Self-Harming Monks Who Listen to Bad Music - What Is the Purpose of Ethics?
|
Time
Text
What is the purpose slash goal of doing ethics?
How is universal preference, as defined in the book, Universally Preferable Behavior, on page 33 and 34, different from an indicative conditional?
Use a bunch more questions, but that's good to start off with.
All right.
Nice to meet you.
How are you doing?
I'm doing fine.
How are you?
Well, thanks.
Let's start with the first question.
What is the point of doing ethics?
Is that right?
Yep.
Well, ethics gets sexually frustrated and it likes to be done.
Just kidding.
Okay, tell me what you mean by doing ethics.
We're not talking about roofing ethics.
This is a seduction-based scenario.
What do you mean by doing ethics?
It's a little hard to explain.
It's sort of the notion when someone, I guess, does something like, I guess, theology.
I guess what I was...
Hang on.
No, no, no.
What are you dragging theology in for?
We're talking about ethics.
Yeah, I know.
I'm giving an analogy because it's a little hard to sort of explain.
So if someone does that and I say to them, what's the goal of doing it?
I would imagine they would give an answer of the sort that they're trying to understand, I guess, what God is, right?
But then in doing ethics, I suppose, I guess, why would someone, I guess, want to figure out, or at least why would you even conceive of a notion that there are certain behaviors people ought to act, I guess, in accordance with?
Right, right.
I mean, it's an old question.
And, um, it goes a little something like this.
Good people don't need an ethical theory to be good.
I don't wake up in the morning seething with a mad desire to torture animals and set fire to buildings and so on, but I'm like, ugh!
Evil blocked by UPB. Damn it!
If only I hadn't developed that theory, I could unleash all the Anglo-Saxon pointy-headed evil in the world.
And so good people don't need a system of ethics to be good, and bad people...
Won't become good because they've heard a good system of ethics.
So it kind of leaves ethics, as they used to say when I was a kid, at sixes and sevens, which means it's kind of like halfway in between a useless place and another useless place.
Is that something to do with what you're asking?
Yes, but if you sort of explain it that way, then it seems like a sort of, I guess, pointless endeavor.
Because even if you do do a good job...
The people that, I guess, that would take it already don't need it, and the people that do need it won't take it.
Like, we're waiting for Luigi, the pockmarked mafioso hitman, to call into the show and say, I decided to stop shooting people because I read UPV. That, to me, I gotta think that'd be kind of a killer scoop in the world of philosophy.
Now, to be fair, we have...
We have got people out of the military.
We've got people to convince others to get out of the military.
We've got people out of abusive relationships.
So, you know, all of that is great.
But I think that there is a very important foundational, fundamental reason as to why we would do ethics.
And I can give you a little rant about that, and then you can tell me what you think if that helps.
All right.
So, I have not instructed, say, my daughter on a complicated system of ethics because she is an incredibly nice person to begin with.
And not nice like, oh, can I offer you some more tea?
Would you like anything from my savings account?
You know, not a sort of one of these drippy people, but a really nice person who also knows when it's time to be firm and, oh, you know, I like to think that I've modeled some of that behavior and so on.
So, I don't need a system of ethics for her because, you know, she's been treated gently and kindly and respectfully and peacefully her whole life, so she doesn't need a system of ethics.
However, I am instructing her in ethics as a whole.
I don't need to instruct her in ethics for her to be a good person, but I need to instruct her in ethics because of other people.
The question is not, will ethics make a good person good or a bad person good?
No.
Ethics is self-defense against bad people.
That's the missing part.
We look at individuals in isolation not as an aggregation or not as a social collective or as social atoms that are continually trying to influence each other.
And So you need, like, why, outside of hunting, right?
And why do people have guns?
Why do people have guns?
They have guns because bad people have guns, right?
It's self-defense against bad people.
You didn't just own a gun if you lived on a desert island.
Maybe you want to shoot a coconut out of the air or something, but wing a turn and eat it.
But we have ethics as self-defense against those whose, the evil people, their greatest power is the redefinition of ethics, right?
Yeah.
The redefinition of ethics.
I mean, I've talked about this before on the show, just touching it briefly here, the question of guilt.
If you can make people feel guilty, in particularly European case-elected people, it creates a situation of discomfort, which they will then pay to be alleviated off.
So if you can convince someone that they have, you know, white privilege or patriarchy or that they're responsible for slavery or they profited from colonialism and so on.
Like, people always say this in the comments whenever I talk about Europe and the rest of the world.
Well, Europe got all of its money from pillaging and so on.
Yeah, that's right.
Because nobody pillaged before Europe came along.
Boy, everybody was just...
It was one giant robot city of infinite bliss before Europe came along and took a giant dump on the glorified hippie kumbaya group hugs of everybody's sharing and cooperation.
So, of course, every culture pillaged and raped and slaughtered and murdered and conquered and all that when it could.
But there was something quite different about the Industrial Revolution and some still existing vestiges of human freedom that Europe developed.
But if you can make people feel guilty, then they'll give you stuff, right?
But you make good people feel guilty by applying collective standards of bad behavior.
They're bad because they're in a category.
The category is bad.
So if you're a Catholic, then if you're born, you're born into original sin and you're tainted with the disobedience of Adam and Eve.
You didn't have to do anything.
That's the key thing.
Corrupt people will convince you.
You didn't have to do anything in order for you to be guilty.
It is not an individual action on your part that has caused the guilt, the bad behavior that you are guilty of.
It's because you're part of a category.
You're a white male, so you're privileged.
You're a European, so you profited from slavery and colonialism.
There's just this whole category that you must feel guilty because you are part of a particular category.
And therefore, you must give people things in order to make that guilt go away.
And of course, it's basically emotional blackmail.
And I don't know how we can break that word down.
But it's emotional blackmail.
And the way that it works is appeasement brings more demands.
Appeasement brings more demands.
And, you know, maybe that's why Charlie Sheen went positive with his HIV statistics.
He's playing off all these blackmailers.
Although he did, actually.
So there's this general collective guilt that people can try and impose upon you.
And so they'll say, basically, particularly, and they won't say it explicitly, it has to be just generally implied and so on, and with a weight of historical passive aggression behind it, which is a clear warning that if you defy, they're going to escalate until you comply, verbal attacks or whatever.
So there's this general...
You are part of this race category, and therefore you are bad.
Or you are part of some other race category, in which case you're good.
You are a victim, you can't be racist yourself, and you're always right in any conflict and so on, right?
Or there are Asians who nobody likes to talk about because they don't fit the mold of white racism because they generally do better in white countries than white people do.
So...
Why should we care about ethics in that situation?
Well, it's self-defense against racism in this case, right?
Because obviously to say white people or white males are collective recipients of institutional privilege, which they get by oppressing other people, Well, of course, the rational response is, okay, well, I haven't oppressed any black person.
No, no, it doesn't work that way.
You don't have to actually do it.
You just, you know, the numbers have to deviate in some manner.
You know, like there are fewer blacks making more money or fewer blacks in college or fewer blacks in high levels of occupation and so on.
And therefore, oppression clings to you like, I don't know.
Some media ex-girlfriend won't take no for an answer.
Like what?
Like white on rice.
Like white on rice.
That's pretty good.
That's pretty good.
So, of course, the lunatic thing here is that when people say, well, you know, white males are wrong, white males are oppressors and this and that and the other, they're making a collective judgment about race that is somehow supposed to be anti-racist, right?
I mean, I literally cannot think of anything that I could say about blacks or Asians as an aggregate.
I mean, even the categories are kind of fuzzy.
So, I couldn't honestly say, well, blacks are this or Asians are that, but people can say this about why it's the last legitimate group left to hate on the planet.
And so why would you need ethics?
You need ethics because you need self-defense against manipulations.
Or, you know, the idea that, well, the government is here to protect you from aggression, from the initiation of force.
It's like, oh, how is this government funded?
By aggressing against you and initiating force.
Hmm.
I think, like, if there was no government and you put this forward in a philosophy course, you wouldn't even get past the intro to philosophy stuff, right?
Is that right?
Naomi Campbell is half black, half Asian?
Tiger Woods?
I mean, obviously he's half mammal, half foliage, so that's really confusing.
But is that right?
Half black, half Asian?
That's what the internet tells me.
It does.
I'm not sure why you have Google alerts for half black, half Asian, Michael, but I'd really like you to forward me those links if you don't mind.
Yeah, it's Photoshop.
That's right.
So I think that we study ethics for the same reason that you carry a gun in a bad neighborhood, if it's legal, right?
In that there are other people out there who are going to try and do you harm through appealing to ethical norms or standards, and you need a way to defend against them so that they'll not be able to trigger guilt in you, right?
So that would be my sense.
What do you think?
It seems really good.
And also, it's sort of interesting because if you put it that way, then it's sort of like evil people do ethics so they can, I guess, acquire more power and get away with doing things.
And so the good people have to do it in order to defend themselves.
Dude, you just finished the show.
I'm going to go for a smoke.
That was Stone Genius.
Yeah, absolutely right.
I couldn't agree with you more.
Because we agree, we know they're right.
Oh yeah, and getting to the second question, which really has to do with the book, on page 30, should I just read the part?
Are you currently calling from a shower?
No, it's just I'm close to a kitchen.
Oh, okay.
It's not the end of the world, but if there's any way the person could wash their feet later, that would be excellent.
I'll take a burger if we're going that way.
You have to remember, you have to talk something about bad taste in music.
Can we have that pickup artist about that?
All right.
So, do you want me to quote from the book?
I'm saying, can I just read those parts?
Yeah, yeah.
On page 30, you define universal preference, and then again in page 33 to 34.
And there's a slight difference in the definitions you put forward, and I'm not sure which one I guess we should go by.
So the first one says, when I speak of universal preference, I'm really defining what is objectively required or necessary, assuming a particular goal.
And on page 33 to 34...
It's defined as, when I talk about universal preferences, I'm talking about what people should prefer, not what they always do prefer.
To use the scientific analogy, to truly understand the universe, people should use the scientific method.
This does not mean they always do so, since clearly millions of people consult ancient fairy tales rather than modern science for answers.
So there's a slight difference in those definitions.
I'm not sure if it's the same and I'm just confused.
Well, I don't see the slight difference, but because it's my book, maybe I'm not as objective about it as you are.
So let's go through the first one and just make sure we understand it.
Go through the second.
Sure.
And then see if we can find the difference.
So, sorry, the first quote again?
When I speak of a universe of preference, I'm really defining what is objectively required or necessary, assuming a particular goal.
Okay.
So the sentence is here.
Sorry, you've read it.
I just want to give the whole paragraph.
When I speak of universal preference, I'm really defining what is objectively required or necessary, assuming a particular goal.
If I want to live, I do not have to like jazz, but I must eat.
Eating remains a preference.
I do not have to eat in the same way that I have to obey gravity, but eating is a universal objective and a binding requirement for staying alive, since it relies on biological facts that cannot be wished away.
So there are three categories here, right?
One is preferences that are not central to living, like liking jazz or not liking jazz, but still a choice, obviously.
Second is preferences essential for living that are a choice, like whether you eat or not.
And the third is things that are not open to your choice, like whether you can choose to obey gravity or not, right?
Yeah.
Okay, universal preference, objectively required or necessary.
Now, we always have to assume a particular goal.
I don't think you can have a preference that is in any way universal that can avoid the need for a particular goal.
So, that's why we have to assume a particular goal.
Otherwise, there can't be any universality in the preferences.
Sorry, because if it's not tied into anything objective or out there or a goal that is preferred, then it is just a subjective preference like, I like jazz, which can't really be part of philosophy then.
So, okay, we've got universal preference if you want to assume a particular goal.
Now, the way this works in ethics, at least as far as I see, is that if you are claiming that...
You are putting forward an ethical theory or an ethical proposition, then it has to fall into the categories of universal, preferable, and behavior, right?
That's sort of my argument.
And for those who want the book, it's at freedomainradio.com slash free.
You can get audiobook or PDF or HTML or any of those sort of things.
And...
So that first aspect is pretty clear, at least to me, right?
And again, I make the whole case in the book.
But if you say that something's ethical, then it has to be universal.
Because if it's not universal, then it's a personal or subjective preference, like I like jazz or I like ice cream.
If it is universal, then it has to be something that can be preferred.
Like you can't have as your universal system of ethics defying gravity.
I mean, you can, but it'll be a pretty short-lived movement with a lot of splatter marks.
And so it has to be universal, it has to be preferable, and it has to be behavior, not thoughts, because thoughts can't be verified objectively.
And this is why there's no such thing as thought crimes outside of Missouri University.
So that's the first sentence.
I'm not saying that's perfect, but that's the first paragraph.
And can you give me the second again?
The second one is at the end of page 33.
Which is, does, when I talk about universal preferences, I'm talking about what people should prefer, not what they always do prefer.
Yes.
Okay.
And why are these...
So what I'm saying, okay, if you have a particular preference, there's objective ways to achieve it.
And then when I talk about universal preferences, I'm talking about what people should prefer, not what they always do prefer.
Because if people always did prefer something, you wouldn't need a system of ethics, because it would be involuntary.
Like, there's no system of ethics that involves obedience to gravity, because obedience to gravity is involuntary.
So it has to be something about that people have a choice about preferring, if that makes sense.
And that's why I say I'm talking about people should prefer, not what they always do prefer.
Yeah, I understand that.
But I'm saying the difference, I guess, I perceive is that the previous one sort of denotes assuming some certain goals, but this one doesn't necessarily include such a clause.
When I talk about universal preferences, I'm talking about what people should prefer, not what they always do prefer.
To use a scientific analogy to truly understand the universe, people should use the scientific method.
It doesn't mean they always do.
They consult Bibles and stuff.
There is no way to achieve truth about the universe without science, but people are perfectly free to redefine truth as error and content themselves with mystical nonsense.
So, I don't include the goal thing here, but I don't deny the goal thing here.
Does that make sense?
Yes.
So I've said, okay, well, we need a goal.
And here I say, okay, well, I'm making sure that people understand that it is preferable.
In other words, people can prefer it, but they don't always prefer it.
And again, I can't think of anything in this life that people always prefer.
I mean, maybe you can.
I've given myself this thought exercise a couple of times.
But, you know, what do people always prefer?
Sex?
No, they're amongst.
Money?
No, they're amongst.
Life?
No, there are suicides.
You know, good music?
No, there's Nickelback.
Oh, I don't even know why I say things.
I don't even have any particular opinion about Nickelback.
But they're just a band that people like to make fun of, and who am I to not follow the craft?
So, I can't think of anything that people...
Always prefer.
So, I'm not denying the preference part here or the goal part here, but I don't think it denies it.
Now, if I said, well, you know, you don't need a goal or a goal is bad or whatever, that would be in contradiction.
To the earlier part, but the fact that I don't remind people of the goal here when I'm talking about something else, I don't think is a contradiction.
It may be somewhat incomplete, but again, you can't pull everything together.
I'm not saying, I was just getting the idea that, is it the same thing?
And now you're sort of confirming that it is in fact the same thing.
Yeah, I mean, it is almost a tautology, but not quite, I think, which is to say that, I mean, if people accept that ethics have to be universally preferable behaviors, Then the behaviors have to be universal and preferable and behaviors, right?
I mean, it sounds like a tautology, but it's not because I do go through the reason as to why ethics has to conform to these three standards, that it's universal, that it's preferable, and that it's behavior.
So it's not quite a tautology, but once we accept that, so if people want to put forward an ethical theory, ethical theories are binding on other people.
Yeah.
I mean, otherwise, they're not ethical theories.
It has to be something that, can you go to jail for it?
Do other people have the right to defend against it?
Do they have the right to shoot you if you violate it, break into their house or gnaw on their leg or something like that?
And so if ethics is something which is enforceable upon others and binding upon others, then There must be a mechanism by which that can be established and proven.
And again, people can act against it.
But the purpose to me of ethics is to give people the right of self-defense intellectually, right?
Because if you can defend yourself intellectually, for the most part, you won't need to defend yourself physically.
The physical defense is always the end result of a lack of an intellectual defense, right?
Like, I mean, the sort of, quote, compatibility between Western European Female-friendly, maybe over-friendly cultures and say something like Islam.
Well, there's a lack of intellectual clarity and defense about that first.
And as a result, there's a need for a physical defense, which is not achievable because people aren't allowed to have weapons.
So I hope that makes some kind of sense.
Yeah, that makes sense.
And now, given that definition, my, I guess, question then is, how is it different from an indicative conditional, which is the if-then statement?
Like if this is true, then this must also sort of follow.
Like if you want to find out the truth about, I guess, the physical world, you should use the scientific method sort of statements.
Okay, and just because people, indicative conditionals is not always particularly clear for people.
So here's something from Plato.Stanford.edu.
It was first published Wednesday, August 8th, 2001.
Oh no, it's been revised since, so I assume it's still there.
Take a sentence in the indicative mood suitable for making a statement.
We'll be home by 10.
Tom cooked the dinner.
Attach a conditional...
Clause to it.
And you have a sentence which makes a conditional statement.
We'll be home by 10 if the train is on time.
Or if Mary didn't cook the dinner, Tom cooked it.
And they go into, you know, you can look this up, just indicative conditionals.
And it is people who have a lot of time on their hands and I guess enjoy drawing logic trees rather than going out and helping people in the real world spend a lot of time on this kind of stuff.
And so my way of saying is that if you wish me to be bound by your system of ethics, you must establish that your ethical theory is universally preferable behavior.
And that's my self-defense.
That's my self-defense.
If people scream at me that I'm privileged and I need to groffle before them, I would question their knowledge of the word privilege because that does not sound like very privileged behavior to me.
Or when people say, well, as a white male, have you ever experienced racism?
It's like, you know, there's a lot of people who don't get hired who are white males because people are trying to hit particular quotas.
And so, you know, I just...
Need that defense because people will constantly come at you and try and define discomfort into your limbic system so that you'll pay them off, you know?
It's like this old...
It's an old thing in movies where someone injects you with a poison and you have 24 hours to find the cure or you're going to die and so on.
And that's what people do is people will come up to you and it's not...
It's every race and every culture and every creed and every...
It's all over the place.
They'll come up to you and say...
You're bad.
Yeah.
And you'll say, well, what did I do?
Oh, it's not something you do.
It's something you are.
It's like, what?
So I'm bad because reasons?
No reasons.
You're bad because category.
I don't think a category can be bad.
Can I be judged as an individual?
No!
You can't be judged as an individual because category or whatever, right?
I mean, and this could be the case in many different contexts.
And so the defense is, okay, well, so you're saying that you have a category of ethics.
Is it universal?
Right?
In other words, does it apply to everyone equally all the time and in all circumstances?
Yeah.
Okay, that's the first, right?
Are you talking about something that people can prefer or not?
Now, I can't not prefer to be a white male.
Look, man, I took dance classes in theater school.
Trust me when I say, world out there, I cannot choose to not be a white male.
People would actually come to watch me do dance routines because they just found it funny.
Basically, it was like a fast-fed compilation of failed videos watched on acid.
So, clearly, I can't choose to not be a white male, and therefore, the second part is not valid.
And if it's behavior, if I'm supposed to have done something that's bad or oppressive to women or minorities or something, point to me the behavior that I've done.
So, this sort of social justice warrior stung, SJW versus UPB. One of them is Ronda Rousey.
Well, Ronda Rousey, before the last match.
And then it switches.
Anyway, I'm going to overuse that metaphor, but analogy.
So yeah, if someone comes up to me and says, like, you're a bad guy because you're a white privileged male who's racist because category or something.
Okay, I say, well, is it universal?
No, because it only applies to white males.
Is it behavior that I've done that has rendered me to be bad?
Well, no, because they can't point to any specific behavior that I've done that is racist or exclusionary or something like that.
And is it something I can prefer or not?
Well, no, because I'm in a biological category that I can't hop out of no matter what my thoughts may be.
I can't will my outie peepee to suddenly become a burrowing anteater innie.
And so...
That fails, right?
So this is the, you know, and people say, well, how can you stand up?
Because I have UPB. The cavalry is riding in.
And when people say, oh, you're a bad guy because X, Y, and Z category, it's like, okay, I just put it through the UPB mill and it fails at every conceivable level.
So that's my self-defense.
And that's kind of the gift that I try to put out to the world to give people the self-defense of People coming up to you and saying, well, you're bad!
You're bad!
And by the way, can you give me money?
I won't say that you're bad.
Well, I'll stop saying you're bad for about 12 minutes, then I'll come back saying you're even worse until you give me more money, and then repeat until society collapses.
But it is giving people the gift of saying, okay, well, this person's making a moral proposition.
Does it pass the test of universally preferable behavior?
And if it doesn't, I don't have to listen to it at all.
That's my fundamental reason as to why.
It's not going to make bad people good, and it's not going to make good people get better, but what it does is it blocks the The sliding slope that bad people like to create wherein resources flow from the overstimulated guilty consciences of good people towards people who say aren't so good.
It blocks the resource transfer of manipulative ethics that grabs resources from good people and deposits them in the lap of bad people.
So it ends the subsidy for bad people from good people and that's my particular goal.
Okay.
Just to be sure, the question about how it's different from indicative conditional, you say it's because of, I guess, logical complications that it was easier to present it this way.
Well, I mean, when I say if you want to achieve a particular goal or there's a conditional, then it's in that category, right?
It's not gravity is, right, which is not a conditional.
Yeah.
And, um, so whenever there's an if, right?
If you want to do X, ABC is the way to go.
If you want to head north, go that way, right?
If you don't want to head north, whatever, right?
Yeah.
So, um...
It is within that category.
But if you sort of take the long view out, logic itself is in that category.
If you wish for your statements to even be potentially true, they have to be internally consistent.
First and foremost, they have to be logically consistent.
And secondly, they have to be in accordance with empirical reality.
So everything that has a value attached to it has that kind of if-then statement.
You know, if you're hungry...
Go get something to eat, right?
If you're not hungry, then you don't, right?
There's no commandment that says, go get something to eat, unless you happen to be in Florida and you're American, in which case that seems to be their UPV. So, I think everything that...
But people make the mistake of thinking, well, because it's conditional, if then, then somehow it's subjective.
I don't think that's the case at all.
There are some if-thens which are subjective.
If you like jazz, then go and see Yanni play whatever that weird hippie stick is that he beats up music with and go do that.
But that's not an ethical statement.
Aesthetics perhaps is another matter.
But there are absolutes out there.
Which are entirely around if-then.
And they're around choice and preferences and so on, right?
If you want to not have a stomachache, don't eat gravel while listening to Nickelback.
Anyway.
But it doesn't mean that they're subjective.
Yeah, I understand.
Okay.
And which brings me to page 35, premise 4.
And it says...
There's really one statement in it that I guess I'm interested in, and it's in the last line, which is that truth is universally preferable to error and that truth is universally objective.
Given, I guess, the definition of universally preferable we're going with, when you say truth is universally preferable to error, It's unclear, at least to me, what this statement, I guess, means.
Because, again, going by the notion that it's sort of conditional, what, I guess, universal preference is sort of pseudo-conditional.
Then when you say truth, it's universally preferable to error, as opposed to what?
As opposed to error.
Like, you can't say, I'm wrong.
Therefore, I'm right.
That would be too obvious a contradiction, right?
So nobody puts forward an argument that says, my facts are wrong, my reasoning is wrong, and I'm just plain wrong, so I'm right.
That would never happen, right?
So truth is always perceived as universally preferable to error.
And of course, again, it's almost tautological, but if you want to achieve the truth, then you have to pursue the methodologies that allow you to achieve the truth.
And truth is universally preferable to error in that the way that philosophy works is that once you've admitted to error, then you have to change your perspective.
You have to change your opinion.
And if I say, oh, my podcasts, I'm going to sell them for $1,000 a second, right?
Then I can put that out there if I want and see if the market will bear it.
And I will find that the market, in fact, won't bear it and I will not make any particular sales.
So I've got, I think it's true that people will pay $1,000 a second for my podcasts.
I can put that out there and find out whether or not it is true.
Now, if it's not true, I don't get to go and hold people up with a knife to their ribs and say, here, listen to these five seconds, now give me $5,000, right?
I mean, that would not be valid.
So if I have a hypothesis about the value of my podcast and I put them out of the marketplace and they're not worth that, then obviously I have to change my hypothesis about what they're worth to people because price is an objective measure of a transaction of resources for value in the moment or value for value in the moment.
And so if I admit that I'm wrong, then the rule is that you stop putting forward that particular argument.
You stop holding that particular position.
You can revisit it and you can refine it and so on.
But if you go out in science and you try to establish a particular correlation and you can't, then you can redefine the experiment.
But that experiment has been a failure.
I mean, it doesn't, or not a failure because you've proven that there's no correlation, at least in that circumstance.
So truth is universally preferable to error because that's the deal when it comes to having a debate or having a conversation with someone.
And you know, I've had hundreds of debates in my life and a couple of dozen probably here on the show.
And that's the way it works is that people try to say that my logic is incorrect or my data is invalid.
And that way they hope to dislodge me from my particular position.
And at the same time, I'm trying to show that their logic is invalid or their data is incorrect.
And I'm trying to dislodge them from their position.
Now, in my experience, very few people get dislodged from their particular positions, no matter how much evidence and reason you bring to the table, which is why I would not usually have these kinds of debates Unless it was in a public space where I could help other people.
You know, I'm not going to go to a dinner party and chat about the flat earth with someone, right?
But if it's a public way of showing, you know, how you can be patient and reasonable and hopefully helpful to people who have, let's say, divergent methodologies of achieving truth.
So I think to say that truth is universally preferable is one of these things that you really can't argue against.
Because either you can say, well, truth is not universally preferable, because then you have to say, okay, well, is that a true statement?
No, it's a false statement.
It's a false statement that truth is not universally preferable.
It's like, okay, well, you've just disqualified yourself from that position, right?
And if you say it is a true statement that truth is universally preferable, Sorry, if you say it is a true statement that truth is not universally preferable, then you've just self-detonated your argument, right?
Because you said that I am putting forward a universally true argument that truth is not a universally valid or valuable thing.
In which case, why would you bother?
I wouldn't make any sense.
By the way, I would like to invite Flatt...
Flat Earthers to dinner and just have to eat up the globe.
I just wanted to mention that.
That would be a lot of fun.
Yeah, I understand your argument, but there is the, for instance, there are some people that I guess I've met that are sort of the, I know that I guess my belief in some sort of higher being might be irrational, but it gives me sort of satisfaction, so I'm fine with it.
Where it seems to them, truth doesn't appear to be, I guess, universally preferable, so it sort of creates...
Wait, hang on.
Are you saying that people say, there isn't a God, but I choose to believe one because it makes me feel better?
They say they don't care if there is one, but believing in one does make them feel better.
Well, okay, so then they're saying that their feelings have a higher standard of value than sort of empirical or objective truth?
Yes.
Okay, so then they've put forward a proposition, and you'd say, does it actually make you feel better?
And they'd say, well, yes.
So it's true that it makes you feel better, right?
Because if it was false, you'd hold something else.
And then they would say, feelings are the highest standard of value, right?
And people can say that.
And quite often they do.
And quite often they're in heels.
But again, we're back to this thing where it's like, yeah, people can have some other methodology for, it's not really a methodology, they can have some other approach for the universal value, but feelings can't be, you know, we put, okay, the statement, whatever makes me feel good is the highest standard of value.
Okay, well, let's put that through UPB. Are your feelings universalizable?
Well, clearly they're not.
People have opposite feelings.
People have no feeling.
And people have, they're asleep and they're having dreams and they're having other kinds of feelings.
Feelings come and go and so on, right?
So clearly it's not universally.
Is it preferable to have certain feelings or other feelings?
I don't think that that's entirely the case because feelings are not under direct conscious volitional control.
You can't order yourself To be happy.
Otherwise, you know, therapy would just be a boot camp of screening at people to suck it up and be happy, dirtbag, or something like that.
You can't order yourself to be happy.
And feelings are not behaviors.
Feelings are, they may result in behavior, but they themselves are not behaviors.
So the question of, well, can feelings be the highest standard of value?
Well, I don't see how that passes none of the UPB. And then people may say, well, I'm going to hold it anyway.
And it's like, okay, well, then you just...
But you're claiming that something is true outside of yourself, which falls into the universal standard, right?
There is a God.
And that's what makes you feel better.
Because if somebody genuinely did not or accepted that there was no God, then the positive feelings they would get out of believing in God would vanish to some degree over time, right?
And so...
They are basing their emotions on a truth claim outside of themselves.
Now, they may avoid examining whether or not there is a God in order to maintain their feelings.
They may just want to hang around with other people who believe the same emotional stuff.
So they may have all of that.
But it doesn't pass UPB. And they are containing a contradiction because they're saying, well, the happiness that I have from believing in God requires that there be a God out there.
Otherwise...
I won't get the same level of happiness.
So they're making truth claim outside of themselves.
And then they're saying, but I don't want to examine that truth claim.
And that's fine.
You know, again, that's just people who say they know something about reality by consulting chicken entrails.
And that's, again, you don't have to follow the methodology that you claim is valid, but you can't win an argument that way.
Yeah, the reason I ask that is because if I substitute, I guess, the earlier definition for universally preferable, and I say truth is, going with the definition on page 30, truth is objectively required or necessary, it would be assuming some particular goal, and in their case, apparently, they're not interested in said goal.
No, no, they are, though, because if somebody says, I'm happier when I believe in God...
Then they're saying that they need to believe that there's a God outside their head that operates in the universe that they have some relationship with and who cares about.
Like, there's a whole bunch of things that they need to establish in order to achieve the emotional benefit that they want, right?
Yeah.
And so those are truth claims that exist independent of consciousness.
And so if they then say, well, but I don't care if he exists or not.
I mean, you know, people can say whatever they want, but they're still implicit, um, Axioms or claims, there are implicit claims embedded in the proposition that God exists and it makes me feel better when he or she does exist.
That is, God exists is a truth claim that is outside of emotions and preferences and mere mortal consciousness.
Yeah, I understand that.
But again, I guess I'm in difficulty.
Again, if I substitute the definition, like I said, truth is objectively required or necessary.
I guess it would interpret necessary to error, which I'm not sure I doubt would, I guess, substitute.
Well, no, if you're making a truth claim about something in the universe, then it is not up to your feelings whether that is true or not.
Like, if I say, I feel happy, okay, well, I could make that claim, maybe you could record it on some MRI or something like that, but I say, I feel happy, I'm not making a truth claim about the universe, right?
Yeah.
But if I say that God exists, I'm making a truth claim about the universe that is independent of my consciousness.
Yeah.
I'm not proposing a subjective truth like I am happy, but an objective truth like God exists, right?
Yes.
Now, if you wish to make an objective truth claim, then you have to follow the rules of making an objective truth claim.
Because you can't say, well, I want God to exist, therefore God exists, right?
I mean, that's not a valid way of, you know, I guess otherwise there'd be a whole lot of instant karma Kim Kardashians appearing in 14-year-old boys' bedrooms at about 11.30 at night, right?
Yes.
And so if you're going to make a truth claim that is independent of consciousness, then you need to submit to the rigor of making that truth claim valid, right?
You know, again, back to the debate with the flat earther.
He says that the earth is flat, and, you know, we have some questions about that.
And so he's not making a claim like, I have a feeling called the world is flat.
He thinks the world is flat.
Yeah.
And so if you wish to make a truth claim about reality, then you have to follow the methodology of reason and evidence for establishing something that exists outside your consciousness.
If I say I'm happy, I don't think I have to follow an objective method.
I could still be lying or whatever, but I'm not sure how many people would care.
But you don't have to follow that objective methodology to report a subjective state of mind.
But if you're claiming that something exists independent of consciousness out there in material reality, then you have to follow the rules, which has to be logically consistent and there has to be some evidence of the thing itself or at least its effects on nearby matter.
And that's the rule, right?
I mean, So if you want to say something true about the universe, you have to follow the methodology that establishes whether what you're saying is true or false.
You can't just say it and wish it and will it.
I mean, you can, but you're wrong.
Yeah, I understand that.
But I guess the claim isn't about whether or not they want to make a claim of truth.
It has to be whether truth is in fact objectively required or necessary.
Because again, even going back to the example you gave, there are some people who do content themselves on mystical nonsense.
And certainly, I'm not sure if they would say truth isn't necessary for them.
Well, you know, this is all hearsay, right?
I mean, we're trying to argue perspectives of crazy people who aren't on the call.
So I think we better stop at this point, because I don't mind arguing with crazy people directly if there's a good use to it.
But I think you and I are both pretty sane people and trying to figure out what crazy people would say under certain conditions may not be that helpful.
Yeah, it's really to get at the point that truth is universally preferable, which is, again, assuming it's a conditional, truth is universally preferable to error if you have what goal in mind.
Well, so for instance, if I'm making, I'm just going to say this one last time and move on because I made the same argument five times, which either means you're not listening or I'm not listening, but it's not about to change, right?
So if you're going to make a claim of a truth statement external for consciousness, you need to follow that methodology of reason and evidence or you're invalid, right?
You're not saying anything in particular, so.
The question is slightly, I understood that part, but the question isn't whether or not you're making a truth statement, it's why do you even, I suppose, why do you objectively require a truth statement?
What do you mean, why do I? What do you mean, why do I objectively require?
Again, if universally preferable does mean objectively required or necessary, why is truth objectively required or necessary?
Well, it depends what truth you're talking about.
If you're talking about, I feel happy, okay, well, that may not be objectively verifiable.
But if I'm saying, look, there's a tree over there, that's something that's objectively verifiable.
So if I'm making a statement about objective reality that I want people to accept as truth, then it needs to conform with the principles of objective reality, which means, you know, tangible and logically consistent, right?
I can't say it's a tree and an elephant at the same time, right?
And so, if I'm making a truth claim about something external to consciousness, then I need to follow an objective methodology.
Otherwise, the claim can be dismissed without further investigation.
Okay, I've got to move on to the next caller, but great chat.
You're welcome back anytime.
I certainly do love me a tasty ethics eggwich sandwich in the morning.