his chief, and this was creating frustration within our planning group, especially as it related to the POV component.
I tactfully addressed this concern with the OPS.
How did you tactfully address it?
I just told him he is critical, absolutely critical to this operation.
He is the key decision maker, a key incident commander, and his input is absolutely critical.
Unequivocally required, especially as we were looking at the POU plan, which was the crux of our plan to dismantle the protests.
He was absolutely vital to his success and needed.
So, obviously, I was the person that often went to OPS to have discussions, but throughout my time there, I would get the feedback from the different.
Planning components that we need access to this.
We need access to this.
Can we make this up?
So I was a guy trying to work our way around any barriers that we were facing.
And I know that the lead planners who had tremendous trust and confidence in just said, we need him.
And he's being pulled away again.
We need him back here ASAP.
If we're going to put this together, his input is critical.
We can't spend hours and hours developing a tactical solution.
So those are the first two issues.
There was a third issue.
If we go up the page, I want to take you to the bullet that starts with while it was established.
So he called us his will say, which is like, I guess, the witness statement.
It was learned that the mayor of Ottawa had engaged with the protesters and negotiated them to all move to Wellington Street, and that OPS made some decision.
So, and then the next bullet says that Incident Commander Bernier briefed you at around six, just after six o 'clock, that due to the mayor's decision, it was a good time to take positive action on those who stayed outside of Wellington.
Now, in your interview with us, you describe this action plan as uncharacteristic of Bernier.
Why did you say that?
He was well aware of the overarching plan that we had created for them that would systematically dismantle the protest zone.
And to go back to the chunk-by-chunk dismantling would require additional resources, and he knew that.
We challenged Bernier on the plan, but we brought key members of the team into it, PLT, Intel, POU.
They actually supported it.
So it wasn't like, we don't want to do this.
Okay, now we have a plan and we're going to pivot.
We need to adjust.
So are we all on the same page as to where we're going?
I hear a lot of words coming out of this witness.
What did not happen?
The action.
The action.
And I'm wrestling my brain.
I do believe it relates to a resource reliability from a POU perspective.
So this is the tactical portion of our...
So, ultimately, it did not occur either.
Because it was, again, it was contrary to the plan, the systematic plan that had been proposed.
But again, when we put the team together, POU said, yep, we think it's doable.
If it can resource, PLT felt that they had exhausted all that they could do with this particular group.
And Intel gave us nothing that Which suggests that it would be ill-advised to do so.
So it's like, okay, we're good to go.
Now we have to start resourcing.
And I do believe it ultimately came down to a resourcing issue why it did not occur.
Right.
So it would appear that all of these issues on the 14th, the first day of the supposed integration, caused you sufficient...
Concerned that early the next morning you spoke to the OPP Commissioner Karik.
Am I right?
I'm sure.
Which date?
Sorry?
The next date, you said?
The next date.
Yeah.
February the 15th.
15th.
Let me show you a document that may help refresh your memory.
OPP 401785 at page 28, please.
So this appears to be a phone call that you made to Commissioner Karik, where you raised some of these concerns about the unified command, and you asked for his intervention.
The commander is in a more robust...
Oh, come on!
This guy's getting like three words per sentence.
We might never...
Is this page 20?
Take some risks.
I'm looking for the reference where it says the elephant in the room.
Right there, right there.
It's on the bottom.
I reviewed those notes.
Unfortunately, after retiring, my notes all went back to archives.
I just got them back yesterday.
So you remember reading that?
I remember reading this, but this is not in reference to a conversation with the commissioner.
It might have been from an earlier conversation, but at that time, I was in a meeting with our broader group.
We might have to take some risks in relation to providing an update to the Ottawa Police Services Board.
Risks with the elephant in the room.
It was a brief call out from that meeting.
I do, however, recall talking about my challenges.
You know, I have made statements through this that publicly were integrated, but in reality...
We're still missing a lot, so we're truly not integrated until we reach all of these points.
We are still at times working in silos.
Okay, I've got to go do a few more things now with family obligations.
So you might have just anticipated my question because I was going to ask you for the context where this conversation took place and to explain.
This statement that you apparently made to Commissioner Karik.
The elephant in the room is...
Can you read that to us?
It's not my writing.
My scribe wrote this down.
The elephant in the room is everything we have been...
We have done?
We have done so far have been blocked by the OPS chief.
So these are notes.
That attribute things to you, things that you apparently said.
Did you say this?
Conversations, yes.
You know, we were in an intense planning meeting that morning because we got our approval the day before.
Like, we're good to go.
When I got called, my phone started ringing and I did not answer it after multiple times.
And finally, I got the nod that, you know.
The commissioner needs to speak with you ASAP.
So I let exit the meeting and I left my scribe at the meeting.
And I went and had a separate meeting with the commissioner and two deputies.
And it's in different notes.
So when my scribe was with me, I took another notebook and I took my own notes.
So there's other notes that overlap the exact same time here.
So in that context, you asked for his intervention.
They had a relationship, certainly much more.
I'm going to keep listening and see where this goes.
I'm confused.
I'll bounce back in a bit.
For his job.
This is a cure for insomnia.
But I really didn't know him like the commissioner did.
And I just thought, if you have any influence that you can talk with so we can move things along, please do so.
And again, it's based, in fairness to Chief Slowly, it is now based on How things have gone, and what I'm being told, that it's, you know, we're waiting for the chief on this.
We're waiting for the chief on that.
We have to wait for the chief on this.
So I'm just asking, you know, if there's something we can do to intervene, please, let's do it so we can move this thing along.
Everybody on the team had a go.
We could get out of Ottawa as quickly as we could, but doing so safely and efficiently with a plan that would end these protests.
So that was the morning of the 15th.
As we know, later that day, the former chief resigned.
And in your interview with us, you said that the implementation of the February 13th plan moved more quickly after Chief Slowly's resignation.
What did you mean by that, moving more slowly?
Moving more quickly.
Yeah, because Slowly was moving slowly.
It was just...
Just that.
You know, he resigned.
And it was like, let's go.
Everybody from OPS, we're ready to go.
My God, everyone is just throwing everyone under the bus.
Everything that was in the...
Okay, I'll be back, people.
And there were still barriers.
I mean, we still had our issues.
I don't want to think that...
I don't want anybody to think that it was just Chief Sloan.
We had issues right throughout the deployment in Ottawa that we wrestled to the ground, but...
You know, once that happened, for example, the meeting that I was called to go to with the board also got cancelled.
So that freed up my time to put focus where it needed to be.
Now, in my remaining time, I hope I have another 15 minutes.
So in my remaining time, I want to focus your attention.
I have a little over 17 minutes.
Oh, that's very good news indeed.
Now, we've been speaking about the February 13th plan, and that was the one that you and Lou and Bernie approved.
And then, as I understand it, the integrated planning group continued to work with the OPS to develop that plan until it was finalized on or around the 17th.
Is that right?
Correct.
And between those dates, the 13th and the 17th, Something happened on the 14th, which was the invocation of the Emergencies Act.
Correct.
So I want to ask you now about, like, can you confirm whether the final plan of February the 17th contemplate the use of any powers or any measures made available under the Emergencies Act?
Yes, it did.
Sorry?
It did.
It did incorporate.
And tell me about that.
Well, like every plan, one of the things that every operational plan considers is your people.
Our people are our absolute most valuable asset that we have in the operational plan, and it's important that we have information and inform them of everything.
So we ensured that our officers were aware of the piece of legislation that Parliament had given us and to use it to the best of our ability.
Now, during your interview with us in the summer, and I guess in September as well, you said the group had a lot of debate about the authorities that the Act provided and so on.
But did the police in Ottawa ended up needing the Emergencies Act to tow vehicles?
No.
Explain to us why not.
Well, you know, if we didn't have the Emergency Act, that would imply that we couldn't tow vehicles.
We tow vehicles every day for different things.
We have laws under the Highway Traffic Act.
We have common law authorities that we use on a regular basis.
So, you know, if a vehicle is used in the Commission of Defense, its evidence, or whatever the case may be, we have various authorities to seize and or remove or tow that vehicle.
So we did not need the Emergency Act.
We had legislation under the province that also assisted us when it comes to towing and removing permits and CVORs and impounding vehicles.
But again, we did not explicitly need those authorities to tow a vehicle.
And you also said that the police would have managed to put an end to the protests without the Emergencies Act.
They would have done so within the timeline that the cell was contemplating.
Before the federal government declared an emergency.
Could you elaborate on that, please?
Well, I think it just says what it says.
Our operational plan, when we put it in place, we did not have those authorities.
It did not suddenly turn us on a reel that we had to change a lot.
We just added it to the plan.
It helped.
I'm not going to say that it was not useful.
It certainly, it provides us with some authorities relating to toll, relating to perimeters, relating to preventing people from going into the red zone, etc.
But we could have done that anyway.
So, in your view, was the Emergencies Act necessary to end the protests in Ottawa?
Well, that's a loaded question.
I'm a police officer.
Parliament gives us legislation.
We don't make legislation.
They provide it to us and we use it to the best of our abilities.
They gave us a piece of legislation to use.
We were thankful for it, and we used it to the best of our abilities to incorporate in our plan.
And in your view, was there a police solution to the demonstrations?
A police solution?
Yes.
Policing solutions?
There was a solution, and we reached that solution.
We had some help with the EMCPA, the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act regulations that we have with the province, and the Emergencies Act.
In my humble opinion, we would have reached the same solution with the plan that we had without either of those pieces of legislation.
Within, around the same timeline?
Yes.
Okay.
Is there anything else that you want to tell the Commissioner that I haven't yet asked you?
I don't think so, sir.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Okay, thank you.
Council for former Chief Slowly, please.
I'm Tom Curry.
Please meet you.
Chief Party, the events...
That you became involved in the first week of February, I think the 8th?
Yes, sir.
Unprecedented in your experience?
Absolutely.
One of a kind, sir.
And unforeseen by anyone in your command in the Northeast region at the time that the convoy protesters who came through the Northeast...
No.
I would say that in my role and my operations superintendent who prepared an ops plan, which was largely traffic-based, but in partnership with the municipal police services that the convoy went through, the end in reports, what we were hearing, we kind of felt that Ottawa was kind of in for it.
Right.
And in your command at At that time, did the OPP have an opportunity for you to share your conclusions or what was going on in the Northeast as the convoy came along?
Well, all of that was reported up.
There was a major incident commander overseeing it as it went through Northwest region into my region.
PLT was engaged heavily.
With the protesters, they were traveling in vehicles.
You know, for example, they split at Highway 11 and 17. The weather in the north was terrible.
The heavy trucks came down 17. The smaller vehicles we felt were safer.
The weather was less severe because of the lake effect, the superior.
They went via Highway 11. So the convoy split there.
Everything, I mean, I was not deeply embawned.
In fact, I was in Sault Ste.
Marie, Ontario.
I arrived there 7.30, 8 p.m. at night for business the next day.
Because at that stage, I had a team that looked after him and I trusted that I had a plan, an ops plan that the ops superintendent has signed off on.
Intel led, I'm good to go.
Just keep me informed if there's any difficulties.
I was doing my regular business.
I remember it distinctly because it took me 15 to 20 minutes to turn into my hotel because the convoy was coming through with a steady stream of tractor-trailers so I couldn't get turned.
And so if I follow that, you were in the Sioux.
Your team is running the convoy, observing the convoy.
Presumably you had squad cars, marked vehicles, unmarked vehicles in the presence of the convoy as they came into and exited your region.
Yes, sir.
And passed along whatever intelligence could be gathered about the scale of the protest and those PLT interactions.
We did, but it didn't work that way, sir.
I mean, this is a major event for the OPP.
So there's an instant commander in Aurelia.
Everything is being fed up through logs with PLT.
We're seeing it, but we're not having to report it because Aurelia is actually getting it.
Understood.
So does Aurelia...
Well, two things.
Thank you for that.
Two things.
Northeast region would never have, on that basis, been in contact with anybody at OPS at that stage.
No, sir.
What Northeast region does is feeds that intelligence into Aurelia, a central command.
Is that true?
Yes, sir.
And then...
And then would it be, in your experience, would it be expected that if there was something to be gained from that intelligence that should be shared with a partner police service here in Ottawa, that it would be passed along to say something troublesome your way is coming?
Yes.
But I mean, I didn't learn something troublesome is coming based on them coming through my region.
I learned that from the briefings that we had.
Okay, got it.
And are the briefings that you had, would we understand the same information that you had if we read the Hendon reports?
Generally, yes.
I mean, occasionally we participate in the calls just to get, and largely it was my office superintendents that would be engaged in those meetings, briefing me.
You know, it was widely felt that, you know, they're going to Ottawa for the long haul.
Just because of what they were looking to accomplish, we knew nobody was going to give in to those sorts of demands, like ending the health mandates for the country and shutting down government or having people from government removed.
That was just not going to be accomplished.
It made the, in your view, the PLT effort to engage protesters with that agenda, Well, first of all, it was unsuccessful, wasn't it?
In what way, sir?
Well, the PLT didn't negotiate the departure of protesters until the moments before the public order plan, your plan.
That's correct, sir.
Okay, got it.
And at the time that they came through the Northeast region, your team...
Would have been in touch, presumably, with the next region over, which I guess is this region, the East region.
East region, yes.
I mean, in touch, again, we're one organization, so it's not like we're separate organizations here.
It's pretty seamless.
The PLT, there'll be handoffs.
These are people that work together.
The Intel, again, these are people that work together.
So my point is, my region wouldn't continue on to here.
It'd just be a handoff kind of to the next team and our team go back to their regular business.
Understood.
And you yourself personally had no contact with anyone in the Ottawa Police Service until the moment that you got a call from your deputy commissioner.
That is correct, sir.
Okay.
Now, OPS for a minute.
It's obvious, isn't it, that they would not have had on their own, with their own resources, a policing solution.
They needed help.
That's fair.
And you've told us that you've been part of providing help to the OPS over the years, as has the RCMP.
Yes, sir.
And as have other municipal police services.
That's correct.
And you've worked with that group, you told us, on other occasions.
And that would be the universe of...
Resource, pools of resources.
Would that be right?
That's fair, yes.
Assuming that we're not going to go another step into military aid to civil power through the military, just sticking with police services, it's OPP, RCMP, Municipal Police Services, and I suppose I should add the Parliamentary Protective Service.
Yes, sir.
And the resources that they Needed were the subject of estimates provided by the OPS through communications from Chief Slowly to Commissioner Karik and to Commissioner Lucky, among others.
Did you ever see the spreadsheet of the resource request that had been made to Commissioner Karik, for example?
I don't think I saw it before my arrival there.
I know we discussed it because I distinctly recall it being broken down even down to civilian members and analysts and e-crime analysts and a whole myriad of resources.
So I do recall seeing the list.
We may have discussed it on that February 9th meeting.
We discussed a lot of things in a short period of time.
But yes, I was aware.
And the objective when a police service, and I appreciate it, it's unprecedented.
So you have not seen previously a municipal police force that has been overwhelmed by protesters as this one was.
No, that's fair.
And so the main objective from the perspective now of an Ottawa police service would be to get the help it needs.
Yes.
And I think you learned probably from your briefings and you observed firsthand that the situation was quite grave here in Ottawa during the time of that protest.
That's a fair statement.
Obviously residents were in distress and the city was quite in its core.
Quite paralyzed.
It was.
I mean, I have friends in the downtown core that live in the downtown core and reported to me the devastating impact that it had on their ability to sit and think in their own living room.
And as to the police service, that when we speak about a service that is overwhelmed, the best they could do with their own resources was, I think I saw in one of your notes, was that they could maintain control of the perimeter.
Yes.
of sufficient resources to mobilize any kind of operation.
Correct.
Correct.
are those circumstances.
Would you agree with me that the top priority for that police service is to get help?
Yes.
And, To try to reach out to policing partners, OPP, RCMP, the ones that we talked about, yes?
Yes.
And to define, try the best you can to define the resources that you need.
Yes.
And you are in the, understandably, from the perspective of the Ottawa Police Service, they need to know what resources are available from other municipal services, OPP or RCMP, correct?
Yes.
Now, the resource demand here in Ottawa was matched by demands in other communities we know, including Windsor.
That's correct, sir.
And I don't know, it probably doesn't matter, but the Windsor blockade of the Ambassador Bridge arose following the convoy protest here in Ottawa.
It did.
Was the OPP able to prevent that blockade?
Or did it try to prevent that blockade?
I mean, I was briefed, obviously, because it was going to impact our request here in Ottawa.
I can't speak to the specifics of what was attempted prior to.
Sorry.
No, that's fine.
But once the blockade in Windsor was established...
OPP resources were required there?
As well, yes.
And at an overlapping period here with respect to Ottawa.
Okay.
Now, a couple of things, if I can.
Just as to resources and operations, you told us about a plan that was reviewed.
It didn't go ahead, but a plan that was reviewed here in Ottawa by the OPS to go block by block through the protest.
And you favored a one-time, one operation start to finish, right?
Am I right that as it was defined, at the time it was defined, that the OPS team had devised a block-by-block strategy because that reflected the resources that they had at that time?
Does that make sense?
Yes, because that's exactly how it was portrayed in that February 9th.
You take it chunk by chunk, understanding it will be resource intensive, but one section at a time.
That's fair.
And resource demands, resource requests, I think you told us that you took action.
You made a resource request against what you said, I think, was a concept of plan or a concept of strategy.
Concept of operations.
Concept of operations.
That's a little less than a plan.
Is that fair?
You know all components of what you're bringing into your plan, and you've got your SMEs now building those components, but now we know where we're going with that concept, with that skeleton.
Our concept was much more detailed than the one that...
They provided us.
Right.
Because it did break it down in terms of the teams that we're going to need to fulfill this concept.
Understood.
They had a concept of plan.
Yes.
You had a more detailed one.
Correct.
They had a plan.
The integrated team brought a more detailed one.
Correct.
Now, a couple of quick things, if I can, then, just about turn to the plan for a second.
Could I please show you a document?
It's, Madam Register, OPS.
Three zeros.
10470, please.
I think you've seen this, Chief Party.
This is...
I hope I've got it.
Could you scroll down, please?
There it is.
So, you're copied on this.
So, did you see the first email?
It's from...
Bill Liu.
Phil, I'm afraid I don't know his rank.
Superintendent.
Superintendent Lou, thank you.
He writes to you and mainly to Deputy Chief Acting Ferguson.
And do you see this?
He says, find attached PowerPoint deck that outlines the plan we have been working on.
Obviously, this plan originated with your plan, which we examined, bolstered.
And strengthen.
Fair?
Very fair, sir.
Okay.
And that was your approach?
And this email is just to put proper context.
In my evidence in chief, I mentioned we reached out to Trish Ferguson on that evening and we followed up with the deck.
This was the email attaching the slide deck to help her explain the plan to the chief.
Got it.
Thank you.
I just want to show you one other document just to see, please, could I switch out to OPS?
I think this one has four zeros.
3, 9. So this is 10th of February to the long list there.
Mostly it's, this is your own.
Your own service, and it looks like other services, other municipal services.
Do you see that?
Yes, sir.
And the read line, if we could just scroll down, please.
As a follow-up to our earlier call, many police agencies have expressed an ability to support Ottawa Police Service with frontline boots on the ground.
Our integrated planning cell composed of are mobilizing resources and support.
Could I please ask any agency?
Which has officers you can deploy to support the plan to please respond to that OPP email address with the number you have available, when available, and for how long.
You sent that?
Yes, sir, I did.
And this email was what we call the Big 12. The Big 12 police agencies in Ontario, with a couple additional ones that had stepped up, small agencies that actually stepped up and were routinely supplying OPS with resources.
And you were able to...
Send out that call for help for resource assistance on the 10th of February prior to the finalization of your plan after you had your concept.
Absolutely.
You know, from a planning perspective, when you start thinking about your concept of operations and where you're needing to take it, you need to be thinking about how you're going to resource that plan.
And we knew that no one organization in the province had the capacity.
To resource that plan.
So it's like kind of putting the bug in everybody's ear as early as possible that we're coming, we need.
Indeed.
And when you looked back at what or looked at what you were dealing with when you got to Ottawa, am I right that that's the kind of thing Chief Slowly had been trying to do up until that time?
It's fair.
I mean, I hadn't watched closely.
I know I saw some of the media ask for a resource.
Absolutely, I saw that.
Got it.
Thank you.
Could I show the witness, please?
OPP, I think four zeros, 1389.
Just get your help, if I could, Chief Party, with a couple of other things.
This is a situation report.
Maybe, can I see page eight?
I'm certain that I might have the wrong number.
If that's the case, I'll take this down.
But could I see page 8, please?
Councillor, there are only five pages in this document.
I've got the wrong one.
All right.
I'm going to come back to it unless I'm whisked off the stage.
Can I speak for a minute about what you told us about Chief Slowly?
No doubt is there, Chief Party, that Chief Slowly had the hardest job in the country during the time he was the chief during this time.
I would agree, sir.
The city was under siege and the service was under siege.
Yes, sir.
Did you know anything at all when you got there about the circumstances of Chief Slowly's tenure as the Chief of Police?
No, sir.
Thank you.
And any difficulties that he faced here in Ottawa, either with issues that arose...
Because of his race or issues that arose because of his inability to lead the change that he had been asked to lead.
I'm sorry.
I was not aware.
Clearly, he had, at the time that you observed it, a very difficult relationship with his command team.
That's fair.
And others below the senior command.
You agree, you observed during the time that you were here, or maybe even before you got here, there were political issues that were raised about Ottawa Police Service's handling of this crisis.
Yes, sir.
Both at the Ministry of the Solicitor General, with some controversies about what resources were here or not, right?
Yes.
And at the level of the federal government, with political...
Leaders making statements about what was going on in their city.
That's correct.
All of which added to the complexity and challenge here for him.
Absolutely.
Did you also, I take it towards the end of your time here, you became aware that the Police Services Board and the Municipal Council had expectations of Chief Slowly and the service that they would tell them that there was a plan and indeed be briefed upon it.
Yes.
And that's how you were asked to go, and you checked in with your commissioner to see if you should.
No, I actually just flat out denied it's not going.
And then I was asked, and a follow-up from the commissioner, in light of the Borden report from G20, you know, the board has certain roles and responsibilities, and he felt it would be appropriate for me to make a presentation.
To the board in light of those key responsibilities that the board has, which I understood.
But again, that plan, that could only be done with Chief Slowly's approval.
Understood.
And it's unusual in your experience to brief political actors on operations plans.
To the detail that we were seeing, absolutely.
Very unusual.
And so, a couple of other quick things, if I can.
Were you aware that a member of Chief Slowly's...
The OPS contacted Superintendent Morris about his attendance at the briefing.
No, sir.
Without telling Chief Slowly that he was going to do that.
You didn't know anything about that?
No, sir.
Were you aware as to how the senior command Yes, I knew.
I mean, she was the person that I dealt with pretty much exclusively after I arrived in Ottawa in terms of any contentious issues or things to deal with or questions about getting the plan approval.
It was Deputy Chief Ferguson.
And that Deputy Chief Bell was responsible for the intelligence lead?
I don't know if I was aware.
I've certainly learned that he was, but certainly not aware.
I mean, I had met Deputy Chief Bell at that initial meeting, and until he became interim chief, I don't think I had two words with him.
Got it.
Thank you.
I think I've now helped from my colleague, Commissioner.
I've got the number I was trying to show the witness.
I think it's three zeros.
Madam Reserve, 1839, please.
Bear with me, Chief Party.
If this is not it, I'll...
Okay, here we go.
February 10th, just to orient you, these are minutes of an integrated planning meeting.
You talked about it, I think, earlier.
Just the attendees, am I correct just stopping there?
All of the attendees.
Are from OPP, RCMP, or other non-OPS police services.
And it was just scroll down if we if we could to page two.
And in a little bit.
Further, if we could, please.
Okay, just stop there for a second.
One of the things that you were asked by my friend, Mr. Au, is whether thought had been given to taking over the leading this and taking over from the police jurisdiction.
And I think you indicated that, no, that was not the plan.
Well, I think for that to happen...
There had to be a request from the chief, and the chief made it very clear that that wasn't going to happen.
Understood.
There was some suggestion within the group on the 10th.
You'll see from the RCMP to support the...
Just up the...
You'll read...
Stop there.
Thank you.
We need to slowly come back.
There is suggestion from the RCMP that maybe you should take over.
And you'll see it says, and I've forgotten his rank, Tetro is.
So are we at the bottom here?
Yeah.
OPS saves face on this.
The OPS, in its own words, is on its knees.
We remove OPS from this slowly over the course of four to six or eight shift cycles.
They're exhausted.
They go back to work and police the rest of the city.
We're going to build a police detachment, incident police by another police service within your city, same as a terrorist plane crash, and so on.
Just then scroll down.
You said the OPS is listening to their tactical advisors.
This is brainstorming.
RCMP, I'll use instead of the word tetro, but presents a viable plan.
Is that the only plan?
No.
Is it an option that should be given consideration?
Absolutely.
I won't go through the rest of it, but at this meeting, consideration was given to thinking about replacing OPS.
So I think context is very important here.
Sure.
And the context is here, it starts with they're on their knees.
We witness officers burn out and just walking out of, getting up and walking out of meetings saying, I'm done.
I can't take this anymore.
They were burning out daily.
We saw their senior executive chief slowly.
The stress was very evident on all of them.
That perhaps if they focus their efforts on policing the city, we'll build a plan for the event.
Still going to be involved, but just remove them from the equation to allow them to build some strength.
Because quite frankly, we saw the burnout, we saw the stress, we saw the anxiety throughout the whole of that.
Is it fair to say that one of the things that...
May have eroded trust between the integrated planning cell team and Chief Slowly and maybe others.
Was the idea that maybe there was a plan to replace OPS?
There was never, sir, a plan to replace OPS.
And we never talked.
We had lots of brainstorming sessions.
You know, we'd start every meeting by saying, listen, we need everything on the table.
You have an idea.
Let's consider it.
There was nothing off-line.
Thank you.
Page 8 of this document, please.
This is just shifting gears for one second.
Chief Party, help us, if you could, with the issue of Windsor.
There's some references here to the demands on...
just scroll down I think please There we go.
RCMP POU will get to Windsor tomorrow.
OPP has to pivot.
If Windsor is a priority, they have to pivot.
Translation or the point being made that Windsor is going to take resources away from, of course, from Ottawa.
Well, I think, again, context is everything.
The support that I and my team receive never changed in terms of we get what we need.
Well, going back to my very first meeting with Ottawa Police.
We're very clear that we're looking at this not just at the local level, we're at the provincial and the national level.
And we have to keep our eyes on all that.
What's happening in Coots could have an impact here.
What's happening in Manitoba could have an impact here.
So we, as a team, wanted to be alive to that.
The word pivot became very instrumental throughout the deployment.
It was used a lot.
We had to pivot daily on things because our plan needs to be able to pivot.
And adjust to impacts to it.
So when Windsor happened, we needlessly knew that, okay, we're not going to get all that is available because Windsor is going to need some.
Got it.
And Windsor, it became not the priority, it became a priority.
Understood.
In my view.
Ottawa never changed in mind.
I did not say, okay, I'm going to put my focus on Windsor.
Thank you very much for letting me know about Windsor.
Now let's get back to what our problem is here.
Our focus still remains solely on it.
Understood.
Scroll down a little bit.
Last bullet point on this.
Words attributed to you, there's a last point.
RCMP advises 60 hotel rooms are available in Vanier, and that's on account of the fact that 60 POU members had to go to Windsor.
You had the rooms, but you didn't have the personnel because, of course, for the reasons you've given.
Windsor required them.
One thing I forgot to ask you when I talked for a moment about Chief Slowly and his circumstances, I think you told us that he was unable to attend one of the meetings.
He had a different commitment.
Am I right that that commitment was a risk-threat assessment against him personally?
Yes, he and his family.
I understood it to be not just him and his family as well.
I mean, uncalled for, but there were threats against him.
Right, and that was it.
A death threat.
Yes, sir.
There were other death threats that came to your attention.
Municipal politicians, presumably many others.
Then could I just ask then finally the PLT.
PLT, in your experience with PLT, they have had success and they have been unable sometimes to bring protests to an end on their own without further police action.
Well, we have seen PLT used in a myriad of situations over the years.
I'm a big fan of them nonetheless.
I think it's obvious.
We've seen them have complete success, but it depends.
We use PLT in the OPP in our daily operations now.
In my region, for example, I had a PLT officer in every one of my detachments.
Plus, I had a full-time component in addition to the designated PLT in every one of my detachments.
They handled contentious issues.
Right down to a protest is a neighbor dispute between two people and resolve lots.
You know, resolution, if you're saying complete resolution, there's a massive process and PLT alone was able to resolve it.
That's a fair statement that that doesn't happen often, but they are an instrumental part of the solution to get a protest to a workable size that allows us to effectively dismantle it.
Understood.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Thank you.
This may be a good time for an afternoon break.
I think since we're going to go for certainly an hour or better, so I'll take a 15-minute break and we'll come back if that's okay.
Sure.
Thank you.
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission has reconvened the Commission.
Okay.
We're back.
Are you prepared to proceed?
Okay.
Next, I'd like to call on the Ottawa Police Service.
Good afternoon.
Good afternoon.
My name is Jessica Barrow and I'm representing the Ottawa Police Service.
We heard earlier in your evidence that the reason the integrated planning cell was created was to assist OPS.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
And you listed a few reasons that that was the case, but one of the ones that you listed was to restore the public's confidence in the police.
Is that fair?
Yes.
And would you agree with me that the loss of public confidence in OPS was related, at least in part, to the public's perception of inaction by OPS?
Yes.
And that perhaps residents felt like the unlawful behavior of protesters was going unchecked by OPS?
Yes.
In response to that, however, you are not a proponent of leading with enforcement.
Is that fair?
No, it's not fair.
It's not fair, okay.
I'm a proponent to leading a measured approach, and if enforcement is a part of that, then absolutely.
However...
I think you're attributing that maybe to my comment that you're not going to arrest your way out of this.
I could find 100 police leaders that would say the exact same thing.
Right.
So I guess my point was that it's not the place you start.
Is that fair?
It can be a part of.
Strategic arrests are always a critical part of a lot of these types of operational plans.
But that alone is not going to solve this problem.
Right.
And your goal, I think you explained this earlier, the goal is to try to negotiate your way out prior to engaging enforcement unless necessary.
The negotiation is a part of the plan.
If you look at our plan in detail, there's a time when negotiations are in the way and it calls for the next.
There's always graduated steps of enforcement running parallel to, not after, parallel to the negotiations.
Fair enough.
But because you are a proponent of that integrated model of negotiation and perhaps enforcement where necessary, you are a huge proponent, and I think you've mentioned this earlier, of the value of PLT.
Is that fair?
Yes, they have proven their value over and over in major events over the years, and I would see no reason why we would not incorporate them in any type of operational plan.
Of this nature.
And you were of the view at the time of your arrival in Ottawa that OPS was not providing a supportive environment for PLT.
That's correct.
I mean, I should point out, I have knowledge about obviously OPS background.
They wrote the book on this stuff.
They do it well.
It just wasn't happening.
Fair enough.
And you...
Earlier in the commission hearings, we've heard about the national framework.
I take it you're familiar with that.
Yeah.
And the national framework favors the use of PLT wherever possible to negotiate, correct?
Absolutely.
And so is it fair to say that the answer in response to the loss of public confidence wasn't necessarily to go in right away and start enforcing?
Is that fair?
It could, again.
Be part of that measured response.
It absolutely still could be part of the measured response where there's blatant offenses occurring to deal with them.
Absolutely.
But there's no one solution to this.
Go in and enforce your way out of it.
Not going to have to negotiate down the size of the footprint.
Absolutely a viable option, along with a measured approach on enforcement.
Fair enough.
So you would say that at the very least, any level of enforcement that was happening or ought to happen needed to happen in tandem with PLT?
Yes.
And for that reason, obviously, the operational plan that ultimately was agreed upon with Superintendent Bernier as the event commander did involve the strategic deployment of PLT as part of that, correct?
Yes.
And in fact, I believe you indicated in your witness statement that the integrated plan involved a vital PLT communication and negotiation plan.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
And that when you presented the cell's proposed plan to OPS, the key role of PLT was actually specifically stressed because the cell was concerned about the lack of buy-in at OPS in relation to the role of PLT.
Is that fair?
It certainly wasn't being used.
We were getting information that PLT were in a tent drinking coffee and not out engaging with protesters, trying to have an understanding of their intentions, whether or not there was any room to negotiate to maybe move or leave the area.
They were sitting in a tent drinking coffee.
So they weren't being deployed in a way that you felt was appropriate.
Is that fair?
I think the standard would be, I mean, because you put in this that I felt this.
This is a program that was in the OPP that was born out of the Upper Wash Inquiry.
And they have proven their weight and goal over the years in terms of the connection that they can make with and trust that they can build with protesters or otherwise.
You know, so you can reach some common ground on some issues.
If they can fix the issue or resolve the issue, that's a huge plus.
But they have become a vital part.
I mentioned in my cross with Mr. Slowy's counsel, we even use them now with neighbor disputes.
Instead of them taking the hard end of law enforcement laying charges on both sides, maybe we can negotiate a settlement here so that people can live in a little bit of harmony.
And it works.
It brings about better community safety.
So I think part of what you're saying, but you can correct me if I'm wrong, obviously.
Is that in order for PLT to be effective, they have to have the autonomy to actually negotiate effectively.
Is that fair?
They have the autonomy, but at the same time, they have to throw the commander's intent.
They have them to understand what that autonomy means, what they're being given.
Right.
And in this case, early on, it is my view, based on everything that I heard, all the information that was provided to me, that they really did not have that direction nor autonomy.
Fair enough.
And you were of the view, obviously, again, correct me if I'm wrong, that the reason PLT wasn't engaged in the way that you're describing in terms of its effectiveness was because that Chief Slowly didn't believe in the PLT program.
I think it went beyond maybe Chief Slowly, that others felt that it's time to get in there.
There's a lot of pressure on them to take action that is seen to be taken.
Fair.
PLT is action taken that nobody sees.
Right.
So in terms of you're talking about the optics of it.
The optics of it.
And so I don't think it was just Chief Slowly.
I know that in my meetings with the conversations with him, he had mentioned, for example, that they didn't have this type of concept with the Toronto Police Service when he was there.
And that he was not as overly familiar with it as we were.
We were told that negotiations is simply, Right.
So it perhaps is not that he didn't believe in it.
It may be that he didn't understand.
He certainly still talked about it and understood where we're going with it.
Absolutely.
But, you know, it was our belief because they were challenged by Superintendent Abrams in my meeting with them on the 9th of February about PLT.
Because we already added directly from PLT that they don't have authorities.
They don't have autonomy.
They're not doing.
What they do.
And we were told simply that, oh, they're used, but it's failed.
I'm sorry, who were they told that about?
I think that was Superintendent Patterson that said that at that time.
And so ultimately, when the integrated plan was agreed upon with Superintendent Bernier, and obviously with buy-in from others at OPS, there was an agreement that PLT played an important role in the dismantling of...
Of the convoy.
Is that fair?
Well, I want to be careful, but that makes it sound like we negotiated what goes into a plan.
No, no.
Yes, fair.
What we're talking about, what we built is what I would consider in our policing world right now for major events and protests, standard practice, template practice in terms of the engagement.
So there was agreement because it's what we do.
And it works.
They do provide that layer of assistance to get us to where we need to be when we take kinetic action.
Okay.
I want to talk very briefly about the chain of command and have you assist those of us that don't work in policing to understand how the chain of command works.
So you would agree with me that police services are paramilitary organizations.
Is that correct?
I wish.
You wish you agreed with me?
No, I wish they were.
There was a time that we absolutely did say that we were, but I think police services have largely moved away from being able to characterize themselves.
When I joined the job, we were paramilitarians.
Would you agree with me there is a chain of command?
But there is a chain of command.
Okay, so however you describe it.
That's the only similarity that I probably would agree with.
There's a chain of command.
There is a chain of command that one expects to follow, correct?
Yes.
Within a police service.
So however that's described, there is a chain of command.
Yes.
And that chain of command requires that where an officer is directed or ordered by a senior officer to do something, they're required to follow the command.
That's correct.
And in fact, it is a misconduct offense under the Police Services Act.
Not to follow a command.
A lawful order, correct?
Yes.
And in addition to that, would you agree with me that it would be considered unprofessional to directly question the directions of one's superior in front of partner agencies?
That's a relationship thing.
I mentioned earlier about my team.
I had constables, civilians up to chief on my team.
And they were given, you know, I need your voice.
So yeah, you have an opinion.
I need you to tell me I'm wrong.
So it depends on the environment and the expectations of the leader.
Fair enough.
I want to talk a little bit about the integrated command.
So when the integrated planning cell arrived in Ottawa...
Its first activities, and we've heard about this already, involved meetings with OPS to get a sense of where their plan stood.
Is that fair?
Yes.
And the integrated planning cell brought with it a fairly significant amount of planning expertise.
Yes, it did.
And you indicated, with the exception of you, that these were experts in their field.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Okay.
And the goal of the integrated planning cell was to work with OPS to work towards a more robust overall plan?
Yes.
And we've heard throughout your testimony, and I'll use the word criticism, but perhaps you would describe it otherwise, but would it be fair to say that there's some level of criticism of the level of integration OPS was allowing with your team at this point in time when you arrived?
I think criticism is probably fair.
I ran interference a lot on that very topic to actually, as I mentioned, at one point in time publicly.
It was announced we have integrated.
Behind the scenes, I'm telling my folks, but we're not there yet.
You know, integration means they're actually working with us.
We're no longer in silence.
We're actually talking about the direction that we're going in.
And we had obstacles.
But those obstacles were not just human.
Fair enough.
And we do know, however, that Superintendent Bernier was appointed as event commander on February 11th.
Yes.
Although perhaps not the integration level that you would have liked, there was an integrated command table after he came in, correct?
It started.
It started.
The positive work started.
Yes.
And that was born out of, you know, I think the commissioners are referenced to the NCRCC down in Orleans, Ottawa Police Headquarters.
We're at the NOC.
We have command posts in various different places that add to the complexities of integration.
Ideally, you want your key command positions to be integrated and also have access to one another.
And ultimately, that does happen, right?
Superintendent Bernier moves his group over to where you are.
And as our team work towards securing the right position, right location at the RCP headquarters that could house the type of integrated team, we're talking well into the 100 plus that would need it on operations day.
For every component of the plan, we had to have a rep there.
Right.
And that takes time, obviously, to assemble that number of people.
And one of the things that Superintendent Bernier did when he was appointed as event commander was appoint a deputy event commander.
Is that right?
Right.
And that deputy event commander was Inspector Springer?
Yes.
And he's from the OPP?
Yes.
I think he's retired now.
A retired member of the OPP then, perhaps?
I think so.
And part of that integrated team that was assembled and evolved, I guess, is what you're saying.
It was specialties from all different specialty units, as well as members from a variety of different agencies.
Is that right?
Correct.
And you felt at this time, I think you indicated, that even with Superintendent Bernier and the integrated table in place at this time, that there was at least a perceived need.
for chief slowly to approve any kind of planning.
Is that fair?
It was still that perception amongst everyone, right down to my boss's call and ask me, but as he approved it, they understood that Bernie had approved it, but they asked if he had, and that was that follow-up call I had with Trish Ferguson, and I trusted her, and when she said, "You're good to go," we went.
Right.
You know, we talked a little bit throughout this commission hearing with various witnesses about this incident command system.
We know that there's multiple iterations of it, but would you agree with me that irrespective of which version we're talking about, that the chief's requirement to sign off on an operational plan is inconsistent with that model?
Is that fair?
Not only job, but inconsistent with approval, yes.
Correct.
You indicated that your team met with Deputy Chief Ferguson on the 11th to present the plan that your team had created.
Is that right?
We did that over phone, I believe.
Okay, so there was a meeting of some kind, right?
And am I correct in saying that the plan involved the creation of a unified command?
Yes.
And you indicated, I think, earlier in your testimony that Deputy Chief Ferguson was very supportive of that plan.
Very supportive, yes.
And you also indicated that Ferguson was your primary contact with the OPS at this time?
Yes.
And so would you agree with me that that support that she indicated on February 11th was generally consistent with the level of collaboration you saw from her during your interactions with her?
Yes.
In fact, in your witness statement, you referred to Deputy Ferguson as a voice of reason.
Is that right?
That's fair.
Okay.
And you also indicated in your testimony earlier that by this time...
All of the rank and file of OPS was working well with your team.
Is that right?
Yes.
And on the same day of Chief Slowly's resignation, you would agree with me that Interim Chief Bell agreed with RCMP and OPP to implement a unified command.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Those are my questions.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Next, call upon the Government of Canada.
Good afternoon.
Check my time.
You indicated in your...
Oh, yeah, introduce myself.
I'm sorry.
My name is Donna Ray Nygaard.
I'm counsel for Canada.
You indicated in your evidence in chief that police services, including the OPP, tow vehicles all the time, you have the authority to do that.
And I just want to make sure that I'm understanding what you're saying.
You're talking about...
The authority to tow vehicles, that's something you have, and you didn't need the EA for that.
But you don't, or you didn't absent the EA, have the ability to compel tow truck drivers to assist with that.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
And that the use of tow trucks, in particular heavy tow trucks, was instrumental to the plan to clear out the protest in Ottawa, correct?
Unequivocally.
And the integrated operation was not actually able to obtain the services of such tow trucks without the use of the EA, the Emergencies Act, in this situation, correct?
That's not entirely correct, no.
So very early on, in fact, day one, we engaged with our OPP Traffic Services and Operational Support Command.
Deputy DeMarco, her team, that run all of our traffic programs.
We had a gentleman by the name of Kirk Richardson.
I believe he's a sergeant with the OPP.
Everything told his expertise.
And he had the relationships with MTO.
So they had been working tirelessly behind the scenes to build a plan.
And I do know that he had some 34 rigs lined up.
There were, however, some, I'm aware.
That were reluctant because of some liability issues, and the Act gave that support.
Could I have document number ONT50179, please?
Now, you mentioned Kirk Richardson, who was doing this, and he was doing the organization with the...
He was working directly with MTO.
Right.
If we can just scroll down to the first email in the chain.
So yeah, just so we can see the beginning.
So this is an email on February 16th from the MTO.
And there's a number of recipients, including Mr. Richardson, you can see there.
And if you can see in the first bullet point there, it says there were 13 heavy tow trucks requested and support equipment, 11 tow trucks confirmed so far from three towing companies, and they were working on securing more.
So that was the situation that I think if we scroll back up at 119 on February 16th, and then if we continue to scroll up to the next email in the chain, At the bottom of the first page, we'll see the time.
So now we're at five in the evening that same day.
And there's a follow-up email.
And if we can just see there that it says in that first line, good afternoon, estimate below per day based on discussions with two towing companies.
Third towing company has dropped out.
We have...
Total 10 trucks at this time.
And then you'll see that he says, we need a letter from the OPP requesting these companies to provide services and stating that the federal act cover any damage to their equipment and indemnify them from damage or other claims resulting from vehicle towed upon a police direction.
And then if we go up to the final email in the chain.
You'll see that it says, Hi, Veronica.
I've told them that the letter will come tomorrow.
They will be moving tonight based on my and Steve's commitment credibility.
So would you agree with me that at the end of the day, MOT was actually only able to obtain two towing companies and that those were only obtained if they were...
Compelled under the Federal Emergencies Act.
Certainly, reading this, I would say that was my understanding going through that.
I mean, when I say tows, there's companies with multiple equipment.
It was my understanding we had a significant number available, but there were holdouts that the Emergencies Act absolutely supported their engagement and to bring this to a successful conclusion.
But you'll agree with me that...
As far as heavy tows are concerned, this email chain makes pretty clear that they were only able to obtain these two.
Yes, I'm fully alive to the fact that there was a significant issue with tows.
Our friends from Ottawa Police in one of their preliminary plans were going to use police officers because they could not get access to tows.
They were going to use police officers that had the ability to drive those types of vehicles to remove them.
So I would agree it was a significant issue.
Yes, and that the solution to that issue when it came to the heavy tow trucks was using the Emergencies Act regulations.
Certainly assistive, yes.
Thank you.
You've talked in a fair amount of detail this afternoon about the importance and the role of the PLTs in the work they do, particularly to shrink the...
The footprint of a protest before enforcement action is taken.
And I take it based on what you've said, you'll agree with me that that was a very important part of your plan here.
Yes.
And in fact, I think you said that if you had had to go in without shrinking the footprint, you would have needed 10,000 officers to deal with everyone who was there.
It just means putting hands on everybody that's in there and two officers per.
Just do the math.
It would need a lot more officers, yes.
And if you can't shrink the footprint, not only do you need a lot more officers, but it takes more time to control the situation.
That's very, yes.
And also that there is more risk of violence or injuries when you've got a bigger crowd to control.
There's always risk.
I mean, we assess those risks on a day-by-day, then operations hour-by-hour, minute-by-minute.
You know, when PLT is engaged.
They're really good at reporting back to us whether or not they believe they've reached their limit.
And in our plan, our measured approach, it's PLT that gives us that final nod.
What's the status?
Do you have any more room to move?
No.
Okay.
They're out.
We go in with positive action.
But the bigger...
The bigger the activity that you're trying to deal with, the more possibility there is for volatility.
Yes.
And therefore, the greater chance of violence and injuries.
Yes.
Although I think it's important when I hear the word violence and injuries, that was a key aspect of our plan, of this integrated plan.
Yes.
To ensure that we, from start to finish, the systematic dismantling of the process is done.
With everything in our power to minimize injury to anybody, and we succeeded in that.
Absolutely.
And you did succeed, and an important part of that was the ability of the PLTs to shrink the footprint significantly.
Again, it was a good part of it.
And the BLTs' ability to do that job is dependent on how persuasive they can be in convincing people to leave.
They're negotiators.
You know, their role is to ensure that the protesters or those that are inside that perimeter are aware of the law, the expectations, you know, around lawful protests.
And then when they go to the point that it's no longer lawful, now you're committing advances to inform them, negotiate.
It's about building trust.
Sometimes they...
They make concessions and they're willing to do things.
We have to give them the leeway to make some concessions if necessary.
But this all happens with the commanders being fully aware of what's going on with PLT, with their mandate, what autonomy they've been given, what authorities have been given.
Yes.
And one of the tools that the PLT has to convince protesters to leave is educating them on the consequences if they don't leave.
Absolutely, yes.
Presumably, the more significant those consequences, the more persuasive the PLT can be in convincing people to leave.
Yes, possibly, yes.
And in this case, when this plan was actioned and the PLTs went in to do their work to try and shrink the footprints, one of the tools that was used was a pamphlet that was handed out, correct?
I believe so, yes.
And perhaps I can just...
If I can pull up OPP401852, this is the integrated phased approached plan from February.
This particular version is dated February 18th, but I understand this is just an update of the plan that was in place for at least since the 13th was going through various iterations.
And if we can go to page five, please.
Probably actually page six of the...
Document, it's page five on the page numbers.
Yes, down towards the bottom of the page, up a little bit.
Just under the bolding there, this talks about the pamphlet that was being, or it was a media release provided, but I understand that there was also pamphlets handed out that stated the same thing.
Is that your understanding as well?
Yes.
And so there's various information that was being provided to the protesters to try and convince them to leave by the PLTs, and it's listed here.
First, it mentions criminal code offences, and if we can go to the next page.
It then names a couple of consequences that, as I understand it, come out of the Ontario emergency legislation.
Is that correct?
Yes.
Those consequences, in particular the driver's license suspension and the commercial vehicle operators registration suspension, those would only be applicable against people from Ontario, correct?
No.
Ontario legislation allowed you to suspend the driver's license?
They seized.
If that was a vehicle from out of province, plates were removed, the stickers were removed, and we would seize.
And then we had those agreements with other provinces.
Yes, it was my understanding on Enforcement Day, it's exactly how it was used.
So your understanding is that the Ontario legislation allowed you to...
They're in the province of Ontario.
Just let me finish the question.
Allowed you to suspend the driver's license of someone from British Columbia?
Who was sitting here in British Columbia?
Yes, that is my understanding.
If we go down, the following bullets are all, except for the last one, measures under the federal emergency legislation, correct?
Correct.
So the personal business accounts, personal or business accounts, the fines for bringing minors into the area and traveling to an unlawful protest site or delivering fuel and other supplies.
Those were all under the federal legislation, correct?
And you'll agree with me that the addition of those bullet points provided more...
Persuasive fodder for the PLTs to convince individuals to leave.
Any piece of legislation that we were given, we used to the extent that we could possibly use it.
Absolutely did support it.
And as a result of those additional tools, the PLT would have been able to convince more people to leave than they otherwise may have been able to do.
Well, I don't have any metrics for their success, but the more that you can give them, absolutely.
And so that allowed you to have a smaller footprint that you were dealing with and perhaps allowed you to get to that smaller footprint faster?
Possibly.
Those are all my questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Next is the JCCF Democracy Fund.
Good afternoon, Mr. Commissioner.
Good afternoon.
Good afternoon, sir.
Good afternoon.
Mr. Commissioner, the...
Can you speak up or turn up the sound of it?
Yes, Mr. Commissioner.
Can you hear me better now?
Yes.
Thank you.
Council for the Government of Canada just brought up a document and showed it to the witness, and it was about tow trucks.
It's against the rules, but I'm wondering if you would grant me leave to show this witness a single document which we haven't provided notice for, but which may assist him and which may assist the Commission in understanding how many tow trucks may have been available.
Well, I'm not sure mechanically how we can do this.
A few questions arising from that.
One is, it is a document that exists in the party database?
Yes, it is.
Okay, and is it a...
Are you able to provide the document ID number?
Yes, I am.
Mr. Commissioner, obviously, within your discretion, but the parties nor Commission Council haven't had an opportunity to review the document and see what it is.
I'm not sure what it is, but one of the things that we can do is, once we know the numbers, have an opportunity to look and see what it is.
And for what it's worth, Commissioner, I was going to ask for leave to introduce probably the very same document.
Okay.
Well, is there any objection?
Obviously, if the OPP seems to have no problem with it, I think it should just go ahead.
If you can give the number so that we can then get it before the Commission.
Commissioner, can I just...
Yes.
My only comment would be, if it's in relation to the questions I was asking, and because I wasn't given notice that it was going to be put to the witness, it may raise an additional question for me.
I suspect I know what document it is, but I'm not entirely sure until I see it, obviously.
Well, if you want to follow up on it, you can ask at the time, and obviously I have discretion to allow that.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
The document is OPP401585.
Can we just go down to the third page?
The top of the third page, please.
So here you can see an email, and can you just actually scroll up a little bit so we can see who the email is from?
So this is an email from Rose DeMarco.
Do you know her?
Yes, she is a Deputy Commissioner of Traffic Services and Operational Support with the OPP.
And it looks like this email is being sent to somebody at the Solicitor General's office as well as the OPP Commissioner.
Yes.
And if we just scroll down a little bit.
She says there are a total of 64 heavy tow companies in the province of Ontario.
Do you see that?
Yes.
And I think this is what you were referring to before.
She says companies who would provide service, seven with 34 total heavy tow units.
Yes.
And if we just look down two lines, she says 10 companies waiting for callback from the 57 in total.
Yes.
Now, the document that we just saw from the Government of Canada was, I believe, dated February 17th, 2022.
So that's some four days after this document.
Correct.
And it looks like perhaps in that time, the number of tow companies who are willing to provide trucks or the number of trucks that they can provide decreases.
It appears, yes.
And it could be the case, could it not, that the invocation of the Emergencies Act, which happened in between these two events, actually caused tow truck drivers or tow truck companies to become more reluctant to provide their services or to put conditions upon their services, such as indemnification for damages.
It is possible, but I personally don't believe that, sir.
There was a reluctance very, very early.
We're with tow companies to be engaged.
As I mentioned, the OPS on February 9th were unable to get any tow companies to engage to the point that they were going to use their own people.
And I do believe there's even reference to getting the military to come in and tow some vehicles for them if needed.
So while it may have had an impact, I think it was an issue.
And I think that issue was What's connected broadly to the broader issue that we're dealing with in the public domain, namely the pandemic, this massive protest, and the unwillingness of some agencies to simply be engaged?
Well, it was an issue on February the 9th, as you say.
And it was still an issue on February the 13th, but there were some trucks there.
There were some 34 trucks.
Can you think of anything material that changed between the 13th and the 17th?
Other than the invocation of the Emergencies Act, which would cause fewer companies to agree to the OPP using their trucks or to providing services to the OPP.
I think the key comment that I think is appropriate for me on the tow issue is that we knew it was a contentious, our team knew it to be a contentious issue from the very start of our deployment.
I was fortunate to have a team that I could just say, can you deal with this?
And Curt Richardson, MTO, and the folks in that email, right up to Deputy Commissioner DeMarco, took that up on place.
So they might be in a better position to answer that question.
I simply ask for a tow plan, and can you give me people that have the capability to develop that plan?
And I got a plan, and it worked.
Thank you very much.
Let me change topics here for just a moment.
We heard from your OPP colleague, Superintendent Patrick Morris, not long ago, that he thought some of what the media was reporting was problematic.
Did you hear that evidence?
I did not hear his evidence.
I think I listened in about 10 minutes of it as I was arriving in Ontario looking to do some of my own prep, so I didn't spend a lot of time.
Are you aware that he testified that he read accounts of, for example, Russia being involved in the protests and he found that to be problematic?
I think I may have read that somewhere, yes.
In your evidence today, you adopted a will say.
And in that will say, you stated the media was not portraying what was on the ground.
Can you tell us what your concerns were?
Well, it's just the things that were happening and this protest group were...
Incredibly well organized, in my opinion, and the narrative about what was happening in Ottawa was being controlled or was one-sided.
Sorry, go ahead.
No, and that's the basis for that comment, because there was a lot of good things happening.
You know, there's things that were going on within the protest group that, you know, we heard about the bouncy castles and the prayer meetings in the morning.
But we didn't hear publicly about threats to people inside the perimeter who wanted to leave and they didn't want them to leave.
We didn't hear about that publicly.
Things of that nature.
It's just but one small example of, you know, the narrative that was out there about, you know, this is a family event.
Bring your kids.
There's a bouncy castle.
We can have fun.
Yet there were people within that red zone that wanted to leave.
I felt threatened and couldn't leave.
And you didn't think that was being accurately conveyed by the media?
It was not being conveyed at all, in my opinion.
What about something like what Patrick Morse testified to, that the protesters were being portrayed as extremists, and he found that to be problematic.
Did you find that to be problematic as well?
I do, because I've been involved in the events in the past, from OAS summits to some of the G events.
Where we had a lot of extremist views.
There was fringes of it with the two groups, I believe, that were around Nicholas and Waller and Rideau Sussex, maybe, were of concern.
But they were not a major concern.
But there's always that risk of escalation that you see from those extremist groups.
It was the profile of the protester.
For this event was none like I've ever seen in my 36-year career.
We had everything from grandparents.
You know, my first day in this assignment, I was shown a picture of two officers that had worked for me in the past, who were retired, who were in the crowd with the protesters.
We saw children.
We saw a lot of crestfallen police officers in the crowd, military, nurses.
Normal group of people that you're dealing with.
So, I guess that's the point.
Was there still concerns from our perspective on extremism?
Absolutely.
But we relied on and trusted the intelligence as it came in on that matter.
Thank you very much, sir.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Next call on the City of Ottawa, please.
Good afternoon, Chief Superintendent.
My name is Anne Tardif, and I'm one of the lawyers representing the City of Ottawa.
Good afternoon.
If I could turn up, or ask to be turned up, OPP 401792.
And, sir, these are your notes.
I don't know if you have a hard copy there that you'd prefer to refer to, but otherwise it'll go up on the screen.
I'll wait for the screen, sure.
And could I ask that you turn to page three, please, of the document?
Now, this is just to show you the date at the top, sir, the 8th of February 2022.
And if we could scroll down to about the middle of page four.
A little bit lower.
There we go.
Now, do you see there's an arrow there that has the word from federal government?
At the end of it.
And I'm going to ask you if you could help me out with your handwriting for the first part of it.
You may have to help me with my handwriting.
Sorry.
Do you see it there?
There's an arrow just below the middle line of the page.
What did you write there?
Daily siege from federal government.
Daily siege from federal government.
Yeah.
What did you mean by that, sir?
Pressure.
Pressure.
And was this pressure that was being placed upon the Ottawa Police Service?
Police service the community to get this resolved.
On Ottawa as a whole to get this resolved, basically.
And was this siege being applied just, you know, privately and in calls to the chief or to city officials, or was this occurring publicly?
Well, this is notes that I took on being briefed on my assignment.
Okay.
It might be better from those who gave me that, but that was my sense from the briefing that there was pressure around.
We've got to get this fixed.
And can you just help us out?
Who provided this briefing?
It was jointly provided by Commissioner Kreek, Deputy Commissioner Harkins, Mike McDonnell at Injects as related to PLU, and Craig Abrams, who was on Videolink, gave us the overview of the state that was up to that point.
Thank you.
So we can ask them about this.
And I take it they were...
I'm relaying this to you in your briefing because that was impacting the response in Ottawa, making things more difficult, if I can put it that way.
Yes.
If we could turn now to page 12 of the document, please.
Thank you.
Okay, and if you could scroll to the bottom of the page, Madam Clerk.
Now, we can go back if you need me to, sir.
We're on February 9th at this point.
If you could stop there, Madam Clerk.
Do you want me to go backwards to see the date, or you're all right?
Okay, let me know if you do want me to.
Do you see the entry there, 1034, on February 9th?
And it says TC, which I take it as telephone call?
Yes.
From Deputy Harkins, is that right?
Yes.
And he's the Deputy Commissioner for Field Operations at the OPP.
That's correct.
It says, need to be looking at this more broadly.
And there's an asterisk.
Ambassador Bridge shut down.
Yes.
We could scroll to the next page, please.
402, that's the highway, right?
Yes.
Shut down both directions, 40 kilometres from the border by farm tractors.
Yes.
Economic impact equals $350 million per day, right?
Correct?
Correct.
And then it says Big Auto, and there's an arrow, 24 hours, and they shut down factories.
Is that right?
Shut down factories.
Shut down factories.
Okay.
And this is being reported to you by Deputy Commissioner Harkins.
Correct.
Okay.
And then the next, I'll skip over the next asterisk only because I think that may relate to Toronto.
Is that right?
That's regarding the GTA dump for waste would be impacted of where it could go.
Because of the closure of the 402?
Yes.
Okay.
So this is an impact on the Toronto garbage dump arising from the blockade at the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor.
Not the Ambassador because it's Lampton County.
I'm sorry, my geography for Western Ontario is a little off.
Okay.
It may have been as a result of 402.
I see.
Just separate from...
Understood.
And then it says planning to block access to Impact Toronto.
That's what you just told us.
And then the final little note here, it says request to determine what the...
And what's that next word?
Current resource deployment is to the City of Ottawa.
Okay, perfect.
And then if we turn over the page to page 24. And so now we're at February 10th.
And I'm actually, if you could just go up to page 23, Madam Clerk, we'll just see the beginning of this.
Do you see at 9, oh, down a bit.
Do you see at 921?
Yes.
So this is, again, a telephone call with Deputy Harkins.
And it says you were, I guess you and the deputy were joined later by Commissioner Karik.
Is that correct?
Correct.
And this is on February 10th.
And before we get into this, I just want to back up a little bit.
So we talked about the call just the day prior on February 9th, where you're...
Alerted to the situation in Windsor and asked about the current resource deployment to the City of Ottawa.
And February 9th is the same day that you had the, I'm going to call it the meeting, at Elgin Street headquarters of the Integrated Planning Group with OPS Command.
Is that right?
That's correct.
Okay.
And coming out of that, you mentioned earlier in your testimony, there was an ask for staffing, and I think you said the number was 516, 516.
Correct.
Right, and that was a maintenance ask.
Yes.
So, in other words, that's the number of officers OPS needed from OPP just to maintain the current posture and traffic points, right?
Yes.
As I said earlier, though, there was some math problem with it.
Ultimately, that number you divide.
516 by 3. I think it's 174 or 178 or something like that.
Because they had been employing a three-shift model.
And as we talked through it, it was like, oh, I forgot to tell you, we actually, with the support of the Ottawa Police Association, they had reverted back to the two-shift model, which would allow you to spread.
There are inherent benefits with the three-shift model.
With my organization coming in, it certainly would be a benefit beyond the same type of rotation, which they did.
The RCMP, however, remained on a three-shift model.
Okay, so I don't think we need to get quite to the level of specificity of numbers, but if I understand that, the maintenance ask on three shifts was 516, 516, that's correct?
On three shifts.
On three shifts.
And if you drop it to two shifts, which you said you were able to do, then it's probably closer to 300.
Is that about right?
I would put it in the range of 350.
Okay, 350.
In other words, it's about a third less.
It's a third less.
Okay, whatever that number amounts to.
Fair enough.
So that's the number that comes out for maintenance of the February 9th planning meeting.
But of course, the OPS was also looking for additional POU supports for their enforcement action, correct?
Absolutely.
And the decision of the OPP coming out of that planning meeting was, we will meet your maintenance ask, we'll supply what turned out to be approximately 350 officers to maintain the current posture, but at this time, we're not going to move forward with the POU ask.
Ask for the reasons you've already explained relating to the planned, etc.
No, that's not accurate.
That's not accurate.
We continue to deploy POU, to make plans for POU.
There was obviously a plan in Windsor at the Ambassador Bridge for action down there, but that did not slow us down.
We knew that, of course it was going to impact, because we're drawing from the same pool.
Sure.
But it did not stop.
We just realized at that stage that, if I'm not mistaken, Darwin Tetral in that same meeting said, we need that 800.
That's about all that we have in the province of Ontario.
Suddenly we have to pivot.
We're not going to get all we have in the province of Ontario because they're going to be used and they're going to be needed down in Windsor.
Then we started our outreach to Edmonton, Calgary, Vancouver, and the province of Quebec.
Okay, well, in fairness to you, let me show you where I thought I saw that information, and you can perhaps correct me if I'm wrong.
Can we go to page 19, please, of this document?
Okay, and actually, just scroll up a little bit, please, Madam Clerk, the following page.
So there's that 516 number, right?
Three shifts as documented by OPS, 516.
That's the maintenance number, and we've explained that they went down to two ships, so it ends up being more like 350, correct?
And now let's scroll down, Madam Clerk.
Now, I see a number of POU requests here, and if we keep scrolling down...
Okay, stop there.
You'll see the lowest POU you get, POU by this stage, 55 plus 600.
So that was their POU ask coming out of the planning meeting on the 9th, right?
I believe so, yes.
Okay.
And can we scroll down a little bit more, Madam Clerk, please?
And then, whoops, it's up there.
And then you'll see where it says 1635.
Do you see that?
Yes.
It says briefed team.
These are your notes, right, sir?
Yes.
And then it says, will staff to the maintenance plan, which has roles and responsibilities built in, continue to build our plan, right?
So that's what I was referring to.
Yeah, and that's accurate.
Okay.
When we talk about that in our plan and we continue to build, we're asking as we need.
You know, we add people.
We weren't also, we're not taking action.
We're not in a position.
We needed 800.
And that's what I meant earlier.
For the reasons you've discussed, the plan's not there.
Right now, you're staffing to the maintenance because that's what you think is needed in Ottawa right then.
And our ask will immediately go out for others now.
We want others to join in.
We need the SQ.
We need Vancouver.
We need Calgary and Edmonton to join the team because we need this number.
And then the logistics around arranging all that, getting the approvals, the supports for them to be deployed, we're current.
I understand that, but at this point, the immediate decision is to staff to the maintenance plan.
Can we agree to that?
Yes.
Okay.
Now, back to page 24, please, Madam Clerk.
We're going to move ahead to February 10th.
And we'll scroll up to the following page, sorry, 921.
This is where we were.
Telephone call with Deputy Harkins, joined later by Commissioner Karik.
We'll scroll down to page 24. And if I could stop you, Madam Clerk, at the CC.
Do you see that there?
That's Commissioner Karik, I'm assuming, since he joined the call later?
I think so.
Okay.
And it says, provincial priority has changed due to ongoing, and you'll have to help me with the next word.
Issue in Windsor.
Issue, thank you.
Due to ongoing issue in Windsor, both from, I think that's Intel and Impact Assessment?
Yes.
Okay.
It is now our priority, it mean Windsor, while continuing to support the RCMP slash OPS in Ottawa.
We may not be in position to supply Ottawa with all they need at this juncture.
Right.
And that's what Commissioner Karik told you on the morning of February 10th, correct?
Yes.
Just to put us in time, that's the Thursday, right, before the weekend, correct?
Yes.
Okay.
It's my understanding that the maintenance ask, the approximately 350 officers, was actually only fulfilled on the morning of Saturday, February 12th.
Is that accurate?
I need a lot of information in front of me to be very specific in terms of when we finally did it.
We certainly made the ask.
Yeah, and no one's suggesting otherwise.
I can pull up a document.
It's not a problem.
No, if you say it was reported that it took the hell then to do it, I believe that.
Okay.
It was a struggle.
A lot of people did not want to be deployed to Ottawa.
A lot of people did.
I missed the last part.
Did not want to be deployed there.
To Ottawa.
Yes.
You want people to want to be there, but it was a struggle.
Right.
And the circumstances you're describing, Windsor and the reasons you've just described, that explains why the ask being made took from February 9th to February 12th to be fulfilled by the OPP.
And when you say OPP, OPP and partner agencies, it wasn't just, I just happened to be OPP.
We're there with an integration with multiple agencies.
We're all in it together.
I understand.
Let me be fair to you.
It took three days for OPT together with all of its partner agencies to fulfill the maintenance ask by OPS.
Thank you.
Those are my questions.
Okay.
Thank you.
Next, the convoy organizers.
Good afternoon, Mr. Commissioner.
Good afternoon, Chief Party.
My name is Bathsheba Vandenberg, and I'm counsel representing Freedom Corp and protesters.
I have a few questions for you this afternoon.
I'd like to ask you about the February 9th plan I referred to earlier today.
It contemplated building a public order unit plan.
Is that right?
Yes.
Oh, sorry.
The February 9th plan that the Ottawa police presented to us.
That's right.
Yes.
Was the first operation of that February 9th plan to clear Rideau Sussex on Thursday, February the 10th at 6 a.m.?
It was going to be 4 a.m. with a possibility of being moved up to 11 p.m. on that date that they were telling us.
Okay.
And was it event?
Commander Patterson, who wanted to deploy POUs as part of executing that plan?
Well, we didn't get into the weeds in terms of numbers, but POU was part of the plan that they were going to execute, and an incident commander had been assigned on that plan.
Okay, thank you.
And yesterday, Superintendent Abrams testified that the police, the AL zone teams, PLTs, were not involved in the planning process.
And he suspected that Event Commander Patterson did not communicate this plan to the PLTs.
Is that right?
Yes, that's fair.
Were you aware that at the same time as the integrated cell plan in what you call the group, that the PLTs were negotiating a plan with some of the protesters to start moving trucks on February 10th from the Rideau-Sussex intersection?
I don't have independent recollection right now.
There's so much that was going on.
It's possible, yes.
Was the February 9th plan abandoned because there were not enough POUs?
Well, what happened, myself and Phil Liu, prior to leaving Ottawa headquarters, met with Acting Superintendent Burnett.
We both knew him, and Phil had worked closely with him in the years prior.
We stopped by to say hello as we were leaving the building, aware that he was being assigned the task.
We didn't get into the details of it, other than he told us that he had some legal concerns that he was seeking advice on, and that from there he was going to be consulting with his PLU experts.
He consulted, and at 1820 that day, we learned that they did consult with the broader group.
And they didn't find it to be tactically sound and decided to defer.
And that was on February 10th?
I learned that on February 10th, yes.
Because notwithstanding what was...
No, sorry.
I learned that on February 9th that it was shut down.
Just discuss now on February 10th.
We learned that the Commissioner Carrick mentioned to you that there was a lack of availability of POU resources.
And also, did RCMP Sergeant Tethro also tell you this, that there was a lack of POU resources?
Well, we knew that, you know, POU was going to be stretched in the province at the capacity that we had.
Are you aware that the RCMP put a freeze for 72 hours from February 10 to 13 on any POU intervention?
I need to know some greater context.
I'm not sure where that's from.
I don't recall it, but I'm not saying it didn't happen.
Okay.
Thank you.
Earlier today, the mission statement of the February 13 plan was put to you, and it included a reference to the utmost respect.
To the individual Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is that right?
Yes.
And part of that February 13 plan to contain a main action plan, is that correct?
Yes.
And that the mission statement provides strategic direction to operations, is that correct?
Yes.
And that the objective of the main action plan was to de-escalate and negotiate a peaceful resolution.
And demobilization of the Ottawa Truck Demonstration.
Is that right?
On February 14th, you continue to work on developing the February 13th plan with a group of POU SMEs.
Is that correct?
Correct.
The February 17th plan, referred to in your testimony, officially titled Integrated Public Order Unit Concept of Operations, is also referred to as POU Tactical Plan or Action Plan, correct?
Yes, it's a sub-plan of the master plan.
Right.
And the objective of that February 17th action plan was to systematically clear and take down the protests, right?
I put it to you that the mission of the February 17th action plan was to ensure the removal of the protesters in the area of the blockades in relation to the Freedom Convoy 2022.
This will be achieved by securing, isolating, and evacuating persons within the designated blockade zones to ensure the safe detention.
And arrests of any participants taking into custody.
Ensure public and police safety.
You agree that there is no reference to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the February 17th Action Plan?
Permission as it.
That's normally where it's contained, but what you read there, no.
Thank you.
Those are all my questions and thank you for your 36 years of service.
Thank you.
Thank you.
If I could now call on the government of Saskatchewan.
Go ahead.
Good afternoon, sir.
Can you hear me?
Yes.
Thank you.
Sir, my name is Mike Morris and I'm counsel for the government of Saskatchewan.
I'm just going to have a few questions for you today.
Would you agree with me?
That the OPP, the RCMP and the OPS did not need the Federal Emergencies Act to be invoked to set up an integrated command structure?
For the purposes of setting up an integrated command structure?
No.
We've done that in every major event that we've had with OPS in the past.
And I gather you'd agree that those same police forces didn't need the Federal Emergencies Act to be invoked to come up with an operational plan for removing the occupation in Ottawa, correct?
I would agree with that.
And you signed off on the operational plan that was ultimately used on February 12th on behalf of the OPP, correct?
That was a version.
There were multiple versions, but that was a version, yes.
Okay.
And I understand the RCMP approved that same version of the plan on February 12th as well.
Is that correct?
Yes, sir.
And I think we've heard that the OPS approved that same version of the plan on February 13th, correct?
Correct.
And when you signed off on that plan...
You were confident that it could be implemented to end the occupation, correct?
Yes.
And the February 13th plan did not contemplate any powers under the Federal Emergencies Act, correct?
Not at that time, no.
And as commander of the integrated planning cell, if you had thought that such powers were needed, you would have told someone, correct?
Well, we certainly felt that we had what we needed to develop a plan to dismantle the protest with what we had.
Thank you, sir.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
uh next if i could call on the government of alberta Good afternoon.
My name is Mandy England, and I'm asking some questions today on behalf of the Government of Alberta.
Sir, you mentioned in your response to counsel for the Government of Canada that some tow truck operators were reluctant due to liability issues to engage in the towing, and so the Emergencies Act was helpful in that respect.
Was that correct?
That's correct.
And so would it be fair to say that there were tow truck drivers who were willing to do it?
They would not have needed to be compelled to do it, but they just wanted that additional reassurance about liability?
Yes, that's fair.
Okay.
Isn't it true that there are also provisions under the Ontario Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act that protect individuals who are acting in good faith and performing an order under that act from an action against them for liability and performing that duty?
I do believe so, yes.
And is it true that there's provisions under that Act that provide a way for anyone whose property is damaged where an order under the Act is being carried out to seek compensation from the province itself rather than from an individual like a tow truck operator who's carrying out the order?
Well, I'll be honest, now you're getting into weeds of it that I'd have to say I need to look at it to see what it provided, but I was looking at it and I focused mostly on the enforcement powers that it gave us.
If what I had just said was true, that there was a mechanism for that individual to have sought compensation, would you agree that between those two items, that if there was an order under the Ontario Act authorizing the tow truck drivers to provide those towing services, that those operators would be protected in the same way by the Ontario Act?
I'm not sure, because I know we had some difficulties with our earlier planning where we had...
A robust tow plan in place and it all fell apart because of the indemnity issue and the length of time for that indemnity that the operators just felt that given the nature of the protests, the fear of reprisal, that they needed an extended period of an indemnity that we just couldn't provide.
So again, I left the tow issue to our tow experts.
But I'd have to look at the legislation.
Maybe consult the lawyer looking at the legislation as to how far and how deep the indemnity of whether the EMCPA or the EA provided.
That's fair.
If the provisions were the same or substantially similar, though, would you agree that the Ontario legislation would have been equally helpful then?
Providing the assurances to tow truck operators?
If you're telling me that, then I would say it would be.
Thank you very much.
Those are my questions for you today.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Does the OPP have any re-examination?
Excuse me, Mr. Commissioner.
I believe before we get to the Party for the Witnesses, the Ottawa Coalition did have five minutes and the Party for the Witness usually gets to go last.
I am sorry, I must have skipped them.
I apologize.
Mr. Champ, you have five minutes and I'll even give you six if you need it, given my error.
Good afternoon, Chief Superintendent.
Thank you for joining us.
My name is Paul Champ.
I'm a lawyer for the Ottawa Coalition for Residents and Businesses.
Yes.
Just a few questions for you, Chief Superintendent.
I've represented police officers for many years, for about 20 years, and it's been my experience that there's a lot of very strong personalities in policing.
Is that fair to say?
Very fair.
Strong characters, strong leaders, and sometimes those personalities can conflict?
Yes.
And similarly, when you have these strong personalities in leadership positions, it can be kind of difficult for them to give up leadership or maybe admit they're wrong or seek assistance.
Is that fair to say?
Yes and no.
Sometimes it's a failure of leadership for not doing it, not asking for help.
That's fair.
Where I was going to go at, I wanted to ask you about Chief Superintendent, is that you told us before about how a Chief of Police in Ontario can ask the Ontario Provincial Police to take over their service or assist their service in cases of emergency, correct?
Yes.
And Chief Slowly didn't do that in these circumstances?
No.
But it's also the case that under the Police Services Act, the board could ask the OPP to take over, correct?
The Police Services Board?
Yes.
Or the Ontario Civilian Police Commission?
Yes.
So if they have the relevant or proper information, they could have considered that and weighed that option.
Yes, they could.
And you would agree with me that given the prevailing conditions in Ottawa at that time, the Ottawa police simply couldn't provide adequate and effective policing services to their community.
I'd say they were stretched as it related specifically to the protests to say that they were not otherwise providing because Ottawa is not just a downtown courser.
That's fair.
Absolutely.
Because we talk regularly with them about their ability to respond to their day-to-day business.
Right.
But we've heard lots of evidence, and I don't think it's really in dispute, that the auto police services simply did not have the capacity to bring this event to an end on their own.
The numbers were such, the scale was such, it was recognized generally.
The auto police couldn't end this on their own, correct?
That's correct.
It took an enormous amount more of police resources from elsewhere to bring an end to this, Chris.
And I'm just wondering, like, I was taking a look and reviewing the national framework on police preparedness for demonstration assemblies, and there's nothing in there about what happens if the demonstration is of such a scale that the police force of jurisdiction can't manage it, and then how or in what way.
There could be a trigger for them to ask for another service to maybe even take over if they're having a real problem.
Would you agree with me, Chief Superintendent, that more policy or protocol around that for how police services can feel comfortable reaching out to get assistance would be helpful?
It absolutely would.
Yeah, if Chief Slowly had had some more guidance on that or his strong personality, maybe he felt he was kind of getting it from all sides.
I think we've heard a lot of evidence from that, felt embattled.
But if there was a policy there saying, hey, at this point, that's a trigger, you should actually cede responsibility to another service.
That perhaps could have helped this crisis.
Would you agree?
Whether or not it's ceding responsibility to another organization, you know, I'll just back up and qualify this answer with another statement.
The OPP policy, for example, when an incident exhausts the ability of the local detachment to respond, we will stand up an EOC so we have a more coordinated response.
Now we're going to be needing resources from others.
So it's kind of inbred in our nature that...
When an event overwhelms one jurisdiction and others are needed, we stand up a broader group of support so that the locals can still focus and we can bring the supports.
So I don't believe it's about policy that you would have to seek responsibility, but certainly that when you are overwhelmed that it's time to ask and integrate with other organizations to seek their assistance to collectively.
I have grown to like this witness.
Very thoughtful.
Calculated.
There's no real good guidance for a chief about when might be the right time to press the emergency button.
I would say there probably is no guidance or written guidance in that regard.
Thank you very much, Chief Superintendent.
Chief Superintendent Chalmers.
You're down with OPP?
Yay, you know me!
I loved the testimony about the people in the crowd, some of his retired colleagues.
Real fringe.
There was no extremism there.
Good afternoon, sir.
It's Christopher Diana, Councillor of the OPP, as you know.
I'd like to maybe take a step back a little bit.
You've answered a lot of questions about the details of what happened in Ottawa.
Part of the mandate of this commission and part of what I think the commissioner may be interested in hearing about as well is taking a look at the bigger picture.
Lessons learned is part of the mandate of this commission.
And you're in a unique position as a recent retiree with 36 years of experience doing this kind of public order policing and incident command to maybe give some thoughts that may be of assistance to the commissioner.
And the question I wanted to ask you in particular is about an integrated or unified command.
Do you believe in the value of that concept?
Absolutely.
It's absolutely...
Critical to our success in any event where it's beyond the scope of one organization.
Right.
And what are some of the impediments?
So if we're looking at lessons learned, what are some of the impediments going forward that the commissioner may want to consider while contemplating the evidence that he hears?
Well, we've already heard about, you know, the personalities that exist in a lot of police leadership roles.
Oftentimes that can be the impediment.
They simply don't want to do this on their own.
They don't need help or I need your help, but I want command and control of your resources.
There's an organization out there that I know of that would ever say, okay, we'll send you 500 officers and just use them gently.
It doesn't work that way.
You know, when you send, when you deploy five, 600 officers to another organization, they come with a command and control.
Everyone in Rumble, good to see you back as well.
If you don't integrate, you're going to be working in silos.
If you don't integrate, you're not going to be communicating.
But the ultimate strategic objectives and goals of what you're trying to accomplish.
So it's absolutely critical that leaders buy in.
Leadership is actually absolutely key at all levels, in my humble opinion.
If you don't have the leadership team buying in, then it's not going to work.
And I think just to maybe kind of drill down a little bit into the why.
Why is a unified command?
A useful tool, even if there's an event in a larger city that has a large police service.
Ottawa has a fairly large police service.
Toronto...
This lawyer reminds me of...
Large police services may benefit from this concept, but maybe you can explain why this is useful.
Toronto Police Service, for example, may have a lot of resources, but why is a unified team useful for a large event?
Well, it's unified because of the power of the human brain.
The more people that you have, the more expertise you bring to bear on a problem, the more communication that you have, you know your solution is going to be that much more refined and appropriate.
It takes, as I mentioned earlier in my evidence, it takes the weight of one pair of shoulders who is feeling the burden of this event.
I feel for Chief Slowly the burden that he was under for this event.
But bringing in an integrated command and all that it brings to bear with the resources, the subject matter expertise, can only produce a win.
Ultimately, though, it comes down to whether the police service of jurisdiction kind of buys into the concept, correct?
Yes.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Well, they really sound like they're slowly was incompetent.
Can I just check with the Government of Canada?
Are you content?
There's nothing further you'd like?
Canadians are so boring, fender bender.
I just have a couple of questions.
Let's hear this, Chief.
Your Honour.
About, there have been words about what the operation and its...
It's been referred to, as I understand it, as ending the occupation, but also some people have said ending the protest.
Is there a difference in your mind between the approach of saying the plan is to end the protest or end the occupation?
I certainly have used them synonymous today as one and the same.
It was absolutely, in my view, an occupation, but it's often referred to as...
A protest can be an occupation.
So they're one of the same for my people.
I don't like his answer, but I still respect the guy.
I just want to ask you if you could have a look at your mission statement, and we've had it referred to, and I think it's OPP 1851.
By the way, I'm going on live with Eric Connolly at 5.30, so that's...
And I think we might be at page 8, I think.
So you've got OPP, Regional Police or Budget Police.
Go down a bit.
Yeah, it's up a bit.
It's the mission statement I'm looking for.
Viva, can you add the names of people and titles?
I don't know how to add things.
Maybe it's down.
It may be further down.
I believe it's page 8. If we had just gone down a little bit from where we were.
There it is.
Okay.
And I'm wondering here, you've put in with the utmost respect to the individual's Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
And I was wondering, was there any thought about there are protesters there that may wish to protest appropriately, if I can call it, without breaking law, i.e.
continue a protest?
Legally, in some manner, in some place.
That protest was legal.
Was that taken into account?
Absolutely.
It was taken into consideration in our message and through PLT that, you know, you want to protest where you are now is deemed illegal.
You need to leave.
You want to protest other venues.
And this is why we put in this mission about the charter rights.
Because there are lawful protests that you can do.
I guess that's why I was wondering about your answer of saying ending the protest and ending the occupation you took as being the same.
The same, but I guess I should qualify within that red zone that's now deemed to be an illegal occupation.
If you're in there, you're breaking the law.
If you're in there, you need to leave because it has been deemed illegal, what you're doing, an illegal occupation.
That's great.
Just create a red zone around any protest anywhere.
Illegal.
uh interacted with that he continually uh pleaded that well we're all doing everything lawful they had this plot a lot of them felt they had that deny plausible deniability until they so plt had to educate them okay you're it's a lawful protest to a point now you've reached a point there's injunctions there's criminal mischief well what was the injunction this demonstration this occupation is now deemed ill Yeah,
out in the woods.
Go protest somewhere where it doesn't bother anybody.
So the PLT was seeking to reduce, shrink the footprint, but are you saying they also would facilitate?
A continuing legal protest in some location or in some manner.
If someone said to them, but we have a right to protest, they would have said not here.
There's other ways that you could protest, but now you're in an illegal zone to protest.
I mean, it's just like...
I want to say facility, and they're not going to stop what they're doing so we can now set up a place for you to protest.
But they would certainly, and we've done that.
I'll use the example of G8.
We set up the protest stages, everything.
You want to protest?
Here, you go here.
Do it somewhere where it doesn't bother anybody.
They'll help facilitate this because you're not getting to there.
Was there any part of the plan that provided for this aspect that you've just described that you could continue your protest legally, just not here?
I think by that time we had exhausted all negotiation.
And without reading the final plan, I would say no, because our negotiations with the protesters...
You can still disagree with this guy.
But they didn't need to invoke the Emergencies Act.
No, enforcement action was next.
That's the bottom line.
There you go.
Enforcement action.
That's a measured approach.
Are you aware of people after, or members of the public in media or otherwise, criticizing after the fact the operation, saying they simply wished to...
I don't doubt that.
I don't independently recall those.
I didn't actually.
I avoided the media and the news.
Fair enough.
So I could focus.
But I don't particularly recall it, but I don't doubt it.
We had to look at that very, very carefully.
I'm certain there was a lot of people in that protest zone.
They're actually telling us the truth.
This is an illegal occupation.
Now we have to move.
They scandal out of there.
As I mentioned earlier about the profile of the protesters, unlike anything we've ever seen, there's a lot of good people in there.
We can disagree with what he's saying right now.
They wanted their voice to be heard.
We knew that.
They didn't need to invoke the Emergency Act to disperse that unlawful protest in terms of the potential and threats of violence that existed in there.
We gave the opportunities.
That was all part of the negotiations.
They even looked at having alternate locations for the trucks to go.
Yeah, that was part of the agreement.
So that they could stage there and we'll bust you for a process.
And that did not work out.
That didn't work out.
Why didn't it work out?
So just to close that loop, do you feel the plan was adequate in terms of allowing continued protests for those who may wish it in retrospect?
At the stage where we executed this plan and went kinetic, i.e., we went hands-on with the operation, that was the option that was left available to us with all other aspects of the plan exhausted.
I do believe that we acted appropriately, professionally, and accomplished not only our mission but all of our goals and objectives in terms of, A, assisting in restoring the confidence and faith in the City of Ottawa and the Ottawa Police.
Returning Ottawa to a relative state of normalcy for business to be able to open.
Normalcy of a year and a half of shutdown and lockdown.
And doing so without injuring people and having to arrest too many people.
A lot of people put a lot of stock in arrest, arrest, arrest.
We also know our justice system just doesn't have the ability for us to arrest and charge 3,000 people.
We all know what would happen there.
I would press on that.
What would happen there?
And did so and returned because very shortly thereafter, there were protests again in the city of Ottawa that were permitted and were peaceful.
Permitted protests.
One other thing I just want to explore briefly.
You spoke about PLTs and I don't know how to put it.
It was not necessarily embraced as it maybe should have been.
By OPS in this operation.
Is that fair?
In their initial.
Yes.
In the initial.
You know, within a day of our arrival there, we engaged with Marcel Baudin, who I believe you're going to be hearing from.
And we got things back on track.
We, they, collectively, when I say we, got it back on track.
Now, a lot of the work of PLT involves, as you've talked about, negotiating, de-escalating.
Yes.
And for those who wish to bring a quick end to a protest, PLTs maybe are not viewed in the same way, or they're viewed as delaying what they wish as a result.
My personal opinion is that if we took an enforcement action directly every time just to end it, we'd be sitting before another commission of inquiry in a row about a lack of a measured approach.
So in my opinion, I would use PLT in every circumstance.
They may last 10 minutes and be rendered ineffective, but we've tried.
We've tried the negotiation route.
We've tried the de-escalation route.
It did not work before we go kinetic.
You may be going the wrong direction.
You're thinking I'm going the wrong direction.
I'm not disagreeing with that.
What I'm trying to get at is the public often is not aware of the role and importance of PLTs because they want results.
Would that be fair?
In some cases.
I would say that's a fair statement, sir.
And I guess all I'm asking is, do you think an important component in a protest such as this is educating the public on the need for the process to be worked through negotiation, etc.?
In other words, because we heard a lot about public pressure to close this down, and I'm just asking...
Whether there is a role for public education?
There's a significant role.
In fact, when you look, I'm sure you'll get this from Inspector Baudin, a lot of what PLT does, because it's not just with the protesters that they deal with, a lot of what they do is education as well.
You know, our PLTs are active, not just in the middle of a crisis.
They're active.
So education is absolutely critical.
The public needs to know.
When we engage PLT in these events, we have PLT members who are dealing with the business association.
We have PLT members dealing with the residents so that we know collectively all of the issues that we're facing.
So they're not just negotiating with the protesters necessarily.
They're looking at everybody that is impacted by education.
I would love for every member of the public to become a PLT.
One of our goals in our communication strategy was to make every uniformed officer With their messaging from the Constable on the street up to the Prime Minister of Canada.
If we could get everybody saying the same message, we're educating the public, we will succeed.
That was a stated goal right within our mission.
Okay.
Well, thank you very much.
Thank you for your testimony.
We appreciate it, even though you're in retirement.
Yes, I'm sorry.
My apologies.
I have just a few questions.
This is, for the record, Brennan Miller Council for the Freedom Corp.
Arising from your questions, I had none until some answers came out.
There's just two minutes of questions I would like to ask, if I may, sir, with respect to the evidence from...
The witness regarding there being no more ability to negotiate, etc., given that I understand that that wasn't the case, sir.
There is no provision for a re-examination.
We're not going to reopen it.
There will be plenty of witnesses you can question about the process as they come through, but I'm not going to reopen because you wouldn't be the only one.
Very well, sir.
Thank you.
That's a fair point by the judge.
Thank you for your testimony, and especially since you're retired.
Appreciate it.
We're going to rise until Monday morning at 9.30.
Thank you.
This way, we can have some afterthoughts, and then I can...
The commission is adjourned.
La commission est ajournée.
La commission est ajournée pour la fin de semaine.
Vous ne devez pas aller chez vous, mais vous ne pouvez pas rester ici.
You don't have to go home, but you can't stay here.
Okay, so I missed a good hour, at least an hour, hour and a half, when I was at the vet's office having money just pulled out of my digital bank account.
Winston, he's not here, has a yeast infection in his ear.
It was the antibiotic shot that really jacked up the price of that visit.
That was good.
We'll do this all next week.
I need to...
I need to...
I'll work out how to not drive myself crazy by having the audio running while I'm trying to do a separate stream.
Reading from the Rumble section chants, YouTube is ampersand, dollar sign, dollar sign, H-O-E.
That witness was good.
Look, it's funny.
They just declare it to be a red zone and therefore unlawful protest.
I'm curious.
I guess it's an order from the police.
You've been issued an order to disperse.
If you don't, you're violating, I don't know, the law.
I can understand that.
I still think it's wrong.
The idea that it's a protest.
When we tell you you can do it, where we tell you you can do it, fine.
The whole thing, though, is this guy was basically testifying.
We had the means.
We had the measures.
There might have been some leadership issues with slowly, but we didn't need the Emergencies Act to be invoked.
And that's what's at issue in this.
That is the question that is to be determined.
Now, the judge might say, yeah, you know, it really helped when the Emergencies Act was invoked.
That's what ended the protest.
But...
If that's the new standard for invoking the nuclear weapon of litigation, of legislation, well, that's it.
Welcome to the new world where if there's a protest occupying a downtown core, Emergencies Act, bring in the highly militarized police.
Billy N. Sherman says, Tyranny.
Candice808 says, Protest isn't illegal.
We are in trouble for sure.
Oh, and then Blondie44562 says, save money by ordering prescribed vet meds from Chewy.
Eh, whatever.
I don't mind supporting local business.
I like supporting local business.
I should have asked.
I did not need the antibiotic shot because that doesn't, I don't think that does anything.
I don't think he's got an infection.
But my goodness, he's got, you know, when he gnaws at his paws, that they turn pink from something in his saliva.
So they got...
Oligarch's Thorn says antibiotics often cause and worsen yeast infections.
It's allergies.
They gave him a shot.
They gave him the shot because I cannot administer anything to that dog.
He's like a rabid mongoose trying to hold him down.
So everyone liked this format.
It was good.
It might confuse with the daily stream, but I think people are interested in watching this.
It's hard to find this thing.
I think we'll get a lot more people watching the inquiry.
I need to clip the part where he was talking about the composition of the crowd because that was poignant.
And that was...
Can you imagine how many...
Someone in the chat, I think it was Rumble, said, what percentage of supporters didn't attend the protest?
Anybody who was following that convoy.
People on overpasses throughout the country, there was nothing fringe and there was nothing minority about that protest.
I actually think the people who are up in arms about it themselves are the minority.
More people in Ottawa were rightly upset about this protest, but the people outside of Ottawa who have no idea what they're objecting to, calling these people fringe extremists, they are the minority.
It's not...
You cannot be a fringe minority within Canada and attract a national movement.
Sorry, an international movement.
They don't work together.
A small fringe minority that created an international movement.
It was not small.
It was not fringe.
It was not a minority.
It was a lot of damn people in Canada.
Might not have been a majority, but 30% is not a minority.
And it certainly is not fringe.
Let's see here.
The fuck?
Facebook says, yep, the judge that said it was legal should be in this.
Well, the judge didn't say it was legal.
The judge just said, so long as you respect the terms of this injunction, you can continue to protest peacefully and legally.
You don't even need him there.
Don't get that judge in there.
That injunction order, that provision of that order speaks for itself.
By the way, everybody, let me see if I can't find YouTube.
I'm going to be live with Eric Hunley, Laidback News.
Is it Laidback News?
No, it's America's Unpulled Stories.
It's America's Unpulled Stories.
With Mark Robert, Eric Hunley.
We're going to be talking about Eric Hunley.
We're going to be talking...
It's the one-year anniversary.
I cannot believe it's been a year since...
It's been a year since Alec Baldwin shot Helena Hutchins.
Can't believe it.
Here's a link to that.
And go check it out because it'll be fun.
So that's it.
I mean, that witness is done.
They'll go to the weekend.
Oh, Audra12 says, UN planes, did they explain that?
I don't think anybody has formally confirmed that.
I remember seeing the stories, but can't confirm, can't...
Provostman says, I don't see how you can complain about noise in any city.
I mean, it's...
UN planes, they didn't, but it has an explanation.
All right, well, that's it.
So, yeah, well, oh, I see.
Latanya says, Viva Fry, not merely shot, but murdered.
I still stick to my theory.
He pulled the trigger on purpose, thinking it was a blank.
This is Alec Baldwin.
And so, go, if you'd be kind enough, go and support Hunley.
Share that link around, and let's get the party started there.
So, everyone, thank you.
I'm going to go end this.
I need to post another highlight from yesterday's stream, which was demonetized on YouTube.
The soft censorship of YouTube.
What do we got?
Okay, that's it.
There are pictures of the UN planes.
Yes, but pictures, you need to know.
Bottom line, sometimes you need to see something with your own eyes while live streaming it in order for it to happen.
I did notice a lot of police officers with no names.
A lot of them, some of them did have names, but some of them, I don't know where those police officers were coming from, what unit they were with.
The witness said, this is from Rexasaurus, says, the witness said that they had the means to control the protest and disperse the crowd without the Emergency Act being invoked.
That's it.
That should be the end of it.
Anyone who lived through it in real time knows the provinces did not want Trudeau to invoke the Emergency Act.
Some, many, most, maybe even all.
Maybe with the exception of Ontario.
The provinces did not want Trudeau to invoke the Act.
Shredded.
Shredded the fabric of Canadian society.
And shredded it specifically so that he could show the power of the ability to freeze bank accounts.
The superfluous violence in the arrests, in the breaking up of the protest, I'm sure dictator Trudeau thinks it makes him look very strong and powerful to the rest of the world.
Flexing that muscle to freeze the bank accounts, that's where it was at.
All right, so go.
Thank you all.
I'll let it run for...
No, you don't need to let it run for a few seconds.
We'll do this again next week.
We're going to have streams all next week.
Maybe try to get Keith Wilson on at some point to talk about his heartbreak with that order and talk about this, update this.
Police did not want, it says, oligarchs thorn.
And Rexasaurus says exactly it was an abuse of power.
It was an abuse of power and testing out.
Can you imagine Canadian citizens?
Are not up in arms at the unilateral extrajudicial punishment on suspicion alone, association alone.
That ordinary Canadian citizens who might hate the protesters, who might hate the convoy, did not object and did not get up in arms at the unilateral freezing of bank accounts, the promise to immunize the banks that did it.
This is North Korea, China-level tyranny coming out of Justin Trudeau, who...
He admires the basic dictatorship of China.
So he tested it.
Canadians didn't object that much.
And I don't think this hearing is going to yield anything in terms of a sanction against Trudeau.
Okay, Blondie says, take care, Viva.
Scream says, stay sane.
Okay, well, move on over to Hunley's place and we're going to have fun over there.
Everybody, enjoy the weekend.
Thank you for sticking with me through the learning curve this morning and hopefully it'll go smoother next week.
Go, enjoy the weekend.
▲
Export Selection