Nov. 19, 2025 - Bannon's War Room
47:23
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| Speaker | Time | Text |
|---|---|---|
| This is the primal scream of a dying regime. | ||
| Pray for our enemies because we're going medieval on these people. | ||
| Here's not got a free shot on all these networks lying about the people. | ||
| The people have had a belly full of it. | ||
| I know you don't like hearing that. | ||
| I know you're trying to do everything in the world to stop that, but you're not going to stop it. | ||
| It's going to happen. | ||
| And where do people like that go to share the big lie? | ||
| MAGA Media. | ||
| I wish in my soul, I wish that any of these people had a conscience. | ||
| Ask yourself, what is my task and what is my purpose? | ||
| If that answer is to save my country, this country will be saved. | ||
|
unidentified
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War Room. | |
| Here's your host, Stephen K. Bannon. | ||
| Okay, welcome back. | ||
| Tuesday, 18 November, Year of Lord, 2025, quite a busy day. | ||
| Also, there's going to be this formal dinner tonight, so Real America's Voice will be covering all of it. | ||
| Brian Glenn, our White House correspondent, maybe we'll dip back over there in a while. | ||
| Yaakov, Katz, thank you. | ||
| What brings you to the United States? | ||
| Here at a conference, General Assembly of Jewish Federations in North America. | ||
| Were you presenting? | ||
| I'm presenting, yeah. | ||
| Okay, so the book is While Israel Slept. | ||
| I cannot give a higher recommendation to read, I think, an even-handed yet shocking account of October 7th, what led up to it, the intelligence failures, although you'll see individual stories of heroism and bravery, and then the military part, which we'll get into. | ||
| When you present this, because look, you know, I'm not Jewish. | ||
| Our audience is, we are kind of split. | ||
| We have a big contingent, very pro-Israel. | ||
| We have other people who are questioning some of the relationships now. | ||
| This is, I believe, as an outsider, so brutal in its assessment. | ||
| Number one, how has the book been received in Israel? | ||
| I know our audience that bought it from the first time we spent an hour with you have loved it, and I've gotten great feedback. | ||
| And as I've told people around town, because the details are not really talked about anywhere, they've gotten it. | ||
| The feedback I've gotten is like, how is this not like the number one book that everybody's talking about? | ||
| What has been the response in Israel? | ||
| And what has been a response like when you come to a conference like this? | ||
| Well, I think it depends where. | ||
| You know, people are still very much intrigued and want to understand what happened and how this very powerful military that I think we all recognize is really one of the most powerful and strong militaries and intelligence apparatuses in the world, how it failed so miserably. | ||
| Because at the end of the day, Stephen, I think you get this. | ||
| Strategic surprises will always happen. | ||
| They'll happen again to Israel. | ||
| They'll happen here to the United States. | ||
| We don't have to go that far back in time, right? | ||
| September 11th is a perfect example. | ||
| These things will always happen to countries around the world. | ||
| And how do we avoid them? | ||
| How do we prevent them? | ||
| Or if they happen, how do we identify them happening and know how to provide the right answer and right response immediately so it doesn't spiral into a war for example that Israel has been embroiled in the same way from the strategic what I love about the book you go strategic operational level to the Tactical, right? | ||
| And you talk about the failures. | ||
| And as you see, strategic failures can kind of overwhelm you, right? | ||
| When you're totally caught by surprise, and then you've got you're trying to turn around operationally. | ||
| And then in the tactical, that's where you see some of the individual heroism of people. | ||
| And tactical, you'll always see that. | ||
| I mean, Israeli people are incredible. | ||
| American people are incredible. | ||
| People will always stand up if they see something bad happening and they'll go out there and they'll race down to southern Israel, take a sidearm, and go out and try to fight to save people they don't even know. | ||
| That's the beauty of Israel, right? | ||
| And that's something that's incredible. | ||
| But beyond that, and you're asking how it's been received, look, it's still a very painful moment in Israeli history. | ||
| It's one that, while a lot of the people in the military and in the intelligence agencies have been replaced in the government, same government, same ministers, same people who are still in their roles. | ||
| And now that the war has winded down, there's a lot of talk and a lot of demand of a commission of inquiry on a national level that will look into what happened here to get to the bottom of it and study. | ||
| Let's go. | ||
| What are your bona fides? | ||
| This book has been received, particularly at a professional level, as something that's got to be read given your and your co-author's background. | ||
| So just give the audience both of us are longtime journalists. | ||
| I was been doing this for about 25 years, covered military affairs. | ||
| Now, Mir, my co-author, continues to cover military affairs in Israel for about 20 years. | ||
| I was the editor-in-chief of the Jerusalem Post, one of the daily newspapers, big English language papers in Israel, for about eight years up until two years ago. | ||
| This is my fourth book. | ||
| I've written about Israel's bombing of Syria's nuclear reactor back in 2007, what happened in the Bush years. | ||
| I've written about Israeli military technology. | ||
| I've written about Iran a lot. | ||
| Actually, here at this conference I'm at, speaking on a panel about Iran and the fear, for example, that the next round is not a question of if, but it's more of a question of when, and that you're hearing from the intelligence folks both here and in Israel. | ||
| So, really, been in this space of Israel-U.S. relations and of Israeli military and intelligence operations. | ||
| So, I came up as a kid as a paper boy, and I remember the 67 war because it was amazing. | ||
| You had Moshe Dayan, you had all these kind of larger-than-life figures. | ||
| But the thing that left the impression is that whether it's the Mossad or in this case, Shinbet and Amman, Israeli intelligence is world-class, and the IDF is a world-class military operation. | ||
| And so, that aspect of it, you never have to worry, right? | ||
| In fact, they say, Hey, if and I doubt I'm not a big believer in the greatest ally theory, but part of that is because the intelligence and the military. | ||
| The book, what's so shocking about it, takes those two institutions as institutions and really gives you kind of an insider's look of these failures. | ||
| So, let's go, let's just summarize the intelligence part for those that weren't with us a couple weeks ago. | ||
| Just take us through the lead-up and the intelligence failures, and they're pretty dramatic because the intelligence was actually out there, right? | ||
| And particularly, you have these young women that are the first wave. | ||
| Then you have later they find a report that actually was written two years before that is absolutely goes through in detail what they believe Hamas is going to do. | ||
| So, it's not that you didn't have the information, but somehow the system was so bureaucratic that it never got up to, and the failure of imagination that Hamas could ever do this caught Israel in those brutal moments from like three o'clock in the morning on the 7th. | ||
| Because a lot of people in the United States don't realize the night before, like starting at 6 p.m., local time. | ||
| The guys are saying, Hey, I think something's going on here, right? | ||
| And there's an eight-hour debate about what that is. | ||
| And basically, at three o'clock in the morning, you realize a lot of guys in the central command realize, hey, something big is about to happen. | ||
| So, I would split it into three different categories. | ||
| On the one hand, in the tactical, in that moment, in the 24, 36 hours preceding, there were alarms going off and indications. | ||
| They were uncovering rocket launchers. | ||
| They were preparing Hamas. | ||
| They were preparing their underground bunker systems, tunnel networks for their top commanders. | ||
| There was things going on with their communications that Israel was picking up on. | ||
| All of that was information that was flowing in in real time. | ||
| Some of it was getting caught in bureaucracy, was not moving from one agency to the next. | ||
| That's always going to be a problem in the worlds of intelligence, as you know. | ||
| But that was there. | ||
| That's level one. | ||
| And that was misinterpreted. | ||
| Israel was in a debate. | ||
| The commanders on the ground. | ||
| In real time. | ||
| In real time. | ||
| Is this a drill or is this an attack? | ||
| That's what they were not sure about. | ||
| And the tension is: if it's a drill, we can't be too quick to respond because then they'll know all the intelligence. | ||
| We'll know where to go. | ||
| We'll tip them off that we know. | ||
| It's the Coventry in England situation where you have the code system, Ultra, the cold breaker, and you got to let this town be bombed. | ||
| Otherwise, you'd let the Luftwaffe know you had their bombing schedules. | ||
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Right. | |
| So you will know that they'll know that you know, and then they'll reverse engineer how did you find out? | ||
| Or they'll think that you're doing something and they're just planning a drill. | ||
| But now because they see you doing something, they might actually attack. | ||
| So why instigate it? | ||
| So that's the debate throughout the night. | ||
| The second layer, which goes back a few months, is those women soldiers and others who are seeing things happening on the ground, the surveillance people who watch Gaza, watch the border, seeing training, seeing more senior Hamas commanders come near the border, and they're shut down by their commanders who say, listen, you don't get it. | ||
| The Hamas does not want war. | ||
| You're misunderstanding. | ||
| And then the third is going back even further in time was this report called Jericho Walls, a reference to the biblical walls of Jericho that came tumbling down. | ||
| Tell me about that report, that report, because it comes about halfway through the book. | ||
| No, it was written by just intelligence analysts who saw what was happening. | ||
| Essentially 21 or 22, 21, 22, and saw what was happening and said, basically outlined one to one, Steve, what was going to happen. | ||
| And they called it Jericho Walls because they looked at the barrier that we had erected along Gaza and said, it could come tumbling down, like ancient biblical Jericho came tumbling down if we're not prepared. | ||
| And this report also stuck in a drawer somewhere. | ||
| The Israeli defense minister only finds out about it about a month or two into the war that there was even such a report. | ||
| How come he didn't see it on day one in his job? | ||
| So really, when you look at all of that, you have to ask yourself a bigger question. | ||
| How could they misunderstand this? | ||
| How could they not imagine what was possible? | ||
| Hamas is a known enemy. | ||
| It's a jihadist genocidal terrorist group. | ||
| We fought with them multiple wars over the years. | ||
| Why did we think that this could not happen? | ||
| And that speaks to a deeper issue for a country when it gets caught up in a belief system that its enemy, A, is not capable of doing something, or B, its enemy is a very important thing. | ||
| Is it hubris? | ||
| I think it's a mix of hubris on the one hand. | ||
| They can't surprise us. | ||
| We know everything. | ||
| We're more powerful. | ||
| But it's also something else. | ||
| And this is a weakness and a strength that Israel has. | ||
| Israel is a country that is a Western nation. | ||
| It's a country that has its trade and cultural ties with the United States, with Europe. | ||
| It looks to the West. | ||
| It wants to be like the rest of the Western world. | ||
| And that puts it into this frame of mind. | ||
| Kick the can down the road. | ||
| Don't deal with it. | ||
| If you can avoid the war, avoid the war. | ||
| Look, you talk about this. | ||
| About this bureaucratically and socially. | ||
| Yeah, but you know, appeasement also to some extent. | ||
| If there's a way to buy off your enemy as opposed to confront your enemy, go that route first because we don't want, we just want to have a good life. | ||
| And the problem is, Israel is in a region and a neighborhood that you can't just have a good life. | ||
| How much is, when you read this, how much, and you're the technology guy, how much is it the belief that we're so far technologically superior? | ||
| Because here, one of the first things in the evening at 6 o'clock, you have a surveillance system that's even the name of it's classified. | ||
| So you don't go into a lot of detail. | ||
| That system went down, and people are arguing, hey, it's either been taken down and guys got glitches in it. | ||
| But there was, you could tell from the institutional response, you depended a lot on technology. | ||
| You thought you were so technologically superior and had such a detailed surveillance system, nothing had happened. | ||
| The other, at the strategic level, was a belief that it looks like so much of the focus had been on Tehran, that not just Hezbollah and the proxies, but that the regime itself and a lot of the strategic resources or time and focus was on the Persian situation versus the wolf that happened to be at the door. | ||
| How much did that go into? | ||
| Technology is a huge piece of it. | ||
| You know, we had Iron Dome, Arrow, David Sling, multi-layered missile defense technology. | ||
| So their missiles, they can lob them at us. | ||
| We can shoot them out of the sky. | ||
| They're not an issue. | ||
| They try to tunnel into Israel. | ||
| We'll build an underground tunnel and sensors to detect when they're digging tunnels. | ||
| We'll build a multi-layered barrier to stop them. | ||
| The technology, also in the SIGINT and signal intelligence, we can listen to all their conversations. | ||
| So we don't need to have human assets on the ground inside Gaza. | ||
| Why waste your time in cultivating an asset and having an informant? | ||
| But Steve, thousands of people ended up crossing the border. | ||
| Not one could pick up the phone and call their Israeli handler and say, listen, this is in the works. | ||
| Get ready. | ||
| Because we didn't have those assets. | ||
| You can't just rely on technology. | ||
| And I think that's a big wake-up call. | ||
| So this is the reality because one thing that jumps off here, you think being a Westerner, that whether it's Mossad or Shimbet, Orman, whoever it is, that half of Gaza is on the payroll, that you have human intelligence. | ||
| The thing that's so shocking here, there's no real ever human intelligence, even for verification of what's going on. | ||
| Is that because the reliance on technology made human intelligence like a thing from a James Bond novel? | ||
| Well, Israel A pulls out of Gaza in 2005, 20 years ago, so it doesn't have boots on the ground. | ||
| When you don't have boots on the ground, harder to have intelligence, human assets to be able to manage and cultivate. | ||
| That's always going to be a challenge. | ||
| But you're able to do it, for example, in Iran. | ||
| You're able to do it in Lebanon with Hezbollah. | ||
| Here it was: okay, we don't have the boots on the ground. | ||
| Why invest the resources when we actually have the technology that can fill the gap, right? | ||
| And that's a problem. | ||
| I mean, we see this with the United States as well in so many different spheres of operations, where they also, the American intelligence community, is putting much more of an emphasis on the technology as opposed to on the old school, you know, the guys in the trench coat standing on a street corner and trying to get a source, get an agent, someone on the inside who can't get it. | ||
| Do you think the entire West is too dependent upon technology now, particularly surveillance technology, that it's a problem everywhere? | ||
| Well, I think you believe we have these kind of problems that we could get caught as bad as 9-11? | ||
| 100%, Steve. | ||
| Look, everyone, I mean, we have satellites, we have drones, we have systems that can listen to our phones and intercept our emails. | ||
| It makes you feel almost that you can get into someone's head. | ||
| It makes you feel that you know everything about someone. | ||
| But here's the honest truth: the brutal truth: as much as you might think you know, you don't know what's really going on. | ||
| And if they also can assess that you're listening and seeing everything, they're going to come up with other ways to communicate that are old school or offline, and they can plan this. | ||
| And that's exactly what we saw happen here. | ||
| Right. | ||
| Let's talk. | ||
| Okay, so we get to the three o'clock in the morning and the attack comes. | ||
| By 3 o'clock a.m., everybody's kind of on alert. | ||
| You basically put the nation on alert, militarily and militarily. | ||
| I mean, the nation's still significantly happening. | ||
| They're waiting to see what's going to happen. | ||
| You got the head of the Shinbet, that agency sends some news. | ||
| You can't tip it because if it's not happening, you don't want to give away the fact that you're not going to be able to do it. | ||
| So they're waiting. | ||
| 629, the rockets start firing into Israel, and right away, head of the Shinbet, for example, calls the commander of the IDF of the Israel Defense Forces and says, they're going to kidnap people. | ||
| You got to work to prevent that. | ||
| And unfortunately, the tragedy comes. | ||
| They kidnap 251 people. | ||
| They murder 1,200 people. | ||
| Right out of the box. | ||
| Pretty much. | ||
| Let's go through the hour because what happens then? | ||
| One of the other questions here, besides the intelligence, the IDF is kind of legendary, right? | ||
| Why did it take the IDF? | ||
| I mean, some of the heroes here are old school IDF guys that fought in previous wars or older guys are just hearing this and they're getting in their cars and driving down with whatever weapon they could grab and they're going to kill somebody, you know, they're going to shoot some bad guys. | ||
| But the institutional, you know, you got the strategic, the operational tactical. | ||
| Why did it take so long for the tactical or operational piece to kick in to have a more organized response? | ||
| This was probably. | ||
| That's basically. | ||
| No, it's a great. | ||
| This is one of the more painful questions and issues that come up here because, okay, they'll try to invade. | ||
| Here they're invading. | ||
| Where is the army? | ||
| You have an intelligence failure. | ||
| The barrier fails. | ||
| You're defensive, your line of defense fails, right? | ||
| Now they're inside Israel. | ||
| The whole military should be flooding the South. | ||
| And that doesn't happen. | ||
| So I'll say a couple of things. | ||
| Number one is this was a very sophisticated, although very low-tech attack. | ||
| What did they do, Hamas, essentially? | ||
| They had studied for years the way the Israeli military is deployed along the border. | ||
| They understood what happens when, for example, they fire rockets. | ||
| So what did they do? | ||
| They fire a massive barrage of rockets. | ||
| Those women soldiers that we spoke about, where do they go when the rockets are fire? | ||
| They go into a safe space inside their base. | ||
| So they know that basically they're kind of not watching right now. | ||
| They're pretty much inside, all centralized in this one area to protect themselves because of the rockets. | ||
| They know that's happening in all the frontline positions. | ||
| At that moment, they're also storming the border. | ||
| They're taken out with drones. | ||
| They're dropping explosive devices on the cameras. | ||
| So we got no eyes on the border. | ||
| Then they're going to those frontline positions. | ||
| They're cutting communications. | ||
| So they're going to make it difficult for one frontline position to talk to the other. | ||
| And then they're raiding those bases themselves. | ||
| They're not going. | ||
| The assumption of the IDF had been they're going to go to the communities, the kibbutzim, right? | ||
| No, they're going first to the bases and also to the kibbutzim at the same time. | ||
| But once they bog down the commander, so you got a story. | ||
| For example, in the Gaza Division headquarters near a kibbutz called Raim, big base. | ||
| He's on the base over this holiday. | ||
| It's a Saturday. | ||
| He's there in the command center. | ||
| Rockets are flying. | ||
| He's inside. | ||
| His base comes under attack. | ||
| He's a former commando. | ||
| He's to be the commander of the Sheldagh unit, one of the most elite commanders. | ||
| He's got a tremendous track record. | ||
| Track. | ||
| He's, do I go out and fight or do I stay here? | ||
| So he's got to have his soldiers are fighting for survival in their own base. | ||
| How can he actually send troops to the kibbutzim? | ||
| He's got to fight in his own base. | ||
| So they managed very successfully to cut communications, cut the eyes, and bogged down everywhere. | ||
| Let me stop right there. | ||
| Because as a, you're a professional in this area, I'm not. | ||
| But when I read this, the level of detail they have about the kibbutzes. | ||
| Yeah. | ||
| Like they have a map of the kibbutz and where they're. | ||
| Who lives in what home? | ||
| Who lives in what home, where the safe space is, who the key people are in the kibbutz, who are the leaders of the business. | ||
| Does this home have a dog or not? | ||
| Right. | ||
| The level of the base, what they know about the bases, the tactics of the Israelis, it leads a civilian to say, or a former naval officer, to say they had to have inside information. | ||
| There is no way they could just garner this from particularly Hamas. | ||
| I mean, they don't have the reputation of being the most organized folks in the world. | ||
| They don't have the reputation of being people that have put together a strategic plan like this that can be operated over such a wide, you know, it's paramilitary. | ||
| They got gliders. | ||
| They've got, it's over 40 miles. | ||
| But the level of detail down at the, what you call the center of battle is so detailed. | ||
| I'm sitting there going, not only did they not have human intelligence on the Hamas side, Hamas somehow has human intelligence on the Israeli side. | ||
| You know, in the couple of years. | ||
| Am I wrong on that? | ||
| So the couple years before. the attack, Israel starts to allow because this fits into the paradigm, right? | ||
| What's the paradigm? | ||
| Hamas wants economic prosperity. | ||
| So that's how they're prosperous, the less we got to worry about. | ||
| Exoterranism. | ||
| So that's how you get to the situation where Qatar is sending $30 million in cash every month to Gaza. | ||
| Israel's asked them to do that. | ||
| The United States is asked to do that. | ||
| Let's buy some quiet. | ||
| But there's another thing Israel does. | ||
| It starts to allow in Gazans from Gaza into Israel to work inside Israel. | ||
| Work mostly inside these kibbutzim, agriculture jobs, factories along the border. | ||
| These people, we now know, go back to Gaza. | ||
| They were intelligence assets. | ||
| Well, maybe willingly, maybe some unwillingly. | ||
| Who controls Gaza? | ||
| Hamas. | ||
| So these guys cross back into Gaza after a day's work or a week's work. | ||
| They get pulled aside at the crossing by Hamas security forces. | ||
| Tell us what you know, who lives here, who lives there. | ||
| Gather for us information. | ||
| Whether they did it willingly or unwillingly doesn't make a difference. | ||
| And you're saying over time, that's how they knew, like the maps of the kibbutz. | ||
| That's how they had the maps. | ||
| That's how they knew who the leaders were, where the safe rooms are, all of that. | ||
| But they were also very sophisticated in gathering intelligence on the military bases, watching them, watching the deployment, seeing over time what happens when they do X. What is the IDF? | ||
| Do you think that in this inquiry that could be quite painful? | ||
| Do you think that it's going to come up the potential that they're actually Israelis that sold out their nation and gave information to these guys? | ||
| Particularly on the military basis? | ||
| I pray that that's not the case. | ||
| You're a professional, though. | ||
| I know it'll be heart-rending to everybody in Israel, particularly given the smallness of the nation and you surround it. | ||
| And a very patriotic nation. | ||
| Super patriotic. | ||
| But you have to come to the conclusion that something there is deeply wrong, given the level of detail they knew. | ||
| They had such an advantage tactically in going because they kind of knew the whole thing, right? | ||
| I mean, that's where they knew where to go. | ||
| I can't say it's impossible because we just don't know. | ||
| And there's no evidence to show that way. | ||
| The Israeli people are going to demand to get to the bottom of this and find out everything that we want to do. | ||
| I think we need to. | ||
| And look, unfortunately, there have been instances recently that have come to light of cases of where the Iranians have succeeded in recruiting Israelis to gather intelligence. | ||
| Not people who are not. | ||
| So not people who are within the defense establishment. | ||
| What do you mean by that? | ||
| You know, reaching out to people online, social media, finding susceptible Israelis and paying them money. | ||
| Go find out, go take pictures of this Air Force base. | ||
| Go find out information about this senior official. | ||
| I mean, look, here in the United States, you've had cases of senior American officials who have literally been under threat, and there have been assassination attempts by the Iranians against American officials, right, who have needed to have security. | ||
| It's not, this is what Iran does. | ||
| And they use people in the United States, and they use people also in Israel like any other country in that sense. | ||
| We're always going to have people who are going to be rotten weeds, but we got to get to the bottom of it. | ||
| So dead day, walk through particularly kind of the panic of some people in the IDF, but the basically heroism of others has said, okay, we got to get a grip here, and this is bad, but we've got to strike back. | ||
| Well, I mean, what I said before about this, so you have this breakdown. | ||
| You have them bogged down in the bases. | ||
| They're attacking the bases. | ||
| But here's the other question. | ||
| They're inside the wire. | ||
| They're in the start of the wire. | ||
| Where is the rest of the military? | ||
| And this is the real painful question. | ||
| Like, why not take the Air Force, take a couple Apaches, throw them up on the border. | ||
| They got those cannons under the fuselage, and just mow down anyone who's crossing in from Gaza. | ||
| Why don't they do that? | ||
| I spoke to pilots who boarded their aircraft and flew out to protect gas rigs in the Mediterranean. | ||
| Who gives a shit about a gas rig right now? | ||
| We got people who are flowing into the communities. | ||
| This is what you got to do. | ||
| So there's a couple of things you got to say here. | ||
| Number one is we have this attack in the South. | ||
| How do we know it's the last? | ||
| Maybe they're coming from the North now. | ||
| Maybe you got Hezbollah that's going to come across the border. | ||
| And if Hezbollah comes across the border. | ||
| You got a big problem. | ||
| You got a big problem. | ||
| They are double. | ||
| That's light infantry coming across the border. | ||
| That's double the size. | ||
| These are serious people. | ||
| So you can't just send the whole army down south. | ||
| Although these guys, it's interesting to me, I don't call them terrorists. | ||
| I mean, these are paramilitary. | ||
| I mean, their training in Hamas is pretty impressive for how they hit their marks about what they had to do. | ||
| This was their elite force, what they call the Neuchba force. | ||
| This was their elite Nuchba force. | ||
| They were also lower-level people, you know, just random people who decided to come across and pillage once the border was wide open. | ||
| But Hezbollah, different caliber. | ||
| And if we send everybody down south, this just might be the— What time has that decision made? | ||
| So this— So if 6.30 is when the attack potentially commences, only about 9, 10 o'clock do they start to understand, okay, we see what's going on down there. | ||
| Can we safely assess that Hezbollah is not coming? | ||
| It's two and a half hours. | ||
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Right. | |
| So that's two, two and a half hours in, three hours. | ||
| But what time is the political hire up? | ||
| Netanyahu and the South. | ||
| They're already at this point at the military headquarters in Tel Aviv. | ||
| And they're making those decisions and they're gathering the intelligence to understand that for sure, Hezbollah is not coming and they're beefing up forces on the north just in case they're misreading that situation too. | ||
| At the same time, they're trying to assess what's happening in the South. | ||
| But because of the lack of communication, because of what the success of Hamas's low-tech attack, it's hard to understand what's happening. | ||
| And here was a problem with the military, right? | ||
| The Air Force, for example, which is very painful because they could have made the difference. | ||
| They don't know or they didn't know then how to function in an operation where they don't have somebody on the ground telling them where to go and what to do. | ||
| And that's something that has now changed, right? | ||
| It's not easy. | ||
| And you know, this is a naval officer. | ||
| They almost have to have spotters. | ||
| That's right. | ||
| You know how they attack helicopters. | ||
| Helicopters don't just go to a border and shoot people, right? | ||
| You know, maybe that should have happened on October 7th, but that's not a good way to operate on a regular day. | ||
| And therefore, the military was not built for this type of chaos. | ||
| Hang on, we're going to take a commercial break here. | ||
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| Four years we've been putting this out. | ||
| Seven now free installments. | ||
| We're coming out with a physical copy of this. | ||
| We're going to announce that at Amfest, the Charlie Kirk Amfest in Phoenix on the 19th, I think 19th of December. | ||
| Somebody can check it out. | ||
| Go there today. | ||
| Short commercial break. | ||
| Yaakov Katz, the author of a book that you've got to get while Israel Slept. | ||
| Absolute blockbuster. | ||
| Go check it out today. | ||
| We're going to continue our conversation in just a minute. | ||
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| Yakf Katz joins us in the house while Israel Slept in the subtitle, How Hamas Surprised the Most Powerful Military in the Middle East, Military and Intelligence. | ||
| Hamas, I want to get back to the operation of the IDF. | ||
| Hamas was really never taken that seriously. | ||
| I mean, they're not Hezbollah, they're not Iran. | ||
| They've always been kind of disorganized. | ||
| Don't get me wrong, they're brutal, and some of the brutality that went on that day is almost unspeakable, but I think it has to be talked about. | ||
| But they weren't taken seriously. | ||
| They were never considered that serious, as sophisticated. | ||
| But in this day, they actually had thought this thing through pretty well. | ||
| They knew exactly where the leverage points and the weaknesses of not just Israeli intelligence, but the IDF, right? | ||
| They had studied very carefully, and they understood exactly how to carry out what they wanted to do. | ||
| Look, their objective, I mean, let's be honest for a moment. | ||
| I don't think they knew or they thought Yaqui Sinoir, the leader of Hamas, didn't think he's going to defeat the IDF, right? | ||
| He wanted to hurt Israel in a mortal way, and that he succeeded, killing 1,200 people, taking 251 people hostage. | ||
| But he had other objectives. | ||
| One of them, for example, we're talking on the day that Mohammed bin Salman is visiting Washington, D.C. | ||
| We back then, on October 7th, 2023, we were on the verge of potential normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia through the Abraham Accords for them to join the Abraham Accords. | ||
| He scuttled that. | ||
| This war torpedoed that. | ||
| And now, even with this visit, it's not so clear if this is going to get back on track or not. | ||
| So he succeeded in that. | ||
| But here's the other thing, Steve. | ||
| Oh, they succeeded in a two-state solution. | ||
| And we got the two-state solution back. | ||
| But this is what I'm saying. | ||
| The other big success for him, and this should have us really concerned. | ||
| It should have you concerned. | ||
| Look around the world today. | ||
| What is the rallying cry of every young progressive liberal in the world? | ||
| Where are they marching in London and Paris and university campuses here in the United States on behalf of Hamas? | ||
| They're supporting Hamas today in all of these colleges, unfortunately, in all these capitals around the world. | ||
| He got the French and the Canadians and the UK and others to recognize the Palestinian state while they're holding hostages. | ||
| The UN Security Council now passing a resolution that includes a Palestinian state in a pathway towards that. | ||
| So if you think about it. | ||
| And a Turkish security force. | ||
| And a Turkish security force. | ||
| And the Qataris are in the funder of the Muslim Brotherhood being the financier. | ||
| It's pretty jaw-dropping. | ||
| So, I mean, if you think about all that, I question sometimes, I mean, who's really won this war and who has lost this war? | ||
| I think Israel got back its hostages. | ||
| We've degraded Hamas. | ||
| There's no doubt about it. | ||
| I mean, so you and I might not agree on that. | ||
| How can you say they've done this? | ||
| Because, I mean, I think from a military perspective, if we look at the last two years, where we were then and where we are now, we are totally safer and more secure than we've ever been. | ||
| We have re-engineered the Middle East. | ||
| Iran's axes, these proxies that they created, they're in decline. | ||
| Now, you got to maintain that. | ||
| You dropped a hammer blow on the proxies of Iran, but. | ||
| And on Iran itself to some extent. | ||
| Well, I would argue, and this has been my big problem, and I was called anti-Semitism. | ||
| I believe Netanyahu, you had no ability to finish what you started immediately upon the start of that war, which I think goes to the fact of you got to take care of business here. | ||
| You didn't have the defense capabilities. | ||
| We had to send Aegis cruisers, Patriot missiles, STADS, and then you had no ability. | ||
| If the whole objective of that war is to take out their nuclear enrichment capability, you had no ability to do it. | ||
| To the point of even the Israeli Air Force, we had to send 30 cruise missiles. | ||
| on a place I was patrolling in 1979, the North Arabian Sea. | ||
| You had to send 30 cruise missiles to take out the surface capability of it. | ||
| You had no ability until President Trump dropped the hammer with the total obliteration. | ||
| Did you do some great stuff in Tehran militarily, you know, taking out the negotiating team and taking out some members of the hierarchy? | ||
| Yes. | ||
| But that was the mission was to get. | ||
| Here's the question. | ||
| To me, if the United States had not stepped in, I told the president this, you're bailing out the Israeli military because they can't, that war was about to go dramatically the other way because you couldn't stop what was hitting Tel Aviv at all. | ||
| But here's the question that Israel had to ask itself. | ||
| Iran is racing forward with its enrichment. | ||
| It's not nuclear. | ||
| That's not true because Times of Israel, this is what, no, that's just not true. | ||
| The Times of Israel just released, as I said the night on that Thursday night when Netanyahu bombed, I said, show me the intelligence that it's so urgent. | ||
| And Netanyahu is happening next week, two weeks. | ||
| On Sunday night on Fox News with Brett Berry, he goes, well, it's six months to a year. | ||
| Well, now we know from the times that Israel released the war cabinet minutes where the war cabinet said it was two years. | ||
| There's no pressing concern they had to go that Thursday. | ||
| Netanyahu's government wants to always focus on Tehran and the Persians. | ||
| Here, you had a, this could have very easily, if it hadn't been for the heroism of some people that day and quick decisions, this could have metastasized into something worse. | ||
| I mean, that's what's so shocking about it. | ||
| It couldn't have been 1,200 people, which was the worst day since World War II or since the Holocaust. | ||
| You could have had thousands of done, and then you could have had all of Gaza risen up. | ||
| You know, all of Gaza, because as Hamasis, you know, how they've, you know, trained up some of the people there. | ||
| It could have been the end of Israel. | ||
| You could have had an actual offense in there. | ||
| This thing is so scary. | ||
| By the time you're in late, the time you're in the late morning, it's like, hey, if it's not for people making quick decisions and getting their act together under the pressure of combat, this thing could have metastasize much worse. | ||
| And the Iranians, I say the two problems is one here, because now you got the Turks and the Muslim Brotherhood in it. | ||
| Okay, number one. | ||
| That's a defeat. | ||
| Number two, you have a bigger problem in the streets of New York. | ||
| You talk about the protests around the world. | ||
| I got it. | ||
| But I've said I'm the first guy to identify this guy when he was at 2% because people in New York told me, hey, you're not focused on this guy from the Working Family Party. | ||
| He's a jihadist and a Marxist. | ||
| Mamdani is a jihadist and a Marxist. | ||
| Okay. | ||
| And everybody, I would talk to all the people in New York, no, Cuomo's got $40 million. | ||
| He's got the firemen, the cops, the Irish, every synagogue, the New York Times op-ed page, the New York Post. | ||
| It's impossible. | ||
| This will blow out. | ||
| And now this guy's going to take power. | ||
| And to me, you saw the real face of him on the night of his victory. | ||
| You don't have happy, tap-dancing, you know, TikToks going through the grocery store. | ||
| He was coming out and I'm saying, hey, that's the new boss. | ||
| Because you saw that up in President Trump's grill and up really in the American establishment grill. | ||
| We have huge problems, but to me, you've got to focus on exactly what you have to take care of business to do. | ||
| While I'm saying, you have to look at it its entirety. | ||
| What Hamas did crossing into Israel, obviously, with that attack, they are a massive terrorist group that we failed to deal with. | ||
| But you have to look at the bigger picture. | ||
| The bigger picture starts in Iran, proceeds to Hezbollah in Lebanon, is also Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen. | ||
| The nuclear track, whether they're six months, a year, 18 months, two years, with the ballistic missiles that they're developing, with their capabilities and with the whole picture, they had to be taken on at this moment. | ||
| Steve didn't have to be taken on. | ||
| Let me tell you. | ||
| Let me give you one other reason why. | ||
| I respect you tremendously. | ||
| You're absolutely dead wrong because here's why. | ||
| By doing that, here's what you got. | ||
| In the middle of November, in the year of our Lord 2025, you have the reality. | ||
| Two million Gazans, or Palestinians are going to stay in Gaza. | ||
| The Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar are going to finance a redevelopment. | ||
| You have, which is almost incomprehensible, you have the Turks are going to be the international security force coordinators of the Saudis, UAE, and Egyptian troops in Gaza, which is basically a foothold in Israel. | ||
| And now we have today, you're about to have a formal dinner with Elon Musk and all the tech bros showing up because they can't wait to get their hands on the cash of the Saudis. | ||
| And so it is the worst possible world. | ||
| And a big part of that came from this maniacal focus on Tehran as an immediate threat. | ||
| Now, Hezbollah and the Houthis, yes, they're proxies, definitely. | ||
| And you took, but you took out Hezbollah. | ||
| You've eventually, with the Americans, crippled the Houthis. | ||
| The maniacal focus on that, and I think for political reasons, has left Israel in a horrible strategic situation. | ||
| But Steve, am I wrong in that? | ||
| I think you are, but let me explain to you why. | ||
| Katz, I got to get you in here more often. | ||
| Let me explain to you why. | ||
| If you have Iran, what's your concern about Iran? | ||
| Twofold. | ||
| A, they get nuclear, B, their ballistic missile program, and their proxies. | ||
| If you ever want to attack, let's say it's in two years, because you got two years, according to what you're saying to the people. | ||
| I'm just saying with the times. | ||
| No, no, I got it. | ||
| You got two years. | ||
| You wait till they're at the verge. | ||
| You still have Hezbollah and you have Hamas. | ||
| When you attack, you're going to get the Iranian missiles, the Hezbollah missiles, and the Hamas missiles. | ||
| What did Israel do in June? | ||
| After it had viscerated Hezbollah, it had weakened Hamas. | ||
| The payback, the retaliation goes from being up here suddenly to being down here. | ||
| Because you were there to fence your terror. | ||
| So you have an operational. | ||
| So you do have to be concerned about the Iranian missiles. | ||
| And America helped Israel with that, with the Thads and the Aegises. | ||
| I'm not saying not, but you had an operational window. | ||
| I was calling for it because I said to myself. | ||
| You were calling for what now? | ||
| For Israel to take action against Iran. | ||
| If there was a moment, it was in June. | ||
| I wrote a piece. | ||
| I knew nothing of the plans that were taking place. | ||
| I wrote a piece the week before saying Israel has a moment in history now to operate because we don't have to worry about Hezbollah. | ||
| We don't have to worry about Hamas. | ||
| We don't have to worry about the Houthis. | ||
| We've taken all of them out. | ||
| We still have to worry about Iran, but if you're going to act, you act now. | ||
| Now, you could say, hold on. | ||
| If Israel was going at it on its own, it was only going to set them back for a small window. | ||
| We didn't know that Trump was going to send the B-2 bombers and take out the business. | ||
| No, no, no. | ||
| He dragged us into a war. | ||
| I don't know if it was dragging into war. | ||
| It was 100% trusted. | ||
| I would say we did something together where we took out an enemy that you would not want the Iranians to get a nuclear bomb just as much as I would not want them to get. | ||
| You got plenty of time. | ||
| You got plenty of time. | ||
| They say two years, it could be 10 years. | ||
| Yeah, or two years could end up being half a year. | ||
| It could be a half a year. | ||
| It's a gamble in either way, Steve. | ||
| I just think, I think there, I don't believe there was active buy-in because you see that Friday morning when you go on Fox News, Israel did it, and we kind of caught up with it and said, okay, but it was an active thing. | ||
| As soon as you sent, as a naval officer, as soon as you sent the Aegis cruisers to the Eastern Mediterranean, I said, these guys are in trouble because they need our air defense. | ||
| They need to send the Patriots. | ||
| But you know, Lake Hamilton. | ||
| But what was happening in the full story, your book tells the full story of the Hamas attack, or at least what we know today. | ||
| And I think this will be the predicate for which I believe will be one of the biggest events in the history of Israel will be the inquiry into this, right? | ||
| And even the setting up of the inquiry, whether Netanyahu forms a warring commission or whether other voices say, no, we have to have this totally independently. | ||
| It's going to be huge. | ||
| And what comes out here, there's going to be a lot of finger pointing. | ||
| The other thing is what really happened on the 12-day war, because I believe that Tel Aviv was getting pounded much harder than the Western media said. | ||
| You know, the Western media hasn't done a good job, I don't think, in Gaza, and they particularly didn't do a good job during the world. | ||
| Yeah, we had about 500 missiles that were fired, and about 60 of them, 10% or so, were not intercepted in Lanthanum and they caused casualties. | ||
| We had about 30 Israelis who were killed. | ||
| We had extensive damage. | ||
| But I think you and I do agree whether it had to happen then or not. | ||
| Here's what we agree on. | ||
| The world is a safer place today with the Iranians on the defensive. | ||
| The world is a safer place with the Iranians weaker. | ||
| And the Iranians are just as much a threat. | ||
| Steve, you know this. | ||
| The world's not. | ||
| When the Aitollas march on the streets of Tehran. | ||
| The focus of that gets you. | ||
| The world's not as the world's, I don't think it's when they march and say, destroy Israel, death to Israel, they're saying death to America on the same breath. | ||
| I was there in 79 and 80 as when the hostage crisis happened. | ||
| My destroyer went over there. | ||
| They've been yelling that for years. | ||
| When people use that, I go, if that's the best you got. | ||
| Here's what I know is reality. | ||
| You have the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza with 2 million Palestinians and their unlimited amount of money. | ||
| And you got, which is mind-bending, you have the Turks. | ||
| The whole purpose of the revolt, the whole purpose of that sector in World War I was to drive the Ottoman Empire and the Turks not just away from the two holy sites, but drive them out of the Holy Land. | ||
| In fact, drive them out of Damascus back to Turkey. | ||
| And now you've got the Turks that are going to be the international security force coordinator of an Arab army, basically an Arab legion that's going to have a foothold in Israel. | ||
| So you can't say from Israel's perspective, it's catastrophic. | ||
| What's happening now in Gaza? | ||
| You do agree is catastrophic. | ||
| What's happening now in Gaza is deeply concerning. | ||
| I mean, I'm concerned about it. | ||
| You're going to get into politics deeply. | ||
| What do you mean deeply concerned? | ||
| I'm not going to go. | ||
| I didn't know. | ||
| Catastrophic is deeply. | ||
| Catastrophic is one good word to use. | ||
| I mean, look, are you shocked about the outcome here? | ||
| If this is the outcome, I'm shocked, yes. | ||
| Because if this is what victory looks like. | ||
| If this is what victory looks like, then this is not victory. | ||
|
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Hold it. | |
| Let me give you the worst one. | ||
| Because I had Rabbi Walicki, and I'm close to Rabbi, and I've been adamant that these guys were taking the wrong path. | ||
| He said, well, Hamas has got to be disarmed, and that's going to be a thing. | ||
| I said, you're missing that. | ||
| You're missing what's really happening. | ||
| They're saying now, hey, if Hamas turns over their arms, fine. | ||
| If not, we're going to be segregated or there'll be some deal. | ||
| There's no push to take the arms away from Hamas. | ||
| Am I missing that? | ||
| Or is that just the way I reach it? | ||
| Right now, it doesn't look like that's going to happen, which is insane, right? | ||
| In other words, you have Gaza right now. | ||
| Israel is still in control about 50%. | ||
| Hamas is back on the streets of 50%. | ||
| They still have about 200 miles of tunnels. | ||
| They still got their arms. | ||
| They might not have the rockets that have depleted or been destroyed, but they'll rebuild. | ||
| I mean, who are we kidding? | ||
| If this is how the war ends, this is not a victory for Israel. | ||
| This is not a victory for the West. | ||
| So what are we thinking? | ||
| The Turks aren't going to go in and disarm them? | ||
| The Qataris are going to disarm them? | ||
| Come on. | ||
| You know, that's not going to happen. | ||
| No, of course that's not going to happen. | ||
| They're going to rebuild it. | ||
| Why am I advocating now a three-state solution? | ||
| I'm saying, hey, we need a Christian part of this. | ||
| I think, I say this, if this deal goes on and it looks in the direction of what you're seeing with the Saudis today, I'm not sure you have an Israel in 20 years. | ||
| That's why I'm arguing for a three-state solution. | ||
| I want the Christians to have part, and I think that would be a stabilizing factor. | ||
| And people go, you're crazy. | ||
| I go, no, I'm not crazy because I've seen the arc of this, right? | ||
| And the arc, the trend line is not good. | ||
| Would you admit that? | ||
| If this is what victory looks like, Hamas is still armed, because they're going to be still armed. | ||
| We've just said that over the last 72 hours. | ||
| No, no, Steve, here's what we're doing. | ||
| Wrong in this. | ||
| Here's what we know. | ||
| There is something called decisive victory in war. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| America has achieved that in some of its conflicts. | ||
| Many, many, many, many years. | ||
| Many years ago. | ||
| But when it did that after World War II, when Japan and Germany were decisively defeated, both those countries embarked on a new journey. | ||
| We don't have that in Gaza today. | ||
| And the thought that what is happening is going to change. | ||
| Part of the world would say they are on a new journey. | ||
| They're on a new journey of self-sufficiency and really Arab buy-in, Muslim buy-in, et cetera. | ||
| It's not right. | ||
| As long as Hamas is there. | ||
| I've heard yesterday's show about the Islamification of Texas. | ||
| Because I keep telling people, you didn't pay attention to me in New York, and now New York is going to be like London in 10 years. | ||
| And people, and some of my conservative friends said, oh, you're overplaying this. | ||
| He's a socialist and socialism fails. | ||
| He's not a socialist. | ||
| He's a Marxist jihadist. | ||
| These guys are like Bolsheviks. | ||
| Once they get in there, you're going to take a look at the parts of London you walk through today. | ||
| You feel like you're in downtown Beirut to Ramadan. | ||
| Because you are. | ||
| This is what New York City is attracting. | ||
| And Jews cannot walk down their streets safely. | ||
| And quite frankly, most Englishmen can't walk down the streets safely. | ||
| Sadiq Khan, and they had the same kind of happy face, you know, happy-clappy. | ||
| I said, look what's going to happen here. | ||
| I was dead right about that. | ||
| London's getting worse. | ||
| I've said that London, the English are heading to a civil war. | ||
| It can't happen here. | ||
| In Texas, we have a massive problem right now, funded by the Muslim Brotherhood. | ||
| We've had 48 mosques developed in the Dallas area in the last two years. | ||
| They're doing two a month. | ||
| So it's got to stop. | ||
| And I just see what's happening in Gaza. | ||
| It is actually a mind-blowing outcome of this war. | ||
| And that's what I think you've got to, here's for the audience. | ||
| To start to get a grip of all of it, which we try to do to make sure that you guys geopolitically and capital markets, everything, can make decisions for yourself. | ||
| Start with this book. | ||
| This book is shocking. | ||
| For an outsider, it's shocking. | ||
| You're shocked on every page of it. | ||
| And then you see what happened in the war and the solution we have now. | ||
| And all I say is that when you guys have the formal inquiry, it's going to be even more shocking because I think that's not going to tear the country apart. | ||
| I think we'll actually bring Israel together, but they'll have to face up to a lot of things. | ||
| They looked at not just technology, but maybe focus too much on Iran, but also just how societies and cultures get ossified, right? | ||
| The legendary intelligence services, the legendary military that saved Israel every time they're overwhelmed, you start to see the reality of it. | ||
| I've talked too much. | ||
| Take a couple of minutes. | ||
| We've got about two minutes left. | ||
| Look, Steve, you're a great guy, and I'm really glad you came over here. | ||
| Thank you so much for having me. | ||
| I don't think this abuse. | ||
| No, no, it's not abuse. | ||
| I mean, listen, I think what we all want is we want a safer region and we want a safer place. | ||
| And I think that the problem that we currently face in the aftermath, we have to study and we have to learn. | ||
| I appreciate your kind words about the book. | ||
| And there will need to be a commissioner in Green. | ||
| Hopefully the Israeli government will establish that because we have to prepare for what's coming because there's more coming. | ||
| And that's the brutal truth. | ||
| The way this war ended in Gaza, it could happen again. | ||
| Hamas could potentially be able to rebuild. | ||
| His Bila is still there in Lebanon. | ||
| And the government of Lebanon, despite all the support it's getting from Europe and the United States, they're still not confronting them head-on and trying to disarm them too. | ||
| And the Iranians will rebuild if they are not stopped. | ||
| So the region. | ||
| Next time I want to get you on, maybe we'll have to you're not going to be back for a while. | ||
| And maybe in a couple months. | ||
| Okay, I want to get you on because I want to talk about the Greater Israel Project because I think that was a big people not understanding that here in the United States of America hurt at the moment of decision, hurt kind of the relationship between Israel and the United States. | ||
| But where do people get you? | ||
| Where do they go for your content? | ||
| Yachofcats.com. | ||
| You can find me there. | ||
| Contact information, X, LinkedIn. | ||
| Are you working on a book on the 12-day war? | ||
| It's something that I'm thinking about. | ||
| That's hard. | ||
| By the way, I can't recommend enough that you should do that book. | ||
| I think people have to understand about the 12-day war, particularly here, President Trump's decision-making, what it all meant, et cetera. | ||
| Okay. | ||
| Birchgold.com, end of the dollar empire. | ||
| We're coming out with a physical copy of it. | ||
| We're going to launch that next week about how you can actually qualify for it. | ||
| We're going to talk about that. | ||
| It's the big launch. | ||
| It's going to be at Amfest, Charlie Kirk's Amfest. | ||
| It's going to take place, I think, the 18th through the 21st, I'm correct, 18th through the 21st in Phoenix. | ||
| Of course, the 19th and 20th will be the big days. | ||
| We're going to have the live studio there. | ||
| I want everybody to show up. | ||
| I want to thank Yako, thanks for doing this. | ||
| I know you had a busy thing, and thanks for coming into the war. | ||
| I really appreciate it. | ||
| Look forward to getting you back on. | ||
| We're going to leave you with the right stuff. | ||
| We're back at 10 a.m. Eastern Standard Time tomorrow. | ||
| Our show's already packed. | ||
| Don't miss it. |
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