| Time | Text |
|---|---|
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New Cold War Dynamics
00:03:46
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|
| It seems like we're really in a Cold War. | |
| It seems like, you know, we always say the Cold War ended, you know, at a certain time. | |
| It feels like there's a new kind of Cold War going on in the world, the whole world. | |
| Who do you think might even now be getting together to form a one world alliance that would want to be able to destroy America somehow? | |
| Oh, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran and their allies, I think, are clearly the access, the other side in this new Cold War. | |
| And what they're trying to do, you know, what they're trying to do is what we did in the old Cold War. | |
| You know, we have forgotten the lessons of Ronald Reagan from the old Cold War, peace through strength. | |
| We would much rather be engaged in this passionate argument over President Trump and all of that. | |
| And the threat is forgotten. | |
| And what they are trying to do, Sun Tzu said it best, you know, that the greatest victory is to win without war. | |
| And that's what nuclear weapons make possible. | |
| That's how we won without war in the Cold War. | |
| And they want to do that too. | |
| They're trying to win without war. | |
| If they have to go to war and destroy us physically in order to do it, they're perfectly capable of doing that and would do it. | |
| But their first preference would be to win without war. | |
| And I think the first experiment for them was North Korea. | |
| You know, they're the ones, China and Russia, that basically enabled North Korea to achieve ICBMs and a hydrogen bomb now, you know, so quickly. | |
| I mean, it isn't amazing. | |
| And, you know, people were astonished, the conventional wisdom that little North Korea, that couldn't even feed its own people, you know, has been able to so quickly come up with such sophisticated weaponry. | |
| Well, it's not that such a mystery if you're willing to open your eyes and see the role that Russia and China have played in North Korea. | |
| Many people in the State Department still don't want to acknowledge that. | |
| You're kidding. | |
| You know, because they want us to come to Moscow and Beijing and beg for their help. | |
| Okay? | |
| In part, that's it. | |
| But also, they want to raise the stakes so high with a nuclear-armed North Korea that the United States will recalculate the risk. | |
| Is it worth it to put Chicago and New York City and Washington and our own people at risk in order to provide for the security of our Pacific allies, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines? | |
| Most Americans would say no. | |
| We don't want to sacrifice American cities to hold up that alliance relationship. | |
| So North Korea being able to reach out and strike us, let alone conduct an EMP attack that would destroy our whole society, completely changes the calculus of risk for us and the benefit cost ratio of our alliance relationship in the Pacific. | |
| And they're hoping that the forces of isolationism, I mean they, the new Cold War access, Russia, China, North Korea, et cetera, they're hoping that we will back off and that we will say, you know, this isn't in our interests, and that we will listen to the isolationist voices on both the left and the right and pull back. | |
|
Nuclear Umbrella Bluff
00:00:43
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|
| And even if we don't officially do it and don't formally do it, that they know that we will have gone through the calculation and said, well, maybe we'll continue to try to provide an umbrella, a nuclear umbrella, but it'll be a big bluff. | |
| We're not really going to let ourselves get sucked into a war that's going to possibly result in the destruction of America. | |
| And they're also calculating that Japan and South Korea and our allies in the Pacific will also realize that and have less confidence in our security guarantees and say, you know, we can't count on the United States to sacrifice itself to protect us. | |
| So even though we may pay lip service to this alliance that we have, in effect it will become hollow. | |