May 23, 2019 - Steve Pieczenik
04:39
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| Time | Text |
|---|---|
| Hi, this is Dr. | |
| Buchanan. | |
| Today I want to address President Xi of China and say to him, the last time that you tried to manipulate a country by manipulating the mineral resources, that was Japan in 2010. | |
| Thank you very much. | |
| Lost the position and your power is waning. | |
| Let me explain something to you. | |
| The Long March was not a metaphor for success. | |
| It was a metaphor for failure in China. | |
| Although you use it as a notion that China has to endure pain and suffering, I use it, and history uses it, as a lesson in how to lose a war. | |
| What do I mean? | |
| The initial Kuman turn that was created by General Go Bu, G-O-B-U, and Otto Braun in 1934 started the long march from the southwest of China, ending up to the northeast. | |
| It started in October 1934. | |
| What you do not know and refuse to recognize is that the primary person who ran the long march was not Mao Zedong. | |
| When he was in charge, he lost 145,000 men He went to 10,000 and so he lost 135,000 men in that long march. | |
| The one who was successful in this long march and who did show his medal was Zhou Enlai. | |
| And for reasons I do not understand, you refuse to look at the two principal history figures in China that made China what it is today, a formidable country. | |
| That is Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, both of whom were on the Long March. | |
| And yet you insist on following the teachings of Mao Zedong, which is antiquated and inappropriate for a modern nation like China. | |
| Let's look at the famous Battle of Ludong Bridge, which you claim and others have claimed as a point of victory for China. | |
| It in fact was a point of failure for the intelligence and the military capacity of Mao Zedong. | |
| So what am I saying to you, President Xi? | |
| I'm saying that for the first time you have to understand a dynamic which you don't understand very well, and that is the dynamic of asymmetrical power. | |
| In the 1970s, when we helped you out, you were a backward nation. | |
| We in turn gave you all kinds of technology for your weapons, for your airplanes and for your infrastructure. | |
| We helped build you into a formidable country so that by 2005 and several years later you were able to go in the World Trade Organization where again we were able to help you in terms of making you a powerful nation. | |
| Not as powerful as the United States but still a powerful nation. | |
| That creates a dynamic where we, the more powerful country, has to maintain the asymmetrical relationship with you, the less powerful relationship, less powerful country. | |
| What happens in turn is that a less powerful country and you're exhibiting it becomes angry because of its dependency on the more powerful country and that is a psychological phenomenon that you have to understand in order to continue leading China. | |
| If you do not understand that dynamic, you're falling into the trap of enragement, anger, disappointment, disillusionment, and hitting back at the very benefactor who made it possible for you to be a powerful nation. | |
| Now if you think we will allow you to manipulate us into a subordinate position, I think you should think again. | |
| I say to you again, when Deng Xiaoping came and had to take over the mess of the Cultural Revolution, he said the following words, let us go into the West and let us take whatever the West has so that we can improve China. | |
| I think it's important that you start studying the work and dynamics of Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai. | |
| Let me quote one of your great businessmen, Jack Ma, M.A., who runs Alibaba and created it. | |
| He said, a tariff war for China will be terrible for China and for the world. |
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