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April 9, 2009 - Freedomain Radio - Stefan Molyneux
53:58
1325 Freedomain Radio: Ethics, Rights and Society - A Debate (video available)
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Yeah, I'm basically a social anarchist.
As to my exact position, I sympathize with mutualism, anarcho-syndicalism, and anarcho-collectivism, so my personal beliefs fall somewhere within that realm of things.
And you had some questions for me, if I understand this rightly, that you wanted to go over that you had written down, is that right?
Yeah, that's correct.
I don't know, should we just go dive into it?
Let's just go.
Alright, I kind of want to touch on your whole theory of UBP, but it seems to me that the best way to do this is to tackle the concept of self-ownership.
And I've heard previous debates with you, particularly with brain police and people like that, where You've apparently equated self-ownership with one's ability to control their spinal cord, if you will.
And I think that's wrong.
I think that typically, if you make a claim like self-ownership, that's an entitlement claim.
You know, saying I have self-ownership is akin to saying I am entitled to my own person.
Like, it's contingent upon your ability to control, but it's not...
You know, the essence of it, if you will.
So, like, I think your whole, the, like, that notion of control somehow equating to an ought is, it doesn't really fall out.
Sorry, just want to make sure that I understand what it is that you're saying.
So I understand your characterization of what it is that I'm saying.
I say that self-ownership is based upon a physical fact that you own your own body or you control your own body.
Is that right? Yes, but the problem with that is I don't actually deny the fact that I'm controlling my spinal cord, obviously.
My point is, by characterizing this fact of self-ownership, you're essentially equating a fact with an ought.
You're equating an entitlement claim with something that just occurs naturally.
And this essentially doesn't follow.
Okay, just so I understand where you're getting this from, can you tell me where in my writing or podcast you have heard me make this claim?
It was in one of your, if I'm misquoting you, correct me, but if it was in, I believe, one of your debates with Brighton Police, if I remember correctly, where you were equating control of oneself with self-ownership.
Well, but in that very debate, I say that there are no such things as oughts or shoulds and so on.
So, I just want to understand where it is that you're getting that I said that because that's certainly not my position in that debate or in my books.
Well, the thing is, the kind of, well, at least it's always been used, the kind of self-ownership, well, which I think is a misleading concept, All of us is referred to a kind of ought.
It's referred to an entitlement.
And essentially all rights claims, whether positive or negative, pertain to entitlement.
In the case of positive rights, you're entitled to things.
In the case of negative claims, you're entitled to be from things.
I don't think anyone's arguing that rights exist as floating things in the universe, but it seems the way that you construe them is misleading and not accurate.
In a way, or at least significantly diverges away from how it was previously used.
Just to clarify, rights do not exist for me in any way at all.
Rights, positive obligations, none of these exist for me, or at least in the way that I construe philosophy.
So I just want to make sure that if you're going to criticize me or things that I've said or written, that you get the views right, at least as I've expressed them in written and vocal form.
Well, the thing is, you use the term self-ownership, and at least in my understanding how it's always been used, it refers to an entitlement claim.
So if you're not making an entitlement claim, it's really odd to borrow the term self-ownership to refer to that.
Can you tell me what you mean by that?
I just want to make sure that I understand where you're coming from.
Basically, all conceptions of property are an entitlement claim.
Freedom of speech is an entitlement claim.
You're essentially saying that, like, in the case of positive claims, like positive rights, which I would disagree with, if I say, you know, I have a positive right to X, then I'm saying I'm entitled I have a right to, like, I should be able to acquire whatever it is I claim to have a right.
Or if I claim I have a negative right to X, I'm saying I have a right to be free from whatever this is happening to me.
Like, I'm Like, I have a right to be in a circumstance where I'm not subjected to whatever it is I'm claiming I should be subjected to.
Do you kind of understand what I'm saying?
I do and I don't.
So perhaps you could tell me a little bit more about if I say I have the right to be free from aggression, which is probably something you and I would agree with.
What does it mean to say I have a right to that in the real world?
What does that mean in the real world?
Um... If you really want to get down to the nitty-gritty, we essentially value things like self-defense, consistency, and whatnot.
If you want to get down to the nitty-gritty, it pertains more to the consistent applications of one's values.
I just want to understand what you mean when you say rights, because I don't think that I do understand it.
Well, I don't actually think of a right as a You know, a thing, as you're floating around in the universe, as you described.
A right, like as people typically conceive of them, in a real-world sense, is more a state of affairs where one is seen, at least by a given society, to be entitled to things or from things.
So it's a social construct, for sure.
Rights do not exist outside of the context of a society.
Okay, but I'm still not sure what it is you mean when you say the word rights.
Do you mean if I say I have the right to freedom from aggression, this gives me some sort of positive moral obligation?
Yeah, that would imply it in a way.
Yes, I would agree, I suppose.
And these rights don't exist in the real world.
But if you're saying that these rights are...
It's incumbent upon other people to respect my rights.
Well, what I'm saying is the concept of rights is contingent upon society.
I mean, for instance, if you were on an island, like all alone, say, you know, it was kind of some kind of a Twilight Zone episode and everyone else was dead and you're the only guy on an island.
It doesn't much make any sense to claim a right to property or a right to non-aggression, because essentially rights are a construct that we use to deal with other people, and if there are no people to deal with, you know, the very purpose, nature, concept of rights actually breaks down.
So a right is me saying to people, please don't aggress against me, and they respect that?
Yeah, in a sense.
So it's really a request?
It depends how one uses it, but pragmatically it's a request in a sense.
Okay, so when you say in a sense, I'm not sure what you mean.
Like I can say to people, I would rather you don't aggress against me, like it would be nice, I would prefer that you don't aggress against me, right?
Yes, that would be. And is that the same as what you're supposed to say?
It depends on the nature of the discussion.
When you're talking about rights, if you're talking about interpersonal relations in this kind of regard, Essentially what you're saying is if I have a right to not be aggressed against, if you tell someone this, you're really saying it is my understanding that I would rather have it, and if you applied what you value consistently, you would probably not rather have it if I was aggressed upon in most cases.
So it's an expression of a value, if you will.
Yes, but again, it's something that's like a request.
Again, I'm just trying to understand where it is you're coming from.
If I come up to you and say, I would rather you don't aggress against me or steal my stuff, I'm making a request of you.
Is that right? Yeah, you are essentially.
Because you keep using words like essentially, so I'm not sure if it really...
Okay, yes. Yes, you are.
Sorry. I don't mean to use qualifiers.
So, if I make a request of you, that's the same as having rights.
Is that right?
If you make a request of people?
Well, that depends on the nature of the request.
Well, again, if I say I would rather you not steal my stuff, that's the same as making a request.
Yeah, in a sense, yes.
Okay, not yes, yes, you're making a request.
So rights is a fancy way of saying, please do me a solid brother and don't steal my stuff or punch me in the face?
Yeah, essentially.
Okay, so we can just use, like, preference or request.
And, of course, the challenge with this stuff is the people who will respect your requests in this matter are probably not people that you really have to worry about.
But those who won't respect your requests won't be interested in your definition of rights or won't care anything about your definition of rights, and that's why I have a problem with the concept.
Those who violate your rights aren't going to care about your rights, and no syllogism is going to stop them.
No syllogism is going to stop them. Oh, of course.
So it just seems to me like it's something that works really well among uncivilized moral people who you don't need protection from.
And it doesn't work at all because uncivilized, immoral, immoral people...
Who you do need protection from.
It's like taking some sort of immunization against a disease you're never going to get, while at the same time rendering yourself incredibly susceptible to a disease you aren't going to get.
So it just seems to me kind of like seeing on pointless demeanor, on these kinds of requests in pointless demeanor that I said.
In a sense, the ad, I mean, it makes sense, but at the same time, you need some kind of focal point for social interaction.
So, if I, obviously...
Let me just interrupt you.
I understand that, but what I'm saying is that the people...
Rights aren't going to protect you by claiming something.
you know, biclaim a right to self-use.
They're either going to be reasonable or decent people, in which case you don't need all these rights, or they're not going to be reasonable or decent people, in which case they're not going to use these rights, and they're not going to respect the rights.
Yeah, but that's kind of a false dichotomy.
I don't think necessarily we're dealing in terms of black and white.
Essentially, you could, for example, encounter someone who would have otherwise violated your rights, and you could point out to them that, like, look, if you value, let's say, truth, consistency, self-defense, etc., then it would be better if you didn't do these things, because, like, you're going to experience cognitive dissonance, and then, like, on that basis, you can, like...
Persuade them, if you will, not to screw with your person if you can't catch my drift.
I certainly do, and have you ever succeeded in that approach?
Yes, I have actually, with a number of people.
So somebody who was going to use violence against you was?
Well, it's not so much people that were going to do that, but like, say, people who would like, who would have viewed it perfectly fine to use the state as a proxy to who would have viewed it perfectly fine to use the state as a proxy to be I've actually convinced a couple people that that was not a preferable course of action.
Sure, sure, I understand that.
But you can't convince the state not to be used as a proxy.
I mean, if nobody uses the state as a proxy, politicians will use the state as a proxy and so on.
So this is an issue.
This is a great danger that I see in the realm of this question of rights.
It's like it doesn't help anyone.
There's a great risk also because if people say, well, I have the right to this or that, right to property or freedom of speech or freedom of association and so on, the next thing they want to do is they want to create a state to protect these rights from other people.
And then, of course, a state grows and ends up taking away these rights from everyone or violating these rights into perpetuity and get preyed upon by society.
It's actually a huge negative effect.
People then say, well, I have a right to this and that, and then they want to run off and create a government to protect those rights, which then preys upon them in perpetuity.
I actually think it's a pretty statist concept, rights as a whole.
To that I would respond like they don't necessarily have to be.
One could just as easily form a voluntary social contract on the basis of freely associating with like-minded people to create some particular state of affairs, whether it be health care or some kind of club relation, etc., that was based on some sort whether it be health care or some kind of club relation, etc., that And it could be done like without violating, without using aggression against anyone or trying to screw with their equity or whatnot.
Right.
It's useful, but it's not actually a thing.
Like, you're not going to appeal to rights, you know, to the statist, to this bureaucrat, and that's not going to solve anything, obviously.
Right. But, of course, then we're back to the situation where if you are...
If you are... Oh, dear.
We're getting quite negative. Oh, sorry.
You just... I just switched microphones because there was lots of complaints about volume.
I just saw this in the chat room. Okay, that's better.
How's that? I think that's better.
So, yeah, so the issue is that when you said, well, you can join together with a community of like-minded people, I agree with you.
Yes, you can absolutely join together with a group of like-minded people, in which case you don't need talk of rights because they're like-minded.
So they're not going to steal from you or punch you in the face or whatever.
So it just seems to be one of these things that is a real problem because it lures people into believing that they need a state.
And then it's sort of like a hook, right?
It goes, oh, I need my rights protected, so let's have a government which then violates all of these supposed rights because the government doesn't need to respect the rights.
It has a monopoly of force.
So anyway, I mean, I'm sure that we're of similar minds about the non-existence of rights I'm very much around, the very concept of human rights is incredibly dangerous and seems to be a sort of one-way sliding pit into the hell of statism, and so I actually oppose very strongly the concept of human rights and so on, which is, you know, I'm sure going to be slipped and quoted out of context, but I very much I do not like the concept of rights.
I find it to be very dangerous.
And it's the worst kind of thing because it gives you illusory protection against people who will, in fact, do you harm without respecting those rights.
And it's completely unnecessary with those who are going to respect your rights in the first place.
So to me, it's just a big lure for statism and war and prisons and that kind of stuff.
So I just wanted to sort of clarify that up front.
But then it seems to me, why would you appeal to, like, I saw in your property rights video, and correct me if I'm wrong, but you appeal to self-ownership, which is a type of rights claim.
No, no, no, no, no.
Look, when have I ever said that self-ownership is a rights claim?
Well, it's not so much that you said that self-ownership is a rights claim, it's that pretty much in all hitherto uses of the term self-ownership, that's typically what people refer to when they say the term self-ownership.
Yeah, well, sorry to be annoyingly precise, but that's like saying, well, somebody used the word relativity before Einstein, so let's use that definition rather than the one that he's using.
I mean, if you want to talk about other thinkers, that's great, but if you want to criticize my theory of rights and so on, then...
You know, saying other people use the word differently is a challenge, right?
Because then you can debate those people and not me, if that makes sense.
Well, I know, Will. It just seems kind of misleading in a way, because all libertarians, people like Murray Rothbard, when they use the term self-ownership, they refer to kind of right.
In addition, I also think it's kind of misleading because it has kind of a dualistic concept of self-ownership, or of ownership.
I don't know how well Brain Police mentioned this to you, but ownership implies a person.
So, you know, in essence, like, you know...
Self-ownership implies that something other than that which is being owned owns the property, in this case yourself.
So it's like by the use of this term you're implying some kind of a third person or a dualistic property of self and ownership that's inherent to persons, and I think that's also kind of misleading.
So, I'm sorry, I just want to make sure, that was quite a lot, and I unfortunately couldn't quite follow at all.
If you could just go through that a little more slowly, because there was quite a lot in there.
Sorry, I just kind of assumed that you're familiar with this, but...
No, no, I'm familiar with those formulations.
I just want to make sure I understand how you're applying them in this context.
Well, I'd say if I own this bottle cap...
Or if someone owns this bottle cap.
What I'm saying is that, like, by my assertion of this, this implies that something other than the bottle cap owns the bottle cap.
So if I say self-ownership, I'm implying that someone other than myself owns myself.
So I'm implying either a third person Like, that exists somewhere else, or I'm implying that there's some kind of dualism in persons as pertains to ownership.
Like, there's some kind of floating property of self and floating property of ownership, and they kind of connect somehow.
Okay, sorry. I want to make sure I understand what you're saying there.
So, you're saying if I use the term self-ownership, that I'm saying someone other than myself owns myself?
By implication. That's why, like Spraynpley said, I think it's a bad metaphor.
We're trying to express...
Well, but there's a...
I mean, correct me if I'm wrong, but there's a clear biological and physical difference between you and the bottle cap, right?
In that you can manipulate your own body directly, but you can manipulate the bottle cap directly.
I mean, there's a really quantifiable basic difference there between you and the bottle cap, right?
The bottle cap can be transferred out of your range of motion, but your limbs can't unless you're going to have some horrible...
Farming accident, right?
I mean, there's a huge and quantifiable and fundamental difference between you and the bottle cap, so I'm not sure why what applies to the bottle cap would also apply to you.
Because you're saying self-ownership, so you're saying the same ownership, you're equating the bottle cap with yourself.
Well, no, that's why the word self-ownership is there, not just ownership.
As ownership would refer to external objects, self-ownership is the identification of the biological fact that you control most or at least some aspects of your biological function, right?
Well, like, I know what it refers to, but I'm saying, like, the implications of conceiving of that, well, for one, I take issue because, you know, you've kind of used...
Self-ownership, like, in a radically different context, and it's pretty much been used by all libertarian thinkers, like, up to this point.
And, you know, at the same time, like, it still implies there's another person.
Like, you said self, but just, you know, the very word ownership implies that, you know, something other than the self does the owning.
So, like, you're implying... No, no, no, no.
Sorry, how are you getting that?
If you use... Hang on.
If you use... If you use self-ownership, then that's the self-contained language.
To say that there's a third party implied in that doesn't logically follow.
Like if I say A, B, and you say, well, that implies C, well, no, it doesn't.
There's only A, B, and there's only self-ownership in that formulation, right?
There is a self, and there is control over the body, which is exercised to some degree, like I can't control...
I don't know. I can't control my legs if they're twitchy or if they fall asleep, right?
I mean, there's limits, of course, right?
And I can't make my liver rotate.
I've tried. But I can't, right?
So we have some limits. But over certain aspects, which would be moral, right?
The use of my hands, the use of my voice, and so on.
I do have some control over what I do with these things, right?
And so that is a biological fact, right?
That I can't make your hands move.
I can make my hands move.
I'm responsible for my hands, and therefore I'm responsible for the effects of my hands, just as I'm responsible for the effects of my arguments, which is the stuff that you've heard, and you're responsible for the effects of your arguments.
That, we can agree, is a simple biological fact.
Self-ownership is not an ought, it's an is, right?
That we have control over certain aspects of our bodily functions.
Well then, like, why not just say that?
Like, why actually use the...
The term self-ownership, because it has all these other implications as well.
And, like, my point about ownership was the term ownership is kind of ambiguous in this instance because...
No, no, no, it's not ambiguous.
It's not ambiguous, right?
Because we do have soul control over our own body, right?
No one's denying this.
I'm just saying, like, the very concept of ownership implies something other than the property being owned, you know, does the owning.
Like, the property doesn't own itself.
It's like something external to the property does the owning.
So if you say self-ownership, you're implying something other than itself doesn't.
Look, I'm sorry to interrupt.
I mean, we've gone around this mulberry bush a bunch of times.
If you want to put other thinkers' implications into the words that I'm using and clearly defining, then you need to talk to those other thinkers or write rebuttals to those other thinkers.
We inherit the words in the English language, right?
That's why I didn't make up a new word called, you know, schnitzbizel for my conception of a stateless society, but I have to use statelessness or voluntarism or anarchism or whatever, right?
The same way I have to use free market, the same Why not call it personal sovereignty or individual sovereignty?
Wouldn't that seem to be a little bit less than the U.S. more clear?
I don't think so.
I'll just ask people in the chat room if they would find individual sovereignty more clear than self-ownership.
Anyway, well, I mean, all I can do is talk about the way that I use the language.
You know, we don't like the word anarchy because it has all of these negative connotations, but we can't invent a new word, right?
Because then people will say, if we invent a new word, like schnitzbizel, and we say, this is schnitzbizel, this is the state of society, it's like, oh, that means anarchy.
Yes, well, but I don't like to use that word, right?
And so if I say, well, personal sovereignty is like, well, how is that different from self-ownership?
You know, I just like to go with the words and give clear definitions.
So I don't want to keep going around this thing where you say, well, other thinkers imply that there's some sort of third-party ghost or strings or whatever, right?
I can only use the terms as I've used them and defined them in my writings and podcasts.
So I think we agree that there are no rights.
You feel that there are values to rights.
I think that they're very, very dangerous concepts.
It's like the right to self-defense.
People always want to create a state to enforce it, which ends up violating it in perpetuity.
So let's just say we agree to disagree that self-ownership is the right term because we want to, I think, get to the meat of the ideas rather than worry about the syntax or the rhetoric, if that makes sense.
Okay. So should we just move on then, I suppose?
Yes, please. No, go ahead.
The other issue I have with what I would call UBP is It seems to me that it doesn't so much prove that a moral theory is, quote-unquote, invalid or necessarily wrong, but it more proves individual hypocrisy and inconsistency in individuals.
So that if, you know, if you point out that, like, let's say an individual holds, like, two moral propositions to be true, like, say the first one is, all killing, like, regardless of context is wrong, and then they say, you know, well, but the state is justified in killing, like, this would be a, this would be a, like, an obvious contradiction.
Anyone would, like, with any sense would recognize this, but...
You know, it seems that according to, like, the standard of consistency in UBP, that if you were to point this out...
I'm sorry, are you saying UBP? Or, uh, UPB, sorry.
UPB, okay, sorry. But, um, my, um, the point was is that if you did point this out, you wouldn't actually have refuted the claim that, um, all killing, regardless of context, is wrong.
You would have just merely proved an individual instance of hypocrisy.
And, like, I'm not saying that's not useful.
That's certainly very useful.
I mean, if you're trying to argue with people, to prove that they, like, to show or to bring them into a state of cognitive dissonance is essential for the ability to persuade or to argue with them.
But, you know, you've claimed that UPB is...
is a validator or an invalidator for moral theories and it just seems like it definitely proves individual hypocrisy but that seems like the extent of what it does.
It doesn't actually invalidate the theories per se.
Alright, let's say that that's true.
I don't agree that it's true but let's say it's true for a moment then you would have a mechanism by which theories would be invalidated rather than merely proven to be logically inconsistent.
There would be some other standard that would actually invalidate the theories.
Is that right? Well, I mean, you could probably come up with some other standard to evaluate, like, the validity of moral theories.
But, like, I'm not saying that you couldn't.
I'm just saying, like, all that UPB does, or all universally preferable behavior does, is it effectively proves individual instances of hypocrisy in individual, but it doesn't actually refute the moral theory they have.
All right, let me ask you, I mean, you could be right.
Let me ask you a question, because I think that philosophy should at least strive, because I think philosophy is an overarching science, right?
UPB is not, you know, because I'm so smart, it just happens to be, right?
Because UPB is something that validates and invalidates scientific theories, mathematical theories, engineering theories, and of course it's not, I mean, the scientific method does all of that, I'm just taking an overarching I think that philosophers should at least try to attempt to get the same degree of intellectual respectability and consistency as, say, your average high school biology student.
So if you're a high school biology student and you go up to your teacher and you say, "Mammals include both warm-blooded and cold-blooded animals," what would he say?
I would probably disagree.
Michael, what's your point?
Well, no, but what would he say?
If you say, mammals include both warm-blooded and cold-blooded animals?
He would say no. He would say no, that's incorrect.
Now, would he say, well, your proposition is not invalid, it's just an example of personal hypocrisy?
Well, here's my problem.
Give me the step-by-step and then you can tell me how I'm completely wrong, right?
So, would he say your theory is not invalidated that mammals are both warm and cold-blooded, it's just an example of personal hypocrisy?
He would most likely claim it was invalid.
I guarantee you that he would completely claim that it was invalid.
Now, if you were to go to a physics symposium and you were to call them up and you were to say, well, I'm kind of a home physicist and I've come up with this great theory that the speed of light is both constant and variable simultaneously under the same conditions, that matter both attracts and repels itself simultaneously under the same conditions, that gases both expand and contract simultaneously under the same conditions, and I'd like to present a paper on it, what would they say?
They would say probably no, or that it was invalid.
And would they say, well, it's not that your theory is invalid, it is just an example of personal hypocrisy?
This is the problem with that, though.
They would not say that it's an example.
Right, but the physics review committee would not say, this is not an example of an invalid theory, it's just an example of personal hypocrisy.
It would say it was invalid.
Right, so if a theory is logically contradictory, It is not an example of personal hypocrisy.
It is an example of an invalid theory, right?
This is the problem, though.
You've equated, essentially, moral propositions, which are usually based on some kind of rights discussion, which we've agreed don't exist in reality as things, with a science.
Of course they have.
You're comparing related things, but they're completely different.
Like, I think as you mentioned, to call a rock bad doesn't make any sense.
You could prove out an instance, like if someone said, the rock is good and the rock is bad.
That's an instance of personal hypocrisy, of course.
But you haven't actually proved, you can't go, aha, you know, the theory that the rock is good or that the rock is bad is hereby invalidated because this person has declared few mutually exclusive No,
no, no, but look, any logical statement, any statement that I make that is logically self-contradictory is invalid.
Whether it's in ethics or science or math or whatever, right?
Or odd theory.
It's true. Like, the thing is, they both can't be true.
But the fact that, like, you know, if I say, again, you know, the rock is good, the rock is bad, like, these both can't be true at the same time in the same way for a given person.
Sorry, I'm not sure if rock is good or bad.
Sorry, rock is good or bad is an irrational statement, right?
I mean, it has a logical concept.
It is, but this is essentially what moral discussions are in a way.
Sorry, not according to UPB. I mean, I'm sure lots of people like to make up good and bad the same way that people like to worship Krishna and Jesus and Yahweh, right?
But as far as UPB goes, what we do is anybody who makes a positive statement about truth that is considered to be binding or universal That statement must, in its first instance, be logically consistent according to the facts of reality.
It cannot be self-detonating, and ideally, it should also explain some of the general facts and trends of human society.
But, you know, first and foremost, it has to be logically consistent if it is going to be a valid theory of any kind, whether it's math or engineering or physics or biology or ethics.
Okay, let's say, rephrase that to, like, to make this easier, one should not throw rocks.
And then, but the same person says, you know, also accepts that one should throw rocks.
The point is, like, if you point this out, if you go, you know, aha, you hold these two mutually exclusive stances.
That mere fact hasn't actually refuted the individual claim that one should not throw rocks, or it hasn't refuted the opposite, that one should not throw rocks.
It's proved hypocrisy, but since these kind of moral claims aren't science, if you will, they don't actually exist in reality in the same way that this rock does, you can't invalidate them like that.
Of course you can. Look, the scientific method does not exist in reality, but it's not subjective.
Of course. E equals MC squared is not written somewhere on the surface of atoms or in the constellations, but it is still logically empirical and verifiable and objective, right?
Yes. So the fact that the concepts do not exist in the world does not mean the concepts are arbitrary and subjective.
Like, I didn't claim that, but yes.
Okay, so if somebody makes a logically self-contradictory statement, then the theory that they're proposing is invalid, right?
So if I say, thou shalt not kill unless you're wearing a green costume, right?
That's like saying, well, a lizard is cold-blooded unless you put a hat on it, in which case it becomes warm-blooded.
And obviously, that would be an insane theory to put forward.
I mean, again, I always try and think of, like, if I were to take this approach to a scientific body and say, this is my theory, that lizards are lizards...
I'm not saying this is your theory, right?
But this is what I would say to somebody who says...
That we shouldn't kill unless we wear a green costume, then we can go and kill all we want.
I'd say, but that's like saying that lizards are cold-blooded unless you put a hat on them, in which case they then become warm-blooded and also gain the ability to fly.
Clearly that would be an insane biological theory.
And it's no saner, an ethical theory, right, to say that human beings can have opposite properties, i.e., can kill, should kill, and should not kill, depending on entirely arbitrary circumstances like putting a green hat on them or whatever, right, pinning some stuff to their chest.
So if somebody puts forward a should or an ethical theory or something like that of universally preferable behavior and draws arbitrary lines that have no consequence whatsoever, In the application of an ethical theory.
In other words, it's universal to all people except for those guys with hats on.
I mean, that would be insane. That would be like saying, well, it's wrong to murder unless you're over six feet tall.
Like, clearly that would just be an arbitrary distinction between wrong and right to murder, and you would have to provide some sort of objective justification as to how these things are different, right?
How these people are different.
And you would be unable to find any physical or biological underpinnings as to why rights would change if you pass over six feet or if you put a funny hat on or whatever.
And therefore, those claims are invalid, just as if it would be an invalid claim to say that if you put a fish in a straitjacket, it gains the ability to breathe air.
It would just be an arbitrary and insane thing to make up.
I'm not saying that you're doing that.
I'm just saying that that's how UPB would say.
It's not just a matter of personal hypocrisy.
It's just wrong.
Well, the problem with the lizard example is you're equating rights claims with empirical evidence.
In the sense that, like, and you mentioned, like, someone holds a moral theory that, you know, we should not kill unless we're wearing some kind of a green costume.
That's arbitrary. And, of course, it's completely arbitrary.
And, like, as far as making any kind of argument, like, the burden of proof goes to you, like, to why that should be so.
And, you know, it's extremely doubtful that, like, one could now offer any kind of sound justification to why that would be so.
However, my point is that if one...
Claims this, even though it's arbitrary, like a weak, pathetic argument.
It's not technically invalid.
Well, but you realize you're not making any arguments, right?
You're just repeating, just saying it's not technically.
Why is it not invalid? Why, if I make a completely self-contradictory statement that does not mirror any facts in reality, how is that not?
It's completely invalid in science, right?
Because it's not contradictory, is my point.
It is contradictory. If you say that a theory of ethics is universal, unless someone puts a hat on, then it's no longer universal, right?
It is universal to those who don't have the hat on.
It's arbitrary, it's stupid, but it's not...
No, no, no, because you're saying human beings have these properties, the ability to kill at will.
And then you say, well, you put a hat on, that does not physically and biologically change the nature of a human being.
We agree with that. You put a hat on, you're still a human being, right?
You're not a space alien.
You're not a rock.
You're not a thought, right?
You're just a human being with a hat.
Right.
Of course.
So if you say that this is universal to human beings, except for the people with hats on, then you're saying that putting hats on changes someone from a human being into something else, into something quite the opposite of a human being, really, right?
Because you're saying that they have opposite properties.
You could be claiming that a human being with a hat has higher moral properties than a human being without a hat on.
Yes, but the fact is that putting a hat on...
Sorry, but the fact is it is completely contradictory because putting a hat on does not change the nature of a human being any more than if I put a hat on a lizard, it turns it into a mammal, right?
Well, the thing is, we're not claiming it turns into a mountain.
We're claiming, like, higher moral properties, so you're equating two completely different things.
No, no, no, no. Putting a hat on does not create higher moral properties for a human being, right?
Of course not. So, therefore, it's an invalid proposition to say that people with hats on have different moral obligations, because they're exactly the same as the people without hats.
It's a completely inconsequential difference that they have a hat on, right?
It's inconsequential.
It's arbitrary. It's totally subjective and pointless, but it's not logically contradictory.
If we can't get past this, then there's no point continuing.
Do you think, just between you and I and whoever ends up watching this, do you believe that putting a hat on someone changes his or her physical properties in any way?
I'm playing devil's advocate here.
I mean, I think the whole notion of life is soldiers.
No, I don't. It does.
Now, do you think that any scientist would say, any biologist, anyone who would do any empirical research, who would do an MRI scan, who would check the gravitational mass, which maybe would change a bit with a hat or whatever, would any sane human being say, put a hat on someone, it changes his or her fundamental properties?
Yeah, probably no one would say this, yeah.
I agree. Nobody would say that.
And if they did say that, they would either be insane or in the military, which is sort of redundant, right?
So, clearly, if somebody says, if I put a hat on, I get completely different obligations, properties, what people would generally call rights and so on, they would be empirically and logically and rationally and factually and scientifically and biologically completely incorrect because they would be claiming the creation of an opposite property based on the application of an inconsequential aspect like putting a hat on.
The point is, we're doing this in terms of logic, and remember, I'm just playing devil's advocate here.
I actually think that universally preferable behavior as a tool to prove individual hypocrisy is very useful.
So in that regard, I would support it.
Just because one claims this infinitesimal difference, putting a hat on or a uniform on or what have you, that somehow that bestows magic, higher moral properties on someone, that's stupid, subjective, and arbitrary.
But logically, if they claim that, it's not necessarily contradictory, just that in and of itself is my point.
Yeah, it is. It is contradictory.
It is contradictory.
It is contradictory. And I've given you about 50 examples as to why.
And you either have to tell me how putting a hat on a lizard turns it into a mammal, or you have to accept the points, right?
Because you can if you want, but I won't continue the debate if you just keep repeating the things and not addressing the arguments that I make, right?
With all due respect to your obvious scintillating intelligence, and I mean that with all sincerity.
You're an incredibly smart fellow, and I'm really happy to have the debate, right?
But I keep providing you examples of how it is factually, empirically, logically, scientifically, biologically incorrect.
And you say, well, all it does is prove personal hypocrisy.
When we've already agreed that if I propose a logically contradictory theory and an empirically contradictory theory to any scientific body, it doesn't just prove personal hypocrisy.
It proves an invalidity of the theory.
And I've given you examples of how that exactly follows from what you're saying with devil's advocate position based on the hat thing, right?
So you either have to, you know, accept the point or we can, you know, we can convene to another time if you want to take some time to think about it.
Or you have to tell me how putting a hat on, because it's not just higher moral properties.
If I say thou shalt not kill unless you have a hat on thou shalt kill, those are opposite.
It's not just higher, it's opposite.
It's the opposite properties that those human beings have.
Don't kill and kill.
And so you're turning a lizard, not just into a mammal, but into the opposite of a lizard, whatever that might be, by putting a hat on it.
And that clearly would be invalid.
It can't be valid with a human being either.
So it's not just a matter of personal hypocrisy.
Empirically, it completely does not work to say putting a hat on turns a human being into the opposite of a human being with regards to positive obligations.
The point is, like, you're equating science, you're equating biology, physics, etc., with moral claims.
And the thing is, my point is, there's a disconnect with here, is that, like, we can't actually prove, like, the validity of this.
Like, to claim that, you know, that, to make an analogy, like, to take your analogy to say that, like, claiming a green uniform bestows higher moral properties is like, you know, claiming a, you know, Like, a human is cold-blooded, you know, in a literal sense, is a valid analogy.
The thing is, it breaks down.
Because in one case, you're dealing with, like, the application of values.
You're dealing with, like, the combination of mutually exclusive values.
And, like, while it's true that, like, these both can't be...
Can't be valid, can't be positive at the same time.
It doesn't actually refute the individual claims.
Sorry, why doesn't it refute the individual claims?
If I say, if I put a hat on someone, they gain some sort of opposite property, which is never empirically verifiable.
In fact, quite the opposite is proven.
How does it not invalidate the claim?
That's what I want to understand. How does it not invalidate the claim?
Yeah, you're saying it doesn't invalidate the claim, but how?
How does it not invalidate the claim?
Because we're not dealing in terms of empirical evidence of material reality.
We're dealing with values.
We're dealing with the application of values, which, well, I mean, values obviously occur in reality, but not in the same way that a, you know, a lizard is cold-blooded or warm-blooded.
Oh, so for you, everything we're talking about is subjective.
Um... Yeah, it's contingent upon the application of one's values.
My point is that you can prove hypocrisy.
You can prove that someone is applying their values inconsistently.
It's that, like, how they apply the values that, like, lead individuals to take the positions that they actually take, like, they're definitely being inconsistent.
However, this doesn't actually refute the values they hold, which lead them to, like, either side of the hypocritical conclusion.
Okay, so wait, so if I understand this correctly, you can't invalidate UPB? I can't invalidate UPB? Well, I wasn't trying to, well, invalidate, well, I was trying to, when I say like invalidate UPBI,
I was trying to invalidate in the sense of it being a valid evaluator for moral theories, but in the sense of, UPP being valid or UPP being valid as far as proving personal hypocrisy, I would totally agree that it's valid.
You can definitely prove it.
No, but sorry, are you saying that you can invalidate UPP if it claims to do more than show personal hypocrisy?
That that is then an invalid theory if it tries to do that?
If by the terms it's working with, equating science and biology with morality, then yes, it would be invalid.
In the sense of personal hypocrisy, though, it's...
Wait, wait, wait, sorry. Let's just pause here for a second, right?
So you're saying that you can invalidate somebody's ethical theory if that ethical theory happens to be UPB, right?
If they...
Yes, because that's more of an epistemological claim rather than an ethical claim.
You're equating material reality and you're putting morality on the same plane of evaluating different aspects of human interactions, i.e.
moral interactions. No, no, no, no, no.
Sorry, sorry. UPB does not validate or invalidate moral interactions.
It is for moral theories.
I know, moral theories. Right, so you're saying that...
My point is moral interactions pertain to theories.
Right, so you're saying both that theories, that say a theory about putting a hat on giving opposite, that cannot be invalidated, but UPB can be invalidated if it makes the claim that it can invalidate theories.
Well, I mean, I wouldn't actually claim it based on that premise, but yes, I would say that, like, if universally preferable behavior claims do anything more than prove personal hypocrisy that it's invalidated.
And how is it invalidated?
Right, how is it that I don't get to invalidate a soldier shooting people, but you get to invalidate a moral theory?
A standard for evaluating moral theories?
Because you're equating science, you're equating hard science with morality.
And that's an overstepping of, like, applying this.
You're equating a moral standard with a scientific standard.
And is it that a scientific standard trumps moral claims?
Like, a scientific standard is higher than moral claims?
It's that you're conflating two aspects of, let's say, human knowledge, if you will, that are on different levels.
It's like comparing... A shoe and a toaster oven.
Like, they're both made out of...
Okay, that's a bad analogy, but it's...
Yeah, I'm sorry, don't follow that. A microwave and a toaster oven, like, they're both designed to, like, heat a type of food, but they do so in radically different ways.
My suggestion is, and I think we've had a good debate here, my suggestion would be I don't understand how you can say that universal standards of truth and falsehood We're good to go.
I don't think we're going to get a chance to explore it now.
I mean, you can have a listen to this, I'll have a listen to this, and we'll see if we can get any further.
But it seems to me that you're using UPB, as people generally do, to attack UPB. In other words, you're saying there's a universal standard which says you can't equate ethics with science, and therefore UPB is invalid.
But saying you can't equate ethics with science is a UPB statement, right?
And therefore you can't say it both validates and invalidates a truth statement completely.
I think you have a logical problem to work out.
Maybe you can and maybe you've got a great way of dealing with it, but I would say that that is the essence, that you can't impose a universal and absolute truth statement to say this methodology which says absolute and universal truth statements have to be consistent is now inconsistent.
That, I think, is the challenge that you face.
As everyone does, who attempts to disprove UPB, because UPB is a standard of internal logical consistency and empirical validation, and if you attempt to disprove UPB using either a requirement for logical consistency or for empirical validation, then you're affirming UPB, and you can't use logic to disprove logic, right?
And you can't use UPB to disprove UPB. You can use UPB to disprove or prove particular truth statements made about reality or logical consistency or something, but you can't use it to turn over UPB because the only thing that's optional or the only alternative we have to logical consistency and empirical evidence is sort of blind assertion or the voice of God or something.
I'm not saying you're putting any of those forward, but that's, I think, the logical challenge.
That you face. And I'm done as far as the conversation goes now, though I certainly have appreciated it.
Is there anything that you'd like to add?
And I'll give you the last word in case I've completely misinterpreted what you're saying.
My point is that moral propositions can't be true in the same sense that, for example, the state that this rock exists or doesn't.
...is something that can be proved true or false.
The claim that I have a right, or like that one should kill or one should not kill, can't be proven true or untrue.
That's essentially what I'm claiming, is that one is a subjective preference, and the other one is an aspect of material reality.
So that if we're discussing...
If we're discussing the moral things that one ought to do something or one ought not to do something, that regardless of what you claim, you can't prove it true or false either way.
You can prove hypocrisy.
You can prove that you're not consistently applying your moral claims, but you can't invalidate the moral claims because they can't be proven true or false either way, regardless of what your moral claim happens to be.
Right. So for you, if there's no empirical evidence, you can't prove it true or false, right?
Exactly. So for you, there's no such thing as mathematics, right?
Well, I mean, you can prove it true or false in terms of logic, and that's definitely valid.
That's essentially what science is predicated on if it's true or false.
Fantastic. Well, then I think we agree perfectly.
I think we just, you know, came at it from a very different angle.
So thank you so much for taking the time.
This is probably more a semantic problem than anything else.
It could well be.
That's what it is. But thank you very much for your time.
I do appreciate it, and I will talk to you soon.
Okay. Bye.
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