Richard Werner exposes how the Federal Reserve and central banks—privately owned and undemocratic—create money through lending, fueling asset bubbles like Japan’s 1980s crash or the U.S. housing collapse, while suppressing dissent (e.g., his book Princes of the Yen was blacklisted by U.S. publishers). He links bank credit cycles to wars (Fed’s WWI financing) and geopolitical control, citing China’s decentralized banking as a model for growth vs. Western consolidation crushing small businesses. With CBDCs looming, Werner warns of programmable financial tyranny, urging sovereign banks over centralization to revive equitable prosperity. [Automatically generated summary]
You're one of the best known economists in the world, most significant, but you have a story that I think that I didn't know.
And let me just summarize what I understand of it, and then I'm just going to turn it over to you to tell the whole story.
So it's the 1990s, you're living in Japan, a consultant to the Bank of Japan.
You speak Japanese.
And in 2001, you publish a book about the banking system in Japan in Japanese.
It's not published in English.
It's only published in Japanese in Japan.
And that book about the Central Bank of Japan and explaining why the country is in this protracted recession becomes number one in Japan, which is kind of amazing, even in Japan, beating Harry Potter.
And then your life changes completely.
I think this is one of the more significant stories that I hadn't heard.
So if you don't mind, if you could take it from there, explain what the book was about, why people responded to it as they did, and what happened next.
And yeah, it's not so easily available, but I can mention that later.
I was trying to solve some puzzles.
You know, I'd come to Japan, I'd learned Japanese, and I was an economist, I'd studied economics at the LSE, was at Oxford working on my graduate work and doctorate in economics.
And Japan was actually really posing some major puzzles that the world couldn't explain and economics couldn't explain and all the world-famous experts could not explain.
And for some reason, I decided, okay, I want to solve all these puzzles.
When really digging into it, it transpired that maybe I've bitten off a bit more than I can chew.
All the experts were shaking their heads and telling me, you know, oh, give up.
You have to change your topic.
You know, there's no solution to this and you will never find out.
So one of the puzzles was...
Well, there's several, but one was a concrete puzzle.
I was just doing an internship at Deutsche Bank in Tokyo at the peak of this fantastic stock market bubble.
Well, it wasn't called a bubble at the time, you know.
At the time, they were just saying this is Japanese productivity and, you know, this is all it's going to go up more and more and more.
You know, it's only afterwards when they sort of point out, oh, well, okay, that was a bubble.
So in this bull market, Japanese, you know, stock market 1989.
And there were some problems with the official story.
And actually, they led me to conclude also that the stock market was a bubble and it's going to crash and it's going to take the banking system with it.
That's what I then, once I found the answers, that's what I then concluded.
So in 91, I was one of the first to very loudly and clearly state, as a discussion paper I published at Oxford, having come back, that we should be very cautious about Japan.
The international strategists were saying, oh, the Bank of Japan is lowering interest rates, is stimulating the economy.
Stock market has come down, but growth is 6%, 7%.
And the market has become cheap.
Buy Japanese stocks.
That's what they're always saying.
Buy Japanese stocks.
I concluded in 91, based on this research, that's answers to some of these puzzles, that Japanese banks were likely to go bankrupt.
And you see, you have to remember that in those days, 90, 91, the top 20 banks in the world were Japanese.
And the 21st century was going to be the Japanese century.
Japan was in the 80s buying up everything left, right, and center.
Japanese capital flows, flooding the world, buying Rockefeller Center, Petal Speech Golf Course, Hawaii, California, investments in Britain, you name it.
And here I was saying, no, Japanese banks are likely to go bankrupt, and Japan is likely to move into the biggest recession since the Great Depression.
That's what I conclude in 91 in this discussion paper.
And of course, it took a lot of investors by surprise what happened in the following years when to me it was very clear that this had to happen.
Although there were policy responses that could prevent the worst, which I then also proposed.
So I proposed a new monetary policy concept that I called quantitative easing, which has been used and abused and distorted and has been quite popular with central banks, but we'll come to that.
But back to your question.
So what were the puzzles in the late 80s, which led me to all these other things?
Well, one was Japanese capital flows.
They were extraordinary.
The scale was unprecedented in modern history.
But also, not just the scale was so massive, it just was against all the economic theories.
Now, the main theories about capital flows concern, again, interest rates and interest rate differentials.
And Japanese money was flowing in the opposite direction.
Then Japanese investors were also losing money because the yen was rising.
So it was actually a losing trade to then invest abroad.
And so no economic model could explain it.
And that was the task I set myself.
So then I was going around talking to all experts.
I was only a student, you know, this is my first piece of research.
I just graduated as an undergraduate from the London School of Economics.
But I had been thrust into these sort of positions and opportunity.
And yeah, I took the challenge.
And the response was, give up.
you can't find an answer.
But I also then spent a lot of time with practitioners and actually investors that were investing abroad and looked at the institutional investors, life insurance companies and major international investors.
And then I was searching for a link to the other phenomenon, which was pretty crazy and economists couldn't explain, and that was land prices in Japan.
So in 1889, Japanese land prices had reached such stratospheric proportions that if you took the central Tokyo, and it was particularly, of course, the big cities, but the central Tokyo land price to value something like the Imperial Palace Garden, which is a public park, I mean, it's nice, it's large, but it's not, you know, on the scale of things, not that large.
So if you valued that at standard central Tokyo market prices and then exchange rates, it would be the same market value as all the real estate in the entire state of California, including Los Angeles, San Francisco, you name it.
And that is the correct response.
You've got to laugh, I mean, or cry.
I mean, this is ridiculous.
This is totally ridiculous.
Now, my idea was that, okay, there's got to be a link.
We've got these two crazy phenomena.
One is these absolutely nonsensical land prices in Japan.
And the other one is Japanese capital flows, just Japanese money seemingly fleeing the country, buying up the world.
Well, if I was a landowner and these are the land prices, I would say, well, let's quickly buy some land outside Japan or something else, anything outside Japan before people realize that the land price is overpriced, the yen is overpriced, and so on, right?
And so it was going around and, you know, in those days, it's pre-internet.
So I had to literally, you know, how do you do academic research pre-internet?
You had to go to the library, get all the journals indices on topics, your topic indices, keywords, and then physically go through various journals and journals and, you know, 20 years ago, 30 years ago.
So I spent months doing that.
I was looking for some kind of economic model, a paper that linked capital flows and real estate.
Because I thought, well, there is a link.
And there wasn't.
There wasn't.
And I wasn't looking just on Japan.
It could be any country, right?
I mean, you should be able to use the same analytical framework then from another country.
But there wasn't.
I couldn't find anything.
So at the time, the clock was ticking.
And actually, I was a bit in trouble because at the time I was the first foreign research fellow at the Japanese government's development bank, the Development Bank of Japan.
I was the first Shimomura fellow.
If you're interested, we can talk about this, Mr. Shimomura, because he's a bit of another secret, you know.
They didn't tell me like, okay, why is there a prize for him and who was he?
You know, I mean, they treat foreigners very well anyway in Japan, but I was their first Shimomura Fellow, the first foreigner.
And I was invited to all their events and all the clubs and circles, learning baseball, which for a European is kind of unusual activity with the other staff and, you know, Japanese calligraphy.
They give me this huge apartment in central Tokyo, which is part of this Shimomura Fellowship.
And I felt like a bit of a fraud because I can't deliver my part of this deal because there seems no solution.
All the experts, there was one capital flow expert in Tokyo at the Nomura Research Institute.
I knew some people there and they were saying, no, you can't find an answer to this.
And no.
So give up was the story.
And, well, I needed a miraculous intervention.
And actually, you know, I got my miracle.
And I got the I got the solution.
If we have time, I can come back to that and explain how this happened.
But let me just give the answer first.
So I knew the solution.
Now, actually, before then, there was somebody saying, oh, there is a solution.
Oh, I sent him the paper actually recently saying, hey, do you remember this?
So people were telling me in Japan, oh, there's this American and his collaborator, I think Peter Boone, they had written about this topic And they had actually posed the same hypothesis that there's a link between land prices and capital flows.
So they were at METI, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, slightly renamed it now, this famous ministry supporting the economy and trade.
And go there, you know, it's pre-internet.
So they will have the physical discussion paper that they produced on this topic.
So I went there, asked around, and oh yeah, yeah, yeah.
We had Professor Sachs.
Okay.
And there was the paper.
So I went back to my research institute at the Development Bank.
And same idea, which is fine because I was just a young researcher.
I just slightly modify that and I'm okay.
You know, I don't need to discover the, rediscover the wheel or come up with a great insight.
But then I came to that sort of main part and conclusion.
And therefore, we conclude there is no link between real estate, you know, land market and capital flows.
What?
So, you know, at that point, I was really in trouble and I needed divine intervention because, you know, humanly, it was impossible to make this link.
And all the experts were saying there's no link, but there was a link.
And when I understood that, I knew exactly what data to get.
Now, what Professor Sachs and Peter Boone were arguing was that, you see, how if you're a Japanese landowner, you own this super expensive real estate, and now you figure out it's probably better if I buy half of California, let's say.
Which they did.
So let's do it.
They were arguing, well, they would have to sell the land.
Now, who's going to buy Japanese land?
And it was true that foreigners were not buying Japanese land.
It was totally overpriced.
No foreigner would buy Japanese land.
So only other Japanese would buy it.
Oh, but that means the money stays in Japan.
And that means there's no link.
That was their argument, you see?
But I realized that's not how it works because I'd spoken to a lot of practitioners.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, which is, you know, it's quite a highly ranked journal in 2019 by two Stanford University professors about progress in economics.
And they mention that, oh, sadly, we haven't had any progress in macroeconomics for at least a century.
So, and why is that?
So the solution to all this and why economics has made no progress is bank credit.
Now, bank credit, and actually you should say fully bank credit creation.
This is a concept that's been a taboo or a secret in economics.
Banking has been frozen out of economics for a long time.
There's no banks in economic models and theories.
And that's, of course, also why they don't work.
Because in reality, if you ask some ordinary people in the business district of any town, they will tell you, you know, what's important in the economy, they will mention banks.
In fact, I did a survey with my students in Frankfurt in 2011.
My audience was getting larger when I was teaching at Goethe University Frankfurt.
It was only sort of for a few years, substitute professor, optional courses.
So the first one was only 50 students, but next one was already 150.
In the end, it was 450.
Everyone was there also from politics and law.
And so I thought, oh, this is a great audience.
Listen, guys, let's use these numbers.
Let's do a survey.
So I sent them out, you know, because you've got so many people, then if everyone does 10 questionnaires, you know, you're talking big numbers.
So we did a survey of central Frankfurt.
And one of the questions asked was just this question.
Who do you think creates and allocates the majority of the money Supply in the economy, and to make it easier, here's multiple choice answers: the government, the central bank, the financial markets, the banks, and so on.
You know, give a few options or savings, you know, people through their savings, you know, which is another economic theory.
So, and the answer was, just as you said, and you know, you spoke the facts, 84% responded, either the government or the central bank are the ones that create and allocate the majority of the money supply.
Because that's common sense.
You know, it's something very important that clearly affects everything and everyone.
It should be in the hands of the government.
It's what people feel.
But it's not true.
That's not how it works.
And so what is the answer?
Well, of these three theories of banking, which one is correct?
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The replication is debated whether you can always replicate, but certainly you can test.
You can do tests and we can certainly control for certain things.
And that's what I did.
And I thought it's crazy that, you know, you had for over a century this debate between these three theories, but nobody had actually done the scientific things.
Let's find out.
Let's just test with the data and observation which of the theories is in line with the data and which is rejected by the data.
Now, to do this, I needed a bank that would cooperate.
And my plan was, well, I'm going to take out a bank loan and we're going to watch inside the box, inside the banking's accounting, the bank's accounting system, how are they accounting for this and what transactions are taking place when I take out my loan.
The intermediation theory says deposits get lent out.
The fractional reserve theory says that the bank needs to have excess reserves at the central bank and that's then used for the new loan.
And the credit creation theory, you know what it says?
It says when you get a loan, no money is transferred to your, it's transferred away from anywhere else and you just credited new money out of nothing that is not transferred away anywhere inside or outside the bank, which seems quite sort of extreme.
So when the 2008 crisis happened, the central banks were using the so-called DSGE models.
This is a huge, complicated sounding name.
Dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium models, which sounds very sophisticated.
There's some like super bright rocket scientists in there with complex models.
Well, the whole thing is nonsense from start to finish, and it doesn't include any banks whatsoever.
And it's built on really pretty crazy assumptions that are true, perhaps on some remote planet in some very faraway solar system, certainly not in ours, and certainly nothing to do with planet Earth.
I just think as a non-expert, the idea that banks would play no role would not be included in an economic model, a macroeconomic model seems insane because the experience of every person living in the world includes banks.
Well, in fact, you've described now the methodology of the dominant mainstream economics, which is the hypothetical, axiomatic, deductive methodology where you just pose an axiom that you know to be true, so you don't have to check whether it is true.
And if you did check, it's not true, it would be the result.
And then you add assumptions, which you admit are simplifications, heroic assumptions, which are, yes, we know they're not true, but it doesn't matter.
And then you build your model on it.
And that's the approach they use.
Now, this approach is particularly useful if you have a predetermined conclusion you'd like to come to.
Because then you can actually start out with your preferred conclusion, work backwards, then define what assumptions do I need to pose this model.
What axiom do I need to present this?
And then the key step, present in reverse order.
Ladies and gentlemen, let's just, for sake of our assume these and these things, oh, look at this.
The model is telling us, you know, interest rates, lower rates lead to higher growth and higher rates lead to low growth.
What you're saying is, I mean, I believe that there are a lot of people who just never thought that option three, your description of banks, the bank credit creation, could be a meaningful factor.
They just never thought of it.
But there had to have been a lot of people who realized this before the 1990s.
So if it's not publicly known, it sounds like it was hidden.
And I do go through the literature and the sort of history of economic thought.
And there's some very curious things happening.
So, for example, there's John Maynard Keynes, and many people would say, well, he's certainly the most famous economist of the 20th century.
Certainly the one who's quoted a lot, cited a lot, and had some policy influence and so on.
Now, when you look at his writings with the topic of credit creation, bank credit creation, his development is kind of curious.
So when he was young, he discovered it.
There's a book by him from 1924 in which he, the book was on something else, but he stumbled on this.
And he writes, I mean, I'm paraphrasing, something like, and look up my papers, then you'll see the extra quote, but he was writing like, oh, the banks actually are adding to the money supply through their activities.
That's a very important fact that changes everything.
I will return to this later.
You know, that sort of thing.
It's something that will have to be examined further.
That's very important.
Well, six years later, in his important book, Treaties on Money, two volumes, he had moved from the credit creation theory that he clearly had discovered in 1924 to the fractional reserve theory.
He was saying, oh, banks are just intermediaries, but yes, in the system, the interaction is creating some money.
Six years later, he published the famous general theory.
And in that general theory, he'd moved on to the financial intermediation theory.
Now it is, again, the savers who need to save money and then deposit it.
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It's unbelievable.
By the way, one of the drug houses is like walking distance from my house.
Well, you see, in the last few years of his life, he had been, I mean, most people don't know this, but he had been appointed director of the Bank of England.
And you have to realize the Bank of England was 100% privately owned.
And to be a director, you had to be a significant shareholder.
And that is billionaire level nowadays.
So he was doing pretty well moving away from the truth step by step.
He started out research on the Great Depression, where he was beginning to realize banks were a factor.
I mean, he didn't write this, but actually 10,000 banks were busted.
I mean, it's one of the saddest periods of U.S. and world history.
You know, the Fed was created on the pretext, on the main argument, because there's lots of doubters who didn't want the Fed.
It's very un-American, was the general view.
And they were very sneaky to actually get the Fed and get the law passed.
They used some of the rules and how you can schedule a vote.
And they went for the most obscure procedure, which is easy to overlook, that there's actually a vote.
And the vote was on the 23rd of December.
And most congressmen actually weren't even aware.
But in any case, they're already gone for Christmas.
And so it's just the hardcore group of insiders.
And they voted the creation of the Fed.
That's how it was done.
But in terms of arguments, in favor of establishing the Fed, the main argument is the lender of last resort function.
And it's true that if you have a fantastic bank, very solid, strong, conservative, it's doing well, is helping many small businesses, good bank.
If a very convincing, nasty rumor is circulated, and let's say it's effective and people believe the rumor and they just run for their deposits, they all pull out the deposits, that good bank will be in trouble.
That is true.
Of course, there's policies against that that you could do.
But the argument was, well, the best is to have a central bank because they can provide endless liquidity through money printing, which is internal money, reserves, or if needed, if they want cash, the central bank provides the cash, paper notes, and therefore this good bank will not go bust.
And that is sort of convincing.
But when it came to that, beginning of the Great Depression, what did the Fed do?
It let more than 10,000 banks go bust in the nastiest way.
These were banks that were small lending to local businesses, to the farmers in particular.
And they let them go bust.
Now, in the 1920s, there was mechanization of agriculture, you know, tractors and so on.
So there's expensive equipment and the banks were giving the loans.
The farmers were taking the loans.
Now, these banks were bust.
Well, they were taken over by big banks, bigger banks and banks that were part of the Fed cartel.
But to lose 10,000 banks is just such a setback for the economy.
Unbelievable.
Now you'd think, oh, good for the farmers, you know, at least they're out of these loans.
No.
Number one, when the banks went bust, there was no deposit insurance, these families, these farmers, these small businesses, they all lost their personal savings.
All that money they had in the bank was gone.
That wasn't refunded.
Okay.
Number two, you'd think they'd be off the hook from the loans?
No.
The banks were then taken over, bought cheaply, and they still had to repay the loans, but they had nothing left and they were destitute.
Well, the banking systems, once you set up a central bank that's not controlled by the people, then you're in the hands of the central bank.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is 100% privately owned, and that is really the center where all the decisions are made.
You have the Washington board of the Fed, but that's a political shop.
The actual central bank operations are all in New York, 100% privately owned.
And what happened in the 1930s is therefore these farmers became destitute.
The land was the collateral for the loans they couldn't repay.
They lost their land.
They lost their livelihoods.
Some lucky ones became day laborer on the farms that they previously owned.
The unlucky ones starved.
There was starvation in the United States of America of honest farmers.
And it's really such a, I mean, read The Grapes of Wrath by John Steinbeck.
You know, these are better descriptions of economic reality than the economics textbooks where they tell you banks are financially intermediary.
So we don't need to talk about banks.
That's for sure.
So the central banks, when push comes to shove, they pursue the agenda of concentrating the banking system and reducing the number of banks, which increases the power of the central banks.
But we were talking about the three theories of credit creation.
And so conclusion there was I did the empirical test.
Banks create money.
They are therefore the most powerful economic player in the system because they're special.
They have a license to print money.
And the majority of the money supply is created by banks.
Well, so when I published Can Banks Individually Create Money Out of Nothing, I published at the same time another paper which is entitled, How do banks create money and why can other firms not do the same?
Google it is also open access, which is exactly the question you asked, and it's very sensible.
And it gets very curious.
It has to do with accounting.
But I really wanted to get to the bottom of this accounting.
If you look at the accounting, the difference is when a loan is granted.
And of course, we can take a loan from a non-bank.
I mean, there's major non-bank financial institutions.
And companies can give you credit.
And insurers give sometimes loans.
So why can't they do the same as the bank?
And in order to find the answer, I realized one needs to break up the accounting process into further steps.
Because it's clear, if you compare the accounting, the bank balance sheet, when the bank lends, the bank balance sheet lengthens.
You get the loan as an asset.
That's the same for everyone, no matter whether you're a bank or not.
And on the liability side, the borrower is credited with the money.
Now, that's true only for banks.
And non-banks, when they pay out a loan that they give you, they have to draw down something, some money holding on the asset side.
So the balance sheet doesn't lengthen.
So I wanted to find out, okay, what is the thing that allows banks to do it this way?
And it is what in England, which is the home of banking, you know, the first modern bank was the Bank of England.
And in the 17th century, all the banking rules and the laws concerning banking came essentially about in England.
And in England, this is therefore most apparent.
They call it the client money rule.
And there's an equivalent in the US.
In every country, there's a slightly different name.
But it means that if you have client money, then this money has to be kept off your books.
You have to hold it in custody like a custodian.
And you have to put it in practice with a bank and say, well, that's the client account.
That's not my money.
I'm not claiming this.
That would be fraudulent, right?
And you have to be careful.
It can be a criminal offense.
So everyone has to separate client money from their own funds.
And except banks.
They're exempted from the client money rule.
And that means when we put our money with a bank, it's on the bank balance sheet.
And the bank is the keeper of the books.
And if you're the keeper of the books, keeper of the records, you can fiddle the records.
You know, if you put money of a client into a bank, you can't tell the bank, oh, can you please just be a bit creative with the accounting?
It's not going to happen.
But if you yourself, you know, you're the keeper of the record, you can be slightly creative.
So what the bank does is the loan contract, here's how it works.
You're the borrower.
I'm the bank.
You want a loan, mortgage, anything.
And the important thing is the contract that you have to sign, you know, in your own blood, you have to sign it.
The loan contract, the agreement, the credit agreement, mortgage, whatever it may be.
I mean, they're all more or less the same type of instrument.
And actually, I should say this, economists classify banks as, they always say this, when they mention banks, banks are financial intermediaries.
They're deposit-taking institutions that lend money.
But because they're intermediaries, only we don't need to look at this.
And then, you know, they take deposits and they lend money.
Well, if you look at the legal, you know, situation, it's clear that this is not true.
Banks don't take deposits and banks don't lend money.
They will say, you'll find this in your account with us.
They may carelessly say, we've transferred it to your account, which is incorrect because no transfer happens.
Your account will be credited because the accounts payable liability arising from the loan contract is represented or misrepresented by the bank as another type of liability called customer deposit.
And that is the trick you can only do when you're the keeper of the records.
And that's only banks that can do that.
Others have to keep it off their books.
And they can't do this trick of switching the type of liability from, you know, accounts payable liability from the loan contract.
Present that or misrepresent it as another type of liability called client deposit.
So the conclusion is when you borrow money, the bank just writes the number in your account.
And that's what I could empirically confirm because at the bank that I finally found, which was happy to do this and let me look inside their books and their transactions and their system.
And we had all the bankers there.
So we literally were watching what everyone is doing.
The BBC was filming this, by the way.
They haven't used the actual footage yet, but they were there.
Well, they're close to the City of London Corporation, which is the banker's state, a sovereign state inside the United Kingdom or outside the United Kingdom, you can't even say, because the king is not allowed to enter without permission.
So it's not part of his sovereign territory.
And I guess maybe it wasn't considered convenient to air this documentary.
But it's on the record with the BBC.
So when I did this empirical test, which is published in a peer-reviewed journal.
So this is what happens.
The banks create the money and others can't do it because the banking license gives you this power to invent money.
And so that's why it's very important to actually have the right type of banks in your country.
Now, what type of banks would we want?
And it's an important principle I need to explain.
It's very important who a bank is lending to and for what purpose.
And that is because it's money creation.
If it was just an intermediary, it wouldn't be so important because it's zero-sum game.
You now have money, but somebody else is less, plus, minus zero, not a big impact.
If you use it more efficiently, maybe a small impact, but basically not a big impact.
But if it's money creation, there will be an impact on all of us.
Therefore, it's really a public privilege that the banks have to create money.
And the question is, how should that be used?
Now, hopefully it's used in favor of the people.
And it can be, bank credit can be a marvelous engine of enormous economic growth, prosperity, and in fact, abundance.
And that's one message I want to get across.
We can have high, sustainable economic growth, which is very stable and smooth, but very high, creating a lot of wealth for the majority of us.
When a bank creates credit, there's three possibilities.
What has been happening since the 1980s in most industrialized countries, most Western countries, is that banks encouraged by the regulators, by the way, the BIS in Basel, bank regulation, international bank regulation, the Basel framework, they've been encouraging that the banks lend for unproductive asset purchases,
for the purchase of ownership rights, mostly in real estate, but it could also be financial assets, any type of asset.
Now, that doesn't contribute to national income.
It doesn't contribute to GDP.
And if you look at the definition of GDP, it's not in there because, hang on, you're buying this asset, somebody else is selling it.
So big picture, I think what you're, please correct me, but I think what you're saying is that most of us assume prices are set by markets, which is a product of supply and demand.
A lot of people want something, it becomes a lot more valuable relative to its abundance.
You're saying that actually prices are determined by banks.
Yes, and actually it's more than that, because your question implies you're still, you know, we're all influenced by what's mainstream.
And your question is about prices.
And then, of course, the price of money, the interest rate.
And that is what we're being taught.
Think about prices.
It's all about prices, the economy, equilibrium, markets, demand, supply, prices, prices.
Quantities are much more important.
And that's because there's no equilibrium.
That's one of these other ridiculous assumptions.
They just assume equilibrium.
There's never been any evidence of any equilibrium.
So markets are rationed.
Rationed markets are determined by the short-side principle, which have a quantity of demand and supply smaller.
That's the common denominator.
That determines outcomes.
It's quantities.
And what's the most important quantity in the whole system?
The quantity of money.
And where does it come from?
Created by banks.
And then it's important, what is the money being used for?
so I told you one of the three scenarios so far, when banks create credit for asset purchases, you get asset inflation.
That, by the way, will always lead to a banking crisis when it's large enough.
Because once, then, say, after five years of banks doing that, they then, for some reason, maybe the central bank, other external shock, they stop increasing credit for asset purchases.
These asset prices collapse.
But they're the collateral for the loans.
And because bank equity is very small, 10%, and you've pushed up asset price by 300, 400%.
If from the peak they fall by, say, 20%, the banking system is bust.
And that's why we have banking crises.
And that's, of course, also what happened in Japan in the 90s.
Once you analyze this and you understand credit creation, what banks really do, they create money, they create this Ponzi scheme, then it's very easy to forecast, okay, the banking system is bust.
And they, you know, they're bust very often.
We have these recurring banking crises.
But there's also ways to get out of it.
I'll come to that.
But just before I want to tell you the other two scenarios.
So when banks create credit for GDP transactions for the real economy, it will affect GDP growth because asset prices, asset transactions are not part of GDP.
So these bank loans don't even contribute to national income.
You know, the real estate lending and asset lending.
But when banks lend to the economy, to the real economy, we have two possibilities.
Number one, if banks lend for consumption, consumer loans, what happens is these consumers now have suddenly purchasing power.
And of course, they're taking out the loan to spend.
That's why it's called a consumer loan.
So we get more consumer spending.
But have we increased the quantity of goods and services in the system?
No.
So this creates inflation.
So bank credit for consumption is inflationary.
And that's what we had, of course, 2021, 22.
I had the data, data from the Fed was out already in 2020.
So I was one of the first to warn very accurately, this was in May 2020 on my Twitter, sending out messages.
Well, based on this data, it was shocking data.
We have to expect significant inflation 18 months down the road, which is exactly what happened.
Nothing to do with the war in Ukraine.
Nothing whatsoever.
Nothing to do with oil prices, gas prices, and all that supply shock.
By the way, when you go back to the 70s, it's the same.
In fact, when you look at bank credit creation and central bank policies, quantity of credit policies, they created it from 71 onwards, 71, 72, ballooning credit creation in the US, in Germany, in Japan.
And it's a fascinating story because, and we're sort of going off all attention, but it's another amazing story because, and it's a very relevant one because what happened was, I mean, this goes back to before President Nixon detached the dollar from gold, which is a very euphemistic way of putting it, before America defaulted on its international obligations, August 1971.
We had the Bretton Woods system from 1944, where the dollar was linked to gold, and all the central banks participating could at any time switch US dollars, dollar balances in their accounts with the Fed into gold.
That was the system.
Of course, you weren't sort of encouraged to do it, but it was possible.
Now, all the currencies were in a fixed exchange rate to the US dollar.
And the US, as some people had warned, were beginning to take advantage of the system.
The Fed was creating a lot of dollars.
The banking system was creating a lot of dollars.
They were exported at the fixed exchange rate.
You were printing dollars and buying up the world.
And by the late 60s in France, because France wasn't part of NATO, it was not an occupied country.
In other words, it's just another bank transaction.
Okay, you know, this is your gold now.
Of course, we'll keep it.
It's very safe with us.
You know, we'll keep it in custody.
So step number two was then when the French decided, you know, there's Pompey Dou that Charlie de Gold, they decided, well, hang on, we better get the gold because kind of it doesn't really change much if they just switch the name, the label of the account, who's holding the gold, you know.
So they literally sent their Navy battleships to Manhattan.
They docked in Manhattan and they, you know, captain and his sailors walked to the to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and they took out the gold.
Now, this they couldn't allow, the Americans couldn't allow to happen too often.
I mean, it goes back to, and in my books, you know, I've got this story in there, Princes of the Yen also.
It goes back to what happened several times throughout history.
And a good example is when it happened again in England in the 16th and 17th century.
I mean, in China, from the 10th century, they had paper money, which is a smart system, especially because the government was creating the money.
As Western people, the public thinks is happening with us, but it's not, right?
So what was the difference?
So, well, the Chinese had paper money.
In Europe, the rulers, the governments, the princes and principalities thought gold is money.
So what do you do when you're the government and gold is money?
Well, you try to create some gold.
Well, certainly in Europe, and particularly in Germany, where there were 355 principalities as part of the Holy Roman Empire of German nation, each one of them had a court alchemist given a lot of R ⁇ D money to create gold, turn any other base metal or mercury or whatever into gold, which is why, of course, Germany became leading in chemistry because of that massive over-investment in what, you know, alchemy, what was early chemistry.
Well, you put your money, your gold, where it's safe.
Turns out there's some professions that were working with gold.
And therefore, they had safe places.
They had their own little private security team, private army to watch their safe with the gold.
And these are the goldsmiths.
You know, they make gold jewelry for the king and the aristocrats and the rich people.
And so people started to deposit their gold with a goldsmith.
Obviously, you need evidence.
Like, what if something happens to the goldsmith and his son taking over the business denies that that's your gold?
So clearly you need some receipt.
Okay, so that was the convention.
They got a little fee for safeguarding the gold.
Fine, everyone's happy.
But the next step is this.
Let's say I'm, you know, in the province somewhere in Hampshire, in England, and we're neighbors and we agree I'm buying this plot of land from you and we agree on the price and okay, how much gold?
Fine.
So what are we going to do next?
Well, I've got the gold with the goldsmith in London.
You know, okay, I will go and get the gold.
By the way, what are you going to do with the gold?
Because if you're not going to keep it here, then it's kind of dangerous.
Like I'm risking my life going to get the gold, bring it here, and then you bring it back to the goldsmith.
We might as well leave it in the goldsmith and I give you my deposit receipt.
And that's what happened.
So the receipts of deposited gold, of deposited money, became the first paper money in Europe.
Now, so the goldsmiths, of course, realized what's happening.
Oh, nobody's coming to pick up the gold.
That's kind of convenient.
And because, and this already explains the secrecy that suddenly then engulfed the whole thing, because people also realized, well, the goldsmiths have the money, they have the gold.
And if you suddenly get into trouble or you lose your job, you need money, where do you go?
Well, the goldsmiths have money.
So people came there begging for money and asking for loans.
Here's where the secrecy comes in.
Until around 350 years ago, in almost all European countries, it was illegal to lend at interest.
That's Christian rules.
You know, the Bible was against interest and interest was everywhere forbidden.
So the goldsmiths would say, oh, well, yeah, maybe I can lend you some money, but we have to keep this very secret because, you know, of course, I'm going to charge you interest.
Now, so the goldsmiths realize we can lend out this gold that everyone is depositing with us.
Some of it, particularly the one that's like bullion in a standardized size and whatever, we can lend out.
Nobody will realize.
And we keep it secret.
Everyone's sworn to secrecy because, you know, we're doing something illegal here with the interest.
We're charging interest.
That's, by the way, how the bond market was created because it's pretending not to charge interest.
You know, discount bonds where you have no coupon.
You come and you want to borrow money.
Okay, I'll give you 90 and you pay back 100, which is the bond calculation of the that is the interest, really.
But anyway, so all these tricks came about because of the prohibition of interest.
But the goldsmiths then realized next, well, hang on, maybe we don't even need to lend the gold.
And of course, like every guild, any trade association that we're meeting regularly, they were talking shop.
And, you know, how do we deal with this issue?
Of course, we don't want to lend out too much gold.
We might get into trouble.
Also, we need to collaborate.
If some goldsmith suddenly needs more gold, we have to help each other.
Otherwise, everything will come up and we'll all get arrested for lending at interest.
You know, so they were sworn to secrecy.
And one goldsmith, probably the first one to have this idea, said, hang on, guys, I've got an idea.
We don't need to lend out gold.
I'll show you.
So the next, there's always this guy coming every Monday morning.
Okay, so let's wait.
He's coming probably in 20 minutes.
They always want to borrow money.
I've turned him down.
I'll lend him money to show you.
So he comes around.
Oh, please.
Oh, you know, dear goldsmith, I need to borrow this money.
All right, today I've decided I'll lend it to you.
Here's the standard contract.
You know, all the small print, the interest.
Your daughters will be sold in slavery if you can't repay.
You know, it's a standard practice and all that.
Small print.
Don't worry about it.
Yeah, I know.
Okay, it's fine.
Just one more thing.
Before I give you the gold, okay, we said 300 grams of gold.
Here it is.
I will, you know, you sign there.
I sign and I lend it to you.
But I want you to deposit the gold immediately with me.
Well, I need the gold.
I need the money.
Yeah, but you get the deposit receipt.
And, oh, yes, of course.
Yeah, that's all I need.
I need the receipt.
Get it?
So what happened was the goldsmith, loan contract signed, and the goldsmith buying that loan contract, that's an asset on the balance sheet, hands out the 300 grams of gold.
And with double entry accounting, which was created for banking, to hide the truth of banking, it looks all very transparent because you can't see the money creation at first sight in double entry accounting.
So why is all it's all correct?
The borrower deposited the money.
Didn't you see it?
Just deposited it.
Ah, but it is still fraudulent.
It's fraud.
And you can prove this because did this person, the borrower, when they walked to the goldsmith, did they have gold with them?
No.
But they're leaving the goldsmith with a document that confirms they've deposited gold.
Well, how did that happen?
And also, secondly, if you measure the amount of gold at the goldsmith, did that increase?
But it is, you know, there's technicalities and you have to do it properly.
It doesn't mean, you know, you can be careless.
And sometimes when they are careless, it blows up and we have banking problems, you know, and banking crises.
But the regular banking crises are mainly when banks create credit for asset purchases.
And that's what creates these boom-bust cycles.
In the UK, bank credit, 85% of bank credit is for asset purchases.
And so you get these asset boom-bust cycles, banking crises in regular intervals.
In some other countries, I haven't mentioned the third scenario now.
So bank credit for asset purchases, no good.
It's not sustainable.
It's not productive.
Credit creation for consumption is for the real economy, but it's for consumption.
Therefore, it's inflationary.
It's also no good.
It's not sustainable.
The third possibility is the redeeming feature of banking.
And that's why we can turn banking into a very positive, very powerful positive force for creating prosperity and abundance.
Namely, when banks create credit for productive business investment, for the investment in the production of goods and services, implementing new technologies, implementing new ideas, it's actually the driving factor for growth and prosperity when banking supports entrepreneurs that implement new things.
And that's when you get very high economic growth without inflation, without asset inflation.
And so really what we should do is bank credit creation should be mainly only for business investment.
But this is not what regulators do.
Regulators now have not just hundreds, they have thousands of rules for banks.
And banking is the most regulated industry on the planet.
Most of them are useless.
They don't achieve the goal of preventing banking crisis.
For that, we can scrap all these rules.
We just need one rule that banks should only be allowed to create credit if it contributes to national income through business investment.
If banks focus on that, you get very steep economic growth.
That is, by the way, the solution to the puzzle of how some countries have had the most amazing economic growth, taking off like a rocket.
You know, this is another measure of success of macroeconomics is how many countries, you know, we've had this macroeconomics, development economics for 100, 200 years, mainstream economics coming from English, classical economics, neoclassical, it's more or less the same.
And the IMF and the World Bank have implemented this now globally since, you know, since 1945.
Developing countries forced to more or less carrot and stick, you know, to implement these policies that are considered orthodox, deregulate, liberalize private ties, and allow foreign investment to come in and, you know, follow the orthodoxy, then interest rate policies.
So how many countries using this IMF World Bank approach to economic development have actually succeeded and have developed?
You know, we've had 80 years of that.
So it's, you know, it's enough time to actually say, okay, let's take stock.
I thought you were going to say, what about China, for example?
India what You can count them on five fingers of one hand.
The countries that in the 20th century and perhaps early 21st century included have moved decisively from developing country to develop country status, namely, in that sequence, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and China.
Now, with China, if you want to quibble, because it's such a huge country, some parts of it have not yet made that transition, but key parts of China have actually.
And so I think we can include China in this list.
In fact, China is the best example of how this was achieved.
They all achieved it in the same way.
Japan was the first in the Japanese model, which is also what I found in my long research on Japan, and which is described in detail in the book Princes of the Yen.
What is this high-growth system?
It's a magic system for having high growth and prosperity.
Well, China is the best example because most of the time in the post-war era, they didn't follow this model.
Under Mao, it was Soviet, Stalinist, planned economy.
And of course, also looking at banks.
How many banks did they have?
One.
The central bank, the People's Bank of China.
Okay.
Now, after Mao died, there's some to and fro, but then a new leader came to power, Deng Xiaoping, in November 1978.
Deng.
And he was a smart guy, and he gave a speech very early on.
It's the first speech where he was, you know, rising to power.
And he said that, I mean, I'm paraphrasing.
Essentially, he said, let's forget about all this ideological stuff.
I had to be careful, obviously, because there were still hardcore Maoists probably in the room.
But let's not talk about ideology.
Why don't we focus on what delivers growth and prosperity?
Essentially, what he's saying.
You know, it's a famous expression.
It's like, it doesn't matter the color of the cat, whether it's a red cat or a black cat, is what he should have said.
It doesn't matter what we call the system, as long as it delivers and achieves what we want, which is high growth, prosperity, which of course strengthens China.
So everyone wants that.
Let's do it.
That's what he was saying.
And he was switching from ideology to practical empirical work.
And there's another expression, learn truth from facts.
You know, where you get these four Chinese characters, proverbs made up of four characters.
So seek truth from facts.
That's the empirical methodology, not ideology, which dominates economics.
So it was pretty radical for China.
It remains revolutionary for Western economics, where they still have ideology dominating it.
Essentially, their Western type of Mao's little red book is still dominating things in economics.
Whereas the Chinese decided, okay, we've done that cultural revolution, great leap forward, which was greatly backward.
I mean, this all seems to be happening now in Europe, you know, all this ideology and deindustrialization, which is what they tried and didn't really work, wasn't really good.
Now, he had a neighboring country that was performing really well, Japan.
And what did he do?
He went to Japan.
Already before he was appointed, but in the same year, 1978, he traveled to Japan with his experts.
And he knew, I think his, because a lot of, when I was in Japan for 12 years and when I was a student initially, you realized the large majority, the biggest majority of foreigners in Japan is Chinese.
There's many Chinese and among the students, so many Chinese students.
So they know Japan well.
There's generation, generation, they've studied in Japan, speak Japanese very fluently, really know everything about it.
So he came with his experts.
And I'm sure they knew one charming feature, which I also discovered of the Japanese people who are very kind to foreigners.
I mean, kind to everyone, but very friendly and kind people.
They have this additional charming feature that they want to tell you the truth.
But culturally in Japan, there's this interesting thing.
And when you go to Japan and you read some book about Japanese culture, what are the differences?
Usually it's mentioned, oh, in Japan, there's two truths.
Two truths?
What is that?
Yes, the official truth and the real truth.
Yeah.
Well, that's true everywhere, isn't it?
But in Japan, it's culturally recognized.
And so what happened to me a lot of the time when I was in formal meetings during the day, trying to ask questions about, you know, how does this work with this foreign investment, real estate transaction, bank credit?
They would give me answers.
And several times on the way out, one of the group speaking to me would say, Richard, that was, of course, the official story.
Well, let's meet for dinner.
I'll tell you the real story.
You know, the official story is called Tate Mai, which means the facade, the front, the outside, the outer appearance.
And the true truth is hone, the real intrinsic truth.
And this happened many times because Japanese people want to tell you the truth.
And because it's recognized that what you hear in official meetings, government announcements, or even business meetings during the day, that's, you know, that's just the official narrative, but it's not true.
There's a gap.
And that's, by the way, also why they have to work such long hours, because there's a rule that after six o'clock, it's off the record and you can speak the truth in informal setting for dinner and so on.
They did have some banquets, some dinners with sake and Motai flowing.
And that's when they tell you the truth.
And he did ask the question.
He said, I have come.
You know, here's the Chinese leader coming to Japan.
These countries were at war, Second World War.
And it was not just making peace.
It was literally he was saying, thank you for receiving me.
I have come to you to seek the elixir of high economic growth.
He was alluding to this legend that both the Chinese people know and the Japanese people know, namely that there's this legend there was an ancient scholar, one of the sages with a long beard and the flowing gowns from China going to Japan seeking the elixir of life, which is a bit like the, you know, Philosopher's Stone, the alchemy, you know, which, you know, is probably the link to money creation.
But anyway, and it's a famous story.
Now, he didn't find the elixir of life in Japan, but you know, this Chinese scholar seeking it.
So he was alluding to that when he used that expression.
Everyone knows.
And, you know, of course, the Japanese know that their culture, the writing, you know, so much is from China.
Actually, there is a close relationship, you know?
And I think both peoples actually quite appreciate each other.
It's usually, I must say, you know, it's like foreign policy neocons from the US who want these countries to be apart.
It's like Germany and Russia must be apart.
But anyway, so, and he told him that, you know how the Japanese reacted when he said, I've come to you to ask you what is the secret of high economic growth, the elixir of high growth?
They told him.
Now, what did they tell him?
Well, it's not recorded.
You know, there's no transcript of this dinner.
But we do know what he did after that.
And I can imagine the conversation.
Probably the first question, and these were all senior people from the Ministry of Finance, Bank of Japan, bank leaders.
I can imagine they will have asked, okay, so how many banks do you have in China with your, I don't know, at the time, maybe five, six hundred million people, already a multiple of Japan.
You haven't even finished your explanation of the meeting between Deng Xiaoping and the Japanese leadership.
And you've just here's what I think you're saying or about to say that one of the problems with China's economy was that one bank could never efficiently allocate credit, which is the driver of the economy.
You've made that case, I think, really powerfully.
And so you said what you really need are smaller banks because they can more precisely allocate credit to different parts of the country that have different needs.
And if you don't have that, you have like stagnation and inefficiency and like death.
And that kind of describes what's happening in the United States.
In fact, I did a study on the U.S. with my collaborator, former PhD student of mine, because America still has just about the largest number of banks in the world, although the number used to be a multiple.
The Fed killed 10,000 banks in the 30s.
It killed 10,000 banks, almost 15,000 banks in the post-war era.
Central banks want to consolidate and reduce the number of banks, but the more banks, the better for an economy, for the country, for the middle class.
What we found in the study is we looked at what is the link between the size of the bank and the size of the borrower.
And what we found, I mean, it makes common sense, but it wasn't really demonstrated properly in the research by others yet.
It's a simple fact in banking.
Big banks want to do big deals with big customers.
Makes sense.
That's how they earn big money.
Who lends to small firms?
Only small banks.
Now, why are small firms important?
They're the biggest employer.
Small and medium-sized enterprises employ 65, 70% of everyone in every country in the world.
In some countries, it's 70, 80% of employment.
When you study finance and I'm teaching finance at several universities, basically they focus on companies that issue stocks and shares.
Well, that's such a minority.
99.9% of companies don't issue and publicly trade stocks.
They're not listed in the stock exchange.
They are small firms.
Where do they get money from?
Small firms, you know, 99% of the companies are small and medium-sized enterprises.
They get their money from, I mean, internal money, friends and family, yes.
But external money is only from banks.
Now, which banks?
If you have an economy that's mostly dominated by large banks, extreme case is the UK.
Five big banks dominate the banking system.
85% of deposits with five banks, the big five.
Then because they want to do big deals, they don't lend to small firms.
Everything is affected, even fertility, because if everyone has to move to the big cities where property is more expensive, smaller apartments, small dwellings, can't have another child.
So many things in society are actually affected directly by this trend.
And this trend has been driven very hard by the central banks.
They want to reduce the number of banks.
Sometimes it's official like the ECB.
We think Europe is overbanked.
There's too many banks.
And the ECB is the youngest major central banks.
It's only founded around 2000.
And it's already managed to kill 6,000 banks in Europe.
Wow, well done.
So it's very sad.
Now, Germany in Europe used to be the country with by far the largest number of banks and still is the one with the largest number of banks.
But in the last 20 years, under ECB pressure through their policies of reducing banks' profit margins, you know, zero interest-negative interest rate policy, and then this over-regulation made life so hard for small banks, they had no choice but to merge.
That was the goal and that was achieved.
So the number of small banks goes down.
And that means banks lend less for productive business investment.
The best way to make sure that banks create credit for the best of these three scenarios, you know, to make sure they don't lend for real estate or for consumption, but mainly for productive business investment, is to have many, many small banks that lend locally to small firms.
And that was the system in Germany.
But it's been under threat.
But it also, you know, while Germany was doing well until a few years ago, Germany produced the largest number of hidden champions.
Do you know what these are?
These are special small firms that that's why hidden, because basically we don't know the names of all these small firms.
They may be dominant in their market niche, but they're so small we don't know the names.
And you can look internationally where these hidden champions, champion because they have top one, two, three market share, gold, silver, bronze, like a champion in the Olympics.
That's where this concept comes from.
And if you look internationally, Germany had by far the largest number of hidden champions of any country in the world, much more than China, Japan, even the US.
And it's because of this extremely decentralized banking system with all these thousands of small local community banks.
But by now, the numbers already dropped a lot in the last, particularly under the ECB, last 20 years.
But that explains why Germany in the past did very well.
But that's now being eroded.
And it's the same in the US.
The US has been, in the past, a very strong economy because there were so many small banks, local banks communities.
So, the fewer sources of bank credit you have, the more centralized your society is, the more control there is in a smaller number of hands, the less democratic your country is.
Well, you know, if you go back to Japan's relationships with other countries in the world in the 60s and 70s, particularly 70s and then early 80s, it became clear the one country that was most unhappy about Japan was the United States of America.
They had one political initiative after another to try to force the Japanese to change their economic system.
Structural impediments initiative, this, that, and the other.
No, no, this is unfair.
You must change all your business practices.
Now, officially, in terms of the economics, the argument was always, we want to help you become a stronger economy.
Are you sure?
And, you know, it didn't work politically.
So the central bank was used essentially as a traitor to blow up the system.
It's the same in the Asian crisis, you know.
With the Asian crisis, I was sent, I was at the time at the Asian Development Bank, and I was sent as an official representative to the government and central bank of Thailand to analyze what's going on with this Asian crisis and what are the right policies.
And it so quickly emerged the same mechanism, the same goals as in Japan.
This was to destroy the success, blow up the system, create a crash, create a crisis, and then also IMF forcing them to open up to foreign investment.
And because there was so much growth and prosperity, but the Western big owners and banks didn't have any ownership in this.
And the Asian crisis and Japan, Korean crisis was a way to force it open.
And they even then sent me the actual copy of the magazine.
But there was no article of me.
It was like last minute.
They even forgot to take me off the distribution list.
So I called them, thanks for sending this, but where's the article?
Where's the interview?
And they explained, well, we had to kill it because of pressure.
So that happened on the one hand.
But, you know, still, I mean, I would say more than half of the time my interviews got through.
I thought at the time, well, it's pretty controlled.
I now realize with hindsight, that was pretty open because once I went to the UK, it was like fully controlled.
And, you know, I did not have this media access anymore.
But it was only in Japanese.
So one day I got a call from a Reuters journalist.
Well, from Reuters, this and this name, British guy on the phone, apparently.
And he mentions my book.
Oh, so I thought, oh, that's impressive because it's all in Japanese.
And usually, you know, the foreign journalists, they don't speak Japanese.
So I was quite curious.
And I expected, you know, he wants to interview me on the book.
And then he's, oh, no, no, it's no, sorry.
It's about your book, but it's a personal matter.
Really?
Personal matter?
Yes, I'm calling.
It's a private matter.
I want you to help my wife.
Right.
Well, I'm confused.
Can you explain?
Well, you see, her job is to translate your book.
Well, hang on.
This book has been translated.
It's a great translation.
I helped with it.
The publisher, we sat together.
We, you know, we were really wordsmithing every sentence to make sure it's got the right news.
I wrote it in English, yes, but it's a very good translation.
What do you mean?
Her job is to translate my book.
Yes, her job is to translate it back into English.
She's given a very tight deadline.
And, you know, if you give us the manuscript, the original English, then she's done with her job.
Excuse me, what?
You know, I own all the language rights.
I've sent it to some American publishers.
I'm still waiting for the result.
This is like a pirated translation.
I'm sorry.
I mean, I'd love to help you and your wife, but I can't do this against my own interests.
So I had to decline.
Now, he did say where she worked, and it was one of the major, I don't want to say it, I don't want them to get in trouble even after, even though it's 20, 24 years ago, but it was one of the major places in Japan that are more considered official where you'd also think, well, hang on, why do they need to read this in English?
Because the Japanese people are quite happy.
If something is in Japanese, they will only read the Japanese.
You know, you've got a choice.
Nobody will say, okay, I'll read the English.
So it was clear there's somebody outside Japan who wants to read this, but who could use one of the major, what's considered government institutions as a translation bureau.
Well, the puzzle was solved a few months later when somebody came to visit me from America, from Washington, head of one of the think tanks and the Congress.
I had met him before.
He knows me.
You know, he's doing Japan.
He wanted to, a lot of people came through to see me on Japan and asked me on my analysis.
And so, you know, we met and first thing he says, Richard, great book you wrote on Japan.
Princes of the Yen?
Well, hang on, you don't read Japanese.
No, of course not.
No, I don't.
But, you know, the translation is circulating in Washington.
And then...
And then, you know, a few months later, I got the call from the U.S. Embassy.
It was, you know, clearly a Japanese lady working there, very polite, as you'd expect.
Professor Werner, we have a request from the U.S. State Department.
Actually, somebody suggested when I told them the story that that also was my opportunity to ask for something, like, you know, be president of one of the Federal Reserve Banks in the U.S. as part of the deal to stop talking about credit creation.
Actually, it reminds me, I need to finish another story I started.
You know, I told you about Keynes moving away from the truth.
Well, I spilled the beans on what is the most powerful mechanism for both economic growth and prosperity or arranging for the boom-bust cycles.
And of course, this is something that's been happening across the globe in the last 200 years quite a lot.
And I was mentioning names.
And I did, okay, I need to tell you to finish that before we come back to the, to Ben Bernanke and colleagues.
After that visit, all the US publishers sent back their polite letters turning down my book.
I mean, imagine this is a book that was the number one bestseller in Japan.
It did have a chapter in it on the US.
There was a link.
I had a chapter on Asia, the Asian crisis, same story.
And I had a chapter on my encounter with Alan Greenspan.
And based on that encounter and some analysis, I concluded, and that was in that chapter, that actually the Federal Reserve is on track, and Alan Greenspan was still heading it at the time, was on track to create the biggest asset bubble in history.
And they will do likely the same as in Japan, and it will be a crisis.
It will be a bust.
But because it's America, it's going to be a global financial crisis.
That was in my book.
It's published in the original Japanese in 2001.
Now, I then found one publisher that has a, I don't want to mention the name, it's a very good name.
And they have international offices, global, excellent pop reputation, and their U.S. operation is quite independent, has editorial independence.
And I met to, I sent the whole manuscript to the CEO of their US side and their excellent distribution in the US.
And then I went to New York and I called him and said, I happen to go through New York.
Can we meet?
Of course, we met in the four seasons.
The first thing he said when he saw me is, Richard, thanks for sending me your book.
I read your book.
It's the best business book I've ever read.
That's what he said.
Of course, we'll publish it.
So that's how the lunch started.
And I thought, well, this is good.
This is starting good.
I better immunize him a little bit on what's going to happen next.
People will approach him, and I experienced this in Japan.
They will say that this is a dangerous book.
That phrase was used.
Some particular journalists working at the New York Times, but probably also rather, you know, in the mockingbird style, perhaps working for some of the agencies, they did some sort of activism against my book because I wanted a book launch on the Japanese book for the foreigners and foreign journalists in Japan at the Foreign Correspondence Club.
And the head of the foreign correspondence told me that these U.S. journalists were really trying to block that.
Anyway, so I told him, you know, they will say this is dangerous.
You see, my first article after, you know, after I published this paper in Japan for the Development Bank in Japan solving the puzzle of capital flows, was credit creation was the answer.
And it's still the only paper to explain Japanese capital flows with credit creation for asset purchases explains capital flows and also this huge outflow and the collapse.
It's published then, it takes years with these academic journals, published in 1994, land prices in the Japanese asset bubble and capital flows.
And so that I'd sent to the economist at the time because it also I'd taken the next step because I realized this is so powerful.
I can explain capital flows, but I realized with this, I can explain almost everything.
I can explain Japanese GDP growth and that worked.
I can explain the ups and downs of the business cycle.
I'm now expecting a credit crunch and a banking crisis.
So because I linked it into a macro model, there is one very simple macro model that links money in the economy, which is quite famous throughout modern economics in the last three, 400 years, actually, the so-called quantity equation, MV equals PY.
PY is prices times, for some reason they use Y for real GDP, real income, because the I had been used for investment by Keynes already, then used Y for income, real income, times prices is nominal GDP.
So really we're saying money, M, times a constant velocity equals nominal GDP.
That's what it says.
So there's a direct link between money supply and GDP.
But the relationship broke down because velocity wasn't constant and it was all over the place.
And that's when monetarism failed in the 80s and people thought it's not working.
But what I realized was that that equation is wrong.
Number one is it assumes that all money creation is used for GDP transactions.
But what about credit creation, money creation used for asset purchases?
Which, of course, since the 80s has ballooned.
And that explains the velocity decline, you see.
That explains it.
So I realized we have to have two equations.
One is the money going into GDP, the real economy, and money going into asset markets.
And I did that, and it worked.
Well, how could I do that?
Milton Friedman himself, at once they said, oh, I wish we could divide money into its use.
Well, we can.
If we understand the money creation process, which is credit creation, the credit data you can disaggregate.
Credit for the real economy, credit for asset purchase.
And that's what I did.
So I call it the quantity theory of disaggregated credit.
It's really the general quantity theory because it turns out the ancient MV equals PY is a special case.
I've got the general case, which is credit as money and divided into the two flows: money for the real economy, money for asset prices.
Anyway, so that's what I did at the time.
I sent this to the economist.
They wrote a brilliant write-up, a whole page on my work.
This was the economics editor at the time.
And because this is pre-internet, now anyone who wants to read this, it was in the public domain.
I'd presented this at various conferences, Royal Society Economic Conference, and an Asia-Pacific conference.
Anyway, but people had to write to me.
Who wrote to me?
It was the Bank of England, Ross Childs, J.P. Morgan, and oh, the Fed.
Now, they were like, there was a fax, there was a phone call at Oxford where I was in the Institute of Economic Statistics.
And it was like urgent.
Everyone's telling, the Fed, the senior people from the Fed, they need the paper.
We need it yesterday.
So, okay, and I sent it to all of them.
I never heard back from anyone, but they were all clearly curious about because, you know, in the write-up, the key words credit creation were mentioned.
And, you know, my whole approach was mentioned.
And the author is a good economist, Clive Crook.
You know, he wrote, you will hear more about this.
Or perhaps he expected it to spread faster.
He perhaps underestimated the resistance against the truth spilling out.
He may be at some other meeting.
I think he's still writing maybe for Forbes.
I can't remember.
Yeah.
Anyway, so there was this write-up.
I sent it out and then the Fed had wanted to see it.
So later, when I was actually also thanks to that write-up, I got job offers from various investment banks to be their chief economist in Tokyo.
I was interviewing with Goldman Sachs, had an offer from Swiss Bank Corporation to be head of research, and then Jardine Fleming offered me their job as chief economist, which I thought, that's not bad, you know, for my young age of what was it, 25 years old.
So I took that, went to Tokyo, because they gave me the leeway to implement my credit creation model.
And so I quickly rose to being one of the top economists in the various surveys, Institutional Investor Survey, Greenwich Survey, a top three economist on Japan, because my forecast worked.
If you use credit creation, it works.
You can forecast what's happening, what's going to happen.
And so they sent, and these firms send you around the world.
You sing and dance for the institutional investors.
You're on the sell side presenting.
And you get some really tough questions.
It's a good way to get feedback and get critiques of your theories and models.
So they've been pretty much tested against a lot of resistance.
And when I was, and of course you go to places where there's money, so New York, Boston was also part of the itinerary as you're going around the world.
But I managed to arrange an afternoon in Washington.
And then I went to see the Fed and the senior economist at the time wanted the paper.
We had a good meeting.
And so I asked him at the end.
So, you know, who was that senior board member you had mentioned wanted to read my paper?
Oh, that was Alan, of course.
Oh, okay.
Alan Greenspan.
Great.
So it made my day.
And then another two years later, there was the annual, you know, biannual meeting of the IMF.
And the World Bank is outside Washington.
It's somewhere in the world.
It happened to be in Hong Kong.
And my investment bank, the Asian headquarters, was in Hong Kong.
So they had a big dinner with all the big cheese people there.
And I managed to get myself to come over from Tokyo.
And there was Alan Greenspan, usually crowds around him.
And all the top guys, you know, finance ministers, central bank governors, everyone there.
And at one moment, crowds had receded.
Okay, my chance.
I'll go and talk to Alan Greenspan, introduce myself.
And I'd prepared this chat-up line, which I then immediately used.
May I, excuse me, may I introduce myself?
My name is Richard Werner.
I believe you've read some of my research.
And of course, you'd expect, this is four years later, you'd expect him to say, your research?
And I'm like, uh, would you venture to comment on my paper?
Next surprise.
You know what he says?
Can't remember.
Turns around and walks away.
Hang on.
It's just proven that he remembers every single detail of this.
But he clearly didn't want to talk to me.
So that was kind of scary.
And so when I got back to Tokyo, we had the system called Reuters 3000.
You know, it's all sort of pre-internet or very early stages.
So I looked up Greenspan's publications, his speeches, anything written, anything uttered by him, because, you know, he said it, Richard Werner, credit creation, the key words.
So, you know, when and how and how often has he used credit creation in his, and he, you know, he was central bank chairman of the board of governors for, what, 18 years?
So, you know, and, you know, he's been prolific in his, in his utterings and speeches and publications.
You know how many times he's used credit creation?
Now, of course, I knew through this encounter that he knew extremely well why this is so important, so powerful.
He knew this very well.
That was very clear.
But he was playing ball.
This is a taboo.
He's never used it.
And I thought, ah, that can't be.
There must be something.
I kept searching.
And then I discovered there's a book edited by Ayan Rand.
And he wrote a chapter in it in 1967 when he was not yet at the Fed.
And it's about, oh, credit creation and how gold is a much better way to run the system because once you give central banks this much power, they will create too much credit.
Basically, when you read it, he criticized the Fed for creating the asset bubble of the 1920s in the US and then the Great Depression in the 1930s, which was the Fed's job.
They did that.
And it wasn't an accident.
And of course, the Bank of Japan was doing the same thing in Japan.
So I realized, wow, this is how it works.
He then was offered a job at the Fed, but he was basically told never to talk about this again.
And the same is true.
Now, back to Ben Bernanke.
He started to work on credit when he wrote about the Great Depression.
And, you know, there's some papers, but he hadn't discovered the credit creation aspect, like banks create money out of nothing.
He'd never written about that.
But, you know, he's more and more writing like, oh, we need to look more at credit and banks.
Why do we drop out banks?
We need to understand what's happening there.
This sort of thing.
That was his work.
Until 1993.
This is ready after my first paper was out.
And I think the Fed decided we need a counter argument now.
And there was this paper by Bernanke with a headline, credit creation and the macroeconomy.
Wow.
That's like, wow, this is what I'm talking about.
So I read it.
And you know what he says?
Oh, credit creation is the financial intermediation of banks gathering deposits and then lending them out.
He's defined it away.
There was no credit creation.
And then he also writes, oh, I used to write a lot about bank credit, but it's not so important.
Mea Kulpa, even in a footnote, I was wrong writing about bank credit.
It's not so important.
And where was this thing published?
Federal Reserve.
Federal Reserve Publication.
That's where his career started.
And his career then took off and he became chairman of the board of governors of the Fed, but he would never talk about it.
Now, when he did use the knowledge was when he copied my quantitative easing.
And I must mention this, because of course, you know, I said earlier, once you create this asset bubble, you get a banking crisis.
But it doesn't need to be a 20-year recession.
It doesn't need to be a 10-year recession as a result.
It doesn't even need to be a one-year recession.
You can have an immediate recovery and you can get rid of the non-performing assets in the banking system just like that at zero cost to society.
So whenever they say, oh, we need to use fiscal money, we need to have national debt now based on this bailing out the banks.
And now we need austerity.
All the ordinary people need to tighten their belts now.
This is all a lie.
We don't need any of that.
It's just an accounting problem.
And the central bank has the tools to legally just change the accounting such that there's no more problem, namely.
And this is my original proposal.
So I published this in the Nike, Nien Keze Shimbun, the main newspaper, financial newspaper, daily, highly respected, big article, 2nd of September 1995, headline, we can have a recovery and high growth through quantitative easing, which was my proposal.
And I explained bank credit creation.
So the first thing is, you know, we have to boost bank credit creation for the real economy.
And here's how to do it.
And I have basically, there's three things the government could do.
And so, you know, simplistically calling it just QE1, it's the first thing, QE2, second type, and then the third measure.
QE1 is for the central bank when you have a bust banking system with all these non-performing loans.
The central bank can just buy them up, of course, at face value, as if they were still valued at 100 at par.
And the banks clearly will be very happy about this.
Their balance sheet will be very strong.
They will be more liquid than ever in their whole history.
You've solved the banking crisis.
There's no more banking crisis.
Now, you could say, well, hang on.
Aren't we just shifting the problem to the central bank?
Well, no, because the central bank doesn't have to mark the market.
You can just forget about these holdings.
But hang on.
Isn't the central bank now creating money?
Aren't we paying for this through inflation and a weaker currency?
No, because it doesn't create money.
Because money creation is when the banking system creates credit and injects it into the non-banking system.
But this is a transaction within the banking system between the banks and the central bank.
The central bank buying non-forming assets from banks, it doesn't create money at all.
It just cleans up the bank balance sheets at zero cost to society.
Whenever the central banks don't want a banking crisis to turn into a major thing and recession, that's when they do it.
I'll give you two examples.
August 1914, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland declared war on Germany and her allies, which meant the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire.
Okay, so that's how the First World War started.
Britain declared war, just like with the Second World War.
The trouble was, I think the next day, the Treasury, the Bank of England and the government got visitors from the British banks.
And they said, maybe clutching some balance sheets and documents, sorry, you've declared war.
We're bust.
Well, how did that happen?
The British banks were bust.
Not all of them, but quite a lot of them.
Well, London was the number one financial center for everything.
So even for bills of trade, bills of exchange, and financial settlement between Ottoman Empire and Hungary, often it would go through London.
London was the place.
And of course, often also pound denominated.
That was the most liquid international currency, you know.
And because now all these countries, these are major countries, Germany, Ottoman, Austria-Hungary, they're now considered enemy country.
All the paper held by British banks were deemed non-performing.
Because irredeemable enemies...
Of course, how do you get the money?
So, and it was large enough for the banks to be busted because capital is not high in banking, 10% or less.
So you quickly reach that point where your equity is wiped out and you're bust.
Now, because Britain had just declared war on all these countries, Was it a good moment to have a prolonged banking crisis, recession, economic depression?
May I ask you since you brought up the First World War and we're on the cusp of war right now, potentially a global war, what is the view of war by the banks?
Like, what do the banks think of it?
You've described the banks as the single greatest control mechanism of human behavior in a society, I think.
Particularly the central banks, because they have the bigger the bank, the more the power, but their power extends beyond just their relations with other banks.
Their power determines a lot of what happens in your country.
And they're not under the control of voters, right?
So it's an extra-democratic institution, which happens to be the most powerful, which is crazy.
Well, central banking and warfare are very closely linked.
As I said, I mean, the modern major bank, the first modern major bank and central bank was the Bank of England, of course.
And in the very act, law, act of parliament, the law founding it, it says this institution and mechanism, because they didn't want resistance, they don't mention Bank of England.
What we're doing here is establishing a bank of England.
They kept that secret.
We're doing a mechanism, a new mechanism by these investors to raise and lend a lot of money to the government, namely by establishing a company.
We'll be allowed to establish a company.
That's the Bank of England.
In order for what?
In order to wage war.
It was in order to make war.
they're closely linked Exactly, the Act of Parliament establishing the Bank of England.
It said the purpose is to make war.
Do you know why the Federal Reserve was established and there was a rush to establish it for 1914?
I mean, you know, gathering everyone on the 23rd of December 1913 when nobody was there.
And then also introducing income tax.
That's also the Bank of England.
It was established together in the same act calling for establishing new taxes.
Why?
Because when you have these central banks, privately owned central banks established, it's basically this trick where these entrepreneurs persuade the government, oh, you don't want to make, you know, you don't want to issue money, issuing money, we'll issue money for you.
What?
That's what they're essentially saying without being so direct about it.
But that's what they want to persuade governments to give up the power to create money themselves.
We'll do it for you and we'll lend you the money.
And henceforth, well, how do we get our money back?
Well, we love to lend to the government because you can raise taxes.
And that's why taxes were introduced.
The federal income tax didn't exist before the creation of the Fed.
Yeah, well, it was really at the pinnacle of the war economy.
There's no doubt about that.
It's very clear.
And the same is true, of course, for the other side.
Now, from 1917, the U.S. and Germany were at war, which is very sad.
A lot of Americans are of German descent, and Germans didn't really want to be at war with Germany, but that's what happened.
So we've got these two countries at war, sad, soldiers dying in the trenches, and their economies organized as war economies at the pinnacle of the war economies are the central banks.
So who were the key players in the German central bank, the Reichsbank, which was 100% privately owned?
Was somebody called Max Warburg, or Max Warburg, you might say in English.
And who was at the pinnacle, in fact, was a founder of the Federal Reserve, and who was the key person there.
It was somebody called Paul Warburg, Paul Warburg, his brother.
But of course, the soldiers have to kill each other.
And of course, I don't want to just pinpoint the Warburg family, but I mean, there's other families and there's many families.
There's JP Morgan, you know, and there are various backgrounds and, you know, ethnic backgrounds and whatever.
But the principle is we do have...
Well, yeah, bankers, Particularly, those that are close to central banks and maybe are private owners of these central banks.
And the Reichsbank was 100% privately owned.
And, you know, when I mentioned Keynes, you know, when he became a director, he must have been an owner of this privately owned central bank because they have these rules.
If you're a leading person, well, you must be a leading shareholder.
You know, that's how it works.
So now I just want to give you the other example of, you know, to prove this point that you don't need to have a crisis and a recession, even when the banks are busted.
Because the second key example is 1945, Japan.
Even Japan.
So the Bank of Japan knew very well how to get out of these problems because in 1945, it was much worse.
The banks were 100% bust.
They were lending to the government East Asian Greater Prosperity bonds, basically war bonds of a country just defeated.
You know, you could trade them in the flea market for almost nothing.
And secondly, forced munition loans to the military industry, most of which was also bankrupt or was not even in Japan any longer because the country of Japan shrank a lot after 45.
The whole of Manchuria, no longer under Japanese influence.
Taiwan and Korea were intrinsic parts of Japan until 1945 for half a century.
Of course, these were added during the Second World War.
But Korea and Taiwan were already for 50 years were part of Japan.
1905.
Exactly.
So these banks were bust because all these loans had no value.
It's like 100% non-performing loans.
What do you do?
Is 1945 a good moment to have a big banking crisis and long recession?
No, because they had bigger problems.
You know, most cities were devastated by these incendiary bombs and the carpet bombing of civilians, also like in Germany.
So then you don't want a banking crisis and recession.
What do you do?
You don't need to have one.
The central bank buys the non-performing assets at its face value and the problem is solved.
And that's what they did.
So you can't tell me the Bank of Japan didn't know what to do.
That's QE1.
Now, I was quite convinced that even if in, you know, say, I propose this in 1995, even if at that time the Bank of Japan were to buy all these non-performing assets, most people at the time were still saying, oh, it's not so big a problem, these non-performing assets, Richard Werner always talking about.
I was quite clear that they would rise to 25% of all bank assets as non-performing because you just look in the 80s, what was, you know, the real estate lending, how much did it increase?
And you got the numbers.
And that turned out to be a very correct estimate.
So I was convinced that even if the bank of China just wiped that clean by buying it up at face value, you would still not get a recovery in bank credit.
But you need that for an economic recovery because the loan officers are shell shocked.
They see what happened.
And you know, it's human nature.
And even if you get bailed out, you're not going to immediately increase lending.
So I came up with this proposal on how the central bank can force banks to increase credit, which we can call QE2.
So QE1 is the central bank buys non-performing assets from banks.
QE2 is the central bank buys performing assets from non-banks.
And I gave the example in my report at the time for investors.
I wrote, well, the central bank needs just to buy real estate in Tokyo because all this is going to turn into non-performing assets, dot loans, and the real estate is the collateral.
The central bank should buy it up, the loans, the real estate, therefore coming with it, and turn it into parks.
Because we don't have enough park space in central Tokyo.
It's not such a green city as it could be.
And that is a very simple thing to do, which improves quality of life, but also it creates money.
It forces banks to create credit.
Why is that?
It's because normally, let's say here's a property owner.
They don't have an account with the central bank.
So when the central bank buys their land, they will tell the central bank, well, please pay me.
Okay, what's your bank account number?
Okay.
They give the central bank their bank account number.
What happens next on the balance sheets is the central bank instructs the bank to pay this client of the bank.
And because this is between the central bank and the bank, this is unusual, right?
The bank gets reserves from the central bank on the asset side.
And it must now credit the account of this customer with those deposits, which is deposit creation.
That is the credit creation, as we discussed earlier.
That's how the central bank can always force banks to push up bank credit.
And then you get a massive, within six months, you get a massive economic recovery.
There's just no way around that because Japan was in deflation.
The economy is shrinking.
Credit was shrinking, negative credit growth.
It was really bad for many, many years.
And so this proposal would have solved the problem.
I actually contacted in Greece later after the European sovereign debt crisis and Greek credit creation was negative.
And the young generation, basically their future wiped out, no job prospect.
So I went to Greece to speak to the Treasury.
And because even when the central bank is not playing ball and the ECB was clearly trying to create this problem, it was not trying to help.
There's something the government can do.
That's the third form of QE without the central bank, Treasury QE, which is again something we have to look at in the US.
I think there'll be Treasury QE as well.
This is where, you know, if you look at the bond markets with this crisis, the bond yields jumped in Greece, you know, double-digit, 50%, 60%.
Spain approaching 7%, which was quite crisis level.
Ireland, double-digit, 20%.
Why would they even issue bonds?
And I told all these don't issue bonds.
What is the interest rate borrowing from banks in your country?
Oh, it's only 4%.
And when you borrow from banks, unlike the bond market, you're creating credit directly.
But you're in a shrinking economy.
Credit creation is shrinking.
That's the solution.
That's the third way you can reflate the economy.
Now, they all refused to do it, not because It wasn't possible.
It was legal.
I checked with an expert on ECB law.
It's perfectly legal.
They could have done it.
That's where the political power comes in.
They were essentially scared into not trying these policies.
The Bank of Japan for years said, oh no, we can't do this QE1, QE2.
We can't do it.
It's like, no, no, no.
Well, came 2020, March 2020.
They all suddenly could do it.
And that's the next surprise.
So what happened actually in March 2020 was the Federal Reserve implemented QE2.
And I should also add, in 2008, so actually Bernanke, you know, he implemented my QE1.
He made actually a speech at that time in January 2009 saying, well, I'm not doing what the Bank of Japan had done because they used my expression QE, but they were faking it.
They were just buying performing assets from banks, which doesn't really do anything.
You have to buy non-performing assets from banks or performing assets from non-banks.
But the Bank of Japan didn't do that, but Bernanke did in 2008.
That's why the U.S. recovered first from the global financial crisis, even though it started in the U.S. It's because he borrowed my proposal of purchasing the non-performing assets from banks.
unidentified
He didn't credit me when he gave countries a bank bailout.
Actually, before we come to that, can I just tie together some loose ends we have?
I'll be very, very brief.
So on Greenspan, the reason why I talked about Bernank and Greenspan was because we were saying Princes of the Yen, the publisher's turning down the book.
And you see, I concluded at the time, how did I get this published by a good U.S. publisher?
It's probably that chapter where I write about Alan Greenspan, my encounter, but credit creation.
He said the words.
So he knows credit creation are his chapter.
And I concluded he's doing the same thing as the Bank of Japan.
That's why he doesn't talk about it in secret.
So it's going to be a global financial crisis.
That was my prediction.
It's probably that chapter.
So I took it out.
It's the last chapter.
Sent it to the next publisher, an academic publisher that they also had some books on Asia.
I thought they could be interested.
They immediately accepted it.
And it was published without that chapter.
Later, that publisher was bought up by a British publisher.
I wrote to them, the new owner, I want my copyright back.
Oh, yeah, of course.
They thought it's just some academic book.
Okay, fine.
I got it back.
So I've now republished it with quantumpublishers.com, including the long lost last chapter.
So it's back in there and one can get it.
That was on that one.
On Deng Xiaoping.
So once he found out the secret, the elixir of high economic growth, he went back to China.
And what did he do?
He founded thousands of banks, small banks, local banks, regional banks, provincial banks, village banks, savings banks.
Thousands.
There's almost as many now in China as in America.
Almost 5,000 banks.
And economic growth took off.
And of course, their job was to lend to small firms.
And the logic is very clear.
If you compare the Soviet system that he had previously with one bank, that's maybe, let's say there's five people at the board making the decision how much money to create and who to give it to.
Well, the Japanese must have laughed at that and told him, look, why don't you have 5,000 banks, which is what we have now, almost in China, 5,000 banks with 35 branches each, with 30 loan offices each branch, lending to small firms, checking millions literally of loan applicants, checking them, kicking the tires.
Does it make sense?
Can this be repaid?
You know, then you have more than 5 million decision makers, if you do the calculation.
These loan offices, it's more than 5 million deciding how to create and allocate this money and who to give it to.
And it will be used for productive purposes, business investment.
So which system is better?
Those five guys at the central bank trying to do this for 600 million people or the 5 million loan officers?
And of course, I think Deng Xiaoping was smart enough to realize, okay, it's a no-brainer.
We'll have these banks.
And economic growth took off.
China delivered double-digit economic growth for four decades.
You know, when you have 15% growth, then every four and a half years, you double national income.
And that tells you we can all have prosperity.
All we need is for bank credit creation to be mainly used for productive business investment.
It can be done and has been done.
All the high growth economies are showing it.
We can have it in the U.S. We can have it in any European country.
And it's good to contrast this to what is possible, because the fact is every country in the world can have high, sustainable, equitable economic growth without crisis and without inflation.
You know, our research on the U.S. shows that even the small banks, as they merge, as they do naturally, as they do under central bank pressure to merge, and the number of banks goes down as it has in the U.S. Dramatically.
Yeah, thousands have disappeared already.
But even the small bank, and so then banks stop lending to the smallest firms.
As they get bigger, they lend only to the bigger firms.
And you already get less economic growth.
And secondly, even the smallest banks, as they merge, you know, they reduce their lending to the smallest companies.
So we constantly need to create new banks, actually, just to stay at the same level of having money going to the small firms.
And the small firms are the productive job creators.
You know, give $500,000 to a large firm is not going to create jobs.
Give it to a small firm, oh, there'll be three, four new jobs, you know?
If you look at long-term historical charts, it's very sad how economic growth has been declining in the post-war era in the U.S., most European countries.
Now, we're being told, oh, that's because of demography and aging societies.
Climate change and the need, in fact, to lower growth because of the limits of growth.
I quickly want to address that point because there are many people out there who seriously, they have good intentions and they think, well, hang on, Richard's talking about trying to have higher growth, but isn't that a bad thing?
Isn't growth bad?
Aren't we destroying the environment?
Well, hang on.
I am all for protecting the environment.
I love nature.
I think you love nature.
And we want to protect the environment, yes.
But economic growth is not the problem.
Absolutely not.
It's not the enemy of the environment, of nature.
No.
And the quickest way to explain why is to actually to analyze what is economic growth.
Well, ask a physicist who studies physics, what is economic growth?
And they'll say, well, I don't know.
In physics, there is no growth.
What are you talking about?
You see, it's nothing tangible.
And therefore, there is no limit to economic growth.
In physics, there's no growth.
You can only transform energy from one state to another.
And actually, again, tying together loose end here.
You know, I told you that when we talked about how the interest theory is the main propaganda, you know, lower rates lead to higher growth, higher rates lead to lower growth.
Well, and I told you there's zero studies showing that.
There's no empirical evidence whatsoever for that.
And so I did the first empirical study on that.
It's published again, open access.
You can look it up.
It's called Reconsidering Monetary Policy and then something, interest rates and growth.
And we know what we found.
It's together with a very good statistician from Korea.
And it's state-of-the-art econometrics.
You've got to do this properly.
And it took years to get this published because everyone hated this.
What we found is that the relationship between interest rates and economic growth is the opposite of what they tell us.
In two dimensions, it's the opposite.
The correlation is supposed to be inverse negative.
Well, we found that both are not true, and it's the opposite.
The correlation is positive.
And the causation, as far as statistics can prove it, you know, Granger causality, statistical causality, is from growth to interest rates.
So instead of the official story, low rates lead to high growth, the real true narrative is the hone, the real truth, as the Japanese would say, is high growth leads to high rates.
And now, actually, what we also found is, and I found this much earlier already, that long-term interest rate, 10-year government bond yields, they follow GDP.
I mean, sometimes coincidental, of course, but they don't lead GDP, okay?
And it's roughly always the same.
And I always puzzled about that.
Why is 10-year government bond yields usually similar to nominal GDP growth?
Which, of course, was therefore also why I was forecasting when I saw the inflation for 21-22, a huge bond market crash, because rates will have to come up with such high nominal GDP growth due to inflation.
But why is it that bond yields usually very nicely track, and the US very nicely track GDP growth?
Why?
And you see, it's the same answer.
It's because what is GDP?
It was created by the bankers to gauge the ability to service national debt.
So think in those terms.
Now, you've created GDP to figure out how much can they pay.
Then what is the interest rate you're going to charge?
Well, you want to charge the maximum without blowing up the system.
Which, what is that?
Well, it is the same as the economic growth rate because that is the income generation.
If you charge too much, it becomes a debt trap.
Your debt spirals out of control.
And I'll mention that in a moment.
And if you charge too little, that means below growth, you're leaving money on the table, which they don't want to do.
Well, when interest rates are higher than the economic growth rate, which is your, you know, economic growth, national income growth is the ability to service and repay the debt.
But if the debt rises faster, then you can never get out of it.
That's the IMF World Bank system to exploit developing countries.
Because what the IMF and World Bank have done over the last 80 years is tell them, based on this economics, which is true and very scientific, axiomatic, deductive, made-up equilibrium stuff, there's no equilibrium.
That's heresy, by the way, to suggest there's no equilibrium, but it's just ordinary.
Well, we know the savings rate is pretty low in the U.S., if not negative.
But yes, still, that's the argument they use.
So it's a trick because developing countries can have their own banking system based on many small local banks.
They will have growth and prosperity and you don't need foreign money because actually foreign money never enters the borrowing country.
So it's always a trick.
It's one of the rules of banking.
You know, let's say there's a developing country, let's say South Africa, and they're told, oh, we need money.
We don't have enough savings.
We need the savings from abroad.
Okay, we'll take a loan from Barclays in London for half a billion pounds.
Okay, they tell us that's what we need.
Okay.
Well, where does Barclays get this half a billion pounds worth of money from?
He creates it out of nothing, credit creation, through the banks.
Now the South African Finance Ministry says, well, actually, we want to use this money in South Africa.
So Barclays, send over the money.
Oh, you mean you want South African rant?
Yeah, yeah, sure.
Well, we can arrange for that.
There'll be some costs, you know, and FX and whatever fees, but we're happy to do it.
So what happens next is Barclays calls around South African banks.
One of them may be a subsidiary of Barclays.
It doesn't matter, but South African authorized licensed South African banks, you see.
Why?
Because they're the ones that have their accounts in South African RAND.
Barclays can't create South African RAND.
And they will ask for a quote.
We want to sell, pound, and buy South African RAND.
What happens next?
The South African bank will create that money out of nothing, which is something South African banks could have done without the round trip abroad, which indebts the country.
And usually you debt for equity swap or you can't pay your debt.
It's not as if, oh, the rich countries are exploiting the poor.
That's not exactly true because we're also being exploited in the rich countries and the middle class is being exploited and being drained of wealth.
We could have prosperity and abundance.
This is what people need to realize.
Everywhere in the world, we can have peace and abundance, but we must address the financial system, the banking system.
And the best system is when you decentralize the power.
As Lord Acton said a long time ago in Britain, power corrupts.
And absolute power corrupts absolutely.
When you are this powerful central planner, central banker, power creates temptations.
And human nature tells us, and history tells us, most people can't handle these temptations.
And that's when you get the abuse.
And in the end, it's all about maximizing that power for the central forces.
And of course, so what we need to do is create many small local banks, also in the U.S., in every country in the world.
We should create state banks, state sovereign banks, as they have in North Dakota, because there's only one state-owned sovereign bank in the United States, in North Dakota, as a result, because that basically protects the local chartered banks.
So they're not so dependent on the Federal Reserve or on the FDIC, and therefore they can make sure that these banks stay in business and thrive.
And therefore, the economy and the small firms will thrive, and therefore job creation will thrive.
We need more of that, particularly in this day and age where the central planners want to do the opposite.
They don't want these many small banks.
They want to force them to merge.
And the biggest club they're wielding now to get rid of the small banks is actually the introduction of central bank digital currencies.
And since you ask about the next 10 years ahead, we have to talk about it because That's definitely top of their agenda to introduce central bank digital currencies.
Now, what is that?
How does that fit in?
Well, first of all, again, it's marketed in a very devious way.
They're telling us, oh, it's the digital aspect that's new.
We used to have cash, paper, that's old-fashioned.
So CBDC is the central banks opening accounts for the general public at the central bank, which means that you just need to create the next banking crisis.
And the central banks are very good at doing that.
And all the money will leave the banks.
The banking system will shut down and it will all be in the central bank.
And we have, hey presto, we've gone backwards.
China moved from the Soviet mono-banking system to thousands of small local banks and thrived, you know, doubling national income every four and a half years for 40 years, becoming the most powerful economic power, you know, in such a short time, actually faster than Germany, America before in history, and lifting more people out of poverty than anywhere else before in history.
But we are moving in the opposite direction.
Our central planners in Europe, in Brussels and at the ECB, they are killing banks and they want to now introduce CBDCs, which means they want to move to central planning.
And the same, you know, as any country in the US, at the moment, the Fed is saying, fortunately, no, we're not going to do this.
But of course, they're studying it and they're preparing for it.
So when the time is right, you know, I'm sure they'll wheel it out because central bankers, they're human.
They're tempted by the temptations of power.
They already have so much power.
De facto no accountability.
I mean, when are central banks held to account for their actions?
And they have said this, you know, central bankers have said this, that they can then write the rules and they have the technology to enforce those rules.
And that's what's going to happen with CBDC.
So it's not really money, it's potential money.
You have to apply.
May I please use it to buy XYZ?
Oh, sorry, you know, your carbon footprint has been used up or whatever the excuse may be.
If people have made it this far into this remarkable interview and want to learn more about this topic, so much has been written about central banking.
So little of it bears any resemblance to what you just said.
I mean, you're thinking about it in a very different way.
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