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Oct. 21, 2022 - Viva & Barnes

02:46:31

Emergencies Act Inquiry Live Feed WITH COMMENT SECTION

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	Morning, everybody.
	We're working out some logistics here.
	So for anybody who's tuning in, recommendation was just to run the public inquiry into the Emergencies Act, let it stream on my second channel.
	I'll pop in whenever I can to watch, commentate, partake in the chat.
	And that's a good idea.
	There's no reason not to do that.
	It's actually the ideal solution.
	To just sitting around, like, you know, staring at a camera, not saying anything, but following it enough.
	Let's get this all leveled here.
	So I think we're going to try to do that.
	See how it works.
	And, you know, people can chat while watching the inquiry and ask each other questions and give each other answers.
	This is not today's stream.
	I'm going to do a stream on the main channel at 11.30.
	But I've been watching the inquiry.
	Hold on, where is it now?
	Present.
	So anybody tuning in to watch this, this is what we're going to do.
	Here.
	At the end of that week.
	Refresh.
	And play.
	Am I right that you were given by your commandant?
	I think you got it in the afternoon of the 24th.
	Who's being a witness right now?
	It's the guy.
	Who's testifying today?
	Develop your plan.
	I think it's Craig Abrams.
	In your strategic command.
	If I'm not mistaken.
	Okay.
	And what you did was...
	What do we think?
	Is this a good idea?
	Chat?
	You looked at the information that was available to you, Project Hendon.
	Oh, sorry.
	Hold on.
	I should probably get the screen leveled in here.
	And you spoke to your colleague, Superintendent...
	Chalmers.
	Superintendent Chalmers.
	Yeah, Superintendent Morris.
	There we go.
	I was part of conversations where he would inform us of...
	Most current intelligence.
	After you got the assignment, forgetting that you get the hand in reports, I get that you received them all.
	But after the 24th, before you deployed, you spoke to him and got a briefing from him, right?
	It sounds accurate.
	Pardon me?
	I'm assuming I did.
	Don't assume.
	Let's help you.
	You've looked at these before you came today, I assume.
	My notes?
	Did you look at your notes?
	Okay.
	I've looked at my notes many times, yes.
	No, I know, but before you came here, did you look at these?
	Yes.
	Okay, good.
	So I don't want to test your memory, but...
	Test his memory.
	Test it hard.
	This is Monday.
	You're working from home at that time.
	Do you see?
	Yes.
	And...
	Yeah, this is a perfect solution to every problem that we've had.
	0948, email to intersect.
	You told us about that.
	I'm going to listen while we're talking.
	Discuss the convoy issues, impacts in all of our areas.
	1305 Tovel, I think that's one of your colleagues, doing a traffic plan for the convoy arrival.
	Someone in the chat asked, is anything going to come of this?
	1554 intersect email.
	That's you sending them.
	Convoy 2829 January.
	Everybody thought this was a two-day protest.
	It's live on Rumble.
	I don't have to stay here all day because I can't, but we can let this run.
	I'll follow the chat wherever I am.
	I think the dates are indicative of arrival dates as opposed to event dates.
	Okay, well, let's carry on.
	They were going to get through Arnprior on the 28th, three convoys above that.
	I'm hearing a lot of noise into Ottawa.
	We'll slow traffic.
	This is OPP's plan.
	We will slow traffic but not block.
	The intention is to hold a peaceful demonstration with no hostility.
	Forward to Chief Thomas, Inspector Tovel, and Semple.
	That's your team, right?
	And just to add context, I'm not saying that the OPP will slow down traffic.
	The convoy organizers have stated that they will slow traffic but not block it.
	I understood.
	Thank you for that.
	And what you were going to do to get to this, the traffic plan was to effectively escort the convoy to Ottawa.
	We didn't want to do any escorting, so there was no OPP vehicles necessarily, you know, in front and back and follow us.
	It was more monitoring.
	Okay, so you had cruisers.
	Did the cruisers have their overhead roof lights on or not?
	I can't be 100% whether they did or not.
	Viva, this might be too depressing, these hearings.
	The way they talk about freedom and liberty makes someone want to...
	The hearings are depressing.
	So sometimes if protesters sympathetic were on the side of the highway supporting the convoy as it went by, you might have had...
	A cruiser might have had to use their emergency lights in that situation, for example.
	But you had cruisers in and around the convoy.
	From the time it crossed the Manitoba border until you handed them off to Ottawa, correct?
	Correct.
	How many cruisers?
	I can't articulate a number.
	I'm going to put it in slow mode and subscriber-only mode.
	Do you imagine that it is 10 units?
	Yes, I'm trying to...
	20 units?
	I'm trying to recall the operational plan if it listed the traffic units, but...
	I would say at least 15 to 20 units would be a fair number, yes.
	And then just to carry on, 1622, Chief Thomas, email, that's your Chief Superintendent.
	Correct.
	MCIC, something possibly?
	To come over possibly.
	To come over possibly.
	Aviation Consulted, that's your aviation team, yeah?
	And then it says...
	POIB is, of course, the Intelligence Bureau.
	Pat, you spoke with him?
	No, I didn't speak to him that day.
	I knew that his role and what he was doing was he was engaging with police partners outside of Ontario so that we could have a picture of what was coming across Canada from west to east.
	Got it.
	And then finally, at 1622, you note that in that...
	Conversation or rather email with your superintendent, your chief superintendent, you were asked to be the strategic superintendent for the event and you went into action.
	Therefore, effectively the next day, the 20, really into action, the next day, the 25th, correct?
	Correct.
	Two days, effectively two days before the, what we understand to be the arrival of some of the first vehicles in Ottawa.
	Can I show you?
	Or can I ask you to confirm that what you then did was you got your colleagues, your team, reporting to you to do a traffic plan, an operations plan for this event.
	What's amazing is everybody's watching this and seeing what they want to see.
	People are watching this saying federal had no choice.
	They had to invoke the emergency act.
	OPP monitoring the convoy through Ontario until there was a handoff into Ottawa, correct?
	Yes, many other regions.
	Had similar plans, and they were tracking the movements in a similar fashion.
	Right.
	And so we had to create our plan, obviously, just for our geographic area.
	Right.
	East region.
	And you then set up some of your own people in your operations center in Ottawa, correct?
	It was in our operations center.
	I might have to duck out and prepare for the 11.30 Friday stream.
	And where were you located during that time?
	Okay, good.
	And you had a couple of people you've described on the ground here in different places.
	And did you have in Smith's Falls any other people?
	With you as part of your team managing the event?
	I assigned an incident commander, Scott Semple.
	Okay, in Smiths Falls?
	Yes.
	Okay, got it.
	Smiths Falls, Ottawa, help us with the geography.
	Southwest, 40 minutes.
	Okay, got it.
	And then you had, am I correct, you did not have resources, logistical resources, any other kind of resources.
	For an event that was going to be longer than a weekend protest, correct?
	That is correct.
	And the reason that you didn't is because your review of the intelligence available and the information available to you at OPP pointed to a two-day protest.
	They come, they protest, they leave, right?
	I wouldn't agree with that.
	I would say that my plan was based on my conversations through intersect calls with Ottawa Police, who indicated they were planning for that level of event.
	I'm blown out, right?
	The one thing we don't do, or do we, is defer to another police service when we make our own plans at the OPP.
	That's an input, but you're not telling the Commissioner that you didn't plan.
	For an extended, protracted, three-week event in Ottawa because the Ottawa Police Service didn't, correct?
	Certainly not, because as we saw and as I explained in my evidence before, we expected a traffic event that was going to end downtown in the city of Ottawa.
	So we did not plan based on intelligence, based on Hendon, based on any other information source that we expected vehicles or protesters to clog up provincial highways, which we were responsible for.
	This is not the day's live stream.
	I'll explain what's going on at 11:30 on the main channel.
	We've got 15 minutes to eat and get my stuff ready.
	So all of those cards indicated for the OPP's perspective a very quick event essentially a one-day trip from different areas of the city into the downtown core and that would end the OPP's involvement in The movement of those vehicles.
	And the OPP plan, we can look at it if you need it.
	The OPP plan describes in language the handoff.
	You were going to hand off after they were finished traveling over the provincial highways into the city of Ottawa, correct?
	Correct.
	Your expectation was that as many as 3,000 vehicles were going to be in the city of Ottawa and you were quite content with what you saw from OPS was their plan to allow the convoy operators.
	To protest, correct?
	The numbers were uncertain.
	Ottawa police indicated that they thought they could handle 3,000.
	Hendon and other reports, as we've seen, didn't specifically exactly say X number of vehicles, but I was satisfied based on my calls with Ottawa police that they felt they could handle that number of vehicles.
	Yes, and you knew it wasn't 3,000 once they got there.
	No, the indicators were just the vehicles that crossed from the west that was in the 800 range, and they may pick up some as they move south.
	Got it.
	And so you were content to hand off to Ottawa in the expectation that the team that you had put together as the strategic operations lead here would allow you to manage that convoy as they left Ottawa as well, correct?
	There was no, we didn't know what the exit plan was, so we always had to be ready and available to write what that exit plan was.
	So that was an unknown to us as to, would the exit en masse, would the exit slowly?
	That was uncertain.
	But in addressing that uncertainty, you were content that the team that you had in place was appropriate, correct?
	That we felt we could manage a mass entry.
	Is not much different than a mass exit.
	And so therefore, right, and therefore you did not plan, you didn't bring any additional resources for anything longer than the weekend protest that you thought was going to be on, correct?
	Correct, because as you noted in my notes, once it looked like it was going to be prolonged, I had to have meetings with my command team to say, let's plan for an extended event.
	29th of January, I believe.
	Maybe a little later, is the first time that you began to assemble resources for a different event, correct?
	Correct.
	And the Ottawa Police Service was in the very same position that you were in, correct?
	Position as in not planned for an extended event?
	Yes.
	It seemed to be.
	Certainly in my conversations with Deputy Bell on the 31st, I believe it was, was the first time that he indicated that.
	He felt this was going to be a protracted event, and they were planning for what could be a four-week event.
	And they made a shift in their planning and operations, just like you did, correct?
	Yes, for sure.
	And what you did in advance was send a public order unit to Ottawa in advance.
	This was part of your planning, but you sent them to the...
	To the PPS, Parliamentary Protective Service, correct?
	Yes, so I can explain the structure.
	I mean, if you need to make an explanation, go ahead.
	I need to explain because it wasn't my direction.
	That's why I need to explain.
	I did not direct those resources.
	As Chiefs of Commander, I did not direct public order unit operations.
	I did not direct where they went.
	They reported to me to tell me what they were doing, but that happened through our Field Support Bureau.
	In your question, I did not direct that.
	Fair enough.
	Thank you for that clarification.
	OPP sent a public order unit, but they didn't send them to the OPS, they sent them to the PPS, correct?
	That is correct.
	Okay.
	And then you set out the calls for resources.
	You needed to make a new plan, and you began to get resources in the form of additional personnel, correct?
	Yes.
	How many additional personnel?
	At the very beginning, We reached out to say, look, we have 18 members right now that we could pull from local detachments, and it started from there, and it continued every day, it continued to rise from there.
	It was obvious to you as a person with experience in this area that the Ottawa Police Service would not be able, with its existing resources, to manage this event, correct?
	Once it changed its complexion, right?
	I didn't know that until I heard that directly from their own deputy chief.
	I made assumptions that I felt that they had come up with a plan to address many different options that may have occurred.
	So we'll talk about plans, but just talking about personnel, you knew from your experience with Intersect, the size of the Ottawa Police Service did not allow it to manage the event that this had become.
	Correct?
	Yes, and I learned that through those calls.
	Yes, but did you need to be told that?
	If so, that's fine.
	Or did you know it from your own experience that they were overwhelmed in numbers?
	I had to be told that because I couldn't assume.
	I knew they have, I believe it's 1,200 or 1,400.
	They have many members, and at that early stage, it was hard to know whether...
	That many members could contain what was happening in those first day or two or not.
	I needed to hear that from them because I wasn't on the ground.
	That's fair.
	So then you needed to be told that by them and they told you that?
	Yes.
	And what they asked for was help, correct?
	Correct.
	They asked you for help as early as, what do you say, the 31st?
	I'd have to check my notes, but it was Saturday or Sunday, yes.
	Okay, got it.
	And when they said they wanted help...
	They told you they needed help in particular areas, right?
	Correct.
	Very specific areas, correct?
	Correct.
	And am I correct that you were unable at that time to give them all the help that they wanted?
	I don't recall that.
	When I talked to Deputy Bell, he said his immediate need was for traffic control.
	He needed officers to be able to relieve his officers downtown doing traffic.
	So we were able to provide those bodies.
	We started with 30 a day, and I was able to provide those bodies within my own region in short order.
	There was never delay.
	It was not adequate, correct?
	He needed more after that, because he indicated that it would probably come to 60 when the formal letter would come from Chief Solely of the Commissioner, Karik.
	Deputy Chief Bell indicated to me that he felt it would probably be around the 60 number.
	That they will be asking from the OPP from frontline.
	And then there would be public order section requests and PLT requests as well.
	Am I right, though, that you were not able to give them the resources they needed when they needed them, correct?
	I believe I was able to give them when they needed them.
	Okay.
	So what did you do to get resources?
	Were you confined to moving resources within the East Region?
	Or did you put in a call to your...
	Superiors or the other parts of your command to get additional resources?
	Question.
	In the early days, I was able to contain it within my own region.
	I believe in my other evidence I described, we have a regional deployment plan for emergencies such as this.
	We know how many officers are at each of our 16 detachments.
	We know who's working each day.
	And in an emergency, we know how many officers we can ask to leave that area to attend whatever the emergency happens to be.
	So I relied on that.
	Emergency Regional Deployment Plan to gather those resources of 30 a day to assist Ottawa.
	Once a couple of days goes by and I'm aware that there's going to be an increased ask of 60, then yes, I need to call our Emergency Operations Centre, which is based at Orillia at our General Headquarters, which falls under our Field Support Bureau.
	Okay, now it's too dark.
	When did you first put in a call to the emergency?
	We're going to figure this out, people.
	I'm listening as we do this.
	Be right back.
	Three days to four days of the 30 a day when it was clear, when the letter came in from Chief Slowly asking for 60, I had to make the phone call to our EOC to say, okay, I need your help.
	To gather resources to come to East Region.
	And am I correct that you came to the conclusion that 60 a day was not enough?
	I could only rely on what Ottawa police said they needed from me.
	You were told 60 a day was not enough, that they needed many more, correct?
	As other days went on, that would be communicated to me, say, can you give us more?
	And we would be able to tell them, yeah, we can probably give you this money more or this money more.
	And on the...
	You told us about the...
	First, let me go back.
	You had never been through anything like this before, correct?
	Not to this scale.
	You've never seen an urban occupation, a protest that had become an occupation, correct?
	As it was explained to me, this was the largest unplanned deployment of OPP resources in our history.
	Right, got it.
	So therefore, in your history, you told us that you'd been through some other blockade situations, but they have not involved the urban environment like this.
	And obviously, the sheer scale of this one was beyond anything you had experienced.
	Yeah, none of my experience.
	And so when we talk about resources, you participated in a call, you told us on the 6th of February, Chief Slowly requested his team to make an estimate of the resources they needed, right?
	Yes, I recall that was a video call, yes.
	Yes, and you told us that you thought that...
	That it was unusual that he told his team to double the number if they thought they needed 100 to double it to 200.
	You made that comment, correct?
	Yes, it seemed odd to me, yes.
	Yes.
	It didn't seem odd enough to you, though, to record in your notes, right?
	And I address this in my will state, is because in the meeting they were discussing Ottawa police business.
	I didn't feel it was appropriate for me to make notes on Ottawa police operations, so I purposely did not make notes.
	You made a lot of notes.
	Superintendent about Ottawa Police, you've made notes about rumors and innuendo and what people told you some other guy said.
	All kinds of times, haven't you?
	I have.
	In that situation, I purposely chose not to take notes because it seemed inappropriate for me because they were talking about internal Ottawa Police operation matters that I didn't...
	My purpose to be on the call was to talk about PLT.
	Okay.
	So you didn't...
	So can I put it this way?
	That whatever chief slowly said, that you didn't record in your notes, you didn't think it was important enough to imagine that the number that they came back with, 1,800, when they came back 24 hours later with a number, that there was some lack of validity or integrity to that number.
	Did you?
	I questioned where the number could have come from in that short period of time.
	You didn't?
	Yeah.
	And did you tell Chief Slowly or anyone that you weren't going to take action in respect of their request for resources because you had heard him make a comment to his team that you didn't record in your notes, but that you were going to use to deny them resources that they wanted?
	I never communicated with Chief Slowly on that.
	I never would deny resources.
	It's just systemic incompetence.
	And the only people who pay for it are the citizens.
	Lighting is still not good.
	Hold on.
	Holy cow.
	I almost took down the computer.
	So what did you think that was going to do, Superintendent?
	Did you think that was going to get them the help they needed?
	Or did you think that was going to cause people to believe that there was no actual number that they needed?
	That had any validity.
	What did you think you were doing with that?
	What I was doing was protecting the members of the OPP.
	And what were you...
	I'm sorry.
	Go ahead, Superintendent.
	How were you protecting the members of the OPP?
	Because of a large request like that, it was important for me to communicate to my senior command that A, perhaps they're not truly needed, based on what I heard, and B, since we have no operational plan yet, To send that number of officers into a situation with no real plan on what to do with them was a concern.
	So that's why I felt it was important to communicate to my commander about that.
	Do you agree with me that it had the effect of causing your people and everybody else to think that what Chief Slowly was asking for, to help the citizens of this city, and to help the government of Canada, and to help his own police service, did you think you were helping him or them?
	I think it was helping everybody have the proper knowledge before they made decisions to deploy resources.
	Sure.
	And so, of course, we now know, don't we, that the 1800 estimate that his team put together was exactly right.
	Maybe it was a little under, actually.
	You know that, don't you?
	Yes, we've heard those numbers here.
	Yeah.
	So it wasn't a rabbit pulled from a hat.
	And it wasn't a bunch of numbers that were just randomly doubled, was it?
	Yeah.
	It seemed to me as a number pulled from a hat in that short period of time.
	Do you accept now that it wasn't a number pulled from a hat, that his team worked very hard to actually get the number that they needed?
	Do you accept that now?
	No, because there was no plan.
	Okay.
	And that's, of course, what you passed on.
	I'm sorry.
	Please let him finish.
	Thank you, Commissioner.
	I know you're over your time and I'm being generous.
	Thank you.
	So important to be fair to the witness.
	Of course.
	Superintendent, go ahead.
	From my experience, as we've talked about, we build a plan first and then we add numbers to it after.
	The fact that the numbers fit the integrated planning team's plan, I don't know that that connects to the work that his team did within those 24 hours.
	Did you look at it?
	The integrated plan?
	No.
	Did you look at the numbers that were on the table that his team put together?
	On February 9th, when I attended the meeting downtown with the integrated planning team.
	That's the first time I was presented with a three-page document that showed the numbers that they were requesting.
	So before you even looked at it, you made the statement that it was an overestimate and that it was not a valid number?
	You didn't even look at it?
	I never indicated in any of my communications that I felt it was an overestimate.
	I just wanted our senior command to know that when Ottawa police were trying to determine how many people they needed, this was the direction that their chief gave them.
	That's all I did not opine on, whether I felt it was adequate or inadequate.
	I never said that.
	You cast doubt on it, didn't you?
	I only said that there was suspicious that how they could come up with a number like that, and certainly the suggestion that that number would be doubled.
	Fine.
	And then you passed that on to the minister.
	You passed on an incorrect number to the minister, didn't you?
	I did not do that, no.
	The minister, the solicitor general.
	Did you see the minister's statement?
	Did you do it?
	We're talking about two separate events here.
	You want the truth?
	Let's move to the second one, then, if you want to think it's the second event.
	Did you pass on the number to the minister?
	Please, let's ask questions.
	Don't turn things around, please.
	Be fair to this witness.
	So the video call when I met with Chief Sully and he talked about having his team go away, that date was February.
	You have to help me, Councillor, on the date that video call happened.
	There we go.
	You just mentioned the date.
	Done.
	I had moved on to the statement that the minister made.
	I'm happy to go back if you want.
	So February 2nd, I received an email requesting we have in the OPP a representative within the government buildings in Toronto and their liaison between government and the OPP.
	And I received an email from that unit.
	Saying that CISO General wanted a number of OPP members who have been in Ottawa since the beginning of the event.
	So I asked my team to create a chart which indicated the numbers from the beginning of the event until the 2nd of February.
	And I described what that chart looked like yesterday.
	It included numbers of logistical people, EOC numbers, frontline members, public order unit members.
	And I emailed that to my Chief Superintendent.
	And since we're a paramilitary organization, we follow the chain of command.
	And then I assume from that point on, those numbers that I obtained were moved up to higher levels.
	And the minister on that basis issued a statement to the public and in the House, in the legislature, correct?
	I became aware of that later.
	I wasn't aware at the time.
	And it was erroneous?
	I can't say that.
	It's not accurate.
	Well, there weren't 1,500 OPP officers here, were there?
	In a day.
	The Chief Slowly and his concerns to me when we had our meeting was he felt that that media release indicated there was 1,500 OPP officers in his streets, in his town that day.
	Yes.
	And that impacted, you now know this, it impacted what the RCMP considered the Ottawa Police Service needed.
	It impacted the way the public in Ottawa thought that the OPS was handling the matter.
	It impacted the council and all of the other things, didn't it?
	As I stated to Chief Slowly, I presented the daily numbers with a roll-up of the total numbers.
	How those numbers were used or controlled after that was beyond my control.
	Yes, and what steps did you take to tell the Solicitor General that the information upon which she was relying had been misunderstood, misinterpreted?
	Any steps?
	It was not within my purview to reach out to the Solicitor General.
	Did you tell your commanding officer that that had happened?
	No, I did not.
	That meeting was the first time.
	Two quick things.
	The bridge.
	Have you seen Chief Slowly's news conference on February the 4th that you told the commission about yesterday?
	I only saw the live portion when I was sitting in the command post and I saw him and Deputy Bell doing the news conference.
	So you're relying on your memory from February 4th?
	Yes, I recall hearing that and then reacting immediately.
	Because I connected with the deputy immediately.
	Well, I don't have the time to play it for you, but he never said that he was going to close bridges.
	What he said in his news conference was that consideration was being given to that and that bridges or access would be closed if needed or as needed.
	He didn't say he was closing bridges, did he?
	That's what I heard, and so that would naturally precipitate a call to confirm.
	What I heard.
	Maybe I misheard.
	That's why I needed to reach out to Deputy Bell to say, did I hear this correctly?
	I thought they said they were closing bridges, and I thought they did.
	You were told by Deputy Bell that you had misheard it, that there were no bridges being closed, right?
	Yeah, my concern was more about the off-ramps.
	The bridges were within the City of Ottawa, so I wasn't concerned about the bridges.
	My main concern was about what I heard about off-ramps.
	Same thing, though.
	Deputy Bell said...
	It's not the same thing for me as far as my...
	A concern in my operations because my operations didn't concern bridges.
	In fairness, this is my second channel.
	I don't know how they work for notifications.
	No one's closing a bridge.
	No one's closing an off-ramp.
	Relax.
	I heard it very clearly that there was a plan to close off-ramps and that's what precipitated my call to Deputy Bill.
	Quick thing about the PLT.
	Can you imagine the shitstorm going on?
	Unfortunately, never had any success in negotiating the departure of convoy participants or protesters, correct?
	I would disagree with that.
	I felt that at the end, much of their work allowed some of the convoy protesters to leave voluntarily.
	So prior to the...
	I should have been clearer, thank you.
	Prior to the public order operation going into effect to clear these streets, PLT had not succeeded in negotiating an end to this protest, had they?
	Certainly.
	The protest was still ongoing when public order had to do what they did.
	Yes.
	And so the Coventry Road issue...
	What PLT had negotiated, am I correct, was that protesters could take their fuel from Coventry Road and place it in a different depot.
	I wasn't aware of the particulars of that because PLT didn't report to me.
	What I was engaged in was solely on the deconfliction end of it to say that this happened, this miscommunication happened within the Ottawa Police Service, and could you help us?
	As my friend Mr. Van Nienhuis asked, the fuel in Coventry Road.
	Whether it's in Coventry Road or somewhere else, was a significant public safety risk, correct?
	Yes.
	And if PLT negotiated that they're going to move the fuel from Coventry Road to a different depot, you could appreciate why Ottawa Police Service would be very concerned, correct?
	I can't speak to what the idea was or what the plan was.
	So you're not telling the commissioner that you're second-guessing the operational decision to...
	To seize fuel if that was a public safety risk, correct?
	Correct, because our teams were intended to integrate and they didn't report to me.
	Thank you.
	And then Windsor.
	The information that was available to OPP was not sufficient to allow it to avoid the blockade at Windsor.
	I was not involved in any of the Windsor.
	I would not have any information on Windsor or our plans at Windsor.
	And resources have to be allocated.
	Among the OPP detachments across the province so that when we saw the note from your colleague in Windsor about whether Windsor was a priority over Ottawa, that's a decision that has to be made at the level of OPP resource allocation, correct?
	Right.
	In a province of size and material, there's various priorities that have to be decided on how we staff them.
	And as to the Emergencies Act, the OPP PLT, Notes to protesters included and relied upon terms under the Emergency Act, right?
	I believe that's what we saw, yes.
	Understood.
	Thank you, Commissioner.
	Thank you.
	Next, I'd like to call on the City of Ottawa.
	This is an adversarial January 6th actual hearing.
	So there are opposing interests, examining, cross-examining witnesses.
	Kind of what January 6th should have been.
	Where everyone actually gets a voice and where meaningful discoveries.
	Good morning, Superintendent.
	My name is Anne Tardif.
	I represent the city of Ottawa.
	Anne Tardif.
	She's representing Ottawa.
	I'd like to take you first to your notes.
	I know you have them in front of you and I'll give you the date, but I'm going to give the number so that everyone else can follow along.
	It's OPP 50774.
	And I'm going to go to the date at February 3rd, Superintendent.
	And it's page 19 of that document, Madam Clerk.
	You see the date there at the top of the page?
	Yes, 3rd of February.
	Correct.
	And I'd like to go to the before last entry on that page, Madam Clerk.
	So just scrolling down a little bit.
	A little bit.
	Perfect.
	So do you see the entry there, Superintendent?
	I think it's 1752.
	It could be 1952.
	I'm not sure the time matters, but do you see that entry?
	I do.
	Okay, and it says Superintendent Alakis, FSB, and that note.
	And it's actually the last...
	I suppose it is at that entry that I want to draw your attention to.
	It says no real plan for them and no meaningful dialogue with truckers occurring.
	So first, is this something that you're reporting to Superintendent Alakas or is he reporting it to you?
	I'll correct you quickly.
	My grade four teacher would still not be happy with me.
	My penmanship is not the best.
	There's no real plan forthcoming.
	Okay, it's the second part that I want to talk about, the no meaningful dialogue with truckers occurring.
	Ottawa has got to prove that there was no other alternative.
	And this is with respect to the Ottawa situation.
	So by February 3rd, we don't have any meaningful dialogue with truckers occurring.
	And you described the events of February 6th yesterday and again this morning, correct?
	Yes.
	PLT went into Coventry to negotiate the removal of gasoline.
	Yes.
	And Superintendent Patterson used the opportunity to seize the fuel and charge some of the protesters.
	Is that correct?
	Correct.
	And PLTL felt they had lost all the goodwill they were able to reach with some of the convoy organizers.
	That's what was communicated to me, yes.
	Okay.
	And were you aware that two days later, on February 8th, Ottawa police asked the city manager, City of Ottawa manager, to meet with protesters?
	I was not aware of that.
	We've heard that police felt they didn't have anything to lose by facilitating a meeting, and it would be a win to gain trust with truckers.
	They could use it as a bargaining chip to move trucks.
	Were you aware of that at the time?
	I was not aware of that, no.
	We've heard as well that the city negotiated an agreement to remove trucks from the residential neighbourhoods in the dates that followed.
	Were you aware of that at the time?
	Not at the time.
	I can indicate that.
	I received messaging from our PLT members to indicate that they were frustrated by the involvement of municipal leaders and how it was impacting their work, but I was not aware of the exact times these were occurring.
	And I guess that's what I'm getting at, Superintendent, because that's reflected in your witness summary, which has been filed into evidence.
	And so at the time that you received those concerns from your PLT officers, I take it you were not aware that the city had spoken with protesters at the request of police.
	Right.
	Outside of what may have been reported in public media, I wasn't aware of what was happening.
	Okay.
	And you were not aware that a senior OPS officer had been at the table to negotiate the logistics of how and where the trucks would move?
	I would not have been involved in that or aware of that.
	And just given in your reference it already, but in your witness summary, you indicate that your PLT officers were frustrated because they were hearing from protesters that they had met with the mayor and that they wanted to continue to meet with the mayor.
	That's what you were hearing on the 15th of February.
	That's correct.
	And the evidence this commission has heard is that the protesters, in fact, never met with Mayor Watson.
	I take it you're aware of that now?
	No, now I'm aware, yes.
	Okay.
	I want to switch tracks a little bit and talk about Superintendent Early's notes.
	Now, it's Dana.
	I'm assuming Dana Early is a she.
	Is that fair?
	That's correct.
	Just want to check.
	Thank you.
	And so Superintendent Early was in Windsor during the Ambassador Bridge blockade.
	She was.
	She was essentially performing my role, but in Windsor.
	Fair enough.
	And so I take it that if you did have a conversation with her, it's going to be about resources.
	I mean, that's really the only reason for you to speak to Superintendent Early during the events of February 2022.
	Fair?
	Fair.
	Okay.
	Now, when you were asked yesterday, initially, you did not believe that you had spoken to Superintendent Early at that time.
	You recall saying that?
	Yeah, I didn't have an independent recollection of that conversation, no.
	Fair enough.
	And to be fair to you, we've seen that there's no mention of it in your notes except for the words Dana Early slash on February 10th, correct?
	Correct.
	And you were then taken to Superintendent Early's notes of that call.
	And I will ask that they be put up on the screen.
	It is OPP404543.
	Thank you, Madam Clerk.
	And can we go to page 1515?
	Okay, so this...
	Just to be fair to the witness, oh, actually, the date's on it.
	Perfect.
	Do you see at the top there, 10th of February 2022?
	Can you see that, Superintendent?
	I do, yeah.
	Okay.
	So just before we get into this, you described at some length in your testimony a meeting that occurred with the planning team and with the leadership of OPS at OPS headquarters on Elgin Street, and I believe that was on February 9th.
	Is that correct?
	That's correct.
	Okay.
	At 1210, I believe.
	Pardon me?
	I believe it started at 1210.
	Okay, we've got the same meeting in mind.
	So that's the day before February 10th, obviously.
	Okay.
	So you explained during that meeting, I'm not going to take you back through all of it.
	You've explained it in some detail.
	It's in your witness summary, which has now been filed.
	But at some point, as I understand it, Superintendent Phil Liu of the RCMP tells then Chief Slowly to pump the brakes on the enforcement plan.
	Is that fair?
	It's fair.
	And he says that he thinks he can get 400 POU officers to Ottawa in a week's time.
	And sorry, I'm correct.
	I believe it was Staff Sergeant or Sergeant Darwin Tetro who was saying that.
	Pardon me.
	Not to Phil Liu.
	The statement is as you claim, but I believe it was made by Darwin Tetro, not Phil Liu.
	And is Staff Sergeant Tetro also with the RCMP?
	He is, and he has a public order component in his work.
	Perfect.
	So we've got an RFMP officer advising that they think they can get 400 POU officers in Ottawa in about a week's time, right?
	That's correct.
	So if we're at February 9th, that means they think they can get their 400 POU officers in Ottawa on or about February 16th.
	Fair?
	That's fair.
	Okay.
	And I think we've heard at length that a number greater than that was actually needed in order to bring the convoy to an end, right?
	Oh, certainly.
	And I believe...
	South Sergeant Tetra would believe that as well.
	He just indicated, let's start there and then we'll work with our public order partners across the country to try to gather more.
	Fair enough.
	So the 400 was a start.
	Yes.
	Now, if we can scroll down here till 1021, that's the first indication of the call.
	Do you see that call?
	I can't tell if that's to or from.
	It looks like from.
	Not much turns on it.
	Craig Abrams.
	To confirm resources.
	And that's consistent with what you've told us.
	Any call with Superintendent Early really would have been to focus on resources, right?
	Yes.
	And then Ottawa has been sending reshored sheets.
	Is that sheets?
	Sheets, yeah.
	To EOC.
	That's the Emergency Operations Centre of the OPP?
	Based in Aurelia.
	We use that term a lot.
	So every region has an emergency operations centre.
	So in this case, she's talking about...
	Aurelia because we were both using Aurelia to help facilitate logistics to obtain resources for both our operations.
	That's right.
	So you've gotten exactly where I wanted to get at.
	This is the same place that you both are writing to to get resources, right?
	Correct.
	Okay.
	And then 10-23, and actually before I get here, I think I heard you say that you believe that Superintendent Early had a scribe.
	Is that right?
	Yes.
	I thought, I would assume she did.
	Okay.
	And so you believe that these are notes taken by her scribe?
	And I have no...
	Confirmation of that.
	Okay.
	Assuming it was, but I could be mistaken.
	Okay.
	That's fine.
	So at 1023, advised Abrams, Windsor is priority according to deputy.
	Do you see that?
	I do.
	And the next line refers to a gentleman named Harkins.
	Is that Harkins?
	Pardon me.
	Is that Deputy Commissioner Harkins?
	Yes.
	And he's in charge of the Field Services Bureau.
	Do I have that right?
	He's deputy in charge of field operations.
	Field operations.
	This is boring as hell, people.
	So as I'm reading this, the Deputy Harkins advised that Windsor is priority.
	Is that the way to read this?
	That's what that says.
	And Harkins, Deputy Harkins, told me, being superintendent early, to go through the EOC, and you advised that that's what was happening at that time, right?
	Yes.
	So you're both going through the same emergency operations centre to request resources for your operations.
	Correct.
	We'll have much better idea of numbers this afternoon after meeting with POU commanders.
	And then at 1024, sorry, 1026.
	This is going to go on until November 23rd, people.
	You can see it there as superintendent.
	Abrams will call EOC to confirm staffing process.
	You are priority.
	We will take leftovers.
	Do you accept that you made that statement, Superintendent Abrams?
	I wrote it.
	Either that or something to that effect.
	Oh, I didn't write it.
	These are notes.
	No, I don't recall making that statement.
	Leftovers?
	You don't recall?
	That's so disrespectful.
	Do you recall any discussion that Windsor was the priority for resources to be obtained out of the EOC at that time?
	No, I don't recall.
	Because on that day, literally that day the 10th, I spoke with Chief Party.
	Party.
	Here's a bad joke.
	An extra 120 officers were coming.
	Why did the blind chicken fall into the well?
	So that's why I'm confused.
	Because it couldn't see that well.
	I asked and we required another 120 and it was approved and it just obviously...
	Absolutely pissed off, Dragon.
	I'm going to go out and then go do the other stream live, which is going to cover Bannon's sentence, the dismissal of Peckford's lawsuit, which is the big deal of the day, and a Trump judgment.
	So I'm going to go read that now.
	Leave this going.
	Everybody enjoy it.
	I'll pop in and out as much as I can.
	Suggesting that you were made advised here that Windsor was the priority, but you deny that.
	And we're going live on the main channel.
	I was never told that.
	I'm not denying that statement was May, but we had discussions.
	She told me that the deputy told her that Windsor was a priority.
	So I'm saying, okay, if you're telling me that the deputy told you Windsor is the priority, then okay.
	But that information from what I'm seeing is the deputy, Deputy Harkins, I'm assuming, was telling her.
	I didn't tell her that.
	So we may just be lost in language and semantics.
	When I said you were never told, I was meaning to say by Superintendent Early.
	Do you accept that you were told by Superintendent Early, early, pardon me, that her understanding was that Windsor was the priority?
	I'm not asking you what you were told by Deputy Harkins.
	Right.
	I accept based on the notes.
	I don't have an independent reaction number.
	That's fine.
	But you accept it based on the notes.
	Thank you.
	we could keep strolling down okay So I'm looking at the second 1028 note, and you were taken to this in fairness to you, Superintendent, yesterday.
	Do you see Ottawa is just trucks on side streets?
	Do you see that note there?
	Yes.
	And I think you said yesterday that you also did not have an independent recollection of this call, correct?
	I really don't.
	I'm trying, but so many calls over so many weeks, I can't say that I recall this one specifically.
	But you explained what you may have meant yesterday.
	You said that it was easy to drive around if you were south of Wellington, i.e.
	outside of the red zone.
	I think you said south of the 401.
	417, Commissioner.
	Oh, pardon me.
	Did you say south of the 417?
	My apologies.
	No, that's fine.
	I had south of the 417.
	Yes, it would have, based on what I'm reading and trying to recall, would have had general conversations about what she was dealing with.
	and what I was dealing with and what it looked like in her area and what it looked like in my area and we would have had conversations about the impacts to the City of Windsor overall because of the location of Ambassador Bridge and those types of things so I believe that's the context of where this comes from.
	So if I understand it correctly, it was that if you were outside of the sort of impacted downtown core, you could drive around the city.
	You could navigate the city outside of the downtown core that was blocked.
	Is that fair?
	That was just my personal experience in the times I had to be able to do that drive.
	I'm sure there were days due to traffic backups that there was difficulty in some areas of the city.
	I'm just stating in general terms from my own experience, I didn't see a massive impact outside of that core area traffic-wise.
	And you were aware, I take it at the time, that some of the bridges between Quebec or between Gatineau and Ottawa were closed or subject to lane reductions?
	Lane reductions for sure.
	Full closures, I believe they were kind of rotating depending on days because I recall there was impacts with nursing staff that were trying to get from Gatineau to the hospitals in Ottawa, so there had to be some.
	Give and take to open up some lanes so people could get to work.
	That's right.
	So we had health professionals having difficulty accessing their place of work, correct?
	That's what I recall.
	And you recall also, I take it, that we had patients having difficulty accessing their appointments.
	Were you aware of that?
	I only recall that some leaders of the hospitals that indicated that their staff weren't able to get to work on time, which had obviously operational impacts for their agencies, and there was a request.
	It's not controlled by the OPP, but it requests whoever was controlling the bridges on either side that they can make some accommodations for that.
	And those side streets that the trucks were parked on in Ottawa, because as you say, they weren't parked on a bridge or on the 417, they were parked on side streets.
	Those side streets you knew weren't residential neighborhoods.
	There may have been apartment buildings on them.
	When you say residential, I'm picturing suburban, but there may be urban.
	Apartments that were on those side streets, certainly.
	Yep.
	And so the trucks were parked at the front door of some of these apartment and condo buildings?
	I'm sure they were, yes.
	They were idling and honking?
	There was lots of honking, yes.
	And we've heard complaints of resident harassment in these neighbourhoods as well.
	You heard, I take it, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson saying that they received complaints about that.
	And I heard it personally myself in my own visits to store owners that they told me directly.
	Thank you.
	So that didn't work.
	Hold on.
	Let me see what I just did here.
	Sorry.
	Share screen.
	Damn it.
	Hold on.
	Where the heck?
	Here's the public hearings.
	Okay.
	Sorry about that, people.
	So now I know I need to leave that window up.
	I can't close that window.
	Is that fair?
	I think we talked about what her blockade was doing in relation to mine, similar to...
	So I've got to leave this window open.
	The economic impacts rail blockade has was very similar in circumstance.
	More significant than in Ottawa.
	Economically.
	Thank you very much, Superintendent.
	Thank you, Commissioner, for your indulgence.
	Okay next is the Ottawa Coalition.
	Good morning, Superintendent Abrams.
	Thank you so much for coming to Ottawa and answering these questions for all of us here.
	My name is Paul Champ.
	I'm legal counsel for the Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses from downtown Ottawa.
	And I just have some questions for you.
	Superintendent Abrams, were you aware, did you know about how many residents roughly lived in the red zone in downtown Ottawa?
	Not aware at all, no.
	So if I said 15,000 approximately, would that...
	That would be the first time I heard that number.
	But based on the time I've spent downtown and the number of buildings I've seen, it certainly seems like an accurate number.
	And so when you were making decisions or being involved in the operations, the police operations in Ottawa, you were aware, we're talking about thousands of people who are being impacted by these convoy protests in downtown Ottawa?
	Certainly.
	And when it came to that, I mean, how many people were required or the impacts?
	I had to rely on my partners at the Ottawa Police Service to indicate to me what was happening down there, what impacts were happening, and what they needed to address those impacts.
	And you were aware there were a large number of businesses in downtown Ottawa that were shut down completely, correct?
	Sure.
	I saw them myself personally, as I said, in my own visits to business owners and saw many businesses were closed.
	And obviously, not only those business owners experiencing those losses, there had been...
	Countless workers who were out of jobs during that period of time as well.
	You would have known that?
	Certainly.
	I live an hour from the city.
	I have family and friends who are directly impacted and talked about having to relocate because of the honking, because of the noise.
	So, yes, I was aware.
	Right.
	And with respect to the conditions on the streets, you're aware of, obviously, the large number of semi-trucks.
	In some cases, right outside of people's doors, honking and so forth.
	But we also had other conditions downtown, like the large stacks of wood, the large number of propane tanks often together, the jerry cans of diesel fuel, the open fires at almost every other intersection, the fireworks that were going on at night.
	You were aware of all those conditions, correct?
	Yes.
	And we heard evidence last week, Superintendent Abrams, about residents being fearful that their building Perhaps could catch on fire.
	There could be an explosion from the dangerous propane and so forth that's around.
	You agree that that was a reasonable fear?
	Certainly.
	I believe there was an actual arson-type incident, not linked to the convoy, I guess, specifically.
	We saw that it clearly could be something that could happen.
	So yeah, it was a valid concern.
	Sorry, that's...
	Oh, not linked specifically.
	Not linked at all.
	Liar.
	Not linked at all.
	And it had nothing to do with it.
	The police were unable to effectively control or prevent these inflammatory...
	Yeah, I'm getting ready to go live on the main channel.
	Enjoy people.
	I will keep popping in and out when I'm done pulling my hair.
	Correct?
	It certainly was a challenge.
	To prevent the flow of gasoline.
	Well, it couldn't be done.
	They couldn't do it.
	Maybe it could have been done, but they weren't stopping it, correct?
	I know my officers made attempts at times, but at times they'd get swarmed by other members, they'd have to pull back.
	So there was attempts made at certain times to do so, but it was difficult.
	Yeah, for sure.
	I'm not saying that they couldn't do it.
	Like, effectively, they couldn't do it, given the numbers that were on the ground of police at the time, correct?
	It was difficult.
	Well, it wasn't possible.
	I wouldn't say it was impossible.
	Our members tried, and I believe some gas was seized.
	I can't be certain about my membership because I told my members, because my members were normally in two-person units, so it was highly dangerous to their safety to try to get involved with multiple people carrying jerry cans when there's just two of them.
	What do they think was going to happen?
	They had been there for an extended period.
	They're not going to douse people with the gasoline?
	This protest is going to turn into the most murderous force in this protest ever?
	Simply because we were outnumbered with our numbers as they were.
	Well, they're carrying jerrycams of gas.
	And that's a very good point that you just made there, Superintendent Abrams.
	It wasn't simply downtown residents and business or rescuers.
	There was dangers to your officers downtown.
	So much of a danger that nothing ever happened.
	Well, certainly my officers were subjected not only to...
	Threats of physical assault, but yelling, I had to get my public order unit teams.
	I interviewed cops on the street in real time.
	That's not true.
	Yeah, the horns and the diesel fumes, no doubt you were hearing complaints about that from your officers.
	Corns, yes.
	Diesel fumes, I can't say that.
	Why don't you ask a more loaded question?
	Now, we've heard you say, Superintendent Abrams, I spoke with the cops.
	They said it was peaceful.
	In real time, every day.
	I asked them, not knowing the answer.
	OPP, that the auto police service did not have the capability to bring an end to this incident or this event.
	Is that fair to say?
	I have to look at my notes, and that would have been the day that I had the conversation with Inspector Ferguson.
	Right, exactly.
	Gotta love the Canadian accent.
	It was clear that they were, that particular day, were dysfunctional and unable to make a plan.
	I don't believe I would make an opinion that just because of what she was experiencing or seeing that day meant that there was no way the Ottawa Police Service could resolve this event eventually.
	It was just...
	An observation that day that there was no plan and they were dysfunctional that day.
	But to be clear, Superintendent Abrams, even if the Ottawa Police had a great plan, and we've heard all the evidence about the struggles of coming up with a plan that was acceptable to the OPP, but even if they had a plan, it was very clear to you the Ottawa Police Services simply did not have the resources on the ground to bring that incident to an end, correct?
	This is the crux.
	They needed the federal.
	They needed the emergency.
	And that remained your view throughout and, in fact, was the reality.
	It wasn't until significant numbers came that they were able to bring it to an end.
	And it's my understanding, Superintendent Abrams, that you had a conversation on January 31st with Deputy Chief Bell where he indicated to you the auto police service at that time was looking at a four-week sustainability plan.
	Do you recall that?
	Do you recall that?
	And you were quite surprised, is my understanding about that?
	I was.
	You were concerned the Ottawa police were looking at already that this could be a prolonged event and they were just going to try to manage it for four weeks?
	That was your understanding at the time?
	Correct.
	From my experience, we normally plan in 24-hour cycles, 48-hour cycles, to hear that there was a plan that didn't look like it would have a resolution until at least four weeks.
	It was surprising to me, yes, to hear that length of time that they were planning.
	And I believe that was the conversation where he basically stated, we don't know how to resolve this.
	And I presume, Superintendent, that it was a concern to you because you could observe yourself about the significant impact on the residents in downtown Ottawa.
	Is that fair?
	Is that fair?
	Don't do drinking games with, is that fair?
	In my experience, as more time goes by in these events, it only adds more participants, which makes the job of policing more difficult.
	Yes, it is true, and we're going to talk about it on the main channel.
	It makes the job even more difficult.
	43 seconds.
	Excuse me, that's why there is a desire to try to end this type of event as soon as you can.
	For sure.
	And that leads to another point, Superintendent Abrams, is that we've heard a lot of your testimony about closing the off-ramps to the 417, and the OPP did not prefer that option, correct?
	You were content with the trucks to continue to come downtown Ottawa on the weekends that followed, correct?
	No, we were happy in the weeks that followed after the main arrival.
	We were happy to work with our partners, and most of it was our own partners within the province of Ontario, saying there's X number of trucks coming to Ottawa.
	We were happy to try to work out and communicate with them first, hopefully, to say, look, there's no more room downtown.
	For anybody who doesn't know what's going on, we're live on the main channel, where we've got screen and screen.
	We would try to do those communications with those operators first.
	If we weren't successful, that's all the police would say.
	OBP, can you close this ramp or this ramp?
	Because there's no capability to accept those vehicles.
	It's going to cause traffic chaos.
	Artificial brains.
	So can we try to get them to go to this ramp?
	So the only way to get them to that ramp would be to close other ones.
	So we would do that, you know, off and on.
	So we're live.
	This is the intro video, but we're going to...
	I'm going to explain what the heck is going on.
	Well, if I understand what you're telling us, Superintendent Abrams, is that the OPP worked with the auto police to try to identify the best routes for the trucks to get downtown if they were going to indeed come downtown.
	Is that right?
	That would minimize the traffic impacts on the rest of the city.
	Certainly, once the...
	I think we're live on Rumble as well.
	The protest was underway and we're into second and third.
	Okay, I see some comments.
	Let's just see.
	Our plan was if...
	With a truck was to try to get downtown.
	This is so confusing.
	And make arrests.
	Audibly for me?
	Where's that super chat?
	That super chat's in the stream.
	Their intent was to participate in what was going on downtown.
	I'll explain exactly what's going on right now.
	The idea and the plan was...
	What is your memory of the local businesses shutting down?
	I remember seeing somebody's choice or forced by local government or police to make it inconvenient for the convoy.
	We were going to monitor that convoy.
	I believe they were told to shut down.
	Don't go downtown.
	By recollection.
	And the one that stayed open, the iconic cafe, got harassed in what is an illegal event.
	Okay, so now I'm going to stop what's going on because this is just going to get too confusing.
	I'm going to...
	But that was just the last four or five days when the operation was being rolled out to bring the event to an end, correct?
	Just prior to, that's correct.
	I just didn't want to make a blanket statement that we were allowing.
	We were going to facilitate the arrival of trucks through this whole event.
	No, at some point, we were not going to facilitate trucks heading into the downtown core.
	Yeah, but that was around February 16th or 17th you stopped doing that.
	On the weekends of 5th and 6th and the 12th, there were big signs on Highway 417 saying...
	Convoy truckers this way, correct?
	That's correct.
	I just wanted to make sure your initial statement was it kind of made it seem that we were going to allow trucks downtown through the whole event.
	And Superintendent Abrams, I'm not sure if you appreciate how the affected residents of downtown Ottawa felt when they saw the Ontario Provincial Police putting up big signs saying convoy truckers this way, apparently rolling out a welcome mat to them downtown.
	Did you appreciate how the people in downtown Ottawa would have felt at that time?
	I certainly can appreciate that.
	And our perspective is we had to rely on Ottawa Police to say, this is where we need those trucks to go.
	This is where we think we can house them.
	So we were only doing what Ottawa Police were requesting of us to facilitate the movement of trucks.
	I appreciate and understand the impact.
	You're out of time.
	I thought I got 15. No, according to my notes, you had 10. I believe.
	My notes had 15. Can I ask one more question there, Commissioner?
	Yes, go ahead.
	Superintendent Premier Abrams, you've told us that you reported up to Commissioner Curric and Deputy Commissioner Harkins about your observations of your concerns with downtown Ottawa, or pardon me, with the Ottawa police and how they were effectively doing that.
	You would have assumed that they would have reported that up to the Solicitor General?
	No, because I'm not familiar with what Okay, but given your observations of the challenges, the significant challenge the Ottawa Police Service were having to respond to this event, both based on the problems you were seeing at Senior Command, as well as just the bare resources.
	Did you consider, or do you know of anyone in the OPP ever considered reporting this either to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission or perhaps to the Ottawa Police Services Board, so some type of effective action perhaps could have been taken by others to direct or guide the Ottawa Police Service towards a more effective response?
	I was never involved in any conversations like you would suggest.
	But was that ever considered?
	Were you aware of that if that was ever considered?
	I wasn't aware if that was ever considered, no.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Next, call on the province of Saskatchewan.
	Good morning.
	Can I be heard in Ottawa?
	Yes.
	Thank you, Commissioner.
	My name is Mike Morris and I'm counsel for the government of Saskatchewan.
	Good morning, sir.
	Morning, sir.
	We have about five minutes, give or take, today, so it won't be too long.
	I have some fairly straightforward questions for you, I think.
	Sir, will you agree with me that OPP officers have authority to enforce the criminal code and provincial offences, including under the Highway Traffic Act?
	They do have that authority, yes.
	And am I correct that OPP officers have always had this authority, including in the City of Ottawa?
	Yes, they're sworn in as officers in the province of Ontario.
	So it follows that OPP officers have not required the Provincial or Federal Emergency Act to be invoked to have those powers then, is that correct?
	Correct.
	Their powers under the Criminal Code, the Highway Traffic Act and other provincial offenses were in authority in any city in the province of Ontario.
	And will you agree with me that intentionally blocking a public road with one's vehicle can constitute an offense under the criminal code?
	I'm in two streams at the same time right now.
	No, I'm not because I haven't shared it.
	Add to screen.
	Now I'm back in two screens at the same time.
	It is called stream exception.
	And it's nuts.
	But it's good.
	Because I'm going to pop in and I'm listening to that inquiry while I'm walking around the house driving myself crazy with this.
	Now, we've heard some evidence about...
	Now we are strictly on the mainstream on YouTube.
	That will be running in the background.
	Comments, chat.
	You can all figure it out.
	You can super chat if you want as well.
	No pressure whatsoever.
	I'm going to keep my headphones off because I can't seem to mute the back screen.
	I can't seem to mute the second stream without actually muting the stream.
	So that's it.
	Now I don't know which stream I'm in.
	Oh, I'm an idiot.
	Hold on.
	This is going to be very confusing.
	I think I pulled the hearing.
	Out of the sidestream.
	Aiding and abetting mischief, which was occurring in downtown Ottawa by trucks occupying the Corps.
	That's how I understand it, yes.
	Assuming these people were committing an offense, would OPP officers have had the same authority to arrest them as the OPS?
	Yeah, the criminal code applies to all law enforcement officers if an OPP officer chose.
	And felt they had the reasonable grounds under the mischief section to make an arrest for that offense, they would have had the ability to do that if they chose to, yes.
	And that's the offense of providing fuel for people participating with their vehicles in the downtown core and blockading roads, correct?
	If that particular officer felt that it fit the criminal code and fit as an offense, then you would have the authority to do that.
	So at this point, we've heard evidence, quite a bit of evidence, about there being a lot of trucks in the Ottawa downtown core.
	My question is, were there checkpoints for vehicles entering the downtown core before the Federal Emergencies Act was invoked on February 14th?
	Checkpoints leading into the downtown core?
	Yes, sir.
	I can only go by what my officers were asked to do.
	My officers, LPP officers, were never involved in checkpoints.
	I can't speak to Ottawa Police or our partners through the MTO.
	I recall being involved in a teleconference with the MTO where they were considering doing vehicle safety checks within the City of Ottawa, but my members were never involved in any checkpoints.
	To your knowledge, were there road closures or traffic diversions before the Federal Emergencies Act was invoked on February 14th?
	And I'm talking specifically to prevent vehicles from entering the downtown core in Ottawa.
	I can say there was because on the early days of this event, those were the areas my officers were asked to attend.
	And when I attended down there to check on them, they were essentially making sure that certain streets were closed in the downtown core.
	Cement barriers that block some streets and some streets were blocked with physical police officers with cruisers blocking streets.
	And am I correct then that decision on blocking those streets would have been, that would have been the decision of the Ottawa Police Service?
	The Ottawa Police Service or the City of Ottawa under their authorities to do that with their own streets.
	And do I understand correct?
	I believe I heard you say that there were road closures and blocked streets before February 14th when the Federal Emergencies Act came into effect.
	Is that correct?
	There was, yes.
	If I can, I'd like to talk to you a little bit about a demonstration that occurred in Ottawa in April, known as the Rolling Thunder demonstration.
	Are you familiar with that one?
	You're going to have to do it very quickly.
	You're already over your time.
	Okay.
	I will be quick, Commissioner.
	Thank you.
	I am aware of it, and I was assigned as a strategic commander for that event as well.
	I understand there was no emergency legislation in place when Rolling Thunder occurred in April, correct?
	Correct.
	And checkpoints or, I guess, roadblocks or controlled access was used for Rolling Thunder, is that correct?
	Correct.
	My members were used in the same kind of context to do traffic points and to restrict flow of vehicles on certain streets, yes.
	And Rolling Thunder was successfully managed and resolved, correct?
	I would call it a successful event, yes.
	Thank you, sir.
	Those are my questions.
	Thank you.
	And now if I could call on the JCCF Democracy Fund.
	I believe they're attending.
	Good morning, Superintendent.
	I am Alan Hauner.
	I'm a lawyer for the Democracy Fund.
	More, sir.
	Earlier today, Council for Canada asked you about towing guidelines from the OPP Commissioner, and you couldn't comment on those.
	If you can't comment on this question, it's fine.
	But are you aware that on February 13, 2022, before the declaration of the public order emergency, the OPP had confirmed that seven towing companies were willing to provide services and a total of...
	34 heavy-duty trucks were available to the OPP in connection with this protest in Ottawa.
	I would not have been aware of that because that was not under my command or part of my mandate.
	Thank you.
	I'll ask that question to another witness later on.
	Can we pull up opp.ir.701?
	This is the OPP institutional report.
	And can we just go to page 36?
	Just to put this in context, what we're looking at here is the OPP role in the police response to the Ottawa blockade.
	And do you see that chart there?
	Just maybe scroll down a little bit.
	So we have a chart here.
	It's called OPP frontline officers provided to Ottawa Police Services.
	I see you.
	Okay, so do you notice that, well, first of all, let me ask you, do these numbers seem accurate to you?
	Do they accurately reflect the frontline officers provided to the OPS on the dates listed?
	It does, and I think it's important to clarify when they speak about frontline officers, it is strictly just those officers.
	These numbers don't include public order unit officers.
	They don't include intelligence officers.
	They don't include aviation services.
	There's many other OPP resources that were used in Ottawa that aren't captured in these numbers, just for clarity.
	Yeah, understood, and thank you for clarifying that.
	What I noticed when I look at this chart is that the frontline officers increased significantly.
	On February the 16th, and then again on February the 18th.
	And obviously you would agree with that.
	It's in the chart.
	Yep.
	And if we could go back just to page 35, and perhaps, Superintendent, I don't need to go back to page 35. Would you agree with me that one of the reasons these officers were able to be deployed to Ottawa at that time was because...
	Resources were freed up from Windsor.
	I suppose there were more resources from Windsor, but the reason for the increase in the numbers would have been to bolster increased traffic points that needed to be bolstered in that period of time in order to support the public order unit plans.
	So I can't say that the increase that you see on the chart.
	Is directly connected to the successful conclusion of Windsor.
	It was more related to operational issues and plans here in Ottawa.
	Okay, can we just scroll down to where it says February 15th?
	Pardon me.
	So it says here, Ottawa Police Services, OPP and RCMP planning sections were physically integrated at the RCMP.
	And then later on in the next paragraph, following the reopening of the Ambassador Bridge, 400 additional OPP members were rapidly deployed from across the province.
	So some of those went to Ottawa and some went elsewhere, I suppose.
	Yeah, that's correct.
	And it was in this period of time when we talk about most of those 400 additional officers were frontline officers.
	And within the OPP...
	The frontline officer component in Windsor was not as strong.
	We had a larger public order unit component in Windsor.
	So the 400 additional members, those were frontline members that came from around the province, and that's why we had to defer block training and cancel discretionary leave to be able to get that number of officers to Ottawa.
	And I'm almost out of time here, but would you agree with me that the reason for the redeployment of these frontline officers to Windsor was not related to the Emergencies Act?
	And that it would have happened anyway?
	I'm sorry, I have to repeat your question again.
	Yes, absolutely.
	Would you agree with me that the deployment of these frontline officers to Ottawa and the increase in numbers on the 16th and on the 18th was not directly related to the invocation of the Emergencies Act?
	It is something that would have happened in any event.
	I would agree with that.
	It was directly related to what we knew now was an operational plan with public order that needed extra support.
	And that was the operational plan of February 13, 2022, correct?
	I never saw the plan, so I'm not certain of what the date was, but it was the plan that the integrated planning team came up with.
	Was it called the Integrated Mobilization Operational Plan?
	I can't be certain of the title of it.
	I'm sorry.
	Okay.
	But in any event, that plan was in place prior to the invocation of the Emergency Act.
	I know it was being worked on because the integrated planning team came February 9th.
	They started their work on the 10th and the 11th.
	The Act was in effect on the 14th.
	Because I wasn't on that side and I wasn't part of that team, I can't tell you for sure exactly what day that plan was finalized.
	That's fine.
	I suspect we'll hear that from...
	Chief Superintendent of Party State.
	Thank you very much, sir.
	Those are my questions.
	Thank you.
	Okay.
	Any examination by the OPP next?
	Okay.
	Any re-examination?
	Just one series of questions, very briefly.
	Superintendent Abrams, you gave evidence about the February 9th meeting, and you were asked in cross-examination about Darwin Tetro and the commitment sought for 400 RCMP officers.
	Do you recall that?
	I recall, yes.
	Can you tell us, was there a similar commitment sought or offered on behalf of the OPP at that meeting?
	I don't recall us speaking about public order unit commitments.
	We already had a large amount of public order sections in the City already.
	I think the discussion was more about how we could get extra.
	Certainly, OPP could provide a couple more sections, but in that meeting, in Ottawa Police Headquarters, I don't recall us talking about the OPP PLU component that may be able to assist.
	Chief Hardy may have talked about that, but I don't recall that.
	Thank you.
	Okay, so that completes your examination and cross-examination.
	Thank you very much for appearing and for your evidence.
	It's complete.
	You're now free to leave.
	Thank you, Commissioner.
	Thank you.
	Okay, so we're, I think, at the time where everybody's entitled to a break.
	So we will...
	Take a break until 5 after 12, and then we'll come back and go with our next witness, who I understand is Chief Superintendent Pardi.
	The commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Order all order.
	The commission has reconvened the commission.
	Thank you.
	Good afternoon.
	We have another witness counsel.
	Thank you.
	It's Frank L. Senior Counsel for the Commission.
	Our next witness is Chief Superintendent Party.
	Superintendent, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
	I'll swear.
	For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
	Do you solemnly affirm that the evidence to be...
	I think he said he'd swear?
	Yes.
	Oh, apologies.
	You'd like to swear on a religious document?
	Sorry?
	Would you like to swear on a religious document or affirm?
	I'll swear.
	On a religious document?
	Sure.
	Bible?
	Bible's good.
	okay Do you swear that the evidence to be given by you to this commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth to help you God?
	I do.
	Thank you.
	Thank you.
	Good afternoon.
	Please have a seat.
	Chief Superintendent Pardee, do you remember attending an interview, well, actually two interviews with me and my commission colleagues in the summer?
	I do, sir.
	And after the interviews, we provided you with an interview summary.
	You did?
	May I call up the document number WTS 6033?
	So, Chief Party, this is the summary that we've sent you for review?
	It was the version of it, yes.
	Right.
	This is the version that you approved?
	Correct.
	And do you adopt this content in its entirety?
	Are there any changes or corrections you'd like to make?
	I think, like all documents, context is important, but I'm sure that will come out in evidence.
	That's right.
	That's right.
	Okay.
	Now, Chief Superintendent Party, I understand that you recently retired after serving more than 30 years with the OPP.
	36 and a half years, sir.
	I started my policing career in 86. I left active duty in July, July 15th.
	But I've officially retired now for three weeks.
	Only three weeks?
	Only three weeks.
	Congratulations.
	Now, you were a former critical incident commander.
	Yes, sir.
	And you have, throughout your career, worked for many years in the national capital region on major events.
	Well, I spent 28 years of my OPP career, six of six years with the RCMP in New Brunswick.
	But my 30-year...
	Our OPP career, 28 of it, was spent in Eastern Ontario in various roles.
	And the latter part, the last 12 years of my career was in a senior leadership role as a superintendent.
	And I did a lot of work in the National Capital Region with major events, presidential visits, North American leader summits, Canada Day events, etc.
	Yes.
	And in the course of your career, have you collaborated frequently with members of the Ottawa Police Service?
	Yes, sir.
	And what do you know of their reputation in terms of managing or responding to large-scale events like protests and demonstrations?
	First class.
	First class?
	First class.
	Are you aware of any changes within the OPS in recent years that might affect their ability to respond to these kinds of events?
	Well, certainly upon my arrival with the integrated planning team, I asked the question, what's going on?
	What happened to you guys?
	And certainly the pandemic has had an impact, retirements, people moved on, lack of major events, keeping those skills honed when people move on.
	Emergency readiness, emergency preparedness is much like crime prevention.
	Nobody wants to pay for it when nothing's happened.
	And that's across all sectors.
	But certainly, you know, there's been a lull perhaps since about 2016 with the mass of large-scale events that they've had in Ottawa.
	So it's just been a considerable passage of time that there hasn't been anything major.
	Yet Ottawa is renowned for...
	Almost daily protests of some sort.
	So I'm going to take you back now to the events back in January, February.
	I understand that in January of this year, you were the commander of the OPP Northeast Region, right?
	That's correct, sir.
	And then in early February, you were asked to lead the integrated planning group to assist the Ottawa Police Service.
	That's correct.
	So let's talk about the specific assignment, your lead role with the planning group, the integrated planning group.
	When were you asked to take that on?
	It was the evening of February 7th.
	I received a telephone call from my supervisor, who is Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins, advising that they were putting together a team to go to Ottawa to assist Ottawa.
	And asked if I would be interested in leading that team.
	He felt that I was a good fit for it with my background.
	And he gave me 10 seconds to say I didn't want to do it.
	I accepted the assignment and that very night packed a bag and added to Aurelia for a briefing the following morning.
	And the following morning, what time was the briefing?
	I believe it was about 9 a.m.
	In the commissioner's office.
	Who attended?
	Commissioner Creek was there.
	Deputy Commissioner Harkins.
	Superintendent Mike McDonnell was present.
	Superintendent Craig Abrams was on video link.
	I believe perhaps the commissioner's executive officer may have been present as well, but I don't get to recall.
	Right.
	And we've just this morning heard from Superintendent Abrams.
	Could we call up the witness will-say number OPP50792, please?
	Now, Chief Party, the Commission has received a will-say.
	It's going to be shown on screen.
	I just wanted to ask you, do you recall when this will-say was first prepared?
	It was started while I was still in Ottawa.
	When in Ottawa?
	During the month of February.
	My supervisor, Deputy Commissioner Arkins, suggested that, you know, put my mind to developing or preparing a will state for the events leading up to and to the conclusion in Ottawa.
	I started it with...
	High intentions of catching up and keeping it live, but within a few hours, my schedule was overtaken, and so I had maybe one page done while I was in Ottawa, and I completed it when I went back to my regular duties in North Bay.
	And when did you complete it?
	First week of March.
	Okay.
	Now, tell us about...
	The nature of your assignment.
	What was the mandate?
	Well, the mandate was to provide Ottawa Police support.
	I was given a broad range to ask for anything I needed.
	I received from start of the deployment to the conclusion of deployment that type of support from not just my organization because I was an OPP officer but leading a team.
	An integrated team from multiple organizations.
	So it wasn't just OPP.
	It wasn't about the OPP.
	But I was given incredible support to ensure that we got what we needed, understanding the complexities of the events in Ottawa and the evolving events that are happening both provincially and nationally.
	Right.
	So a moment ago, you were starting to tell us about this.
	9 a.m. briefing involving, among others, Commissioner Karik of the OPP.
	Tell us about that briefing.
	What was discussed?
	Well, I got an overview from Superintendent Abrams as to the State of the Union in Ottawa, that the concern was there wasn't a plan.
	They were asking for a lot of resources, but there was no concrete plan in terms of how those resources were going to be utilized.
	There was dysfunction.
	There was a loss of confidence and faith being displayed by the public.
	The narrative in the media was certainly slanted.
	In terms of the protest and by the protesters, generally, it was a crisis in Ottawa.
	Now, you mentioned earlier that the purpose was to support.
	You know, one of my most common phrases that I uttered throughout my time is in Ottawa with their senior executive, their officers, we're here to help.
	What kind of help?
	Whatever they need.
	But, you know, we were there to help build and complement any plans and direction that they had.
	There was never an intent, and this was explicit in my assignment.
	We were not going to Ottawa to take over.
	Command and control of the event.
	We were going there to support them.
	Certainly there was a goal to integrate or unify commands.
	This is an event that was clearly now beyond the capability of one signal organization just by its size and the need for resources.
	It stretched well beyond what Ottawa police themselves could provide.
	Which, in my world, that's generally the kickoff for developing a unified or integrated command with others.
	So, you know, that was the focus, to get there, to have a team of dedicated people, of which I only knew one of the people that were assigned to me.
	I was beat.
	I was going to be meeting these people that evening when I arrived.
	I was given a contact with the Ottawa police.
	And later that morning, I got in my vehicle and I started making my way and spent the next four hours on the phone.
	Right.
	So you were in Orillia at 9 a.m.
	And by 5.35 that afternoon, you were in a meeting with the members of the OPS, right?
	That's correct.
	Who did you meet with?
	At that 5.35 p.m. meeting?
	Well, I know I had someone taking minutes for that meeting.
	I know Deputy Chief Trish Ferguson, who I'd known previously, was at the meeting.
	Superintendent Patterson.
	There was a number of other folks with them, both on conference and video link.
	I know that initially, even in my own minutes, it reflected that Chief Slowly was.
	President at the meeting because that was on the invite, but he did not make that meeting due to emergency.
	It was delayed, right?
	I don't recall him joining.
	The minutes don't reflect any comments or whatsoever from the chief.
	My recollection is he did not join the meeting at all.
	All right.
	Now, we heard from...
	Deputy Chief Ferguson from the OPS yesterday, I believe she said that the former chief was delayed, but he did join by teleconference or some other means of remote communication.
	And that is very possible.
	As I said, I reviewed the minutes from the meeting.
	And when you look at all the minutes that we took throughout the event, it's very clear, in my own opinion, who's speaking.
	There was certainly no indication from those minutes that he was there, but it's very possible that he was, that he did join.
	Right.
	Now, if we scroll down, this will say to the next page.
	Right.
	So this is the first dark bullet.
	Planning team held its first meeting at 1735 hours from RCMP headquarter with the OPS, all OPS.
	We're on video or conference call.
	Also note that counsel for the OPS, Christiane Honnold, was present.
	Do you recall her being present on a video conference?
	Yes.
	Okay.
	Now, let's talk about what was discussed at that meeting.
	Tell us what happened.
	You know, we started the meeting by just doing introductions of those that were available from my team.
	My team are still not all in Ottawa.
	They were still arriving.
	But we did have Inspector Tim Skinner from the York Region Police.
	One of my planners from our emergency unit in Orillia, Brad Taylor, was present.
	Superintendent Phil Liu from the RCMP.
	Then Sergeant, now Staff Sergeant Darwin Tetrell from the RCP as well, was present.
	You know, we stated our objective.
	We're there to help.
	What do you need?
	We need a plan.
	Let's start building on what your objectives are.
	And they proceeded to give us a broad overview of their concept of operations for the occupation.
	And it was just that.
	It was a concept of operations.
	We had lots of questions.
	We received an update from Superintendent Patterson, and he was the incident, the event commander at that time, about things that were on the horizon with some potential arrests and some strategic take backs, if you will, in the downtown court.
	We're listening intently just to find out.
	Our goal at start to finish the meeting is to learn as much as we possibly could.
	You can only help when you have a true understanding for what the needs are and to understand those needs.
	And we left that meeting with a commitment from Ottawa Police that they would provide plans to us.
	We asked for e-versions.
	Whatever version they could get to us would be very helpful so that we could see what they have on paper in terms of their plan and then what we would reasonably need to do to complement that plan.
	Also, it was critical for us to have access to them, the Ottawa Police.
	We're there to work with them to get through this.
	So we wanted an established liaison who had the authority.
	To access and provide the information that we would need.
	Was there any discussion at that meeting about the nature of integration between the OPS and the group that you're bringing?
	It was raised by me at that meeting that they would consider integration or unified command and because there's inherent benefits with it.
	You know, from my experience, just about all of my major events that I've been involved.
	What we ended up having here in Ottawa with an integrated command has been my experience.
	You know, whether it's a presidential visit, you still have the police of jurisdiction, you have the lead, or the RCDP because of their IPP responsibilities or internationally protected persons responsibilities under legislation.
	But when you call on multiple organizations to participate...
	They bring their command structure.
	You inject your advice to them.
	You work as a team.
	Ultimately, someone is leading that and makes the final call.
	But as an integrated team, you're all on the same page.
	You're not working in silos.
	You're working collectively with the same objectives and goals.
	Let's talk about the members of this team that you were assembling and bringing to.
	It's called Integrated Planning Cell or Integrated Planning Group.
	That was the assignment to create this Integrated Planning Cell.
	We quickly deviated from the word "cell" and just called it our Integrated Planning Group.
	But yes, I was provided with planners from Toronto Police Service, two planners, Sergeant Arlene Duffy.
	And Constable Isabel Essier, their background and their credentials were impressive in terms of emergency planning.
	I had Inspector Tim Skinner, who I already mentioned, from York Region Police.
	His background is in public order maintenance and command and control.
	Again, a wealth of knowledge.
	I had Tom Warfield from the Peel Regional Police Service.
	Tom came to us with a background in case management.
	To ensure that we were capturing to the best that we could in a very kinetic and dynamic environment as much of the information versions and whatnot as we went forward.
	We had Brad Taylor, a planner extraordinaire from the OPP.
	Brad is a civilian member, but his expertise is in emergency planning.
	We rely heavily on Brad for his expertise.
	Then, of course, we had the two RCP officers, Phil Liu, who became my right arm throughout the event.
	Phil's background was in major incident command, national standards, had an extensive background in training and developing and mentoring people in the incident command world.
	And Darwin Tetrell, who to this day is impressed me incredibly with his leadership.
	In public order command.
	Right.
	He's renowned nationally and connected internationally as it relates to public order maintenance.
	Right.
	So yesterday when we spoke to, when Deputy Chief Ferguson testified and she explained the process of developing a plan, an operational plan, she referred to subject matter experts.
	So this group of people that you're bringing to Ottawa are these Subject matter experts, then, in the various areas?
	Yes, sir.
	In fact, I would say that I was the only one that wasn't a subject matter expert.
	All right.
	I was just brought to bring this team together and get them working and lead our way through this.
	Right.
	Now, we've heard from some witnesses about the importance of operational plans, and I just want your view on what are the components, the key components of a good operational plan?
	Well, the key components have to align with your objectives and your goals, and that drives your strategies in terms of what that operation is meant to entail.
	Certainly, you need to have a clear understanding in creating a mission for the event.
	The mission statement is something that in every event that I've ever been involved in, whether it was a peaceful event, Or not, is something that is critical that your members, your employees, your officers on the ground, everybody is in line with the mission of the plan.
	From there, commanders' objectives.
	And then, you know, what are we looking to achieve with this plan?
	And then every single aspect.
	So if it's a public order issue, you would need, the key aspect there is the public order consult.
	And a good idea, okay, what is the nature and scope of the event and what kind of public order plan would we need to inject with it?
	You need crime, you need victims, you need key things like messaging, communication.
	Logistics is key.
	In fact, major events from a policing perspective when we debrief often are successful or fail.
	On the backs of good, solid logistics support.
	When you get people there, what are you doing with them?
	Where are they staying?
	How are we feeding them?
	What's their duties?
	How are they being briefed?
	That all has to be fleshed out so that when you have people arrive, you have a seamless operation.
	Right.
	Now, we've heard references to an overall overarching plan and sub-plans for specialized Areas.
	So were those what you were trying to describe to us?
	Absolutely.
	And I was speaking with people that I had confidence also were on the same page and understood that.
	Right.
	And in terms of an overall plan or overarching plan, does that refer to something that takes you from start to finish?
	Yes, sir.
	What about contingencies?
	Well, that's always built into your planning.
	When you look at public order as an example.
	It's filled with contingency plans.
	If this is the intent, if it doesn't work, this is our main action plan or direct action plan, and then there would be an alternate action plan if they had to deviate.
	And command and control structure, should that be reflected?
	Absolutely.
	Why is that important?
	Again, you know, when you're developing plans for major events, the ultimate goal is to succeed.
	And in order to succeed, there needs to be, we're police officers, we're creatures of Abbots, there needs to be clear lines of communication.
	There needs to be clear commanding who is in charge, who is responsible for this.
	Right down the line, because in major events, you might have a major event commander, right down to a commander on the ground.
	All have distinct roles.
	Roles and responsibilities are absolutely key to get you through the event in a successful way.
	At the time you arrived on February 8th, did you know if the OPS had experienced planners like the ones you brought to Ottawa to help them develop this kind of a plan?
	I was making an assumption based on my experience with OPS that, in fact, they did have that depth, although some of the ones that I had worked with in the past were absent and I learned I'd retired.
	Because as I said, the OPS have always been renowned.
	We've been there to support them countless times at major events.
	We're different organizations.
	We have different structures.
	But make no mistake about it, they were good at what they did.
	Right.
	So you told us that on that first meeting, at that first meeting, you were shown this strategic concept of operations document, but you didn't have a copy, right?
	You weren't given a copy at that meeting.
	There was references to it on that date.
	I do believe I may have been given a copy.
	And you said you asked for more?
	We asked for more, and they indicated that there was a nod from Superintendent Patterson that any plans that were approved would be, in fact, supplied to us.
	Okay, so we go to the next day, February the 9th, at 7 a.m.
	There's a note in your will say that you weren't getting the plans yet.
	And we go to page three of the will say.
	The second bullet.
	Oops.
	That's right.
	Maybe scroll down a bit.
	Is this page three?
	Oh, that's right.
	So, sorry.
	Scroll up, please.
	Okay, the second bullet, discussion around injunctions and then stress we needed to develop a plan.
	Oh, I'm sorry.
	I think I'm looking at the wrong page.
	Okay, I found it now.
	So, go down again.
	I apologize.
	After February, the heading February the 9th, do you see the second bullet?
	Yes.
	And the last two sentences.
	I learned that everything had to go to the chief before it could be action or release to our team.
	Now, I just wanted to ask you about that.
	What did you mean by this?
	Well, we learned very, very early in our time in Ottawa that the chief was very much engaged.
	And that ultimately everything that they intended to do had to be approved by him.
	Who told you this?
	I heard it from just about every OPS employee that I dealt with there in some way, shape, or form.
	Okay.
	It was very clear to me in my dealings with their senior officers, Chris Riem, whose name is there, Rob Drummond, who was at times working with us in different aspects, Trish Ferguson.
	I didn't deal a whole lot during my initial days with Deputy Chief Bell, but certainly it was very, very clear that Chief Slowly was to be informed of and approving all aspects of their operation.
	Now, in fairness to the former Chief, you did tell us that there was some departure of senior officers from the OPS.
	So isn't it quite understandable that he wanted more things to go through him to ensure...
	That, you know, important decisions are made with the benefit of his input.
	I don't lay blame, sir.
	I look at this.
	This was an incredible event unfolding in his city.
	That was the loss of confidence that you were seeing in the media, in the police service, undoubtedly brought a lot of stress to bear.
	That he wanted to be looped in on everything that was going on.
	I can't fault him.
	And you also mentioned earlier that the OPS counsel, Christian Hanout, was present.
	Yes, I did find that to be, from my experience, to be a little bizarre.
	Why is that?
	Well, needless to say, I've been involved in a lot of major operations over the years, and there's always consult with legal on our legal authorities and common law authorities and the different tactics where you'd make sure that we're sound within in the law.
	However, it was a first time experience to have counsel actually sit through operational discussions.
	But wouldn't it be helpful to have a lawyer around in case any legal questions arise?
	Well, again, as it became more protracted the event, I suppose it could be.
	You know, where you would have counsel there immediately to give advice back on legal points that were being discussed.
	But as we proceeded, it certainly came across a little bit more than that, that she was tantamount to an approver of the action or the plan, which was very concerning.
	It's police operations.
	Okay, so that's the morning of the 9th when you were still looking for a plan and not getting it yet.
	And then around noon that day, you got to meet with the OPS team again, right?
	Yes.
	Where did you go?
	Well, we had called for a meeting to discuss things more broadly.
	And it was downtown Ottawa at the Ottawa Police Station, 474 Elgin Street.
	It was in an upstairs boardroom.
	We couldn't bring all of our team.
	I would have liked to, but we were going to be somewhat restricted.
	And we were still in the pandemic, so we were mindful of all these things still going on.
	So we brought a smaller part of the team, including...
	Craig Abrams, who also joined our team initially, along with Mike Francis, two OPP officers who have been in Ottawa, working already, assisting Ottawa, one from a POU perspective, one more from a strategic command perspective.
	Myself, Tetrell, Skinner, and Phil Liu, and there was another RCP officer, I believe his name is Charles Mason, was present with us at meeting along with the OPS command team and their council.
	Okay.
	Well, tell us what happened at that meeting.
	Well, again, we discussed two different documents that they provided us, their strategic concept of operations.
	That was the same one that you saw yesterday?
	Yeah, very similar.
	And yes, I believe it was the same.
	They're a broader overarching kind of concept of operations for the truck demonstration.
	And we had discussions about that.
	We were asking for numbers.
	There was a Sergeant or Staff Sergeant LeBlanc from the Ottawa Police Service who provided us the breakdown of numbers, what they needed to sustain operations.
	And the number, if I'm not mistaken, was 516 FTEs or police officers to sustain operations at all the checkpoints that they needed.
	We had a lot of debate about that.
	Ultimately, you know, there's some math issues that we came to terms with.
	But again, our goal is there to completely understand.
	We didn't just go in blank and say, "What do you need?
	Here you go." So we had discussions about that, and then we had discussions about an overview provided to us by Superintendent Patterson of an operation at Rideau and Sussex that they were contemplating.
	My notes reflect that it was scheduled for four with the possibility of being moved up.
	To 11 p.m.
	And that night, as I noted, I brought those that I did to this meeting for a specific purpose.
	And, you know, we had discussed it prior to.
	We're going there as a team.
	You have input to give it.
	You know, we have a lot to get done here in a short period of time.
	Let's not pull the whole thing back here.
	So Darwin Tetral asked if he could speak when he was being presented this thing.
	And I do appreciate when I heard the tail end of Superintendent Abrams' evidence that he mentioned the number 400.
	The number in my mind, in my notes, was 800.
	He said, based on his knowledge of PLU, when you look at the dynamics of this event, the number of areas that were blockaded and the work that had to be done, we would need approximately 800 PLU officers to effectively dismantle this protest.
	But furthermore, and the key thing for me, hearing from a subject matter expert with his level of experience, is that once you start this operation, you should not stop.
	And their intention, as it was presented to us, was to kind of do it chunk, to use the words that were used, chunk by chunk.
	And there was recognition that it would be very resource intensive, a significant demand and resources to do it that way.
	But we didn't have a significant number of resources.
	And the best advice I was receiving right at that meeting from our SME is that strategically, if you're going to do this appropriately, when you start your POU action, you should not stop.
	You need to start moving systematically through all the points to shut it down.
	And he suggested that we pump the brakes.
	Let's stop this.
	Let's not proceed with this operation.
	And ultimately, that is what happened.
	Although I did have conversations with the incident commander who was assigned to the operation just by happenstance.
	Is that Burnett?
	Paul Burnett, yes.
	And ultimately, that operation did not happen.
	But that was back to the meeting.
	That is inject into it.
	There was a lot of discussion about resources because when he raised that number, and again, the number sticks out to me because it ultimately was the number of POU approximately that we needed to successfully dismantle.
	So Darwin Tetreault is from the National Capital Region.
	He lives in this area.
	He runs these programs nationally for public order maintenance.
	He is a public order person himself.
	He had given a lot of thought to understanding the zones which had been presented to the day before in terms of all the checkpoints and the key areas of concern in the red zone.
	So, you know, I thought, you know, very clearly he's already put some significant insight in terms of what needs to be done to successfully shut this down.
	So Chief slowly, very passionately and very concerned about the reliability of getting resources.
	He was very concerned.
	That we would come through.
	You wanted guarantees with no caveats that if you're going to say you're going to give us X, you're going to give us X, period.
	No questions asked.
	We just stressed that we're building a plan.
	We have the support of our organizations to get in what is needed to develop a plan to successfully shut this down.
	All right, so you've covered a lot of grounds there.
	Let's try to unpack that a little bit.
	First, with respect to the numbers as it relates to the Rideau Sussex operation, I just want to be clear because we heard some evidence about doubling the number.
	But here it's quite the opposite, isn't it?
	Like they were preparing for an action planning for using 400.
	And you're telling us that according to the subject matter experts in your group, you're going to need 800.
	No, they didn't suggest the 400.
	I think that was Craig Abrams' evidence that he thought that Tetral...
	Suggested that you would need 400 to do it.
	In my view, in my notes reflect that Tetral said you need 800 to effectively because when you start this PLU action, when you start kinetic action in this way, you can't stop.
	All right.
	Which means when you look at the number of areas that the control needed to be taken back, that was his immediate assessment.
	And that proved to be very accurate as our planning assumption of that day.
	And as we then engaged all the SMEs to develop that plan, it was exactly what was needed.
	Does that go back to something we talked about earlier, planning from beginning to end and anticipate the difference?
	It absolutely does.
	Because we did have a number of times throughout my time in Ottawa where there was deviations, sudden deviations from the plan.
	That would impact the broader plan if we were to do it.
	But yes, planning from end to end is always your goal.
	You always like to have lots of time to plan.
	We were planning in crisis mode and doing it as quickly as possible and trying to consider everything that needed to be considered.
	From the residents to victims to the cold weather, the conditions in the City of Ottawa.
	Everything needed to be factored into the plan.
	Right.
	Now, you also said something about the former chief being very passionate.
	Now, I want to take you to your will say at page three.
	Sorry, yeah, page three at the very bottom.
	So here, Chief Slowly was very passionate about the impact the demonstration was having on the city, and he was looking to break the occupations.
	However, they had limited ability to affect this due to baseline levels of staffing.
	I offered that we were there to ensure that he had what was needed to sustain operations, but needed a plan.
	He advised they were working on last-minute plans.
	Does that reflect what happened at that meeting?
	It does, sir.
	So let me ask you this.
	As I understand it, then, you were offering to help, and then you said you needed a plan.
	But putting this in context, Because this happened on February the 9th, right?
	So we're already more than a week into the protest and the commission has heard evidence how that has caused significant social impact on the residents and so on.
	And if the suggestion is that you need a plan before we can send resources, isn't that problematic?
	Because they may not at that stage have even the resources to do the planning.
	So how do they get more resources?
	Well, that's a very loaded question.
	Essentially, you need a plan to be able to communicate with police leaders.
	When you're asking for resources from around the province, and in this case around the country, you need to be able to articulate what that need is and why that need exists.
	And in doing that, it's always about, you know...
	What's my officers going to be doing when they get there?
	What are the logistics?
	What are the plan, the briefings?
	Everything is something that you always provide.
	We're in a state right now that, you know, I learned really quickly that staffing was an issue for OPS.
	Staffing is an issue with just about every policing organization out there for a myriad of reasons.
	So as a regional commander coming into this from another region where you're going to be called upon.
	To provide resources to supplement an operational plan, you're pulling from resources that you have available to police your communities.
	And oftentimes, in a lot of my detachments, we're already at our base level.
	So when you're still, because of a crisis there, you're going to pull.
	You're going to pull them only when they're needed, not to sit around waiting to know what they're going to do when they get there.
	Plan is absolutely critical.
	It can be a concept.
	Because we develop the concept of operations within 48 hours of being in Ottawa, a concept of operations that we ultimately use throughout the event.
	So you can have that, know that you're building this, this, this, and this, and we're going to need to staff those up.
	So let's start preparing that.
	But it can't just be, I need this number.
	You need to know what these people are going to be doing when they get there, right down to where they stay and who's feeding them.
	We're human beings.
	You need those basics in place.
	None of that was in place.
	Right.
	So let's take a look at this plan that they did show you on the 9th at this meeting.
	Could we call up please OPP 50774?
	Thank you.
	So if we go to page 91, please.
	Thank you.
	Sorry, Councillor, can you repeat the page?
	Page 91, please.
	91, thank you.
	So looking at the cover, does this resemble the document that you saw at that meeting on February the 9th?
	Yes, sir, it does.
	And if we go to...
	The mission statement at page 96. So the mission statement simply reads, to end the unlawful elements of the Ottawa truck demonstration and restore safe and open neighbourhoods and businesses.
	What do you think of this mission statement?
	Well, it's a mission statement.
	It wasn't broad enough for my liking.
	You know, it was just really, really...
	We focused and not encompassing the broader event.
	My experience with mission statements, safety needs to be factored in.
	Officers need to know.
	Every officer needs to know.
	It's drilled into them.
	Every briefing, the mission for the operation is drilled into them.
	So safety for the residents, safety for officers, safety for the protesters.
	Charter rights often are embedded.
	You have all those considerations in a more broader mission statement.
	Now, we heard from Deputy Ferguson yesterday that by February the 13th, your group has collaborated with Superintendent Bernier of the OPS to come up with another plan.
	So can we call up that other plan?
	And the number is OPP, four zeros, 1851.
	1851.
	Sorry, can you repeat that?
	OPP401851.
	Can we see the entire front page, please?
	Or maybe the next page has the date.
	There we have it.
	Do you recall this as being the plan that was developed by the 13th?
	Yes, sir.
	And that is my signature on it.
	Okay.
	Can we go to the mission statement at page 8, please?
	So this mission statement reads, using an integrated response, the Ottawa police and policing partners will keep the peace, enforce legislation, and maintain public safety for the duration of the Ottawa truck demonstration with the utmost respect to the individual's charter of rights and freedoms with priority on community and emergency services personnel, safety, and well-being.
	How does this one compare with the one we saw before?
	Well, it is a mission.
	The other one's more an objective.
	This is the broader mission of the entire integrated response.
	When it's all done, we'll have accomplished this to ensure safety for all, involve, maintain public safety for the duration, etc.
	So the mission is your very high level, your strategic direction you want to go in.
	Now, you said a moment earlier that the other one, the shorter one, wasn't so much to your liking.
	But is it a matter of subjective preference or is it something more objective?
	I would say, no, it's more objective.
	I mean, I go back to my training in instant command, my involvement in multiple North American leader summits, presidential visits, G8, G20, First Nations issues, blockades.
	No, we've always been taught very early, you're missing needs to encompass that broader range to ensure how you agree to accomplish your goals and what you're open to accomplish.
	Okay, so your group came and four days later, after the February 9th meeting, you have this plan developed collaboratively with the OPS.
	So I guess...
	My question is, if this can be done within a number of days after your group arrived, why didn't you come earlier?
	Well, that's not a question that I can really answer.
	I went the day that I was asked to go.
	Before then, I was a commander for the Northeast region.
	I was alive to what was going on with the convoy because it came through my region.
	We had an odds plan for that.
	I thought that's a question that perhaps should be posed to somebody else.
	Yes, I'm sorry.
	It is not a fair question to you.
	You were chosen to lead the project.
	You weren't the one who came up with the idea.
	But looking back, knowing what we know now about the OPS capacity to develop something like this, would you agree that it would have been very helpful for a group of experts like yours to offer assistance to the OPS, let's say...
	The Monday after the first weekend instead of on February 9th.
	Yeah, that's a fair statement, sure.
	All right.
	Let's talk about...
	Now, you said the February 9th plan that was presented to your group missed a lot of the key elements of a good plan.
	In your view, the February 13th plan, was that good enough?
	It was getting there.
	I mean, we were, as I mentioned, when you...
	When you're building a plan in crisis, you're ensuring that you are encompassing all key elements to that plan, knowing that there is literally things are going to be continually built into that plan once the event is even finished.
	Yeah, you know, because it's based on your concept.
	You know what you're going to do and how you need to resource it, but you're still continuing.
	The plan will continue to evolve through the duration of the event.
	Right.
	Now, one of the things that you also told us that arose during this February 9th meeting is the former chief's request for...
	He was seeking some assurances.
	He was asking for some kind of a guarantee that the resources would arrive, right?
	And I take it that you disagree that that kind of guarantees could be given?
	It wasn't that I disagree that the guarantees...
	I think we need the context of the conversation.
	You know, there's debate about some misrepresentation of numbers in the media that he had with Superintendent Abrams.
	There was discussion, because he made it very clear, from my view, in conversations I had, that there were people in the ministry that wanted him to fail.
	And he had sources in the ministry that were letting him know that, you know, people wanted him to fail.
	And I just assure them that, well, we're not those.
	We're here to help.
	Well, what about the argument that to plan properly, one needs to know a little more about what kind of resources you can count on?
	So, for example, if the OPS were to develop a plan based on having 1,800 officers available, that plan wouldn't have been very helpful if those people are not actually coming, right?
	Well, I'm going to suggest the opposite.
	If they had a plan, an operational plan that encompassed 1,800 officers with duties assigned in a rotating cycle, then we would have then refined.
	Likely that plan to ensure that it was sound and we could have done that fairly quickly and started our deployment because we actually started deploying officers in our team pretty much on day one as needs were arriving.
	All right.
	Now, if we go back to the will say, please.
	The document number is OPP50792.
	Page four.
	Go down please.
	I'm looking for the sentence.
	Okay, yeah.
	Do you see the sentence, the overall tone?
	Yes.
	The overall tone of this meeting was somewhat unprofessional and disrespectful.
	Chief Slowly was very clearly under tremendous pressure to act and was very suspicious of levels of commitments from police agencies.
	Tell us more why you said that.
	Well, as I said, when we attended this meeting, we fully anticipated to, you know, and I'm not looking, I don't look for thanks, but expected that we were going to be welcome there, that they was going to be happy that we were there.
	You know, the meeting, well, the meeting overall, the tone, I would say, was very antagonistic.
	It was disrespectful in terms of we're there to help, and he's just not trusting it.
	It was very clear he had confidence issues in what we were there to do.
	It wasn't what you expected?
	Certainly not what we expected.
	I think just about everyone on my team at some point in time within the minutes of leaving the meeting received apologies from other members of his command for his behavior.
	Right.
	Now, if we scroll down on the same page a little further, or we may go into the next page then.
	I'm looking for the sentence that starts with after the chief and his team left.
	Right.
	Thank you.
	After the chief and his team left the room, Inspector Debbie Palmer remained with our team, and we again pressed for copies of their plans.
	Eversions, and she stressed the chief's comments.
	That some aspect of their plan had not yet been approved.
	Tell us.
	Well, I want to stress as well, notwithstanding the tone of the meeting, it did not change our resolve.
	You know, we went, Debbie Palmer was the person that was initially, the name that was initially provided to me as our go-to person.
	She was replaced the following morning by Chris Rielm.
	But...
	That's what the chief had meant.
	There still was some last-minute planning going on.
	And she said she would do her best to get it for us.
	In the end, we really never did receive a plan from the OPS.
	Right.
	So at the end of this meeting on February 9th, was there any agreement between the OPS and the integrated planning group on any operational plans going forward?
	Well, we just committed to continue to build and work with this team and to build a plan to complement what their objectives were from their con-ops that they provided us.
	And was there any agreement about the degree of integration?
	No.
	Now, we expect that we may hear evidence from Mr. Slowly that to the extent his approval is required, he gave.
	All the approval necessary on February 9th.
	What would you say to that?
	I obviously wasn't there.
	Because I received no such information of approvals.
	I think it's reflective in the follow-up meetings we have.
	When I would call and say, what's your status?
	Well, we need a meeting before we can...
	We need another meeting for me to understand that before we can move forward.
	So there was no implied.
	Certainly no implied or explicit approvals for anything.
	Commissioner, I saw you looking at me.
	Is that a sign?
	If it's a good time for lunch, we'll take an hour for lunch and come back after.
	Thank you.
	Very perspicacious on you.
	Okay, so they're going to break for lunch and we'll come back in an hour.
	The commission is in recess for one hour.
	La comision le ve puena.
	La comision le ve puena.
	La comision le ve puena.
	La comision le ve puena.
	La comision le ve puena.
	Okay.
	There we go.
	And now, how do I share the StreamYard here?
	Is it this one or this one?
	It's this one.
	Now watch this, people.
	Inception.
	There we go.
	And now we see the chat.
	I don't even know what we're looking at anymore is how confused I am.
	They're on break, so nothing to watch there.
	I can't end that.
	So what I'm going to do right now, I'll just go to YouTube.
	I'm going to get a video that's going to be nice for us to watch as we wind up on Rumble.
	Thank you all again for being here, as always.
	Beyond the black pill, the black pill is always the blackest before the dawn pill.
	We just need to wait for the Dawn pill.
	But I'm going to find something nice to watch on the way out so that we can at least leave feeling slightly good.
	It's going to be a fishing video.
	It's going to be a fishing video.
	Hold on.
	I think I've...
	Okay, here we go.
	Here we go.
	Enjoy, people.
	Enjoy.
	Thank you all for being here.
	Enjoy the day.
	Sunday night.
	Maybe tomorrow we'll see what happens.
	Don't give up and don't give in.
	But don't do anything that will make you feel bad about yourself.
	Everybody, go.
	Enjoy the day.
	I don't even remember what's happening in this video.
	Who wants to see that?
	Go!
	Everyone enjoy the day.
	See you soon.
	See you soon.
	See you soon.
	See you soon.
	Thank you.
	Has my face been in here the entire time?
	Hold on, guys.
	I'm closing.
	I can't see the chat.
	My face has been in here the entire time.
	Have I been doing anything embarrassing?
	I forgot that I was still in this stream.
	Did I pick my nose?
	Oh, jeez.
	I'm sweating because I don't even know if I was doing anything embarrassing.
	Well, that's funny.
	I was watching a video, which you didn't hear, which was me catching...
	Now I'm going to the chat in Rumble.
	You used to be full screen.
	I was sitting here watching a video of me finding that lure.
	In the fish's mouth.
	Well, this is confusing.
	Holy cows.
	Now I'm sweating because I don't think I was doing anything embarrassing.
	Who knows anymore?
	Oh, yeah.
	What do you want to show?
	You want to go for a walk?
	Okay.
	Hold on a second.
	Get out of here.
	Let me see.
	So we've been on pause for a little while, eh?
	You were just sitting bobbing your head.
	Okay.
	Well, here.
	This is what I was watching.
	Hold on.

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