All Episodes
Previous Next
April 5, 2019 - Freedomain Radio - Stefan Molyneux
01:33:46
STEFAN MOLYNEUX IS A THIEF & INITIATES THE USE OF FORCE! 'Rationality Rules' is NOT hysterical!
| Copy link to current segment

Time Text
Well that escalated pretty damn quickly.
So a couple years ago a guy whose channel's name is Rationality Rules.
I'll just call him Rob.
I don't know what his name is.
He put out a video criticizing my theory of ethics.
I put out a rebuttal video and then in this one you can see he just went kind of nuts.
He's like now defaming me.
He's calling me a plagiarist.
He's all kinds of hysterical.
He's saying that I've initiated the use of force.
That I'm a thief.
That I'm stealing.
Just really wild stuff.
So I'm not going to continue after this, but this is worth a rebuttal just so you can see, I guess, how nasty some people can become.
So here's how this video starts.
This is a scenario, my friend.
This is a scenario right here.
You did it two years ago.
It's a scenario right here, right now.
You have the chance to reject the truth.
UBB is wrong.
And it will permanently enhance the well-being of people.
Okay, so he's starting, he starts with the very end of my video.
My video was like an hour and a half, and rather than do a snip and clip of his video, I went through the whole thing, right?
I didn't just cherry pick, I just, I went through the whole thing.
Now, his foundational moral principle, his foundational moral stance was this.
He said, if I had to choose between the truth and the well-being of organisms, I would choose the well-being of organisms every single time.
Now that's utilitarianism, which he did not credit.
I just wanted to point out.
Apparently I'm a big plagiarist for talking about common philosophical concepts, but he, quoting directly from the utilitarian school of thought, is not.
So he said, I would choose the well-being of organisms over the truth every single time.
And then I said, well, UPB bans rape, theft, assault and murder.
So if you're saying UPB is false, then you must be saying that you prefer the truth over that which benefits human beings for sure, because human beings are harmed by rape, theft, assault and murder.
So this was my argument, just saying, by your standards, what you're doing is immoral, which means that you need to change your standards, right?
I mean, because you want to be a good person.
But you didn't take that, did you?
So even by your own argument, you're not only wrong, You're immoral.
Right, so just to reiterate, I didn't say he was immoral, I said buy your own argument, right?
If you would choose, if you say I would choose the well-being of organisms over the truth, but UPB is wrong even though UPB will serve the well-being of organisms, then you've made a huge moral mistake, right?
A few weeks ago, Stefan Molyneux published a response to my video titled Universably Preferable Behavior.
Now, I just want to point out something that is not an argument, but is kind of an irritant, which is, throughout the video, my book, my theory, and everything, is called Universally Preferable Behavior, but he consistently refers to it as Universally Preferable Behavior.
It's not The end of the world, it's not a massive argument, but it does show a particular kind of carelessness if you can't even get the name of the theory and the book right.
Just pointed that out.
Debunked.
This is universally preferable behavior.
Debunked!
Within it, he, according to him, rebutted my criticisms, and this is my rebuttal of his rebuttal.
But first, please forgive me.
Alright, so he's got some card game.
Debunked.
Debunked, alright.
It's been three years since I created my original video, and it shows.
At the time, my equipment was poor, and my time was scarce, and consequently, I had to yell at the microphone in order for it to pick up my voice.
Sorry.
Okay, so, I'm not sure- so he says his time was scarce, but the video is chock full of excerpts from my audiobook, of screenshots of my book, of graphics that were animated, so to me, if you had enough time to do that- I don't do that kind of stuff, I'm just- it's just me and a camera for the most part.
But if you have the time to put together all these graphics and get all these screen grabs and find the right places in my audiobook, you really can't claim that a shortage of time was the issue.
And I don't really think that you can claim that your audio setup wasn't exactly what you wanted and therefore... Well, let's find out.
And I was not able to be as articulate and precise as I otherwise could have been.
So he was not articulate.
He was not precise.
Because he didn't have time.
And his audio equipment wasn't what he wanted it to be.
Come on, that's just crap.
You're responsible for what you release, right?
So you can't release something and if it turns out that you made some major mistakes, which he did, you can't just say, well, you know what?
I didn't check it.
I didn't have time.
My audio equipment wasn't quite right.
I mean, that's a good cop and it doesn't blame his tools, right?
You own it.
Given this, I think a few of Stefan's comments are valid.
My choice of language wasn't perfect, and I should have bolstered and caveated a few of my statements.
If there was a scenario in which I had to choose between knowing the truth but permanently diminishing the wellbeing of organisms, or not knowing the truth but permanently improving the wellbeing of organisms, I would choose the latter every time.
And so for this, I take responsibility, and will do my best to rectify these mistakes within this video.
little scale here on the left is truth and on the right is the well-being of organisms he says he would choose the well-being of organisms but he actually has the way scale go down on the truth which is the opposite of what he's saying it's just a funny little mistake and it's not particularly relevant it's just something my daughter noticed which was which was interesting every time and so for this i take responsibility and will do my best to rectify these mistakes within this video
but as wait so he's hang on so he's saying that his core moral statement was incorrect it.
Then I guess, you know, why are you concerned about the speck of dust in someone else's eye when you have a mote beam in your eye?
Why is he bothering to criticize my system of ethics when his core moral statement, his absolute moral statement that he would choose the well-being of organisms over the truth every single time is something that he does not believe or something he does not accept or is incorrect?
Why don't you look in the mirror and fix your own ethical system before you go around?
Anyway, okay, let's go on.
For Stefan's actual rebuttals, I find them either poor or literally non-existent.
Ah, okay.
So, interesting.
So, some of my criticisms are valid, he says earlier, like not 30 seconds ago, but now you see my criticisms are either non-existent or poor, right?
So, you can't have those three categories, right?
I'll explain why shortly, of course, but first, I want to show you a much clearer way of exposing the fallacious nature of UPB.
You see, I took Stefan's advice, and while doing so I realised something that I had completely missed the first time round – he equivocates several different definitions of universally preferable behaviour.
On page 30, he writes... he writes...
I do not have to eat in the same way that I have to obey gravity.
But eating is a universal objective and binding requirement for staying alive, since it relies on biological facts that cannot be wished away.
Okay, so he's got this quote from my book.
Now, I did actually suggest reading my new book, Essential Philosophy, which has a really boiled down summary of UPB.
But anyway, so he went back to the original book, and right below this paragraph, he's got this one highlighted in yellow, right below this paragraph, He has not highlighted how I go from universal preferences that are biological, not moral, to, I say, ethics as a discipline can be defined as any theory regarding preferable human behavior that is universal, objective, consistent, and binding.
And again, I go into all of this, the reasons why.
So I'm going from general biological requirements, as distinct from physical absolutes like gravity, to ethics, and that's the process.
So according to this definition, it's not enough to simply say, it's universally preferable to eat, as such a statement is not contingent upon a particular goal.
We must say it's universally preferable to eat if we want to live.
Preferential behavior can only be binding if the goal is desired.
Right.
So I say that when I'm talking about, you can just see this up the top to the right of my head, I'm really talking about what is objectively required or necessary, assuming a particular goal.
Let's just go back here for a sec.
When I speak of a universal preference, I'm really defining what is objectively required or necessary, assuming a particular goal.
So this is early on in the book, so I'm saying universal preferences always assume a particular Goal.
Right?
So I'm not going to repeat that every single time I use the phrase universal preference because I've already set it up as universal preferences mean assuming a particular goal.
Got it?
All right.
Let's go on.
We must say it's universally preferable to eat if we want to live.
Preferential behaviour can only be binding if the goal is desired.
Right.
Now this is a very clear philosophical definition, albeit linguistically confusing, as labelling something that's required universally preferable implies that all entities universally share the same preference.
No, it's not linguistically confusing if you project confusion onto the definition.
So when I say universally preferable, that's talking about the future.
Something that is preferable means the future in general.
Something that you prefer is in the present.
Preferred generally is in the past.
And so I don't know, when I say that something is a universal preference, that if you want to live you have to eat, And I specifically say in the book that not everyone chooses to eat, right?
There are anorexics, there are people on hunger strikes, and so on.
And so it's universal if you want to live, but that doesn't mean everyone chooses it.
That's very, very clear in the book.
So I don't know why it's linguistically confusing when it's very clearly defined.
Coupling something that's required, universally preferable, implies that all entities universally share the same preference, and… No, it doesn't – see, when you say implies, you can't say it's confusing, if it's not there.
Of course, they don't, as Stefan acknowledges.
Oh, so it's not confusing because I acknowledge that it's only universally preferable to eat if you want to live.
However, it needs to be made very clear that this is simply Immanuel Kant's hypothetical imperative.
Okay, so, Kant's Hypothetical Imperative.
This is where things start to get pretty nasty and defamatory, so.
It's an if-then statement.
If you want to live, then you must acquire calories.
If I say that it is preferable for human beings to exercise and eat well, what I am saying is that if you want to be healthy, you should exercise and eat well.
But despite Stefan Steele in Kant's work, Ah!
See, now I'm stealing Kant's work.
Now, let's go on to hear what he has to say, and then I'll give you my rebuttal.
And labelling it UPB, this is nonetheless a crystal clear definition.
Okay, so Kant's work, hypothetical imperative.
I looked this up.
I hadn't, I was not aware of the term hypothetical imperative.
I did some work on Kant for my graduate thesis, for my master's, but I was dealing with his metaphysics and his politics and did not go deeply into his ethics.
So I do have some information here that will help us clear up this hypothetical imperative, because he's incorrect even in his definition.
I don't know where it came from, but let's just say it's, I did look it up.
Okay, so this is a very brief introduction to Kantian ethics.
I'll put the links to all of this below.
So this is John Stuart Mill, more of a utilitarian and consequentialist, who would be more in line with what Rationality Rules talks about.
So the summary here is Kant, unlike Mill, believed that certain types of actions, including murder, theft, and lying, were absolutely prohibited, even in cases where the action would bring about more happiness than the alternative.
So this is Absolute morality, unlike consequentialism, utilitarianism, some overlap with pragmatism, which is the idea that you act to maximize benefit to people, I guess, in this.
So when, when rationality rules, when this Rob Fellow says that he would choose the well-being of organisms over the truth every single time, he is sitting in the camp So, for Kantians, there are two questions we must ask ourselves whenever we decide to act.
1.
Can I rationally will that everyone act as I propose to act?
If the answer is no, then we must not perform the action.
2.
Does my action respect the goals of human beings rather than merely using them for my own purposes?
Again, if the answer is no, then we must not perform the action.
Kant believed that these questions were equivalent.
Kant's theory is an example of a deontological moral theory.
According to these theories, the rightness or wrongness of actions does not depend on their consequences, but whether they fulfill our duty.
Right now, I don't talk about the categorical imperative in UPB, because I don't believe in the categorical imperative, which says, can I rationally will that everyone act as I propose to act?
No, I don't agree with that for reasons I've gone into a number of times before.
And I don't talk about duty, and I don't talk about law, and I don't talk about Moral guidance from a theological perspective, right?
So Kant believed that there was a supreme principle of morality and he referred to it as the categorical imperative.
The CI determines what our moral duties are.
Okay, so, I'll just go real quick here.
An imperative is a command.
So, pay your taxes is an imperative, as are stop kicking me and don't kill animals.
So, hypothetical imperatives.
These imperatives command conditionally on your having a relevant desire.
E.g., if you want to go to medical school, study biology in college.
If you don't want to go to medical school, this command doesn't apply to you.
Another example.
Your father says, if you're hungry, then go eat something.
If you aren't hungry, then you are free to ignore the command.
Right, so morality here, so the catecholic imperatives would say, don't cheat on your taxes, even if you want to cheat, and doing so would serve your interests, you may not cheat.
What is the connection between morality and categorical imperatives?
Morality must be based on the categorical imperative because morality is such that you are commanded by it and is such that you cannot opt out of it or claim that it does not apply to you.
Okay, so Kant has distinguished between absolute morality and categorical imperatives and these hypothetical imperatives, which is if-then statements.
So he's categorizing something that has been around in philosophy from the very beginning.
So way back in the day, and this is both Plato and Aristotle and as far as we can tell Socrates based upon what Plato wrote about him, that there are two states of being, right?
Or two actions, right?
So Aristotle said that the one thing we don't do in order to do something else or to get something else is a state of happiness, right?
So when we're happy We're not happy in order to become something else, right?
So we eat well to not be overweight, because being overweight would make us unhappy.
We eat well, we exercise to stay healthy, because being unhealthy makes us unhappy and in pain and so on.
So there's lots of things that we do in order to do something else, to get something else.
But then there's a state called happiness or eudaimonia or whatever that we just sit in because it's very pleasant in and of itself.
So the idea that there are ends in themselves and then there are goals to an end is all the way back to philosophy.
And if you look at the difference between the categorical imperative as Kant has described it and the hypothetical imperative in the realm of morality versus law you can see this very very clearly.
So moral instruction generally came from religion in the past and religion would say God has commanded this, therefore you must do it.
It's not optional.
Okay, it'll get you to heaven in some religions and so on, but God has commanded this moral absolute, therefore you must obey it.
Now for those who don't accept that, there is the secular law courts, police, jails, you name it, right?
And so why should you not steal a car, for instance, right?
You should not steal a car Because stealing is wrong.
Thou shalt not steal, saith the Lord.
Now for those who don't accept that, you could say, well you should not steal the car because you'll go to jail.
You'll be caught and you'll go to jail.
And that's going to be bad for you, right?
So the first is a categorical imperative.
The second would be closer to the hypothetical imperative.
But here you can see that the hypothetical imperative does not Always mean morality, and it may not mean morality in particular, right?
So if you want to go to medical school, study biology in college, right?
So that is the hypothetical imperative.
It's the if-then statement which has been around from the very beginning.
of philosophy, and it would have been around even before philosophy.
I mean, if somebody says, let us say, well, there's an ancient Japanese proverb.
I talked about this in a recent video with my daughter on Minecraft.
And the ancient Japanese proverb says, there's no point digging for water when you're already thirsty.
Right?
In other words, if you wish to quench your thirst, you should dig for water earlier.
And this is an ancient Japanese proverb.
Are they also stealing the hypothetical imperative from Immanuel Kant?
No.
Immanuel Kant gave a label to a long-standing, long-term trend of a way of thinking in philosophy and just in life.
In life.
I mean, monkeys are like, well, if I want the fruit at the top of the tree, I have to climb the tree.
They wouldn't formalize it, but they would definitely pursue that.
Are monkeys also stealing from the categorical versus the hypothetical imperative from Kant?
No.
This is not... Now, if I said That I have developed this idea that some goals require objective actions to achieve, and I came up with the hypothetical imperative, and nobody thought of it before me, and it's all mine.
Well, that would be plagiarism, of course, right?
But talking about if-then statements, I mean, if you get a brochure from a medical school saying, hey, if you want to become a doctor, you should enroll here, are they also stealing?
Kant's hypothetical imperatives?
I mean, come on!
This is common.
Half the Socratic dialogues are, you know, what is the end goal of medicine?
The end goal of medicine is health.
What is the end goal of exercise?
The end goal of exercise is strength and flexibility.
They're always talking about the end goals versus the things that you're happy with in and of themselves, like happiness itself.
So, a little confusing here.
In fact, he's just wrong to say that when I talk about if-then statements, oh my goodness, beginners applied symbolic instruction code, the programming language that me and nobody else over 12 used.
If-then statements.
And so, are computers also stealing from the hypothetical imperative because they have if-then statements?
I mean, it's not...
So many years ago, I put out a video which described my theory of property, which is we own the effects of our actions.
And I talked about sort of why and how it works.
And some dude, I think he was an academic, got all hysterical and said, aha, Molyneux is stealing from John Locke, because John Locke had the labor theory of property, which is very distinct from the labor theory of value, which is a Marxist concept, kind of opposite in many ways.
And so John Locke's theory, very briefly, is that when you create something, when you make something, you are mixing your labor in with that object and therefore it becomes yours.
And as long as there's enough for everyone else and it's not the last one and all that.
The idea that when I say we own the effects of our actions and therefore I'm plagiarizing John Locke is again defamatory and ridiculous and false.
Because is anyone going to seriously think?
Is anyone out there going to seriously think?
That no one had any idea of ownership before John Locke.
Like in the ancient world, if you made a gourd and took it to the marketplace, you could not sell it because nobody recognized it as yours.
If you went to an unowned area and you made a house, it was never going to be your house.
If you had a baby, everyone just wandered around saying, I have no idea who the parents are.
I have no idea what's going on.
If you wrote a book, Right?
The Republic by Plato.
Plato created the Republic, he's the author of the Republic, he's responsible for the effects of his actions, in this case a book.
And so the idea that John Locke had a particular way of categorizing and describing a commonly accepted notion in all rational legal systems, or even irrational legal systems going back to the dawn of time, that if you create something it's yours, The fact that John Locke described it in a particular manner and attempted to justify it in a particular manner does not mean that anyone who talks about you own what you create is stealing from John Locke.
Because the idea predates John Locke by thousands and thousands and thousands of years.
And in the same way, the idea that in order to achieve some goals you have to perform objective requirements, this goes back thousands and thousands and thousands of years.
So the fact that I'm talking about it, now if I said I invented this idea and it's called the hypothetical imperative and it's distinct from the categorical imperative and right then you could accuse me of plagiarism.
But talking about an idea that, a basic idea in philosophy that predates Immanuel Kant by thousands of years and then saying, ah you're stealing!
You're a plagiarist!
It's literally crazy.
It's literally crazy.
Now, this is from Stanford.
It's a little more formal, but I just sort of read it to sort of follow it.
So this is categorical and hypothetical imperatives.
Kant holds that the fundamental principle of our moral duties is a categorical imperative.
It is an imperative because it is a command addressed to agents who could follow it but might not.
It's a great quote from the Godfather, e.g.
Leave the gun, take the cannoli.
It is categorical in virtue of applying to us unconditionally or simply because we possess rational wills without reference to any ends that we might or might not have.
It does not, in other words, apply to us on the condition that we have antecedently adopted some goal for ourselves, right?
So it's an absolute regardless of the goal.
There are oughts other than our moral duties, according to Kant, but these oughts are distinguished from the moral ought in being based on a quite different kind of principle, one that is the source of hypothetical imperatives, right?
So, this is Stanford, right?
There are oughts other than our moral duties.
If you want to live, you ought to eat.
If you want to live, you ought to breathe.
And they're distinguished from the moral ought.
They're other than our moral duties.
So, I have a book called Universally Preferable Behavior.
Sorry, I was going to say Universably.
Universally Preferable Behavior, a Rational Proof of Secular Ethics.
The book is about ethics.
It's about morality.
And so to say that I have taken Kant's hypothetical imperative, which is not specifically related to morality, and created a moral system of absolutism based upon a category developed by Kant to distinguish actions from morality is, I mean, it doesn't fit at all.
Because this guy, Rob, Rationality Rules, whatever his name is, he says that I've stolen the hypothetical imperative and repackaged it as UPB.
But the hypothetical imperative is not to do specifically with morality.
It's, well, if you want to become a doctor you need to go to medical school.
If you're thirsty and you want to quench your thirst you need to drink something.
It's not moral categories.
So how on earth could a book on morality Have stolen something that is not related to morality, which predated Kant as a concept by thousands of years.
I mean it's...
It's just sad.
It's really, it's a sad, pitiful, defamatory accusation that is really wrong.
It's really, it's a nasty accusation.
It's harsh.
It's hurtful.
It's destructive to reputation.
It's bad.
It's bad to lie about someone in this manner and accuse them of something that is not true.
I mean, he's got no proof of anything to do with this.
And the quotes that he has Is that the hypothetical imperative is moral, but here you can see, according to Stanford and other places, that it's not foundationally moral.
It can include some aspects of, quote, morality, but Kant, I think, would say that if you don't steal a car because you don't want to go to jail, that's not moral.
It's just consequentialist, right?
It's not foundationally moral, which is why he has the categorical imperative, which is the morals you have to follow no matter what.
So, the arguments that I give too, like you don't have to like jazz but you do have to eat if you want to live, it's clear that I'm not talking about morality.
Because you can choose to starve yourself to death, it's not immoral.
Your body is your own property, you can harm it if you want.
It's not evil because you're not initiating force against someone else.
So, Anyway, it's a terrible thing to say about me.
It is hysterical.
It is false.
It is wrong.
And I guess it can tell you all you need to know about this guy's ethics.
So, to return to this fellow's argument, the examples he's got highlighted there are not moral arguments.
Right?
If you want to be healthy, you should exercise and eat well.
It's not a moral argument.
It's a consequentialist argument based on human biology.
And so if he says this is an example of me stealing Kant's work, but the hypothetical imperative says a moral obligation that applies only if one desires the implicated goal, well then he's got examples here where I'm not talking about morality.
So how can I be stealing Kant's hypothetical imperative if I'm not talking about morality?
But he's got the quote here which says, a moral obligation that applies only if one desires the implicated goal.
Now, the reading that I've done on Kant says that the hypothetical imperative includes non-moral actions, but of course, non-moral goals have been around since the dawn of philosophy and even before.
So, either way, he doesn't make this claim, this really nasty, ugly, vicious claim of plagiarism stick.
And stealing.
And so on.
Anyway, let's go on.
It is preferable for human beings to exercise and eat well.
What I am saying is that if you want to be healthy, you should exercise and eat well.
But despite Stephan Steele in Kant's work and labelling it UPB, this is nonetheless a crystal clear definition.
However, on page 33, he writes, Thus when I talk about universal preferences, I am talking about what people should prefer, not what they always do prefer.
Right.
So earlier I said universal preferences.
When I'm talking about universal preferences, I'm talking about what people should prefer if they have a particular goal.
If they have a particular goal.
And so, right here, right after what he highlighted, highlight?
I say, to use a scientific analogy, to truly understand the universe, people should use the scientific method.
This does not mean that they always do so, since clearly billions of people consult ancient fairy tales rather than modern science for answers.
Likewise, if a man wants to cure an infection, he should take antibiotics rather than perform an Aztec rain dance.
So earlier, I say, when I'm talking about universal preferences, I'm talking about assuming a particular goal.
And the two examples I give right after this are assuming a particular goal, right?
If people want to understand the universe, if a man wants to cure an infection.
So, I've already defined universal preferences assuming a particular goal.
I don't mention assuming a particular goal here because I assume that my readers are intelligent enough to understand that when I say, when I'm talking about universal preferences, I'm talking about assuming a particular goal, that they can hold on to that definition It's subtle, I must admit, but did you catch the crucial difference with this definition?
I'll play it again.
are the smart people, I think the smartest people around.
So when I say this is what universal preferences are in this book, assuming a particular goal, I don't need to repeat that every single time I talk about universal preferences, right?
It's subtle, I must admit, but did you catch the crucial difference with this definition?
I'll play it again.
Thus, when I talk about universal preferences, I'm talking about what people should prefer, not what they always do prefer.
While the first definition makes no assertion about what we should or ought to prefer, I am really defining what is objectively required or necessary, assuming a particular goal.
The second definition does make such an assertion.
I am talking about what people should prefer, not what they always do prefer.
Yes, because I already said that when I'm talking about universal preferences, I'm talking about assuming a particular goal.
The fact that I did not repeat it every single time… it's just sad, it's sad." While the first definition is strictly in the realm of facts, the second is strictly in the realm of values.
The former is descriptive, and the latter is prescriptive.
Thus, Stefan employs at least two different definitions of UPB, and he switches between them according to what, or who, he's confronting.
No, see, I mean, I don't mean to repeat myself, but this is all just such nonsense.
I've already said that the definition of preference includes universal preference includes the assumption of particular goals.
I don't repeat that every single time I use the phrase because that's the whole point of setting up A definition is you don't have to repeat.
I mean, can you imagine reading a book where there was a dictionary definition on every single word?
You couldn't get through anything.
So yeah, when I say this is what I mean by universal preferences, I don't have to repeat it every time.
Just picking one time I didn't say it, I mean, it's silly.
I'll provide an example of this later, but first I want to emphasize that there's nothing really wrong with Stefan's first definition, other than the fact that it doesn't deliver what he promised.
Ugh, it is the holy grail of philosophy that has been sought since the time of Socrates.
Ooh, young Stef.
Hi.
I believe I have done it.
Universally preferable behavior proves that rape, theft, assault and murder are immoral.
Right, now this is what's always fascinating is everybody gets knotted up about this UPB stuff at the beginning, which you know is fine, it's fine, but not one person who's taken on my theory.
has ever dealt with the proof that rape, theft, assault and murder cannot be universally preferable behavior.
The proof, very simple, is this.
Let's just talk about theft, right?
If stealing is universally preferable behavior, then everyone must want to steal and be stolen from.
For that theory to be applicable, to be possible to achieve.
But if everybody wants to steal and be stolen from, there's no such thing as stealing.
Because if I want you to take my property, it's not theft.
Right, so theft, rape, assault, murder cannot be universally preferable behaviours, which is how we know that they must be banned in any rational moral system.
No one has taken on that argument, because you can't.
I mean, you can't.
Everybody just knots up around all of this metaphysics and is-ought dichotomies and so on.
No one actually gets to the moral theory.
You know, it's just interesting where everybody stops, right?
And, of course, that he's simply stolen Kant's hypothetical imperative and sold it as if it's his own.
Yeah, again, that's a really shitty accusation to make, man.
It's very defamatory.
I've stolen Kant's categorical imperative, you say, and sold it as if it were my own.
This must mean that you, my friend Rob, have never once in your hundred plus videos ever, ever, ever said that there are objective requirements for people to achieve a particular goal.
If you have ever said that without referencing Kant, Then you, by this standard, are a plagiarist.
And, uh, I'm not going to go back and review all your videos because I only have stomach for this kind of stuff so much, but, uh, yeah.
Oh, and also, well, we'll get to utilitarianism.
All right, let's keep going.
Which, by the way, according to his own moral framework, is immoral.
Theft are immoral.
Is that Shia LaBeouf?
So, when I talk about theft, I'm talking about the forcible or fraudulent removal of someone else's property against their will.
I mean, even if I was a plagiarist, that's not the same.
It's not a criminal action to be a plagiarist.
I mean, it's intellectually dishonest.
It's negative, but it's not a criminal action.
So, I don't get where he's coming from at all.
Even if his accusation was true, it would not fall into the category of stealing, which is why you don't go to jail for plagiarism, but you go to jail for theft.
It's just, it's wacky and I mean, I know what's going on with this guy.
I disproved his core moral premise.
And he's lashing out because he's kind of immature and he wants to level up, so now he's trying to use my own ethics against me by creating this straw man that I stole from Kant, a common human conception that some things have objective requirements if you want to achieve a goal, which is kind of basically most things in life, just about everything in life, right?
If you want to get to the top of the leaderboard in Fortnite, you have to play Fortnite.
You know what I mean?
This is not Kant.
Kant does not own That there are objective requirements to achieve particular goals.
Kant doesn't own that.
He categorized it in a particular kind of way.
But that's like saying that the guy who classified mammals invented mammals like God did, like created mammals out of plasticine and God breath.
I mean, categorization is not the same as creation.
It's a common idea.
So anyway.
As for his second definition, which, if true, would deliver what he promised, it fails because it violates David Hume's is-ought distinction, otherwise known as Hume's Law and Hume's Guillotine, which states that we can't derive what ought to be based upon exclusively what is, or that we can't get a prescription from a description.
Now, on page 9, Stephan states that he fully accepts Hume's Guillotine.
I fully accept the Humean distinction between is and ought.
Valid moral rules cannot be directly derived from the existence of anything in reality.
The fact that human beings in general prefer to live, and must successfully interact with reality in order to do so, cannot be the basis for any valid theory of ethics." But in his response to me, he implies that he rejects Hume's guillotine.
If you can't get an ought from an is, you are getting an ought from an is, which is you ought not talk about getting an ought from an is.
Like, you have already created one.
Now, Stefan's assertion here not only represents why he doesn't understand Hume's law, but also why he doesn't understand many of the criticisms of UPB.
Okay, so this is the argument.
You can't get an ought from an is, so if your goal is truth, you ought not to say that you can get an ought from an is.
I'm sorry if this language is kind of annoying and complicated and it's kind of technical, but But you get the idea, right?
There's nothing in nature that says, thou shalt not steal.
In fact, stealing can be a very productive and successful evolutionary strategy for human beings and for animals and insects and so on, right?
I mean, look at the Clintons.
I mean, the Clintons have gathered, what, a fortune of a hundred million dollars plus, I believe, largely through corruption.
That's enough for basically infinite generations of Clinton spawn, right?
And look at Barack Obama, how much money he's made from being president and so on.
And so, it can be very, very valid and helpful To do all of this.
So, there's nothing in nature that says we must not steal.
In fact, Darwinian imperatives would say that stealing is a damn fine thing to do at times because it's a whole lot easier in terms of effort than going out and hunting and growing crops and so on.
So, yeah, there's nothing in nature that says we ought not to steal.
There has to be something in philosophy that can provide us that if we do not accept the religious argument that morals come from God.
There has to be something that philosophy can tackle.
So yeah, now if your goal is truth, right?
If your goal is truth, then you ought not to say that we can get morality from nature.
If your goal is truth, right?
Because I've said that all UPB is based upon the acceptance of a particular goal.
In this case, saying something that is true.
Saying that you can't get an ought from an is, is an is statement, not an ought statement.
Hume didn't imply that you ought not get an ought from an is, he implied that it is the case that you can't get an ought from an is.
I just want to sort of point out that… Philosophy should be a whole lot simpler than it is, and I believe that it is a whole lot simpler than it is.
And so, yeah, can you imagine trying to run a society on, well, you know, you ought... Hume didn't say you ought not get an ought from an is, he just said that it is the case you can't get an ought from an is.
So good luck IQ 85 people following moral laws.
I mean, I'm sorry I shouldn't laugh.
It's just this overcomplication of philosophy is wretched.
I mean, he's basically saying philosophy is an elitist snob occupation that's so confusing and contradictory that the average person can't participate.
I mean, it's crazy.
Gotta not dumb it down, but simplify it to the point where a person even of below average intelligence can follow this.
But how exactly does this shine light on UPB, you might be wondering?
Well, in reply to me explaining that even if all people believe that the moon was made of cheese, this wouldn't make it so, Stefan said the following.
Okay, so, fantastic, so if people… Okay, so he said, even if everyone believed that the moon was made of cheese, that wouldn't make it so.
Right, it's false, it's a false statement.
Now, if your goal is truth, then, if someone says, I am in pursuit of the truth, And I believe that the moon is made of green cheese.
And then you prove to them that the moon is not made of green cheese, then they should change their perspectives to accept the truth, right?
They ought to, because their goal is truth.
Like, if I want to head north, and I'm walking south, and you tell me, oh, you're walking south, well, if I want to head north, I ought to turn around, right?
Assuming a particular goal.
It's always the case, assuming a particular goal.
...believe that the moon is made of cheese, they're objectively wrong, and they should correct their beliefs according to the reality.
Right.
Correct their beliefs according to the reality.
So this Fellow Rationality Rules or Rob or whatever has spent years and years and and probably thousands and thousands of hours pouring out video after video correcting people and right there on the screen False premise!
An incorrect proposition that forms the basis of an argument or syllogism.
He's got the red.
It's wrong.
He's been correcting people for years and years and years, thousands of hours, a hundred plus videos, correcting people, saying that they're wrong, saying that they're incorrect, saying that they should reject their incorrect opinions.
UPB is false.
You should stop accepting UPB and so on, right?
So the idea that he would say well there's you know people there's no there's no reason why anybody would want to accept the truth and reject falsehood this I mean this is exactly what he's been doing with his life for years for years thousands and thousands of hours and it takes a long time to produce these videos and I respect the work that he put in not the conclusions but the work so It's just kind of funny to me.
Well, let's hear what he has to say.
It was kind of funny for me.
Just remember as we go forward that this guy's poured thousands of hours into correcting people online.
That the moon is not made of cheese.
UPB!
Right there!
Preference for truth.
Preference for objectivity.
Preference for the concepts in the mind matching what actually goes on in reality.
Come on!
Dude!
Now did you catch Stefan's violation of Hume's law?
If there's anything I want you to take away from this... Oh, wait a minute!
I just noticed this!
Right!
So he said... When I say, if you can't get an ought from an is, you ought not to say it, right?
Now, according to him, I just created an ought from an is.
The moon is not made of green cheese, therefore you ought...
To correct your opinion, right?
So now he's saying I have violated Hume's law, which is exactly what I said earlier.
That if you can't get an ought from an is, you ought not to say that you can get an ought from an is.
Right?
If morality, if truth is not found specifically in nature, truth is the relationship between concepts in the mind and empirical evidence through the senses, right?
There's no truth in nature.
Like there's no scientific method in nature.
There's no mathematics in nature.
There's matter and energy in nature.
It doesn't mean that our concepts are subjective, because they have to match empirical objective reality.
So I say, you ought not say, you get an ought from an is.
Now he, Rob, thinks I just said, you ought, like I got an ought from an is.
The moon is not made of green cheese, therefore you ought to correct people on it, right?
I mean, it's not like a trap.
It's just, I say, you ought not to get an ought from an is, right?
And he said, no, no, no, that's fine.
You can totally get an ought from an is.
It's just, you know, it's descriptive, not prescriptive, blah, blah, blah, blah, right?
So, now he says, Steph, you just violated Hume's law, which was exactly my argument from like 30 seconds ago.
He began by making an is, or factual, or descriptive statement.
So if people believe that the moon is made of cheese, they're objectively wrong.
But he concluded by making an ought, or should, or prescriptive statement.
And they should correct their beliefs according to the reality.
He said it is the case that they're wrong.
They're objectively wrong, and so therefore they ought to correct their beliefs.
And they should correct their beliefs, but as any undergraduate philosophy student will tell you, this simply doesn't follow.
Dude.
Well, and I'm talking about him correcting someone else's beliefs.
Right?
I'm talking about someone – him correcting someone else's belief, as he is trying to correct my beliefs here.
So there's the ought from an is.
You ought not You know, ought not to get an ought from an is.
And I'm saying that is the ought that you get from the is, and he's just fulfilled that perfectly, like he's just fallen into a train track and following my argument.
And of course, I am talking about those in pursuit of truth, not, you know, just having to run around correcting everyone's beliefs, right?
Stefan is equivocating truth with good, but just— No, I'm not.
I don't know—where does good come into it?
Good what?
I'm equating truth with good?
Like, what, it's moral to not believe that the moon is made of green cheese?
That's the definition of morality now?
Come on.
Where does good come into it?
I don't understand.
This is a real out-of-nowhere definition.
He hasn't defined good.
He hasn't talked about what good means in this context.
He's just dropped it in.
It's because something is true that doesn't make it good.
Well, of course.
It's just because something is true that doesn't make it good.
My enemy strangled a hobo!
That's true, maybe, but it doesn't mean that it's good that he's strangling.
I don't know where all this is coming from.
Truth is about what is, and good is about what ought to be.
That... Oh wait, good is about what ought to be?
Ah, that's, you know, I mean, I don't even know what that means.
Ought can include non-moral things.
If you wish to strangle a hobo, you ought to close your fingers around his neck.
In a nutshell, it's what's wrong with UPB.
Okay, in a nutshell.
Stefan is either executed via Hume's guillotine, and hence has failed to deliver what he promised.
and these bombs in like it ain't no thing.
- In a nutshell, it's what's wrong with UPB.
- Okay, in a nutshell.
- Stefan is either executed via Hume's guillotine and hence has failed to deliver what he promised.
- I fully accept the Humean distinction between is and ought.
- They're objectively wrong and they should correct their beliefs according to the reality.
Or he's initiated force by stealing Kant's hypothetical imperative and selling it as if it's his own.
Yeah, again, I... I mean, he just gave me an ought from an is, which is exactly what I predicted.
This stealing thing is nasty and underhanded and vicious and catty and defamatory.
And now we get Shia LaBeouf again.
All right.
All right.
Yeah, yeah.
Meme, meme, meme.
Okay, with this made clear, I'm now going to respond to some of Molyneux's comments, starting with his first and primary argument, In reply to my saying that, Premise 2 is simply incorrect.
It's a false premise.
If I state a preference for truth over falsehood when debating UPB, this does not mean that I have a preference for truth over falsehood in all things.
Stefan responded by saying, - Whoa, okay, I'm trying to follow this, perhaps because he's a stone genius, but let's see here.
So I say, arguing against the validity of universally preferable behavior demonstrates universally preferable behavior.
Yeah. - 'Cause earlier he said, "I'm executed by Hume's guillotine," right?
My argument is false because I'm trying to get an ought from an is and I'm objectively wrong and objectively incorrect.
I failed to deliver and blah blah blah, right?
So yeah, this is UPB.
This is true.
This is valid.
This is correct, which is if you say, well, there's no such thing as universally preferable behavior, Steph, so you should stop arguing for universally preferable behavior and you should accept that it's invalid.
You are accepting universally preferable behavior, obviously, right?
Because you are saying the truth is preferable to falsehood.
Accuracy is preferable to error.
We should change our minds to conform with the truth.
And so you're talking about objective values, universal truth, and saying that other people, if they wish to say things that are true, right?
See, if they wish to say things that are true, again, this is all conditional upon Wishing to say things that are true.
I believe that doing so is the best way to expose where he's going wrong.
He can't argue against UPB.
Now, before I respond, here's how he more carefully puts it within his book.
Oh, God, why include that if you're just going to go to the book?
I believe that doing so is the best way to expose where he's going wrong.
If you correct me on an error that I have made, you are implicitly accepting the fact that it would be better for me to correct my error.
No, I'm not implicitly accepting the fact that it would be better for you to correct your error, because it is not a fact that it would be better or that you ought to correct your error.
What I'm implicitly assuming is simply that you have a preference for truth over falsehood.
I don't know what this means.
This guy spent thousands of hours and years and years of his life correcting everyone in their own universe and then he says it's not better to be correct?
I don't know.
It's like some doctor spending thousands of hours and years and years of his life developing a cure and then says I'm completely indifferent to cures versus illness.
I mean, I don't know.
Again, it's just an empirical fact.
Your preference for me to correct my error is not subjective, but objective and universal.
You don't say to me, you should change your opinion to mine because I would prefer it.
But rather, you should correct your opinion because it is objectively incorrect.
Again, no.
I don't say that you should correct your opinion because it is objectively incorrect.
So he doesn't say... So, I'm executed by Hume's guillotine, because he thinks I'm getting it all from his, but I should not correct... Okay, it's so confusing.
Sorry, let me just hear this again.
Again, no, I don't say that you should correct your opinion because it is objectively incorrect.
But he says it's a false premise.
It's wrong.
It's illogical.
I say the hypothetical imperative that if you're seeking the truth, you ought to correct your opinion according to the facts.
If you're seeking the truth, which is exactly what I said.
If you're seeking the truth, you ought to correct your opinion according to the facts.
We're completely in agreement here.
In that bit about the moon and the green cheese.
I said exactly that.
If your goal is truth, right?
Anyway, I don't know.
It's, uh...
Silly.
If I did say, you should, or ought to, correct your opinion because it is objectively incorrect, then I'd find myself swiftly executed by Hume's guillotine.
As if we put this into Humean language, it would go as follows.
It is the case that you're objectively incorrect, and so you ought to correct your opinion.
And this, for reasons previously mentioned, doesn't follow.
It's a non sequitur.
Again, when two people are debating objective truth, of course the goal is truth.
Of course the goal is truth.
I mean, I don't know what to say.
It's like going to a nutritionist conference and just objectively reminding everyone with every second sentence that their aim is good nutrition and healthy eating.
I mean, it's implicit.
Yeah, I understand.
So to repeat this specifically in reference to Stefan's reply to me.
If you say, well, there's no such thing as universally preferable behavior, Steph, so you should stop arguing for universally preferable behavior and you should accept that it's invalid, you are accepting universally preferable behavior.
Indeed, if I spoke such words, I would be accepting UPB and violating Hume's law.
But I don't speak such words because I don't think they're accurate.
You are saying the truth is preferable to falsehood.
Accuracy is preferable to error.
We should change our minds to conform with the truth.
Again, no, I'm not.
I don't- So he does not think that accuracy is preferable to error and truth is preferable to falsehood.
Made a hundred plus videos correcting people, but he doesn't believe it.
Doesn't believe it.
Don't say that, because I don't think that's accurate.
Universal truth, and saying that other people, if they wish to say things that are true, must conform to universal standards of truth.
Yeah.
If people wish to say things that are true, they need to conform to universal standards of truth.
It's basically philosophy, and science, and everything.
You can't argue against UPB.
Yes, I am talking about universal truth, and all I am saying is that- If, if, if, if, if they- Did he really just- I don't know.
All I'm stating is a hypothetical imperative.
Now, that's interesting because if he's stating a hypothetical imperative, then I assume that every time he has made this case in the past, he's referenced Kant's work.
Because he himself is saying, I am stating Kant's hypothetical imperative.
So he must have referenced that it's not his argument, his idea, his perspective, but he specifically is using Kant's hypothetical imperative in this argument formulation.
Therefore, every single video in the past, he must have referenced Kant, otherwise he's plagiarizing, as far as I understand it, according to his definition.
And I'm implicitly assuming that your telos, or goal, is truth.
Implicit.
So he's implicitly assuming that my goal is truth.
Well, of course.
And do you know how he can implicitly assume that?
Well, he doesn't have to implicitly assume it.
He can explicitly assume that my goal is truth because I'm saying this is true.
This is valid.
Universally preferable behavior is valid.
So it's not something he has to assume.
It's something that I'm saying.
Like, if I see some 80-year-old granny, I don't sit there and say, drop and give me 20, right?
But if I say, oh, I can do 20 push-ups easy, and someone says, oh great, let's see, right?
It's not implicit.
I'm openly saying, I can do 20 push-ups.
UPB is valid.
Truth is objective.
Moving on, after explaining why premise 2 is a false premise, I went on to state that- What is for sure is that what we value personally is not universal.
And here's how Stefan responded.
What- Oh!
Oh!
Oh!
Dude!
Do you even listen to yourself?
What we value personally is not univer- What we value personally?
Oh, I'm sorry, I can't see all that.
What we value personally is not universal!
Look!
There's a universal statement of values right there on the screen.
Can you read your young eyes?
It's got the word value in it, right?
Can you read the text that's right in front of you?
What we value personally is not universal.
Is that a universal statement?
No.
Okay, then you have to qualify it and say, I like the idea that what people value personally is not universal, although I reject the very idea of universality.
But you know, that's a lot.
What we value personally is not universal.
Right there!
Universal statement!
God, read that book again, dude.
You really need to.
For the purpose of clarity, I'm going to respond to this one sentence at a time, starting with... Look!
There's a universal statement of values right there on the screen!
Can you read your young eyes?
Yes, Stefan.
It's a universal statement about what is, not what ought to be.
Oh, so now we're dropping the preference for truth, right?
Because it's inconvenient.
Now there's no implicit assumption that we're in pursuit of the truth.
So values have gone out the window.
This is a wonderful setup.
So you can correct other people, assuming that everyone's in pursuit of the truth, and therefore you can bypass Hume's guillotine, right?
So when you correct people, well, I just assume that your telos or goal is truth, right?
So it's a great, it's a great setup.
So anytime you correct someone else, you can say, well, you know, I'm assuming the goal is truth here and you're incorrect.
I'm going to correct you.
But when someone corrects you, you can say, Hey man, you're violating, you're violating Hume's guillotine.
And that's great.
Fantastic.
It's a description, not a prescription.
It's a universal fact about values, not a universal value itself.
Right.
Yeah, because now you see we're no longer implicitly assuming a goal of truth.
Yeah, earlier, yeah, but no.
You personally, it's not universal.
Is that a universal statement?
No.
Okay, then you have to qualify.
Again, it is a universal statement.
It's just not a universal value or preference or moral.
It's a statement about what is the case, not what ought to be the case.
If you're in pursuit of truth, of course it is, which is what he said was implicit already.
Qualify it, and say, I like the idea that what people value personally is not universal, although I reject the very idea of universality.
Again, I don't reject the idea of universality.
Objective facts exist, so far as I'm convinced, but that doesn't mean that objective values exist.
Of course, there are right and wrong ways to achieve our goals, but that doesn't mean that our goals are good or moral or universally preferable.
Unless, of course, you're using exclusively your first definition of UPB.
What is objectively required.
But in which case, all you've got is your stolen loot from Kant, and not what you promised.
Yeah, that's right, because nobody before Kant ever said that some goals require objective means.
Never happened!
We were just a complete void before Immanuel Kant came along and had no idea how to achieve anything.
There were no manuals on how to make a saddle.
There were no manuals on how to ride a horse or forge a sword or win a battle.
There was no instructions of any kind on how to achieve a particular goal before Immanuel Kant came along.
What people should prefer.
So let's move on to Stefan's second proof, which goes as follows.
All organisms require universally preferred behavior to live.
2.
Man is a living organism. 3.
Therefore, all living men are alive due to the practice of universally preferred behavior.
4.
Therefore, any argument against universally preferable behavior requires an acceptance and practice of universally preferred behavior.
5.
Therefore, no argument against the existence of universally preferable behavior can be valid.
Now here's the primary criticism that I gave.
Premise one is begging the question.
Okay, so just so you know, begging the question.
Let's say that you and I are in a debate.
And I say at the beginning, okay, let's assume that I'm right and take it from there.
Then what I'm doing is I'm moving the conclusion of the debate, whether I'm right or not, back in time to the beginning of the debate.
That's kind of like begging the question, right?
But this is not begging the question.
At all.
I'm not saying, let's assume that UPB is valid and go from there.
I'm saying that the proof that UPB, like nobody can argue against UPB because in order to be alive you have to have followed biological UPBs to live.
You have to have breathed and eaten and slept and had shelter and kept your body temperature within a certain range and so on, right?
So I'm looking for empirical evidence as to the validity of UPB in a biological sense.
Once we've established UPB as a whole, Like UPB is valid as a concept then we can start to drill down and see how it works in the realm of morality, right?
So we're starting with UPB as a whole.
It's not begging the question because I'm not saying let's assume UPB is right.
I'm saying here's the proof that UPB is valid because you can't be alive to argue against UPB unless you followed it.
It's like if you say that there's no such language as English to an English person, it's not begging the question to say you've just detonated your own argument.
Because the conclusion of the argument is implicitly included within the premise, making the entire argument circular.
And here's how Stefan responded.
No, that's not true.
No, see, it is saying that in order to make an argument you have to have pursued universally preferable behavior in the past.
That's not begging the question.
Yes, it is begging the question.
Okay, so why is it begging the question?
Sure, it's saying that in order to make an argument you have to have pursued universally preferable behavior in the past.
But a begging the question fallacy occurs when the conclusion of the argument is included within one or more of its premises, and it doesn't matter whether or not those premises are correct or incorrect.
Yeah, but you haven't proven anything.
You haven't shown me how the conclusion is embedded in one of the premises.
Which is to say, implicit in the premise, in order to make an argument you have to have pursued universally preferable behaviour in the past, is the conclusion that, no argument against the existence of universally preferable behaviour can be valid.
That, sir, is begging the question, and you can't just hand-wave it away.
What?
Okay, he's just… so what he's done is he's played a quote, and then he's given the definition of begging the question, but he hasn't tied it into what I've said?
Unless, of course, you have a preference for falsehood over truth.
What's more, this also applies to your 5th proof.
Premise 1 is again begging the question.
In fact, it's almost identical to the 2nd proof's 1st premise, that all organisms require universally preferred behaviour to live, and it carries all of the same problems.
Wait, did he get it right?
Hang on.
He got it right!
He got it right!
I guess that was a couple of years ago, anyway.
Live, and it carries all of the same problems.
You can't just hand-wave this away, Stefan.
As someone who proudly boasts that they have the largest philosophy show in the world, for you to so easily discard such a valid criticism is embarrassing.
Wait, now your logical argument is that you find something embarrassing?
No rational rebuttal?
No showing where the illogical error is?
Just a statement that you're embarrassed?
Oh man, that's sad.
That's very grade school.
Anyhow, back to Stefan's second proof, and here's that equivocation fallacy that I promised.
If Stefan is using exclusively his first definition of UPB, then while this argument is sound, all he's proven is that arguing against objective requirements requires practice of objective requirements.
But here's the thing, he doesn't use exclusively this definition.
In premise four, he smuggles in his second definition, what people should prefer.
In essence, he's asserting that, therefore, any argument against what is objectively required, requires an acceptance of what people should prefer.
But it doesn't.
Sure, we might, if the goal is life.
If the goal is life.
So if somebody is alive, they have pursued UPB in order to stay alive.
Therefore they can't argue against UPB.
You can find people who have thrown themselves off cliffs and so on and tried to rat on the Clintons, right?
But if someone's alive, then they've obviously pursued UPB, arguing against UPB anyway.
We must acquire calories to live, but that doesn't mean that we should or ought to acquire calories.
Which is exactly what I said in the book, with the example of hunger strikes, and anorexia, and hanging yourself, and... yeah, it's all... yeah, I got it.
That, right there, is a bait-and-switch.
It's an equivocation fallacy, and it's a violation of Hume's law.
Again, Stefan is either doing this, or all he has achieved is the theft of Kant's work.
Again, no focus on the arguments for rape, theft, assault and murder.
Not one single touch on what the majority of the book is about.
There's quite a few more comments that I can respond to, such as Stefan insisting that humans are the most successful species.
Yeah, so I made a big, long argument.
I actually put it in afterwards.
I was wondering if people had noticed that I'd shaved.
I made a big, long argument about humans being the most successful species.
And does he play the whole argument and rebut it?
No.
What he does is he plays a joke I make about dung beetles.
Human beings can write the most astonishing poetry, haiku, sonnets, you name it.
But the sonnets of dung beetles, I mean, they're good-ish.
They're just not as good.
That he's never heard of libertarian free...
Okay, so that's not a rebuttal.
He just put in a joke that I made while delivering a fairly long sophisticated argument.
But that's shitty.
If you've got enough time to put in my joke, surely you've got enough time to... Anyway.
Okay, so what was that?
Now, this one's interesting.
He's never heard of libertarian free will, despite the fact that he's argued for it profusely.
Now, this one's interesting.
So I did look this up after I saw his video.
And I'd never heard of the phrase libertarian free will.
Libertarianism to me was a political philosophy in general.
And I'd never heard the phrase libertarian free will and he says although I've argued for it over the years so then what he would have to do is since he knows that I've argued for quote libertarian free will he has to find a quote of me repeatedly saying libertarian free will but of course there is no such quote I've never heard to my free will position referred to as libertarian free will I just didn't know the term so what I mean there's no bearing on the argument whatsoever so you know anyway so let's see what he's got to say.
What is libertarian free will?
What?
I don't know what libertarian free... I've never heard that phrase before.
Free will is an argument in philosophy going back to the pre-Socratics.
I... I don't know what libertarian free will is.
Yeah, so?
What does that have to – it doesn't have to do anything – I don't know a particular – and it's a fairly obscure term to my knowledge – it's a fairly obscure term to describe a particular free will position.
It's not my free will arguments and so on, so yeah, I don't know some fairly obscure term for free will.
What does that mean to him?
I'm not bearing on anything." And his relentless condescension and poisoning of the will.
Ah, poisoning of the well.
Yeah.
You know, maybe like starting a video with somebody's passionate conclusion without any of the lead-up arguments.
But I'll address these comments and arguments in the future if you, the viewer, have the preference for me to do so.
So, if you want me to make another video, you ought to leave a comment saying so.
But with this said, there is one more thing I feel inclined to respond to.
While addressing Stefan's first proof, to give an example of people valuing different things, I said the following.
If there was a scenario in which I had to choose between knowing the truth but permanently diminishing the well-being of organisms, or not knowing the truth but permanently improving the well-being of organisms, I would choose the latter every time.
Okay, so just before he gets into all of this, he's very, very sensitive about, Plagiarism, right?
Now this is utilitarianism, and this is from Encyclopedia Britannica.
Utilitarianism, actually let's switch over.
So this is utilitarianism from Encyclopedia Britannica, a normative ethics, a tradition stemming from the late 18th and 19th century English philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.
That an action is right if it tends to promote happiness, and wrong if it tends to produce the reverse of happiness.
And not just the happiness of the performer of the action, but also that of everyone affected by it.
Such a theory is in opposition to egoism, the view that a person should pursue his own self-interest even at the expense of others, and to any ethical theory that regards some acts or types of acts as right or wrong independently of their consequences.
Utilitarianism also differs from ethical theories that make the rightness or wrongness of an act dependent upon the motive of the agent, for according to the utilitarian, it is possible for the right thing to be done from a bad motive.
Utilitarianism is an effort to provide an answer to the practical question, what ought a man to do?
Its answer is that he ought to act so as to produce the best consequences possible.
The best consequences possible.
Right?
In the notion of consequences, the utilitarian includes all of the good and bad produced by the act, whether arising after the act has been performed or during its performance.
Anyway, so you can go on and on.
But yeah, this is the key thing, right?
So utilitarianism, the answer to what ought a man to do, that he ought to act so as to produce the best consequences possible.
So when Rob Rationality Rules says that he would choose that which benefits organisms.
I assume he means man because I assume that if he has a UTI he takes antibiotics, right?
He's willing to kill off the bacteria or the germs or whatever it is that's causing him discomfort.
So he's talking about that maximizes human well-being.
So utilitarianism is that men ought to act so as to produce the best consequences possible, right?
Now, when he made this claim in his rebuttal to me, he did not say, I'm a utilitarian.
I follow the arguments of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.
He presented this moral argument that he would reject the truth and pursue the well-being of men and women every single time.
No matter what.
It's an absolute moral statement.
That's utilitarianism.
So, he's taken someone else's argument and presented it as his own.
From what I can see.
I mean, tell me where I'm wrong about this, right?
So, he is a utilitarian.
He got the idea from utilitarianism.
The greatest good for the greatest number or whatever it is, right?
Right?
This basic argument.
Act to produce the best consequences possible.
Act which benefits organisms in his view.
So, this is utilitarianism.
So he could say, I'm a utilitarian.
I follow Jeremy Bentham.
I follow John Stuart Mill.
Hume dipped into this.
There's a lot of People who have come up with this argument, and it's pretty old, and maybe he's more into pragmatism or consequentialism and so on, which is that we judge the value of something by its effects, not by its innate moral nature or its rational consistency and so on, right?
So this guy, Rob, incredibly sensitive you see, to not giving proper credit where credit is due.
Now, I didn't even know about hypothetical imperatives, and they are an ancient idea in humanity, let alone philosophy, so no plagiarism on my part, but he's actually specifically stating a utilitarian moral position, but he's not given any credit to the utilitarians.
So that's not good, right?
So when I put forward an argument by Ayn Rand, I say this is the objectivist argument for, I don't say this is my moral argument, right?
I give credit where credit is due.
So, ah, you know, it's a... He's not having any luck.
He's not particularly good at this stuff, but he's not really having any luck.
Because when he proclaims himself as a utilitarian without saying, I'm a utilitarian, I follow Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, or whatever, Or I'm a pragmatist or whatever it is, right?
I, you know, if he's read his Hume, he knows that Hume focused on the consequences of morality because of the is-ought dichotomy and so on.
So he presented this as his moral argument.
I would do this.
This is my moral argument.
This is my moral perspective.
Not, I got this from other people and this is what I subscribe to.
Which is fine, right?
Which is fine.
But he portrayed, or he presented this as his moral perspective without saying that it came from other people.
But you see, it's really, really bad to pass other people's work off as your own, you see.
It's just terrible.
Here's another example.
This is from the same article again.
Links are all below.
Growth of classical English utilitarianism.
In the history of English philosophy, some historians have identified Bishop Richard Cumberland, a 17th century moral philosopher, as the first to have a utilitarian philosophy.
A generation later, however, Francis Hutcheson, a British moral science theorist, more clearly held a utilitarian view.
And the reason this is important is that utilitarianism is not necessarily an argument like, in order to achieve a particular goal you need to take objective steps, which goes back to the beginning of humankind and includes some aspects of the animal kingdom.
This is a relatively new couple hundred year old philosophy.
Okay, this Francis Hutchison said he not only analyzed that action as best that, quote, procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers, end quote, but proposed a form of, quote, moral arithmetic, end quote, for calculating the best consequences.
The skeptic David Hume This guy obviously knows a lot about Hume, right?
Rationality rules.
And it's also funny, I just wanted to point out that he says that his channel is called Rationality Rules, but he says he will ditch the truth in favor of that which benefits human beings every single time.
In other words, it's not rationality that rules at all.
That very channel is misnamed.
So the skeptic David Hume, Scotland's foremost philosopher and historian, attempted to analyze the origin of the virtues in terms of their contribution to utility.
Bentham himself said that he discovered the principle of utility in the 18th century writings of various thinkers, of Joseph Priestley, a dissenting clergyman famous for his discovery of oxygen, of the Frenchman Claude Adrien Helvetius, author of A Philosophy of Mere Sensation, and Cesare Beccaria, an Italian legal theorist, and of Hume.
Helvetius probably drew from Hume, and Beccaria from Helvetia.
So anyway, you can sort of read on this more, but yeah, this idea, the greatest good for the greatest number, that which produces the best benefit regardless of Consistency, rationality, or traditional morality.
It's a relatively new idea and Rationality Rules presented it with no attribution whatsoever.
He presented it as his moral perspective, his moral idea.
His, well, apparently it's really really bad, you see, to plagiarize.
Dear oh dear.
And I do, I mean, I have, I'm not a strict person with regards to this stuff, right?
So if you say your argument is illogical, then you don't have to say, by the way, I'm using standards first developed by Aristotle or whoever, right?
That's fine.
Now, if you say I invented logic, that's assuming Aristotle's work and other people's work, right?
So it's one thing to use a standard is fine, right?
I mean, you don't have to reference every time you use someone's standard and so on.
But anyway, let's continue.
Now this is a statement that I really should have caveated.
Oh yeah, let's go back to his statement.
If there was a scenario in which I had to choose between knowing the truth but permanently diminishing the well-being of organisms, or not knowing the truth but permanently improving the well-being of organisms, I would choose the latter every time.
Right.
This is a moral absolute statement of consequentialism, right?
Now this is a statement that I really should have caveated, as all I was attempting to convey is that I consider the well-being of sentient entities to be more important than I do the truth.
Alright.
Funny thing is, is that he bothered me a little bit by criticizing so badly, so where was his concern for my well-being rather than the truth?
No, he chose the truth over UPB, over my feelings, and so again, this is all just very convoluted nonsense.
But what I failed to make clear is that in reality, in practice, the way to ascertain and maintain well-being is via truth.
Wow.
Now that's a huge admission, right?
That's a huge admission.
Now, it's not like you failed to make clear.
If you say 2 and 2 make 5, and then you say, well, what I failed to make clear was that 2 and 2 make 4.
It's like, no, you just, your earlier statement was wrong.
Your earlier foundational moral statement was wrong.
And, you know, a more mature person would look at me, at Steph, and say, wow, you know, you really dug into what it is that I said about ethics, and this is something that I wrote down.
I assume he had a script of some kind.
He produced the video three years ago, I think he said.
He reviewed it.
He put the graphics in, the animation, the text.
This was his core moral position.
And he said every single time, in opposition between truth and well-being, I choose well-being.
Every single time.
Every time.
It's a foundational, absolute, universal moral statement.
When we're debating about UPB, right?
So he had a UPB right there, right?
This is an important point as well.
If he says, I would choose well-being over truth every single time, that's universally preferable behavior.
Right?
So, this is a huge change to say, When formerly you said there's an opposition between truth and well-being to now say truth serves well-being.
That's an amazing omission.
Now, I helped him out of this error.
I mean, again, a mature person, somebody who understood the Socratic approach that nobody loses when you get corrected.
You win when you get corrected.
He would sit there and say, wow, you know, for years I believed this statement.
I put it out in a video.
I put it out on the internet.
I put the text in.
I put the graphics in.
I stood by the statement for three years and I assumed that he, after he read the utilitarians in the past, that he came up with this or derived this perspective from them.
He's a utilitarian.
And so then he would say, you, Steph, have really helped me out of a terrible error that I had made, because I said the truth within opposition at times to well-being, and I would choose well-being over the truth every single time, in which case you have to rename your channel.
Well-being rules, not rationality rules, right?
So I did this guy a great favor.
I mean, who else in his life has dug this deeply into something he said and helped him out of a terrible error since he values the truth and he values integrity and right?
Because he criticized me for my lack of integrity or whatever it is, right?
It's embarrassing that you wouldn't know, right?
So I did this guy a huge favor who nobody else has done it for him because he continued in this massive moral error unabated for years before we assume for this video and for the years afterwards and it wasn't until I pointed out that by rejecting UPB he was violating his moral rule to choose well-being over truth because UPB would serve humanity's well-being.
And it also is true, but okay.
So I did a huge amount to help this guy.
And how does he repay me?
For the work that I did digging in and freeing him from a huge error that had gone unnoticed in his life and among his audience for years.
How did he repay me for rescuing him from this terrible error?
He called me a plagiarist, a thief that I'd initiated the use of force, he called me a hypocrite that I'm violating my own moral standards, and he put stupid-ass Shia LaBeouf gifs in there.
That's how you get repaid!
Well, you know, I guess we all know the story of Socrates.
That's how you get repaid for helping someone out of a foundational error in their ethics.
And so this statement is purely a philosophically hypothetical one.
It doesn't map onto reality.
The statement is purely a philosophically hypothetical one?
Wait, so you were wrong about something, but you said, I believe this, I choose this, this is my morals.
These are my morals.
But when you're disproven, you say, well, that was only hypothetical.
Yeah, okay, I can play that game too.
Anytime I'm wrong, it's also hypothetical.
Come on dude.
You were saved from a huge moral error and I did that and Malita style you're just you know it's hard you know like when you are when you think you're right and then you're disproven fairly easily it's happened to me in the past right but it stings your vanity it stings your you know and and you have to know how to process that stuff emotionally so you don't come off and attack people who've actually helped you.
And so what I'm saying is that outside of philosophy, the example that I gave is contradictory.
And so in hindsight... Okay, maybe I didn't help him as much as I thought.
Okay, sorry, I need to go back.
... onto reality via truth.
And so this statement is purely a philosophically hypothetical one.
It doesn't map onto reality.
So, something can be philosophical that does not map onto reality.
Now, when you say it does not map onto reality, isn't that saying that it's false?
You know, if I say that gases contract when heated, right?
Gases expand when heated.
If I say gases contract when heated, or a ball held at shoulder length on the earth's surface falls upwards, well that's a false and incorrect statement, right?
My ideas, my concepts don't match onto reality.
It's all not true.
And so this statement is purely a philosophically hypothetical one?
Ah, so if I say that a ball will fall upwards not downwards when dropped on the surface of the earth, I can say, not that I'm wrong, but it's a purely philosophical hypothetical.
What's that mean?
Can you... You're like the Fonz, you know, like there was this old... I used to watch Happy Days when I was a kid.
And he was wrong.
And he couldn't say, I was wrong.
He said I was rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr The fault was that I didn't have enough time.
The fault was that when I was wrong it was just a philosophical hypothetical.
I mean, just say that you were wrong about something.
It's fine.
You're a young man.
You've got a bright future ahead of you.
You're smart.
You're articulate.
Do you think you know everything?
Do you think, you know?
I've been doing this for, gosh now, 35 years.
I mean, I might know a little bit here and there.
You know, it's fine.
It's fine to be corrected by people.
It's not the end of the world.
It's fine, right?
Anyway, so when he's wrong, then it's okay because it was just a philosophical hypothetical.
And so this statement is purely a philosophically hypothetical one.
It doesn't map onto reality.
I mean, you know, when something doesn't map onto reality, we call it false, don't we?
The moon is square.
The moon is where Minecraft is, right?
It's just a philosophical hypothetical that doesn't map onto reality.
No, no, you just simplify things, man.
Don't make philosophy so complicated.
You're just wrong about something.
You made a moral statement which you did not attribute to the utilitarians and your moral statement now has been tossed aside.
Right?
Because you're saying these things are in opposition and now you're saying that the truth serves, right?
The truth serves well-being.
That's a monstrous change, a huge change.
It's a very productive change because I also believe that the truth serves well-being.
And because, you see, if he'd held on to that earlier perspective, he would have to go and support UPB because UPB would serve the happiness of humanity enormously by helping people understand why rape, theft, assault and murder are wrong.
So UPB would massively serve humanity.
So, I mean, maybe that's why he adjusted things.
But don't just say, it doesn't quite map onto reality, and it's a philosophical hypothetical error.
Just say, nope, you know what?
He really helped me figure out that that statement was wrong, was incorrect, and, you know, good.
Thank you for fixing my error.
I really appreciate that.
No one else has done that.
And I've had this mistake in my brain for years.
Like, whew, fantastic, right?
No.
And so what I'm saying is that, outside of philosophy, the example that I gave is contradictory.
Oh, I'm sorry.
I mean, I know this is a while, but you know when people – I mean, he's struggling to reorient, right?
He's struggling to reorient, and I understand that, right?
It's a huge change.
to put out an absolute moral statement and then utterly change it three years later because someone criticized you and you hadn't even noticed the error.
That's a huge change, right?
I understand, look, I was an objectivist for 20 years until I worked on UPB.
It's hard to change, right?
I put out moral arguments, you know, that philosophy serves the needs of man, rationality serves the needs of man.
Like all the objectivist arguments about ethics, I put out the same objectivist arguments about free will and minarchism, small government, and then I had this big revolution, right?
I became a voluntarist or a stateless society advocate, an anarchist, and UPB I worked on because I was in my 30s, and I still didn't feel like I had a firm grasp on ethics.
I worked on that.
It's hard to change, and it's hard to publicly reverse positions, right?
I was against political action, and then I talked about Trump.
I mean, I get it.
It's hard.
But you don't say I was right in some abstract sense, and you don't throw philosophy into the woodchip because you made a mistake.
Making a mistake is perfectly human.
We're all on this wild path to get to truth, and it's a complicated and difficult thing to get a hold of, right?
So don't do this.
Reality.
And so what I'm saying is that outside of philosophy, the example that I gave is contradictory.
No, see, oh my god.
It's like saying, well, I said that gases expand and contract when heated, but now outside of science, this is contradictory.
It's like, no, the whole point of science is consistency.
The whole point of philosophy is consistency.
You can't say my inconsistent statement is fine in philosophy, but outside philosophy, it's inconsistent.
That's, I mean, you, you, come on, man.
And so in hindsight, I should have used a better example.
And so this is on me.
In hindsight, I should have used a better example.
You made a moral, universal, absolute statement that you're now enormously changing.
My bad, my mistake, my blunder.
However, Stefan jumped on this single sentence, and from it, fabricated an entire moral philosophy, and somehow even a political agenda.
Now, I pounced, you see.
Now, when you're talking about morality and ethics, when someone puts forward their foundational moral proposition, It's okay to focus on that, right?
I mean, it's acceptable when you're talking about foundational universal ethics, that when someone makes a foundational universal ethical statement, like, I will ditch the truth in order to maintain the well-being of organisms, Not pouncing on it.
And look, I mean, consequentialism is foundational to leftism, right?
Because redistributing wealth benefits people who are poor.
And it adds, right?
There are more poor people than happier people.
And so when you take, use the state to take money from rich people and give it to poor people, net happiness in the short run goes up, right?
So utilitarianism does often lead to, and it's very much associated with leftism, whereas a principled approach to property rights says that taxation is theft.
So, no, it's not fabrication.
Oh, yeah, okay, so he's a lefty, alright.
And then spent a significant amount of time burning this strawman to the ground, after ironically accusing me of strawmanning him.
And this guy says... Wait, what strawman am I burning to the ground?
I mean, he just... So he put forward a moral position that he prefers well-being over truth and will sacrifice the truth for well-being.
I attack that, but that was his position.
It's actually written on the screen.
How on earth is that a straw man when I'm responding to what someone actually wrote on the screen?
That he would prefer to sacrifice the truth in order to enhance the well-being of organisms.
Are you beginning to see the problem here?
The sophistry, the lies, the falsehood, the lack of commitment to even his own ethical standard.
Right.
So just so you understand, this is the closing part, and I do hope that my sort of passion about this topic, and you know, false moral theories have killed hundreds of millions of people around the world.
I'm not blaming it on this Rationality Rules fellow, I'm just saying that false moral theories like fascism, communism, certain kinds of religion, and so on, have literally killed North of a billion people, north of a billion and a half people, but certainly hundreds of... Just look at statism, right?
Outside of war, governments killed 250 million of their own citizens in the 20th century alone.
A quarter of a billion people were killed by government.
Like, bad moral theories are the biggest curse and plague on humanity, which is why I work so hard to defend and expand UPB.
So it is important and I mean if you're not passionate about ethics and it means you simply don't understand the consequences of bad moral theories which is literally the deaths of hundreds of millions of people and so here's the argument so he and again the fact that he's revised it good you know but don't call don't call me attacking a straw man when you simply changed your theory later right or changed your moral your foundational moral principle changed to
Truth serves well-being, not truth is in opposition to well-being.
So this is the argument that I'm making, just because he didn't play the whole argument, so I just want to give you the context, right?
So this is the argument that I'm making.
He said that he will sacrifice the truth in order to enhance well-being.
Now, clearly, if people stop raping, stealing, assaulting, and murdering people, well-being is vastly improved, right?
We can accept that.
I mean, that's not a very complicated argument, right?
And so, given that UPB disproves that rape, theft, assault, and murder can be universally preferable behaviors, it's a huge step forward in morality.
So if he says, I prefer well-being over truth, and he's attacking UPB, then either he has to say that he prefers truth over well-being, or he has to say that well-being is enhanced by that which UPB disallows, which is rape, theft, assault, and murder.
Now he can't say that humanity is enhanced or made happier or better by rape, theft, assault, and murder.
Can't.
Then he can't say that he prefers well-being over truth if he's criticizing UPB for being false, even though getting behind UPB and supporting it would enhance the well-being of human beings, right?
So that's the basic contradiction, and that's what I pointed out at the end, and that's why he changed his position, which I kind of admire, although he kind of blames philosophy and says, well, the problem is philosophy, and, you know, outside of philosophy it's contradictory, but somehow in philosophy it's not.
Anyway.
Horrible.
Ratchet.
Ridiculous.
Wrong.
Now the final embers of the Strawman, and indeed his final words, were the awkwardly intense.
This is a scenario.
Okay, I still don't know what the Strawman is.
I'm simply talking about the logical consequences of his fully stated, printed out on the screen moral position.
I'm not misrepresenting it in any way.
So just saying Strawman does not create a Strawman.
Scenario, my friend, this is a scenario right here.
You did it two years ago.
It's a scenario right here, right now.
You have the chance to reject the truth, UBB is wrong, and it will permanently enhance the well-being of people.
But you didn't take that, did you?
Yeah, so I'm pointing out that he's not following his own moral rules as they were stated in his video.
Which is true.
So even by your own argument, you're not only wrong, you're immoral.
Right.
He is immoral.
At least he was according to his stated views, because he said he would choose well-being over the truth.
But then he argued against UPB, although UPB would enhance the well-being of human beings.
Right.
He's not a straw man at all.
And in reply, I want to say the following.
Now, he could say again, he could say, you know, thanks, that was a big error, you know, I mean, he obviously watched his video again, didn't notice the error, didn't notice the error when he made it, didn't notice the error, I don't know if anyone commented on it or sent him an email or anything, but I really worked hard and I dug in to help free this guy from a mistake that he'd made, which is a kind thing to do, right?
I mean, it's a nice and kind thing to do, and he did dislodge himself from this Position of utilitarianism.
Good.
So he could thank me for helping correct a major moral mistake that he'd publicly put out there and has believed in for many, many years.
He could.
Let's find out.
This is a scenario, my friend.
This is a scenario right here, right now.
You did it eleven years ago.
It's a scenario right here, right now.
You have the chance to act according to what you insist is universally preferable.
Don't initiate force.
Don't initiate... Oh, is he?
Okay, okay, right.
So he's back to... Because I say that some goals have objective requirements, I've stolen from Kant, and therefore UPB is what?
I don't know.
Plagiarism.
Don't steal.
And yet you've stolen Kant's hypothetical imperative.
Yes, he... Again, I can show thousands of examples of how the fact that human beings have objective requirements to achieve particular goals goes back long before that, but Utilitarianism is fairly recent, and your moral position is directly derived from utilitarianism, which you did not give credit to.
You thief!
And so by even your own argument, you're not only wrong, you're immoral.
How long do I need to stare at it?
How long did he stare at it?
Crikey, Stefan.
So intense.
Yeah, I mean, it is an intense issue, right, to deal with ethics.
As I said before, false moral theories have caused the death of hundreds of millions of people.
If somebody was talking about releasing a particular virus that would kill hundreds of millions of people, you'd be pretty damn concerned about that, especially if you would be in the path of that virus and your family and people you love.
So yeah, I am pretty intense about ethics because they really, really matter.
Maybe they don't matter to you as much, but they really matter to me.
And yeah, given this false accusation of plagiarism, this defamation, which is very, very unwise, I'll tell you that right now.
Very unwise, unless you've got really good proof to publicly accuse someone of initiating the use of force, of stealing, of plagiarism and so on.
Very, very unwise, I'll tell you that.
And of course a decent moral person would retract that.
I mean, I've made the case.
It's a false accusation and you should retract it.
It's wrong.
And yeah, with that having been said, as far as this guy goes, yeah, I'm done.
Well, thank you so much for enjoying this latest free domain show on philosophy.
And I'm going to be frank and ask you for your help, your support, your encouragement, and your resources.
Please like, subscribe, and share, and all of that good stuff to get philosophy out into the world.
And also, equally importantly, go to freedomain.com forward slash donate.
▲
Export Selection