"Let me use Stefan's answer to the question "Can we be certain about the future?" – which you can find in his September 27 Wednesday Night Livestream at 1:23:07 – as an opportunity to publish a short essay I have written after reading The Art of the Argument...."Join the PREMIUM philosophy community on the web for free!Get my new series on the Truth About the French Revolution, access to the audiobook for my new book 'Peaceful Parenting,' StefBOT-AI, private livestreams, premium call in shows, the 22 Part History of Philosophers series and more!See you soon!https://freedomain.locals.com/support/promo/UPB2022
Alrighty, well, good morning everybody, hope you're doing well.
So somebody wrote me an essay some time ago, I'm sorry it took me so long to get to it, but he wrote me an essay which is wonderful, a great set of questions, I really appreciate the pushback and the critiques.
So let's see if we can't sharpen this diamond to a slightly brighter hue.
He says the argument and consequentialism and he said let me use Stefan's answer to the question can we be certain about the future which you can find in his September 27th 2023 Wednesday night live stream at 1 hour 23 minutes and 7 seconds as an opportunity to publish a short essay I've written after reading the art of the argument.
Motivation.
This is not a rebuttal to the art of the argument.
I would have to write a book to do that which I have no intention of doing so.
I have no problem with 99% of what Stefan is saying in the book.
This is a criticism of Stefan's view of consequentialism and determinism.
As an empiricist he focuses on the evidence and I don't want to criticize empiricism.
In my opinion empiricism is critical
Oh, crucial, sorry.
Crucial to rationality and true freedom.
And Stéphane is saving it where it needs to be saved, in our everyday lives.
But empiricism is only one side of the coin, and that's what this is about.
And he makes a note, the quotes in italics are from the book The Art of the Argument, Western Civilization's Last Stand.
Artoftheargument.com, you should totally check it out.
What is consequentialism?
So, he quotes from the Satanic Temple of Wikipedia and says, In ethical philosophy, consequentialism is a class of normative, teleological, ethical theories that holds that the consequences of one's conduct are the ultimate basis for judgment about the rightness or wrongness of that
Conduct, thus from a consequentialist standpoint, a morally right act or omission from acting is one that will produce a good outcome.
All right, so that's a little bit of
So, normative simply means prescribing a norm or a standard, which are pretty basic to ethics.
Teleological refers to something that has a design or a purpose, particularly in nature.
So, that's consequentialism, right?
Freedom and consequentialism, he writes, and this is a quote from me from page 36 of The Art of the Argument.
The argument occurs every time you try to convince someone else of your position or preference without using threats or force.
And then he writes, from a consequentialist standpoint, an argument occurs when the consequentialist tries to convince someone of what he believes a good or bad outcome will be.
Thus, a consequentialist argument is a value argument with its alleged value living somewhere in the future.
The value is not true yet, but it could become
True.
All right?
I'm down with that as a definition, not necessarily as a final argument.
And then he quotes from my book.
Page 7.
A truth argument cares nothing for consequences.
A value argument cannot be defined by consequences, but cannot be indifferent either.
And then he writes, the main motivation of consequentialism is to be not indifferent of the future.
So when facing a consequentialist statement, we are facing a person who wants to affect our free will choices in order to achieve a behavioral change for the sake of a different outcome in the future.
This has everything to do with freedom, so we must be very careful.
All right, so... It started off well, with some great setup and all of that, but here's the problem.
The main motivation of consequentialism is to be not indifferent of the future.
Now, that's a kind of foggy goop that seems to mean something but really doesn't.
So, with philosophy we should be little concerned with motivations.
Why?
Because motivations are a subjective claim.
If somebody says I'm motivated by X, how on earth are you supposed to disprove that statement?
How on earth are you supposed to disprove that statement?
And so philosophy cannot take, as is any of its moral axioms, the question of motivation.
Because moral axioms have to be founded in facts, truth, empiricism, syllogisms.
They have to be unassailable.
And if you're trying to build something that's unassailable, then you can't have a subjective claim as the foundation for anything to do with that.
I mean, you've heard this all the time in the call-in shows with regards to parents who misbehaved in the past or did bad things in the past.
What do they say?
We did the best we could with the knowledge we had.
There's no way to prove any of that.
And when people make subjective claims, I think that's fine.
If somebody says, I prefer the color red over the color blue, I think, I mean, what am I going to do, argue with them?
They're making a subjective claim.
But there's no place in philosophy.
There's no place in philosophy.
Can you imagine judging the value of a scientific theory by the stated motivations of the scientist?
It would make no sense, right?
Can you imagine judging the validity of a mathematical solution by the color preference of the mathematician?
Would make no sense at all.
So when people say, he writes, the main motivation of consequentialism is to be not indifferent of the future.
I mean, I won't say he's already lost me because, you know, it's worth examining these things in more detail, but why on earth would I care from a philosophical standpoint about the imaginary motivations of people who claim to be fans or advocates of consequentialism?
So, I don't really get this and, you know, just when you are writing to me or to anyone you want to be taken seriously, the art of the argument is
Organized very sort of specifically and carefully there are syllogisms, there's inductive and deductive reasoning definitions, there's a passionate plea for why reason and evidence is so important because the only alternative is threats and force.
So I put the book very carefully together and put a lot of thought into how to make the case.
So when somebody says to me the main motivation of consequentialism
Is to be not indifferent of the future.
He's bringing in something called motivation, which he doesn't know.
He can't possibly know.
And so when somebody starts off their truth claim by something they can't possibly know, and even if they know it, I can't verify it.
And if I can't verify it, it's not part of a debate.
If you say, well I dreamt of an elephant last night, there's no possible way for me to verify that.
I may believe you, I may not believe you.
But it doesn't matter.
I mean, can you imagine if someone has a will, like your grandfather has a will that leaves everything to your brother and then you're with your grandfather when he dies and you say, my grandfather whispered to me that everything should come to me and not go to my brother.
Would any court in the world accept that?
Well, no, because there's no verification, there's no notarization, there's no test for sound minds, there's simply your word against the stated, notarized legal will of the document.
So, that which cannot be independently verified
Has no place in moral philosophy.
That which cannot be independently verified.
Right?
So, when I make a case about UPB, make the case for UPB, you can independently verify that.
You can run that through logic, reason, evidence and so on.
And you can determine whether what my claims are true.
So when somebody says the main motivation of consequentialism is to be not indifferent of the future, he's saying that he knows the motivations of all people who are pro consequentialism.
He knows their motivations.
Or is he saying that the philosophy itself has a kind of motivation?
But an argument doesn't have motivation.
Human beings have motivations.
You see the argument, the argument doesn't see you, right?
So it's all quite confusing in terms of what he's saying.
And when you are reading something that's particularly rigorous, as in the art of the argument, he took great care in putting all that together.
When you read something that's particularly rigorous,
And then you start with subjective assertions of the motivations of all those who are advocates for consequentialism.
I don't really know what to say about that other than you're really missing the boat.
Right?
You're really missing the boat.
I mean, I kind of hate that phrase, you've lost the plot, because it doesn't really mean anything, but it's not anything substantial.
And the other thing too is, well, of course philosophy is not indifferent to the future.
And I say that right there.
I say a value argument cannot be defined by consequences, but it cannot be indifferent either.
So, what I mean by that is if you're saying it's morally good to mass murder, then we wouldn't want you to put your theory into practice, right?
We wouldn't want you to test your theory.
This is, of course, the great question that Dostoevsky poses in Crime and Punishment.
Raskolnikov has a theory about property.
He has a theory about the legitimate use of violence, which he describes in great detail
In an essay he writes before he commits his crime.
So, value arguments can't be indifferent to consequences.
We won't try a bunch of mass murdering to see if it works, but it's not defined by its consequences.
So, to be not indifferent of the future.
Well, of course, philosophy is about changing our behavior for the better.
Now, the change of that behavior for the better will always exist in the future.
Because we cannot change the behavior that we have exhibited in the past.
I mean, if you go to a nutritionist and you're 300 pounds, the nutritionist is doing what?
Well, the nutritionist is making the case that you should change your eating habits in order to lose weight and be healthier in the future.
I mean there's no magic wand, I'm sure it would be pretty popular if there were, but there's no magic wand that a nutritionist can wave to have you not eat excess calories for the past 10 years and end up at 300 pounds.
That doesn't exist.
So, to say that a nutritionist is indifferent to the future is obviously false.
Any doctor, any physical trainer and a moral philosopher are all making cases and arguments for you to change your habits or solve a problem in order to improve something in the future or at least not have it get worse.
So all human mental disciplines that aim to change behavior are designed for the future.
I mean we even study history which is behavior that can't be changed in order to make better decisions in the future.
All human thought bends towards the future because all human thought is designed to change behavior for the better, and that change of behavior for the better only exists in the future.
So, if you're saying the main motivation of consequentialism is to be not indifferent of the future, you would have to say why consequentialism is the only mental discipline, or a discipline wherein the major focus, as opposed to other disciplines, is interest in the future.
Sorry, that was badly worded.
Let me try that again.
Let's say I say the main characteristic of consequentialism is that it uses language.
If I say the main characteristic of consequentialism is that it uses language,
I mean, of course you would reply, and rightly so, well, yes, I accept that consequentialism uses language, but if you're going to say that the main characteristic, the primary characteristic of consequentialism is that it uses language, you would then have to explain how it ranks with all the other
If you say the main motivation of consequentialism is to change behavior in the future, well, again, you'd have to say why it would be differentiated from all other mental, scientific, medical, or other disciplines that aim to change behavior in the future.
I mean, every ad on TV or
Online aims to change your behavior in the future.
Every diet or nutrition book aims to change your behavior in the future.
Every politician is trying to get you to change your behavior in the future or at least maintain your behavior if you're already going to vote for him.
To have you not change to not voting for him.
So everyone's trying to convince you to change your behavior in the future.
What is different?
What differentiates consequentialism from all other human disciplines that aim to change your behavior in the future?
Yeah.
So he says, so when facing a consequentialist statement, we are facing a person who wants to affect our free will choices in order to achieve a behavioral change for the sake of a different outcome in the future.
Right.
So a person who wants to affect our free will choices in order to achieve a behavioral change for the sake of a different outcome in the future, that's everyone.
And then he says, this is everything to do with freedom, so you must be very careful.
Now, I do have a certain amount of impatience with the caution people.
You've got to be so careful.
I mean, I'm afraid that sort of modern discourse has become such a low-rent WWF oiled bicep brawl fest that all the people who are saying you've got to be super careful probably aren't going to be doing much helpful stuff in that
Domain.
Okay, so then he says consequentialism and threats.
Now, sorry, what I would say, just go back to the last paragraph, what I would say is that consequentialism aims to change your behavior by claiming certain... to change your moral behavior or to make a moral argument by making certain claims about the outcome of choice.
Making certain claims about the outcome of choice.
But he's not making that.
He's just saying consequentialism
He wants to change our behavior in the future, but that's too wide a brush, right?
Almost every human discipline, almost every human communication wants to change behavior in the future.
I mean, when you go to a coffee shop and you order a coffee, you're trying to change the barista's behavior in the future to make you a coffee.
Oh, anyway.
Consequentialism and threats.
He says, a threat is a communication of intent to inflict harm or loss on another person.
But harm or loss, in other words, bad consequences, are not always the result of a threat.
The question is, why would someone want to talk about, or even promise, bad consequences?
Okay, sure.
There's a large circle called bad consequences, being hit by a bus, getting cancer, or whatever, right?
Hit by a meteor, or getting fired or something unjustly, right?
Yes, there's a big circle called bad outcomes and there's a smaller circle which says harm or loss threat.
Small, right?
So one is just bad stuff happens, bad outcomes.
The bad outcomes could be you smoke for a long time and then you get lung cancer.
So you've got a big big circle called bad outcomes now inside that there's a much smaller circle called threats right so yes a threat is always a threat of a bad outcome but not all bad outcomes in life a part of a threat and that's mmm you know that's so blindingly obvious that I don't even know what to say right if somebody says you know
A lot of people have bad outcomes based on their choices.
But some people have bad outcomes not based on their choices.
It's just bad luck.
And is this a profound statement?
Is this a profound moral statement?
It's not.
Some people get into car accidents because they're driving badly.
But did you know, Steph, that a lot of people get into car accidents when they're not driving badly?
It's bad road conditions, it's the error or even bad driving of another driver, it's a mechanical failure when they've kept their car maintained, and it's just one of these statements that's... It's not the end of the world when something is blindingly obvious and adds nothing to anybody over about two and a half years of age, right?
I mean, if I said to my daughter when she was two-and-a-half, I said, you know, there's candy in the house, but did you know there's also candy in the world, and that the candy in the house is just a small part of the candy in the world?
She'd say, well, duh, I know, we see it every time.
So if it's blindingly obvious to a two-and-a-half-year-old, but it's intoned with great solemnity to me, I have a certain amount of, hmm, why are you... Now, it's one thing if somebody says, look, I know that this is blindingly obvious, I understand that this is blindingly obvious, I have a reason for telling you.
I have a reason for telling you and just be be patient right?
Be patient and I'm sorry to say something so blindingly obvious but I have a reason or you know whatever whatever it is that that's fine right?
I mean at the very beginning of
UPB, I say, come on, what are the odds that a software entrepreneur-turned-philosopher has solved the problem of secular ethics, which has bedeviled philosophy since there was such a thing as philosophy?
What are the odds?
Very low, I understand, just skepticism.
So I get all of that.
But when people state the blindingly obvious to me, and now there's been a bunch of them,
But they think that they're adding great value?
I have questions.
OK.
So then he says, the question is, why would someone want to talk about or even promise bad consequences?
And so on page 7, and then he quotes me, he says, for a truth argument to have value, we must value the truth.
For a value argument to have meaning, it must be true.
Alright?
Fine with that?
He says a consequentialist argument about bad consequences is made because the arguer believes he has knowledge about why the outcome will be bad.
That's not true.
And that's not even close to true.
So hang on, we'll get to that in a sec.
Seeing this as a threat, and therefore invalidating the argument, could mean to invalidate the person's experience.
What?
So instead, the empiricist should tackle it by asking for the evidence of the experience, which is what Stefan does when asking, how do you know?
It's not a rhetorical question.
All right.
So again, we have to break this down.
And I can very quickly tell, I can very quickly tell, when someone is not being very critical of their own writing.
And I gotta tell you, for me at least, somebody who's not critical of his own writing
Is a problem because they waste other people's time.
Right?
They waste other people's time.
Because if I have to go through and critique your text, right?
If I have to go through and critique your text already, then you have been somewhat disrespectful, I think, and you have wasted my time.
It's sort of like if somebody sends me an email that's full of spelling errors then I know they haven't carefully read the email to the point where at least I don't have to try and puzzle out what they're saying because their words are misspelled and I get this in live streams though I understand live streams is more of a live typing situation but I do ask people to proofread
There are texts before they send them to me to make sure that we don't waste everyone's time.
So he says a consequentialist argument about bad consequences is made because the arguer believes he has knowledge about why the outcome will be bad.
That's not true.
That's not true.
So the first thing is that the arguer of a consequentialist argument, bad consequences, the arguer
First claims that he has knowledge about what the outcome will be.
That's what he first has to make them.
The question of whether something is good or bad is subsequent to the question of whether the thing will happen or not, right?
So if I were to say to you being kidnapped by other dimensional unicorns is a bad thing,
Would we get into that debate right away?
No.
You would say, well, hang on.
I mean, being kidnapped by other-dimensional unicorns is not a thing at all.
It's not a thing at all.
Now, if I said being hit by a meteor is bad, we could say, well, yes, I mean, the odds are very small, but you could theoretically be hit by a meteor.
But if I say being mugged by a square circle is bad, discuss, right?
The first thing would be, well not, well, is it bad or not?
The first question would be, well, hang on, sorry, wait a sec.
Square circles don't exist, so why are we talking about this thing that doesn't exist, right?
I hope that makes sense.
So the consequentialist is first of all claiming that he knows what the outcome will be, and then he claims that the outcome will be bad.
And then he needs to claim that the outcome
We'll be bad but still better than all other possible alternatives.
So first he has to claim that he knows what the outcome of a choice will be.
And the second thing he needs to claim, even if he wants to stay within the bounds of consequentialism, first he has to claim he knows what the outcome will be and second he has to claim that he knows for a fact
That this is either the very best or the least worst of all possible outcomes.
Right?
So, if you get cancer and you take a chemo, the outcome will be that you lose your hair.
But, I mean, assuming that the chemo is going to save your life, it's better than the alternative.
Right?
So, there's a lot.
He says, he has knowledge about why the outcome will be bad, but he doesn't.
He has to first claim that he knows what the outcome will be.
And then he says, seeing this as a threat and therefore invalidating the argument,
That could mean to invalidate the person's experience.
Now that's very confusing.
That's very confusing.
Invalidating the person's experience, I don't know what that means other than it seems kind of girly to put it my tooth.
Sorry, that's a bit of a negative statement about girls.
But what does that mean?
To invalidate a person's experience?
This is sort of a modern thing that happens, you know, my lived truth or my personal journey or whatever it is, it's like, well, hey man, I don't want to invalidate your lived experience unless you're going to make a universal claim of truth and objectivity.
Then your lived experience is irrelevant.
Right?
I mean, can you imagine as a kid, you write 2 and 2 makes 5, and the teacher corrects you and say, no, no, no, no, my lived experience is that 2 and 2 make 5.
You say that 2 and 2 make 4, but my lived experience is that 2 and 2 make 5.
My personal experience, my vivid sense of blah, blah, blah.
Well, I mean, that doesn't make any sense, right?
My lived experience is that a square circle is possible, or whatever it is, right?
So, invalidating the argument could mean to invalidate the person's experience.
Why on earth would I care about invalidating the person's experience?
The person's experience, by definition, is subjective.
If it's objective, it's the person's argument.
So, invalidating the person's experience... I don't know.
I mean, that's like basically saying, I feel that it's true.
It's like, well, that's an interesting feeling.
First of all, it's not a feeling.
It's a sophisticated, quote, argument masquerading as emotional manipulation.
All right.
So instead, the empiricist should tackle it by asking for the evidence of the experience.
Which is what Steph does when asking, how do you know?
It's not a rhetorical question.
Well, when I say, how do you know?
I'm not asking for evidence of experience.
I mean, if you had a dream about an elephant last night, you have that experience.
I can't get proof of that experience for obvious reasons.
So, when I say, how do you know, you had a dream about an elephant last night, you'd say, well, I very vividly remember it, and I was riding on its back, or this, that, and the other, right?
So, when I ask, how do you know, the question is, if somebody says, this particular moral argument will have a bad outcome in the future, I would say, well, how do you know?
Like, you're making a knowledge claim,
About the outcome of a moral argument.
Which means that you know the future.
And there's a self-detonating statement in that.
Right?
If you know the future, it means that there's no free will.
Right?
Physicists know what's going to happen to the future.
Right?
In the future.
They know how matter and energy are going to behave.
As do engineers, because matter and energy don't have free will.
Like, a bridge doesn't have free will and can't decide to shrug off its itchy burden of back trucks and go scampering off to pick grapes in Queensland, right?
So, where there's no free will, we can accurately predict the future.
Where there is free will, we cannot, because of free will.
So the reason that the consequentialist has a self-detonating statement, a self-contradiction embedded, is he's saying, I want to change your mind about the future because I know in the future there's no such thing as free will.
I know in the future there's no such thing as free will.
I know that there's no such thing as free will in the future, therefore I want to change your mind by appealing to your free will in the present, which of course makes no sense at all.
Over the course of making the argument to change my mind, to appeal to my free will,
In the course of making the argument he's moving from the present into the future over the course of making it.
And he's saying free will exists in the future but never in the present.
Which makes no sense at all.
If you're going to change people's minds, if you want to change people's minds, you have to accept that you don't know jack crap about what's happening in the future.
You just don't.
I mean you don't even know if the person you're debating is going to change his or her mind.
I mean, you hope if you make good arguments that they will, but you can't guarantee it.
Trust me, this one I know, right?
It doesn't matter how good an argument you make, some people will change their mind, some people won't, and you can't predict which is which, who is who.
So the moment you try and change someone's mind, you have to accept that you don't know what's going to happen in the future.
Because of free will.
Because of free will.
So that's why consequentialism is so... I mean, honestly, it's just completely ridiculous, so self-contradictory.
Right?
You can't at the same time say, I know for certain what everyone's choices are going to be in the future, which means that they're not choices, but people are a species of physics with no free will, and I want to change your mind in the present.
If human beings have free will, you don't know what's going to happen in the future.
If human beings don't have free will, it makes no sense to debate them.
Because then you might as well debate a rock, right?
So then he says consequentialism and bribery.
He said, bribery is the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any item of value to influence the actions of a person.
I mean, again, what can I really say?
I mean, I know what bribery is.
Trust me, I've been offered bribes in my life.
I know what bribery is.
So we are talking about subjectively good consequences.
The question arises, can consequences also be objectively good?
Now we are entering the domain of the so-called common good, a concept every rational thinker should be at war with, and it's the crucial concept hijacked by all political evildoers in the history of the universe.
In other words, people are bribed with the promise of a common good all the time.
A consequentialist argument about good consequences is made because the arguer believes he has knowledge about why the outcome will be good.
The same logic applies.
How do you know?
And what kind of good are you talking about?
At that point UPP can be applied.
The necessary action for achieving the outcome can be considered good as long as there is 1. evidence of either a win-win situation or prevention of an unwanted win-lose situation and 2. a good reason to assume that the outcome is universally consistent.
So, a consequentialist argument about good consequences.
And two, a good reason to assume that the outcome is universally consistent.
Evidence of a good reason to assume.
These are not philosophical arguments.
Philosophical arguments for ethics need to be absolutely ironclad and indisputable.
Indisputable because we're talking about the use of force, violence, right?
Violence takes no prisoners, so intellectually morality should take no prisoners, right?
So, of course violence does take prisoners, but you know what I mean, right?
So, evidence of either a win-win situation or prevention of an unwanted win-lose situation.
I don't know what any of this means.
So, people will say, of course, well, we can't end the welfare state because people will be poorer.
Okay?
I absolutely accept that.
That people who are taking money from other people through the power of the state, if that stops, then some people will be poorer.
I mean, in the short run, for sure.
Yeah, absolutely.
So?
So?
What is that?
Here's a good question.
Here's a good question for people who want to be moralists.
If your argument can ever be used to justify slavery, it's like the coma test, right?
If your argument can ever be used to justify slavery, then he's a bad argument, my friend.
He's a bad argument.
He's no good.
So, if we say, well, you know, some people are affected negatively by the end of slavery, well, sure, yeah, absolutely.
Slave owners, slave catchers, all the judges who adjudicate slave contracts and disputes and so on, right?
They will be affected negatively by the end of slavery.
So, you say, ah, well, but in general, it's a good thing.
It's like, well, the moment you start to say in general, you're in the realm of subjectivity.
You're in the realm of subjectivity.
And some people may
Do badly materially as the result of a moral change, but they may also be happier about that.
So, I mean, people who are addicted to a particular substance, if that substance becomes unavailable for some reason, either the dealer moves away or they go to prison or whatever it is, right?
The substance becomes unavailable, they will go through withdrawal.
But they're happy about that.
So, you know, that they're relieved that the drug is no longer available.
I mean, I'm sure we've all had it.
If you have a particular food weakness, right, whatever it is, that you indulge if it's around.
So you decide not to buy it, not have it in your house.
And then you're kind of snacky and you go to the cupboard and you feel like whatever it is that you like to snack on that's bad for you.
And then you remember, oh,
I didn't buy it, it's not here.
And you're like, whew, thank goodness, otherwise I would have eaten it, right?
So, a negative consequence can be welcomed.
Can be welcomed.
So, we're all talking about subjective stuff.
We make decisions based on principles.
So, consequentialism and principles.
Consequentialists do not necessarily stand in the way of principles.
Again, it's just a statement, no definition.
And it's funny because he's defined bribery, but he hasn't defined principles.
Which do you think is more important to define?
Bribery or principles?
Alright.
He says every consequence is the result of behavior.
For a consequentialist it doesn't matter whether a choice is made because of principles or out of subjective personal interest.
Consequentialism doesn't prefer the one over the other.
There are consequentialists who prefer a subjective good without any moral contemplation and there are consequentialists who act upon principles for what they believe would be objectively good.
So he's just saying people who believe in consequentialism don't care whether you make a decision out of principles or subjective personal interest.
I mean, that seems important.
If a moral system aims to improve mankind, it should promote making decisions based on principles, it seems to me.
It seems to me.
It's sort of like saying, well, your body doesn't care if you cut back on calories because of willpower, or because you're locked in a basement.
Okay, I mean, I get that.
And he says, consequentialism doesn't prefer the one over the other.
And okay, he's just making statements.
I still don't know what his definition of principles are, or outcomes, or how consequentialists magically know the future, which is unknowable because of free will.
See, everybody with bad arguments wants an external authority to appeal to.
The appeal to authority is foundational to almost all sophistry.
And so, whether that authority is the World Health Organization, or Dr. Fauci, or God, or whatever, right?
And for some people, the authority is a magical knowledge of the future.
I mean, honestly, when people say, well, we should do this because there'll be good outcomes in the future, it's the exact epistemological equivalent of somebody saying, we should do this because my magical elf friend tells me it'll make him happy.
My invisible magical elf friend tells me it will make him happy, so you should do this thing.
It's like, look, I'm sorry that you have these delusions, but that's not an argument.
So, again, lack of definition.
And consequentialism doesn't prefer whether you make decisions based on principles or subjective personal interest.
Again, you can make these claims, but now you're saying that all consequentialists are completely indifferent as to whether somebody makes a decision based on principles or out of subjective personal interest, but consequentialism is a moral argument claiming that it's a preferred state and that preferred state is better outcomes in the future.
So you can't say that a moralist who claims a universal preferred state is completely indifferent as to whether you prefer a universal preferred state, or you just happen to like X, Y, or Z, right?
Again, a moral argument is a universally preferred state.
People should behave because it's better, universally.
And he says universally earlier.
And then he says, well, but it doesn't matter if you're subjective or not.
So the moral argument is saying that it doesn't matter whether you make a decision based on a moral argument or not.
Well, then why am I listening to somebody make a moral argument?
Anyway, he says, in fact, everyone is acting upon principles anyway.
That's kind of confusing, right?
Doesn't matter whether you act on principles or not, but everyone acts on principles anyway.
The principle of pursuing a subjective good disregarding morality is called selfishness.
The principle
Are you honest about the principles you align yourself with?
Now, the word principles here is doing a heck of a lot of work, right?
This is a very hard-working... Because principles, a principled man generally means that he has abstract universal ideals, right?
Some moral principles, right?
And now he's saying that principles now doesn't mean morality, it means justification.
And the fact that he defines bribery but then has contradictory definitions of principles is obviously kind of messy.
All right.
The question is, are you honest about the principles you align yourself with?
So now we have, it doesn't matter whether you make a choice because the principles are out of subjective personal interest, but now the most important question is are you honest about the principles you align yourself with?
So now honesty is a great value.
So wait a minute, if you're a consequentialist it doesn't matter whether you have principles or not, but it's really important that you have the principle called honesty.
Okay, sorry, it's a mess.
All right, let's do one or two more.
I find this stuff interesting and I hope it's helpful to you as well.
The Pragmatic Mind is his note and he quotes from my book The Art of the Argument.
Atheists also tend to prefer consequentialism or outcome-based moral standards.
That which produces direct and immediate benefits in society is considered the good, the greatest good for the greatest number and so on.
These are not principled arguments but pragmatic arguments.
The principled argument against the welfare state is that it violates property rights.
Thou shalt not steal.
The consequentialist argument for the welfare state is that it immediately reduces the amount of poverty in society.
And he says Stefan is technically correct about it being a consequentialist argument but incorrect in his assumption of every consequentialist argument being limited to direct and immediate benefits.
Well, of course.
So, if I say that butter contains fat, right, and if you want to lose weight you might want to cut back on your butter, not advice, just an example, right?
If I say butter contains fat and, you know, fat is a lot of calories, and then somebody loftily informs me that there are other things in butter besides fat, and, and, by the way Steph, didn't you know that there are other foods that also contain fat?
I'd be like,
Well, yeah.
Isn't this kind of taken for granted?
So when I give an example of a consequentialist argument, I'm not saying that every consequentialist argument follows this pattern.
I never made that claim.
Right?
The principled argument against the welfare state is that it violates property rights.
The consequentialist argument for the welfare state is that it immediately reduces the amount of poverty in society.
But I didn't say that all consequentialist arguments follow that pattern.
So, again, it's a straw man, right?
He says, this as far as I'm concerned is because an empiricist tends to be pragmatic.
Yeah, the word pragmatic is just another one of these words that people use to create vague sounding positive noises from their mouth hole without actually making an argument.
He's defined the word bribery, he defined a bunch of other stuff but he hasn't defined the word pragmatic.
The empiricist wrestles with reality for evidence so he prefers direct and immediate evidence over long-term evidence in the same way a selfish person would prefer direct and immediate benefits over long-term benefits.
The empiricist wrestles with reality for evidence
What does this mean?
The empiricist wrestles with reality.
He hasn't defined reality.
He hasn't defined evidence.
He hasn't really defined empiricist.
So I just have to kind of gloss over that, right?
So then he says the duality of consequentialism.
Consequentialism can be divided into moral consequentialism and amoral consequentialism.
Focusing on direct and immediate benefits would be amoral consequentialism because it doesn't care about moral issues.
I call that benefitism because the benefit is considered the highest value while the potential costs are overlooked.
A good example for moral consequentialism is UPB itself.
Why is behavior universally preferable?
Because acting upon universals is believed to result in good consequences.
What on earth is that?
There's nothing to do with anything!
When have I ever said
Acting upon universals is believed to result in good consequences.
Now, I do think, of course, that a respect for property rights is going to generate more wealth in society than an endless violation of property rights.
Sure.
And I do talk about the evidence of an adherence to universals.
There is evidence, historical evidence, because acting upon universals is believed to result in good consequences.
Is there any evidence for that?
There certainly is.
But is the evidence universal?
The empiricist cannot give a final answer.
That's why Stefan provided logical proof through deductive reasoning.
Okay, yeah, so that's fair.
Okay, you know what?
I mean... But he says, why is the behavior universally preferable?
Because acting on universals is believed to result in good consequences.
So he's saying that my... that UPB has, as its preference, good consequences.
You should follow UPB because of good consequences.
Nope!
No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no,
It's because we want to eat things that are bad for us, right?
So because we have temptation we need standards to wield against those temptations.
So UPB results in negative consequences if you want to steal something and you're like, oh UPB, right?
So like if you want to eat a particular food
Like, you want to eat cheesecake, and they say, oh, we're out of cheesecake, or we're out of desserts as a whole, and you're like, oh, actually, you know, it's probably better for me.
Like, you feel the negative consequences, you don't get your cheesecake, but it's good consequences later when you feel better about it.
So, consequences means very little.
All right.
So, I write, here's a, yeah, moral consequentialism and amoral consequentialism.
Yeah, so can be divided as like, yeah, I mean, okay, yeah, you can divide things, but
Give me definitions and give me arguments.
Divine reasoning, he wrote.
Deductive reasoning assumes 100% proof, assuming all premises are correct.
Inescapable perfect divine proof.
Yes.
Divine proof?
Sounds great.
But how much evidence do we have to collect to reach divinity?
Sounds impossible.
But is that even necessary?
I don't know what to say about that.
Deductive reasoning is 100% proof.
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal.
If all the premises are correct, it's 100% certain, right?
So this is not evidence to collect, to reach divinity.
This is by definition.
And then he quotes from my book, given that premises 1 and 2 are valid, the conclusion 3 is inescapable.
What this means is anyone who tries to escape the conclusion is actually trying to escape rationality and reality.
And then he says, this is where so many people go into opposition because they feel someone is wanting them to not escape.
Regarding the fact that a child generally is not allowed to escape its parents in the context of the prevalence of violent parenting, that reaction shouldn't be surprising.
I mean, to be bullied by lies may lead you to be susceptible to the absolutes of truth, like feeling bullied, quote, bullied by truth, but, I mean, what does this mean?
Is this a psychological thing?
And it's interesting that he throws some sort of psychological thing into what's supposed to be a moral, philosophical and rational argument.
People don't like reason because they were beaten as children.
Okay.
I mean, maybe.
Maybe.
They don't like absolutes because unjust absolutes were inflicted upon them.
Okay.
Yeah, I can... I can understand that.
I don't know what it has to do with a moral argument about consequentialism, but... All right.
Apophatic inquiry.
Deductive reasoning provides 100% proof through so-called apophasis.
Apophasis?
The divine proof can't tell us what something is, it can only tell us what something is not.
To better understand that concept have a look at Mark Passio's explanation in the second part of his natural law seminar starting at 3 hours 8 minutes and 45.
Haven't done that.
For example the main premise of UPB is that it is universally applicable.
The main premise of UPB is that it is universally applicable.
It's not a premise.
That's the result of the argument.
In other words, you can, universally, everyone can respect property rights.
Everyone.
Like, the respect for property rights can be UPB.
The violation of property rights, stealing, cannot be UPB.
Because stealing is asymmetrical.
One person who's the thief wants to take the other person's property, but it's only stealing if the other person doesn't want the thief to take his property.
So, it's asymmetrical.
The thief wants to take someone else's property, violating their property rights.
The other person wants to keep their property, maintaining their property rights.
So you have an argument for it to be universal that property rights have to be both violated and respected, which is a contradiction and therefore UPB cannot be universalized.
It's an argument.
So, I don't know what the premise of UPB is that's universally applicable.
In other words, the outcome of UPB is supposed to result in consistent consequences independent of time, space, and whether the bubble dingles are swollen or not.
I mean, I get he's joking, right?
It's a logically correct consequentialist argument.
What?
The outcome of UPB is supposed to result in consistent consequences independent of time, space... No, I mean, the... It's... I mean, it's almost like a tautology.
If you claim that your premise... Sorry, if you claim that your argument is universal,
Then it has to be universal.
It's sort of baked into the definition, right?
If you claim to have an argument about the behavior of matter and energy, then it's universal.
E equals mc squared is universal.
The inverse square law is universal.
Gases expand when heated.
That's universal.
It's not one place in Philadelphia and another place in Arkansas, right?
They're different.
So if you make a claim that applies universally, then that claim has to apply universally.
And if it doesn't, then it's not universal, right?
All right, let's see here.
But do we have non-divine evidence that it is true?
Well, we have thousands of years of empirical data indicating that ignoring UPB results in harm, abuse, sin, slavery, chaos, you name it.
We know
What UPB is not, and we see its opposite manifesting in the world.
That's a hell of a good start.
No, right?
Yeah, so I mean, yes, of course, I think that... I think that pursuing virtue will often lead to positive outcomes, but it leads to negative outcomes for a lot of people who profit from evildoing.
So, alright.
Determinism, he writes.
Determinism is the philosophical view that events are completely determined by previously existing causes.
There is no atheist that considers determinism to be true, and for good reason.
Because one could ask, what's the first cause then?
What?
Many atheists consider determinism to be true.
Sam Harris, I think Richard Dawkins has dabbled in this, so... And again, there are lots of atheists that consider determinism to be true, so I don't know what that means.
Who would ever be able to prove that, what the first cause is?
So let's not look at God creating the Big Bang, but instead at reality.
Alright?
Does determinism occur in our everyday lives?
Is it observable?
How many people walk over the edge of a skyscraper and survive?
How many fly away like Superman?
Okay, so it's human beings are subject to physical laws.
Yes, absolutely.
You cannot walk off a skyscraper and not fall.
But you have a choice about whether to walk off a skyscraper.
That's where the free will is.
Not the free will to completely surmount reality, that would be being a god.
He says we have a lot of experience in falling, but not so much experience in levitation, so we have a good reason to assume that gravity is determined, however that is done.
But does that mean that everything is predetermined?
There are physical laws, yes, and there's human beings who have free will.
Predeterminism.
Predeterminism is the idea that everything is set in stone and we have no say in what is happening at all.
Predeterminism denies the existence of free will.
It's based on the oversimplification of the concept of free will, stemming from a childish understanding of what freedom is.
You see, just because you can't fly like Neo in the Matrix doesn't mean you are not free.
Yes, there is gravity.
Yes, it's pulling us down, every one of us, and empirical data so far shows it's working 100% of the time.
Do you know how to overcome gravity by willpower alone?
No?
Well, then you are not free of gravity now, like everybody else.
Does that mean gravity can't be overcome by willpower ever?
How do you know?
Well, I mean, saying that human beings are subject to physical laws is not any big, profound statement.
Now, you could say, of course, that you can, or will, overcome gravity.
Right?
You can't fly, but you can build a plane.
You can get in a plane.
You can choose to, quote, fly.
Because you have chosen to defy gravity in a sense, right, by creating aircraft or hot air balloons or hang gliders or whatever that can propel human beings through the air, which human beings can't do on their own.
So choosing, like, I can't choose to go for an hour walk in the bitter cold without, you know, risking death, unless I choose to put on
Bulky, warm, heavy clothing, and so on, right?
I can't choose to slide down a snowy hill unless I put skis on, right?
So, I mean, choices can not... I mean, obviously, airplanes use gravity and wind resistance and so on for their propulsion and elevation, but human beings can't fly, but we can, quote, defy gravity by making the choices to build things that'll allow us to do what we couldn't do on our own.
So, did gravity can't be overcome by willpower ever?
How do you know?
So, what he's saying is that there should be grave doubt
Or there could be legitimate doubt about the universality and existence of gravity, right?
But, so that which we have experienced 100% we see everywhere all the time and there's no exceptions and there are scientific conjectures, hypotheses, theories and proofs that gravity is 100% so if we can't be certain of gravity then we can't be certain of anything, right?
So he's saying that consequentialism is good because people can know the future.
They can know the outcomes of complex socio-economic decisions, like the welfare state or whatever, right?
So he's saying that consequentialism has value because we can know the future.
But, you can't know gravity!
Did you see what I'm saying?
We can't know that which is objectively, empirically, universally true and proven by every facet and evidence of our experience in science and theory and reality and atoms, right?
So, a foundational aspect of the universe that is 100% validated by experience and theory.
Well, we can't be certain of that, but boy, we can be certain about the outcomes of complex socio-economic decisions that are made by the state, right?
So, I mean, if we can't be certain of gravity, let's say that we can't, we can't be certain of anything, then there's no such thing as consequentialism, because if we can't be certain of reason, evidence, and everything we've ever experienced, and everything that science validates, if we can't be certain of that, then of course we can't possibly be certain of anything that happens in the future, and therefore consequentialism is invalid.
All right, he says let's... oh, then he quotes from my book.
One of the reasons why clear definitions at the beginning of a debate are so important is that they help you avoid wasting time in synonym logic.
I agree with that.
It's from page 13 of Art of the Argument, artoftheargument.com.
He says, let's be clear about that.
Predeterminism is not the same as determinism.
Predeterminism is a foolish concept leading to the destructive mindset of a nihilist.
Predeterminism is the idea that everything is set in stone and we have no say in what is happening at all.
He says it's a foolish concept.
Why?
I mean, saying that something is a foolish concept is not an argument.
Leading to the destructive mindset of a nihilist.
Okay, let's say it does.
That's a consequentialist argument, right?
That's like saying you shouldn't die because you'll be unhappy.
Determinism, he says, on the other hand, doesn't touch the future, as causes by definition will exist as long as there is time.
What?
Determinism, on the other hand, doesn't touch the future, as causes, by definition, will exist as long as there is time.
So who causes causes?
Can you cause something to happen?
You see, it doesn't matter who began.
It's like trying to make the case that a thunderstorm in 10,000 BC caused water damage in your apartment in 2023.
That's what you do if you want to win the Nobel Prize in Nitpicking.
I don't... I don't understand.
Sorry, I don't... I don't understand anything about this.
Determinism, on the other hand, doesn't touch the future.
Oh, is this that idea that you don't know what's coming next in a movie, but you know that it's pre-scripted?
I've heard that argument before.
Compatibilism, I think it's called.
It still doesn't make any sense.
All right.
I mean, I don't argue with a movie.
If I'm arguing with a person, right, you know, you hear these people in movie theaters when there's a horror movie saying, don't do that, don't run, don't go down that hole.
You know that the movie's already done, right?
I mean, it's kind of a foolish thing.
It's kind of a goofy, foolish thing to do.
To argue with a character in a movie where the movie's already been shot and it's fixed in stone, right?
So consequentialism, sorry, compatibilism doesn't make any more sense.
So, what actually matters is what is happening here and now and what we choose to do.
To better understand how determinism and free will coexist, have a look at Mark Pastry's explanation of the mental schism and the worldview schism at the beginning of the second part of the Natural Law Seminar.
Yeah, I mean, I kind of get where you're coming from, but
If you're going to make an argument, like, if you're competent to make the argument, then make the argument.
If you're saying, this guy has a great argument, then you're not good at explaining it.
And so, if you're not good at explaining the argument, then I won't particularly care what you have to say.
Right?
If you're saying, well, Mark Pacio, or whatever, he makes the really good argument.
Well, if you can't summarize it for me, then you don't understand it.
Well enough to explain it to someone else, right?
Just a big test of whether you understand something is, can you explain it, particularly in fairly simple terms, to someone else?
I mean, I think it was Einstein who boiled down the theory of relativity, or someone did boil down the theory of relativity into like less than 300 words for a telegram, and it was, it was masterly, right?
Or the old quote from Winston Churchill, I'm sorry that I, I'm sorry this is such a long letter, I didn't have time to write a shorter one, right?
So can you, can you make the argument?
Now, he hasn't actually defined what determinism is.
He just says it doesn't touch the future, as causes by definition will exist as long as there is time.
So, he literally quotes me in saying one of the reasons why clear definitions at the beginning of a debate is so important is that they help you avoid wasting time on synonym logic.
But he doesn't define determinism and how it's differentiated from predeterminism.
So that's somebody who's not alive in thought in the moment, right?
So if I say clear definitions are important and he's trying to explain to me the difference between predeterminism and determinism and he hasn't defined the differentiation between the terms,
Then he's not thinking in the moment.
This is all, I don't know, some sort of emotional defense.
Usually these are people who've done bad things in their life and they take refuge in determinism so they don't have to confront their own conscience.
Which doesn't work, but it's strangely compelling for a lot of people, so... Yeah, I hope this helps.
I really do appreciate people sending me this stuff in.
I do find it very interesting and valuable to go through.
