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Oct. 24, 2022 - Viva & Barnes
08:55:18
Emergencies Act Inquiry LIVE with Comment Section - Viva Frei
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Time Text
As one of the deputies assisting the former chief, and you were tasked with the intelligence responsibility, do you recall any discussions you had with the former chief about your specific assignment with respect to the Freedom Convoy events?
Absolutely.
The Chief slowly indicated...
This will be running all day live on my second channel and I'll pop in and out as much as possible.
During those calls, we would discuss issues that had occurred and emerging issues.
The issue of the Freedom Convoy came on our radar in and around that week of the 20th.
I can't specifically identify the day.
And we had discussions and there was clear discussion around intelligence responsibility to be involved and identify risks and threats and make sure that we were informing any sort of planning that was going to occur around our response.
I understand that Mr. Slowly, the former chief, made it clear that he wanted all operations to be intelligence-led.
Is that your understanding, too?
Which witness is this?
One of the things that Chief Slowly was very firm about was that intelligence, and I absolutely agree with it, intelligence needs to inform the planning cycle, and it needs to be realized to actually identify what are...
Steve Bell.
And he assigned you the specific responsibility to ensure that appropriate intelligence were collected and disseminated to the planning team.
That is correct.
And so that would have been your duty as of around when?
When do you recall that first discussion with Mr. Slowly took place?
So again, I don't have a specific date, but it would have been in around the week of the 20th.
I'm not sure the specific date of it.
Okay.
Now, was a threat assessment eventually completed by the Intelligence Unit?
Yes, it was.
I want to take you to a threat assessment that the Commission has received.
Do we know?
I'm trying to find this guy's witness.
Rumble is up, everybody.
The document number is OPS404039.
What's the witness's name here?
Are we dealing with Steve Bell?
I can't find images to confirm before I say it.
Now, looking at the first cover page, this is a document completed by...
I look crazy.
Sergeant Chris Keyes, am I correct?
That's correct.
It is dated January 28th, but the title is Freedom Convoy, Ottawa, January 29th, 2022.
Is that right?
That is correct.
And is the title date January 29th because it was initially expected that the events would start on the 29th?
That's correct, yes.
This version was completed on the 28th, right?
Correct.
And it's version 4. So there's been iterations of this as more intelligence has been received, gathered, and analyzed.
Right.
And I understand from earlier witnesses' testimony that that week in particular was a very fluid and dynamic week.
Lots of things happened.
That is correct.
In any event, we have reached now the 28th, and this is the threat assessment.
I'd like to take you to page three.
Holy crap!
He gets paid $265,000 a year.
If we take a look at the second paragraph, can we enlarge the screen a little bit?
Thank you.
Not that that's undeserving.
The second paragraph starts with, the most likely police matter at this time will be the vast number of vehicles on the area roads.
The convoy will be able to stop and effectively shut down movement if they desire.
That's the understanding as of the 28th, right?
Okay, I gotta go walk the dog, eat some food, I'll be back.
Oh yeah.
To the very bottom.
And mute.
The last sentence in bold says, these conditions create grounds for passionate emotions.
And those conditions refer to the sentiment of the truckers.
Sorry, I'm just reading the paragraph.
Yes.
Take your time.
Thank you.
That is correct.
Now, if we go to the next page, page four, and we go to the heading summation, So the writer concluded that there is a quickly growing financial fund that can pay for food.
This event is, as described above, less of a professional protest with the usual sad players, but rather a truly organic grassroots event that is gathering momentum largely from the widespread population.
And then in bold, we expect very large crowds.
Am I correct?
That is correct.
And then the next bullet went on to quote from a journalist.
To the fact that if we go to the last two sentences, when it finally meets a successful protest to air the grievance, there may be larger crowds and longer disruptions than was ever planned for.
Right?
Correct, but I also believe there's pieces in here, as well as in other intelligence reports, that are missing, that are very germane to the discussion we're having today.
Large numbers.
Yes, we did see large numbers.
What there isn't included in any of the intelligence that we've received is the community impact that actually occurred.
There's nothing around...
The information that identifies the activities of the protesters when they actually arrive in the city.
There's nothing that indicates that the protesters are going to use the citizens of our community as the leverage point to have their voices heard.
In Ottawa, we manage multiple protests on a yearly basis.
We've managed protests similar to this on previous times.
We've never experienced Right.
You're talking about the reality that dawned on everyone once the convoy arrived as compared to what was known the day before.
Well, that's correct.
What I would say is what was known the day before was that a large number and the day before, so if this is the 28th, the 27th, is we were starting to receive numbers on what the size and scope would be.
Right.
And that the overall activity of the group moving across was extremely lawful and extremely law-abiding.
Right.
But you agree with me that this is an assessment and this is a summation part where the writer was trying to draw some conclusions, right?
That's correct.
The writer is not here just reporting various pieces of information.
This is the conclusion, at least from this writer, having gathered all of these disparate sources of information, correct?
Correct.
And I would say the conclusion here is that large numbers could attend the city, and we accepted that.
That there could be...
Traffic disruptions, absolutely, and that it could be emotions associated to it, but not anything that would relate to the activity that we ultimately saw on our streets.
Right.
Now, if we go to the next page, and we look at the third bullet, so the author is here saying that in six years of working, large demonstration events, From the intelligence point of view, the writer has never seen such widespread community action, which means three things for planners.
Now, the third thing is redacted, but we can look at the first two.
The event is likely going to be bigger in crowd size than any demo in recent history, possibly on par with Canada Day events, but more disruptive.
Second, there is significant popular support for this event on a scale not seen in recent years.
This means the protest groups have access to larger protester pools than they have ever had access to, which means there will be likely widespread disorganization and confusion.
So the author seems to be warning here of something quite unprecedented, at least compared to recent experience.
Do you agree?
Yes, I would absolutely agree with that.
So it may not contain as much detail about...
You know, some of the events that the residents subsequently experienced, but it's providing a warning here as to something quite significant, not seen before.
Well, I would agree with that.
And I would say that all of the intelligence and intelligence gathering that we'd had prior to that indicated a very similar fact.
This group had only come on the intelligence radar in late summer of 2021 and never actually materialized.
As they moved across the country, they seemed to build support, but they seemed to build grassroots support.
And all of the activities that we had seen them engage in prior to that had been very lawful.
I've been very pro-social.
The amount of people that were supporting them, from my perspective, actually gave it more credibility that it was a grassroots initiative, not that we were going to see the violence that we saw on our streets.
Right, and there's nothing here to suggest anything other than a lawful protest, but the author is pointing to the significant number and the likelihood of disorganization, or at least the...
If not likely, well, there will be likely widespread disorganization and confusion.
Now, if we go on to the paragraph underneath the third redacted point.
The demographic of the convoy is very unusual.
The protests globally are made up almost entirely of middle class members of society, since the so-called silent majority is numerically much larger than the professional activists as a result.
Law enforcement is being met with numbers of people beyond the norm.
So it's just reinforced the theme that we've been on, right?
That's correct, but I don't know that the numbers of people who attended from a pedestrian or from a protest perspective were unmanageable or had any sort of...
We had any sort of consideration about the activities that they would be involved in.
Numbers on their own are something that we have managed in the past at different scales.
This was large.
This was unprecedented.
Everyone realized it was unprecedented.
But for us as a policing organization, what pushed it over the top was the activities that the people protesting were engaged in and the harm that they did to our community.
A large protest that was lawful could have been managed, would have been managed.
It was what was anticipated.
The activities engaged in were never clearly identified.
And from my perspective, that is exactly what made this unprecedented to any other demonstration that we'd ever seen.
Right.
Now, what Chief Slowly wanted was for you and Deputy Chief Ferguson...
To coordinate an approach with you, I mean your unit, the intelligence unit, providing the best intelligence to the planning team so that an effective response could have been developed before the convoy arrived, right?
That's correct.
And he took some oversight role in the days leading up to the arrival of the convoy, right?
That's correct.
So an oversight role.
He had a role as a chief of police.
He was informed and briefed on the progression that was being made.
So let's talk about those briefings.
You're reporting up to the former chief.
How often do those briefings occur?
So we would have had discussions on this.
On a daily basis at our command team calls and that's where I would be briefed by Superintendent Patterson and that information would be shared on our command team calls.
As we came into...
The week of the 24th, which I believe is a Monday, and we started to increase those briefings, and actually there was in-person, I don't know the specific time, but there was in-person briefings by Superintendent Patterson in terms of what we were seeing and how we were moving ahead to the command team.
Now, if Superintendent Patterson knew of the Handen report as early as January 13th, why was it that you weren't?
So, one of my responsibilities as the Deputy Chief is to make sure that the information is shared.
And Superintendent Patterson and I had discussions around that.
We had discussions around Project Hendon.
And one of my responsibilities was through him to ensure that the information we were receiving was gathered by intelligence, but also shared with our planning team.
And he ensured me that that was happening.
Then briefed me on the information that was occurring.
He identified that there was regular ongoing calls that picked up in tempo and intensity as the convoy moved across and came closer to Ottawa.
And it wasn't until some point this...
During that week that he identified that Project Hendon actually had an output in a formal report.
It was unknown to me before that.
And that's when I requested that he started sharing it with me and he started to share it with me.
Okay.
Now, I want to ask you about the plan, the initial plan that was developed to respond to the Freedom Convoy events.
That plan was also dated January 28th.
Right?
So I would need to see the plan you're referencing because there's different plans.
Right.
So can we call up the document OPS404221?
So can we zoom in to look at the entire first page, the cover page, please?
So this document is titled Freedom Convoy, Canada Unity, January 29th, 2022.
So the title date is also 29th, but if we go down, we may need to enlarge it now to see the print.
Here is noted that it's authored.
Oh, actually, the name of the author is redacted.
Let me put, we have the identical document in an unredacted fashion, and I've spoken to counsel about this before.
Let's call up the identical document in an unredacted version, which is OPP404262.
Can we go down, please?
So here we know that the author of this is Sergeant Sean Kay, and it's dated January 28th, 2022.
Am I correct?
That is correct.
So that's the same day of the threat assessment that we saw earlier.
That is correct.
Now, if we turn the next page, the...
Authorizing authorities.
There are two here noted.
The first one is Staff Sergeant Kevin Kennedy.
And if we go down, Inspector Russ Lucas.
And we heard from Deputy Ferguson last week that these are members of the planning team.
Am I correct?
That is correct.
So if we go to page seven, I believe, that's where there is a risk.
Assessment section.
Threat assessment.
Are you familiar with this part of the plan?
Yes, I am.
Can we scroll down a little?
Am I able to read it before we scroll through?
Yes, of course.
Can we go back up to the beginning of the section?
Thank you.
Yes, can we scroll down now?
Yeah, I'm good to move on.
Okay, next page.
Okay.
If we can, sorry.
Can I just have you scroll up one there?
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Now, did you read it at around that time?
Yes, I would have received the threat assessment as I was provided, and I believe it was on the 28th, the copy of the operational plan that was being put forward.
and what did you think of it at the time?
So I, I received this prior to receiving the actual threat assessment that had been finalized.
And what I did know is that there had been very good levels of intelligence sharing amongst the planning team.
The planning team had been...
Excuse me a minute.
Are you...
Sorry.
No, the only thing I want to point out is we've lost connection to the database.
So it's...
Difficult for me to see the screen from there.
I gather some of my colleagues have also lost connection.
It's the internet that appears to be down, Commissioner.
I don't think it's the party database.
We've all lost internet connection, if that helps.
So internet connection is gone for everyone, but not for me?
Maybe there's something to be read into that.
Take a moment and the technicians are dealing with it because obviously those who don't have perfect sight may not be seeing the monitors.
Can you tell me when it's back up?
Thank you very much.
You want me to take a break while you fix it?
Okay, we'll take a 10-minute break and come back.
Sorry about that.
No, that's fine.
Thank you, sir.
The Commission is in recess for 10 minutes.
La Commission enleva pour 10 minutes.
Thank you.
Order allowed.
The Commission is reconvened.
Okay, I understand the technical glitch has been corrected with our apologies.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Interim Chief, if I could take you back to the initial plan of the 28th of January at page 7, where the threat assessment is found.
I think you were in the process of going through the assessment.
Yes, that's correct.
I'm going to ask you to repeat if there was a question in there.
I believe I had an answer, but I want to make sure I'm answering the correct question.
Well, that's a very good question.
I actually don't remember what I asked, but let's start with So, have you reviewed?
Have you completed your review of this section?
Okay.
So, I'd like to know, first of all, whether you agree with this assessment.
So, at the time, I think it's very important to identify how this assessment would have been created.
We did create an overall threat assessment, which is extremely important, but this assessment would have also been influenced directly by the connection that existed between our intelligence unit and the planning team.
And much of that information would have been gathered through the ongoing Hendon reports.
So the ongoing Hendon reports and the analysis of that and more.
Formulated the overall threat assessment.
That would have helped to support this, but there was also on-the-ground regular dialogue about the incoming information that was contained or not contained, as we've had discussions about, to help formulate this threat assessment.
If I understand you correctly, your team, the Intelligence Unit, was both gathering information.
Based on the Hendon reports, but also trying to gather information from other sources to corroborate those intelligence reports.
Is that right?
Well, yes.
And that was one of the big challenges that also made this unprecedented.
It is that there was information, there was intelligence through Hendon, but there was information in an unprecedented and almost inundating way that was coming in.
And as it was building through the week.
Until this threat assessment was completed.
Our members worked constantly with the fellow members of the intelligence group and by this time, on the 28th, there was already a joint intelligence group that had been established that was embedded within the planning cell to try and take the...
It's voluminous information that was coming in and assess it and then disseminate it to try and get a picture of what was going to occur at this point within hours.
And looking at this threat assessment and in the context of the 28th of January, what you knew, what your team knew at the time, do you consider this an accurate reflection of the reality to the best that anyone in your team can know?
At the time, I wouldn't have known this because I hadn't had the opportunity to review and look through all the Hendon reports, but I think it is a very accurate assessment.
I think there is one area that's missing that we didn't highlight enough because I don't believe we had enough information to substantiate the level of risk that it created, and that's specifically around the fact that there may be some Members of the convoy who would stay on for a longer period of time around the 28th, 29th, and 30th that we were planning for.
So in retrospect, having identified all of this, the potential that that could occur should have been something that was included in this.
So that's the one thing in your view that was perhaps missing from the assessment is the risk of a prolonged Occupation, if we can call it that.
That's correct.
Now, let me take you to some of the other information that you said might have been available as well at that time.
So, now, you talked about Hendon report.
Maybe before we go to the other sources, let's talk a little bit more about Hendon.
You became aware of it during the week of the 20th, but you also told us that you didn't read, you didn't go back and read all of the Hendon reports.
I want to get a sense of what you did read, and what's your best recollection as to which Hendon reports you did read at the time?
Well, I received them and would have read them on an ongoing basis, as well as receiving all...
Like I said, we were inundated with other information.
So we were receiving lots of information at that point.
And as I received it, I was trying to ensure within my role that we were funneling it to the right area so it could be properly assessed.
So if I got information, and I regularly did, whether it be from concerned community members, councillors...
All sorts of different sources.
I would ensure that that information was funneled through our joint intelligence group for assessment, analysis, and action.
Which was the first Hendon report that you read?
So the first Hendon report that I received and read was the 27th.
And so I think you said that from then on, you read every Hendon report afterwards on an ongoing basis.
Absolutely.
Did you...
Did you ask for the earlier hand-in reports?
No, I didn't because at that point I knew that they had been shared between the intelligence unit who had done the assessments necessary and the planning unit who needed to have that information in order to conduct their planning.
Right.
So, since you did read the 27th report, let's go to the 27th report and see what it says.
Just for clarification, I'm sorry, I have since reviewed all of the Hendon reports.
Okay, yeah, but since we were interested in finding out what was known to you at the time, let's start with the 27. I believe it is OPP401331.
If we go to page 4 of this report, go down.
Okay, so do you see the paragraph that says it is highly unlikely that heavy machinery would be transported in the convoy if there was no intent to use it, or if some individuals in the convoy did not anticipate that it would be needed?
Such equipment could be used to facilitate or secure access to strategic operational positions in Ottawa.
The presence of this equipment in the convoy may indicate that some convoy participants intend to reinforce So this is the part of the January 27th hand-in report that you read, right?
That's correct.
So do you agree that the presence of the heavy machinery supported what the report called Precisions for long-term occupation.
So while I do agree that the report states that, I think the subsequent action is very important to put context to this.
We identified this.
This was one of the early areas that I identified as a concern.
So as a result of that, through discussion with Superintendent Patterson, intelligence worked with the operational branch to actually start to look at this, look at the existence.
By this point, this is on the 27th, people are coming across and there are Police resources, specifically in this case, I believe OPP, who are with the convoy participants.
The follow-up that we received from that was that the PLT, the police liaison team, who we've heard about through these hearings as well, engaged with them and there was understanding that that heavy equipment would not be taken into the downtown core.
There was also...
Understanding through the information we received back that many of the pieces of equipment that we're seeing were fluid within the convoy.
It appeared and as we understood as it...
Came across Canada, the numbers fluctuated up and down on a regular, daily, almost hourly basis.
Some of the equipment that was seen in here was people that in different locations had joined in.
I would imagine or speculate that it was so that they could identify that they were part of this and didn't continue with the convoy as it came across.
As a result of this information, plans were put in place to make sure that we diverted heavy equipment like this from the downtown core.
But discussions were had with the people who had this, and from my understanding, it will be a question better posed to Inspector Lucas, but from my understanding, all of the equipment identified in here or any other...
Trailer-based equipment never made it into the red zone footprint.
So although this is concerning, it's something that we identified, action followed up on and mitigated.
Now, do you agree also that there was a serious intelligence gap in terms of any exit plan for these protesters?
So I do, if we can scroll down to that area.
Yeah, let's go to page six.
So, I do understand, and I know this is in black and white, but there is bolding there around priority intelligence gaps.
So, I believe this area highlights some of the areas where we were concentrating on and some of the reasons for the assumptions that were made.
By this date, this is...
Third or fourth, I can't be for sure until we pull the other ones up, where the intelligence and information had clearly identified a three-day event.
All of the discussion was around the 28th, 29th, and the 30th.
There had been, through the reports, Passing reference, regular, but passing reference to the notion that a small group of people, a group of people undetermined, could stay for longer periods of time.
But predominantly, the intelligence identified it as a three-day event.
And the top five areas in here are identified in red as priority taskings.
The plans for departing Ottawa was something that...
It was a concern and was identified, but based on the fact that it was believed to be a small group, was obviously not identified as a priority tasking.
And as part of our planning, the plans, the egress plans for the demonstration to leave Ottawa, based on the fact that there was the concern about how they would get out of Ottawa, was built and developed into our plan.
It just never materialized once the groups dug in and decided to stay in the city.
Now, there are obviously many hand-in reports.
This is just one of them.
And the information continued to evolve, as you pointed out earlier.
But Superintendent Morris from the OPP did testify here last week as to the likelihood of a weekend event.
And he said that he did not recall, I quote, he did not recall any information which could lead to the induction.
That this will only be a three-day event based on his review of the Hendon reports.
Do you share his view?
So I have ultimate respect for Superintendent Morris.
I think he's an incredible intelligence leader in this country.
But when I read these reports, the specifics around the three-day event are very clear as it moves ahead.
Small numbers would stay beyond that, but all of the information being gathered, even in terms of the priorities for the intelligence gathering, is specifically around that three-day period.
Okay.
Now, let me ask you along this line about the fact that many of these truckers were coming a long way from the West, right?
That's correct.
And you knew that.
So, for example, you understood that a group of participants from the Western convoy would stay.
Well, let me give you the reference.
If I could take you to your summary at page six.
So this is WTS 6029.
So if we go to the top of the page, the second line, as an example, PLT reported that the Western Freedom Convoy lost many vehicles when it crossed the Manitoba-Ontario border.
Interim Chief Bell stated that as the Freedom Convoy drew closer, OPS knew that it was projected to be large.
He noted that by January 29th, OPS was expecting 3,000 to 4,000 vehicles to arrive in Ottawa.
Is that correct?
That is correct.
Now, given that these convoy participants had driven across the country for more than a week, wouldn't it make sense that they might want to stay for a little longer than a weekend in Ottawa?
So I think that's an inference we would now make.
But I think it's...
Important to identify that they did drive across the country.
The numbers ebbed and flowed.
As they moved across the country, there was police agencies engaged with them on an ongoing basis.
Their behavior, as it's described within the intelligence reports and reports we had back, was that they were extremely lawful.
That they were engaged in.
There was no antisocial behavior that they were engaged in.
And that was the observations for a number of days.
Beyond that, the organizers clearly stated on many occasions and throughout the Hendon reports that their intention was to be lawful and peaceful once they came to our city.
So, regardless of whether the number that would have remained would have been smaller as we anticipated it could have been, it was the activities that occurred here that were the most problematic.
We in our police service manage many, many protests a year.
Some of them are prolonged.
Some of them are protracted.
We've had examples of occupations of parks, of occupations of intersections that have gone on for a longer period of time.
But those didn't engage in the unlawful activity that we saw here.
That is what I believe makes this circumstance different.
The scope of people, the size of the area that they overtook.
And the activity and the trauma they put our community through.
There was nothing to identify that that would occur within the intelligence reports.
So perhaps if I could clarify, let us assume that the intent was to engage in an entirely lawful protest.
Making that assumption, wouldn't the sheer size, the number of trucks and the intention to stay For as long as it took until the mandates are lifted, create a risk that it will be a prolonged issue for the residents in terms of traffic and other issues that came with such a loud crowd,
a large crowd in the downtown area for a long time.
But I think you identify the key point there.
If the protests are lawful...
And they're within a contained area that isn't impacting the community.
We would go through a regular process in order to ensure that we are managing that area and that we're negotiating with the people for them to be able to leave the area.
That, what you described though, was not what occurred in our city.
There was a large geographical area overtaken, and there was extreme harm done to our community through the activities of this protest that determined it to be unlawful.
So those are very two, for me, those are two very different circumstances we're talking about.
Right.
Now, you'd agree with me that around that time, both for the former Chiefs Lowly, who you report to, as well as...
Inspector Bryden, who reported to you through Superintendent Patterson, raised concerns about the threat assessment.
Do you recall any communication with them about the nature of the threat assessment that was produced?
So I raised concerns about threat assessment and we had discussions about it.
Because my expectation was that it would have created more direct references to the Hendon reports and to the intelligence information we were bringing in.
The threat assessment as it's completed is done on a standard template.
There is actually a checklist to follow through as you create a threat assessment.
We were trying to become more mature and advanced in our collection and dissemination of intelligence information.
What wasn't included on the checklist was direct references to actual intelligence information that existed.
So I was looking to make sure that we had that included in that threat assessment, or at least references to the mechanisms that we were drawing that intelligence from.
I was concerned that the threat assessment reflect the actual reality.
And in the days leading up to the arrival of the Concord, if I could take you to some of those documents, OPS 403073.
So if we go down the chain and to see how it originated, go to the very bottom, please.
So somebody sent, sorry, go up.
So it appears that the former chief received information sent to him about some potential threat, go up.
And he passed that information on to you.
So let's stop here.
So somebody sent information to the former chief directly.
Somebody wrote, I lay awake tonight as I read Twitter posts from the extreme right vowing attacks on Rideau Hall this weekend.
Some are calling for action akin to the happenings in Washington on Capitol Hill.
I understand the right to peaceful protest, but I'm writing as a very concerned citizen.
As we're not hearing any reassurances from the city of policing regarding the safety of residents surrounding these vulnerable and targeted spots.
So we go up now.
The former chief forwarded that to you.
Sorry, can I finish reading just the content?
Oh, sure.
All right.
If you can just scroll down a little more.
Okay, great.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Is that good?
Yes, sorry.
I'm sorry.
Thank you.
Sorry, I didn't mean to cut off your reading.
If we go up now, it appears that the former chief forwarded that email to you and to Deputy Chief Ferguson.
And he said, the email below from an Ottawa resident who's seeing online postings from what he calls extreme right-wing elements calling for violence in the event.
We go further down.
Sorry, if you can just...
Oh, there's one.
I didn't hit number three yet.
I'll try and read more quickly.
No, no, no.
Take your time.
Okay, thank you.
So he was outlining the concerns from the citizen.
Yep.
And then he went on to say, yet a briefing note, as of last night, says there's no intelligence to indicate that this demo straying will be violent.
Please review all available information, intel, incidents, and ensure we have the most accurate threat assessment and the most appropriate operations plan for the event.
And he said that before your briefing scheduled at 9. So you agree with me that the former chief was taking an active interest as you got closer to the event and he wanted to ensure...
That the threat assessment reflects the most accurate information the intelligence could provide, right?
Can we scroll up on the date?
I'm just looking.
Yes, I believe this is 26. 26, 26. No, so in answer to your question, absolutely.
We were all taking an active interest.
And I think it's important to note here that the information received by the chief was was funneled to our intelligence unit and our joint intelligence unit for assessment.
The Hendon reports on these days, on the 26th, would reflect that there was no anticipated violence to occur.
So we were continually briefing on the violence picture and making sure that all of this information was funneled in to our intelligence unit and then into our planning team.
It makes specific reference to activities or actions that could occur at...
We did look into that.
It raises a national security issue, and I can tell you that there was national security representatives, including CSIS and the RCMP, in our joint intelligence group.
So, again, this was information that was taken in, assessed, evaluated, put towards our threat assessment, and ultimately, this didn't bear out to be...
To be accurate, there was no threats made against Rideau Hall.
And the former chief was also concerned about the language and content in the threat assessment.
If I could take you to the next document, OPS 403748.
So you see that this is an email dated the 28th of January.
It was directed to Deputy Chief Ferguson, but you were copied on it.
The former chief said, Trish, thank you for sending this draft operational plan.
I assume this is the 28th plan that we've just seen.
It is well developed considering how fast-moving and fluid the situation has been.
I provided you with feedback on this draft report at our 9.45 a.m. meeting in your office.
Review and improve the language and content in the threat assessment.
Explicit expansion of operational scope to include parallel demonstrations, risk beyond the Freedom Convoy, explicit adherence to uniform conduct policy for all participating members.
Do you know if that was done?
So I don't know directly because this was directed to Deputy Chief Ferguson, who would have put it back through her chain of command to her planning team.
And the planning...
The normal process would be the planning team and intelligence would look to identify the areas of gap that the chief felt existed.
All right.
Let me take you to the note of Acting Superintendent Bryden on the 28th.
This is OPS 3014555.
Can we go down?
Sorry, I...
Oh, sorry, I didn't give you the page number.
Page 9, please.
So TA issues, is that the threat assessment issue?
I would believe so.
So the notes of Inspector Bryden said, Narrative around convoy, but need more info on activists.
If we go further down...
Sorry, if I can...
Yes, I'm sorry.
I'll let you read it.
Thank you.
The bullet I'm interested in is the one that starts with, plan is to demobilize the convoy on Sunday.
But current threat assessment...
Does not support that operational move.
Current threat assessment says low or no threat.
Do you know what that means?
So if you can, and I'm going to apologize, but if you can let me know what date these notes are.
I believe it's 28th.
Can we go up to check the date?
28th.
Friday the 28th.
So I think it would be, if we can go back down to the notations so I can see what I'm speaking to.
A little farther down.
A little farther down.
So I'm not sure.
That isn't a meeting that I'm involved in, so I'm not sure specifically what he would be speaking to specifically there.
And I would say that we would need to cross-reference with the Hendon reports and whether there was any reinforcement around heightening our concern that the convoy could be longer than the three days.
Right.
Now...
So I'm not in that meeting.
Yeah, but it's fair enough.
But he seems to be referring to the threat assessment, and he has a notation here that it says low or no threat.
When we interviewed Inspector Brighton, he confirmed that that was the view at the time, that the threat was low to no risk.
Do you agree with that assessment?
So do I agree with the assessment that they made on that day?
Do you agree that as of the 28th of January?
That there is a low threat of violence?
Then yes, I would agree there is a low threat of violence at that point, as has been identified within the Hendon reports.
All right, so you interpret the low to no threat as specifically referring to the risk of violence?
That's specifically the threat index, I believe, the Hendon reports were giving on that day.
Not to the risk of a prolonged occupation.
No, I don't believe that they were speaking to a prolonged occupation because as I indicated, based on our experience, which was limited, and our assessment, there was a low risk of the convoy.
In large numbers, staying beyond the weekend.
I think that's another area that's very, very important to highlight.
Superintendent Morris identified that this group grew and tried to mobilize over the fall and actually never did mobilize.
They galvanized for the ultimate convoy that occurred.
In normal circumstances with intelligence, one of the things that you rely on in your assessment of it is experience.
This group had not existed before.
Nobody had any experience in terms of what they were going to do and how they were going to position themselves.
And I'll give you an example of where experience is important to us.
We have a yearly We have a demonstration at one of our embassies that has gone on for a number of years.
We infrequently have high levels of intelligence around any activity in that area, yet we continually create a large deployment footprint between ourselves and the RCMP because we have the experience that violence has occurred there and there is the potential for violence occurring.
The same could be said about The panda game, homecoming.
There is little intelligence that comes out, yet we create deployment plans around experience.
Nobody had ever experienced this group coming into an area.
Ottawa on the 28th of January was the first experience in that.
So I do know that following this, there has been extensive changes internally, and people have seen a definitive change in our response based on our experience.
But across the country, police leaders identified that they now had a scope.
of what their experience could anticipate it to be with this group.
Before they arrived on the 28th, we had no experience and all of the experience as they moved across was that they were lawful and that they indicated they were coming to lawfully protest in Ottawa.
That experience package changed for us on the 28th.
And I suppose one of the challenges you faced at the time was the presence of conflicting information.
We put to Deputy Ferguson last week, the information that we heard from the Hotel Association that people were booking stays of upward of 30 days.
And I believe she mentioned there were some information to the contrary.
So let me take you to one email, one chain of email, OPS3014930.
First of all, do you know, of which I'm speaking, the Hotel Association was in touch with the City of Ottawa, and I believe that information was transferred to the OPS.
And so on the 25th of January, there was information that there are all these people who may be staying for more than 30 days.
And then on the 26th, we have this email.
Now, Steve Ball, do you know who Steve Ball is?
Yes, I do.
He's one letter off of my name, but he is the CEO or the Executive Director of the Ottawa Hotel Association.
Right.
So if we go down a little bit.
So it appears that this is, do you know who Matthew Gravel is?
Yes, Matthew Gravel is a member of the mayor's office staff.
So this is an exchange of email between them about the information they had received earlier.
And now if we scroll back up.
Sorry, can I read the bottom first?
Oh, I'm sorry.
I keep doing that.
Please take your time.
How far do you want us to go down?
If we could go to the bottom.
Certainly.
It won't take me very long.
No, not at all.
Can we go down to the very bottom, please?
Okay.
You can scroll up.
Thank you.
You can scroll up.
Okay.
Good to move up.
Okay.
Thank you.
So, I just want to draw your attention to this part at 9.08pm.
I'll get a sense of how long they're planning to be here, to be here by how long they, I guess it should be book rooms.
So far, it's only for a few days.
So, is that one example of information not being entirely clear?
So it's an extremely good example of that.
And I can tell you, we did receive this information from Mr. Ball through Mr. Gravel.
I believe it went into our emergency operations center where it was put into the intelligence group to follow up.
As a result, a member of our police liaison team contacted Mr. Ball, and what initially was identified as a large track of people who were going to be in the city for many, many days was narrowed down to being, no, it's a smaller group of people who have booked a three-day stay.
So one of the challenging things for us is this...
This was information that helped contribute to our view that it was going to be largely a three-day protest.
Right.
Now, so everyone's trying to figure out to the best they can what's going to happen.
And this commission has heard from Ms. Carrier, for instance, a week or so ago.
I referenced this when I examined.
Deputy Chief Ferguson last week, so I'll put that to you again, because Ms. Carrier, who was a businesswoman, a layperson with no access to any police intelligence, just based on her observation, you know, she said, if I could find the transcript, she said, to me personally, it was clear that the 70-kilometer train of trucks...
That across the country was not coming in for a small protest in a day.
And to me, that Sunday night was to prove that, you know, somebody somewhere had underestimated or not listened to the anger, frustration that a large, at this point, you know, large number of people felt.
They were coming to the city of Ottawa as the representatives of what they thought, and they were going to stay there.
They were going to stay there until they were heard.
So, entirely apart from...
Intelligence reports and so on, there's this common sense inference that some people draw, that people are not going to drive all the way from the West with all of these emotions that the intelligence reports also refer to to only stay for a weekend.
So in terms of contingency planning, what role did intelligence have to inform that contingency planning?
So I think intelligence would have played an important role and to try and highlight the risks that they knew at the time.
And I believe that that was done.
It became more possible, as was identified, that a small group of people could continue beyond.
Beyond the weekend, but that mainly was being planned around a weekend protest.
All of the activities that we took, including this one with the Hotel Association, led us to believe that that's what it was.
The intelligence, as we read it, talks about a lot of large protests, but the numbers that are necessary for planning didn't start to come in until...
The day before, and please don't hear that as a fault of anyone.
It was just very difficult because of how fluid and dynamic the situation was for us to be able to gather through our partners real-time intelligence.
So intelligence continually stayed on, continually fed the planning team of what they knew at the time with the best information.
As you described it, though, it was...
It was a fluid week.
It was a rollercoaster that week in terms of information coming out and refining down.
And ultimately, the numbers, the size of it weren't fully refined until the 29th and the 30th when it was already upon us.
And I'll go back to it again because I don't think it can be understated.
The real impact of this protest was the community harm that was created.
What the problem and the consequence to our community was through the activities of these protesters.
There wasn't any information that identified that.
And that, for me, is what created the need, the emerging need for us to make sure that we had the action plans in place as we saw that emerge.
Our community were dramatically exposed to violent activity over that period of time.
Now, this may be open to debate, but one may argue that the combination of the large number of people in trucks with the expression of an intent to stay for some time until the mandates are lifted logically lead to this risk of social trauma if a large number are going to stay here for a long time.
Do you agree?
So I think that goes to exactly what I talked about, about experience.
The other piece you need to add in there is experience with the group that you're gathering intelligence on to actually assess it and then to see how they are engaging in activities.
The experience we had until this point was, you were exactly right, they were people moving across the country, determined to be heard, but they were peaceful.
And they indicated that their intention was to be peaceful when they got here.
That isn't what materialized and that isn't what caused the consequence to our city.
People protesting in an area lawfully is something we can manage and handle.
People creating an occupation that traumatizes our community was something that no community had ever seen.
It was unprecedented and was the situation we're facing when we began to get the experience of these people.
Now, we expect that Superintendent Bernier, who is testifying tomorrow, may say that there was a bizarre disconnect between the intelligence and the planning.
What's your perspective on that?
So I would need to know exactly at what point he's speaking of, because what I do know is as the planning team...
uh was doing their assessments and as the planning team was building their plans that the the intelligence And the planning team were very tightly connected.
I've seen and observed several emails over my preparation for this that indicate that at every point that one of the planners is looking to develop a plan, they're referencing intelligence.
And that's as a leader in this organization is exactly what I would expect to happen.
Okay, so let's go to his Interview summary so that we have more context, WTS 6030,
page 4. So if we go down.
Oh, sorry.
It was earlier.
If we go up again.
The second paragraph.
So page four, second paragraph.
Superintendent Bernier also shared his concerns about the Freedom Convoy with his supervisor, Superintendent Drummond, on the 27th of January.
He told Superintendent Drummond that there seemed to be bizarre disconnect between the intelligence contained in the project hand in reports and OPS's preparations.
Do you agree with that?
So those issues were never highlighted to me.
I don't know what would form Superintendent Bernier's opinion on this, but those issues were never raised.
I would hope at that point they would have been raised if somebody felt that there was such a disconnect between them.
But the question I guess I put to you is not whether they were raised, but whether you saw a similar disconnect between the information contained in those reports and the way the OPS was preparing for the arrival of the convoy.
No, I didn't, because I think what you could observe...
And it'll be very important to flush out through our planning team, is that the information was fluid.
That we continued to develop more, receive more information that became more refined as we moved ahead.
That information was shared with planning.
I believe that's why the planning process was as fluid as it was as well.
This was a circumstance that was changing by the day, by the hour, with information coming in.
Intelligence was bringing it in and assessing it and planning was trying to respond to it.
And then it wasn't finalized until the convoy actually arrived in our city.
Now, as you know, this commission is ultimately about learning from the past to find out what happened in order to improve what we can do in the future.
So as the deputy chief responsible ultimately for the intelligence unit.
What are your thoughts on what could have been done differently or better in order for the OPS or other police services to respond better to an event like this in the future?
So first I'd like to start with thank you very much.
I'm very happy that that's one of the areas the Commission's looking at because I think there are many lessons for us to all learn through this.
Some of those lessons I can tell you we've already learned and put into practice.
In terms of intelligence, I know that one of the things that we've developed is better capacity and capability around open source information.
What was born out of this situation was a unit that's been created within our organization, specifically dedicated at collecting open source information and sharing it into intelligence.
I think the opportunity around intelligence is to ensure that intelligence, open source, and police liaison team information is more readily shared so that it can be cross-referenced.
We've seen that develop within our organization.
I also think one of the things we've been able to do is we read the intelligence differently now.
We've had multiple subsequent events in this city where we've used our experience to leverage our operational planning.
One of those was rolling thunder.
And when you look at the intelligence, there was the identification that it may not have been a large risk event for us, but we used our experience to apply towards that intelligence and created a deployment model that actually ultimately did I believe prevent a subsequent occupation to our streets.
So I think from an intelligence perspective, the coordination and cooperation and it has always been good between ourselves and our partners.
I think this identified that we need to expand that and that we need to broaden the sources of information that we're bringing in and properly leverage them in our operational planning with the experience we have.
All right.
Now, let's leave intelligence for a minute, but still, I want to ask you about planning.
If I could take you to your interview summary, which is WTS 6029.
time.
If we go to page four.
Page four.
I'm looking for the part where you said that the OPS's approach to the protest at the time of the Freedom Convoy did not consider community impact.
That paragraph right at the top.
Okay, sorry.
Interim Chief Bell saw it as OPS.
That's right.
Interim Chief Bell saw...
It as OPS's role to respect lawful protests.
He noted that OPS was experienced dealing with lawful protests on national and international issues and ensuring public safety at these protests.
He commented that OPS's approach to protests at the time of the Freedom Convoy did not, however, consider the community impact of demonstrations.
We go down a bit.
Since the convoy, you not only consider public safety and charter rights and so on, but also the impact on the community.
That goes to part of what you just told us.
Now, at the time, though, you sought a legal opinion on what lawful authority was open to the OPS to respond to the arrival of the convoy, right?
That's correct.
I requested that legal opinion following a...
One of our morning calls, our command team meeting, as one of the requests that was going to be, we needed to fulfill in order to make sure we understood our legal grounds.
Do you remember when you sought that opinion?
I don't remember the specific date.
Okay, let's see if your notes help refresh your memory.
OPS 00014525.
So, it says here January 27th, and you have a note, convoy plan will develop legal opinion on how we will be able to end the convoy.
Does that help refresh your memory?
Yes, it does.
Okay, so on the 27th, you sought the legal opinion.
Do you remember if you got an opinion back?
Yes, I believe I received the legal opinion on the 28th.
The next day.
So let's go to that now.
Can we scroll down on my notes just to make sure I'm not missing anything?
That's it.
Thank you.
So if we could go to the next document, OPS 403692.
Is this the opinion you received?
Yes, it is.
Did you read it at the time?
Yes, I did.
Sorry?
Yes, sorry.
Yes, I did.
Okay.
And did you circulate this opinion to anyone else?
Yes, because it was requested at one of our morning calls, I would have shared it with the entire command team, I believe.
But I don't have independent recollection that I did forward it on.
Okay, but you believe you did?
I believed I did.
I collected it on behalf of the executive team, so I would have shared it with the executive team.
And just to be clear, by executive team, you meant?
So it would have been anyone who was present.
So it would have been with legal counsel who would have done this.
Deputy Chief Ferguson, CAO Dunker, Chief Slow Lee, Chief Executive Officer Kevin Maloney.
And others, I just don't have recollection of who I forwarded it to.
Okay, so let's take a look at this opinion.
Staying on page one, if we scroll down, the paragraph that starts with while the convoy, we could go up?
Yeah, that's good.
While the convoy has not yet reached the City of Ottawa, various considerations will need to be assessed and reassessed to determine the appropriate response, including the balancing of competing charter rights, Impacts to public enjoyment and the right to mobility, impacts to health and safety, impacts on obstructing emergency vehicles, and impacts to public safety generally.
So I want to ask you, in preparing for response, how did you and your executive team consider these bullets, including the impacts to public enjoyment?
And the right to mobility, and the last point, impacts to public safety generally.
I think that would have been done by an ongoing assessment that was being conducted by the planning team and intelligence moving ahead.
Those areas were specifically impacted, as I indicated, and we only realized that once the convoy.
The anticipation of the community trauma and violence to our community that did occur wasn't anticipated because nobody saw.
Nobody saw that coming.
Nobody knew that that was going to be the tactic that the mob that got here was going to actually engage in.
So that is something that we look at.
We look at public safety.
We look at Charter of Rights and Freedoms and all of these index, but we had never taken the view of making sure that the community and the surrounding areas, we were as responsive to their needs.
We take that into account more than ever now, and that's what you've seen as we've responded to Rolling Thunder, responded to Canada Day, to make sure that we interpret our intelligence with our experience, but also make sure that we identify potential hazards or concerns that it could occur within the community and put that absolutely front and center in our planning.
The reason I highlight that The one thing that I hear consistently after the removal of the occupation, and very rightfully, is that we didn't put enough emphasis as a police service on our community and the impact that it caused to them in the very early days.
That they felt that we didn't focus on the harm that was being done to them.
While we have always had that in the planning, I think we need to be overt in it and say, "Community, this is your city.
These are your streets.
We will conduct ourselves in order." To protect you within this community and protect you within those streets.
So I think the emphasis that I'm playing is that we need to always have charter rights and freedoms in our mind.
We always need to have community safety, but we need to make sure that we bring the community impact to the front of everything we do because it was the area that was most violated during this event.
Now the opinion talked about the balancing of competing charter rights.
And perhaps many of the residents felt that there was an imbalance.
And one of the central questions that arose from the planning perspective is about the ability of preventing the trucks from entering the downtown core in the first place.
So I want to ask you, what was your understanding of the lawful authority for the OPS to prevent?
The trucks from going downtown and park there that first weekend.
So I believe that we do have the ability and I think we've exercised it several times since then to prevent the vehicles from going down.
A truck isn't a protected entity under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
People are.
That is something we had not exercised prior as an organization.
When we had vehicle-borne demonstrations, protests, or events in what is the downtown core, we had always allowed them because our experience was they had come and they had left, and we had managed them.
And that was a regular occurrence for us.
So that happened many, many times, usually many, many times a year.
So although the charter doesn't protect the vehicles, I do know that our experience had been that we would allow those type of vehicles.
I think there's another side to it as well that's very important.
Particularly as we became closer to the date, we saw the volume of vehicles that were going.
They were coming to Ottawa.
They were very clear about that.
They were coming to Ottawa.
So the ability for us to protect and preserve public safety would mean that we would want them to go into a designated area so that we could better control it.
We didn't, again, didn't anticipate the activities.
We didn't anticipate the size or scope of number of people who stayed because we do have to remember most people did leave on Sunday night.
So the ability for us to manage the protest and demonstration in a core, as opposed to people coming and have a blocked off downtown core and leaving their trucks on the 417 or trucks dispersed around many different areas, it was going to be more manageable for us in a centralized area.
Now we ask the same question or a very similar question of Mr. Slowly, the former chief.
And I want to show you his answer and ask you if you agree with him.
Can we go to the document WTS 6040?
And if you could go to page 15, please.
The second paragraph.
Chief Slowly was advised that based on the known intelligence reports, OPS did not have the legal authority to deny the Freedom Convoy access to downtown Ottawa simply because some people disagreed with the views of some participants.
He understood that OPS did have authority to close roads and restrict traffic if there were public safety concerns, but closures and restrictions had to be committed.
It had to be commensurate to actual threats or reasonably predictable threats.
Highway Traffic Act or bylaw violations alone would not be sufficient to justify restricting access to the city for all protesters.
Do you share his view?
Do you share his view?
So I think it's important.
There's a lot packed in there, so I think it's important that we go through it.
Take your time.
To reflect upon it.
So I would say, I would absolutely agree.
Based on the intelligence we had, we didn't have legal authority to deny the protesters from a protest.
All of the activity had been lawful and peaceful, and there was no indication of anything contrary to that.
Let me ask you this.
In a subsequent event, rolling thunder and so on, did you have different intelligence assessment?
To suggest a more violent event or higher risk in other aspects?
No, we had experience.
We had experience in exactly what had occurred.
We had seen and learned from what had occurred during the Freedom Convoy, and we had worked with our city partners and policing partners to identify different mechanisms to actually restrict access to an area.
So, in other words, it's not the nature of the anticipated protests that change the planning.
It's the experience of having been through what Ottawa went through in January and February that caused a different planning approach.
Absolutely.
And I think that experience that I talk about is something that you saw across the country as people planned and responded to similar incidents.
Toronto Police Service and the City of Toronto had a much more successful intervention in a protest in subsequent weekends to what we had initially.
And Chief Ramer has been clear in identifying it.
Part of that was because of the experience that they saw occur in Ottawa, that they identified different threats in different ways and built a plan around the experience that they've seen us, they saw us endure.
Would you agree then that the only thing that's changed is the appreciation of the potential risk?
No, I don't think that that's accurate.
I think what's changed is we have an understanding of what these groups are capable of when they come together.
We have an understanding of what could occur as these groups coalesce around a cause in an area.
And that's rolling thunder.
I would propose that had we not had the experience we had, we wouldn't have planned in the way we did.
We wouldn't have had the public order deployment.
We wouldn't have had the exclusionary zone.
And in that case, the Friday evening that it occurred, we would have had A truck that attempted to occupy an intersection that was followed quickly by other vehicles, set up and be successful for a period of time in, again, taking over an area of our city.
That's the appreciation that we have of what is possible when these groups come together.
That's the experience that I'm talking about that we are now applying to all of the intelligence.
So if I understand you correctly, you said what's different is the new understanding of what could occur, right?
Those are your words?
Yes, those are my words.
How is that different from appreciation of the potential risk?
Your words are probably just more eloquent than mine.
Okay, we'll go with your words.
Now, I do want to ask you this.
Taking you back to the legal opinion, which is OPS 403692.
If we go to page 4, go down.
That's right, the paragraph that starts with therefore.
Therefore, while the case law indicates that those who wish to protest have a chartered protected right in doing so, it is not without limits.
These limits, as the courts have recognized, prevent threats of violence, acts of violence, and unlawful conduct.
Moreover, these limits also prevent demonstrators from obstructing travel on roadways.
It is worth noting, however, that there has been at least one decision where it was found that a blockade for a very brief period only constituted a minor inconvenience and was therefore permissible.
So what this memo is saying here is that there are limits to the charter and part of the consideration Apart from potential threats of violence is the prospect of the demonstrators obstructing travel on roadways.
That was your understanding too, right?
Yes, it was.
And when you have a large crowd of protesters and their trucks being brought to the downtown core with no exit strategy, why is that not a suitable consideration for...
In order to achieve some of the bullet points we saw earlier in this memo.
And I think this goes back to how we have and how we had addressed these types of protests in the past.
We live in Ottawa.
We're at the seat of Parliament.
Protesting is something that...
Lawful protesting is something that our community accepts and I believe our community appreciates and they have an expectation on us to be able to appropriately manage and facilitate those protests.
So for a large demonstration to come into the downtown core and in around the seat of parliament and protest for a number of days.
Would not be abnormal in this city, even with the traffic disruptions that would occur.
What was abnormal in this situation was the volume of vehicles that came and the area that they actually occupied.
What was particularly, and I've said it and I will say it again, what was particularly different in this event was the interactions of the protesters.
Between themselves and the community.
We had never seen that before.
That was unprecedented.
Okay.
Commissioner, I'm about to embark on a new area.
I don't know if this would be an appropriate time for a break.
Okay, so we'll take the morning break.
We'll take 15 minutes and come back, I guess, a little after 22. Thanks.
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes.
La Commissione en l 'Évée, pour qu 'est-ce minute?
Thank you.
All right, everybody.
I'm in just trying to figure out a problem here, a technical problem.
Let me just get this lined up.
Okay, hold on.
Lighting.
Okay, this is what I've got to do.
I'm going live with Legal Bytes and others at noon.
I need to be able to run the audio without hearing it with my headphones.
What I'm going to try to do is if I shut, if I disconnect, I will bring us back before the pause is over.
We've got time.
So I'm thinking if I lose connection in life, like if my computer goes down, I think the stream stays live.
So let me see this here.
What a ginormous waste of taxpayers' money.
Oh, they're all getting paid for it.
They all get paid while they try to figure out who screwed up the most at the expense of the citizens.
Okay.
If I...
I'm going to close the window to StreamYard and see if the stream goes down.
If it does, I'll be back.
He's multi-talking.
I understood what you meant.
Yeah, wakey-wakey.
Oh, my God.
No, I was listening to it.
I'm just trying to...
I got to get ready for my main day stream at 1.30.
Live with Alita, we're talking the Menendez Brothers trial back in the day.
Sorry, I've been...
I had my hair in a ponytail.
Ran out of a thingy thing, so I found an old mask in the car and tore off the earpiece.
Okay, let me just do this here again.
Okay, I'm going to close the window and see if the stream stays up.
I'm still the most tech savvy.
Oh, I have no doubt about that.
I am what we say in, what we call in French, un débrouillardais.
Un débrouillardais is someone who finds solutions to problems.
You scared us there.
Yeah.
Oh no, I'm not, I'm not cutting it anytime soon.
Okay.
I'm going to, I'm going to hit X on this window.
If the entire stream goes down, I will be back by noon.
Let me leave one comment up so I can see it.
Here we go.
You know what?
I like this one better.
Yeah.
Happy face.
Thumbs up.
Okay.
Changes you made may not...
See, now it says leaving sight.
Changes you made may not be saved.
What does that mean?
What does that mean?
So that's not going to work.
You're still there, but the sharing of the screen is not.
That's me right here.
What's that?
You said the most handsome person on the interwebs?
You said the most handsome person on the interwebs?
Say it again.
I have no idea.
This is...
This is straight up what happens when you look at a mirror, looking into a mirror.
Okay.
So that's not going to work.
Damn it.
Screen share.
And the thing is, I need to have headphones for the stream with Alita.
Okay, hold on.
First of all, first things first.
Let's go here and just go back to sharing the window.
See, this is what...
It would have been success if we had seen this in the backdrop.
Once I click down the stream.
Okay, so that's one problem.
How many ear jacks do I have?
I have one ear jack.
I think the solution, and the only solution, I'm gonna have to do the stream with Legalbytes off my iPhone.
And then this afternoon, I'll be able to run the audio here.
I won't be playing that many videos on my stream, so I won't need to have, maybe use multiple browsers.
That won't solve the problem because I am using multiple browsers.
It's the audio coming from the inquiry that I want to be able to hear.
I can't even mute the audio.
See, if I go here and then mute the audio here, then you won't hear it.
If I turn down the audio on my computer, then I won't hear it.
You'll still hear it, but then I won't be able to hear the audio from the stream that I'm about to do.
Thrilling moment indeed.
You're watching the wheels turning very slowly.
Okay, so if I ran this on another computer, which I could do, but then I need to invite myself into the stream, and I don't have a second computer.
Okay, I'll have to do the stream at noon off my iPhone with earbuds, and that'll be fine.
I'll just...
Yeah, you need multiple inputs, feeds for that mixer.
Well, I've got...
See, I've got that thing called a Behringer Euphoria UMC204.
That's for the mic, though, for this.
Then I've got a Cloudlifter.
I don't know what the hell that does.
I got a sign that says Freedom, yo.
And I got a shirt that says Freedom.
Okay, whatever.
I'll do LegalBytes livestream on my iPhone.
The lighting should be good, and that'll be it.
Yeah, so this is painful.
It's boring.
It's like we're watching a government institution basically lament as to how incompetent it was.
And then, oh, they learned from their mistakes.
They learned so much from the Ottawa protests.
They learned how to deal with Operation Rolling Thunder or that other short one-day protest, the stated object of which was to roll past the cenotaph, not park their car so they wouldn't get arrested by an overly zealous...
Baton-wielding, pepper spray-wielding police force.
I need to splurge on a secondary computer.
Yeah.
One day, one day.
Life is just about hemorrhaging expenses.
Okay.
Public hearing is there.
What was I looking for?
I was looking for that.
What the heck was I just looking for?
Oh, any idea what U.S. Garland is up to at 1:30?
Apparently big news conference.
I heard that as well.
Oh, maybe we'll livestream that.
I'm going live at 1:30.
Dude, zero no.
Thank you very much for the idea.
Let's do that.
Not that I was...
Hey, escape.
We're going to do that.
We're going to live stream that and see what's going on.
It doesn't matter.
You see people making conflicting reports.
Some are saying it's domestic.
Others are saying it's international.
Someone in the stream last night saying planes were flying soldiers all over the place.
Whatever.
The government and their handlers are a truck crash in slow motion.
I say train wreck.
This inquiry has given me the same warm, fuzzy feelings as paying my taxes or having a tooth pulled.
You know, having a tooth pulled, at least you're getting some immediate benefit.
Paying your taxes?
You're getting robbed so someone can take your money, take their cut.
It's like it's a compelled rake.
At least when you get the rake the house takes its cut at a casino, you go there to have fun.
This is like they're raking it out of your butt when you don't even want to gamble.
I just want to be able to use the money that you've worked hard for.
Working for the government.
I was talking to someone.
What day is it today?
Yeah, the day before yesterday on the pier.
Explaining how much we pay in tax in Quebec and Canada.
It's 48%, give or take.
48% if you make over, let's just say $100,000, give or take.
It's about 50%.
Then you got 15% sales tax.
Provincial.
Government sales tax.
Then you got mutation taxes if you buy property.
Then you got home tax, which is municipal.
Then you got tax on gas, tax on alcohol.
What else?
You got death tax.
They don't even let you die in peace.
The amount, you pay more than you keep on every dollar you make when you make more than a certain amount in Quebec and Canada.
And people down here don't appreciate it because here you have federal tax in Florida, but you don't have state tax.
It's 50% only for the top end and effective tax rate is much less.
But then that's the other issue.
What is it?
Something like 20% of Quebecers pay 80% of the taxes?
And then you got your seasonal workers who work part of the year.
Get employment insurance, although it should be called unemployment insurance, for the other part of the year while working not so over the table.
So, you know, it's fantastic.
Anyhow, and then of the tax that you pay, 25% to 50%, depending on how you do your math, depending on who you ask, goes to healthcare, which you pay for even when you don't use it, and then when you need it, lacks, is lacking, just to say.
Just to say the least.
Death taxes are an affront to humanity.
I don't think anyone would disagree with that.
Okay, so here's what I'm going to do.
It's 136.
If I put my iPhone here with the earbud...
Okay, we'll do it.
It will not be the most ideal form of...
It will not be the most ideal stream format.
But it'll do.
And this...
Oh, is that a cute baby in that avatar?
I just saw that.
I would say babies look like really old people.
Our kids, when they were babies, look just like my grandmother.
This hearing is outrageous.
Anyhow, we'll see where it goes.
The lawyer examining right now, he is for...
Does anybody know?
I keep forgetting.
He's not for the Ottawa Coalition.
Is he for the OPP or Ottawa Police?
If anybody knows.
Yeah, it used to be called unemployment insurance.
That makes the most sense.
Employment insurance.
Something went wrong with the stream.
Yeah, no, no.
They don't call it...
They don't call it...
It's called employment insurance.
Employment insurance for when you don't have employment.
Alright, link in here.
Alright, I'm going to go get my links ready for this afternoon.
See if I can find the Merrick Garland when he goes live.
That pic is from 1959.
Yeah, that looks like it could not have been a replica.
How's the lighting, by the way?
I'm a little neurotic here, obviously, but it's too dark on this side, so I've got to move one light.
The Roomba, we have a Roomba, and it came through my office.
We have a Roomba that came through my office and took down both lights.
Okay, that's better.
We are funding this inquiry.
The war on Ukraine and the East Coast has to beg to raise money for what the federal governments and provincial governments are supposed to do.
Let's see this.
If you make $130,000 a year living in Ontario, you will be taxed 40,000.
So that is...
Hold on, hold on, hold on.
40, that's only 30, I say only.
That's less than 33%.
Is that provincial?
That means your net pay will be 90,000 or 7,000 a month.
Your average tax rate is 36, 30%.
Marginal tax rate is 43. Is that, though, both federal and provincial?
Andrew, a serious question.
I'm trying to understand it because when I was a young lawyer and we started off at $80,000, I think, give or take, I think I recall only netting in Quebec, netting $45,000.
44. 44 on only the top tier.
Yes, both of us.
Okay.
All right.
Well, while you hear me ramble, they have been very meticulous.
Look, I just said it and they came back here.
Okay, people, I'm going to draw myself out of the stream and try to continue getting prepped.
Morning again.
Morning.
I understand, Andrew.
Okay.
Before the break, we were talking about intelligence and other aspects of pre-arrival planning.
I'd like to take you now to the events after the convoy has arrived.
And during our interview, you explained to us that the events after the convoy arrived could be broken down into different phases.
So I'd like to take you to those different phases.
First, explain to us what those are.
And it may be helpful if we go to your interview summary first.
For sure.
So could we call up WTS 6029, please?
And this will be found at page 9. So Interim Chief, you told us that, broadly speaking, the events after the convoy arrived could be broken down into three phases.
The first, roughly from January 28th, which was a Friday, to February 4th, another Friday.
Now, you separated the weekends from the weekdays because you said the weekends are very different.
First of all, why are the weekends...
So what we found during the course of the occupation was during the week time, it was the people that were here.
We would see those numbers swell.
Friday night, usually Saturday during the day into Sunday and then disperse into Sunday and we would go into another week long.
But the people that traveled to Ottawa, not in trucks, but people traveled that on foot attended the area during the weekends really seemed to swell and rise.
And the week was more of a stagnant.
Stagnus is probably not the right word.
A period where it was the people that were dug in and sitting there and remaining.
So, phase one, from January 28th to roughly February the 4th, I believe you call that a period of orientation or adaptation after the convoy's arrival.
Tell us what you meant.
So, during that period, several key things occur.
On the 28th, the convoy arrives.
We are anticipating a three-day event with the potential of a smaller group of people staying, and there's massive numbers.
So through the weekend, and I wouldn't be the one to best speak about it, but through the weekend, the event is managed.
Sunday night, so I believe that's the 30th, we then...
Anticipate most people leaving, many people left, but we still had a very large red zone that we identified it with lots of trucks, with antisocial behaviours that are targeting our community.
So we start to then move into the Monday where we're seeing an entrenched group who are actively demonstrating, protesting and targeting our community.
During that phase, so on the 30th, as we're looking at going into Monday, demobilization planning, as it's called, is being identified by Deputy Chief Ferguson.
So there's direction that's being put out by Deputy Ferguson.
Okay, so always the potential of them.
Some staying.
We have a very large footprint now.
What are our potentials to actually remove people from this area if we need to go there?
So that's tasked out on the 30th.
So during that week, we're starting to orient ourselves.
So I wasn't present at it, but on the 1st of February, so 31st is Monday, 1st of February is Tuesday, there's a meeting that occurs between Deputy Chief Ferguson.
Chief Slowly and the large public order unit commander table to start looking at options for a tactical resolution to this.
So that group then is tasked out with coming up with options that could be used.
That public order team then brings back options to Chief Slowly, myself.
Deputy Chief Ferguson and other senior leaders to identify the three options that they had identified on the 4th of February.
So that would be, I believe that's the Friday.
From that optioning...
Optioning solutions that have come out.
There's three that are identified.
The command team has the discussion with them as we go through, weigh all the benefits of each of them.
And ultimately, an approach is then identified on the fourth.
So that takes us through the first week.
So the orientation is figuring out what's going on within the environment, making sure...
Trying to get the resources that we require or assign the resources that we require to hold the red zone in a safe manner, try and manage public safety issues in the way that we can with the limited capacity we have, as well as then start to develop planning or at least identify strategic concepts around how we're going to approach this moving ahead.
Right.
Now, I have more questions for you about this first phase.
But before we get into that, I'd like you to tell the Commissioner, first of all, what the other phases are.
So the second phase, I believe it is from February the 7th, which is a Monday, to February the 11th.
Is that a Friday?
I believe it is.
I'm sorry, I don't know.
This is a...
Block of time to me, the days.
I'm not sure of what that day is.
Okay, but in any event, from the 7th to the 11th, right?
I believe the 7th, if we, the 4th is, so 7th would be a Monday, and the 11th would be the Friday.
Yes, so during that period is the time that we're looking at doing, it was...
The strategic concept that was developed and approved was to look at taking off bite-size or chunk-size pieces of the demonstration to decrease its footprint to ultimately resolve it.
Keep taking bites out of it until it's actually fully resolved.
That week was orientation around developing...
Targeting lists, for lack of a better word, identifying how it would be approached and developing smaller operational plans to do operations to try and limit or shrink the footprint.
So that's the period when you called it the period of ad hoc responses, right?
That's correct.
And then we move to the third phase, which starts on February the 14th, which is a Monday.
And it carries on to the end of that week, the 18th.
And I think you described that as the week when there was a focus on the development of a long-term plan to end the protest or occupation, right?
Yes.
So because we've only counted weeks, I think I would move that date of when the long-term planning started back.
But I think it was...
The 11th or the 12th?
Right.
Well, these days aren't exact, but it gives us a general sense of how events progressed.
So going back now to the first phase, now you've told us in our interview in the summer that that was a time, you described it as, I believe, let me look for the reference, you said the OPS was exceptionally unprepared for, and you...
And the team realized that after that first weekend.
Do you still agree with that description that you gave before?
Yeah, I believe we were unprepared for what transpires.
In the sense that you weren't prepared for what would eventually turn into an occupation.
That's correct.
Now, so I want to take you to some documents and see if we can explore further what happened during that period.
Abrams from the OPP testified last week that he had a conversation with you on, I believe, the 31st of January.
That would be the Monday after the first weekend.
And you told him that the OPS is now looking for a four-week sustainability plan.
Do you recall that conversation?
Yes, I do.
Tell us more about that conversation.
So as we transitioned...
From the Sunday night of the 30th into the Monday morning of the 31st, the reality of what we were facing was much more clear.
Although there continued to be dates through intelligence that we'd received that identified there might be an actual date where the group would pick up and leave.
We identified that that may or may not come to fruition and we needed to start to engage in our planning.
Engage in the planning to ultimately remove the occupation.
So one of the things that we did at the very early outset in a command team meeting, I think it was actually at our morning call or a specific briefing around the convoy.
I can't remember which one it was, but we established For the purposes of planning, what would be a long window of what we could potentially be looking at for a sustainability perspective?
It's an important premise for us in order to look at the window that we're going to need to plan for.
This is mainly not to identify when it's going to end, to identify what is the potential that we meet.
May need from a staffing perspective, from a resource perspective, so that we can actually look at planning how we manage our members and other resources coming in.
So although we didn't know what the length of it would be at that time, we identified on the long end a four-week planning period for sustainability so that we would know we had the resources in place that we needed when we needed them.
And you and Superintendent Abrams had ongoing discussions as the events progressed about the different challenges facing the OPP and the OPS, correct?
Yes, so one of the things that we agreed to, because there were so many tasks at that time, there was a lot going on, that I would support Deputy Ferguson by being the conduit to the OPP to either ask questions at a strategic level or get input or questions from them.
And that's the role that I played, and that's the context that I had my conversations with Superintendent Abram.
That's right.
Now, if I could take you to Superintendent Abram's summary of the events around that time, perhaps you can tell us if you agree with his description.
Could we go to WTS 6013, please?
Okay.
Page five.
So on February the 4th, Superintendent Abrams had what he characterized as a formal conversation with Deputy Chief Bell about OPS's lack of a plan and unified command structure.
He explained that by unified command structure, he meant that OPS needed to be unified within itself because it was not at the time.
He told Deputy Chief Bell...
What his OPP officers had relayed to him, that OPS was disorganized and poorly coordinated.
He also told Deputy Chief Bell that OPS's maintenance of multiple command centers at the 245 Green Bank Road, OPS office, where OPS is MIC, that would be Major Incident Commander.
Superintendent Patterson was based at the OPS headquarters on 474 Elgin Road.
NCRCC in Orleans, where OPS's incident commander was based, were contributing to these problems.
Deputy Chief Bell agreed that OPS needed to formalize operations and told Superintendent Abrams that OPS was trying to develop a plan and a unified command.
In characterizing the conversation, Superintendent Abrams explained that it was an uncomfortable situation, but he felt compelled to raise his concerns.
And offer advice.
Now, there's a lot here, so let's unpack it.
First of all, he mentioned that there are multiple command centers, and I believe there are at least three locations there.
Is that what happened at the time, that there were multiple command centers within the OPS?
So there was different areas where work was being generated out of or coordinated.
But the NCRCC, the National Capital Region Command Centre, was the dedicated command centre for this event.
The Major Incident Commander, Superintendent Patterson, did originally work out of his office at 245, but I believe he regularly attended the NCRCC.
I'm not sure that we'd have to verify that through...
Inspector Lucas.
There also was, was there another one there?
474 was where the executive command was.
The NCRCC was our command center.
That's where all operations were resourced out of.
That's where our joint intelligence group was.
That's where our incident commander was.
There was meetings that occurred in different areas.
There was different locations that did need to feed information into the NCRCC.
But ultimately, the NCRCC was the area where operations were controlled from, from established from before.
The convoy arrived and only demobilized many days after it had been dismantled.
If the NCRCC was where all the actions were, where the command pose was, do you know why Superintendent Patterson was operating initially at least from a different location?
I can't comment on that.
I don't know.
Okay.
Superintendent Abrams also pointed out that there was a lack of a plan and unified command structure.
Do you agree with those concerns?
So, we would have had a command structure that was based out of a unified command that was based out of the NCRCC.
The Ontario Provincial Police, the Ottawa Police Service, the RCMP.
PPS, Parliamentary Protective Services, were all co-located in that area.
So there was the unification of all of those resources there.
From a strategic level command, no, I would absolutely agree with Superintendent Abrams' assessment that we needed a better, more integrated strategic level command.
One of the learnings for me from this is, even though it was assigned to me, I don't...
It wasn't necessarily more helpful for Superintendent Abrams from a strategic command within the operation perspective to come to me instead of managing directly through Deputy Chief Ferguson.
So those are some of the issues we identified and continue to rectify, particularly as we moved towards our integrated planning team and our unified command.
Superintendent Abrams not also raised some issues with you about the difficulty for the OPP officers to integrate in a sense that the OPS, in his view, had failed to provide deployment instructions to his officers.
So Superintendent Abrams identified several...
Different issues that were relayed to the incident command.
And I know one of the issues in the early days was The tasking of a number of Ontario Provincial Police officers who had attended to assist.
That was relayed to Deputy Chief Ferguson.
And it is my understanding, it would have been my expectation, that she would have moved that down to the incident commander, Inspector Lucas, who would have rectified it with his partner at that time, the OPP incident commander, who he was...
Is it your understanding that there were, in fact, OPP officers physically situated in Ottawa who were just sitting around and not being effectively deployed?
Notwithstanding the lack of resources on the part of the OPS.
So I do understand that there was an occurrence of that that did happen that was raised to me.
And it is my understanding that it was immediately rectified and didn't occur again.
And was there not also concerns that in terms of the planning, there were OPP planners provided to assist the OPS?
But they couldn't really do their job because they were getting conflicting directions from the OPS.
So I don't believe that was a concern that Superintendent Abrams raised to me.
Okay.
Could we go to page 4 of this document?
The second paragraph.
Superintendent Abrams also reported that OPS planners and the OPP planners assisting them were receiving contradictory directions.
At OPS's request, OPP assigned two members, Inspector Yunnan and Staff Sergeant Gauvin, to help OPS develop plans.
Chief Slowly had requested plans for three scenarios.
Went through the three scenarios.
On February the 3rd, Superintendent Abrams was advised that OPS instructor Michelle Moran had informed the OPS planners and the OPP planners assisting them to scrap the three-scenario planning because Chief Slowly wanted a new, different plan.
And that Inspector Moran's intervention had left the planners confused as to what they should be doing.
Superintendent Abrams contacted Deputy Chief Bell, who informed him.
That Inspector, I don't know if it's Marin or Moran, lacked authority to issue planning directions and that the planners should be reporting to OPS Superintendent Jamie Dunlop, who was leading planning, even though Superintendent Patterson was serving as the OPS MIC.
Does that help refresh your memory?
Yes, it does.
Thank you very much.
Tell us, what was the nature of the problem or perceived problem?
And this highlights where some of the challenges.
I wasn't involved in any of the tasking that was going on around as not the major incident commander.
So my understanding of what occurred here is, and I do recall Superintendent Abrams calling me and saying that Inspector Marin had come in and given a direction that was contrary to what we had.
Expected to come out of this planning table.
That's why I then directed him to Superintendent Dunlop, who was assisting in that area and would be the person who would be able to provide direction as being involved directly in our morning briefings in terms of how we were moving ahead.
I don't know what occurred to have Inspector Mariah engage in that way with that direction, but I did highlight two.
Superintendent Abrams that if there was any questions in that planning area or in that public order area, that it was Superintendent Dunlop who was best equipped to answer them, and he would be the only one that could give directions in that area.
All right.
Now, let's move on then to the second phase, as you've described it, the phase of ad hoc responses.
This would have begun on around the 5th, although you separated the weekends from the...
From the weekdays, so probably the 7th, right?
So I want to ask you about a number of events that occurred during this period and get your perspective on whether they might be problematic from your point of view.
First of all, on the 4th of February, I think this came from Our interview with you, but on the 4th of February, the OPS made an announcement about a surge and contain plan.
Do you recall that?
Yes, I do.
And my understanding is that that plan contemplated surging officers into neighbourhoods affected by Freedom Convoy activity?
That's correct.
As well as hardening the downtown core protest site, including by closing interprovincial bridges.
Now, you spoke to us about this at page 4 of your summary.
So, I think what's on the screen is Abram's summary.
Can we go to Interim Chief Bell's summary, please?
Thank you.
Thank you.
So if we go to page 14. On February 4th, during an 11.40am press conference, Chiefs Lowley announced that police would close highway off-ramps and interprovincial bridges to prevent convoy participants from entering Ottawa.
Now, first of all, I don't know how precise the wording is, so I want to ask for your best recollection of what was announced during that press conference.
So what was announced during that press conference was that the Ottawa Police Service would take into account all options, including consideration of closing of the off-ramps and...
of the interprovincial bridges.
So there wasn't a definitive statement saying we are closing the bridges.
It was a statement by Chief Sloan Now, if we carry on, Superintendent Abrams called Interim Chief Bell and informed him that OPS had not consulted OPP on February 5th during a 10 a.m. briefing meeting.
Oops.
No, no, no.
Stay where we are.
On February 5th, during a 10 a.m. briefing meeting that Interim Chief Bell attended, Chief Slowly directed OPS officers attending the meeting to close off ramps and bridges.
First of all, is that accurate?
Yes, it is.
Chief Slowly directed OPS officers attending the meeting to close off ramps and bridges.
Interim Chief Bell stated that his understanding was that OPP...
Not OPS was responsible for closing off ramps and that OPS lacked authority to close interprovincial bridges.
Could you explain the authority to do any of these things to us, please?
So the ability to close off ramps is normally attributed to the OPP.
The Ontario Provincial Police because they are the police of jurisdiction responsible, the police responsible for the 400 series highways through Ottawa.
So, Ottawa Police would not normally engage in, in exigent circumstances that could occur, but we would not normally engage in closing off-ramps at the top of the ramp because it was an OPP responsibility.
We do have the ability to close ramps on the street side, but that creates traffic problems and issues.
So we could close them, but not normally.
Interprovincial bridges are a different circumstance.
Interprovincial bridges are much more challenging to close.
Particularly in a preventative way, in exigent circumstances, as things are occurring, they may be closed.
And the first weekend, the second weekend, and even in the third weekend, you saw that happen when the threshold for us to do that was met by the operational commanders.
But to preemptively close an interprovincial bridge would take the...
Would take the intervention of the Minister of Transportation to be able to allow us on a preventative measure to close those bridges.
So if I understand the sequence, the press conference happened on the 4th, right?
That's correct.
And then the directions to do these things, to close off ramps and bridges and so on, came on the 5th, the day after.
That's correct.
So on the 5th, and I think it's an important context to set, the 5th is a Saturday.
The 5th is where we're starting to see a large number of ingress people into our community.
The intelligence and the information we have...
I believe that this is the chief responding to the increased threat that we feel we may be under as we move ahead.
That's part of why you distinguish the weekends from the weekdays.
They were very different periods of time from an operational perspective.
Now, with respect to this incident, the fourth and the fifth, the proposed actions and so on, did you have any concern about the way things unfolded?
So I did.
On the fourth, no.
I believe the statements that were made were very appropriate.
We will consider everything as we move ahead.
On the 5th, my only concern would be to, as the Chief of Police, to provide direction like that on an operational matter as the Chief of Police.
That's something that I believe should be considered, contemplated at an operational level, not a strategic level.
And that would have been my concern in that area.
And why would it be a problem for a strategic level leader to be directing operations?
What is the concern underlying this rule that the operational commander should be doing these things instead of the strategic commander?
The incident command system has levels within it for...
Very distinct reasons.
And that's so that you can actually accomplish the operation that you want to with the most clarity, the most understanding, and the most safely way possible.
The strategic level needs to actually identify what is the approach that's going to be used.
What is the general outcomes that we are looking for?
The operational needs to then look at how, what are the resources?
How are we actually going to make that happen?
When somebody engaged at a strategic level begins to give tactical or operational level commands, it creates a lack of clarity in terms of everyone's role within the structure.
That lack of clarity then creates questions around What do I do?
What is my responsibility within this?
Do I have to escalate and ask a question up?
So the necessity to have that role clarity through it, I believe, is very important.
And you have to play your roles through it because when you don't, you create a lack of understanding which can impact the operations.
Now, to what extent is it clear or ambiguous?
What action constitutes a strategic direction or an operational direction?
Sorry, can you re-author?
I'm just trying to understand as a layperson, having never worked within an incident command, what kind of directions would be considered a strategic direction?
And what direction might be considered an operational or tactical direction?
This is one of the key areas that I believe that we needed to look at when I became interim chief in terms of how we continue to progress around this area.
In this case, a strategic level decision could be I don't want the convoys in the downtown area.
Go and work how we actually keep those trucks out of the downtown area.
An operational level decision, in my perspective, is close the ramp so convoys don't come into the downtown area.
But I think it's also important to note there is no rigorous system that identifies exactly where each of those thresholds land.
And if there is a rigorous system, There is four different accepted systems within Canada that could be used in this area.
So it's an area that I believe is something that probably hampered us somewhat in this with the lack of clarity.
No fault attributed to anyone, just there was not clear clarity across the services.
Across ourselves in terms of what constituted each of those decisions.
So I believe that that clarity needs to be struck and needs to exist.
And that's one of the things that in the early days of me taking over the operation as interim chief that I spent a considerable amount of time doing.
So the people that I was working with, Deputy Chief Ferguson, Superintendent Bernier, had a really clear understanding of what I felt was a strategic role and what I felt was...
Mm-hmm.
Now, in this paragraph that we just read, it would appear from what Superintendent Abrams said that the OPP was not consulted before the announcement was made on the 4th because he heard it from the news.
And since you explained that the OPP would have been responsible for the highway off ramps and so on, would it have been important to consult the OPP before the announcement is made?
Thank you.
So, if the announcement was we will be closing?
Ramps?
I would say yes, it would be extremely important.
If the announcement was we will consider that, I would say not as much and only because the OPP at this point is integrated within our NCRCC, our command center, and those would be operational level decisions that would be made.
There would be tactical responses developed within that area to be able to respond to the issues.
So this is the weekend of the 5th and the 6th.
And if we go to the following weekend, and I could take you to your summary at page 20. I suppose the OPS was anticipating another surge for another weekend.
Sorry.
I'm sorry.
Nope, go ahead.
Well, what I think, what I know was occurring, not what I think, what I know was occurring here was there was intelligence and tracking of a convoy that existed, I believe, within Quebec that was being followed towards Ottawa.
That would have been the early morning intelligence briefing in terms of what was to occur.
This is a Saturday as well.
This is the final, well, the second final Saturday.
So we are continuing to build, monitor, maintain the area, but we are tracking a convoy at this point.
So in the middle of the first paragraph, during the briefing, Chief Sloaly directed that OPS close interprovincial bridges and highway off-ramps into Ottawa until Monday, February the 14th.
Chief Sloaly indicated that OPS needed to act because of the municipal and provincial state of emergency.
So there appears to be a perceived need to close these off-ramps and bridges again, and he's directing, it appears from this paragraph.
Is that what happened?
That's correct, yes.
So if we go to the next paragraph.
Interim Chief Bell engaged in back-and-forth discussions with Chief Slowly about whether OPS had authority to close interprovincial bridges and highway off-ramps, including at a 12.17 p.m. meeting that OPS General Counsel Christian Honout attended.
Now, first of all, wasn't this discussion, didn't you already have this discussion with the former Chief the weekend before?
About the authority to do all this?
No, I had not at the weekend.
Ah, I see.
Okay.
So anyway, you have these discussions with him on the 12th, I believe.
And then in the middle of the second paragraph, Interim Chief Bell explained that while planning and operations would ordinarily have been Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's responsibility, he was relieving Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson that day so that she could rest.
Ultimately, Chief Slowly agreed that OPS lacked authority to close the bridges and off ramps and rescinded his direction.
So first of all, this is the weekend that Deputy Chief Ferguson took two days off.
We heard about that.
Is that right?
Yes, that's correct.
So during her absence, you stepped in to look after her responsibility.
And that's why you are engaging in these.
Discussions, right?
Because normally this is part of the planning.
That's correct.
This would have been under Deputy Chief Fergus's purview.
Right.
The next paragraph.
During these discussions, Interim Chief Bell informed Chief Slowly that Superintendent Bernier had developed a traffic mitigation plan to divert arriving convoys away from the downtown core instead of closing off ramps and bridges.
So first of all, we heard about directions to close off ramps and bridges.
Did you have the same concern expressed earlier the weekend before about a strategic level leader providing operations?
operational level directions.
Yes, I did.
But in this case, we have a different incident commander or event commander who already developed a traffic mitigation plan, right?
That is correct.
So...
We start reading from the middle of the third paragraph.
Chief slowly told Interim Chief Bell that he needed more details on Superintendent Bernier's plan so he could decide whether to approve it.
Now, do you have any concern about the former chief expressing the need to approve the event commander's plan?
So it is not typical in incident command structures.
The strategic level doesn't approve operational level plans.
After some back and forth, OPS implemented the traffic mitigation plan, which kept convoys from entering the downtown core.
Interim Chief Bell's notes record that during the 12-17pm meeting, Chief slowly told him, That Chief Slowly would assess the plan and, if not satisfied, would take appropriate actions.
Interim Chief Bell explained that Chief Slowly was asserting his authority to approve or reject the traffic mitigation plan that Superintendent Bernie was developing, as well as to hold Interim Chief Bell accountable if that plan did not meet the thresholds that Chief Slowly believed it needed to meet.
What did you mean by that?
Holding you accountable.
So I don't...
No, but he did indicate to me that I would be held accountable for the success of that plan.
I don't know specifically what that would mean, but those were the words used by Chief Sloan.
Okay.
Did that cause you concern?
No, I believe there's a level of accountability in every level within the organization.
I actually believe I would be.
Accountable for the delivery of that.
And I was confident in the plan.
So you were accountable because you are now stepping into the shoes of Deputy Chief Ferguson, who was the strategic commander, right?
That's correct.
And so when Superintendent Bernier was implementing that traffic mitigation plan as the commander, you were the one then providing strategic.
Oversight.
That's correct.
And that's why you would have been accountable if anything went wrong.
Well, we ultimately, the chief's accountable for everything.
That's part of the responsibilities of being a chief of police.
The delivery of this day...
And the diversion of this convoy would have from a strategic level come to me and from an operational level come to Superintendent Bernier, who developed a very effective plan and had teams that executed those plans very well that kept them out of our downtown core.
So was that an example of you trying to protect the autonomy of the operational commander?
Yes, I would believe yes, because I strongly believe in the autonomy of the operational commander.
And I believe at the end of the day, the strategic intent was clear here.
Keep convoys out of the area.
Superintendent Bernier and his team took that away and developed a very strong plan to manage that.
Members of our organization and other organizations executed that plan very well that ultimately did result in those convoys not attending.
That is how strategic, operational and tactical level decision makings are intended to work.
Now I want to turn your attention to another aspect that Happened during the convoy events.
If we could go to your summary at page 13. If we go down a little.
Yeah, I need to.
That's right.
So the last paragraph.
During the interview.
Interim Chief Bell stated that there were different perspectives within the OPS on the role of PLT during the Freedom Convoy.
And we've heard a little about this, different perspectives within the OPS on the role that the PLT should play.
Can you tell us more about your perspective and the other perspective on PLT?
So I can tell you about my perspective.
Tell us both.
I don't know that I know what the other perspective is, but from my perspective, PLT is an essentially important part in the development of plans, the pre-engagement with demonstrators, and then ultimately with the engagement of them as you move ahead.
PLT, the police liaison team, does an amazing job of trying to build rapport.
With demonstrators and protesters and we utilize it now beyond that in order to be able to have clear lines of communication but even more so have a good set of understanding of expectations of the protesters and expectations of what the protesters are anticipating to do when they're in their area.
So they're very effective.
In the pre-planning phase and in the early development phase.
They're also extremely effective in the demobilization portion because effective PLT utilization can actually result in, usually through small sets of concessions, through finding common ground with demonstrators and protesters in order for them to be able to successfully and peacefully negotiate an end.
To a demonstration.
This specific demonstration posed exceptionally challenging for our PLT members.
From the perspective that there was so many different people, so many different organizers, so many different groups, those leaders, organizers, and groups changed on a regular basis, and many of them had very different agendas.
There probably could not have been a more complex and challenging environment for our PLT members to work in, and I can tell you they came into work every single day with the absolute best intention to get this resolved peacefully.
Now, the reason I asked you for your perspective and the other perspective is because when you spoke to us in August, I believe, and as captured in this paragraph, you explained that there were different perspectives within the OPS.
So you've just explained to us the perspective that you adopt, as well as Chief Ferguson, Deputy Chief Ferguson.
But as this paragraph explains in the middle...
It says, Interim Chief Bell explained that because of these different perspectives, there was often no agreement on how much negotiation should occur before OPS launch.
An enforcement operation.
Now, does that paragraph, does this paragraph accurately describe the tension within the OPS?
Yes.
In relation to the utilization of PLT.
That's right.
Now, do you recall that on February the 6th, on around the 6th of February, that you had a conversation with Superintendent Abrams?
From the OPP.
And he said that the OPS needed to give more PLT autonomy to the PLT team and that the OPS command was not doing that.
Do you remember having that discussion with him?
I do recall on that occasion having discussions with Superintendent Abram.
Can you tell us more?
So I think you've summarized it very well.
The Ontario Provincial Police has an extremely well-developed, well-used, well-balanced police liaison team.
We model our program around them, and they, in a much earlier way...
In a much more active way would have liked, I believe, would have liked to see engagement of PLT throughout this.
And I think what you're seeing there is some of Superintendent Abrams' concern over what he perceived to be a lack of utilization of our PLT resources.
Right.
Okay.
So we're still within the second page.
So at the second page of this response reaction, we heard different witnesses talk about the meeting on the 9th of February after the arrival of the integrated group in Ottawa.
The chief party and his team met the team of the SPO.
So on this meeting, the 9th of February, Thank you very much.
In a morning meeting with the Chief and Deputy Chief Ferguson, right?
That's correct.
And I want to take you to page 17 of your summary about your recollection of that meeting.
Excuse me.
So, the first paragraph after the briefing ended, Chief Slowly met with Interim Chief Bell, Acting W. Chief Ferguson, and OPS Chief Administrative Officer Blair Dunker at 9.15 a.m.
During this meeting, Chief Slowly told the attendees that the integrated planning team had come to judge OPS to take control or command of the situation, and that they would base decisions on whether to send RCMP And OPP resources on whether the OPS had plans.
She slowly expressed the view that OPP and RCMP were not there to help and were taking directions from their political masters.
Does that accord with your recollection of what happened that morning?
Yes, it does.
What do you understand?
Sorry, excuse me.
What do you understand to be the reason?
So, I don't know what the reasons would be.
I don't know what Chief Slowly's experience would have been with the OPP or CMP.
It was surprising to me because up to that point, all during through this and continuing on, I've had the ability to work with both the Ontario Provincial Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and they have been exceptional partners.
They were exceptional partners to us through this.
Now, in terms of the timing, so this is February the 9th, and we've heard that a day or two days earlier in the Ottawa City Council, there was a motion.
I can't remember who was the council who brought forward the motion, but effectively to ask the RCMP.
To take over.
Are you aware of a motion?
So through this there was many motions.
I think you're specifically speaking about a motion on February 7th that was forwarded by Councillor McKinney in relation to asking the RCMP to engage in takeover policing of the parliamentary precinct.
So I am aware of that motion.
Now, you were there that morning when the former chief expressed these comments.
Did you understand his comments?
Do you have anything to connect with the events before, such as the motion in the council?
So again, as I indicated, I don't know what motivated these comments by Chief Slowly.
What I do know is that in relation to that motion, we had identified that it actually wasn't grounded in law.
The Ottawa Police Service is the police jurisdiction in the City of Ottawa.
So, in all of the City of Ottawa, including the parliamentary precinct.
So, we had provided a letter to the City to indicate that.
So it wasn't grounded in law, that motion.
I don't know whether it contributed to these comments.
That's a question better suited for chief slowly.
But I do know that the motion as it was put forward wasn't grounded in law.
Now, you mentioned that you did not share the same concerns as expressed by the former chief.
And in the next paragraph, you explain why.
Now, I...
I don't want to take too much time reading through your summary, so I'm going to take you now to the afternoon meeting with the Integrated Planning Group.
And if we could go to a different document, OPS 3014454.
I understand these to be minutes taken by the scribe at that meeting.
If we could go to page 131, please.
So can I just ask for a point of reference on where these notes are from and who's taking them?
I believe these are scribes taking notes for the former chief, right?
I can assist my friend.
Those are not scribe notes.
Those are notes of Christian, you know, who was general counsel.
So these are notes taken by Ms. Honnold, the general counsel for it.
Yes, so they are not scribe notes.
Thanks for clarifying.
Counsel's notes.
Counsel's notes.
So let me try to look for the reference.
Can we go down the page?
Mr. Oost, is it possible to reference the date that we're speaking of from the notes?
Yes.
I believe you said it was the 8th.
Moments.
Endowed.
Thank you.
Okay, so I need 131, not 130, please.
Keep going down.
Oh, was it early?
Sorry, can we go up again?
That's right.
Okay, so do you see the comment, Chief, last night was amateur hour?
Hard for us to make our logistics there.
We need to look professional.
Our job is here.
Our logistics are here.
They will be embedded in our plan, and we're not embedded in their plan.
Do you remember that being said?
Can I ask you to move up so I can refresh my memory more fully?
Yeah, so I think you're right.
We need to know a bit about the context.
So can we?
Go up to find the time that may help determine.
Okay, sorry.
Yep, down a bit.
Thank you.
Sorry, can I just read that portion?
Can you back up a little, please?
Thank you.
So it appears...
That this is a meeting that started at around noon, right?
And then if we go down a bit, you see the comment from Trish Ferguson, I want us to limit politics.
We've heard from her that those were discussions at the meeting itself.
I recall this meeting.
The chief said last week we didn't have an incident command.
Everyone was running around with confusion.
Now we know our roles as of noon.
And we go down.
Some of us did our jobs last week in what our teams needed.
We need to stay focused and stick to the plan.
Trish, they're here to help.
Not sure why we're forcing them to arrive here.
I believe that was a reference to their attending at the headquarter location?
That's correct.
So getting back to the question I wanted to ask you, what did you understand the former chief to mean when he said, our job is here, our logistics are here, they will be embedded in our plan, and we are not embedded in their plan?
What's our plan and what's their plan?
What I understood him to mean is that we would maintain command and control of the situation and that any plans that would be developed would be developed by us or with us at the head of the table.
And did you understand why that was important to the former chief?
No, I did not.
Did you share that concern that the team, the integrated planning group?
Should be embedded in the OPS plan rather than the other way around?
No, I wouldn't share that concern.
Okay.
Now, if I go back to your summary, so switch back to the summary, please.
WTS 6029.
WTS 6029.
We go to page 17. You see the paragraph at the very bottom.
The very last line.
You describe this meeting as contentious and heated.
The very last line?
I believe you're talking about a different meeting.
The meeting we were just last talking about was in the morning.
This is a different meeting, I believe.
No, sorry.
I thought there was a meeting within the OPS team.
I'm sorry.
Sorry, I'll let you explain.
There was a pre-meeting before we went down and met with the integrated planning team.
The notes that you had just taken me to.
There were notes that referenced that meeting that Deputy Chief Ferguson, myself, I don't recall who else was there from the notes, had with Chief Slowly prior to all of us attending the integrated planning team meeting.
So before the meeting with the integrated planning group, there was that discussion to ensure that the plan was to meet with them and ensure that they will be embedded in the OPS plan.
That was the comments.
And then the OPS command team met with the integrated planning group.
And now here in this paragraph that we read, you're describing that meeting with the integrated planning group as contentious and heated, right?
That's correct.
Now, I understand that we also put to chief party of the OPP who was present during this 12.10 p.m. meeting about the discussions that...
That was had during this meeting, including the OPS asking the Integrated Planning Group whether they were willing to be embedded into the OPS plan.
And he responded, yes, they were willing to do that.
But tell us why you observed this meeting to be contentious and heated.
Well, Chief Slowly has...
As this meeting went on, expressed reservations about the reasons for which the OPP were present.
He identified that he had concerns with them about a couple of things.
One of them was about the recording of numbers of OPP members that had been provided to us.
And another one was whether they were here.
To help or to assess and potentially overtake us was my impression.
It was a contentious meeting that did not, I don't believe, formed a good start first meeting in what I believe needed to be a very strong partnership.
I see.
Now after this meeting with the integrated planning group, there was a kind of debrief within the OPS command team, right?
Do you remember that?
If you can bring a set of notes up, I believe...
Okay, I'll try.
So this time we go to OPS 3014454.
So this is, again, notes taken by Ms. Hunnot, the OPS General Counsel.
And I want to take you to...
Let me find the right page.
Let's try 139.
Do you see references to OPS debrief from meeting with OPP RCMP?
At 1840?
Yes.
Yes, I do.
And there's a comment attributed to the chief, as far as I consider...
Keep going.
Nothing has changed until I hear something different coming from RCMP slash OPP.
There's a portion redacted, but if we keep going?
Chief said, no, they aren't part of the command.
Just a pie-in-the-sky idea by him.
Nothing concrete promises was made.
So I want to ask you about just what was discussed at this debrief.
Because we know that during the meeting, there was a request that the integrated team be embedded under the OPS structure.
And they agreed.
But after the meeting was over, at this debrief, the chief said, as far as he's concerned, keep going.
Nothing has changed.
Do we have...
Can we scroll up, please?
Because I just want to...
Yep, let's scroll up.
So I don't believe that I'm at this meeting.
Sorry?
I don't believe that I'm at this meeting.
You're not at the debrief?
I don't believe so.
I don't recall it, and I don't believe that it's in my notes.
So I don't believe that I did attend this meeting.
This is on the 9th.
That's right.
Yes.
So I don't believe that I was at the debrief meeting.
Okay.
Is there any notations that indicates I was there?
I'm sorry?
Is there any notations that indicates I was there?
Well, this is what we have.
It doesn't specify who was present at this debrief.
I suppose it was an assumption on my part that because you were there during the meeting that you were part of the debrief.
My apologies.
I don't believe I was there.
That's fine.
That's fine.
Now, I understand also that Interim Chief Bell, you were involved as part of the negotiation.
Well, not as a negotiator, but you facilitated the negotiation between the city and the protesters.
So I was involved in facilitating contact so that the negotiations could occur.
So I want to take you back to the beginning of those events and ask you when, what date were you first involved in that process?
So I believe that I first became involved in the process on February the 8th, I believe.
Not 100%.
I don't know if you have a document that references the specific date.
I do recall the sequence of events, but I'm not sure of the specific date.
I believe it's the 8th.
Okay.
Well, tell us your best recollection as to what happened when.
So I was contacted by Superintendent Patterson, who identified that he was looking for a contact between...
The police liaison team and someone in the city to have a discussion with a group of protesters.
So I questioned him as to what level are you looking for?
Are you looking for somebody to help arrange getting porta-potties or are you looking for somebody at a higher level?
So we got some clarification around exactly.
What the request was, and it was determined that it was somebody in a senior level position, either from the city or from politically from the city or from the city bureaucracy, i.e.
the mayor or Steve Kanellakis, and that they were asking me to make bridge contact with them.
I contacted Mr. Kanellakis and arranged for members of our PLT To attend and have a discussion with him.
And then ultimately, I created that bridge and I believe they directly contacted after that.
So those were the initial events on or around.
Well, you asked if we could help refresh your memory by taking you to your notes.
So let's go to OPS four zeros.
Actually, sorry.
Three zeros.
One, four, five, two, four.
And I'm looking for February the 7th, but I'm not entirely sure what the patient number is.
Yeah.
So could we call up that document, please?
Yes, it's OPS three zeros, one, four, five, two, five.
Okay.
So my understanding is that...
Can we scroll down to February 7th?
Peach 25. I believe it's in the evening.
Thank you.
Keep going.
All right.
Maybe...
Let's try another way.
There's another...
I'll take you to an email.
464.
Thank you.
Now, if we go down to the very bottom, So this chain began as a request from Mark Patterson to John Ferguson.
First of all, who's John Ferguson?
John Ferguson is a staff sergeant within our organization.
And during this period, he was...
Assigned to be responsible and head up our police liaison team.
So, it started as a request from Superintendent Pedersen to Staff Sergeant Ferguson, and then we can go up and follow the chain.
Sorry, can I take an opportunity to read that?
Okay, go up.
So this is when you are added to the chain.
Okay, so does this help refresh your memory as to the date?
Yes, absolutely, February 7th.
My apologies, I said the 8th, it is actually the 7th.
Okay, and the events are essentially as you've relayed.
Can we keep going up?
Go down a bit, please.
Sorry, can I see the rest of that?
Go down, yeah.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Now go back up.
I think that's the top.
Yep, so it does explain.
So we came from Mark Patterson, as you said, on the 7th, and then you facilitated contact, and that happened on the 8th, right?
So my contact with the city happened on the 8th.
I don't recall what date the meeting actually occurred.
Right.
So that was your first involvement, and then you had more involvement.
Later, was it not the case?
A few days later?
So you need to be more specific.
I had it every day in this.
So I understand that on the 13th of February, if we could go to your notes now, it's OPS 3014525.
Let's go to page 64 of your notes.
Yes, page 64. So can you move up, please, just so I can see the date that we're discussing?
I believe the date is February 13th.
Okay.
Okay.
February 13th?
Yeah.
Okay.
So let's go to 12 p.m.
So it appears that there was a briefing in which you were told of a deal to move the trucks.
Do you recall that?
Yes, I do.
What can you tell us about that?
If you can go down so that I can refresh my memory.
Okay, if you can go down more, please.
Go down, please.
Okay, keep going.
Keep going, please.
Okay.
Now, I want to ask you, so in the previous page, page 65, there were some concerns noted around the logistics of moving trucks and that crowd filling, of crowd filling the neighborhood roads and so on, right?
So it wasn't crowd filling.
It was concerns that if we displaced a truck from...
Kent Street, say, and put it down onto Wellington that another truck would then occupy behind them on Kent Street.
Those were some of the early concerns that were identified.
So what was your role at this meeting?
I was there listening.
We were just being briefed as part of the executive command.
This is on the 13th.
I believe Deputy Chief Ferguson is, again, has responsibility of convoy operations, so I'm just one of the executive team who's listening and receiving this information to identify what actions we need to take.
Now, by this time, Deputy Chief Ferguson would have been back, right?
Yes, that's correct.
And so how did you become involved in this?
So I believe if we go up, it was an overall command-level briefing.
So if you can go up and I'll identify the people there.
Yes.
So a little higher, please.
Yeah, so Chief, he called the meeting this way.
He's not identified.
John Steinbeck's Christiane, you know.
Kathy Burns and Vicki Nelson are scribes.
Steve Box, who's the Chief of Staff for Mr. Kanellakis and Mr. Kanellakis.
So it's a command-level briefing for us.
I didn't identify Deputy Chief Ferguson, but I do believe she was present at this meeting as well.
So we understand that there will be evidence that later that day...
Is it Inspector or Superintendent Drummond?
Superintendent.
Superintendent Drummond met with the city and protesters to work out some of the details of the deal.
To what extent were you aware of those details?
So Superintendent Drummond was assigned to be the liaison back to the police because we would need to facilitate the movement of those vehicles.
So he was assigned by, well, I believe it was Deputy Chief Ferguson who assigned him to do that.
So that was my understanding of his responsibility.
So that was the first time we saw on this date that you were involved in any discussions.
Can you tell us what came of this and what was your role, if any, in the subsequent events?
So I didn't...
I was continually briefed.
I didn't have a specific role.
At this point, the Chief had ensured that Deputy Chief Ferguson was the single point of contact for the convoy operations, and I was responsible for things that included our enterprise project management change projects.
So I wouldn't have had any direct role in it.
Other than being present and helping to support whatever was needed of me.
Now, let's go to your summary.
We're near the time for the lunch break, so just if you could be sensitive to when's a good time.
Well, it may be a good time now and we can come back and finish it.
If it's convenient.
Yes, it is.
Okay, so we'll take the lunch break for an hour.
The Commission is in recess for one hour.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
The Commission is in recess.
Someone just asked, what's the scoop with Viva on Rumble?
Oh, Robbie, what's the scoop with Viva?
When is he coming back?
Well, I'm back now, but we're going live on the main channel and another live stream on Rumble in 11 minutes.
This might be on pause for long enough to hear Merrick Garland's live statement because apparently something's up in the interwebs.
So what I'm going to do is bring myself out of this.
I'm going to hope that this stays on pause for long enough.
So that we can listen to Merrick Garland give his public speech.
And I'm going to go live on the main channel for today's stream at 1.30.
So I'm going to bring myself out.
This will still be in the backdrop.
And hopefully this stays off long enough that we can hear Merrick Garland live.
And then when the inquiry comes back on...
My wife almost knocked over the lighting.
When the inquiry comes back on...
I'll take the headphones off so that that stream can continue and then we can continue going over the stuff that we have to go over today.
Okay.
Hope that's clear enough.
See everyone soon.
See everyone soon.
See everyone soon.
See everyone soon.
See everyone.
See everyone.
See everyone.
See everyone.
Thank you.
Order a lot.
The Commission is reconvene.
Okay, well, welcome back.
There's a bit of an internet problem.
It's not here.
It's the service provider, which means that we don't control it.
We're working on trying to get it joined.
We have two choices.
We can continue.
And all of our functions continue, the webcast and the access to the documents, but you will have not access on your laptops.
You may be able to tether to your phones, but that's an issue.
So the question is whether we should or should not proceed on that basis.
We can delay.
I'm looking for a consensus or a response.
I obviously don't mind because it doesn't affect me.
So that's what I'm canvassing.
If you could...
I'm told you have to introduce yourselves because they're having trouble in the transcripts when there's an objection.
Oh, and there's no objection.
Sir Brendan Miller for Freedom Corp., I can advise that the other internet connection works.
It's lack guests back.
Invites fully works.
It's just not the one that we typically use.
Very, obviously there's a lot of organization in the convoy, organizers.
So, if that resolves to everyone's satisfaction?
Yeah, Paul Champ, I can confirm that one's working.
So, there you go.
Thank you for that.
Good afternoon, Interim Chief.
Good afternoon.
So, just before the lunch break, I took you to the events of February the 12th, I believe?
13th.
And I took you to your notes.
Perhaps we could go there again.
OPS 3014525.
So you may remember that I asked you about this meeting you had at 12 o 'clock.
Yes, I do.
And it was a meeting in which you and your command teams discussed this deal that the city was entering into with the protesters, right?
That's correct.
Is it possible to get the notes up?
The notes are up.
The page reference is not there yet.
I apologize.
It's page 64. Thank you.
That's correct.
And I think you mentioned that you were there in a listening capacity.
No, what I indicated and what I would call is I was there as a member of the executive command team.
The primary responsibility was with Deputy Chief Ferguson.
But myself, I would have been there to help support in any way that was necessary.
Right.
Now, given that it was on the 13th of February, and we've heard some evidence that that was the date when the Integrated Planning Group was very close to finalizing a plan with the Superintendent Bernier, who was the incident commander at that time, right?
Are you aware of that?
No, I'm not aware of that.
You're not aware that they were working towards an integrated plan?
Absolutely, I'm aware of that, but you identified that they were about to finalize a plan, and I was not aware of that.
I see.
So, I guess one of my questions is whether at this meeting at 12 o 'clock, when people were expressing concerns, and we've seen some concerns noted in the minutes earlier, whether anyone brought, raised any concerns about how this deal might affect the plan.
Being worked on by the larger group, the integrated planning group.
Any concerns raised about that?
I don't recall that because I don't actually recall myself specifically being aware that by this point they were almost completed the integrated plan.
Okay.
And to the extent that anyone raised any concerns.
And again, if we perhaps grow down a little.
You remember that you read through this and there were some concerns noted, right?
Correct.
Did you share those concerns raised by others?
I'm sorry, I don't understand.
Did I share them with who?
No, no.
I mean, to the extent there were concerns expressed.
Did you agree with those concerns?
Oh, did I share?
Sorry, I misunderstood your question.
My apologies.
Can we move down in the notes a bit, please?
Keep going, please.
So I believe there are legitimate concerns that needed to be identified and raised in terms of how we would move ahead.
Yeah, so if we scroll up a little, for example, FEDs are moving into a state of engagement.
What does that mean?
I think one of the discussion points that we were having at this meeting is that the federal government was coming to the point, somebody had made the comment, not myself, but that the federal government was coming to a point that they were looking to engage in what was happening in Ottawa.
Okay, and if we go down, concern of logistics on how to move trucks, what was that about?
So the logistics specifically would be...
How do you organize ourselves to move the trucks?
Which trucks are going to move?
Where are they going?
Just the overall logistics of the movement of the vehicles from one place to another.
Now, you may not have been aware of the details of the progress of the integrated plan, but you were stepping in on the 11th and the 12th for Deputy Ferguson, and in that capacity, you were involved.
Absolutely, in terms of how the work that I understood that the work was coalescing between the integrated planning team, but I didn't have any indication of how far along they were with establishing a unified command and a unified planning team or how far along they were in actually completing the plan.
Would it have been important to understand how this deal fit in with the overall plan?
We've heard from Chief Party about the importance of ingredients fitting into the overall plan.
And I would agree with Chief Superintendent Party that it is important that these two activities mesh together.
But you don't recall any discussions at this meeting about those?
Those concerns being expressed?
No, no, no, I don't.
Okay.
Now we know that on the 14th, the next day.
Oh, by the way, maybe if I could take you to your summary.
So again, this is I think Mr. Clark will know the number better than I now.
So I want to take you to your summary at page 23, because this may also help refresh your memory.
Page 23. So if we go down a little.
So even though the meeting we just talked about was on the 13th, you learned about this plan.
To move forward with a kind of deal between the protesters and the city on the 12th.
On February 12th, Chief Slowly told Interim Chief Bell that the city was involved in discussions with the convoy leaders to have movement with the current situation and that the information was highly confidential.
Does that help refresh your memory?
Absolutely.
And I think we did cover off the content of that meeting earlier on the 12th.
Right.
So you were aware of the situation on the 12th and then on the 13th in the morning, sorry, at around 12th, we saw what we talked about.
Now, when did you notify Superintendent Bernier for the first time that these negotiations were going on?
So I don't believe that I was the one that notified him.
At the meeting on the 12th, as I indicated, we were told through the city and through the chief that these negotiations were highly confidential and that they shouldn't be shared.
So I don't believe it was shared until the 13th with Superintendent Bernier.
Right.
I understand the sensitive nature of these discussions, but wouldn't you agree that if anyone needed to know, it would have been the one responsible and had the authority for the overall plan, right?
And that would have been Superintendent Bernier at that time.
I would absolutely agree that we could have handled that notification better, and it should have been done earlier.
So when you became aware as the strategic commander on the 12th that this was going on, it would have been preferable.
That Superintendent Bernier be notified at that time.
Yeah, I would agree with that.
Now, that didn't happen and he found out later.
Are you aware that Superintendent Bernier expressed concerns about this negotiation?
Not directly from Superintendent Bernier, I don't believe, but I believe that Superintendent Drummond did indicate that to me in conversations we would have had.
Right.
Now, if I could take you to the interview summary of Superintendent Bernier, and the number would be OPS six zeros, and the last two digits would be either 30 or 40. Let me just confirm.
I'm told the new internet is slow.
Isn't it?
Could we try 30 and see if I have one in two chance of guessing right?
30, yes.
30, yes.
Oh, yes, WTS.
WTS.
Thank you.
So if we could go to page 17. So we see under the paragraph, impact of negotiations for the city.
On February the 13th, Superintendent Bernier learned that Mayor Jim Watson planned to meet with protesters to negotiate an agreement whereby some protesters would remove their vehicles from side streets and relocate to Wellington Street.
Neither the city nor the OPS executive had informed Superintendent Bernier of the negotiation.
Superintendent Bernier was concerned.
He told Inspector Springer that OPS should stay clear of the negotiation because political influence and political negotiation could adversely impact the police operation.
Yes, I do.
What is it?
It's the Integrate...
Command team.
It's the integrated...
So apparently I don't know.
I know what it represents.
It's a combined table of many different disciplines that come together to do collaborative and comprehensive planning around integrated event command table.
Right.
So Superintendent Bernier passed on those concerns to that group and to Superintendent Drummond, and he told Drummond not to get involved.
However, Chiefs Lowley ordered Superintendent Drummond to attend the negotiation as OPS representative.
Superintendent Drummond understood Chiefs Lowley to be directing that OPS attend the meeting and provide logistical support to the city in the negotiation.
Those concerns that were expressed, do they ring a bell?
Absolutely.
Yes, they do.
Do you share that concern?
The concern of Superintendent Bernier?
That's right.
No, I don't.
This is because, as we talked about, everyone has a role to play within the command structure.
There's strategic level decisions, there's operational and tactical lever decisions.
I think this, in my perspective, is clearly a strategic level decision that needs to be implemented.
There's a superintendent who's been asked to go to a meeting.
By the chief, I think it's very appropriate that that person attended.
The strategic level decision here for me is whether we support or not the negotiations, and that was made by chief slowly, so I believe it's Superintendent Bernier's responsibility to identify his concerns, raise those concerns, but then when this level of decision is made, look how we operationally and tactically implement that plan.
Now, perhaps you can help me understand in terms of Understanding what is strategic and what is operational and what is tactical, wouldn't it be equally arguable that negotiation is one component of operations?
Absolutely.
And so why is it a strategic decision?
So this was a strategic decision to be involved in this negotiation.
And I think...
It's more clear as you play it out.
So the strategic level decision here is to be involved in this negotiation to create the logistical circumstances for the trucks to be able to move.
It then moves to operations.
As this unfolded, operational commanders identified challenges in it, and it's my understanding that based on their decision-making at the operational level, it stopped.
That is the appropriate mechanism to follow through a properly integrated command team.
So what happened after the 13th was on the 14th, the movement of the trucks began.
And we expect that there will be evidence that the movement started at around 1 p.m.
And then the movement of the trucks ended sometime that day and did not resume.
Do you know why the OPS stopped facilitating the movement of the trucks from the residential areas to Wellington Street on the 14?
No, I do not.
Were you ever made aware of concerns expressed by the PPS, the Parliamentary Protective Service, about this relocation of vehicles?
Not at the time, but I am aware of them now.
If we move forward to the next day, the 15th, and if I can take you to document number OPS 3014455.
Now, these are the notes of Superintendent Drummond.
If we go to page...
And let's go to 11.20am.
Now, you see the reference?
Call from Steve Bell.
Direction.
Continue to provide safe...
Can you...
I'm not sure I can read that.
Safe passage for trucks to Wellington as per the city agreement.
With Freedom Convoy.
So he's suggesting here that he receive a direction from you to continue to provide safe passage.
Do you recall giving that direction to Superintendent Drummond?
Yes, I do.
Tell us about the circumstances.
Why you gave this direction?
So I believe this is in relation to...
This is in relation to conversations Superintendent Drummond and I would have had or been having during the day for him to arrange the logistical movement of this agreement that had been reached.
He had raised, he had identified with me that there was concerns from Superintendent Bernier specifically around, as I recall it, the political nature of this negotiation.
So this is the point at which I advise Superintendent Drummond.
Yeah, I understand there are concerns.
Continue to operationally move ahead with it.
And I think there's important context to this agreement that we lose the story if we don't actually talk about it.
So this is on the 14th that these notes are correct.
The 15th.
This is the 15th?
Yes.
The 12th and the 13th are the weekend.
The 11th, 12th and 13th are the weekend.
I remember that weekend having extreme concerns for the safety of our members, for the safety of our community based on the volatility and escalation in violence.
In direct confrontational interactions with our members as it relates to them trying to manage the area or conduct any enforcement in it.
It was concerning.
The situation at this point was becoming exceptionally more volatile and you could see it escalate almost on an hour-by-hour basis.
One of the components that What, for me, contributed to wanting to be involved in something like this is negotiations tend to take the temperature of the situation down.
That is exactly, in my opinion, what occurred in this circumstance.
I will absolutely concede we didn't notify Superintendent Bernier early enough.
We'll absolutely say that when it operationally became unfeasible to do it.
Superintendent Bernier made the call and that this stopped.
But you have to remember the time and place we were in, and this was becoming what was a dangerous city before.
This was compounding it.
So the fact that we were able to be engaged in a level of negotiation to take the temperature down, I believe, gave us breathing room through the next week for us to be able to successfully mount and execute our operation.
Who, as you know, was leading the integrated planning group in Ottawa.
We heard from Chief Party that he, the group, the integrated planning group, expressed concern on the 14th when they heard about these negotiations because, in fact, it raised concern for them that the unified command or integrated command was not truly integrated or unified because They were concerned that the OPS was still doing its own thing and not being part of the integrated plan.
What do you say to those concerns?
So those concerns weren't shared with me, so I don't know the specifics of the context of what Chief Superintendent Party would have indicated.
But you told us earlier about the need for autonomy of the operational commander, and that would be Superintendent Bernier now working in concert with the integrated planning group.
If there were to be changes in strategic direction, wouldn't it have been important to convey those directions, change of directions to the group so they could adjust and adapt their plan rather than having plan and then being told that something now different?
All together different now is happening.
So as I indicated earlier, yes, I agree with you on that.
There's many lessons we've learned through them.
How we integrate with the incident commander around something like this is one of those lessons.
Superintendent Bernier and the integrated planning team should have been made aware more early of this decision, as soon as practicable or possible of this decision.
That didn't occur, and I believe that was an error.
Now, so on the 15th, when you gave this direction to Drummond to continue to provide safe passage, the fact that you need to direct something to continue implies that something was stopped.
Did you not inquire as to the reason for why it stopped before you directed the continuance?
I don't recall, but what I...
What I can say is, yes, I would have.
We would have had a conversation with it because it's important that I hear their perspective.
So I don't recall that discussion, but it would have occurred.
And your direction to continue to provide safe passage, was that coming from you or was there any input from anyone else?
So is this on the 15th?
The 15th.
This is on the 15th?
Yes.
I don't recall.
Do you recall any discussions with any officials at the city?
On this day?
On this day or the day before?
I don't recall.
If you have a notation on it, maybe you can help refresh my memory.
We expect that Superintendent Drummond may say that he was under the impression that this could have come from the city.
I don't recall that.
Okay.
Fair enough.
And I think it's important to note Superintendent Drummond at that point would be speaking directly with the city as he was the logistical liaison involved with the city.
Right.
Now, in my remaining time, which is not very much, there are a couple of small things I want to cover off.
First of all, we've heard from some of the parties raising the issue as to why ticketing.
As a tactic or a strategy wasn't employed more as a way to deter the protesters from continuing in their illegal activities.
Now, ticketing is a bylaw function, but we also understand from the evidence that the city bylaw officers were listening to the OPS as the lead agency for what would or would not be appropriate.
Under the OPS Incident Command.
So what can you tell us about this strategy involving ticketing?
So because that was on the planning and operation side, I wouldn't have been involved in any direction that would have been provided to by law.
That would have come through the Incident Command, sort of the NCRCC.
So would probably be a question better directed to Inspector Lucas.
So I understand it's not part of your responsibility, but as a member of the executive, did you have any situational awareness of why certain things were done or not done?
And in this case, I'm interested particularly about ticketing.
More broadly than ticketing, I can tell you that there was officer safety concerns due to the number of resources we had in many of the different enforcement strategies that we were looking to engage in.
I would put the ticketing in with that as well.
So we were very clear with our members due to the volatility of the situation within the occupation.
Make sure you take into account your officer safety if you're engaging in any proactive enforcement efforts.
All right.
Next area.
Well, actually, back to one of the areas that we had covered.
I believe you mentioned earlier when I asked you about intelligence that the OPS planning decision was based on intelligence you're familiar with.
That would suggest that it would be a two day or three day event.
Are you able to assist us with any specific document that would lead you to believe that it was a two or three day event?
Absolutely.
So if you go to the Hendon reports, I believe beginning on the 22nd or 23rd all the way through to the 29th, I believe, there's references to, in the intelligence gaps, the 28th, 29th, and 30th as key dates that they're referencing in relation to the demonstration.
Now, my understanding from reading those reports when they talked about intelligence gap, and by the way, you can correct me if I'm wrong, but intelligence gaps just means we don't know about it, right?
So I would read intelligence gaps to mean we don't know and we need to put some effort here to collect this information.
Right.
So I remember, for instance, reading the January 25th Hinden report when it talks about intelligence gaps for those three dates, 29th, 30th, 30th, or maybe 28th, 30th, right, that I got the impression that what it was talking about was we don't really know.
Much about what's going to happen on these dates, rather than that these are the only dates we can expect the event will last.
Do you agree?
So can you ask the question again?
Right.
So when you're pointing to these dates in the intelligence report, I'm asking for your opinion, since you're the expert in this area, when they talk about an intelligence gap.
For, let's say, these three dates, 28th to the 30th, what do we understand from the intelligence gap?
Is it that we don't really know much about what's going on for these dates?
Or can we conclude from the fact that there's an intelligence gap for these dates that the event will not last beyond these three dates?
So I think in your question that you hit the crux of one of the challenges we faced.
Impression.
So there was a lot of opportunity to have subjective interpretation on it.
I think we've done a much better job as an intelligence community to come together and be more clear through conversations in terms of what we feel these different statements mean.
For me, it's important as we move ahead that you and I don't need to formulate an impression on what it is, that we actually have a clear, common understanding of how and what that intelligence means so that we can actually have a clear, common understanding on how we're moving ahead with it.
As I read those reports, my impression was that they were largely scaled around a three-day event with the potential and possibility that there could be people, a small group of people stay longer than that.
All right.
Now, we also spoke earlier about planning and who might have had the experience to help the OPS at that time.
Don't you agree that Superintendent Bernier actually had a great deal of experience that he could offer, but he wasn't really asked to assist at that time, during the early stages of the convoy events?
Again, that's going to be a question better suited for Deputy Chief Ferguson in terms of how Superintendent Bernier was utilized.
It is my understanding is that he did play a role in early days and played an increasing role as the convoy went through because, as I recall, when he was finally assigned as event commander, incident commander.
Major incident commander, my apologies.
He had to take some time off because he'd been working so hard in his other responsibilities.
I just don't recall what they are.
So that would indicate to me that he was being utilized.
All right.
I'm not entirely sure how much time I have left, but I have one area left.
So if I could take you to the witness summary again.
And this time we go to page 26. I want to ask you about the impact of emergency declarations.
So first of all, we know that the city declared emergency on the 6th.
In your view, did that declaration of emergency had any impact on the way the police operated?
Thank you.
Thank you.
So did it have any direct declaration of the state of emergency for Ottawa had no direct operational impact?
What I do believe that it did is it actually escalated the...
The understanding or demonstrated the escalated understanding to the community that we understood, the city understood the circumstances that we were in.
As the state of emergency is structured within the city, there are very few powers that would assist us in our police operations because we didn't have any large procurement needs.
What about the declaration of emergency by the province?
I would say absolutely that.
And when I talk about the benefits of it, I talk about it from a unified command perspective because I know that the EMCPA was mainly utilized around traffic and mainly utilized by our OPP partners as they developed that highway part of the plan moving ahead.
Okay, and then if we scroll up.
Sorry, screw it down.
So finally, any impact of the federal declaration of the emergency on the 14th of February?
Yeah, I believe there's probably four key areas that benefited us.
The first one is around allowing us to streamline the swearing-in of members coming into.
It's a challenging, sometimes cumbersome process that has multiple stages to it.
So the ability to not go through that process with many different checkpoints in it allowed us to more streamline and effectively create operational bodies with members coming in.
Secondary would be around tow trucks.
So the tow trucks...
Real or perceived was always a challenge for us.
I do understand that in the planning, the integrated planning team had identified a number of tow trucks to come, but they hadn't yet begun.
I think the Emergency Act took away any of those barriers.
The third area would be around the financial investigations, mainly conducted by the RCMP.
And for me, the main benefit that it provided to us was it created a very stable, solid, legal framework for us to be able to operate within to ultimately carry out our takedown.
It allowed for us to very clearly articulate to our frontline officers what their powers were and what the legislative...
The framework that those were based around so that they can understand what to do and how to execute it.
I'm sorry.
I thought you said there were four areas.
That was four.
Oh, that was the four.
Okay.
And the time is up.
So thank you very much, Interim Chief.
Those are my questions.
Thank you very much, Mr. O. Okay.
Thank you.
If I could call on the council for former chief slowly please.
Thank you, Chief Bell.
I'm Tom Curry for former Chief Slowly.
Good afternoon, Mr. Curry.
Just a couple of, if I can get your help for the Commissioner on a few things today.
Just going back, if I could, to the pre-convoy period.
So prior to the convoy issues and just a couple of questions about the Ottawa Police Service.
We have had some other...
Evidence about the circumstances of the service and the strain on resources prior to the convoys arrival.
Did you also experience that?
Most definitely.
I think it was very real for us.
Through 2021, we hadn't had any new hires come in for attrition or for years of past growth that we hadn't achieved.
So as we came into 2022, we were in a deficit position in terms of resources.
So even before we had something that was taxing and overwhelming, we were deficit in terms of resources.
Subsumed in what you've described, but we understood that you had lost some experienced personnel to retirement.
Absolutely.
I've heard testimony as the Commission has gone on around the excellence that Ottawa Police had had in planning, and I truly believe that.
We managed large demonstrations, large...
We've had large protests over a number of years with our partners, and we were seen as one of the best at it in the country.
There was a lot of expertise built within our organization.
Most of that expertise had been lost to retirement.
But beyond that...
We had a two-and-a-half-year window of pandemic where there was no major planning that was occurring.
And beyond no major planning, there was no major exercise of planning by our members to be able to practice what we do.
So we had a less experienced team and a less experienced organization as this unprecedented massive event came at us.
Was there also...
Prior to the convoy, an incident in the city of Ottawa or in or around the city of Ottawa that concerned a large industrial area and an explosion or fire called Maryville?
Yes, that's correct.
So there was an industrial area, Maryville, which is in southwest end of our city, where there had been a large explosion.
A number of people had died through it.
And as a result of that, we'd been involved.
Our partners with the fire department to be involved in incident management of that event.
Now, I raise that because there were, during the time that you, the senior command in the service during the time of the convoy was Chief Slowly, as you've described, Acting Deputy Ferguson and yourself.
You had worked successfully on other incidents under incident management systems, including at Maryville.
Is that fair?
That's correct.
I would also add to the Senior Command CAO Blair Dunker.
She's also part of our team.
Thank you.
And there were, as I understand it, no issues prior to the episode that we'll come to talk about in terms of the convoy.
No issues in the way the police service was functioning at the Senior Command level in relation to Incident Command.
Is that fair?
I believe that's fair.
And as between...
In terms of you and Chief Slowly, you had a good, productive working relationship with him and with Acting Deputy Ferguson.
We've had a professional relationship, absolutely.
You told the Commissioner that there were command meetings amongst that group that you just described every morning, including during the convoy.
Yes, those meetings came into effect.
They would have been in effect for probably two years at that point.
During the time of the convoy, it's no exaggeration to say that at the Ottawa Police Service that it was truly all hands on deck.
That is absolutely not an understatement.
Leaves and time off were cancelled?
That's correct.
Shifts were extended?
Yes, but I think so.
The way the question's based is around the command team, and I think it's very important to extend it well beyond that.
We had members of our organization working long hours in very extreme weather and doing an exceptionally professional job.
So I would never want to leave the perception that it was an exclusive hardship for any one group like the command team.
Our membership was out there every day trying to resolve this.
And that's what I should have been clear.
That's what I meant.
Beyond the command team leaves, as I understand it, whether they be holidays or for any other reason.
Perhaps other than illness, were cancelled for your members across the entire service.
Everyone was required to stay on duty effectively.
Absolutely.
And when we speak about shifts being extended, with the Ottawa Police Association, the service reached an accommodation to provide the resources that it needed to get through this protest.
Yeah, we reached an agreement to...
Lengthen the shifts and reduce the number of platoons that we had in order to be able to make more resources available throughout the day.
Understood.
Now, as you have told the Commissioner, I anticipate that your colleague, Chief Slowly, will say that this protest represented a paradigm shift in the way protest is understood.
In the sense that you've described the leverage, leveraging the community for the protesters.
Do you agree?
Well, absolutely.
And that's what I was trying to articulate this morning.
Absolutely.
It was a paradigm shift that we saw in terms of protesting in our city and across the country.
And therefore, in your opinion, a national security threat?
I don't think I'm in a position to identify whether it's a national security threat or not.
I can absolutely say it was a paradigm shift in how protests were conducted, how members in those illegal occupations engaged with our community, but there's specific intelligence that would be brought in that would be identified as national security threat or not, and that was monitored and managed throughout the protest.
In terms of intelligence, you told my friend Mr. Au that within the intelligence directorate, there were members of your team who did receive the Hendon reports.
You were not on that list at that time, but your colleagues.
We're including them among the other pieces of intelligence that they used.
Oh, absolutely.
Right from the first Hendon report, that was integrated and sent to our intelligence unit and our planning team.
So the information that was contained in there was known to our organization and, I believe, disseminated properly.
And it came in through your directorate, and the idea was to try to make certain to the extent that...
It could be, to the best extent it could be done, to send into Acting Deputy Ferguson's planning efforts.
Well, it is actually, as we look at the tracking, it was simultaneously sent into both areas.
Could I please just have your help looking at that plan that was, I believe, dated January 29th.
So this is for the registrar, OPS.
Five zeros, three, five, three, one.
Other witnesses have seen this and you've I think you told us while it's coming up that you saw it, but at the time it was it was presented.
Thank you.
Now, could we look, please?
Just scroll down if we could.
I want to get your help.
First of all, the plan approvals are there, but just go through to the threat assessment.
I think you've told us that there were, to the best of your team's knowledge, This was expected to be a weekend event with the possibilities,
you've told us, that some people may hold on afterwards, but the number of those people was not considered to represent a material threat that required that something be done differently with this protest.
Is that fair?
So, yes, I believe that's accurate.
We had the intelligence and information to form out that this would happen over a weekend and that there was the possibility that a small group of people beyond may stay in the city beyond that.
And there was an egress plan, I think, or an egress section.
I've left my bound one there.
Maybe my colleague can just pass that along and I'll get you the exact page.
But meanwhile, Mr. Registrar, we can scroll down.
You'll see the heading.
Thank you.
What I want to show you, thanks so much, is section 3.2, please.
It's under the heading event stages.
Do you see that?
And just I'll let you just have a look at it, but I want to.
Shhh.
You'll see it's three stages, ingress demonstrations.
The purpose of the event is for participants to express their lawful opinions and so on.
And then three, egress.
It is expected participants will leave the city at different times depending on their personal intents.
The egress period could continue for an extended period and this stage will continually be assessed and reassessed to determine the appropriate supports that are required to manage.
Does that refresh your recollection that it was thought that it's a large group of people, they're not all going to go at the same time, they'll go over a period of time, and we will assess that as it unfolds?
So, yes, that's accurate how the plan was developed.
And then finally, just if I could ask you to look with us at 3.6.5.
Do you see contingency staffing for a prolonged event?
Due to the unknown nature of this event, staffing will be revised.
This may be a typo there, but should the operational period be extended, staffing plans would include resources in the following order, and they are...
set out there.
So there was, again, some thought given to the possibility that this event may be prolonged and additional statuses.
staffing needs could arise.
Is that fair?
Yes, that's fair, based on this section.
Now, so far as...
You knew from your contact with Superintendent Abrams, and you told us about the role that he played and that you played.
So far as you knew from him, you should not be doing anything differently than you were doing.
Is that fair?
No, there was no...
Well, so I think he raised a couple of concerns as it went along.
concerns about deployment of OPP members, a number of concerns that we went through this morning.
But in terms of, are you speaking specifically in terms of the plan?
Yes, he raised no concern about the plan.
No, I didn't receive any concerns from him.
And in terms of the role that Superintendent Abrams had, He was the Strategic Operations Lead, OPP, and he asked you to be, in effect, a conduit of information to Acting Deputy Ferguson.
I don't think he asked.
I think we identified between the command team that I would play that role, and that Superintendent Abrams would contact me, and then I would then either try and resolve the issue or have conversations with Deputy Chief Ferguson.
At the time that the convoy participants began to enter the city of Ottawa, you believed, and fair to say that OPS Command believed, that they were dealing with people who intended to protest lawfully?
That's correct.
And that the resources that OPS had available to it...
Would be adequate to meet the needs of the community to protect the community and, of course, to allow the protesters to protest safely.
Is that fair?
That's correct.
Now, beyond the OPP and Superintendent Abrams, would I be right that there was no intelligence brought to your attention from any source that alerted you to the scope or the scale or the duration?
Or the degree of disobedience and criminal behavior that you experienced?
Absolutely.
Now, of course, had any intelligence come to your attention in the days, even the few days prior to the convoy commencing, I think you told my friend Mr. Au, you would have faced a significant challenge with the resources that the OPS had available.
That's correct.
And like I said this morning, and I would want to reiterate it, what we didn't see in any of the intelligence, what was never brought to our attention was the actual activity that the protesters were going to become engaged in.
All the way across Canada, through almost every policing jurisdiction in Canada, they were monitored, travelled with, and always lawful, and always acting in pro-social behaviour.
So there was no indications to us about the activity that was going to happen.
The number of commercial vehicles, trucks in particular, that came to the city would have presented a significant challenge in terms of logistics as to where they could be diverted without cooperation from the operators.
Is that fair?
I've contemplated this.
I believe that it would have taken the scale of operation that we would have had with the number of resources and the detailed planning to remove the protesters that we did over the weekend of late February to divert them from coming into the area.
So it would have been a massive undertaking.
It would have been on scale with what we had to execute at the end of February.
That's what I wondered, and you could provide the commissioner with assistance in this respect.
Put another way, had the protesters adopted the perspective and defiance, I'll use that word, that they demonstrated in refusing to leave when requested to do so towards the end of January,
Plus, I suppose it was maybe closer to 1900, service personnel would have been required to manage them prior to their arrival in the downtown core of Ottawa.
I would fully agree with that.
And indeed, would you go further to say that some of the extraordinary powers that were used as available to be used as a tool would also have been required?
in the event that they resisted cooperating with direction or lawful orders.
That's difficult to say because that's not a plan we ever contemplated.
So we didn't actually get to the planning perspective of that, but it would have been a massive undertaking with massive planning requirements and massive resource requirements to undertake keeping them out of the downtown core.
There was no time to have drawn the plans that you're talking about or to have made the resource requests of the OPP, RCMP and other municipal police forces in the short time that you had available prior to the protest arrival in Ottawa.
I would say that there is always time to do planning.
We would have been under tight restraints.
It would have been very challenging, and I don't believe we would have had the level of detail or specificity.
I think the big challenge would have been trying to access resources without having the level of plans that we know we should have to be able to bring resources in.
One of the things the Commissioner has heard is that there is perhaps a fair question about whether Resource requests should proceed ahead of plans or plans should be in place before resource requests.
In this case, do you agree that once the protesters arrived and you saw what you were dealing with, as you've described it, that the most urgent thing that this city required was resources?
So I think there's a balance to that question.
I think you absolutely need the plans to be able to drive the specific resourcing requests that you're going to have.
The type of specific skills that you're going to require.
But the other side of it is you also have a responsibility as a leader in an organization to make other organizations aware that this request may or is coming, regardless of the specific skills you need.
So I think it is actually a parallel track that you can travel down.
And so in the case of Chief Slowly...
You support the idea that he was making requests of his policing, your and his policing partners, for the, in this case, 1,800 personnel that were reasonably expected to be required to deal with the protest?
I think it was reasonable for Chief Slowly to place all of the other chiefs, and ultimately, at the end of the day, chiefs across Canada, on notice that we were going to need a large number of resources.
And in terms of that, I appreciate you were present with others at a meeting where Chief Slowly requested the team to assemble the information that would allow that number to be known.
It turned out to be 1,800.
Do you accept that your team and the Ottawa Police Service made a good-faith effort to define the resources that were needed, actually?
Absolutely.
I think we made the best faith effort we could.
What we lacked at that point was the detailed level of planning to actually indicate the type of resources we needed.
So we were putting best efforts forward while we were building or starting to build plans that ultimately were taken over by the integrated or developed by the integrated planning team.
Right.
And the numbers and specific roles actually map on...
Reasonably closely, don't they?
So I can't comment on that because I wasn't involved in that.
Fair enough.
Can I get your help on this?
So far as you know from the meeting, and I've seen your notes, there isn't a note of this, just to orient you to that.
You didn't make any note that Chief Slowly said, fix a number and then double it.
That's not the method that he chose to follow, is it?
I don't have a recollection of that.
Thank you.
Now, so far as...
A couple of other things, if I can.
Just to, again, make sure I get this right.
I understand the Ottawa Police Service, or perhaps the city, has an arrangement with the government of Canada to provide policing services in and around the parliamentary precinct.
That are beyond the parliamentary police services, and that there is an MOU or another arrangement by which the Government of Canada pays the Ottawa Police Service the sum of $3 million for those policing services?
So the Ottawa Police Service is the police jurisdiction in the City of Ottawa.
So short of security...
Details that are done within the Parliamentary Precinct, which the Parliamentary Protective Services is responsible for.
So security, primary response.
The police is still the police jurisdiction within that area and all of the City of Ottawa.
So if there's a major incident, we will assist in response.
If there's a criminal investigation, the Ottawa Police Service will be the ones that conduct that investigation.
So as part of the...
The responsibilities that we as the police jurisdiction in the City of Ottawa undertake, which isn't just response in Parliamentary Protective Services, which is demonstrations that would impact us directly because we're Canada's, the nation's capital.
The need for us to be engaged with embassies and have a different level of response or different level of training as it relates to diplomats in and around our area is something that we've come to an agreement with the federal government to compensate us $3 million a year for extraneous costs such as Canada Day or other events.
Right.
Understood.
Is that under review after the...
After this event?
Yes, it is.
A couple of things about incident management systems, IMS or ICS, incident command systems.
You mentioned that that was a process that is well understood and had been used in the City of Ottawa by the Ottawa Police Service.
So within the City of Ottawa, they would use the provincial standard of the incident management system.
Policing traditionally uses the incident command system.
Gold, silver, bronze for major events that has been adopted by the RCMP and been utilized in some circumstances by the OPP.
So there is a hodgepodge.
There is a bunch of different doctrines.
They basically boil down to a very similar set of circumstances.
You have strategic level control, operational level control, and tactical level control.
And you described to the commissioner that the border zone between strategic, Strategic decisions, operational decisions, and tactical decisions, these are not bright lines.
No, it's something that I believe is really important within every area to have those discussions with the commander up and down to make sure that everyone's clear on where the decision-making's made.
It's something that I believe is worth undertaking to make sure that we can create better.
In this case, prior to this convoy protest, I understand that you, Chief Slowly Acting Deputy Ferguson, had functioned, I think you told us earlier, in the incident command system effectively, right?
That's correct.
There was no, you didn't have an experience in which...
Someone was intruding or thought to be intruding on operations or tactics from the level of strategy prior to this?
So what I would say is Chief Slowly was regularly involved in reviews and revisions on operational plans.
I can't recall him ever giving directions around it, but he was very engaged in what could be seen as lower-level responsibilities.
Right.
And his involvement in those matters was not considered to be problematic.
Is that fair?
I think that's fair.
And, for example, I understand one of those...
Might have been the Black Lives Matter protests that occurred in the aftermath of the death of George Floyd in custody.
That was a major demonstration that we managed, and I have no recollection of any challenges within our command structure.
And to the extent that when we came to this unprecedented protest here brought about in the convoy, that...
Chiefs slowly, and probably others, were facing unprecedented circumstances that strained the ICS system as well.
Yes, so unprecedented circumstances, immense levels of stress, very clear expectations on outcomes, and all of those together.
Did strain the ICS system and actually for me identified that there needs to be much better clarity, at least within the Ottawa Police Service, around how that system manages.
That's exactly why when I took over as interim chief, I spent time making sure that everyone understood their role within the ICS system.
And is it fair to say that from your long career in policing that...
This is unlikely to have...
The circumstances here facing the Ottawa Police Service in the City of Ottawa would not have been handled any differently by any other municipal police service?
I think that's difficult for me to say because I don't know how other police services would have handled it.
Okay.
PLT.
At the time of the convoy protest, am I right that there were 14 members...
In the Ottawa Police Service PLT, and I appreciate they're part-time members, that included two sergeants?
So I don't know about those numbers specifically.
National Framework on Demonstrations is a framework that, prior to the convoy protests, am I right, you were not familiar with yourself?
So that's the CACP National Framework?
Yes.
I had reviewed it, but to call myself familiar with it, And the PLT, the work of the PLT in this case included a couple of aspects that you, I believe you did become involved in.
You've told us about a couple of them.
Can I just get your help with them?
The issue of The fuel stored at Coventry.
You recall that?
I do.
Am I right that what the PLT team had negotiated was the removal of fuel that was stored at Coventry and they wished to allow it to go downtown?
To the protesters who were using that fuel to operate their vehicles.
So I'm generally familiar with what occurred there.
Actually, I'm quite familiar with what occurred there.
But in terms of the specifics about what the agreements were, it would be unfair for me to comment because I don't have enough knowledge in that area.
That's fine.
Can I get this from you that you spoke with Staff Sergeant Ferguson, who was then...
Running PLT or on the ground in respect of PLT concerning an issue that had arisen about enforcement, that Superintendent Patterson took enforcement steps to intercept the conveyance of the fuel.
Do you recall that?
Is there a notation that can reference that that I can familiarize myself with?
Yes, sure.
So the easiest place for us to find this...
I think in the time that I have is to look at Staff Sergeant Ferguson's summary in his interview, if I could show you that.
It's in your notes also, but let me just see if I can find the reference to Staff Sergeant Ferguson's statement.
that I have.
Which I don't have.
I don't know what I did with it.
Hang on one second.
I do have.
Mr. Registrar, forgive me for the delay.
WTS 5-0-27.
And could we go to page seven, please?
Coventry Road, do you see that?
Yep.
Yes, I do, sir.
Yes.
Scroll down.
So if I can just read the first paragraph?
Yeah, yeah, by all means.
It's the stuff that I'm interested in a little later, so I could probably spare you this part, but there's a reference to your conversations.
If we could just scroll down, please.
There it is.
Just try 440.
Do you see it on February 6th?
Yes, I do.
Superintendent Patterson advised.
Staff Ferguson.
would be seizing fuel.
And there was a conversation between Superintendent Patterson and Staff Sergeant Ferguson.
I see that.
Staff's next paragraph.
Attempted unsuccessfully to convince others in the OPS not to proceed with the public order operation.
And Inspector Marin.
I told him that the fuel was not to leave.
And there at 510, that's what I'm interested in, Staff Ferguson contacted Deputy Chief Bell and advised him the enforcement operation would undermine PLT's negotiation, which had been proceeding for two hours.
Staff Ferguson informed Deputy Chief Bell protesters were compliant.
At 518, Deputy Chief Bell contacted Staff Ferguson, informed him he agreed with Superintendent Patterson's decision.
Later that evening, Staff Ferguson learned Deputy Bell supported Patterson's decision because three convoy vehicles had left Coventry Road and were transporting fuel to supply protesters downtown.
Does that assist your recollection?
The footnotes, I think, might go to your notes or his notes, but there are some notes of yours I could take you to.
But does that assist your recollection?
Yes, I do recall this conversation.
And this is an example, isn't it, of PLT negotiating something that...
Did not fit with your strategic direction that fuel was not to go from Coventry Road fuel depots downtown where it would presumably present an even greater public safety risk.
Is that fair?
I do believe that's fair.
But I also do believe this is the right call in this circumstance.
But I also think that as we went through and as we managed through this incident, we needed to ensure that we gave PLT better direction, better guidance, better structure so that they could be more effective in their work.
We can't create public safety hazards with it.
And I would assume in this case that PLT would not have known where it was going, would not have known that it was going to create a safety hazard like this.
We have to find a way that we balance the use of PLT with enforcement efforts.
And this is an example of where we probably weren't that effective.
Although, wouldn't it be an example of PLT not...
If they didn't know where it was going, that's its own problem.
Correct.
Right?
Correct.
And there's some other information.
I think the commissioner might hear that they did know where it was going.
So if they...
When we speak about, or when the Commissioner hears about PLT autonomy, do you agree that the PLT could never operate completely autonomously because, for example, they might come to a conclusion that lies in the opposite direction of strategic direction from those who have more information, like, for example, you in this case.
Is that fair?
I think what this highlights to me is that one of the areas that we failed was, or one of the areas we were not as effective as we could be, failed is too strong of a word, is in our alignment of PLT within our overall operating context.
This type of...
Confrontation is probably too strong a word, but this type of disagreement around what is occurring wouldn't happen likely, I don't believe, if we had better common understanding of what we were achieving and how we were moving ahead.
So for me, this is one of the things in terms of lessons learned that we have to take very, very seriously.
And I can tell you we have taken it seriously.
PLT needs to be aligned and integrated and help to drive the operations because they are hugely important.
No disagreement.
I think Chief Slowly will say the same thing.
When it comes to specific examples, just like with the strategic, operational and tactical, there are not bright lines.
There has to be good communication between PLT and operations.
Is that fair?
There has to be good communication so that a circumstance like this doesn't actually ever exist.
There were other examples I've seen in the record.
I'll give you one.
Do you recall a circumstance in which PLT negotiators wanted to bring porta-potties, portable toilets, into the red zone or into the protesters with no quid pro quo, just as a sign of, I suppose, a sign of good faith?
And that was a decision that was not shared by, or a goal or objective that was not shared by the strategic command.
Does that ring a bell with you that that negotiation took place?
So I do remember that and I do remember advocating for that.
And I do understand that it was going to be about bringing porta-potties in where there wasn't anything.
Immediately in return, but for me it was about part of those small gains that you could actually make so that you could build relationships so that in those relationships you could look how to lower the temperature and also look for a resolution.
So absolutely, I do recall that.
And running the other way was incredible community anger.
You were dealing with angry residents.
I wouldn't describe them as angry residents.
I think we were dealing with residents who were hurt, who were harmed, who were victimized, and who wanted this to end.
They were angry, but that wasn't the emotion that I would explain first off when we describe our community during this period.
Fair enough.
I'll take the description that you gave.
They were suffering.
They were suffering.
And you and Chief Slowly...
Deputy Chief Ferguson and everyone in the service was trying to do their best in good faith to help resolve this problem.
Absolutely.
Now, one small thing.
Did you ever go to a BIA meeting with Chief Slowly as part of the community outreach during the protest?
I don't believe so.
Okay.
You told us that...
That in a public statement, at least, just dealing with public statements, Chief Slowly did not promise or declare to the public that he was going to close bridges, only that that was something that would be considered correct?
So if we're referencing, and I believe it's the February 4th statement?
Yes.
that was caused concern to Superintendent Abrams.
No, it's not my recollection or upon my review those were the statements.
The statement was that it was something that we could use if needed.
And in the same way, can I ask you about the statement that Chief Slowly made that there may not be a policing solution alone to this protest?
That statement...
I expect the Commissioner will hear, was made at a briefing of Council and Police Services Board, at which you were also in attendance, that lasted many hours.
Do you recall that meeting?
Not specifically.
If we could have some reference pulled up to it.
It is a multiple hours long briefing, February 2. And indeed, you and Deputy We're allowed to leave to get back to work after I think about the three and a half hour mark.
Chief Slowly was asked to remain to answer questions.
But does it refresh your recollection to know that at that meeting, you and Deputy Ferguson spoke about the steps and Chief Slowly spoke about the steps that were being taken to initiate enforcement activity.
To protect the community and stabilize the circumstances that residents were experiencing?
So I'm going to apologize, but no, we had many between board meetings and council meetings.
We had many, many meetings during the period.
So to be able to recall specifically what occurred during one of the meeting, I would need some sort of reference point.
Okay, I won't.
I'll take...
I'll leave it there.
Suffice it to say that it's a fair conclusion that the policing solution that was required to be implemented to deal with the convoy protest involved more resources than the Ottawa Police Service had.
And additional statutory or government action in the form of the emergency measures that you told my friend about.
Absolutely.
Now, then, a couple of things, if I can, quickly, and maybe the last thing based on my time being up.
The Superintendent Abrams told us that he brought to your attention a number of issues from time to time.
Is it fair to say that you exercised your judgment as to whether you would take those issues to to chief slowly or not?
They didn't all go to chief slowly for example.
Absolutely.
Okay.
I have no other questions for you.
Thank you chief sir.
Thank you.
Next call on the City of Ottawa.
Good afternoon, Alyssa Tompkins, Council for the City of Ottawa.
Good afternoon, Ms. Tompkins.
Interim Chief Bell, I want to start by having a quick chat about intelligence and planning.
And I've heard you mention a number of times today the behaviour that was not anticipated was the behaviour of the protesters in relation to the community, the actions vis-a-vis the community.
To clarify for the record, what are the behaviors that were unanticipated?
So the general dynamics of what our community and ourselves were experiencing in that location.
It included honking of horns incessantly, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
The idling of the vehicles.
Much of the engagements that we saw between our community members and members of the protest, whether it be intimidating, hate or biased crime, behavior, assault of behavior, the feeling that people were trapped within their residence, within the place that they live and couldn't move around unfettered.
It was almost constant conflict between the members of this community and people that were occupying our streets.
Thank you so much.
And on the issue of the potential closure of Wellington Street, am I correct that the reason command requested a legal opinion on the ability to close the streets is that they had never closed Wellington Street or downtown before to protesters?
So you'll have to help me because we sought many legal opinions through this and we have sought many legal opinions since, specifically around Wellington Street.
Are you speaking of the January 28th?
Correct.
Correct.
In terms of why was the legal opinion obtained in this instance, and I'm just asking whether it's because it was not the general practice of the police to close streets to protest in Ottawa.
So it...
And I think it's an important point of clarification.
The police alone don't close the streets as it relates to protests.
That's a cooperative.
It's actually under the city manager's delegated authority to be able to close those streets.
We give recommendations and help assist them.
So it's unfair to characterize it that it's the police that close the streets.
But it was a practice that we hadn't largely engaged in prior to that.
So we wanted to make sure that we were getting the best legal advice around what potential steps could be as we...
We had this group come in and then as we moved forward.
And I agree with your characterization.
What I was getting at was indeed the practice.
So it was not a practice that was generally engaged in, had it been engaged in the past?
Not to my recollection.
Thank you.
Now, my understanding is that you were present when the city solicitor, David White, I've provided a briefing on the possibility of obtaining an injunction.
Are you able to provide me a date and a reference to document?
It would be January 30th.
We can bring up, I was going to lead into another point, but we can bring it up, OPS 404878.
Thank you.
Thank you.
At the very least, you received this email of the command briefing, am I correct?
Yes, that's correct.
Okay, and I just wanted to highlight some of the concerns that Mr. White had put forward.
If we can go to page two.
And I just note about the third bullet down, he noted that...
Injunction normally associated with labor disputes, then two down from that, how the injunction will be enforced will be important to outline.
Then if we can scroll right down, right at the end.
Sorry, was there more points on there?
No, I was just going to ask you to confirm that these were, in fact, concerns that Mr. White brought to your attention, to OPS's attention.
Okay.
I'm good.
You can scroll down.
And the last few points I wanted to highlight were that an injunction is a more assertive step and that it might aggravate the situation.
That's a concern that you are familiar with?
That's a concern that was raised by Mr. White, absolutely.
And that the injunction might give a platform or an outlet to protesters?
Another concern he raised, for sure.
And if we can now go to document OPS, I think it's...
Four zeros?
Maybe five zeros, four, nine, two, seven.
Maybe four, sorry.
These are scribe notes, if I'm not mistaken.
Is that correct?
If you can go...
If you can go to the bottom, please, I'll be able to tell you.
If you scroll right to the bottom, I think there should be a notation there.
You can go back to the top.
So I'm not sure whose notes they are.
Okay.
Do you remember a briefing?
Two, the RCMP and the OPP.
It would be a Teams meeting on January 31st.
Can you scroll down?
If we go to page three, it's indicated SB.
Yep.
Yes.
Do you think that's you?
That is me, yes.
Okay.
Thank you, that's what I was looking at.
I just wanted to, if we can scroll up now to page two.
Here, if we can stop here.
Again, talking about an injunction.
So I believe BL, is that Commissioner Luckey?
Yes, I believe so.
And it states concern if injunction, now it's an official movement to another stage.
This will involve the whole country.
Anything official will spark a national response.
Do you recall that concern being expressed by Commissioner Luckey?
I do recall that.
And if we can scroll down a bit further, we have TC.
Is that Commissioner Karik?
I believe that's Commissioner Karik.
And concern with the junction, you would have a legal obligation to enact it.
Continue to build for, I believe it's supposed to be in junction, mass arrests and then removal of.
And I believe there's a comment above.
I apologize.
I missed it.
The fifth bullet, BL is spot on.
Must remain cautious.
This is local.
Careful not to become national or international.
Then if we can go down to page three, BL again.
Third bullet, de-escalation, negotiation, up to legal for injunction, but better not to have it.
Do you recall Commissioner Luckey saying that?
I don't recall her specifically saying that, but if it's in the notation, I would imagine she did.
okay and then we'll just go to another document uh ops four zeros five one nine four And this is another command briefing.
You received this command briefing?
Yes, that's on February.
Sorry, this is the, can you tell me what date this is?
This, so it's sent February 1st, but I believe that it's referring to events on January 31st.
Thank you.
And if we can just go to page two, one bullet after, or sorry, after the redaction, if we can.
Here we have what I believe to be a summary of the call, which confirms that both Brenda Luckey and Tom Karik did not seem to be in favor of going the injunction route, and that's what the OPS took from that briefing, correct?
That's correct.
Okay.
Now, I just want to talk to you about the negotiations between the city and the protesters, and if we could just bring up OPS 00008418.
And I'm not sure whose notes these are.
Are you aware?
Potentially scroll to the bottom.
If you go right to the bottom, there should be a name on them.
No, I'm unfamiliar whose notes these are.
Okay, well, we'll go to them and see if it refreshes your memory.
So on page four...
Again, there's a redaction, and then it says, and this, I believe, follows the correspondence that Commission Council took you to, where there was an exchange from John Ferguson to Mark Patterson, and then you followed up.
And it states here, redaction, one of biggest advocates, organizers, demonstrators, negotiating with PLT members last night, going to be meeting with Steve Kaye, with Citi, wanted to meet with him.
Wind situation, told will be some trucks that will be moved.
So the idea that trucks would be moving came from the police, not the city.
Is that correct?
So just for my clarification, these are notes of the 9th?
I believe it was the 8th.
The 8th, yes.
I'm sorry.
I messed that up before as well.
Yes, that's accurate.
Okay.
And if we can go back, I see Superintendent, it says Bell.
We'll have update in two seconds.
I believe that's you.
Yes, that's correct.
And then we get an update from Superintendent Patterson.
Steve K. assigned to work with PLT members to negotiate with TM.
I assume that's Mr. Kanellakos.
I don't believe we assigned him.
I believe that he indicated he would.
Agreed.
I was more making a little joke.
Okay, so then we're going to follow through.
So in terms, we'll go down to your notes, and those are at OPS 3014525.
And just in the interest of time, Your evidence is that on the 12th, you got an update from the former Chiefs Lowly about the city's negotiations, and it was told to you to be highly confidential?
That's accurate.
Okay.
So that's accurate.
I need to see my notes in order to verify that it was on the 12th.
I don't recall the date.
We can go to page 52, just quickly.
So here we have, this is a meeting with the chief.
If you want to scroll up and see that it's the 12th, we can.
Yeah, that would be appreciated.
Yeah, no problem.
Thank you.
Yeah, so this is the quick.
Update that you got from the Chief.
Then if we can skip ahead to page 64. And this is the meeting at noon.
And I just wanted to scroll down a little bit.
This isn't the same day, I don't believe it.
No, you're quite right.
It's the next day.
Is this the 13th?
It is the 13th.
I apologize.
This is the meeting at noon on the 13th.
So this is, if we can just scroll down, one thing I want to keep scrolling.
The comment here, Premier is very supportive of the action.
Do you have any recollection of who said that?
I don't have recollection of that.
Okay.
And then if we can scroll down a bit more.
Two core scenarios.
What is the outcome?
Of the new footprint, are we able to take out the remainders?
Do you recall this being discussed?
Yes, I do.
Okay, and then if we can just go down.
This is a briefing from the Chief, and is it just you and the Chief at that point?
I don't recall.
It's coming from the chief, though.
It's coming from the chief.
I don't know.
There would have been other people involved in this, but I didn't know who they were.
Okay.
And it's clear from the direction from the chief that you've noted is to maintain our concept of operation.
That's correct?
That's correct.
Okay.
Now, if we can just scroll down a little bit more.
We have another meeting at 2.30.
This you're starting to get into more of the logistics?
That's correct.
Into some of the activities that need to occur in order to be able to make this happen.
And under number four, there's an arrow that says Elgin to Lion is what is being looked at?
That's correct.
And then it says at something footprint.
Can you assist?
Looking looked at.
Poor attempt at an at symbol.
Okay.
And then there's Rideau and Sussex is being developed, but the next bullet says looking at how we can manage a reduction of the footprint.
Is that correct?
That is correct.
Now, there's one other meeting that I didn't see in your notes, but I'm going to take you to because I think you were there.
It refers to Bell.
So it's OPS 3011039.
And maybe these ones are scribe notes.
Can we check the last page?
No, I don't.
Sorry.
We've been unsuccessful on everyone.
I believe they are scribe notes.
Okay.
This is the 13th now?
Yes.
February 13th.
And if we can go to page six.
And if we scroll up, we'll see the notes are from the...
There's a...
Oh, there's Vicki notes in the scribe.
If we can scroll up.
We'll just see that there's notes from the call with the city at noon.
Then it appears there was a call with Commissioner Karik.
And then there appears to be another discussion, the one I'm interested in, on page six.
And it says, negotiating update meeting.
And this is where, if we go about seven bullets down, we see Bell.
All indications that the city got through the negotiating.
The group is trying to separate from the other group.
We do not expect backlash.
Can you explain what that meant, if you can?
Yes, so one of the concerns as this unfolded was...
As I indicated earlier today, there were many pockets and different groups within the overall occupation.
One of the concerns was that if a number of people moved, there could potentially be backlashes from others that didn't want...
Didn't want that to occur.
And again, I'll go back to this is a time from a context perspective that there's much higher, there's an escalation in tensions within the group.
There's more violence that we're seeing on the street, particularly relating to our members.
So it is a much more volatile time.
So we were looking to make sure that something like this or trying to anticipate whether something like this could spark something internally.
And then Deputy Chief Ferguson says, this does not change the operation.
We can make this work to our advantage.
Do you recall that?
Yes, I do.
Those remaining behind will be there by their choice.
John, this is happening at 3 p.m.
John Steinbeck, I assume.
Now, after the redaction, we have Bernier.
Is that Superintendent Bernier?
That would be Superintendent Bernier.
So when my friend put to you that there was no discussion with Superintendent Bernier, Superintendent Bernier about how this worked with his plan.
We actually see here, there's a meeting with him and Superintendent Bernier says, the plan aligns with what we planned and accelerates it, no concerns.
Do you see that?
I do see that, but I think there's clarification that needs to happen around this.
We had our first briefing on this potential deal on the 12th later in the day.
This is on the 13th at the point at which we would have informed Superintendent Bernier.
So this is later.
There is a lag and a gap between the time that we knew and the time that we brought the incident commander up to speed.
But there is a discussion here about the plan.
And at the time, he expresses no concerns about how it's going to work with his plan, correct?
Yes, absolutely.
And in the end, the agreement...
Unfortunately or fortunately, the fact is the agreement did not have an impact, not have the impact on reducing the footprint that it was intended to.
It did not reduce the footprint as was intended, but did lower the temperature.
And the move had very little impact on operational planning.
That's going to be a question better asked to Superintendent Bernier.
Okay, but I'll just put it to you in your witness summary.
That was your evidence.
I don't believe it had it, but the actual impact on operational planning would better be quantified by Superintendent Bernier.
Thank you.
I just wanted to contextualize that statement.
So thank you so much for your time today, Chief Bill.
Okay, thank you.
I could call on the Ontario Provincial Police at this stage.
Good afternoon, Superintendent.
Christopher Diana for the OPP.
I'd like to start by asking about the Hendon reports.
I believe your evidence was that you did not start receiving them until, I believe, January 27th.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Of course, you would acknowledge, as we've heard from other witnesses, that OPS as an organization was, in fact, in receipt of these reports, basically from the inception of Hendon.
Oh, absolutely.
We were a partner and a very engaged partner in...
Project Hendon did receive all the reports widely within our organization.
Right.
And so I think from Superintendent Morris's evidence, I think he name-checked around six individuals that were receiving them.
There were a couple of others that were referenced in Superintendent Drummond's witness summary.
So there were at least eight members in OPS that would have received these reports, correct?
I don't know the specific numbers, but beyond the numbers, what I can say is that they did go, from my review, they did go to the chief of police, they did go to intelligence, and they did go to our event planning.
So they were widely distributed and disseminated in the organization.
All right.
And if I heard your evidence correctly, I believe that...
When you started to receive them, you didn't go back and read the earlier ones.
So was that your evidence?
That's correct.
From the 27th moving forward, I did daily review them.
I've had the opportunity since then to go back and review the entirety from the 13th on.
Considering the nature of the reports, do you think maybe in retrospect you should have went back to review the earlier reports?
Yes, I think that could have been beneficial, but I think it's also very important to realize that is an analytical document that one of my responsibilities would be to make sure that it was properly brought into the organization, properly reflected and analyzed, and then put into the operational planning people.
It's always a benefit the more eyes you get on something like that, but it wasn't absolutely necessary for that to happen to ensure that the information was brought in and shared within the organization.
Right, although that was your bureau at the time, correct?
You were in charge of intelligence?
Well, that was one of the areas within my command, correct?
One of the things that you said in your evidence-in-chief, and you may have repeated it since then, was that there was no intelligence to indicate there would be any significant community impact.
Was that your evidence?
I believe my evidence was that it wasn't reflected within the Hendon reports, the activity that the protesters would engage in that caused the community harm and community violence that existed when they got here.
There was no reference to that within the Hendon reports.
Okay, I wrote down significant community impact, so maybe I misheard, but that was my understanding of what you said.
You would agree that the Hendon reports did make reference to certain things such as...
As early as January 20th, there was reference to no exit strategy in Hendon reports, correct?
I'm sorry, I missed.
There was...
Sorry, as early as the January 20th Hendon report, there was reference in that report and subsequent that there was no exit strategy for the protesters, correct?
That is correct.
And the reports also referenced that the protesters would not leave until their demands were met, correct?
Yes, but I think it's important to put that in the context of it does reference those statements within the Hendon reports, but there are many, many statements within the Hendon reports.
Was that there?
Absolutely, it was there.
Sure, and the demands that are articulated include the demand that all mandates would end.
That was what the protesters were, at least according to Hendon reports.
That's why they were coming to Ottawa, correct?
Is it possible to pull that Hendon report up so we can review it specifically so I can see that reference to make sure I'm getting it correctly?
Well, what I've done, and to try to save some time, is to refer to the Hendon summary.
Superintendent Morris prepared a Hendon summary, which may be useful.
So if we can go to OPP 349.
All right, so this is a, rather than try to bring up a bunch of different reports, this was a summary put together by Superintendent Morris that reviews some of the relevant excerpts from the Hendon reports.
So if we can go to page three.
All right, so there's some points here that...
Sorry, just a moment.
I did have a concern.
If you could just identify yourself again.
Yes, I'm sorry.
David Mijakovsky, Counselor for the Ottawa Police Service.
I had some concern when this document went in that it's a summary of sentences that are taken out of context.
I believe what the witness asked for when he was asked the question is, it would be helpful if I could see the full report.
So rather than give him an extract which has selective pieces of information, why not give him the document that he asked to review so that he can fairly answer the question?
Well, maybe I misunderstood, but I thought the question or the request was, and the witness will answer, that he wanted the actual words of the report.
I didn't take him to say he wanted to see each of the reports, but that's up to the witness.
I would prefer to see the reports, Your Honour.
The point that I'm trying to make, because I don't have the control number for every single of these reports to take it to, nor was that my intention.
My intention was to put to you that there were a number of items in these reports that are already on the record.
I don't need to go through each one, in my opinion.
And if you'd reviewed them, then you would probably remember the fact, as you testified, that they do indeed say there's no exit strategy.
That is one of the things the report says, yes.
The protesters may disrupt the workings of government.
So again, I go back, yes, it does indicate all of these, but as we've had the discussion, there are other statements in there as well, and it's the balance of the interpretation of the entire report that is important.
It's the growth of the report, and please don't hear me say that I don't absolutely appreciate all of the intelligence and information that was provided through the Hendon report.
But to take individualized statements through it, I think, doesn't really reflect the flavor of the intelligence that we were receiving.
There was also statements in there that said they would be completely lawful in all ways.
There were statements in there that said there was going to be a million people arrive in the Hill.
There was other statements as well.
So I think it's the entire context of the Hendon report that's very important to evaluate.
Right.
I could take you to other statements that talk about the potential community impact.
Well, my point is this.
There's enough information in those Hennon reports to show that collectively, all those statements taken together, even in that context that you speak of, there's enough in those reports to paint a clear picture that there could very well be significant potential community impact.
The potential was there, wasn't it?
I would disagree with that.
There is no reference throughout the documents that look to identify the specific activity that occurs.
I think the closest thing that the Hendon report would have within it to identify what could occur is the fact that the groups coming together could be very unpredictable.
I think that mob mentality and the...
Well, that's my point.
You wouldn't expect an intelligence report would specifically identify every single community disruption that could occur, right?
No, I wouldn't, but there wasn't any information included in the Henda reports that specifically or generally talked about the activities that were going to occur in our city.
And I think one of those is there was no reference to any intention that the community would be used as a leverage point within these protests.
Even the large number of people and vehicles, and while those numbers did fluctuate, it did indicate it would be a large number of both vehicles.
Absolutely.
And varying numbers as it went along, 100%.
It did indicate a range of numbers that, as the collection of intelligence came and moved along, was able to be refined up to what would have been the 27th, where numbers were starting to be reported, and they were more accurately reflected on the 28th.
Now, I understand that is a very difficult task for an intelligence gathering.
Group to do.
This was an extremely fluid and dynamic situation and I truly believe the intelligence gathers and collectors did an amazing job in building the system as it went along and refining it up to and including putting a reliability index as we continued through and having numbers.
put into those reports as we got closer to the date.
An extremely difficult task, and I don't want you to hear me being critical of the hen Right.
So I just want to make sure I understand your evidence.
And as I understand it, your evidence was that the intelligence did not set out significant potential community impact.
The intelligence didn't identify that there would be the type of behaviors that we saw demonstrated in our streets.
It didn't bear it out.
All right.
You also indicated that your planning was predicated on a weekend-long event, correct?
The intelligence reports, as we identified them, specifically spoke on a regular basis and an increasing basis about the activities that would occur on January 28th, 29th, and 30th.
As we read them and as we saw them, we identified that to mean that there would be specific incidents, specific...
demonstrations and activities around that weekend and that beyond that, there could be a small number of people that remain, but that was the main focus.
Actually, that is what bore out within our streets.
Most, many people left.
On the night of the 30th that decreased a number of people within our city.
So that was accurate.
What we didn't have was an accurate prediction of the footprint that would remain or the activities that those people were engaged in.
All right.
Can you point out the report that indicates that we're only going to stay for the weekend?
Because I'm not aware of that.
So you've continually said that it was predicated on a weekend-long event.
I'd like you to point me to the source of that intelligence because it's not in the Hendon reports.
So the Hendon reports regularly discussed weekend activities, planning, and in fact, on several reports, you can identify in intelligence gaps activities for the 28th, 29th, and 30th.
There is several different examples where that specifically is what is referenced.
Correct.
The reference to intelligence gaps simply means that the intelligence did not know exactly what was going to happen on those days.
There's no reference that they were going to leave after that weekend, correct?
So, as you've indicated around the behaviors that occurred, it was not that specific that those were going to be the only demonstration days?
That is correct.
Right.
And part of, I think, what you said earlier in your evidence-in-chief, you talked a lot about experience, correct?
Yes.
And certainly it's acknowledged that OPS for many years has responded to protests large and small.
And I believe your evidence was that experience did play a large part in your planning for this event, correct?
So if you're talking around about intelligence, I think the experience that I was talking about was the experience in engaging and dealing with the groups.
Nobody had any experience in dealing with the Patriot movement in terms of a large-scale demonstration.
We were the first.
And from that experience, we've seen other jurisdictions adapt and interpret the intelligence somewhat differently.
I would put to you that your planning was based more on what you thought would happen based on your experience more than the actual intelligence you had at your disposal.
So I think it was, I would submit to you that it was both.
We do have a plan around experience that we did execute in terms of allowing vehicles into that footprint, in terms of managing how we would look to manage what would be a small number of people that would remain in a localized area in the downtown core.
That was the experience package that we brought into this.
That wasn't what bore out.
And that's why I say in terms of interpreting intelligence, it's always extremely important to be able to balance the experience Right.
And you would agree that the operational plan should accurately reflect the intelligence, correct?
I would agree with that.
And would you also agree that the operational plan prepared by the Ottawa police service for that weekend made no reference to Hendon, did it?
If we can pull it up.
Sure, it's OPS 3531.
Was that the redacted one?
One second, we'll pull up the other one.
The OPS operation.
OPP 4262.
Thank you.
This is a document I believe my friend had up earlier.
That's not it.
Sorry, that's not the document.
Go back to the OPP 4262.
And if you can scroll down, this is the operational plan, correct?
My friend took you to this earlier?
That is correct, yes.
Okay, so if we go down to the index, I believe it's page 6. Or maybe it's page 4. Go up to page 4. Okay, scroll down.
Keep going.
Further down.
Keep going.
Okay, it's right there.
Stop.
Where it says threat assessment, if you could just scroll down a little bit and allow the witness to take a look at that.
And when you look at it, I'll be asking you whether or not there's any reference to the Hennon reports or whether or not there's any reference to the fact there was no exit strategy, the potential long-term stay as referenced in the Hennon reports.
The reference is that there may be interference with the operations of government and those other things that I brought out.
but please take a moment just to just to scroll through and take a read of that okay you can move you can scroll down thank you
so So, I absolutely agree there isn't reference to the Hendon Report.
I wouldn't specifically expect there necessarily to be references to the Hendon Report in that area.
What I can tell you is I know that the Hendon Reports, as you indicated earlier, were received by these groups and used in developing the threat assessment and in developing the plan.
And I also do acknowledge that it is a gap.
That there is no reference to the potential of the convoy lasting longer than the three days.
When it comes to planning, you know, you can kind of hope that something may turn out a certain way, but in policing, you always need a contingency, right?
Yes.
I asked Deputy Chief Ferguson whether or not she agreed with my proposition that this plan was not intelligence-led, and she agreed.
With my proposition, do you agree that this plan was not intelligence-led?
I believe I would agree with you that this plan was intelligence-led, that the intelligence provided was actually shared with the planners, was properly brought into the organization, assessed, analyzed, and adequately shared to be assessed and developed into the plan.
Okay, so you disagree with Chief Ferguson then?
Deputy Chief Ferguson.
Yes, I do believe and through all the review that I've done on several points and frequently identify where there's references between the planners and the intelligence group to actually look to access intelligence that exists.
So I do know that that existed.
I do know the planners were very conscious and cognizant of intelligence and making sure that it was put into this plan.
So even though it doesn't reference Hendon and the various attributes that I pointed out, you would still say it's intelligence-led?
Yes, I do believe so, yes.
All right.
Thank you.
No further questions.
Next is the Government of Canada.
Oh, it wasn't intelligence-led.
Oh, mamacita, this is painful to listen to.
I'm not sticking around for too long.
Just want to come in because I was walking the dog.
Listening to this guy talk about, oh, he's talking, the intelligence didn't report what they saw on the ground by way of crimes.
Good afternoon, Chief.
Do tell.
I am Robert McKinnon, counsel for the Government of Canada.
You were the intelligence, head of the intelligence directorate at the end of your position there, and you spent several years in that directorate.
Is that correct?
No, that's not correct.
I was the deputy chief in charge of intelligence information and investigations from December 2021 to up until the point that I was assigned as interim chief.
Who trusts this guy?
Prior to that, I was the chief administrative officer for a year.
Then prior to that, I was in the community policing command.
What I'm getting at is how many years of experience in the intelligence area have you had, would you say?
20. So my experience is at the lower levels within drug investigations and intelligence.
Where I had a number of years of experience.
And then as I've gone through, I've had different command positions within the intelligence director.
How many years, sir?
How many years?
So you would have reviewed, apart from the Hendon reports up to January 27th, you would have reviewed intelligence reports coming concerning the convoy in mid to late January before it arrived.
So, no.
As I indicated in my evidence, I started to receive the specific Hendon reports on the 27th of January.
God, if we hear the Hendon report one more time.
I would be briefed on intelligence reports from my command.
Okay.
And at the time you started receiving those reports plus the Hendon reports, There were conflicting reports on the number of vehicles and people coming to protest.
There was a wide range of reporting on who would be coming to the city for sure.
And how long it would last as well.
Absolutely.
And would you agree that the nature of intelligence generally is that it is seldom black and white.
It's more fluid.
It's dynamic.
Oh, I would agree with that.
And then you have to assess the intelligence as best you can with others and other perspectives.
No, that's absolutely not true.
You never have to assess.
I would agree with that.
And in the intelligence reports that you had received, the later incidents of horn-blaring criminal activity...
And hate-based incidents that occurred were not captured in these initial intelligence reports.
They weren't captured because they didn't exist.
I would agree with that.
I don't think they were captured in any intelligence reports.
Because they didn't exist?
And according to your summary interview, there was approximately 3,000 to 4,000 vehicles that the OPS was expecting to arrive in that first week.
3,000 vehicles?
Correct.
That's correct.
As it drew closer.
And as you have said in your interview summary, there was limited organization within the Freedom Convoy overall.
The organizational structure was extremely challenging because it was non-existent.
That's not what he asked you.
There was pockets of different groups.
I think as the convoy and as the occupation moved through the weeks, it began to coalesce a bit.
There was some leaders that could have been identified as we move along, but that's part of the negotiation challenges that we had was there was many different pockets of leaders with many different perspectives and many different ideologies.
You mentioned 8 to 10 different groups representing 50 to 100 different political agendas, correct?
That would be accurate.
And that the OPS found it hard to identify any one particular leader or group who could speak for them all.
That's accurate.
And you were also aware that there were former police and military members as part of the convoy participants.
That is accurate.
And that they had raised a significant amount of money through...
Crowdfunding platforms such as GoFundMe, later on Give, Send, Go.
That's accurate.
And you were aware of some warnings concerning participants in the protest.
And in that respect, you were taken to a document earlier, which I'll make quick reference to.
It's the intelligence assessment by Sergeant Chris Keyes on January 29th.
The OPS...
Moyu says this is the Canada version of the U.S. January 6th fake trial.
Yes, but no.
Because this is actually adversarial.
This is actually bipartisan.
There's actual cross-examinations.
People with diverse adverse interests cross-examining the other.
And if you could go to page 5. Let's see here.
And under loan actor concerns.
You go down to the heading just below the middle.
Lone actor concerns.
Let's hear it.
So you can see there it says, as the end becomes larger and larger, OSINT, that's open source intelligence, correct?
Open source intelligence.
Is revealing the occasional and not unexpected online instigators, lone actor instigators, who advise others to use violence if encountering police barricades.
Is that correct?
Online.
So it went from at the protest to online instigators.
On page six, there's a warning.
Well, that was the warning.
You want to know why there was no violence there?
At the top.
The veterans would not have allowed it.
The third bullet point, the open nature of this event, coupled with the high concentration of attendees, may further add to the potential appeal among certain individuals who may embrace extremist ideologies.
Who may have had extremist ideologies, may have potential.
So, there are some...
That's not a warning.
That's not a warning.
To be worried about.
Is that correct?
Oh, yeah.
There were some notations here that raised concerns that we should be looking for.
Some main potential online.
You mentioned in your summary that as January 30th progressed into Monday, OPS was not prepared for what developed into an occupation.
It soon began from a protest to an occupation.
Is that correct?
When did it become an occupation?
When?
As of what date?
What minute?
With elements demonstrating lawlessness.
What types of lawlessness?
Parking their cars?
Correct.
What type of harassment?
Yes.
What type of intimidation?
And threats to Ottawa residents and public officials.
Lie?
Yes.
Maybe to public officials.
There probably were some.
I just want to mention one thing that you...
You said with the convoy coming initially that you did try to keep out large tractors, farm equipment that could have posed difficulty.
Is that correct?
You kept those, tried to keep those out from the Corps.
That is correct.
However, there was a huge crane that made it into the Corps that was sitting right next to the Prime Minister's office.
You know what that crane did?
That crane hung a flag.
So I wouldn't characterize it as a huge crane, and I'm not trying to minimize what it was.
It was so dangerous.
It was actually a boom truck that had what would be a much shorter boom than what a crane would have and a flatbed back on it.
It was extended and had a flag hang from it and was used as a stage.
I expect you'll hear evidence, if it hasn't already come out, if I remember, that it was right outside the top window.
Of the Prime Minister's office.
Liar!
It was on the street of Wellington, right outside the office of the Prime Minister.
What a liar.
That's a liar.
You mentioned a few areas in questioning of powers under the Emergencies Act, the Federal Emergencies Act, through its regulations that were instrumental in assisting the police to...
Resolve the situation.
Do you remember earlier in your testimony?
Yes, I do.
Okay.
And those powers were instrumental to the OBS in ending this occupation.
So I don't think I use the terminology instrumental.
I don't believe that's the words I use, but they were absolutely of a benefit to allow us to end this occupation, and we're widely leveraged.
You do mention...
You did mention four areas.
I'll just mention, I think there may have been one that was missed, so I'll just mention three quickly and that come from your interview summary and you can just confirm or not.
One very important power was the authorization to create an exclusionary zone, both the four zones that were used and the red zone, correct?
That is correct.
And which, to your mind, was the most important power because it allowed OPS to stop the movement of more people into the downtown core when it came time.
Is that correct?
It created a very clear legislative framework that was clearly articulable to our members as to their powers to create the exclusion from that zone.
How did he just say?
And it allowed OPS to create a stable atmosphere.
In advance of launching the operation to clear the downtown core.
That is absolutely true.
Had we not been able to limit or stop the flow of pedestrians into the area, it would not have created the stability that we would need to launch the operation.
And I think part of that stability is what led to the safety that we were able to use while we did it that resulted in a very low, small number of injuries.
And it allowed the OPS to execute this operation slowly, deliberately, and safely.
That is correct.
With flashbangs, pepper spray, batons.
It also provided the power to freeze financial accounts, which you made mention.
This is also under the Emergencies Act regulations.
It was not a regulation, it was an order, a directive.
And that provided an incentive to convoy participants to leave voluntarily.
That provided an incentive.
But it also deterred others who may have been thinking of coming downtown from coming downtown.
The unconstitutional overreach provided an incentive.
I don't have any direct examples or knowledge of that, but it seems to be that it could have provided a deterrence factor for people.
And the PL teams used this power in advance of the enforcement action to try to shrink the footprint.
of these protesters, demonstrators in the downtown community.
So I think you're specifically referring to a letter that our police liaison team members handed out that specifically referenced the authorities and powers under the Emergency Act.
So yes, that's right.
So you're saying that the risk of freezing of bank accounts.
I'll take you to that in a second.
In the absence of a corridor.
That's what I'm referring to.
Both in a media release and in a leaflet.
So it was justified.
I'll refer you to them in a second, but that's exactly what I'm referring to.
And you also learned of others whose accounts were frozen, who left downtown, after which their accounts were unfrozen.
Is that correct?
That is.
I don't have specific examples, but that's my knowledge.
These questions are just ridiculous.
Okay.
And the other important...
One of the other important powers that you've touched on before was to make it possible for the OPS to obtain the tow trucks that were absolutely essential in order to move these trucks, correct?
It removed barriers or seemed to remove hesitation for people to actually be cooperative with us because they were directed to...
Yeah, because they were just following orders.
It's amazing how that makes it easy for people to break...
...that they had no trucks.
To convince other tow trucks drivers to drive because of threats and because of damages that they might incur.
And so the indemnity provisions of the emergency regulations also eased that aspect in convincing and compelling these tow truck drivers.
Immunize the banks from behaving illegally.
Indemnify the truck drivers from behaving illegally.
It's amazing how when you indemnify and hold harmless people, they'll do all sorts of things that they would otherwise never do if they had to suffer the consequences of their actions.
I'd like to refer to OPS 00014438.
It's the February 18th iteration of the integrated plan.
Yep, federal government is trying to cover their A's.
At page 5. The footprint.
The footprint of the protest.
At the bottom of the page.
Get to it.
Short attention span.
So you see where it says, as a result, and this is dated February 18th, but this is an iteration of...
As a result, delivery of information, education, and enforcement response was led by the police liaison teams.
Do you see that?
Yes, I do.
And the subsequent response was based on a negotiation approach with the primary objective of voluntary dispersal from the participants who continue to protest and occupy a number of areas in the downtown court.
Get out before we come in and pepper spray you.
And so that was to reduce the footprint to make it easier for the officers to...
Enforce with whoever was left.
Is that correct?
That's correct.
We wanted to have as many people voluntarily leave, knowing that there was going to be an imminent police action, so we could shrink the footprint as much as we have and have less people to remove.
Okay, the last point there, it says, on Wednesday, February 16th, a media release was provided further notice to demonstrators.
And this is the one that's also in the pamphlet.
It has the same points.
So if you go to the next page...
Sir, am I able to reference what document is this?
This is the integrated response.
Trudeau.
You want most to testify.
Justin Trudeau.
Concept of action plan approval.
Trudeau, he's not testifying.
In here, there's nine bullet points.
We've made reference to some of them already, but these are the...
This is what was handed to the demonstrators, correct?
These points, these bullet points.
It's also in this media release as well.
So the first bullet point deals with the criminal charges.
That's provincial.
The second point deals with vehicle and property may be seized and removed.
That can be both provincial and the federal, if that includes the tow trucks.
It says an article from the BBC.
Your driver's license may be suspended and the certificates may be suspended.
That's provincial.
And then the next four.
Encompass federal emergency regulations.
So your personal bank accounts may be subject to examination and restriction.
If you bring a minor to an unlawful protest site, you may be charged.
That's specifically in the emergency regulations.
Do you agree?
Yes, but the only...
Clarity I would provide is around point number one, you indicated that the criminal offences would be provincial.
That would be because the criminal code is a federal piece of legislation.
It would be federal.
Sorry, federal.
Sorry.
Trudeau is scheduled to testify.
They don't have a date.
Regulations under the Emergencies Act here.
So that's what I'm distinguishing, that in this pamphlet, there are a number of these warnings and facts given to the protesters that come directly from the emergency system.
Yes, I agree with that.
All right.
Bringing fuel and other supplies, that also is encompassed by the essential provision of goods as well.
That's encompassed by emergencies.
We don't want this inquiry to dismiss this move.
And again, persons traveling to an unlawful protest site to participate or support an unlawful demonstration.
That also comes from emergencies regulation.
And the last one, that's from the provincial regulation.
Regulations, but it also is encompassed with the federal regulation, which added more sites.
It added parliament and government buildings to that.
Is the lawyer testifying?
Like, lawyer, why don't you just sit down and say what you want to say?
Just see if you'd agree with this statement that there was no realistic expectation that...
Negotiation through the PLTs, as much as they are useful and helpful, would have led to the voluntary dispersal of all those demonstrators.
How about negotiations with the Prime Minister?
There was no indication in any of the efforts that we had made that that would be a way that we could successfully negotiate the end of this after 20 days of occupation.
Where was Trudeau for 20 days?
And you agree that the illegal occupation in Ottawa was having not only a direct, deleterious effect on the residents of Ottawa, but was also acting as an example, an incentive and an inspiration for other illegal protests and blockades that were popping up around the country.
Clip that, share that.
I don't know that I could make the nexus that it was Ottawa that caused...
Others have said more interconnectedness.
For instance, Superintendent Abrams said one event had an immediate impact on another.
Would you agree that areas...
It was an inspiration.
International inspiration.
You know, in Windsor, Fortier, Emerson, Coutts, Surrey, among others.
I absolutely agree there was an interconnectivity between all of the protests that were occurring.
My exception that I was taking was I don't know that Ottawa was necessarily that they were doing it because Ottawa was still existing.
I think there was absolutely just an interconnectedness between all of the movements that were being undertaken at that point.
But it was the prime location.
It started in this.
Would you agree?
It was the first and it was the largest.
That's right.
And it acted...
Would you not agree as an example to others?
It did.
I agree.
He doesn't want to.
I would agree that it was the first and it was the largest and that people watched what occurred here.
And Trudeau knew it.
You said it.
You said that the volatility of the situation in reference to Ottawa, correct?
Correct.
It's lawyers.
Subpar questions.
These other pop-ups that had in similar fashion to Ottawa, maybe not to the same extent, provided an escalating situation across the country concerning these type of protests.
Thank you.
That was it.
Easier than negotiating?
Suppress it.
A good time for the afternoon break.
It's 4.30 for the afternoon break.
People may need to stretch their legs.
So we'll take 15 minutes and come back in 15 minutes.
Now what I want to do while you guys do that...
I am going to go...
Did you see me squirming?
Oh, hot mic, did you see me squirming?
Who just said that?
That was Steve Bell.
What did we just see?
Hold on, hold on, hold on.
I can actually back up here.
Am I on YouTube?
Go to live.
Go live.
Okay, here, hold on.
Hold on, I'm going to cough.
I think actually that's where it was just fine.
It might be in my line of sight.
I'm listening.
I'm listening.
Okay, here we go.
Am I hearing myself?
This is...
Okay, so hold on.
I'm just going to go back and see what was caught on the hot mic there.
How do I rewind 30 seconds?
Now you're all watching me futz around while I...
Here, hold on.
I'll bring it back in a second.
Remove.
Listen to this.
Now we're...
Now we're watching.
Now we're watching.
Here.
Okay, now we're watching me watch me.
What does he say on the hot mic?
People may need to stretch their legs.
So we'll take 15 minutes.
Did you see me squirming?
Now what I want to do while you guys do that...
I am going to go...
Did you see me squirming?
Oh, hot mic, did you see me squirming?
Who just said that?
That was Steve Bell.
Okay, I think we can stop.
We can stop watching me, watch me, react to me from in the past.
That was the witness say, did you see me squirming?
Who did he say it to?
What did we just witness?
Is it, you know, I might be making it more exciting than it is because what else are we going to do?
Go to Chrome tab.
It's here.
And then the public hearing is here.
Okay.
So I'm going to go to the Rumble chat.
Oh, this.
Almost 2,000 people there.
Re-mini-boomer, pure genius, Pete Santilli responded.
Did you see me squirming?
I'm looking at the chat in Rumble.
Who did he say that to?
He would not have said it to the judge.
He would have said it to his lawyer.
Or maybe to the government lawyer.
Anyhow, if anybody knows.
Oh, did you see me squirming?
Maybe he had to go to the bathroom.
Maybe.
This is Chris T says, what the hell is with you hair?
Nothing.
It's all here.
Now, I did, I'm not, I'm going to rag it.
I got to probably brush it, wash it, fluff it, blow dry it.
Can you actually appreciate what the government's attorney was just trying to get at there?
No one is going to doubt for a second that invoking the Emergencies Act absolutely allowed the government, through coercion and violence, to suppress the protest.
No one's going to deny that.
No one's going to deny that.
Freezing people's bank accounts, causing them to default on mortgages, allegedly.
Causing their banks to call in loans, allegedly.
Freezing their ability to pay for gas, mortgage, food.
Nobody's going to deny that that allowed the government to, with a fist of fury, with great envy for the basic dictatorships of China, suppress the protest.
Nobody's going to deny that.
You'd have to be an idiot to deny that.
The question is, was it a national emergency warranting of such draconian measures to suppress a peaceful protest?
That's the issue.
I don't want to use any too hyperbolic of analogies.
Coming in with, you know, paddy wagons, busting it, that would have done it as well.
The issue was, was it, were there no other means through which to end this protest?
And they say, after 20 days?
Oh, your PLTs, your provincial liaison teams, they weren't getting anywhere with the negotiations.
Of course not, you idiots!
Because they were protesting federal mandates, not provincial ones.
Oh, so negotiating with provincial liaison teams didn't resolve the protesting of the federal mandates?
Oh, I'm sorry.
Is that maybe because the provinces didn't have the authority to negotiate for and on behalf of the federal government that had imposed these mandates?
Makes sense.
Why are there so many sex bots in here?
Like, who's...
Block user?
Goodbye.
sex but by the way don't don't click on those links people Chinese-style protest suppression coming from Jacob Castro.
Oh, and the boom.
That boom, by the way, I would have called it a boom as well, was right in the middle of Wellington, right in front of the Terry Fox monument.
You could not have hung from that cable and thrown an arrow beat to hit a parliamentary office.
I mean, it was in the middle of the street.
And it was, at most...
Let's see if I can find my own footage.
I know a lot of people are saying, you want me to be there testifying.
I'm not on the list.
I don't think I can get on the list.
I'm still trying to get on the list.
Viva Frye, Ottawa, day one.
I want to find day one.
I want to find day one.
If anybody's able to find me day one of the protests of my documentation, interviewing the counter-protesters, it's quite funny.
I know my streams did very well.
Despite the viewership, I can't find them.
Viva Frye, live from Ottawa, police crackdown.
That's Viva on the street.
Police crackdown would not be the last day.
Counter-protesters would definitely not be the last day.
Oh, I'm an idiot.
I could just go to my...
I could just go to my...
I can go to my channel and then just go by chronological.
Sometimes it's just so stupid.
Okay, everyone, you can't see what I'm doing, but I'm just going to my video feed and I'm going to go chronologically.
Because ich bin ein stupid Berliner.
Manage videos.
And I'll just go back.
It's going to take a few minutes to scroll back.
So enjoy my pontificating face.
Okay, let's go here.
So many.
Oh, I have to go to lives because they were live.
Okay, let's see how many pages of live streams I have.
I only have 991 live streams on the YouTubes.
Okay.
August 7th.
Oh my God, this is going to take forever.
Is there a way to show 50 per page?
Can't see any of the chat.
I'm just going to continue going back.
Six months.
Okay, we're at March.
Okay, we're getting close.
So it was February.
It ended in February.
And it started.
It started.
It started February.
Live from Ottawa.
Here we go.
Live from Ottawa.
Day one.
Sweet.
Action.
Jackson!
So, let's get this.
Oh, man.
This is going to be a trip down memory lane.
Camera in a good position.
Look how young I was back then.
Are we live, people?
Okay, that's symmetrical.
So which way do I have to move the grip?
So where am I now?
To get...
I like that.
Okay, like that.
Whatever, we'll figure it out.
People, are we live?
Are we live?
Can I see the chat as we go?
This was the first one.
And I'm going to not use the earbuds and charge my phone until I need the earbuds.
Then I'll run the earbuds until the battery goes low and I'll charge the phone.
What's up, people?
I don't know where I parked.
I took a picture of the car.
Oh yeah, this is day one.
This is definitely day one.
Right behind me.
Okay, let's just see.
Imagine that, by the way.
The government suing the GoFundMe account to seize the donations that were sent by the citizens to support a movement that they wanted to support, alleging damages.
Is this day one?
It's like another form of tax.
It's indirect taxation.
Here's the monument, everybody.
You can judge for yourself as to the level.
People, where do I see the date?
That this trucker convoy, this misogynist, racist, xenophobic, transphobic, anti-Semitic convoy, just wait until you see the destruction and disrespect of the war monuments.
Yep.
So I'm going to walk.
I'm struggling to...
I don't understand why I'm such an idiot.
I'm going back to see what date...
MSM claiming that protesters were defiling, urinating, defecating.
Maybe they didn't say defecating.
I think they just said urinating.
Here's the snow, people.
You know what?
I don't know how to rotate the camera.
Here, look at this.
This snow is white enough that I wouldn't even warn my kids not to eat it.
Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, people.
What's this?
What is that?
What is that?
Investigative journalism.
Chocolate milk or hot chocolate.
Okay, January 31st was the first day.
Here's the first one.
Okay, good.
Sorry, I'm just going to replace this one.
This was...
Hmm.
Thank you.
Thank you.
That could be it.
This is day one.
Oh, come on with the ads, man.
Amen.
Thank you.
You can see where people started watching.
So let's go right here.
Okay.
Oh, you're not watching the same thing I'm watching.
Sorry, guys.
What is going on?
That is being severed from the main part in Parliament.
And look, I'm not trying to be unduly understanding.
I understand why they have to...
I mean, this is having its effect without really posing any serious risk, but there would be trucks, and it would be unnavigable for any emergency, any necessity.
One thing is clear.
What day is it today?
It's Monday.
Is it Monday?
It is Monday.
I don't know how Parliament is going to do their jobs, but this is something to behold.
Check this out.
By the way, it's here in real time.
This is where they kept the streets clear.
So they could actually have traffic flow through.
How are you doing?
Sorry, I should have asked.
You don't mind being on the interwebs?
No, let's do it.
Are you part of the protest?
That's Trista Sue.
Yeah, I am.
We're going to go here.
We've already seen Trista Sue.
Yes, yes.
Okay, hold on.
I'm going to stick that in my back pocket.
I can't.
Oh, that's fine.
That was Donut.
Donut Man.
I hope that's my back pocket.
Okay.
You want a donut?
There we go.
No, thanks.
So how's it going for you?
It's amazing.
It's beautiful.
You've been here since the beginning.
Laura Lynn.
Tell the world who Laura Lynn is.
Laura Lynn.
Is a woman of God who's out here fighting for everyone's freedom and their rights.
And please support her.
Please do everything you can to encourage her to.
Laura?
So we've only met on the interwebs and this is for sure.
Oh, I'm so excited.
Oh, I'm so well.
Thank you for all you do.
Isn't this exciting?
This is, I have not seen one bad flag, one act of vandalism.
I have not seen one person who...
Exactly.
Exactly.
Bring it up!
They love you.
Harassment.
And I want to let everyone know, I have done the investigating.
I have searched far and wide for terrorists because I want them exposed.
I cannot find one.
Who was it that put this...
There was a...
Oh, it was...
Oh, I forget her first name.
Who said 3,000 bucks to anybody who can identify the guy walking around with the Swiss decal flag.
Right.
All right, let's see what else we got here.
Do you mind being on the internet?
Yeah, I follow it.
Do you mind being?
Yeah, keep my mind, good, good.
I'm streaming now, I drove down to Montreal this morning to see what it looks like.
Yeah, I know, I was, this, no, no, no, no.
Yeah, I said I could come see this.
Yeah, okay, brother.
It's beautiful, absolutely beautiful.
Hey, let's have a round of applause.
It's a lot.
I like the cave side Canadian flag.
Drew, do you mind being on the internet?
In real time, right this very second.
Where are you from?
I work in Toronto.
I can tell by the intent.
It's not true.
It's more specific.
I'll fucking take it out.
I'm not going to say that.
What are you doing?
What's the role of me in the protest?
The hearing is still on pause.
Now you have to do this.
He's the first one.
No, no, no.
He's honking his horn.
Oh, no.
I had people walk up to me.
Two patriots and soldiers.
Everybody's all his friends.
This was before I realized I needed you.
We will break this cycle.
Thank you so much.
This is the minority.
No.
You're the minority right over there.
Hopefully we can see where they are.
The crane was.
I'm just so happy to be here, man.
Come on, give me a look.
Look behind me.
That's where the crane was.
That's where the crane was.
I'm coming back up.
I'll see you soon.
Take care, man.
All right, have a good one.
Right outside the windows of Parliament.
Amazing stuff.
No, that's further down the street.
It was further up.
So that would mean it was more like here.
All right.
And we jumped in my truck.
Couldn't you?
You're talking to, let's see here, 7,000 people now.
Okay, so hold on.
There's Terry Fox.
And that's the crane right there.
That was the crane.
That was the crane.
When it does a loop around, you're going to see it.
That's the crane.
Right there.
I'm told that there were more people out here yesterday.
I'm going to walk down the street and see how far this truck convoy goes.
That's what the lawyer was suggesting, was right in front of the windows of Parliament.
There.
That crane over my shoulder.
Okay, the hearing is coming back on, so we can take this out.
Hearing's back.
The judge is back.
That's the old Rittenhouse trial joke.
Okay.
Boom.
Shackalaka.
Emergencies Act.
Public hearing.
This is it.
Bring it back in.
Now, I was able to make it the full window earlier today.
I don't know what happened.
But anyhow, we'll have to live with that.
Oh, yeah.
We'll have to live with that, eh?
Anybody wants to go back and watch the video?
Horns are so loud in my headphone right now.
Music to my ears.
Viva, can you get in touch with people from Canadian Constitution Foundation and see if they might use you as a witness?
Oh shoot, now that you're reminding me, I was supposed to do an interview with someone.
Let me see if that wasn't it.
Constitutional.
I'm going to go through my email.
Constitutional.
Cripe.
Too many bloody emails.
Okay, so while that comes back, let me just check my email because I was supposed to do an interview with someone that I met at the protest.
If anybody knows anybody that wants to get me out, if they have a space on their witness list, contact me.
But I have pretty decent immediate connections, which I'm trying to If anybody wants me to come.
lawyer what would that have been their lawyer ottawa There we go.
Found it.
Open the email.
Good, and it's right here.
Okay, I'm going to open that email and get back to it.
Order à l'ordre.
À l'ordre.
Nous allons reprendre l'audience.
I'm going to go to the next one.
The Commission has reconvened.
She sounds like she's got a cold, that person.
Okay.
I'd like to call on the convoy organizers.
Go ahead.
Thank you, sir.
For the record, my name is Brendan Miller.
I'm counsel for Freedom Corp., which is an incorporated entity.
We like this man.
Representing the protesters that are in your city.
Can you speak up a bit?
Sorry.
They were the protesters that were in your city in January and February of 2022.
First, thank you for your service.
I just have a few questions for you.
Thank you.
Good afternoon.
Thank you.
So I take it, sir, that you are aware of the February 8, 2022 media briefing that the Ontario Police Service gave, where it was said to the media and in the public that OPS had concerns for the children of the protesters in Ottawa.
Remember this.
And OPS wanted to discuss enforcement.
With the Child Aid Society of Ontario.
You're aware that happened?
More threat.
You said the Ontario Police Service.
I believe you mean the Ottawa Police Service.
Do you have a document we can reference with that media release or is that a clip?
It's a clip.
Do you not know what he's talking about?
I don't specifically recall references to enforcement today, but I do specifically recall the discussion around our concerns with children in the footprint, particularly as the situation is becoming more volatile.
And I understand, sir, from reviewing just the disclosure generally, that with respect to that media announcement, that you are in fact not supportive of it.
It being announced to the media in that way.
Do you remember that?
Oh, well, that makes sense when I saw the CBC accusing someone of that.
Now, with enforcement of child protection laws, which in this province is the Child Youth Family Services Act, you agree that enforcement is essentially either the threat or the actual apprehension of children from parents.
Is that right?
So I don't specifically recall the references to enforcement that you're speaking of.
I do specifically recall us raising the issue of the potential danger that the children would be in the red zone.
Would, could, potentially, maybe, in the footprints.
When the police come through with tanks.
Not tanks.
I, of course, will have questions for him in the same regard.
But I understand it that...
You had nothing to do with it, but you now know that it was the law, the firm, the political firm, Navigator, that recommended that such an announcement be made.
Do you know that?
So I don't recall where the genesis of the announcement was, but I do stand behind.
I had grave concerns with the fact that there were children within the footprint of an area where the activity that was occurring was occurring.
But beyond that, within the area where there could be enhanced or would be enhanced enforcement activity.
So regardless of where it came from.
I had and shared those concerns.
Were you aware that the Child Aid Society of Ontario had no idea that announcement was being made and were quite unhappy about it?
So I was the one who was liaising with the Children's Aid Society.
And they were, that was something in gaps we identified.
That was a gap that we identified.
I should have had conversations with them prior to that announcement.
So the answer is yes, you were aware that they did not.
But as a result of the announcement, we were able to work together to identify the proper mechanisms that we would use in the event that we did identify children who needed, do needed support within the red zone.
So you were aware that Navigator completed a report for February 5th that talked about some social media commentary about how they could be using, the protesters could be using children as human shields, and that based on that, they recommended that this announcement be made.
You're not aware of that?
Unbelievable.
So I'm not aware of any report that was actually generated by Navigator.
If you could take me to it, I could.
Okay.
It's anticipated that our witnesses are going to say that the day after that announcement on February 9th is when workers from Child and Family Services started to intervene with the protest.
Do you agree with that?
No, I wouldn't because I don't believe that the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa ever directly engaged or intervened in...
They didn't.
What I do understand is that we set up mechanisms in order to be able to, in the event that there was an enforcement action and children needed to be removed and then reunited with family, we set up the processes that would be put in place for that.
But that was at the enforcement stage, as I understand it.
You had set up, from my review of the records, an empty gymnasium of some kind to take children to, and then the plan was to give them back to their parents.
That was what you're thinking of.
Is that right?
So I didn't develop that specific plan.
That was the plan?
Okay.
So you're going to hear evidence eventually from some of the protesters.
You don't want to know what the child abuse is?
Some of the ones that were arrested, upon their release, they were essentially kidnapped by OPS officers, driven out of town in the middle of February winter by OPS officers, and left in various rural areas and parking lots outside of town with no shelter or resources.
Are you aware of that?
Clip it, share it.
No, because I don't know the specifics of what they're speaking about.
What I do know is that we, as part of our planning, and Inspector Lucas Tamura will be able to provide more details, but we did have remote arrest processing sites.
Not in rural Ottawa, in the south end of Ottawa, in a residential mixed commercial area where they were protest and then released to be able to find transportation to wherever they needed to go, which is common with the police.
Right, so one of the areas, there was several as I understand, one of them was a municipal parking lot where the trucks were being towed to.
That's correct, that's in the south end.
Right, and that...
Parking lot doesn't have a building you drop them off at.
It doesn't have a phone.
It doesn't have any of that, does it?
So I don't know what the logistics at the building were.
I would imagine it would have needed to have a phone because you have to be able to call your lawyer.
Well, I can tell you it didn't.
And these people driven out there.
They were already told they weren't charged.
And they weren't being charged.
They were being released.
But they were driven and forced.
Outside of Ottawa or on the outer skirts and dropped off in the snow.
Now, are you aware this happened?
Yes or no?
No, I'm not aware.
And it wasn't outside of Ottawa.
It was still within the G. I'm not aware, but it didn't happen.
In your evidence-in-chief, you kept using the word violence regarding protesters, right?
Yes.
All right.
And you've heard the evidence of Superintendent Morris already.
You sort of touched on that.
And he had stated that the lack of violence in Ottawa during the protest was actually shocking.
I don't recall that statement.
All right.
So is it fair to say that when you use the phrase violence, you're not actually describing any form of physical assaults, are you?
Well, physical assaults do...
Did they have any physical thoughts?
The violence that our community felt as a result of the culmination of actions that the occupiers engaged in.
You don't feel violence.
You experience violence.
So the violence that they felt, not actual violence.
Is that what you're saying?
Good.
That is correct.
Not the criminal code definition of violence, but the violence that they felt by having an incessant horn splared.
Right.
By having trucks run 24-7 a day.
By having people intimidate them and follow them.
And by having people rip masks off their heads.
Never happened.
Feeling sheltered in their homes.
Thank you.
I understand what you mean.
But you're not talking about violence under Section 2 of the CSIS Act, are you?
No, I'm not.
Thanks.
The violence that they felt.
Not that they experienced.
I'd like to take you to a document right now, if I can.
If we could pull up document poe.hrf.
0-0-0-0-0-0-1.
Did I get it right?
Good.
The violence that they felt.
So there were no actual...
Oh, and the masks getting ripped off never happened, by the way.
They were cornered in their houses.
Not by the protesters.
They could have gotten out there and gotten a good breakfast.
They could have had a good hug, a good conversation.
Yeah, there was honking.
There was audible violence.
There was an assault on their eardrums.
The best you could possibly put it.
Oh, by the way, so you're aware that they took them out there and dumped them off the middle of the road?
No, that never happened.
They were put somewhere else.
Is it possible to turn that so that it's the...
Let's crank our heads, people.
Let's crank our heads.
There were people wearing masks, Viva.
I know there were people wearing masks.
I told you why nobody was ripping masks off anybody's faces.
Because some people were wearing masks because they didn't want to be identified.
And the protesters knew that.
Nobody's ripping masks off anybody's faces.
Nobody's shaming anybody for wearing masks.
They had strategic reasons for wearing masks at the protest.
It's a bloody lie.
It's just a bloody lie.
Sorry, now I think I know what you mean.
There were protesters wearing masks.
Yes.
Thank you.
So, Chief, this is an email exchange of February 15, 2022, between one of your officers, Cameron Hopgood, and Matthew Gravel of the Mayor of Ottawa's staff.
You know who both those individuals are, correct?
I do.
And what is Cameron Hopgood's job as an OPS officer?
He's a manager within our data section, so he does a lot of data collection.
He works on uniform crime reporting.
Okay, if we can just scroll down.
170 criminal investigations.
31 have been arrested, 16 charged.
Matthew Gravel asks for all the stats in the previous email with respect to criminal investigations, arrests, and charges.
Cameron Hopgood responds and says that there had been a total of 31 people arrested, but only 16 people charged.
What were they charged?
As of February 15th, 2022.
Emergencies Act.
Would you agree with that?
Well, I would agree that the email states that yes.
Thanks, man.
We can read.
Of course, you just said he's in the data section, so he would know that.
That's correct.
So you have no reason to disbelieve that there were only 16 charges laid.
No, 16 charges.
Between January 28th and February 15th, 2022, regarding the protesters.
Isn't that correct?
So what I would agree is that the data analysis that he would have done would have represented that.
There may have been more in the terms of being processed.
And I think this is on February 15th.
There's a better table within our institutional report that more clearly identifies the numbers that would have occurred.
Right, and that is, if I can call the next document, it's the poe.hrf0000002.
They should have just gone with letters.
It's a copy of the table, but I've added some highlighting to it and some numbers.
Let's see if I have any food in my teeth.
Hold on one second.
Okay, I'm good.
Oh, mamacita, this is...
Does that lawyer have a ponytail?
No, he doesn't.
Okay, I thought he had a man bun.
Do you see the witness squirming?
If we can zoom in on that.
And this has been provided to all the parties.
So...
This is the table of arrests and charges.
I can't make it up much but assault.
The sections that are highlighted, okay?
Okay, I'm sorry, there's an objection.
Yes?
David Michikowski, counsel for the Ottawa Police.
Perhaps I've missed it, as well as the previous document, but I do not see them in the witness documents.
They're not?
That's correct.
They don't have to be.
I sent them out, I think, this morning.
I appreciate that, Mr. Commissioner, but the whole point of having the documents beforehand is that the witness has an opportunity to review the documents before they test them.
Give him a minute.
He can look it over.
Documents under the rules were supposed to be posted on the...
Well, I can do it with your document.
It would just be easier for everybody to understand.
It's up to you.
Just let him finish his objection.
Let's see where the lawyer is going with this.
by the time I checked and realized that was also not in the witness section of the documents.
So just in fairness to the witness, I appreciate sometimes things come up at the last minute.
It's very understanding.
I'm not good at this faux type of politeness.
I don't know if my friend intends to continue asking about documents that are not in the database, but if so...
I think they were in the database, just not given to the witness.
I think those documents were in the database.
Yes, sir.
So all this document is is the exact document he just referred to, except I highlighted the stats between January 29th and February 13th, and then calculated three times, double-checked the total number of charges and what they were for that time period.
That's all it is.
I'm happy to ask him the same questions if the commission is inclined, but I think it would help everybody to essentially see.
It's essentially a cross-examination tool, per se.
J.G., you're proving your ignorance.
It's fun to do this behind the comfort of your computer.
I will testify gladly.
I do believe it is just an adaptation.
You've got to get on the list.
I'm trying to get on the list.
I appreciate you.
There seems to be a consistent troll about it, but there you go.
I brought it up.
Now you've got your three seconds of attention.
Can we proceed with this at the moment?
I'm not sure what the document is, but I believe that my friend may have highlighted it and have some annotations.
My friend is the legal term that they have to use when referring to opposing counsel.
Or not have to, but that they do use.
They're just the numbers to that date.
That's it.
Dude, I was consulted and authorized anybody that wants to use my videos as evidence.
I was in talks with whether or not I needed to come, if necessary, to present my videos as evidence.
They have all.
I'm not a part of it.
I'm not one of the lawyers.
I highlighted in yellow every type of charge between January 29th and February 13th.
And in red, at the end of that...
I added the amount of charges that existed as of February 13th, 2022 at 11:59 p.m.
Let's see the policemen have to admit it.
Yes sir.
Lining up all the numbers.
Yes sir.
So what I want to do is take you through this sir.
So we've got that up and I've explained it already.
So, I understand the protest begins at January 28th, 2022, and in that entire time period until February 13th, 2022 at 11.59pm, there are a total of four charges laid for assault.
Is that correct?
That is correct.
I'd love to know the specific sub-nature of the assault.
And so that's a period of 17 days?
How many tens of thousands of people?
That's probably better than the Ottawa average.
Can I say that?
I'm not sure.
I don't believe from the 29th to the 13th is 17 days.
Well, it's 29th.
They put the first charge first.
You'll see that it doesn't have every single date on it.
They only put the dates on it with respect to...
I agree.
It's not 17 days.
It's only 14 days.
No one was charged at all.
I think it's just simple math.
29 to 13 is not 17. Oh, it's 16. Is it?
Okay.
That's why I went to law school.
I can't do math.
And that's why this guy's a weaselly witness, so he can avoid answering the question.
Between January 29 to February 13, there is a total of four assault charges laid down.
We can agree on that.
Yes.
And with respect to assaults with a weapon from that same time period, there was a total of one assault with a weapon charged.
What was the weapon?
Yes.
All right.
Is it a hockey stick?
And if we can scroll down...
Oh, no.
Just back up.
Sorry.
My apologies.
I'm wondering if there's a Twitter account called...
Can you agree with me that in the entire same time period...
There was no charges under the criminal code for causing a disturbance by fight or shouting or swearing?
Yes.
And there was no charges laid against any of the protesters in that same time period for causing a disturbance by impeding or molesting a person?
That's correct.
All right.
And there were also no charges laid with disturbing an occupant of a dwelling apartment or complex under the criminal code either, was there?
Oh, snap!
Okay.
Can we scroll down?
Perfect.
And can you agree with me in that time period that is from January 29th to February 13th at 11:59pm, there was no charges of inciting hatred in a public place ever late, was there?
Correct?
For obvious reasons.
And can you agree with me that in the same time period that only one charge of intimidation by threat of violence was ever laid?
Laid?
Charge?
If we can, last one.
There was no charge either in that same time period for taking a weapon of a police officer and execution of his duty.
Kind of random, but correct.
And in that same time period, there was never any charges of uttering threats to property to damage property under 265.
And yet this guy testifies under oath, harassment, assaults.
So there's a total of five...
Violent offences charged between January 28, 2022 and February 13, 2022.
Is that right?
So I'm not sure how you're classifying violent charges and we'd have to go through them again to identify.
So anything dealing with an assault or threatening to cause bodily harm or to kill someone.
There's five charges in relation to that.
I'll take your word for it.
We'd have to go through the list again.
Okay.
So, you'd agree with me that that's not unprecedented violence, is it?
I would like to know what Ottawa's average is.
So, as I defined violence, it wasn't strictly criminal code violence.
I'm happy to, again, go through the definition that I was using when I was talking about community violence.
This is a part of it.
Threats, charges under the criminal code was a part of it, but it was the trauma that the community felt.
It was the extreme circumstances that they were exposed to and the duration of time that they were exposed to that has very clearly been described to me by community members as violence inflicted on them.
Now it's third party hearsay violence.
Honking, right?
It's one of them.
Honking would be one of them.
Honking is violence.
I believe the exhaust coming from trucks.
But I think it's important you put it in context.
It's the honking of large air horns of approximately three to four to five hundred trucks simultaneously for 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
It's the incessant noise pollution that is being inflicted on the people that we were referring to.
Right.
And we've already heard evidence that as of February 7th, when Mr. Champ and his client, Zexy Lee, obtained an injunction with respect to silencing those horns, things got better.
You agree?
Well, I think they got better for a period of time, yes.
Right.
But that was on the 7th.
That was...
Nine days, ten days into the circumstance.
But we're discussing the EA, which was two weeks after that.
So if it was no longer an issue, you don't get to involve the EA.
In that area, you've heard some evidence that there's about 18,000 people.
Is that right?
That would be accurate, I believe.
And what's the entirety of the population of Ottawa?
Just over a million.
Just over a million.
So 18,000 residents.
We're the ones being put through the violence, as you define it.
Ottawa itself is a million.
I don't think the size of the amount of people that we're being exposed to minimizes the trauma that those community members felt and very clearly expressed.
On the general population of Ottawa, it was a smaller number, but it doesn't minimize the impact it had on that number of people.
The feeling of violence.
Thank you.
And this is the last document I want you to refer.
I've given very short numbers.
It only became relevant because of some questions my friend from the federal government asked.
It's pb.nsc.can.00003256 underscore R-E-L dot 00001.
Give the frickin' exhibits normal numbers.
Come on.
It's not his fault.
I don't know why they've...
Not label these documents for ease of reference.
It was violence that they felt that they expressed to him that he took to the Prime Minister after the honking had stopped to invoke the Emergencies Act.
I know you haven't seen this before, but this is an email from Commissioner Brenda Luckey to the Chief of Staff for the Minister of Public Safety, and she has a discussion about her views.
on the invocation of the Emergencies Act there.
I just want to read it to you.
February 13th.
And you can read it as well.
I'm of the view that we have not yet exhausted all available tools that are already available through existing legislation.
There are instances where charges could be laid under existing authority for various criminal code offences occurring right now in the context of the protest.
The Ontario Provincial Emergencies Act just enacted will also help in providing additional deterrent tools to our existing toolbox.
Then she goes on, these existing tools are considered in our existing plan and will be used in due course as necessary.
So, you've had an opportunity to read that and hear it, and you also, I take it, heard the evidence from Superintendent Morris.
Regarding there being no credible threat under Section 2 of the CSIS Act, correct?
That's correct.
All right.
And you agree with me that Superintendent Morris is the most senior intelligence officer in the provincial apparatus, is that right?
It's difficult for me to scale exactly.
He's a seasoned and experienced and senior intelligence officer, yes.
Okay.
You're pretty well out of time.
Yeah, I just have one question.
Do you agree with what Commissioner Lucky said in the email I just read to you?
I believe it's a perspective for sure, and I think it's one that would be more appropriate to question her on.
I've been very clear about how we utilize the provisions under the Emergency Act to actually execute our plan and create stability around the execution of our plan.
Do you agree with her perspective?
I do believe there could have been other opportunities.
There was provisions within all of those.
What I have said, and I'll say again, is we leveraged the Emergency Act as it came out to create a very stable platform to be able to access tow trucks, to be able to do the four or five different areas that I identified.
So while these abilities do exist, absolutely, in what Commissioner Lucky has identified, the Emergency Act created a very stable platform, a stable environment for us to execute our plan.
Last question.
We leveraged the unlawful use of the law.
So you're saying that there was existing laws that you could have done the same thing under.
Is that right?
Yes or no.
We had a plan.
We were going to execute a plan.
Thank you.
Checkmate!
The Ottawa residents and businesses?
They're going to harp on the violence.
CSIS is the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
Let's hear the city coming in.
Break up the violin.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Paul Champ for the Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses.
Thank you very much, Chief Bell, for coming and speaking to us today.
Good afternoon, Mr. Champ.
Good to see you again.
See you again.
What's going on here?
Just following one of the questions that you just got before about the harm and how many people live in downtown Ottawa, it's about 18,000 residents.
But you would agree with me, Deputy Chief Bell, there are several thousands of people who live in Ottawa who work downtown who are unable to work during the...
They had been unable to work for a year and a half.
I absolutely agree.
Beyond being unable to work, there were businesses that were severely impacted by...
The same ones that have been shut down for a year and a half.
The businesses and their employees.
And their employees, yes.
So I want to ask you now questions about the role that you were playing during the convoy demonstrations and around intelligence operations in particular.
I understand from your testimony that you've given that The intelligence did not indicate that the convoy planned to use the Ottawa community as, I think you used the words, a leverage point to achieve their objectives.
I just want to ask you about that.
By leverage, did you mean that the convoy protesters were trying to make life difficult for residents in Ottawa as leverage with political leaders to achieve their objectives?
That would be my assessment of the situation.
The different protests as they went, or occupations across the country, had different leverage points.
Ambassador Bridge leveraged economy.
Coots, Alberta leveraged economy and access to the United States.
Ottawa leveraged the citizens and the discomfort that it created for our community as the leverage point to be heard.
People of Ottawa were in a sense being...
Held as hostages until their political demands were met.
It could be characterized as that, yes.
Now, in terms of the intelligence, Chief Bell, there was intelligence about the phrase bear hug or Operation Bear Hug.
Do you recall that?
Yes, I do.
What was that?
And what did you understand was meant by that term bear hug?
My understanding of what bear hug was, it was to be...
A protest that would encircle all of Ottawa to, in essence, close down the entirety of Ottawa.
Right.
To encircle downtown to apply pressure to them.
No, I think it was larger than downtown.
Don't try to fix his answer.
A larger geographical area up to and including all of Ottawa.
They were trying to...
Oh, okay.
That was the plan.
I trust you'd agree with me.
Chief, that a lack of a contingency plan for a prolonged occupation was a tactical error by the police.
I think that the level of depth that we had attributed to contingency planning was an area that we need to be better on moving ahead and one that we've identified and improved on.
Well, here there was none at all.
That's what we've heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson.
There was no contingency plan.
For what to do if these big rigs decided to stay longer than the weekend.
You would agree with that?
So because there was no contingency plan...
I would agree that if Deputy Chief Ferguson...
They get to use the nuclear weapon of legislation.
...develop contingency plan.
She was in charge of the planning, so yes.
And in retrospect, Chief Bell, we can agree that the Otto Police Service, unfortunately, was exceptionally unprepared for this protest.
Unprepared to break up the EA.
So the ONG service was absolutely unprepared for the unprecedented circumstances that we were faced with on the 28th through to the end of February.
Unprepared or just incompetent?
Or just unwilling to actually, you know, negotiate and discuss?
Chief, I want to ask you some questions about the intelligence during the protest.
Should be a short line of questioning.
You were receiving intelligence and were aware that there were former police and military members who were participants in the convoy.
Is that right?
That is correct.
Okay, people, I'm going to duck out.
I got to exercise.
Some of them were involved in some of the planning and logistics for the convoy protests.
That's correct.
And these individuals, I gather, the police were quite sophisticated logistically and had knowledge of police tactics.
That's correct.
And I presume that caused some concern for the Ottawa police in terms of how to manage or respond to what the convoy was doing.
Well, I think it caused concerns for all the police agencies who were involved because it wasn't just Ottawa police members.
It was police members, military members from across the country in a small number.
But the knowledge that that group would have about our operations was concerning.
Right.
Now, this is a different question, but on a related point, Chief.
Were there any concerns or was there any intelligence about current police members from the Ottawa police or other police forces who were sympathetic to the protesters and may have been sharing information with them?
So there was the...
There was concerns raised around that regularly, and there was investigations conducted into that.
And as a result of those investigations, we didn't find any circumstances where there was a compromise of information or actions because information was shared from inside our organization into the protesters.
But your investigations did confirm that a number of auto police members were very sympathetic to the protesters and, for example, were donating funds to them?
So there was two circumstances where members had donated funds beyond to the Give, Send, Go account, and those were followed up on through discipline.
Now, in terms of other...
Intelligence that you had, Chief.
What about, like, we know that the broad number of people who came to Ottawa were from, you know, all kinds of different backgrounds and so forth, working folks and so forth.
But there were also different elements who were participating in the protests who were of greater concern.
Isn't that so, Chief?
Bad elements?
Bad actors?
So can you be more specific?
Well, for example, the seizure of firearms in Coots, Alberta, and the arrests that were made for attempted murder of RCMP officers, those individuals were associated with a group named Diagalon.
It's my understanding the leader of Diagalon was in Ottawa for the duration.
That is correct.
And that was of concern to the Ottawa police?
That was of concern.
And there were other elements, others who were affiliated with known white supremacist groups in Ottawa during that period of time?
That is correct.
And that was of concern to the Ottawa police?
Yes, it was.
Now, I want to ask you some questions about some concerns that others had with the OPS plan and the use of policing resources.
We heard from Superintendent Abrams last week that he raised concerns with you on a number of occasions about OPS plans or the deployment or what he viewed as misuse of OP resources.
That's all true, Chief Bell?
I believe through my testimony today we've gone through the individual circumstances.
There was an occasion where OPS did not deploy a number of OPP officers.
That was rectified shortly thereafter.
The concerns about our plans were raised, communicated, and as we progressed and as we had the integrated planning team come in, that was rectified.
So I believe, from my perspective, all of the concerns that Superintendent Abrams Well, how about with respect to the plans?
We heard evidence from Mayor Watson last week that he was hearing from the Prime Minister and the Solicitor General and the Federal Minister of Public Safety that there were concerns from the OPP and the RCMP about providing resources.
to the Ottawa police because they had some doubts or concerns about the OPS plans and whether it was the right plan or whether it was safe.
Were you aware that those concerns were being raised at the higher I wasn't aware that those conversations were occurring.
Did you yourself have any concerns about the readiness of the OPS plans in the first, let's say, 12 days of the protest?
I would have concerns.
About the time that it was taking to develop the plans.
I do think, particularly once we had the integrated planning team with the amazing assistance of the Ontario Provincial Police and the RCMP, that we did develop the fulsome plans that we needed.
That took some time to get to.
So, while this is occurring in our streets, the time it's taking to plan, coordinate, and then execute is of concern to me.
Was it your impression or your understanding, Chief Bell, that Chief Slowly was a bit resistant to the integrated command?
I think we've heard some evidence of that already.
I believe Chief Slowly was raising concerns or kicking the tires on what an integrated command or planning team would look like that would have indicated he had some resonance to it.
Well, and he made comments to you and Deputy Chief Ferguson that he felt the OPP and RCMP were not there to help and were taking directions for their political masters or comments like that.
You recall that meeting?
That's correct.
And you and Deputy Chief Ferguson didn't agree with him and you raised concerns about that?
That's correct.
You also had concerns, did you not, Chief, that Chief slowly appeared to be taking operational advice from the PR firm Navigator?
That was your impression?
So I don't believe it was that he was taking operational advice.
It was the fact that a PR firm, a crisis communication firm, was involved in that level of operational discussions.
It was atypical to me.
It was ultimately, at the end of the day, Chief Slowly's prerogative and choice to make as the Chief of Police.
It was just something that I hadn't experienced before.
Crisis in Ottawa continued and became more prolonged, Deputy Chief.
You had some concerns about the leadership of Chief Slowly, did you not?
Well, I had not specific concerns about his leadership overall.
I've identified the areas that were of concern to me around the incident command and his involvement at a lower level than I believe.
That was another one, yeah.
So there was different areas of concern that I had, yes.
And Councillor Deans, the chair of the Police Services Board at the time, testified last week that she called you at one point, about one week before Chief Sullivan's resignation.
And she testified that she asked you whether you would be doing anything differently if you were Chief.
Do you recall that conversation?
I do.
Is that roughly what she asked you?
Yes, that is what she asked me.
And she testified that you told her that you wouldn't have done anything differently.
Is that right?
I believe she testified that I said that I wouldn't have done anything differently, but that a plan was coming together and we needed to support the chief as we led through that plan.
I think when you listen to her testimony, that's the more fulsome explanation of what I said.
Fair enough.
So you don't disagree with her testimony on that?
Absolutely not.
And what I would go on to say is my perspective is, particularly as a deputy chief, my responsibility is to support the chief of police, the office of the chief of police, regardless who's sitting there.
And that my obligation is to make sure that that person is successful as we move ahead.
Certainly, at that time, as deputy chief, your obligation was to serve your chief.
But did you also not have an obligation to serve the people of Ottawa?
Chief Bell.
But I do believe I was serving the people of Ottawa by ensuring that we as an organization through the Chief of Police had success moving ahead.
At every opportunity where I had concerns with Chiefs slowly, I raised those.
Ultimately, he's the Chief of Police, so he makes the decisions on how we move ahead.
But to have him fail, particularly in the middle of a crisis, would not have benefited anyone, particularly the citizens of Ottawa.
Precisely.
And that's the point, though, Chief Bell.
So if you saw Chief Slowly, from when I heard your testimony today, reviewed your interview summary, it sounds like you had many points of concern, shall we say, about Chief Slowly's leadership and that this perhaps was a reason why this occupation was so prolonged.
What I'm asking you, Chief, is that if you had concerns that Ottawa police perhaps were unable to respond the way that they could or as effectively as they could because of the leadership, did you not have some duty or obligation to raise that issue with the Ottawa Police Services Board or some other authority?
So my concerns would not have met to the level where I felt that obligation was necessary.
The challenges I had were addressed on a regular and ongoing basis.
And if I thought they had surpassed a level that I needed to report it, I would have reported it.
They did not reach that level.
Okay.
You learned about Chief Sully's resignation from Chair Deans on February 15th.
Is that right?
Well, I believe I first learned about rumors of it on social media, but then ultimately Chair Deans did call me at some point during the day to indicate, to cuss out my interest in taking over as interim chief.
Right.
And between that conversation and the Police Services Board, many of the members being removed the following evening, did you have any communications with the mayor, the mayor's office?
No.
On the mayor's negotiations with the protesters, you made the connection between city manager Steve Kanellakos and the PLT on February the 10th?
That's correct.
And did you know what was happening between February the 10th and February the 12th on those negotiations?
No, I did not.
But you now understand or now are aware that there were different negotiations going on between the mayor's office and the protesters?
Yes, I do.
Okay.
Did you have concerns that no police guidance or assistance was being provided to the mayor for these negotiations?
It was atypical.
It would likely have been, could have been...
We facilitated what we wanted to accomplish more easily, but at the end of the day, like I said before, I truly believe it took the temperature of the protest down, and that was a good outcome.
Could we have arrived at that circumstance better by having police involvement, by advising our incident command earlier?
Yes, it was an imperfect process.
I will absolutely agree with that, but I do believe the outcome of it was beneficial too.
To having the streets remain calm for the time we needed to execute our operation.
I hear you completely, Chief Bell, that if that was a way to get any kind of dialogue with these protesters and get any kind of movement or agreement on them to relieve the Prussian people of Ottawa, that was probably a good idea.
But the question I'm wondering is, how did it turn out that way that the mayor's office was on his own conducting these negotiations with practically no input from the Ottawa police?
How did that happen?
That I don't know.
That I can't answer.
And just finally, oh, it might be about my 20 minutes, I believe.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Thank you, Chief Bell.
Thank you.
Next, National Police Federation.
Hi there.
I'm coming in via Zoom.
Sorry.
Thank you.
Hi there.
My name's Lauren Pierce.
I'm attending via Zoom, if you can see me.
I can.
Good afternoon.
Great.
Hi there.
So I'm counsel for the National Police Federation, which is the bargaining agent representing RCMP members in Reservus.
Okay.
Yep.
So I understand that you, Chief Bell, met with representatives of the RCMP and the Parliamentary Protective Service on January 28th.
Is that right?
Do you have a document to reference?
And I'm going to apologize.
I met with several different people on several different occasions.
For sure.
So I can turn it up if it would be helpful.
It's just from your witness statement, though.
So why don't we do that?
It's WTS 6029.
And I think from my notes that it's near the bottom of page eight is where we see that reference.
So Chief Bell, I see there on January 28th at 4.30pm you attended a meeting.
Do you see at the very bottom of that page?
I do.
And if you could just keep scrolling onto page 9. Just that top paragraph there.
Yes, I recall the meeting.
Okay, great.
Thank you.
That's enough with that document.
I just want to ask you some questions about that meeting.
So first of all, my understanding is that Ottawa is the police of jurisdiction in the Ottawa region.
The Ottawa Police Service, I mean.
That's correct.
Okay.
And that the RCMP has a much more limited policing mandate in the Ottawa region.
Is that fair?
At a high level, that's correct.
And so that limited mandate includes protective policing, which I understand to be kind of ensuring the safety of certain protected persons.
Does that sound right?
I'm not totally versed on what the protective policing mandate is.
I think it encompasses more than that, but I'm not best suited to answer that question.
For sure, for sure.
But to the best of your knowledge, it includes the protection of people such as the Prime Minister and the Governor General and that kind of thing?
It does include that, yes.
Great.
Okay.
And then the RCMP also has a mandate, including federal matters such as?
You know, national security, terrorism, that kind of a thing, to the extent it's occurring in the Ottawa region.
That's correct.
Okay.
And so, I want to turn to the Parliamentary Protective Service, or PPS.
I'll use those terms interchangeably, if that's okay?
Yes, for sure.
Okay.
So, my understanding is that they are responsible for the physical security of the parliamentary precinct, Kind of the grounds and building of Parliament Hill.
That's correct.
Okay.
And you talked about this a little bit in response to some questions from Council for Former Chiefs Slowly, but I want to make sure I got this right.
So my understanding is that PPS officers are not actually sworn police officers under the Police Services Act.
Is that right?
That is correct.
Okay.
And I also understand that they are not peace officers for the purposes of the criminal code.
That I'm not sure of.
I don't believe so, but I can't definitively say.
Okay.
But what you can definitively say is that they don't have the power to lay a criminal charge.
That is correct.
And so what I think I heard from you is that if there is a criminal offense on Parliament Hill...
PPS generally will call the Ontario Police Service to come and address it.
The Ottawa Police Service, yes.
Excuse me, the Ottawa Police Service.
Thank you.
And that's the same if there's a major incident on Parliament Hill, that PPS would call the Ottawa Police Service to assist.
So the Ottawa Police Service would be a primary responder to it, but depending on the nature of the incident, it may be us, it may be a national security issue, it may be the RCMP.
So we would be a primary response, and then we would have to decide amongst the other policing organizations in the city who would be doing the follow-up.
Right.
Okay.
That makes sense.
But in either case, whether it's...
Whether it's Ottawa responding or RCMP responding or some other police service potentially, it's true that where there's a criminal offence that occurs on Parliament Hill, PPS can't deal with it alone.
Not for the purposes of laying criminal charges, no.
Okay.
Is it fair to say that PPS officers...
Do not have nearly the same kind of training that police officers have?
It would be unfair for me to comment on that.
I'm not sure of the curriculum of the Parliamentary Protective Services training.
That's fair, but at least to your knowledge, you're not aware of PPS officers attending anything that's equivalent to Ontario Police College.
Oh no, I am aware that there is extensive training that's provided to parliamentary protective services.
I just, I can't comment on what the content of it is, but I do absolutely know that they are trained.
Okay, okay.
So my understanding is that the parliamentary protective service, their jurisdiction over Parliament Hill Subject to what we just talked about of them kind of needing assistance from other policing partners.
Otherwise, their jurisdiction is actually exclusive.
Is that fair?
To the parliamentary precinct, yes.
Correct.
Okay.
And so, unless PPS invites the Ottawa Police Service to come and respond to an issue on Parliament Hill...
Your Ottawa Police Service officers are not, you know, conducting routine patrols in the area.
So we actually don't need an invitation if we're called upon to there to provide police jurisdiction responsibilities.
But in terms of general patrol or general activity within the parliamentary precinct, no, we don't engage in that.
That is the responsibility and left to the parliamentary protective services.
Right, right.
Okay.
And my understanding is that during the convoy protests, that didn't change, right?
That PPS remained of primary responsibility on Parliament Hill.
That is correct.
Okay.
And my understanding, let me know if this is consistent with your understanding, Ottawa Police Service officers weren't actually permitted on Parliament Hill unless they were directed there by the NCRCC.
I can't comment on that.
I don't know.
I don't know the answer to that.
Okay.
Maybe we can just pull up a document quickly to assist.
A document here, I've got OPP404262.
And Chief Felt, just while this is coming up, this is the January 29th operational plan that you've looked at a couple of times already.
Okay.
Thank you.
And I'm hoping within that document we can please turn to page 32 of the PDF.
So quite a bit of scrolling.
So, I'm looking at the very top of that page.
Scroll down.
Could you scroll up a little bit?
Scroll down.
Oh, I'm sorry.
Up, up.
Yes.
All right.
Thank you.
So, Chief Bell, I wanted to ask you about the second paragraph that you can see there starting, "Any decisions regarding support for PPS?" Do you see that there?
I do.
Okay, and then in the parentheses, I see no OPS member shall be on Parliament Hill unless directed by the NCRCC.
Do you see that?
I do.
Okay, so does that appear to be consistent with what I just said, which is that Ottawa Police Service officers couldn't have responded on Parliament Hill other than if they were directed by the NCRCC?
No.
I'm going to suggest this is a question better posed to Inspector Lucas, but as I read this, what I understand is that all of the movement in and around the area...
of the parliamentary precinct will be directed and controlled by the NCRCC.
That would be typical and understandable because it's going to be important that there's communication and deconfliction around activities that are happening between the Ottawa Police Service, the Ontario Provincial Police RCMP, and Parliamentary Protective Services.
That would be funneled through the NCRCC because there are the incident commander and representatives from all of those agencies.
Right.
So I actually don't think we're disagreeing on this point.
The point I'm making is that even in the event of the convoy protests, it didn't change that Ottawa Police Service officers were not kind of asserting jurisdiction over Parliament Hill.
It was still PPS jurisdiction unless directed by the NCRCC.
Yes.
Okay.
So my understanding, I think we're done with that document for now, thank you.
So my understanding is that PPS's jurisdiction extends to Wellington Street and then it shifts to the Ottawa Police Service's jurisdiction.
Is that consistent with your understanding?
It comes up to the gate of Parliament Hills, yes.
Okay, so beyond the gate of Parliament Hills, so the sidewalk and then Wellington Street is all Ottawa.
That's correct.
Well, Ottawa's police, again, Ottawa's police jurisdiction for the entire area.
PPS has responsibility for safety and security on the parliamentary precinct, which extends to the sidewalk at Wellington Street.
Okay.
Okay.
Just note, you're out of time, so you're going to have to wrap up.
Okay, okay.
I will make my last couple points very quickly.
So my understanding is that during the protests, there was some construction cladding at that area?
I'm not sure of that.
Okay.
My understanding is that PPS officers generally during the protests stayed within their jurisdiction on Parliament Hill.
They were not responding on Wellington Street.
I don't know that for a fact, but that would be my expectation.
Okay, okay.
To your knowledge, were PPS officers a resource that you understood to be available to the Ottawa Police Service in assisting with the police response to the convoy?
So the PPS was part of our integrated command at the NCRCC, and in that they would be able to be assigned taskings that were appropriate to their responsibilities, particularly in and around the parliamentary precinct.
Certainly, but in terms of Ottawa's response to the convoy, which I think was generally outside of the parliamentary precinct.
Did you or your colleagues view the PPS officers as a resource that were available to you as a part of that response?
So I can't respond to that.
That would need to be directed to Superintendent Bernier or Inspector Lucas.
Okay, so I think I will leave it there and use my time there.
Thanks very much.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Next is the CCLA.
Next is the CCLA.
Sorry, good afternoon, Chief Bell.
I'm also coming in from Zoom.
Can you hear me and see me okay?
We can hear you, but not see you yet.
Oh, that's because I have not turned on my camera.
My apologies.
There we go.
Okay.
My name is Kara Zwiebel.
I am a lawyer for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, and I just have a few questions for you.
You were asked earlier about the The Ottawa Police Service's authority to really preemptively stop traffic from coming into the city.
And I think you said that police have the ability to prevent vehicles from entering an area.
And you mentioned that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms doesn't protect vehicles.
It protects individuals.
But you also said that it was clear that...
The truckers were coming to Ottawa, and that part of their plan was to be in the nation's capital.
Is that right?
That's correct.
And part of the role of the Ottawa Police Service and any police service in Canada is to facilitate the right to peacefully protest.
Would you agree with that?
Absolutely.
And in some cases, the manner in which a protest is carried out is a core part.
of the message that's being conveyed.
So, as an example, if you had individuals who wanted to protest insufficient bike lanes and they wanted to ride their bikes, the use of the bikes is an important part of the message of the protest.
Would you agree with that?
It can be, yes.
In the example you gave, yes, I would agree with that.
Okay.
And in the case of the convoy...
When the trucks, we heard from other witnesses, when the trucks entered Ontario, there were some OPP PLT teams that were in touch with some of the convoy organizers.
Are you aware of that?
Yes, I am.
Okay.
And those PLT teams didn't give the truckers any indication that roads would be closed or that they would not be given access to the City of Ottawa, correct?
I don't know what instructions the Ontario Provincial Police Liaison Team members gave.
But certainly it was the expectation.
You understood it to be the expectation of the truckers that they would be allowed to enter the City of Ottawa.
I can't comment on that.
I don't know what the expectation of the truckers were.
At the time the convoy started, leaving sort of the legal authority aside, would you agree that the OPS...
Wouldn't have had the operational capacity or resources to prevent this number of vehicles from coming into the city?
I would agree with that.
Okay, thank you.
Just a couple of questions also about the Federal Emergencies Act and the declaration of the emergency under that act.
There was an operational plan in place that was, I understand, still evolving a little bit before the emergency was declared.
But the nature of that operational plan didn't substantially change following the invocation of the Act.
Is that accurate?
That's correct.
Okay.
And I know you mentioned that one of the more helpful things that the Emergencies Act gave you was the ability to create some exclusion zones.
Yes, correct.
Okay.
But you agree that the police have a common law power to create exclusion zones.
Provided there are grounds to do that.
So I would agree that we were developing a plan based on those authorities.
But when the Emergency Act came in, it negated the need to rely on those authorities and provided a really well-structured legislative framework for us to be able to enact an exclusionary zone and explain the legal authorities.
And our officers' legal authority, all of our members on the front line, so they could clearly, efficiently carry out their duties to enforce that exclusionary zone.
Okay, so the Act was helpful in terms of it being sort of something you could show to the protesters and to your officers to say, "This gives us the authority." Sort of a good demonstration of that authority.
I would suggest it was much more than just a good demonstration of authority.
It was a very clear legal framework that we could rely on to create the exclusionary zone with direct wording and intentions around creating that exclusionary zone.
Okay.
And did the Ottawa Police Service create exclusion zones during the more recent Rolling Thunder?
Event?
So we didn't create an exclusionary zone in the same way.
We created a restricted zone in our downtown core for vehicular traffic.
Okay.
So you weren't clearing individuals out of there, but you were saying these are areas where vehicles can't enter?
That's correct.
Okay.
And you didn't need special legislation to do that?
No, we worked on the authority with the city manager to look at areas that we would look at limiting or prohibiting vehicles from flowing.
Right.
So, would you agree with me that the authority that the police have to do various things depends on the circumstances and the context?
So, when we talked earlier about not stopping the trucks from coming into downtown...
You mentioned that there was no previous experience with an event like this.
There was nothing to suggest that there would be the level of disruption that there was.
So those were pieces of the circumstances and context that were considered in making a determination that you couldn't exclude the trucks from the city.
That's correct.
Okay.
And I mean, in every case, Would you agree with me that the police's authority to do things depend on the circumstances?
That police shouldn't have the authority to stop people or vehicles without some grounds or reason to do so?
I would agree with you that in every circumstance that we exercise of authority, the situation and context that we're in needs to be considered prior to us exercising our authority.
Yes.
Okay.
Thank you.
In your witness statement, I think you declined to sort of provide an opinion on whether the use of the Emergencies Act was necessary.
And I know my friend for the Government of Canada took you to a couple of examples of how it was helpful.
Would you agree that there's a difference between legislation or an order that is helpful and one that is necessary?
I would agree with that.
Okay.
It would probably be helpful to the police's work to have all kinds of authority, but there are other considerations that we need to consider, right?
That's correct.
And you stand by the position that's in your witness statement that you don't take sort of a position one way or the other on the necessity of the Emergencies Act.
No, I would believe that this is exactly the form that the necessity of that will be flushed out and discussed.
It was exceptionally beneficial to us in the execution of our plan, well utilized, and created a stable environment for us to actually remove the occupiers from our students.
Thank you.
Just one more area, and I think this has been covered, so I just want to...
Double check.
I apologize if I had some issues with my Zoom.
So if you've answered this, I apologize.
The role of Navigator, what was your understanding of their role?
Well, they were a crisis communications firm that were contracted in to provide us crisis communication advice.
And my understanding is that they were contracted prior to the convoy to deal with some of the change management within the organization.
There was a bit of a pivot.
Is that accurate?
That's correct.
Okay.
Were they involved in operational decisions?
They weren't involved in making operational decisions, no.
Okay.
And when you became the acting chief, did you end the contract with Navigator at that time?
When I became interim chief, yes, I ended the contract.
Okay.
Thank you, Chief Bell.
I don't have any other questions.
Thank you very much.
Okay, thank you.
Next is the Democracy Fund.
All right.
Good afternoon, Interim Chief Bell.
I'm Rob Kittredge, acting for the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms at these hearings.
And I have just a few questions for you today.
And to show my hand a little bit, they're all geared at, as you say, fleshing out and discussing the necessity of invoking the Emergencies Act.
I'd like to show with these questions that under your leadership, the OPS was quite capable of clearing the process, even if the Federal Emergencies Act was never invoked.
So, as I understand your testimony today, you identified four ways in which the...
The invocation of the Emergencies Act may have been helpful to police in clearing the protests.
First, it streamlined the swearing-in of officers from other jurisdictions.
Second, it made it easier to procure towing services.
And third, the power to freeze financial accounts may have led some protesters to leave Ottawa voluntarily.
Is that a fair characterization of your first three points?
Yes, but I don't believe I said may have been helpful.
I believe I indicated it was helpful.
Which one?
All of them.
All of them were helpful.
I'll admit a little editorial work on my part there.
So things were a little bit rushed at the end of your time with Commission Council earlier, and I want to make sure that I properly understand your fourth and final point, which was basically you said something like...
The invocation of the act created a solid legal framework within which police could do their work.
Am I understanding you correctly to think that the framework that you're referring to there meant the power to create an exclusion zone?
That is correct.
Okay.
So going to your first point, streamlining the swearing-in of officers from other jurisdictions.
Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson testified that saved a few hours and some paperwork.
Would you agree with that testimony?
No, and not to contradict Deputy Chief Ferguson, but as my role of CAO, one of my responsibilities was the processing of those swearing-ins.
It is a much more labour-intensive, administrative process that has several checks and balances and layers to it.
Personally, I wouldn't describe it in hours.
I would describe it in normally days.
It likely could be streamlined into 24 hours, but there are a lot of people you have to line up to be able to do that.
All right.
So in short, though, it could likely have been done in 24 hours.
It could likely have been done in 24 hours, but I don't think the benefit was as to when it could get done.
I think the benefit was that as soon as a member was boots on the ground in Ottawa, landed in Ottawa, they were operationally ready to be deployed.
And that's what we needed as we were bringing members in from across the country.
But you don't dispute that those officers could have been sworn in without emergency powers, do you?
Oh no, they absolutely could have been sworn in without it.
It just could have created a backlog in length time, particularly with the number of officers we were bringing to the city from all across the country.
All right.
So in this regard, though, the invocation of the Emergencies Act was helpful to police, but not necessary, strictly speaking.
Is that fair to say?
It was helpful to us, yes.
All right.
Thank you.
Your second point, making it easier to access towing services.
In the end, emergency powers were not used to compel any tow truck drivers to provide services, were they?
I don't know that.
So that's a better question directed at Superintendent Bernier, who directly interacted on that.
Fair enough.
And he is expected to testify to the effect that emergency powers were not needed to compel towing companies to supply trucks or drivers, because by February 13th, the OPP had retained 34 tow trucks with willing drivers.
Do you agree with that?
I'll let him testify to that.
I don't know that.
But you wouldn't have any reason to dispute.
That, if that's what he testifies?
If that's what he testifies to, yes.
All right.
And I guess just to cut to the chase here, again, the invocation of the Emergencies Act might have been helpful, but was not necessary to police with regard to obtaining towing services.
Is that fair to say?
Again, I can't comment on that because I don't know.
The structure or the challenges that occur to the towing, that was a planning responsibility.
All right.
But if it was not used, in fact, like if it turns out...
This is like the fourth time you're going at that same question.
Okay.
All right.
Fair enough.
I'll move on.
On your third point, the idea that the power to freeze financial accounts may have incentivized protesters to leave Ottawa voluntarily, you don't have any direct knowledge of that, do you?
No, I do not.
And same with the point put to you by Canada's Council that the freezing order may have deterred some people from coming to Ottawa to join the protest.
I don't have any direct knowledge.
All right.
And so you have no direct knowledge of the power to freeze financial accounts being necessary to the clearing of the protest then, I guess?
No, I do not.
You speculate that perhaps it helped, but...
Yes.
Okay, thank you.
And on your final point, the power to create an exclusion zone.
There are other non-emergency powers police could have used to exclude people from the area, weren't there?
Yes, there were.
Yes.
And so here again, the emergency power to create an exclusion zone may have been helpful and may have been very helpful to police, but it wasn't, strictly speaking, necessary, was it?
The exclusionary zone and the powers granted around it were very clear.
There was no debate about them, and that's what we leveraged to actually execute our plan.
The need for the exclusionary zone was, It was very important because we needed to be able to limit the movement of pedestrians in and out of that area.
That is an uncommon authority that police exercise.
So the ability for us to be very clear in how we were managing, striking up, and excluding people from that zone was extremely important to us to be able to execute the plans that we did.
In the absence of the invocation of the Emergencies Act, the OPS would have been able to clear the protests?
In the absence of the invocation of the Emergencies Act, the OPS, the OPP, the RCMP, as part of Unified Command, were going to clear the protests.
All right.
Well, thank you very much.
Those are my questions.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Next we have the province of Alberta.
Good afternoon.
Good afternoon.
It's Mandy England for the Government of Alberta.
The questions that we were going to cover off this afternoon have already been addressed by Council, so we have no questions.
Thank you very much, sir.
Thank you.
Okay, next is the Ottawa Police Service.
David Michikowski, counsel for the Ottawa Police.
Good afternoon, Chief Bell.
Good afternoon, Mr. Michikowski.
Many of my questions have been answered, but I do have a few areas that I want to talk to you about.
One of the things we heard last week was some information forwarded by Mr. Ball of the Ottawa Hotel Association.
Yes.
And I believe that was brought to the attention of the police.
And did the police follow up that information to determine whether it was corroborated?
Yes, they did.
And as I indicated this morning, we determined that there was no long-term booking of any hotels in the city, that the reference to what Mr. Ball had made was actually a three-day booking that the 90 days, or I forget the actual number, hadn't materialized.
Sure.
Could I ask you please, Mr. Clerk, to turn up OPS 14525, please?
And it's page 31. I'm sorry.
Can you go back?
I'm sorry.
It's page three.
These are your notes, Chief, of a update briefing on the 29th of January 2022.
So that would be the Saturday after the convoy had arrived.
Yes.
And you have a note about...
Some information you obtained at that point from the hotels that day.
What was the information that you obtained that day?
What I obtained was that hotels had only been booked for Friday, Saturday, and the groups were leaving on Sunday.
There was no long-term booking.
Thanks very much.
You can take that off.
Thank you.
I want to move on and talk about the question of temporary parking.
We've heard some evidence in this proceeding about temporary parking or staging for trucks being arranged by the city with the assistance of the police.
Do you recall that?
Yes, I do.
And can you explain, is that something new or is that something that has been done in the past with other demonstrations in Ottawa?
So to my recollection, I don't recall us ever establishing temporary parking for other demonstrations.
This was the first time I believe that we'd attempted that.
And has it been done for other special events, however, in Ottawa?
For other special events, yes.
It would be a regular and common occurrence.
And why was it done in this case?
What would be the alternative to not doing it?
It was done in this case to try and limit the footprint that trucks would come to for the demonstration and allow people to park in other areas and access downtown through busing, through rideshare, however, so that they could participate in the protester demonstration without actually bringing their vehicle into the downtown core.
Thank you.
You talked earlier in your evidence.
About heavy machinery.
And there was reference to a crane being in downtown Ottawa.
And I believe you explained that it was not a crane, correct?
That's correct.
It was a boom truck.
And can you just remind me what that piece of equipment was?
That piece of equipment was a boom truck.
A truck that would normally be used to lift construction equipment, then deliver construction equipment.
And what was it used for?
It was used for two purposes.
One is the boom was extended and a flag was raised from it, and I also believed it was used as a temporary setup for stages for speeches and events.
And was it used to cause any damage?
No.
And apart from that piece of equipment, was there any other heavy equipment allowed into the red zone?
Not to my knowledge, no.
You've talked about the Ottawa Police's experience with demonstrations, and you've told us that you have quite a bit, or the Ottawa Police Service has quite a bit of experience.
Can I ask you a question more specifically?
Does the Ottawa Police Service have experience with protesters using vehicles?
Yes.
And can you tell me a little bit about that?
There's multiple, had been multiple vehicle-borne protests.
Every year in and around the area, and I can think of five or six different examples.
One farm where tractors were brought into the downtown core.
Another truck-related one where tractor trailers were brought in.
Vehicle-borne protests in passenger vehicles around Indian farmers.
East Indian farmers, protests around Sri Lankan and Tamil, a Tamil conflict that is existing.
There's several events that occur, several demonstrations of protests that had occurred in the past where vehicles were used and brought into the downtown core.
And did that result in a staging of vehicles on Wellington Street?
Yes, it did.
And prior to the Freedom Convoy demonstration, was it the practice of the city to direct the closure of streets and creation of exclusion zones, prohibiting vehicular traffic to groups of protesters?
No, it wasn't.
And what is the impact?
I understand that is now being done, correct?
That is correct.
By the City of Ottawa, you indicated as delegated authority.
And in consultation with the police, those exclusion zones are being created?
That is correct.
What is the impact of creating these vehicular exclusion zones on the residents of the community or the people who have legitimate reason to travel to those exclusion zones?
Difficult to assess because as I indicated in my testimony before, community impact is one of the main things that we're looking at as we're looking to manage protests and demonstrations in that area.
So I think the impact could be twofold.
One is it may impede their progress in the area at some points in some ways.
But on the other side, it will eliminate the potential that such an occurrence would happen in their neighbourhoods again.
And what about the police resources needed now that you create these vehicular exclusion zones?
The police resources and city resources are considerable to be able to execute that plan.
And was your past experience or the Ottawa Police Service's past experience successful in terms of resolving protests, including those with vehicles, without the type of community trauma we saw in this case?
Past experience since the convoy or prior to?
Prior to the convoy.
I want to move on and talk about the Hendon reports, and I want to ask you some questions about what information can be gleaned from the Hendon reports.
And just before we look at some specific reports, just generally, can you tell me what the reports said about whether or not the protesters were expected to be peaceful and law-abiding?
Yes, it did indicate all through it that the indications that had been received from the protesters, the protest organizers, was that there was a desire and intention to be peaceful and lawful.
And we've heard that there was a traffic plan for protesters.
And I wonder if we could please turn up OPP0426, please.
Thank you.
Thank you.
Councillor, if you could, could you repeat that number?
Yes, it would be OPP-40-0426.
If I could just repeat that.
I'm going to move on to...
That's okay.
That's okay.
So it may be 4262.
Can we just scroll down, please?
Thank you.
Can we just scroll down?
And if we just go to the next, keep going.
And then there is another plan, however, that I'm going to ask that we turn up that was a more detailed plan with a number of subplans.
Is that correct?
And that is OPS 04-221.
I'm going to move on.
As I understand it, we've heard that there was an initial traffic plan, and then we heard that there was a more robust plan with a number of sub-plans prepared for that weekend.
Is that your understanding?
Yeah, that is correct.
As the intelligence continued to come in and became...
More refined in terms of the size of what was going to occur.
We moved from a traffic plan.
The planners then pulled together a larger, more complete and fulsome operational plan.
And a question was raised last week as to whether that was something just pulled off the shelf.
Do you have any comment in response to that?
So while I wasn't directly involved in the planning efforts or the development of the plan, All of the information that I have seen, the back and forth between the planners and intelligence, the conversations that occurred around how to build it would indicate it wasn't just a pulled-off-the-shelf plan.
It was one that was fully developed and sounded out around the circumstances that were evolving and developing and coming towards Ottawa.
And did the Hendon reports contain reference to the possibility of fringe groups and lone actors and the possibility of violence?
Yes.
And were those seen as significant risks?
Yes.
Were they seen as significant risks if they materialized?
They didn't materialize.
It was risks that we identified through our threat assessment and our planning process.
And so did the plan address the possibility of there being violence or serious criminality?
Yes, it did.
And we've heard about POU units who are specially trained.
In advance of the demonstration, did OPS take steps to get additional POU units?
On alert to be in Ottawa, if necessary, in anticipation of potential violence or fringe groups.
Yes, we did.
And was their use, in fact, necessary?
Yes, their use was necessary over the course of managing the dynamics that we had, specifically towards lone actors around issues of violence.
I'm unsure, but the POU units, every resource.
I'm talking about in the first weekend.
In the first weekend, POU units were utilized in terms of crowd management.
Thank you.
I want to ask you about a couple of the Hendon reports, and I wonder if we could start with the January 20th report itself rather than the summary.
And so if I could ask you please to turn up OPP 401024.
Okay.
And so you'll see that is the January 20th one.
And we've had our attention drawn to certain passages.
And I wonder if you could turn to the second page, please.
Thank you.
And the second paragraph indicates that open source research has identified a Facebook page titled Freedom Convoy 2022.
Then it tells you the number of likes and how many it was being followed by.
All of the comments expressed support for this event.
What do we see in the next sentence about the number of people supporting the event and the number who may participate as of the 20th, so eight days before?
I bet those numbers are unknown.
And I'd like you also to look at the third to last paragraph on that same page.
So if we just...
What information, what do you take from the information in that third to last paragraph on that page?
I think there's two pieces.
One that is the organizer promoting as a safe, lawful, and peaceful protest, while other individuals seem to be advocating aggressive tactics.
And were the aggressive tactics prepared for?
Yes, they were.
And if you could please go to the assessment section on page four.
Oh, sorry.
Perhaps...
Sorry.
Go back to the previous page.
Page three.
Yes, just the bottom of page three and the assessment section.
And then you'll see that each hand-in report has an assessment section, correct?
That's correct.
Right.
And if we go then to the, I just want you to see the heading.
If we then go to the next page, under that heading, the second paragraph.
The available information suggests that the convoys may comprise thousands of tractor trailers.
It's possible that a large number of smaller vehicles, including private vehicles, may join them.
Did that, in fact, materialize?
There were thousands of tractors.
There were very few, if I don't believe any tractor trailers that made it down into the red zone.
Does the January 20th report tell you how many people are going to attend and how many vehicles?
No.
How many will stay?
No.
And whether they will engage in the type of criminality or antisocial behavior we've heard about during this inquiry?
No.
And so that's on the 20th.
Based on what we've heard here, that ultimately the Ottawa Police Service needed, I think, several thousand additional resources.
Based on what you see here, would it have made sense to mobilize 2,000 additional officers from somewhere else at this point in time and bring them to Ottawa based on this information?
No.
But I also think it's very important to note...
As we go through these, that I understand the challenges of gathering this information and intelligence.
And I understand that it's imprecise and unrefined.
And that's why I tried to make the point that the experience we have is so important in assessing these.
So I believe every best attempt and great work was done by the Ontario Provincial Police and all the partners in...
Bringing together this information to be able to share with communities through other police services to be able to conduct planning.
Can I ask you please to turn up OPP 401476 on the first page?
That is the Hendon report from the afternoon of January 23rd.
And if we could keep scrolling to the fourth paragraph.
The fourth bullet, rather.
Information indicates that convoy organizers are cooperating and have developed a thorough and well-organized plan for conducting the event safely.
Is that information important to the Ottawa Police Service in its intelligence assessment?
It is one of the pieces we take into account, yes.
And how do you monitor the behaviour of the convoy prior to their arrival in Ottawa?
So the convoy would have been monitored by other police agencies as it came across Canada.
And I know that once it entered Ontario, it was monitored by the Ontario Provincial Police until it came to Ottawa where we took over.
Can I ask you please to turn up the January 27th hand-in report, which is OPP-40-0813.
straight.
So you'll see this is on the Thursday.
Is this the first time we have an indication of numbers?
Yes.
So there were several, as I indicated before, the numbers and the reporting in Hendon enhanced as we went through and as we got closer to the time.
And this on the 27th is the first day that we saw actual numbers recorded.
And understandably the first day, but the first day that we got a much better picture on the numbers that we'd be attending.
Thank you.
Can I ask you now to go to the January 28th ending report, which is the Friday, and that would be the Friday that the first trucks start to arrive in Ottawa, correct?
That is correct.
And so if we could please turn to OPP400815.
I'm all sticky and sweaty from jogging.
Anti-social behavior.
This is like the government that thinks it's our mommy and daddy.
The protest was engaging in anti-social behavior.
Anti-social behavior.
Criminality.
There was virtually nil criminality, as evidenced by Brendan's cross-examination.
Anti-social behavior?
They were giving out free hugs.
They were playing hockey in the streets.
They were making food for the homeless.
So this is the day of, and there is an estimate of the total number of vehicles, which indicates that they are estimates and subject to change.
That's correct.
Antisocial behavior.
And when it says they're subject to change, does that mean it might go up, might go down?
No, it means it's going to be the exact same.
And if you could please turn to page 7 of the document.
The psychological trauma.
Imagine people stormed the beaches of Normandy.
Can you just read the first paragraph in terms of the information that the OPP provided in this hand-in report with respect to the expected duration?
Can you just read that out loud?
The available information indicates that protesters plan to remain in Ottawa at least until...
2022-02-04.
We continue to identify indicators to support at least some protesters remaining beyond the weekend of 2022-01-29-30.
These indicators include collecting donations of cash, food, and water from supporters along the route.
Antisocial.
Thank you.
And so what do you take from that sentence in which there's an indication that some protesters will remain beyond the weekend in the second sentence and the first sentence, which talks about them remaining until the 4th of February?
So what I would assess from that is that there is an indication that at least some May remain beyond it, and that those remaining would remain, the intelligence at this point would remain up until as late as the 4th of February.
Can you believe they're calling it intelligence?
They said they were not leaving until the mandates were lifted.
Just a couple more questions.
I know more than Canadian intelligence.
I want to talk about the events of the first weekend.
And am I correct that the Ottawa Police did not simply allow an endless stream of convoys or vehicles to come into the Corps?
That is correct.
Is that correct?
Well, the Ottawa Police, the OPP, we did it in conjunction, but no, we didn't allow them to stream into the downtown.
And so were there strategies in place that were used and that were successful in diverting some convoy members from...
They were.
That's why it wasn't an occupation.
And on that first weekend, in conjunction with your policing partners, were there periods of time where other traffic mitigation measures were taken, such as dealing with bridges?
They were.
They did.
That's why it wasn't a crisis.
Medic Deb, by the way, says, I bet the guy's bum hurts right now.
Finally, we've heard some individuals during this inquiry talk about officers not coming down hard enough or not taking enforcement actions.
I just want to be clear.
Was there any direction given to police officers to ignore criminality?
Absolutely not.
And what I will say, and I've said it before and I want to say it again, our officers, the officers of the Ottawa Police Service, the OPP, the RCMP, and every other agency that came in worked in exceptionally difficult and challenging circumstances at an exceptionally difficult and challenging time.
Break out the violin.
To criticize their activities is challenging for me because they did absolutely everything they could to help support this city and remove this occupation.
And so just one final question.
So are there circumstances, however, where in the exercise of their discretion, it may not be appropriate for a police officer to take enforcement action?
Yes, that's correct.
And I think I've highlighted a couple of examples today.
Thank you very much.
Those are my questions.
That should end it for the day, people.
Holy crap.
Thank you.
Any re-examination?
Just one or two questions, if I may.
Chief Bell.
Can I just identify for the record again, please?
It's Frank Al for the Commission.
Chief Bell, my friend, counsel for the City of Ottawa, put to you the document OPS 408418.
We're calling up the document.
If we can go to the first page so we can look at the title.
My first question will be to ask if you can help us with the nature of the meeting.
Sorry, can you go to the top, please?
Can you clarify what you're talking about?
It simply says, convoy briefing number 18, Tuesday, February the 8th, 10 a.m. to 12 p.m.
So, by this point, we had a regularized briefing schedule, and I believe we were at two, if not three, a day where there was a briefing where all of the heads of areas would come together to get updates and plans.
Operational targets or issues would be addressed there, and everyone would then go and execute on what they needed to do.
It's such a complicated way of saying it.
They did nothing.
All right.
If you could go to page four.
They were supposed to keep the peace, allow the protest, and then Trudeau was supposed to come down and negotiate because that's what the leader of a country does.
You see the comment attributed to you in the middle of the page?
It says, Bell, concerns that Citi has are political concerns, not day to day.
If Citi sits at table, is concerned about sitting down at Citi, Feds will back down and leave it to the Citi.
What is...
What does that mean?
So one of the concerns that we had, and this wasn't confirmed from any discussions with anyone in the city, but one of the things that we were speculating about around the challenges with engaging different levels of government and potentially negotiating or potentially having discussions with convoy leaders was that when the first one...
and if it was the city, then they would be the ones who would be responsible for conducting the negotiation.
This was never confirmed.
We were just wondering or whiteboarding what some of the concerns about different levels of government would be, would or could have in coming in.
It was not for the province to negotiate with the protesters.
They were protesting federal mandates in front of Parliament.
Terminate your evidence.
Thank you very much, Chief Belton.
Thank you very much.
Be gone.
We will adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9.30.
9.30.
All right.
Now, I'm going to have to figure out tomorrow's schedule.
I might start...
The Commission has adjourned.
La Commission has adjourned.
La Commission has adjourned.
Bon après-midi, tout le monde.
Vous ne devez pas retourner chez vous, mais vous ne pouvez pas rester ici.
You do not have to go home, but you can't stay here.
Let's see if we catch another hot mic.
And that we're done.
Thus ends a torturous, boring, painful, pointless...
They refer to intelligence as though determining that the protest was going to go on for a long time was a difficult thing.
The people drove in from Vancouver.
They took over two weeks to drive in.
What did you think they were going to do?
Drive in for a weekend?
Oh, but intelligence.
Intelligence determined it was going to last a long time.
People who drove 3,000 kilometers to protest the lifting of federal mandates.
Oh, we thought it was just going to end up to the weekend.
And intelligence told us there was a risk of violence.
There's always a risk of violence everywhere and anywhere.
You don't need intelligence to tell you that.
I love how Chief Bell says it was a very complicated, disorganized machine.
We didn't know who was in charge.
We didn't know who to negotiate with.
And then simultaneously saying, we were dealing with a leader.
There was a point of contact that we were dealing with.
Trauma of a city.
This is not to downplay the inconvenience, the noise.
I am sure people in their heads, the same ones who were wearing masks thinking they caught COVID from protesters on the street, had their own sort of internal...
Internal prison, internal exaggeration of circumstances, but to refer to it as trauma, a city of trauma.
You know what city has experienced trauma?
New York City.
Trauma has to result from acts of tremendous violence.
Oh, but they felt like it was violent.
Let me see what we've got here.
Lied, still lying.
Caught lying.
They know we're lying.
We know they know we're lying.
They know we know that they know that they're lying.
And they still continue to lie.
And we have to sit there with an S-H-I-T grinning face on and smile and say thank you.
So that's it.
We got another date.
Chief Bell is gone.
So who is coming on after Chief Bell?
Hold on.
Let me zoom out here.
So it was Steve Bell today.
So we've got Russell Lucas.
Okay, these are the lists of witnesses for tomorrow.
Trudeau, according to a BBC article, Trudeau is scheduled to testify.
I don't know who any of these people are by name.
Oh, Peter Slowly.
So Peter Slowly, the disgraced retired chief.
And by the way, in the early days of this, they alluded to the fact that Chief Slowly, that race played a factor in people's assessment of Chief Slowly's I did not know slowly.
I didn't know of any identity politics aspect of slowly's identity until after.
Let's see what we got here.
They thought it was just going to be a weekend thing.
They drove in from across the country.
The media spent its time ignoring it.
Then they spent their time downplaying it.
Then they spent their time demonizing it.
And they thought these people drove in from Vancouver.
People have to appreciate.
Let me see if I can do my Canadian geography.
Vancouver, British Columbia.
You go next to it is Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba.
No, it's the other way around.
Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Ontario.
People drove in.
I might have mixed up the geographic order of those states.
They drove in from Nova Scotia.
They drove thousands of kilometers from both coasts and they thought it was going to be over in a weekend.
I understand what he's saying about the city did not want to sit down and negotiate because the city, the province, has nothing.
If they sit down and negotiate, the federal backs out and says, well, we don't have to talk now.
The city's involved.
Ottawa's involved.
Ontario's involved.
We can wash our hands, which is what they did anyhow.
Leave it to the provinces to deal with what was a federal protest and then seize the opportunity to invoke the Emergencies Act despite having no need to.
No crisis, no national urgency, no lack of resources, no lack of existing legislation.
And this is what we're getting out of it.
So that's it.
Did I just see a super chat?
Oh, Viva, this is your trauma today, Medic Deb.
Well, I'm thinking maybe we'll do an entire day on it tomorrow.
We'll see.
I'm doing something with Ron Coleman tomorrow.
You may know Ron Coleman from such panels as...
The James O 'Keefe panel where I was with him, Judge Kaczynski and James O 'Keefe in Vegas.
So we're going to do it.
It's not live.
It's a video podcast interview.
It's going to be good.
So I'm doing that tomorrow at 10. I'm going to figure out a way to do all this.
This will be on and we'll be live tomorrow.
Tonight, by the way, I would suggest everybody, if it's not already here, let me just see something.
You got to watch the debate.
The DeSantis-Christ debate.
DeSantis debate.
I almost was able to make it.
It started.
I was going to stream this, but my wife will crush me if I do this.
The DeSantis gubernatorial debate.
Come on, skip the ads.
I'm just going to send everybody the link.
Go watch it.
And for anybody in Florida who dares think that DeSantis is anything but among the best leaders in modern time, you have no idea.
How lucky you are.
I shouldn't say lucky.
How fortunate everybody is down here.
Future Evolutions.
Please subscribe to Future Evolution and of course to this one too.
Hit that rumble button to support this channel.
Someone told me to watch Future Evolutions and I think I'm going to.
Give it a gander as I go bathe.
Okay.
Let me see here.
Okay.
The violence of exhaust fumes.
Okay, people.
Thank you all.
If we like this, this will be something of a distraction because two streams at the same time is very difficult and tough to navigate, but it's worth it.
Let's do it again tomorrow.
Go watch the Chris DeSantis debate.
Here's the link one more time.
Thank you all for being here.
I'm going to go.
Take a shower, brush my hair, and go watch the debate myself.
There will be no play-out, so there's going to be a bit of a cut-off audio in Rumble.
Let's see what we got here.
It's a brilliant plan, sleeping giant, but you look a little bit like Chris Pontius from the Jackass series.
Well done, love the format.
Okay, good, good, because this also, I think, is going to be something to look back on.
And it's not accessible enough on the public inquiry website.
I mean, people can go find the website, watch it there.
It's dry.
There's no discussion.
This is good.
Okay.
So with that said, peeps, go enjoy the evening, and I will see you all on the flip side, Dude Meisters, that being tomorrow.
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