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Jan. 24, 2009 - Freedomain Radio - Stefan Molyneux
20:14
1264 The Trial and Death of Socrates - Part Five

Giving the world to the dictators.

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Hi everybody, it's Stefan Molyneux from Free Domain Radio.
This is The Trial and Death of Socrates, Part 5, Crito and Conclusions.
So it's well worth reading the dialogue called Crito, C-R-I-T-O. The translation by Benjamin Jowett is very good.
And basically we're going to just read short excerpts from it and then we'll talk about at least an approach that I think is very helpful to understand what is going on in this situation as a whole.
And Socrates is given the chance to escape from the From the death penalty.
He's in prison for a while because the ship has got to make a journey and come back, and they can't put anyone to death for religious reasons.
The ship is about to return, so they're giving him the opportunity to flee, which Aristotle did take that opportunity later and said that he would not allow Athens to sin twice against philosophy, as if there had only been two sins.
But nonetheless, Aristotle, the The pragmatist and the rationalist and the sensual empiricist was the one who made the right decision, I think, to flee evil rather than submit to it.
But Socrates, at least according to Plato, did not make that decision.
And why are we spending time focusing on this?
Why are we spending time focusing on this?
I've got some emails that say, but there's so much going on in the world, Steph!
Why are we focusing on the trial and death of Socrates?
Hopefully it will make some sense shortly.
Okay, so Socrates does not take the opportunity to leave, and then he continues with this argument, which we'll get to in a second, but first let's talk about what Socrates, what argument he makes originally.
So he says, for I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason.
And he says, the good people are to be regarded, and not the bad.
And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of the unwise are evil.
He says, was the disciple in gymnastics supposed to attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only, his physician or trainer, whoever that was?
Crito, of course, agrees with him.
And he says, and he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of that one only, his trainer, and not of the many.
Yes. And he ought to live and train and eat and drink in the way which seems good to his single master, who has understanding rather than according to the opinion of all other men put together.
Yes. And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding, will he not suffer evil?
Yes. And what will the evil be, whether attending and what afflicting in the disobedient person?
Cretus has clearly effect in the body that which is destroyed by evil.
Very good, replies Socrates.
And is this not true, Cretus, of other things which we need not separately enumerate, in the matter of just and unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation?
Ought we to follow the opinion of the many, And to fear them, or the opinion of the one man who has understanding, and whom we ought to fear and reverence more than all the rest of the world, and whom deserting we shall destroy and injure, that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice.
Is there not such a principle?
Yes, there is, Socrates.
So here, of course, he is repeating something which he said earlier, but much more clearly, which is that the majority are unwise fools who tend to and enact evil.
They are unwise, they are unjust.
Now, in part of this dialogue he says that the vast majority do things by chance, they don't think.
And I think there's some truth in there, although I don't think it's exactly the same as chance.
Then he moves the argument to say that the majority hold the opinion that if someone does evil to us, we should do evil back to him.
And this is a very interesting argument.
He says, I do not hold this opinion, that I should do evil back to the man who has done evil to me.
But he's going to have a logical problem here, a very large logical problem, which I don't think he overcomes.
And that problem is, these people have condemned him to death, which he considers an evil, the majority of these citizens in Athens.
But to do evil back to them would be to condemn them to death, right?
An eye for an eye, guy stabs me, I stab him back.
People condemn me to death, I condemn them to death.
That would be to do an evil back.
To escape from a death penalty is not to injure the people who have inflicted the death penalty upon you.
So how's he going to solve this problem?
Or try to. So he says, for doing evil to another is the same as injuring him.
Cretus says, very true. Socrates says, then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to anyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him.
And then he says, you skip a bit, he says, ought a man to do what he admits to be right, and ought he to betray, or ought he to betray the right?
Crito, well, he ought to do what he thinks right.
But if this is true, what is the application?
In leaving the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any?
Or rather, do I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong?
Do I not desert the principles which were acknowledged by us to be just?
What do you say? I cannot tell Socrates, says Crito, for I do not know.
Socrates says, and this is his curse, perhaps the most destructive speech in history.
Puts, we'll come back to that.
Socrates says, then consider the matter in this way.
Imagine that I am about to play truant, you may call the proceeding by any name which you like, and the laws and the government come and interrogate me.
Tell us, Socrates, they say, what are you about?
Are you going by an act of yours to overturn us, the laws and the whole state, as far as in you lies?
Do you imagine that a state can subsist and not be overthrown in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and overthrown by individuals?
Socrates says, what will our answer be, Crito, to these and the like words?
Anyone, and especially a clever rhetorician, will have a good deal to urge about the evil of setting aside the law, which requires a sentence to be carried out.
And we might reply, yes, but the state has injured us and given an unjust sentence.
Suppose I say that.
Very good, Socrates, says Crito.
Socrates continues. And was that our agreement with you, the law would say, or were you to abide by the sentence of the state?
Socrates says, and if I were to express astonishment at their saying this, the law would probably add, answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes.
You are in the habit of asking and answering questions.
Tell us what complaint you have to make against us, which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the state.
In the first place, did we not bring you into existence?
Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you.
Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage.
None, I should reply.
Or against those of us who regulate the system of nurture and education of children in which you were trained.
We're not the laws who have the charge of this right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastics?
Right, I should reply.
Well then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave as your fathers were before you?
And if this is true, you are not on equal terms with us.
Nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you.
Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or to your master if you had one when you had been struck or reviled by him?
Or received some other evil at his hands?
Would you not say this?
And because we think it right to destroy you, Do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return and your country as far as in you lies?
And will you, oh professor of true virtue, say that you are justified in this?
Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding?
Also to be soothed and gently and reverently entreated when angry even more than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed.
And when we are punished by her, the state, whether with imprisonment or whipping, the punishment is to be endured in silence.
And if she leads us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right.
Neither may anyone yield, or entreat, or leave his rank, but whether in battle, or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him, or he must change their view of what is just, and if he may do no violence to his mother or father, much less may he do violence to his country.
What answer shall we make to this Cretos, says Socrates?
Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?
I think that they do. Socrates says, then the lost will say.
Consider Socrates, if this is true, that in your present attempt you are going to do us wrong.
For after having brought you into the world and nurtured and educated you and given you and every other citizen a share in every good that we had to give, we further proclaim and give the right to every Athenian that if he does not like us when he has come of age and has seen the ways of the city and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him and none of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him.
Any of you who does not like us in the city and who wants to go to a colony or to any other city may go where he likes and take his goods with him.
But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the state and still remains has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him.
And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong.
First, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents.
Secondly, because we are the authors of his education.
Thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands, and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are wrong, and we do not rudely impose them but give Him the alternative of obeying or convincing us that is what we offer, and he doesn't either. These are the sorts of accusations to which, as we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions.
You, above all other Athenians.
Suppose I ask, says Socrates, why is this?
They will justly retort upon me that I, above all other men, have acknowledged the agreement.
There is clear proof, they will say, Socrates, that we and the city are not displeasing to you.
Of all Athenians you have been the most constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be supposed to love.
For you never went out of the city either to see the games, except once when you went to the isthmus, or to any other place unless when you were on military service, nor did you travel, as other men do, nor had you any curiosity to know other states or their laws.
Your affections did not go beyond us and our state.
We were your especial favorites, and you acquiesced in our government of you, and this is the state in which you begat your children, which is a proof of your satisfaction.
Moreover, you might, if you had liked, have fixed the penalty at banishment in the course of the trial.
The state which refuses to let you go now would have let you go then.
But you pretended that you preferred death to exile and that you were not grieved at death.
And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments and pay no respect to us, the laws, of whom you are the destroyer.
And are doing what only a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen.
And first of all, answer this very question.
Are we right in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not in word only?
Is that true or not?
How shall we answer that, Crito?
Says Socrates, "must we not agree?" Crito agrees.
Socrates says, "then will they not say?" You, Socrates, are breaking the covenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in any haste or under any compulsion or deception, but having had seventy years to think of them, during which time you were at liberty to leave the city.
If we were not to your mind, or if our covenants appeared to you to be unfair, you had your choice, and might have gone either to Lacedaemon or Crete, which you often praised for their good government, or to some other Hellenic or foreign state.
Whereas you, above all other Athenians, seem to be so fond of the state, or in other words, of us her laws.
Who would like to a state that has no laws?
Sorry, for who would like a state that has no laws?
That you never stirred out of her.
The Halt, the Blind, the Maimed were not more stationary in her than you were.
And now you run away and forsake your agreements.
Not so, Socrates.
If you will take our advice, do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city.
For just consider, if you transgress an heir in this sort of way, what good will you do, either to yourself or to your friends?
That your friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose their property, is tolerably certain.
And you yourself, if you fly to one of our neighboring cities, one of the neighboring cities as, for example, Thebes or Megadah, Both of which are well-governed cities, will come to them as an enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you.
And all patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter of the laws, and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the injustice of their own condemnation of you.
For he who is a corrupter of the laws is more likely to be a corrupter of the young and the foolish portion of mankind.
Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and virtuous men and his existence worth having on these terms?
Or will you go to them without shame and talk to them, Socrates?
And what will you say to them?
What you say here about virtue and justice and institutions and laws be the best things among men?
Would that be decent of you?
Surely not. But if you go away from well-governed states to Cretos' friends in Thessaly, where there is great disorder and license, they will be charmed to have the tale of your escape from prison set off with ludicrous particulars of the manners in which you were wrapped in some goatskin or some other disguise and metamorphosed, as the fashion of runaways is.
That is very likely. But will there be no one to remind you that in your old age you violated the most sacred laws from a miserable desire for a little more life?
Perhaps not if you keep them in good temper, but if they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things.
You will live. But how?
As the flatterer of all men and the servant of all men, and doing what?
Eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad, in order that you may get a dinner.
And where will be your fine sentiments about justice and virtue then?
Say that you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them.
Will you take them to Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship?
Is that the benefit which you would confer upon them?
Or are you under the impression that they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still alive, although absent from them, for that your friends will take care of them?
Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly, they will take care of them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world, they will not take care of them?
Nay. But if they who call themselves friends are truly friends, they surely will.
Listen then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up.
Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princess of the world below.
For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids.
Flee. Now you depart in innocence a sufferer and not doer of evil, a victim not of the laws, but of men.
But if you go forth, returning evil for evil and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us.
We shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy, for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us.
Listen then to us and not to Crito.
Socrates says, this is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic.
That voice, I say, is humming in my ears and prevents me from hearing any other.
And I know that anything more which you will say will be in vain.
Yet speak, if you have anything to say.
Crito says, I have nothing to say, Socrates.
Socrates replies, then let me follow the intimations of the will of God.
I'll do the conclusions, sorry about the length, I will do the conclusions in the next video.
Thank you so much for watching. I look forward to your donations.
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