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Dec. 21, 2005 - Freedomain Radio - Stefan Molyneux
38:37
23 Health Care Part 2 - A 'right' to heath care?

Logical problems with a 'right' to health care

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Well, good afternoon!
It's Stefan Molyneux.
It is the 21st of December 2005, and it is six minutes before five.
Do I know how to beat the traffic or what?
So, well, I guess I didn't have a chance to do a podcast this morning.
Did you miss me?
Did you miss me?
Did you?
Huh?
Huh?
I was chatting with my wife, who of course had a fascinating dream, which we had to analyze and figure out what was going on with her.
So, you know, while I'm here, and I guess I'm a little pumped because I had a very good day at work.
I have been sort of making this transition from software management to I'm just closing deals in the software arena, and I just closed, or at least I do believe that I have closed, given that I've been told that there are no deal breakers or material objections remaining, a deal for $340,000, which I think is pretty cool.
So I'm a little pumped, and I'm not going to spend the whole afternoon talking about my deal, because I'm not producing a tape to help Insomniacs.
But rather, a discussion of all things libertarian.
So, let's jump back to a topic that we were talking about earlier this week, which is healthcare.
You know, I do these podcasts and I sort of say to myself, well, there's a lot to say about healthcare, so I'm going to call it part one.
You know, as if it's going to be part one of many, or at least more than one.
And then, of course, a couple of days go by and I can't remember what I talked about because I have so many opinions and all that, so I'm going to continue off on a different tack and we'll see if we can't stretch this baby out till I get home.
So, health care.
You know, what is wrong with the government running health care?
Well, there is, of course, a number of things that are wrong with it from the approach of the argument for morality, right?
I sort of think it's worth having a look at this sort of moral rule that people have where they say, well, you know, people have a right to health care.
And look at it from the argument from morality and then we'll look at some of the sort of practical consequences of, you know, immoral propositions.
So, when you talk to people who advocate universal or subsidized health care, their moral argument is that people have a right to health care, that people shouldn't be subject to the costs that health care represents, and that there's lots of uncertainties in life and we don't know, and your kid gets born with spina bifida, or a woodpecker picks out your eye or something, that you can't predict these things, and therefore society as a whole should take care of them.
And you usually get this sort of argument that, you know, the costs are highly variable and they tend to increase over time.
And, you know, there's no better plan.
And, you know, this is, of course, the argument that people make that, you know.
And also, the health care is one of these things that has a strong emotional appeal, right?
Sort of like how the farmers milk our sentiment for, you know, sort of farming life, which only really occurs to people who've never spent any time on a farm.
So, you know, basically it comes down to, you know, how can you stand to see the poor suffer and, you know, healthcare is a right and, you know, everybody deserves good health and this and that and the other.
So, you know, the argument for morality says or one of the basic axioms is that you don't have to get involved in the argument for morality at all.
Right?
But as soon as somebody uses a moral argument, then, lo and behold, they have now transported themselves into the realm of moral science.
So, if I'm saying, you know, we should go and see this movie rather than that movie, I am not creating any kind of universal moral rule, but a localized preference.
You know, I want a cheesecake, not, you know, a bowl of worms for dessert, is not a moral choice.
It is just a localized preference.
So the reason that the argument for morality comes in is because people use arguments for morality.
And so if somebody says that a human right is, or everybody has the right to, or everybody should, or everybody ought to, or it's best if, or the greatest good for the greatest number, You know, whatever they're going to say, which is a universal ought, a universal ought to, then they are no longer making claims of subjective preference.
They are now making claims for universal prescription.
See how I'm working the word prescription into a discussion on healthcare?
It's that kind of quality language skills that you've come to expect from these podcasts, I'm sure.
So, you know, I have no problem with people saying, I think, you know, it would be nice if doctors gave free health care to the poor.
Then it's like, sure, you know, and I think it would be nice if I had a Lamborghini.
You know, we're not sitting around discussing morality, but just sort of vague and subjective personal preferences.
But the moment that someone starts to say things like, everyone has a right to, people ought to, doctors should, you know, then they are now making prescriptions of universal accuracy, or they are now making statements about the desirability of universal actions, and now they have started to move themselves into the realm of morality.
And now they have to be a little bit more rigorous, actually a heck of a lot more rigorous, about what it is that they're saying.
So, you know, this is sort of how I approach these sorts of arguments.
If somebody says to me, everybody has a right to health care, then I'm going to say, you know, is this an opinion of yours?
It would be nice if everybody had a seven-course meal in front of them right now.
Is it just sort of a whimsical preference of yours, or are you saying that this is a universal moral absolute?
Now, of course, they get all sphinctery and tighten up and their mouths purse and they get all tense because they know that they've sort of made these statements based on, you know, just a bunch of crap they've read in the sort of newspaper or whatever, and some sentimentality and some images of children in incubators and all this kind of stuff.
So, you know, then they have to say, well, okay, is it this, or is it universal, or is it subjective preference?
And they know if they say, well, it's a subjective preference, that I'm just going to say, well, that's nice, but so what, right?
I mean, I like potato.
I say potato, you say potata.
You know, this is nothing to found any kind of social imperative on, right?
You know, the fact that I might like eggs as opposed to bacon, this doesn't in no way affects how laws are conducted.
So they don't feel comfortable saying, no, it's just my little preference.
And they don't feel very comfortable saying that it's a universal moral imperative.
Because, you know, deep down they're going to sense that they're just full of it, right?
Because it doesn't take a lot of mental effort to unravel this into atoms, right?
And then have those atoms further unravel into nothing.
So, you know, if somebody says, you know, everybody has the right to health care, right?
Then you would say, okay, well, what does that principle mean?
You know, well, everybody has a right to that which is essential to life.
Well, of course, that's food and air, so everybody has a right to food, but obviously it would be more important than everybody has a right to health care, right?
Because health care can be postponed, and food cannot, right?
You need to eat, you can get your triple bypass later.
So, you know, if they're saying that that which is required for life must be provided by everyone, Right?
Then, you know, they have a lot of problems to unravel, right?
First of all, they should be fighting for food, the right to food, long before they ever fight to the right for health care.
So, and if they say, sure, okay, well, I'll switch everything and fight for the right to food, then, you know, they would have to be forced to say, well, you know, then if everybody has a right to food, then, you know, farmers must give food for free, right?
Farmers must, you know, give food for nothing because it's a right.
And so, you know, you can't sort of say, well, you have to buy your rights by paying the farmers and so on.
And, you know, you can then say, well, if everybody has a right to food, then, you know, or let's just say health care, I'll stick with that.
So if everyone has a right to health care, then any doctor who refuses health care is evil, right?
And every doctor who existed before the introduction of socialized health care was evil, because if you're claiming it's a moral absolute, then it's universal and so on.
It has to be good for all times in all places, right?
So, a doctor who goes on vacation is performing a fundamental moral evil by refusing to grant people the right to what they naturally have, which is, you know, to health care.
And, you know, they're going to argue back and forth, but, you know, they are claiming a universal absolute.
They're not claiming a subjective local preference, and therefore, you know, they have to sort of, you know, make it clear as to who it applies to and how and where and all.
Now, doctors are one particular conceptual label for a person, and a patient is another one.
Now if you say, you know, patients have, everyone has a right to universal health care, then patients have a right to, you know, the time, energy, effort of doctors and, you know, people who build hospitals and, you know, people who build ambulances and people who build the roads that the ambulances drive on and people who make pharmaceuticals and, you know, you just go on and on and on, right?
So people who are ill or people who are, you know, I was going to say hypochondriacs, but let's not get into that topic.
Let's just say people who are ill.
People who are ill then have a right to all of the energies of everybody else.
And so then you have a problem, right?
And the problem is that you have to define what is fundamentally different about a person who is ill and a doctor.
Right?
Because you're saying that there's a universal moral right, but it only applies to people who are ill.
It does not apply to doctors.
I mean, I guess you could say that a doctor has his right to his own time or to another doctor's time or whatever.
But it certainly, it does not apply equally to the healthy as it does to the sick.
Right?
So you're saying that you have one moral rule for the sick, which is other people must provide me with health care, and you have another moral rule For the healthy, which is, you know, and those who are skilled or experts in the healthcare field, which is we must provide our services to the sick.
So now you have opposing moral rules for the same species, right?
So you have a logical problem.
Right.
You don't have a logical problem if you say that people should exchange goods and services freely and among those are health care and so on.
Or, you know, people have the right to ask for charity and other people have the right to give charity.
Like, however you want to put it, all of those are moral rules which everyone can follow, you know, and health care or the providing of health care services would just be one subset of that general moral rule which would, you know, be perfectly consistent.
I can go to a doctor and ask him to operate on me for free or Or I can go and pay him to operate on me.
Or I can buy health insurance and have that person pay, the insurance company pay.
All of that is just a subset of property rights and trading rights and so on, which are common to mankind as a whole and throughout all time, right?
So I'm perfectly comfortable saying that if a doctor takes money to operate on a patient in 200 BC and then takes the money and does not operate on the patient and sort of skips town that that person is, you know, morally wrong.
It's morally, you know, it's morally corrupt or morally evil to, you know, take money and not give the service that you right up, right?
So, you know, I'm perfectly happy to say that a surgeon who says he's going to cut off your left foot and accidentally, or instead, cuts off your right foot, you know, 2,000 years from now is still doing the wrong thing, you know, and it doesn't matter if they're in Guyana or, you know, America or wherever.
So, you know, it's not a... Those are perfectly valid universal moral rules which, you know, everybody would be pretty comfortable defending.
But if you're going to say that we have one set of moral rules for people who are not well, And another set of moral rules for people who are well and experts in health care, then the person who's positing that moral rule has to do one of two things.
Right?
They either have to say, I have a profound physiological, biological difference that I can prove or show, which completely differentiates people who are not well with people who are well and can provide health care.
In which case, I'm perfectly happy having two moral rules for these people.
We have a moral rule for babies or infants, which is that they don't have to earn their own keep.
We have another moral rule for adults, which says you've got to earn your own keep, or you've got to ask for it, or beg for it, but you can't steal it.
You can't be a parasite.
We have another moral rule for babies, which says the babies don't have to do that.
Why?
Because babies are different physiologically from adults, right?
And so, you know, we are perfectly comfortable making that distinction.
Now, if the moral rule is that the sick can demand things from the healthy, right?
Then it's not the provision of health care, right?
Then they can demand anything from the healthy.
A sick person can demand my wife for the weekend.
If they can demand things from the healthy people, then you could say, OK, well, the physiological difference is one person is sick and another person is not sick, and that's the difference, and that's why there's two moral rules.
Well, you know, that would be obviously very arguable, right?
I mean, what do I get for a cold, right?
The problem with any kind of moral argument that's based on a degree that can be measured is that, you know, there's way too much gray to make it morally practicable.
You know, like, and we already have some of those that we can't get away from.
Like, you definitely should be providing food for your baby, right?
Because you chose to have the baby.
The baby is helpless.
The baby is a human being.
But, you know, the baby doesn't have to get up and go and work for a living.
And for sure, you don't have to provide food for your healthy and mentally alert 30-year-old child, right?
And at some point, I mean, assuming they're not a grad student, but at some point in the middle, you know, there's a gray area where you're perfectly within your rights as a parent to say, you know, junior, it's time to get a job, you know, like you're sort of 15 years old or you're 16 years old.
And, you know, you got like two months in the summer where you're lounging around playing, you know, Xbox.
Maybe you could see your way clear to going out and earning a buck or two, right?
I mean, that's perfectly reasonable.
You can't ask a four year old to do it.
And you're perfectly right to ask a 30-year-old someplace in the middle, probably somewhere around the middle of those mathematical numbers.
It's a valid thing to start doing, right?
But is it one day versus the next?
No, of course not.
So we already have some of those in our life.
But, you know, those are pretty absolute, right?
I mean, like, relative to I have a cold versus I have terminal cancer.
So, if you're going to say that there's a moral rule called, sick people need things from healthy people, then, you know, you have to define a different... and you say that I base this moral rule on the physiological difference of illness versus health.
Well, that's fine, right?
But you then have a difficult problem of figuring out what the moral rules are, you know, for a cold versus a flu versus, you know, a broken leg versus, you know, whatever, right?
And, of course, that's an infinite level of complexity.
It's not like your kids hit puberty, they should get a job, which is relatively defined, and also not an absolute, but just sort of a good parenting practice.
Versus, look, you know, what is the moral... How much do people owe me for spraining my wrist?
You know, I mean, this can't be objectively defined.
At least you can say that puberty, which is a fairly decent time to start getting work, that puberty is an objectively definable, you know, biological process or characteristic.
So, you know, there's some objective biological thing that goes on that's pretty much common to everyone, you know, versus there's infinite ways and degrees to which you can be ill, right?
I mean, we're all ill at one time or another, right?
We all have cold viruses floating around that our immune systems are fighting off or whatever.
So, it's pretty hard to come up with a moral rule based on you know, that's common to all human beings that changes when they get sick or not, right?
So I can't sort of be in one moral state when I'm healthy and then I sprain my wrist and I'm in another moral rule and then my wrist is healed and so I'm back into another moral category.
You know, it's really not...
If you're going to say this is common for all human beings, then you're going to have a tough time arguing that somebody is sort of fundamentally different biologically when they're sick than when they're healthy, right?
I mean, they're obviously going through a transitional phase, but it's not like, you know, if you've sprained your wrist you can't vote, you know, and you can't make your own decisions because you're no longer a free-thinking, moral, rational agent.
I mean, you're just You've got an injury or whatever, right?
So you're a human being with an injury.
You're not a different kind of species.
So coming up with a different moral rule is going to be very tough.
But even if we grant This premise.
And we say, yes, I am perfectly comfortable that when somebody is sick, that they have a different moral set of rules than when if somebody is healthy.
Let's grant that, even though that's pretty foolish, but let's grant it anyway.
And, you know, because there's no problem granting premises that are incorrect, because the consequences are all going to be silly too, right?
So let's just say, sure, okay, I accept this issue.
We're going to have a different moral rule for sick people than healthy people, right?
Then, you know, the problem is that you then have to differentiate between healthy people And healthy people who can provide health care services, right?
So, if somebody's sick and, you know, they can take things from healthy people because the healthy people are not sick and there's a difference in two moral rules and so on, even if we accept that, well, they could come to me, you know, with a ruptured spleen, you know, what am I going to do?
I'm not going to be able to help them.
You know, if they need help unraveling some VB.net code, maybe I can be of service, but, you know, I certainly can't help somebody who's got a ruptured spleen.
So then, the moral rule is not that sick people have the right to resources from healthy people, but rather that sick people have the right to resources from healthy people who can provide health care services.
Right?
So now you have three moral rules, in a sense, or three moral categories, right?
There's sick people and there's healthy people.
And there's people who can provide health care services and people who cannot provide health care services.
Now, you can also say, you know, there are sick people who can provide health care services, sick people who can't, and so on.
You can get into all of that sort of stuff.
But as you can see, we now have three moral categories, right?
Because I can't provide health care services, so a sick person isn't going to have much luck getting me to, you know, fix their ruptured spleen.
And so now you have a much more difficult task ahead of you if you believe this, right?
So now you have three moral rules, and the most important one, or the one that's going to be the hardest to distinguish, is the one between healthy people who cannot provide health care services and healthy people who can provide health care services.
I mean, for sure you could say, you could argue that, you know, the physiological differences when you're sick and that changes the moral rules and so on, but you sure as heck cannot argue that there's sort of fundamental biological differences between somebody who's a doctor, say, and somebody who's a software manager.
You know, even if we say a doctor is smarter, that doesn't mean anything, right?
Because there may be people smarter than the doctor and, you know, we're not basing it on intelligence, but the ability to provide health care.
So, you know, you then have a sort of insurmountable logical problem, which is you then have to sort of explain why A person who can provide health care and a person who can't, who are both healthy, are fundamentally physiologically different and thus have different universal rules that apply to them, right?
We can say sick people and healthy people are two categories that have objective biological definitions, more or less.
Even if we accept that, which is, you know, not true, but even if we accept that, then you still have to further differentiate the people who are providing the service into healthy people who can provide health care services and You know, healthy people who cannot, and you have to prove a fundamental distinction between these categories of people that is objective and biological and factual, and, you know, that really can't be done.
So, for sure, that moral problem, that logical problem simply cannot exist, right?
And so then you have a, you know, sort of that sort of one category of logical problem that people who advocate, you know, the sick deserve, you know, have the right to health care.
It's one thing that they can't solve.
And, you know, this is important.
I know this sounds like kind of sort of abstract mental logical trickery and tomfoolery, but it's really not.
You know, I mean, this is very important stuff.
If somebody claims immoral absolute, then they better be able to defend it.
Because, man, moral absolutes are pretty powerful things, right?
If you're saying that it's a moral absolute, then, you know, you can't stop at anything.
I mean, you can't stop the poor from storming the hospitals and just, you know, with guns and saying, operate on me or die.
I mean, if it's a moral absolute, then you're bringing out the biggest guns in the human arsenal of compulsion.
And you can't stop at all.
Right?
Because it's a moral absolute.
It's not like a preference.
It's not a nice to have.
It's a, you know, gotta have.
And so you really can't then oppose any methodology which achieves this moral end.
Because it's, you know, it's a moral absolute.
Nothing is higher.
And so, it's pretty important that if people are going to start throwing around moral absolutes, that they damn well have a clue what they're talking about, and they better be consistent, because if they're not, they're unleashing a terrible, terrible evil on the world.
Right?
And so, you know, I'm not fooling around when I say that these people better be logical about what they're talking about.
Because if they're not, then, you know, they're just acting with unbelievable levels of destruction, you know.
And, of course, we can see this happening with the health care system as it stands.
So, you know, this is not very abstract stuff at all.
So, let's take another look at a logical problem which occurs in the realm of health care.
And that is, okay, well let's accept, let's continue accepting these, you know, I mean, no problem, as I've mentioned before, no problem continuing to accept irrational propositions.
So let's say that we'll accept that there is a different moral law for sick people and healthy people.
And furthermore, that there are different moral laws for healthy people who can provide health care and healthy people who can't.
So then the methodology becomes, Okay, so, how is this going to be achieved?
Perfectly valid question, because we're not talking about ghosts in the sky, but people on Earth.
So, how is this going to be achieved?
I've come up with something like DROs, or Dispute Resolution Organizations, for how social conflicts get resolved in the absence of a state.
So, you know, the question is, if you're going to propose a moral absolute, like no violence, no government, then you have to come up with how this is going to be achieved, right?
Otherwise, you know, you're just sort of making up... It's like skywriting at night when it gets blown away.
It's like, who cares, right?
So, you know, then the question is, okay, so we accept that sick people have an absolute moral right to health care, and, you know, therefore it is immoral, it is immoral, it is wrong, it is evil, For healthy people who can provide health care to withhold it, right?
And we're not talking a conditional thing here.
We're talking a moral absolute.
So, if I go to a... Okay, let's start off with the ones that they can bat, or at least bunt, and then go to the ones that they're just gonna swing and miss.
So, if I show up in emergency, a doctor must treat me.
Yes.
Okay, so what happens if I show up in emergency?
And a doctor does not treat me?
Well, that doctor has to treat you.
Okay, fair enough.
So, if the doctor has to treat me and he doesn't treat me, then I can force him to treat me.
Of course, people get uncomfortable around this, but, you know, if you get someone who's got some, you know, strong evil moral fiber, then they're going to accept that, yes, by golly, you know, this doctor has to treat you.
And if he doesn't, then you're going to shoot him.
Okay, fair enough.
So, what if the doctor is busy, right?
So, I go to the emergency and, you know, my arm's fallen off and I got it in a bag.
And, you know, I guess I'm not bleeding from whatever artery is in the armpit or whatever, right?
Okay, let's think something a little less gross, right?
So, my finger is cut.
I lost my finger, fell off, I got it in a bag.
And the doctor has to treat me.
And if he doesn't treat me, I can shoot him.
Or I can threaten him, right?
Okay, so fine.
So, okay, what if the doctor is busy?
So, the doctor is busy, but the doctor has to treat me.
So, can I wave a gun at that doctor and say, no, you have to treat me because I have a right to health care?
Well, they'd say, no, I mean, if the doctor is busy, the doctor is busy, you're going to have to wait.
It's like, okay, so I don't have a right to health care when I want it.
I have a right to health care when the doctor is available.
Right?
Yes.
Okay.
So, the doctor is available, but he's been up for 36 hours and he wants to sleep, right?
Can I hold a gun to his head and say, you don't dare sleep, damn you!
Put my finger back on!
Well, okay, some other doctor, let's say all the doctors are tired, right?
Well then, okay, do I have the right to force this doctor to stay awake and treat me?
Well, no, maybe you have to wait until he's had a four-hour sleep or a six-hour sleep or whatever, right?
Okay, well, then... So I don't have the right to health care except within a couple of hours of when I go to emergency and I can't use a gun or whatever.
So they're going to come up with some rule that says, you know, within eight hours you should have this surgery, right?
Well, then they have the moral problem of saying, okay, well, what objectively has changed Between 7 hours and 59 minutes and 8 hours where before I could not use a gun to get my health care and now I can, you know, use a gun to get my health care.
You know, what objectively has changed?
Well, of course, nothing, right?
I mean, there's absolutely nothing has changed in that time frame that has changed the moral nature of what I'm allowed to do and what I'm not allowed to do.
You know, I mean, in a contract at least you can say there's a 30-day clause and 31 days, you know, you've passed whatever you agreed to but, you know, there's nothing like this in health care.
Now, let's look at another example.
These are sort of progressively getting harder, so, you know, but it doesn't really matter.
I mean, the first one fails, but, you know, this just sort of funsies to push this to the wall.
So let's look at another matter.
So I need a new heart, my golly.
And, you know, gosh darn it, there's just nobody who... You know, let's forget the heart, because that's a whole other question of sort of murder, but let's talk about kidneys, right?
So, I have a... I need a kidney.
And, you know, my brother is the only one who has a matching kidney.
He's perfectly healthy and he can live with only one kidney and I need his kidney, right?
I have a right to health care.
I have a right to health.
So, is it allowable for me to force my brother at gunpoint to give me his kidney, right?
Can I slip a mickey or slip something in his drink and have him wake up, you know, half a pound lighter and with, you know, the ability to process slightly less alcohol?
Oh wait, no, that's the liver.
Okay, well, whatever it is.
You know, I said I couldn't provide health care and there's your proof.
So, you know, and if somebody says, no, you cannot force your brother to give you his kidney, right?
Then you're saying, okay, so there are some precedents that take, you know, you have a conflict in rights here, right?
I mean, if you say everybody has the right to, you know, to... like nobody should murder, right?
Then you don't have a conflict in rights.
If you say, That everybody has the right to health care and they can enforce that right at the point of a gun, but they can't force people, someone to give them a kidney, right?
Because that is a net increase in health.
Like, if I die because I don't have a kidney, you know, then one person is dead.
And if my brother, you know, has to give up a kidney, he's just gone through some discomfort for a little while.
And, you know, he's not, you know...
Dead.
But I'm still alive, so it's a net growth in healthcare, so I should absolutely have the right, if I have the right to force people to provide me with healthcare, then I have the right to not only force the surgeon to perform the operation, but also I have the right to force my brother to give me his kidney, right?
If somebody says, then I don't have the right to force my brother to give me his kidney, then that's fine, you know, then they've solved that problem, and of course that's sort of what we all feel to be the case, right?
You can't go shoot, because then what if it's not my brother?
What if it's just some stranger and so on?
Right?
I mean, it's sort of a... you don't want gangs of people with kidney illnesses roaming around the street, you know, forcing people to give them blood tests, then coming back for their kidney.
I mean, I think we all recognize that's not a particularly moral state of affairs.
So then you say, OK, you don't have the right to force.
So, OK, so I don't have the right to good health.
I don't have the right to health care.
I don't have the right to take from me, to take by force what it's going to provide me with good health.
So then you have a conflict in rights, right?
So I have a health care... My brother has a right to keep his kidney, and I have a right to health care, and you've got a collision, and you have to work this out logically, right?
You can't just sort of say, this rock falls up, this rock falls down, and that's my theory, right?
If you're gonna have a moral theory that's absolute and universal, well, it has to be absolute and universal if it's, you know, if it's a moral theory.
Then, you know, you can't have collisions in rights, right?
You can't have things which just don't make sense.
Now, I would say, also, here's another sort of way of approaching it, that if I have a right to healthcare, then Pardon me.
One other example is to say that I can go to a doctor's house in the middle of the night and demand that he provide me health care.
Because if it's a universal morality, then it's not just between the hours of 9 to 5 or just when I make an appointment and so on.
I don't have to make an appointment to have property rights or the right to be free of violence.
That's just a sort of universal absolute.
So, I should be able to go to the doctor's house at two o'clock in the morning, go into his home and pull him out of bed and put a gun to his head and say, you know, put my finger back on him.
There's absolutely no reason why I have to go to a hospital because it's a universal right.
So, if people say, yes, I'm perfectly comfortable with that, then obviously they sort of have a screw loose morally.
In which case, you could just sort of say, well, Then there's lots of arguments against sort of why that would be a good moral situation.
Of course, it's not universal, right?
If I have a cold, do I have the right to do that?
I mean, just keep going with the sort of argument from absurdity until they give up, you know, that this is obviously not a good situation.
So then you're going to say, well, why doesn't the person have the right to go to the doctor's house in the middle of the night?
And force them to sort of surrender the health care value that they have a right to.
Well, you know, property rights, doctors gotta sleep, blah blah blah, so then you have another collision of rights, right?
You can't have people invade your home and sort of grab you by the neck and say, put my finger back on or give me health care, and so on, because, you know, there's a collision of rights.
So, you know, as soon as you have a collision of rights, you know that, you know, this moral theory does not stand, right?
I mean, it simply does not stand if one person has a right to something like You know, private property and, you know, non-invasion of their home.
And yet, someone else has a right, like for health care, which they, you know, if you claim it's a universal absolute, that they can get from that person by force.
So, that's sort of another example of, you know, how things really just sort of fall apart when you start talking about the right to health care.
Now, another way in which this sort of falls apart is that You know, somebody who is a doctor must provide health care because, you know, at the point of a gun, if that's what it takes, because, you know, that's the moral rule, right?
Everybody has a right to health care and therefore the doctor must provide it.
It's not sort of optional, right?
Because it's the right of other people to have it.
So, let's say that I sort of wake up tomorrow morning and say, you know, I've had enough of this sort of fun software world.
What I really want to do is, you know, spend six years in school and then another couple of years working 30-hour days and, you know, and, you know, eventually end up being part of a sort of state-run cartel and, you know, have all of these other things.
I want to become a doctor.
Okay, so...
People don't have the right to demand my services of me at the moment, but when I decide to become a doctor, when I am a doctor, they do.
Now, at what point in this process do they Do they have the right to demand my services of me, right?
Obviously, it's not my first day of doctor school, right?
Where they sort of say, Hi, you're going to be a doctor.
Here's how to bill the government.
And you know, they spend another sort of three and a half years on that and then a half a year on how to refer people to specialists.
So, you know, when does this... It doesn't occur on the first day of my medical school training.
Certainly when I am a doctor, I get my license or whatever, then, you know, obviously people have a right.
When I'm an intern, then, you know, they have a right to it because I'm in a hospital and all that.
But what if I am in sort of my second year of medical school and I've studied a lot about putting fingers back on and some guy comes up to me in a bag, you know, and I'm on the bus and he knows that I'm a med... I mean, does he have the right to demand it of me then?
So the question then becomes, if you say, well, it's at two years and three days that you now have, you know, people can have the right to ask you, then you also have to answer the problem of, well, what has changed, right?
I mean, if it is like one day and Let's say 12 12 o'clock midnight people have the right to You know 11 59 and 59 seconds They don't have the right to force me to provide them with health care but then a certain knowledge has sort of tripped over and you know the weight of On the other side of the seesaw, the moral seesaw has come down, and now they do have the right.
So, you know, a guy can be standing there with a gun to my head, saying, put my finger back on, and he's like, morally wrong, morally wrong, morally wrong, morally perfectly in the right!
You know, and what has changed?
Well, you know, a certain amount of time has passed, or, you know, maybe I've just finished writing my exam, so now he can pounce on me, and, you know, maybe I've just got my license in the mail, so now he can pounce from the bushes and get my health care from me, or get his health care from me.
And, you know, obviously that's a pretty silly idea.
And even if somebody were to cling to it, they would then have to say, you know, what objectively and biologically and empirically has changed so that what was formerly completely immoral?
You know, standing and demanding services from someone at the point of a gun has now become completely moral.
Well, you know, this obviously doesn't make any sense, right?
I mean, you can't sort of say that one day, you know, somebody who's a med student simply cannot provide health care to someone, and therefore it would be moral for that person to attempt to take it from them by force.
And yet, lo and behold, the very next day, or when they receive that piece of paper, magically they are able to do it.
And it's entirely morally appropriate for that person to use force to gain it.
So, you know, again, that's sort of another problem that people are going to have with trying to get this question of health care across.
So, I mean, these are just some sort of logical problems that people are going to have with this idea of the universal right of people to, you know, to have health care.
I mean, this obviously is applicable to many, many other areas in life, the welfare state.
Old age pensions and this that and the other.
But, you know, I had this incredibly quick drive home.
It's only 38 minutes and we're done!
So I hope this has been helpful to help you understand how the argument for morality works and how, you know, if people are going to start coming up with universal shoulds, that it's entirely appropriate to start asking them questions about how it works in practice and also how it works logically.
And then if they can't come up with answers that make sense logically, and they also can't come up with, you know, methodologies for implementation that they're comfortable are, you know, the right things to do, then, you know, well, by golly, their moral stand, their moral theory just fails, and they have to go back to the drawing board and come up with another way of approaching it.
Because, you know, it's not just a matter of opinion.
You know, morality, it's not just a good idea.
It's the law.
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