Tucker Carlson - Ep. 15 Former Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund reveals what really happened on January 6th. Our Fox News interview with him never aired, so we invited him back.
Steven Sund, former Capitol Police Chief, exposes how FBI, DHS, and military ignored January 6th threats—no Joint Intelligence Bulletin issued despite known plans for violence, chemical attacks, and killings. He details 71-minute delays in National Guard deployment due to "optics," violating federal law, while Pentagon restricted troops’ weapons and tactics. Sund accuses agencies of withholding intel (e.g., DataMiner surveillance) and questions political motives behind inaction, contrasting it with 2020 riot responses. Unanswered: why federal agents mingled with rioters without coordination, or why key figures like Pelosi’s aides blocked aid. His conclusion? A broken system of intelligence, military compliance, and partisan oversight left Capitol Police abandoned. [Automatically generated summary]
None of the intelligence that was coming up talking about the storming of the Capitol, killing members of Congress, or killing my police officers, was ever discussed at the conference calls that I was on at least.
If you wanted to understand what happened on January 6, 2021 at the U.S. Capitol, one of the first people you'd talk to, maybe the first, would be Stephen Sund.
Sund was the chief of Capitol Police that day.
He knew more about what happened than virtually anyone else in the United States.
And yet congressional investigators weren't interested in talking to him.
The media not interested in talking to him.
But we were.
So earlier this year, we did a long sit-down interview with Steven Sund about January 6th.
That interview was set to air on April 24th of this year, and it never did.
We don't own that tape, so we can't show it to you.
So instead, we invited Steven Sund back to explain what he saw and experienced that day.
What he has to say is shocking.
We recommend you watch.
Mr. Sund, thank you very much for coming back.
Thank you for having me.
I want to start with the days before January 6th, 2021. It was commonly known there was going to be a demonstration or believe there's going to be a demonstration in front of the Capitol that day.
You were the chief of Capitol Police.
You're in charge of security at the Capitol.
So it would seem logical that you would have the most intelligence, the most up-to-date, most accurate intelligence about what was likely to happen that day.
Because you're consulting with all kinds of other agencies, intel agencies, law enforcement agencies, lots of federal agencies.
But it doesn't sound like you did have the most information about what was going to happen.
I mean, what we've learned that it was out there at the time versus what we had coming into it, night and day.
And when you talk about the intelligence agency, I have my own intelligence agency up at Capitol Police, IICD, Interagency Intelligence Coordination Division.
That coordinates with the other intelligence agencies.
And now, you know, we're seeing the intelligence I was getting coming into it was indicating this was going to be just like the previous MAGA rallies, the November and December rallies that we had.
We had limited skirmishes.
We had some skirmishes afterwards down by BLM Plaza with some of the Antifa groups.
Some of the BLM groups.
But coming into it, absolutely zero with the intelligence that we know now existed, talking about attacking the Capitol, killing my police officers, attacking members of Congress and killing members of Congress.
None of that was included in the intelligence coming up too.
I'm the chief of police at the United States Capitol, probably one of the most prominent and should be the most secure building in the United States in the world.
You know, you'd like to think of that.
But when you look at it, and don't take my word for it, look at, there's now four, at least four congressional reports talking about the intelligence failure, IG reports, GAO reports talking about various intelligence failures.
But coming into it, you know, think about it.
FBI, the Washington field office, didn't put out a single document, a single official document specific to January 6th.
DHS didn't put out a single official document specific to January 6th.
That's very unusual.
I've been through many other events in Washington, D.C.
FBI would host a joint conference call at the least.
It may be a executive JTTF, Joint Terrorism Task Force briefing.
Or, for all these big events, DHS and FBI would get together and put out something that was called a JIB, a Joint Intelligence Bulletin.
So my contacts with those agencies or the other law enforcement agencies would have always been through my IICD. They were the ones that was the conduit.
We're a consumer of intelligence.
We had turned to the intelligence community to get the latest intelligence.
I know Metropolitan was hosting a conference call every couple of Mondays, and I was on a couple of those conference calls.
Nothing.
None of the intelligence that was coming up talking about the storming of the Capitol, killing members of Congress, or killing my police officers, was ever discussed in the conference calls that I was on, at least.
On January 5th, the day before the attack, at 1 p.m., I think it's one or noon.
I had a conference call with the leaders of all the law enforcement, Conti from Metropolitan Police Department, Steve D'Antuano, the director of the Washington Field Office for the FBI. Nobody from DHS was on.
I hadn't thought about that, but all the law enforcement that was down there.
I had the Military District of Washington, General Omar Jones, on the phone with me.
I had the head of the National Guard, William Walker, General William Walker, on the call.
It was a call I coordinated.
Not one person on that call talked about Any concerns for the intelligence, the attack on the Capitol, the threats to officers, that we're seeing that was out there.
And I'll tell you, I'm not the only chief that was in the dark.
You look at Robert Conte, head of the largest police department in Washington, D.C. He also said the same thing.
He wasn't getting the same notifications like the Norfolk memo that came out the day before.
He didn't get it.
So Steve D'Antuano, who's the Washington field office.
FBI. FBI director.
You look at the GAO report that came out February of this year.
It talks about multiple emails.
It's a GAO report, or maybe, no, it's a Senate report that just came out in July, just last month.
It talks about multiple emails going to Steve D'Antuano on Sunday, Monday, and some probably Tuesday, just the days before, talking about the violence that they're predicting coming up to the Capitol.
And I have a video call with him on that Tuesday, and nothing's said about it.
Especially when you think about, think about this, the military, the United States military.
And this gets really convoluted once you get into the response on January 6th and how I was delayed getting resources.
You have the United States military, Secretary of Defense, or Acting Secretary of Defense Miller, and General Milley had both discussed locking down the city of Washington, D.C. because they were so worried about violence at the Capitol on January 6th.
On Sunday and Monday, they had been discussing locking down the city.
Revoking permits on Capitol Hill because of the concern for violence.
You know who issues the permits on Capitol Hill for demonstrations?
He puts out a memo restricting the National Guard from carrying the various weapons, any weapons, any civil disobedience equipment that would be utilized for the very demonstrations or violence that he sees coming.
The military says we're so concerned about potential imminent violence that we are considering shutting down the city, but at the very same time they decide that the National Guard can't adopt an aggressive posture to protect the city.
You know, you begin to wonder why, and especially when you look at things like something that I recently came across, when you talk about the military.
General Milley, you know, we're now finding out, and it's not from me, this is from Carol Lenning, you know, investigative reporter with the Washington Post, has found that he was using DataMiner on his own, coming across intelligence.
I've done many national special security events, and this was handled differently.
No intelligence, no jib, no coordination, no...
Discussion in advance.
It's almost like they wanted it to be watered down, the intelligence to be watered down for some reason.
You know, I talked about a little bit in the book that maybe they were concerned for the Trump invoking the Insurrection Act and they were worried about that.
But I've had people, you know, there's other, you know, thoughts out there.
But, you know, luckily we still have people investigating this because I still think there's puzzle pieces missing.
Someone's going to find out what's really behind all this because it wasn't right.
The way the intelligence was handled and way out, we were set up on the Hill.
My request was shut down, one, because of optics, which is interesting.
You're going to hear that term come up a couple more times, optics or the look of the National Guard on the hill.
But yeah, and the Capitol Police Board, I mean, it's unbelievable that I'm the only chief of police in the United States that has a law preventing me, not just regulations, rules that say I've got to go and get approval to bring in the National Guard, a law.
So that's crazy that Congress is going to pass a law that controls what I can do to protect the Capitol and even in emergencies.
So think of this.
Even while we're under attack, I have to go to those same two people to request the National Guard to be brought in.
I have 340 National Guard that have been activated.
At least 150 to 180 of those are in the city, many of them within eyesight of the Capitol.
Okay?
We get to come under attack at 12.53.
12.55, I called the Washington, D.C. Police Department.
I talked to their assistant chief, Jeff Carroll.
Thank God I had talked to him at 10.59 in the morning and asked him if he could possibly put some additional resources on Constitution Avenue.
And he had some CDU platoons up there.
Called him, said, hey, please send those in right away.
Because we knew as soon as they came to their west front and they started attacking, it was going to be bad.
12.58, I make my first call to the sergeant at arms asking, saying, hey, it's bad.
We need it.
Assistance.
I need a declaration of emergency.
I need to bring in the military immediately and federal resources.
I'm told by Paul Irving, quote, I'm going to run up the chain.
Finally, at 209. 71 minutes later, 2.09, I'm finally given approval.
Think about that.
71 minutes later, I immediately call Mike Stinger, say, we've got approval.
I was so pissed off, I made sure that the watch commander, I'm in the command center, I yelled to John Wisham, the lieutenant, that's my watch commander, I said, John, mark the time as 2.10, I finally got approval for the National Guard.
And my story hasn't changed in two and a half years.
So when they first put out the notice and they were talking about having the hearing, it was only for current employees.
They were still in place.
No one that was no longer in place in their position in security.
So think about that.
Initially, when they put up the request to have, and they put up the, they were talking about having the hearing, it would have excluded Paul Irving, would have excluded Mike Stinger, and it would have excluded me.
Only three people.
The three people at the top of the security apparatus.
So, just to circle back to this Paul Irving, who played a pivotal role, I think whose name is unknown to most people, even people who follow what happened on January 6th.
Now, you know, when you look back and you see some of the intel that was out there, and I reference a lot of it in the book, there's intel talking about going up and killing the palace guards.
Those are my officers.
There are intel talking about using chemicals at some of the entry points.
There's intel indicating that they've done surveillance on some of the entry points at the Capitol.
None of that's been included.
They talk about burning down the Supreme Court.
They talk about different attacks on different members of Congress.
And they talk about storming the building.
Not a single word of that is included in any of the intelligence assessments.
And a matter of fact, my intelligence unit is putting out documents on the 4th, 5th, and 6th indicating a low probability of civil disobedience.
So, I mean, if you were, and I'm not, but if you were conspiracy-minded, you might think that certain agencies concluded there was likely to be chaos at the Capitol.
And that served their political purposes, and so they let it happen, and they prevented you from stopping it.
You know, when you tie that into a number of other things that happen, and if you haven't been, I'd love to take you through some of the military stuff really quick.
So the way it would work is, like I said, through a program, a lot of times the military will come out, they'll do support for civil authorities, whether it's COVID response.
They did it during the avian flu.
But they'll also do it during civil disobedience.
We've used them for, I've activated and sworn in hundreds, if not thousands, of National Guard troops for IMF World Bank, for inauguration.
So we'll have them to help line the parade route, just to help us fortify the perimeter.
We'll have, sometimes we'll have...
What their QRF, Quick Response Force, in reserve in case we need additional civil disturbance support.
So that's how they'll kind of support law enforcement.
So 340 were activated for traffic control and management of crowds around metro stations.
So they weren't backed up and stuff like that.
Not for specific civil disobedience.
So we knew we had National Guard in there.
And the Defense Support for Civil Authorities program is...
If we become overwhelmed, our backstop for law enforcement, and I've used up all my resources, and I was overwhelmed, would have been the military, specifically the National Guard.
So 209, I get approval to bring in the National Guard, probably 210, 211. My first call, well, I've already called General Walker.
Called General Walker at 151. I was like, I can't wait any freaking longer.
I call him.
I said, send me the National Guard as quick as you can.
I'm going to get approval any minute, because he asked, will you have approval from the Capitol Police Board?
And I said, I'll have approval any minute.
Please just get them coming this way.
So they're within eyesight.
Shortly after 209, I talked to them.
234, I get a notification to get on the call with the United States Pentagon.
I have to sell my request to the National Guard.
I'm on the call with a Lieutenant General, Piat, trying to make sure I have his name pronounced right, and a General Flynn is on the call.
And it's mainly Piat that I'm speaking with.
I get on the call.
Mayor Bowser's on the call.
Chief Conte's on the call.
And I said, I need the National Guard immediately.
This is an urgent, urgent situation.
I still remember saying urgent twice.
This is urgent, urgent.
They've got to be looking at the same TVs I'm looking at.
I need the National Guard immediately.
You know what his response is?
I don't like the optics of the National Guard on Capitol Hill.
He goes, I would rather have your officers in the fight and we can backfill your officers somewhere else.
I said, I don't have that option.
All my officers are in the fight.
He goes, I'm telling you, I don't like the option of the National Guard.
You know, I don't like the optics of the National Guard on the Hill.
I said, sir, we're having our asses hand to us.
This is life or death.
I need assistance immediately.
And I still remember, he said, you know, my recommendation is not to support the request.
I still remember Robert Conte going, whoa, whoa, hold on.
You're denying the chief of the Capitol Police?
And he goes, not that we're denying them.
I just don't like the optics of the National Guard on Capitol Hill.
And he goes, I'd rather, and he goes back to that again, I'd rather backfill your people.
So I beg and beg, and he goes, well, I'm going to walk down the hall and, you know, we'll talk to the Secretary of Defense or whoever he's going to talk to.
Right then I get notification.
So I'm still on the call.
We have the shooting of Ashley Babbitt.
And I said, we have shots fired.
I still remember yelling over the phone.
We have shots fired on the U.S. Capitol.
Is that urgent enough for you now?
Hang up the phone because now I've got to start making my notifications.
I've got to call the Sergeant Arms saying, hey, we've got what looks like maybe a confirmed shooting.
Do you know when the National Guard finally arrived?
6 p.m.
6 p.m.
they're sworn in on post.
Do you know those National Guard, the 150 to 180 that are within eyesight of the Capitol, you know what they do with them?
They put them in vehicles, drive them around the Capitol back to the D.C. Armory.
I mean, I don't know what the other conclusion is.
Because, look, under pressure, people make mistakes and make bad decisions.
But you're describing a systematic denial of intelligence and then of support, defense.
Through a whole bunch of different agencies, a whole bunch of different people, all reaching the same baffling conclusion that we're not going to protect the Capitol.
I was looking at the cameras that were surrounding me with my officers, the men and women of the Capitol Police and the other law enforcement agencies.
You know, in a fight for their life.
All I wanted to do was get them resources.
I hadn't even sat back and at that point started thinking about the political aspects of it.
And I will tell you, when they finally showed up, New Jersey State Police beat them to the Capitol before the D.C. National Guard arrived at the Capitol.
I had D.C. National Guard's men and women that were infuriated.
They were so pissed off that they weren't allowed to respond.
And I think it is important to bring up the intelligence.
It's important for people to realize, again, as the United States Capitol Police, we're not part of the intelligence community, the technical IC. There's 18 agencies.
Nine of those agencies are military agencies.
So that gives you an idea of how heavily weighted half of the IC is military.
But in your career, have you seen evidence that the half of the IC, half of those 18 intel agencies, the military ones, are working in the United States?
So in the aftermath of January 6th, there's been a huge debate over to what extent, you know, there were federal agents or people who are working in some way for federal agencies in the crowd.
And the initial explanation was, well, none.
And you're insane if you think that.
You know, you're Alex Jones.
You're crazy.
And then over the last couple of years, we've seen people confirm, people in authority confirm, actually, yeah, there were a lot in the crowd that day.
I mean, that's now a fact.
Did you know that going in?
No.
So just for perspective, since you've been to a lot of these events, there's a planned demonstration in Washington, D.C. Will there always be?
Assets, agents, people working for federal agencies in the crowd in civilian clothes?
And for, like, inaugurations, there would usually be some combined teams out there, one for communications, but just, you know, for situational awareness.
So it wouldn't be surprising, you know, Fourth of July, different things like that, where you have threat pictures or concerning threat pictures.
So coming into January 6th, and I talk about it in the book with the fact that shortly after January 6th, I'm driving through Loudoun County.
Actually, I just talked to somebody from the Hill.
And I get a call from overseas.
And it's press.
I don't remember what it was.
It's somebody from Great Britain.
And they started asking me about feds in the crowd.
And I was like, no, no, I would have been told.
I said, no, we're getting word that there's feds in the crowd.
And I said, no, I would have been told.
I've got lots of friends with the Bureau.
They all have my cell phone number.
They would have told me.
You know, thinking about that, and Jill Sanborn's testimony in 2021 where she said they were taking overt action to keep certain people from coming to January 6th to Washington, D.C. That's big for FBI to start taking overt action.
I mean, that's not covert, overt.
That's a big deal.
Fast forward to February of this year, 2023, in the GAO report that says on January 3rd, the FBI was tracking four domestic terrorists that were talking about coming to Washington, D.C., the Washington Field Office, their AOR, area of responsibility.
By January 6th, they were tracking 18 or 19, it's in the GAO report, domestic terrorists.
So think about that.
They have 18 or 19 domestic terrorists coming to this event.
So of course they're going to have resources on them.
So, I mean, it seems like common sense suggests anyway that you would have to tell the chief of Capitol Police that, hey, we've got our guys in the crowd.
Like, just because...
I mean, you would want to know the difference, correct?
You'd coordinate with Secret Service, just so everyone kind of knew what was going on.
And really quickly, I do want to say this.
You know, nowhere do I want to imply or indicate that I feel that...
Agents instigated this or in any way like that.
I'm never saying that.
I haven't said that.
And a lot of these agencies came to my defense on January 6th.
FBI, Secret Service, stuff like that.
So I just want to make sure that's clear.
But there would have been some coordination.
And when you look at it and you think with the intelligence coming in, if you think there's 19 domestic terrorists coming to Washington, D.C., somehow that would have been included in some type of report.
And when you look at the FBI's procedures, policies and procedures, and again, go online.
Attorney General's guidance for domestic operations of the FBI specifically says the FBI is to do an assessment, an assessment which includes intelligence assessments of events that they're identifying as being the target of possible threats and possible violence.
I think that would have been the United States Capitol on January 6th.
Look through that document.
I outlined it in the book.
And see all the repeated failure after failure after failure of firearm procedures to start identifying intelligence and making the proper notifications.
But it does raise—and I don't have the answer to this question, and I hope I don't ever pretend that I do—but it does raise questions about the behavior of some of the people in the crowd who were instigating others to break the law and who weren't arrested.
And, you know, given our facial recognition software capabilities— Hard to believe they can't be found.
And I would specifically cite a man called Ray Epps, who's now a hero on the left and funded by the Democratic Party, etc.
But take the politics out of it.
What is that?
Here you have a guy on camera repeatedly saying, we're going to the Capitol!
So my concern with that, and I look at it from a chief of police point of view, is you have somebody that's down, and I believe he's right near the old executive office building on the 5th, the day before January 6th, talking to a group of people talking about, we have to get into the building.
We have to get in the building.
And then the next day to see him at what's called the Pennsylvania Avenue Gate.
It's one of the two fence lines I had down at the west front.
And he's there and he clearly sees the metal crowd control barriers that are up with the signs saying restricted.
So he knows that's a restricted area.
And he's up there and you see him lean in and he whispers in somebody's ear and he covers his mouth in such a way so you can't read his lips or anything.
Whispers in somebody's ear and that person moments later is attacking my officers.
Yeah, I think if you watch the video, you see that person immediately go and start pulling on the gate and start, you know, fighting with the officers.
And what's interesting is when...
I believe he went on 60 Minutes.
And on 60 Minutes...
What he said was he went up to the officer and he told that officer, these officers are on our side.
Don't hurt these officers.
I believe that was pretty much not verbatim.
But don't hurt these officers.
They're on our side.
Don't hurt these officers.
Well, if that's the case, why would you cover your mouth and not yell it to everybody?
Because it didn't seem like that protester was the only one that was possibly going to be hurting the officers.
Well, if you have, again, going back to what I'm reading now in the GO report with 19 domestic terrorists possibly coming in, I've never seen anything like that in Washington, D.C., so you may have a larger-than-usual presence.
I don't know what she had and what she didn't have, but I do know that when you look at it, and we immediately knew, I mean, anybody immediately knew, one of the first things you start thinking about is this an intelligence failure.
So think about it.
We go through January 6th.
I was begging for the National Guard, refused before, refused during it.
We get the Capitol under control.
You know, I get them to where they can go back into session, 7.30.
They elect to go in at 8, and then the House goes at 9. But nonetheless, so think about this.
The very next day, less than 24 hours after we got control of the Capitol, Nancy Pelosi goes on national TV, blames the leadership at the top of Capitol Police.
Calls for my resignation on national TV and then lies about me.
Okay?
The very next day, the very next day, puts Yogananda Pittman as acting chief.
There was a hearing just recently that was on TV, you can look at it, where the chief of police, Tom Manger, was asked about.
It turns out that she was given some type of a secret leave so she could leave, start her job on February 1st as the chief of police and not retire from the Capitol Police for months later.
What you're saying is that the head of intelligence for the Capitol Police, which demonstrably didn't have the intelligence it needed to protect the building...
That person was first elevated to acting chief of Capitol Police and then given a very high-paying job right across from Nancy Pelosi's district at the University of California, Berkeley.
I believe we impaneled this committee or commission, this body of members of Congress that went on for about a year and was on the news every single night.
How could you have a January 6th commission whose job it is to figure out what happened on January 6th?
Not get to the bottom of, like, why the head of intelligence at Capitol Police didn't pass on the intelligence, why the chief of Capitol Police was kept in the dark and denied support from the U.S. military, why Yogananda Pittman wound up after failing on January 6th, getting a high-paying job right across Nancy Pelosi's district.
Yeah, well, I know there's people on the Hill still trying to ask those questions, and hopefully they can get answers, but it looks like they keep running into roadblock after roadblock after roadblock.
But it's hard to believe.
Two and a half years later, We're still at this point.
I still think somebody along the line is going to find, you know, the smoking gun, the missing puzzle piece, and put this together.
But it does.
When you look at it, and there's still so much more to it, it just begins to raise more and more questions.
I knew there was something strange going on pretty soon.
When I was running into the issues with them not wanting me to testify, I was like, this starts getting a little weird.
And then when I started sitting down and talking to officers and getting information and finding out from some of the intelligence that was out there and where it was and seeing some of the emails of the intelligence analysts pushing it up to their officials, I knew something was fishy.
I mean, think about it.
How can somebody not look at all this and think something's odd?
To get to the bottom of questions, these are at least to ask the questions of knowledgeable people with relevant experience, and you're at the top of that list.
We interviewed you, never aired, at a previous job, but how many other long interviews have you done with media outlets?
I talk about the White House, and I talk about an agency that was formed by Congress specifically for the protection of the United States president, the Washington, D.C. Police Department.
The White House is under attack, and they are prevented.
They are prevented.
I know it's not from Chief Newsham.
He was the chief at the time.
It would have been from above him.
They're prevented from going on White House grounds and helping the United States Secret Service and defending the White House.
I mean, it sounds like Trump is the key to all of this.
If Trump hadn't been the president, things would have been very...
Responses would have been very different, don't you think?
I mean, if Barack Obama had been president, do you think that someone would have told MPD, the Washington, D.C. Police Department, they couldn't protect the White House?
Look, I mean, it's a—I shouldn't ask you to answer hypothetical questions, but it does seem—it seems a little amazing.
Last question.
Thank you for doing this again.
I really appreciate it.
I think this is important, and I hope that everyone who's interested in January 6th and its aftermath, which really has changed the country, will watch this interview.
But looking back, after spending your entire life in law enforcement, how have your views changed after January 6th?
I mean, my views of law enforcement, I still think law enforcement is a very honorable profession.
I really, really do.
I think it's being screwed up in a lot of cities.
I feel bad for a lot of people that are going into it.
We need good cops.
But right now, their hands are being tied.
When you look at what law enforcement's going on, I mean, I was just talking with somebody who, one of their officers in Washington, D.C., arrested somebody who went to a scene of a robbery, recovered a weapon.
Recovered somebody else's wallet in possession with the suspect.
Made the arrest.
Papered a gun.
Went in the person's pocket during the search.
Found a loaded handgun.
Went down to papers.
No paper.
Armed robbery.
Means all charges were dropped.
That's bad.
That's bad when we're seeing the type of crime that we're seeing in some of these cities and they're not prosecuting some of these cases.
I feel sorry for the officers.
It's very dangerous for them.
You know, I still, you know, love the profession, still love the officers with the Capitol Police, Washington, D.C. Police, still talk to them regularly.
They're going through a lot, and I just don't think they're getting the backing they need.