Loomer Unleashed - Laura Loomer - EP134: EXPOSED: Microsoft Allowed China Access To DOD Cyber Systems

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July 18, 2025 - Loomer Unleashed - Laura Loomer

02:30:56

EP134: EXPOSED: Microsoft Allowed China Access To DOD Cyber Systems

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	There is a young female journalist, conservative journalist by the name of Laura Loomer.
	If America's men acted like Laura Loomer, our problems will be fixed in about five minutes.
	Chained herself to Twitter.
	She chained herself to Twitter.
	Good evening, and welcome to tonight's episode of Loomer Unleashed.
	I'm your host, Laura Loomer.
	We are live right now on Rumble and X, so please be sure that you head on over to rumble.com/slash Laura Loomer.
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	Also, we're live right now on X, so please be sure that you're following me on X at Laura Loomer or on X at LoomerUnleashed.
	We have a lot to talk about tonight.
	I've been in communication with a Navy whistleblower by the name of Tom Schiller, and he has uncovered and exposed something quite extraordinary.
	Over the last few weeks, I've been in communication with Tom discussing his findings.
	And we're going to talk about it tonight, but really also just the obstruction within our own government and layers of chain of command and how difficult it is to expose bad actors, how bad it is to expose issues surrounding a vetting crisis, and how hard it is to expose wrongdoing within the United States government.
	It seems like it's an impossible task to accomplish.
	And this is a frustration that I personally feel just in my own capacity as an independent journalist, trying to expose Biden holdovers and trying to identify bad actors who are buried within certain agencies.
	And it takes months and months and months, even with the access that I have.
	I mean, I have enormous political access.
	And so I can't imagine how frustrating it is for the average American who is in a role.
	Perhaps they are a whistleblower within the Army or the Navy or within some type of government agency and just how difficult it is to be ignored and not listened to and to be stonewalled while you are trying to expose wrongdoing.
	And we're going to have a very extensive and long conversation with my guest, Tom Schiller, tonight.
	But what I want you to take away from this conversation when I bring Tom on is how long the issue that we discussed tonight has been ongoing.
	And then just think to yourself, when you're listening to Tom tell his story and expose what he's recently uncovered within our Department of Defense and their contract with Microsoft and how Microsoft has been allowing for Chinese engineers without the DOD claiming, well, the DOD claims they've had no knowledge, right?
	I mean, it wouldn't surprise me if the DOD is lying because, hey, who could ever imagine, right?
	Our own government's lying.
	But this is an ongoing issue that you're going to be exposed to tonight, something that has been happening at the expense of our national security for the last 10 years.
	And my next guest joining me now to discuss his expose of China's infiltration of our Pentagon cyber defense systems is Tom Schiller, who is the CEO of Next Defense and also a Navy whistleblower.
	So Tom, thank you so much for joining me tonight.
	It's a pleasure to have you here.
	I know you and I have been in communication for several weeks now, and I've been trying to point you in the right direction.
	And, you know, we had some internal conversations about the sensitivity of this information and whether or not it would be even wise to release this information publicly, given the foreign adversaries involved in the national security implications,
	if this became public and if our adversary China became aware that people were finally aware of this hidden, dark, deep secret that has been hidden within the Pentagon and the Department of Defense for the last decade, a relic of the administration of Barack Hussein Obama.
	So I just want to Give you an opportunity to tell our viewers a little bit about yourself and why you decided to, I guess, reach out to me.
	And really, you've reached out to so many people.
	And we're going to get into all of this tonight because I think it's pretty shocking.
	And I want you to name names and say who in the government you contacted about this over the last two years because you've told me that you've been investigating this and trying to bring this to people's attention for two years now.
	So that's pretty shocking.
	Well, an overdrive.
	Yeah, you're to an extent, but yeah, four years, but aggressively these last two years, you have decided to really like ramp up your, ramp up your efforts outside of the nexus of, you know, your chain of command at the Navy.
	So why don't you just go ahead and tell my viewers about yourself and what you do at the Navy, and then we can dive into this shocking expose.
	It's really not even received a lot of attention.
	There's one article in ProPublica about this information, and it doesn't even mention some of the most damning aspects of this whistleblower operation and the extent of the Chinese subversion.
	But I've decided to dedicate the entire two hours of my program tonight to allowing you to have unlimited time to get all this information out there, right?
	We don't operate in sound bites like the mainstream media does.
	I want you to have as much time as you want on my program tonight.
	It's a two-hour show, sometimes two and a half, if necessary, to tell your story because we're going to clip this and we're going to make sure everybody from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseff to Navy Secretary John Phelan, both of whom I know personally.
	And I'm going to make sure that this gets to the White House as well because I believe that President Trump needs to see this information.
	So go ahead.
	No, I appreciate it.
	And thanks for having me on the show and for all the effort, you know, helping out with reporting this to people in D.C. and, you know, just everything else.
	Yeah, it's a long one.
	You know, ProPublica, they reported kind of more the tip of the iceberg or the mountain that this is.
	And, you know, as what was mentioned, it's been going on for close to a decade, you know, since 2016.
	There's evidence I've, you know, tracked and, you know, tried to track down the who, what, when, where, why, et cetera, where it looks like this is started as early as 2014 and 15 when early offerings were done with Microsoft and the United States government.
	And that's kind of one of the important things to highlight here, too, is it's not just the Department of Defense, it's our entire federal government that's affected by this because every department, every agency is in Microsoft Azure.
	There's a small sampling of the system.
	Why don't we start from the beginning and just explain to people what you do, what you do at the Navy, and then we'll start with the basics of what the system is because it's very tech heavy, right?
	So I want to make sure that people understand all of this because these are kind of complex concepts to understand, like technological concepts, and we're going to walk people through it all.
	But essentially, you have uncovered the fact that the United States government across all federal agencies uses Microsoft.
	Microsoft has a very extensive and lucrative contract with the United States government.
	And per their government, they provide all of the digital infrastructure to the various agencies.
	And as a result of using Microsoft, right, there are tech support packages.
	And because different agencies within our federal government have different levels of information, right, depending on whether it's classified or not classified, there are different levels within this Microsoft contract with the federal government that they have to agree to employ individuals with top security clearances to provide the tech support for the various agencies.
	Now, you can imagine that the highest level of security clearance needed to handle information would revolve around our Intel agencies and also our defense agencies, because those are the levels at which the most classified information is being transmitted across airways and electronically via whether it's work phones or computers via email or some type of cloud storage,
	you name it, right?
	The government has all types of ways for communicating, some of which I'm sure that we're not even aware of.
	So it's important for people to understand that this really, the burden of this and the responsibility of this scandal lies on Microsoft, whether they want to say they were aware or not.
	It's my understanding that Microsoft is being very cagey and they're not exactly providing a lot of, you know, a lot of statements or a lot of explanation to the media.
	There really isn't a lot of media coverage on this since the original article came out.
	And the original article just scratches the surface of how damning this information is and the extent of the information that you've uncovered these last four years.
	But the name of the system is called Azure.
	The Microsoft U.S. Government Azure is the technological database which Microsoft manages for the federal government that they have decided to utilize Chinese tech support agents who are located in China for.
	So just start from what you do at the Navy and how you uncovered this, and then we'll get into the scandal of the cover-up and the lack of action in addressing your concerns as a whistleblower over these last four years and especially over these last two years when you've decided to really ramp up your efforts.
	Oh, absolutely.
	So a little bit about myself.
	You know, I've been in and around the military since About 1997.
	Started off in the Navy in 97 and was in for about four years over in Japan working as the U.S. Embassy representative.
	Enjoyed the job, you know, very cool.
	Then switched over to the Air Force for another four years where I was in cyber, mostly out of Washington State, but deployed overseas, went to PSAP or Prince Solon Air Base when we went into Iraq the second time.
	Just a whole bunch of different things like that.
	I took a break in service for a while.
	I was with the DOD and also as a defense contractor as a GS-15, which is the equivalent of an 06.
	I was over in Iraq and Afghanistan for a long time managing mission essential operations.
	Managed the only life-saving mission for the U.S., or the military as a whole, with Operation Horned Owl.
	You know, managing the systems, the sensors, the aerial, you know, analysts and whatnot that we had.
	So there was quite a bit and saved a lot of lives, which I'm pretty proud of.
	But there's been a lot of other accolades like that.
	In 2018, came back with the Air Force Reserves at first and just switched over to the Navy Reserves back this last September.
	So been a little bit of bouncing around.
	I've also helped out like the Space Force for about eight months building software factories.
	So that's another matter for another day, very similar to this one, but we can touch on that later.
	But as far as like the Navy, what I do, I do like operations specialists.
	And actually, I'm going to be starting with a Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division this next year, as soon as the Navy has the funding and whatnot for a lot of these different things.
	In the meantime, I have my own company as a reservist and doing things on the side.
	It's called Next Defense.
	I do a lot of work with various MAJCOM commanders and other generals and whatnot, trying to put together augmented virtual reality training for various MOSs and whatnot.
	And it's pretty important because we've got a lot of military soldiers, sailors, et cetera, where they just can't get the live training that they need or not as often as they need.
	So we're trying to augment that by providing virtual reality training.
	With the concept of it, it's all non-for-profit.
	And this is actually something I'm trying to help the government and the DOD stand up for them to own and not myself or my company, you know, which currently a lot of other companies do some work with this, with virtual reality training, but they own the software.
	And it's caused a lot of issues over the years, you know, because updating training and everything else and, you know, coming back and paying more and then them owning it where they can't, the DOD is kind of locked in, they can't switch to another vendor.
	There's a lot of things like that.
	But also my path.
	Sure.
	Oh, no, I was going to say.
	And so this contract between Microsoft and our federal government was initiated between 2014 and 2016 under President Barack Hussein Obama.
	And he's the guy who personally authorized a number of the cybersecurity infrastructure agreements with Microsoft.
	And then, of course, some of these were later extended to companies like Amazon.
	And so when did you first discover this national security issue with the fact that Microsoft, per the contract with the federal government that was negotiated by Barack Hussein Obama, was utilizing Chinese foreign nationals to do tech support across all agencies, including at the Pentagon and within our Intel agencies.
	So I actually found out about this like right away because Microsoft had invited me to come in and interview for the senior most management position with the escort team back in 2016.
	I think it was June.
	And came in there.
	Explain to the viewers what the escort team is.
	So the escort team is a subcontracted company, staffing company, Insight Global.
	I have heard that there are a few other companies that do this, but they don't have as much of an online presence.
	So not sure how they operate or who they are really.
	But Insight Global, lots of information on that.
	And that's who I was interviewing with, or through Insight Global with Microsoft.
	So the escort team, breaking it down, basically they hire personnel that are able to get security clearances, in many cases being reservists, guardsmen, veterans, et cetera.
	Very Army heavy, you know, folks like that.
	And when you look into a lot of their backgrounds, they don't come from cybersecurity backgrounds or cyber in general backgrounds.
	You know, a lot of them have different kind of past records and whatnot that they've done.
	The most important thing that they decided on was somebody that could get a clearance.
	That was their biggest prerequisite and could maybe understand PowerShell scripts a little bit.
	But that's the kind of personnel they brought in.
	One of the biggest things, I guess maybe it'd be good to just go into like the overview here because we're kind of touching on that quite a bit here too.
	Yeah, go ahead.
	So with the overview, and I've broken this down or condensed this as much as possible over the years because I've easily been over, go into like three or four hours of discussing this stuff.
	So I'll try to be quick.
	So the background, between 2014 and 2016, President Obama personally authorized a number of cybersecurity infrastructure agreements with Microsoft, later extended to companies such as Amazon.
	Among authorizations within these agreements was one permitting foreign personnel that did not have, or they did not have U.S. security clearances to operate and manage the U.S. government and Department of Defense cyber infrastructure.
	Via Microsoft, U.S. government Azure, the only safeguard that Microsoft pitched was the use of an escort team, you know, having escorts that be in place that would supervise, manage, monitor the work being done by the uncleared foreign personnel.
	Now, when I first interviewed at Microsoft, which I'll add to this, they made it seem, you know, with me That they pitched the idea to the U.S. government that this would be H-1B visa workers.
	That was already a red flag.
	They pitched to the government, allegedly, that they wanted to use their H-1B visa workers because they claimed we've got the best engineers, the best developers, the best.
	This is so crazy to me, though.
	Like, you would think that the, I mean, I guess because this took place under Obama, it's not that hard to believe that they would sell us out to us, sell our national security out to a bunch of foreigners.
	But it's incredible to think that Microsoft actually presented the idea up front of using foreign workers.
	And we know that most of these H-1B visa workers come from China and they come from India.
	And so you'd have a bunch of Indian and Chinese individuals.
	And we know that in China that the people of China, right, they are required to have a loyalty oath to the Chinese Communist Party.
	And if you work in industries like tech, you are permitted to collect as much data as possible and hand it over to the CCP.
	This is expected of you as a citizen of the People's Republic of China.
	And so I don't think people really understand the implications of this and that if you are working, and this is why the H-1B visa program needs to be completely overhauled and why I'm such a critic of it and why I've been so outspoken about it is because, you know, if you look at all these H-1B visa workers and most of the people employed in Silicon Valley by these big tech giants are H-1B visa workers.
	It's like 73% of the labor from what I've seen is carried out by H-1B visa workers.
	So just think about this.
	All of the personal information that people are sending over the internet and sending in their DMs or posting on social media.
	And when you ask for tech support, whether it be at Google or whether it be at Microsoft or whether it be at, you know, Amazon or who knows, right?
	X, Facebook.
	You think of all these different companies that people use.
	I don't think a lot of people think of the fact that some Chinese national who has to pledge their allegiance to China, who's on a visa here.
	And we know that a lot of the people who have visas, whether they be students or people that are working here, they make up what we like to call the fifth column, where it's a workforce.
	It's like an unofficial citizenry of China operating, right?
	They call it the fifth column as a spy network for the Chinese Communist Party here in the United States.
	And so it's kind of a reality check when you think of, and I don't think a lot of people are asking themselves when they put in a support ticket or they have a tech issue.
	They're not thinking to themselves, who's the person on the other end of the computer that I'm not able to physically see who is able to access all of my personal information, access my code and see what I've been up to, see what I've been sending, see what I've been doing, see the contents of my email, see the contents of my computer.
	Who is this person that we are giving our personal information to?
	Whether they ask you to confirm your password or whether they ask you to confirm your username or your social security, all this personal information is being handed over to foreign nationals for the most part.
	And while that's disturbing to think of on a personal level, right, just as a regular individual, now imagine the same thing is happening, but with every single employee of the federal government who works in every single agency for the last 10 years, they have been handing over their personal information to Chinese nationals, for the most part, who are doing this overtime tech support.
	The tech support is when you, when you describe the escort program, right?
	And that's why I said for you to explain what the escort program is.
	Oh, sure.
	This is a team of individuals within, I mean, I guess various agencies, but as it relates to the Department of Defense, I would imagine that these are people who work within the military, who work in a cyber division, who have a top secret clearance, and they get contracted as part of this contract with Microsoft and the federal government.
	They get contracted via Microsoft where they're getting paid no more than minimum wage, $15 an hour, maybe, to handle the most classified information that is being transmitted in our country on these databases.
	And if you are asking for tech support after hours, and we all know that the government operates on a nine-to-five basis, you're going to be transmitted or sent over to some foreign national sitting at a desk in China who is reviewing all of your information.
	And apparently the Department of Defense, from what you've uncovered, is now saying that they were not aware of this, even though this program, again, it's called Microsoft U.S. Government Azure, has been ongoing for the last 10 years.
	And so just some facts, and we can discuss this in this overview.
	Over 98% of foreign personnel involved are located outside of the United States.
	More than 90% of these foreign personnel operate directly out of China as it relates to the foreign personnel from this government program with Microsoft, Microsoft U.S. government azure.
	And then this arrangement has effectively allowed Chinese nationals operating from China to access and control critical U.S. government and DOD cyber systems for the last decade.
	And so why don't we go through the limitations of the escort system and the concerns that present?
	Because I'm not a tech person, but you are.
	And so perhaps you can break it down in layman terms for everybody watching who may not have your technical expertise.
	But why don't we try to make people understand what the system limitations are in terms of accessing the content and accessing the classified information and the national security concerns that have now been created as a result of Microsoft Azure?
	Oh, absolutely.
	So as one thing to correct with the ProPublic article is they were saying this is covering aisle four and five.
	That's like unclassed, maybe touching on secret, definitely a frustrated, et cetera.
	However, they were referencing an outdated FedRAMP article from 2017.
	Since then, they've been granted up to aisle six and top secret.
	So we're talking about all classification levels.
	And also earlier this year, just as a segment, Azure AI has also been granted all those same authorization levels.
	So we're talking about a complete clearance deal.
	Also talking on that, so with the clearances, we're kind of talking about that earlier, all the things that the escorts have, they are not just cleared by the Department of Defense, they're also cleared through everyone.
	So everyone that's got a clearance, they've got a DOJ clearance, an FBI clearance, individual clearances with each and every one of the states in the United States.
	They've got to go through other clearances because of ITAR for international trade and arms regulations, so allied nations, et cetera.
	Because these escorts have full access to everyone's data across the board, full admin access.
	And when they open up a VPN session with an engineer based in China per se, they're handing over the reins.
	They have to review kind of what the ticket is and what the work is involved prior to the session.
	But during the session, once they've approved of whatever work it is, they're basically opening up that connection and just watching.
	They're watching as the code goes.
	They're watching as package, proprietary, closed source stuff is going on, et cetera.
	They have no insider overview of any of that.
	But kind of getting back on track, too, with the limitations and concerns.
	So remote access and control.
	U.S. escorts virtually escort foreign personnel via VPN, which we're just discussing.
	Relinquishing control of their laptops, which have full administrative access to Microsoft U.S. government during operations.
	Limited oversight.
	Escorts are only permitted to review the PowerShell code, which I've coined as launchpad scripts, initiating proprietary closed source code developed by the aforementioned foreign personnel, which they neither understand nor have access to analyze or vet.
	As a part of this too, Microsoft came out and tried making excuses, essentially, saying we've got multi-layer security support, you know, lockbox processes, et cetera, et cetera.
	What they didn't point out, either party, Microsoft or Republica, is that the people that have oversight of this are other global support personnel, also out of China.
	Insight Global and these escorts have no oversight of lockbox or their multi-fat layer of security infrastructure.
	They are eyes off, hands off.
	They have no idea what's going on.
	And that was also illustrated by the one escort that was saying, we just have to trust these guys and hope they're not doing anything malicious.
	I mean, that's how crazy it is.
	Capability gaps.
	Senior members of the escort team freely admit that escorts cannot interpret the scripts that they do have access to, the PowerShell scripts, and would be equally incapable of assessing proprietary code even if given access.
	Now, that's coming from myself and three of the senior leadership of the escort team.
	I won't name names or their positions, but we're talking about the core leadership has said the escorts don't understand code.
	They're barely able to do their jobs.
	And that's just a- So if they don't understand code, then that means they wouldn't be able to understand malicious code inserts if when they handed over complete control, right, like sharing your screen or granting somebody the ability, because a lot of times the way this tech support works is you have to download some kind of software and then it allows for somebody else to remote control your computer from another location.
	That's how a lot of tech support works and people are able to get inside your computer from a faraway land or if you give your computer to even a US-based tech support, they're in your computer and they can examine your computer from a remote location.
	And this is also how a lot of spyware is installed on computers as well is people who don't know code or they don't know how to code are not going to be able to determine what is regular code from malicious code, especially if it's code from a foreign actor.
	And so that's a huge problem because it's sounding like the people, and correct me if I'm wrong, because I don't want to diminish anybody's skill set, but it sounds like if these people were truly experts in their field and they were code experts or cybersecurity experts, they would be getting paid probably a lot more than just minimum wage.
	It sounds like these people are just being paid and contracted out, not for their skill set, but rather the fact that they have a security clearance.
	Is that a correct assessment?
	Oh, absolutely.
	It's even worse than that, too.
	I mean, one, they're basically hired and paid minimum wage, like you were saying, about $18 to $28 an hour.
	And the size of the team, Inside Global has got a fixed contract.
	They make the same money any way you cut it.
	The size of the team, smaller team, they might be able to pay their people a little bit more.
	Larger team, they pay their people less.
	They can't rework that contract, though.
	So they're really stuck.
	It's a catch-22 deal.
	But yeah, and they're based out of Redmond, Washington, which is crazy, you know, because Redmond, Washington and around that area of Washington state is hugely expensive.
	Housing, 105% above national average.
	Healthcare, 34% higher, transportation, 30%, groceries, 14%, et cetera, et cetera.
	But one of the biggest issues, too, which is a huge red flag, is that many of these escorts hold secondary and even third jobs on the side.
	And we haven't covered this yet, but they all work.
	Well, we might have actually mentioned this before, but they all work remotely from home.
	Meaning from home, they have full access to the back end of our governments and departments.
	And that's a massive problem because if you were to be accessing classified information in Washington, D.C. within the federal government, you would have to be in some type of skiff.
	So it's pretty crazy to think that people can just be operating these jobs.
	And if you're thinking of, you know, I imagine a lot of these are young guys, like young kids, right?
	When I say kids, I mean like people who are like in their, in their early 20s, late 20s, maybe early 30s, right?
	And if you are making minimum wage in this economy and you're living in a place that far exceeds your income, right?
	In terms of your quality standard of living, then chances are you're going to have roommates or maybe you live in a place that isn't so nice and the walls are paper thin, right?
	And some of these like really shoddy apartment complexes.
	And I'm not trying to criticize people's standard of living, but the facts are is if you're if you're not using headphones or if you have people around you, people could walk around, they could see the type of information that you're discussing.
	So essentially our classified information here in the United States is being broadcasted to people from the comfort of their own home.
	And who knows if they're even using like a VPN or what kind of security measures they're taking.
	The fact that they're taking classified information home with them and they're able to work from home without the proper protections in place that would be established through a SCIF, it's pretty shocking.
	It's pretty shocking.
	There's so many elements of this program that are just completely shocked.
	It just seems almost unbelievable when you examine all these facts and all these findings that you've uncovered.
	It just seems like it would be a major violation.
	And my question is, is how has this been allowed to take place for the last 10 years?
	And what type of, how many, how many foreign actors, what I would like to know is how many bad foreign actors have been aware of this program and have tried to infiltrate?
	Or how many bad domestic actors have been aware of this program and have tried to infiltrate on behalf of a foreign government, right?
	When we talk about people being targeted or recruited by foreign governments or foreign intel agencies to serve as operatives, we've seen members of the military defect.
	We've seen members of the military be charged for giving classified information to China before.
	We have seen members of our intel agencies in the past leaking classified information.
	I mean, this doesn't get reported as much as it should, but it happens on a pretty frequent basis.
	Oh, yeah.
	Yeah, it just happened, what, a month ago, I think, with the Abraham Lincoln, where a sailor on board, I think it was an Intel or something else of that nature, trying to sell information to China, you know, took it out of the skiff or whatever else and just was like, hey, can you pay me for this?
	But it happens.
	And going back to, you know, the environments, the home environments that the escorts work in, accidents happen or violations definitely happen.
	There's been instances where kids have gotten on the laptops when mom or dad, the escort was away, installed video games and whatnot, you know, and doing like chat and, you know, other kind of stuff.
	Well, this is the reason why.
	This is the reason why, if you're in the military, this was established several years ago.
	I think this happened under the Trump administration.
	They said that your kids are not allowed to have TikTok on their phones, right?
	If they live in the same home as you because of spyware.
	And so, you know, if they have rules for certain members of our Intel agencies, depending on who you are, right?
	Your children are not allowed to have TikTok downloaded on any of their devices inside your home because it's Chinese spyware.
	And so it makes you wonder, one, who's in compliance with these rules?
	And two, right, obviously, like, there's no compliance whatsoever that's been established for this program because if there were, right, the first line of order would be, don't take classified information home with you.
	They would have some kind of a designated area in Washington state where you would have to use a badge to clock in and you probably wouldn't be able to take your device or your computer home with you.
	You probably would have to use it within the room so that it wouldn't be contaminated or somehow hacked or infiltrated.
	Yeah.
	No, and it's pretty bad.
	Like the bulk, if not all, of our armed forces are actually out of compliance, you know, as far as like communications and whatnot that are on their phones.
	You know, it's mandated that DOD personnel, and I think government-wide really, they're not supposed to and not allowed to be using anything that's not authorized by, say, the DOD.
	GroupMe or Signal or any of the rest of these are not authorized, and yet all of the various commands and their personnel use them.
	You know, it is a violation.
	It is a UCMJ or Uniform Code of Military Justice violation.
	It's mandated by the branch CIO offices and by the DOD CIO office.
	They all violate it.
	And it's because nobody up in those offices is actually making sure that doesn't go on or punishing.
	I mean, going to commanders and going to commands and finding out, okay, I sent out this mandate.
	You guys aren't supposed to be using this, are you?
	And then finding out it does, and then there should be punishment, you know?
	But nobody's doing anything.
	So it's pretty rampant.
	And I think it's created a culture where service members, DOD, government-wide, they just go with the flow.
	So if they're told, hey, we're using this, even though it's not authorized, they just do it because everybody else is doing it.
	And that's kind of what has probably created like the Microsoft issue in a lot of ways too.
	You Know people, well, I think a lot of people know about this.
	The escorts absolutely know about this.
	Now, Republica, they reported the one team of 50 people.
	There's actually four teams over there of about 200 people.
	And there is a suspicion of about 10 more teams with other companies.
	So we're talking anywhere between 200 to 700 escorts working daily with folks in China and whatnot.
	But all of these escorts, none of them have came forward.
	I had to actually reach out to three of these folks, you know, senior leadership, and convince them to come and speak with the DOG, or I'm sorry, with the DISA OIG office and actually give depositions and reports.
	They would not talk to the press or anything else.
	They didn't want their names out there, et cetera, which I respect.
	But I had to come to them.
	They didn't come out on their own.
	And it's the same with the whole damn team of all that 200 to 700 some odd people, you know, because nobody's ever heard of this, you know.
	But I digress.
	So other limitations, you know, well, actually, let's kind of go into further.
	Export, I'm sorry, experience deficit.
	Like I was saying, they lack backgrounds in cyber security and IT, multiple jobs, we mentioned, work from home, mentioned.
	That's a big one.
	And like you were saying with the SCIF thing, that was one of the first questions I asked for the senior most management position managing that team back in 2016 is, is Microsoft going to be providing a SCIF or a secure facility for these escorts?
	And they told me no.
	At first, we're going to have everybody working out of the Bravern, which is a building in downtown Bellevue there, which they own.
	And I'm like, well, is this Flores going to be secure?
	What's involved here?
	Very light security, not much involved.
	But they said eventually they were going to set up more secure facilities at the proper campus in Redmond.
	That never happened because all the escorts work from home.
	So none of that came to pass.
	Yeah, there's a lot.
	So going into like the historical context, if you want to kind of branch off into that a little bit.
	Yeah, I want to take a moment first to take a quick commercial break to thank the sponsor of tonight's episode of Loomer Unleashed, and then we're going to continue with this.
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	All right, back to our interview with Navy whistleblower Tom Schiller.
	Tom, I want to get into the role of the individuals within the Obama administration who allowed for this to happen.
	I know we said we wanted to name some names tonight.
	And so if there are any individuals who you think bear most of the responsibility for this, I'd love to hear your insight because eventually when there is, if there is, and I hope there is an investigation into how this happened and how the Microsoft Azure system is currently operating across our federal government, I mean, you're telling me that this also includes the United States Secret Service as well.
	The United States Secret Service is also using this.
	As far as I know, all of our government uses it.
	That's a huge problem.
	That's a huge problem because then essentially the Chinese, who we know are buddy-buddy with Russia and Iran, they could be accessing this information and turning over information as it relates to the security and the safety of the President of the United States to our adversaries.
	And this comes at a time where we are experiencing hostilities with China.
	And also, we have seen that Iran is fiercely denying the fact that they have tried to assassinate President Trump at least two times now.
	We know that Iran has tried to assassinate President Trump on multiple occasions.
	They chant death to America constantly.
	They chant death to Israel constantly.
	And so this is very concerning because you have to ask yourself, how much information have they been able to acquire across all the various federal agencies these last 10 years?
	And what are they doing with this information?
	Yeah.
	And the thing is, there's indicators that they have all of it, you know, that they're fully in.
	And that was also confirmed by former director of the FBI, you know, Ray, where he said they're fully infiltrated in our infrastructure.
	And I believe it too.
	I mean, I went back, you know, circling back to after 2016 in that interview, they offered me the job to run the team, hire people, et cetera.
	I turned it down because of what this is.
	I was like, this is too many red flags.
	This has got to be illegal.
	And one of the first places I reached out to was the FBI, sending in reports right on the day, right after the interview, reached out to the FBI in 2016.
	So it's been a long time for porting.
	But the fact that Director Wray, former Director Ray, is saying they're fully in everything else.
	I'm suspecting he might have been basing that off of reports that I put in because I put in a lot of FBI reports.
	I think it was every three to six months I'd circle back, reach back out, submit new stuff, you know, and this went on for a good eight years of the reporting efforts.
	So it's quite a bit.
	I'd be very shocked if it didn't reach the director at some point.
	So he may be basing things off or did base things off of my reporting efforts.
	The key people that I suspect are behind this damn thing, the number one person, if this is investigated, is Craig Mundy.
	Historical context, who Craig Mundy is, he was the former science advisor to President Obama while simultaneously being the senior advisor to the CEO of Microsoft.
	He was formerly referred to as the man behind Microsoft, and he was attributed with being the decision maker for Microsoft's China strategy for 13 of the company's 18 years in China market as of 2010.
	Now, he continued in this role, too, for a couple more years, so it was much more than just the 13 years.
	I consider him to be the key person of interest, aside from APOM himself, likely the principal architect and facilitator of the aforementioned agreements between Obama and Microsoft.
	And so this Craig Mundy individual, are you saying then he's the decision maker?
	He was the one who was ultimately the decision maker about whether or not under the Obama administration, this contract between the U.S. federal government and Microsoft was going to be formalized?
	That's unknown.
	I mean, I've seen a lot of indicators and things, you know, referenced online, articles, et cetera, that does pinpoint him with many of these meetings that happened.
	And he would have been the person in that position that he was in to be making these decisions.
	I mean, especially when he's being attributed as the decision maker for Microsoft's Trina strategy and the man behind Microsoft.
	You know, when he's running the show over there Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait.
	Yep, that's what he was.
	And then he was a science advisor to Obama while being an advisor on China, the Microsoft.
	So, yeah, all of this at the same time.
	It's crazy.
	It's so crazy how infiltrated we are.
	It is so crazy how infiltrated we are, whether it's with the Biden family and all of their associations with China.
	I mean, this is incredible what you're telling me that Craig Mundy was the former science advisor to President Barack Hussein Obama.
	And then at the same time, Craig Mundy is the guy who was behind the strategy for Microsoft to get involved with China and who facilitated their relationship with China.
	How does somebody like that become a senior advisor to the president of the United States?
	Money.
	I mean, Microsoft, and I've kind of went into this in other reporting too, but they were the biggest attributors to Obama's campaign, you know, to get in as a president.
	And it was against a lot of their best interest because Obama was running on raising taxes of people making over, I think it was $250,000 a year or something like that.
	So they went against their best interest.
	It didn't make much sense until he got elected and he put his cabinet together with a whole bunch of lobbyists, including Craig Mundy, who is from Microsoft.
	And they also brought in some other folks, person from Google and some other big tech companies.
	But these were the decision makers that came in in Obama's administration.
	And Craig Mundy was essentially the chair.
	He was the head decision maker for this little party going on.
	At the same time, and it wasn't right off the bat that he became the senior advisor to the CEO of Microsoft.
	He was promoted to that role like a few years after coming on as the science advisor to Obama.
	So where is Craig Mundy today?
	Is he still in his position?
	Is he retired?
	What does he do now?
	So he's an interesting character.
	Yeah, he's still very much involved.
	He is a senior advisor still for Microsoft and for OpenAI and a number of other places.
	In fact, he just put together a paper last year, I believe, with Henry Kissinger, who just passed away, I think, last year too.
	But he was talking about AI.
	So he's very much in the scene still.
	So what does he do for Open AI?
	Don't know.
	He's an advisor for OpenAI for sure.
	What all he does is in that advisement role, don't know.
	But he influences governments.
	He's got a lot of pull behind the scenes.
	He's a puppeteer, in my opinion.
	So he's definitely somebody that needs to be investigated.
	And I do believe he is the facilitator for this.
	Is this program, Microsoft Azure, is it unique only to the United States?
	Or is this a program that's infiltrated in other countries?
	Because it sounds like it's a program that's supposed to be used by a lot of people across multiple agencies.
	And so is this something that was customized just for the U.S. federal government and for the United States?
	Or are other countries also using Microsoft Azure?
	No, there is other Companies using, or I'm sorry, countries using government Azure services.
	In fact, the United Kingdom just signed into a five-year contract for government Azure just this last fall.
	So they are kind of in the same boat that we're in at this point.
	How far they've migrated in, I hope not far.
	But yes, there is other countries involved.
	The thing with Microsoft, though, and many of the service providers, is that they don't build thing from scratch.
	They clone what they already built.
	So they took their civilian cloud infrastructure, something they invested a lot of time and money into building, cloned it, built a separate environment, maybe added a little bit of bells and whistles to meet government compliance with security and stuff like that, and then got authorized.
	They got authorized for, I believe they started with aisle two up to three, maybe four, between 2014 and 16.
	16 is when they got aisle 4 authorization.
	17, I believe, is when they got aisle 5, and then they got aisle 6 a little bit after that, and top secret a little bit after that.
	So they've progressively gotten up there.
	But back to the, you know, circling back, yeah, they don't build anything from scratch.
	They didn't build this for us.
	And I actually suspect that Azure was originally tailored for the Chinese market because piracy and other stuff over in China made it impossible to make any kind of money or revenue out of there.
	So I think that building this cloud offering and having it so you had to pay to get the service and support and everything else is why they did it for China.
	And China was actually the first country, from what I can tell, that got a government Azure instance.
	They got it about a year before we did.
	So, and on top of that, most of Microsoft's engineers for cloud, which is Azure, and also AI are predominantly out of China.
	So the same people building this, you know, all of it, are Chinese nationals out of China.
	It's just nuts.
	Are there any other programs that the U.S. government could be utilizing that aren't dependent on Chinese engineers?
	Not that I know.
	Not civilian-owned, which I was going to go into a little bit further.
	But my recommendation is that we restore things to a pre-Obama era model, that we go back to the United States government, the Department of Defense, all of the departments and agencies owning and operating their own cyber infrastructure.
	We need to return to that.
	Because the second that we went into the cloud and civilian-owned infrastructure was to our own detriment.
	You know, we handed over the reins to civilians who were all about profit.
	And look at what they did with that.
	They turned around and they said, we can hire cheap labor out of countries like India and China, et cetera, et cetera, underscore the competition or whatever, you know, sell this.
	And they didn't care about, I mean, it's obvious, in my opinion, they didn't care about national defense.
	Their idea behind this was profit.
	And honestly, everything they've done, and I don't think they've made much profit out of this doing that, but I think honestly everything they've done was actually working with the Chinese government.
	I think Microsoft and the Chinese government are in collaboration on this.
	I think that something nefarious is afoot.
	Do you think that Microsoft is aware, it's your professional opinion, that Microsoft is aware of espionage being carried out against the United States government by China?
	Is that what you're saying?
	What they've done by doing this, by having this escort team that has no oversight over anything except for the basic launch pad scripts, and then allowing in global support, over 90% out of China, and doing that, they've enabled espionage.
	Like if you look under the letter of the law, like, and there's many different things they violated here.
	There are laws they violated, policies, regulations, executive orders.
	There's so many things violated by doing this across multiple departments and agencies, not just the DOD.
	But by doing this, according to the letter of the law, they have enabled espionage by doing this.
	And saying that everything is secure, you know, and everything else, that falls under the False Statements Act.
	You know, they made false statement by saying, oh, we're 100% U.S., we're secure, et cetera.
	I beg to differ.
	I mean, you had the former DOD CIO come out on the record and a number of other senior leadership within DOD cyber and whatnot saying they had no idea this was going on.
	None.
	So Microsoft's trying to say that.
	Didn't somebody during the Obama administration have to sign off on this?
	Didn't somebody during the Obama administration have to sign off on allowing for foreign nationals to be involved in this database?
	Because surely there was some type of disclosure with Microsoft when they signed this contract with our federal government that the tech support was going to be carried out by foreign nationals.
	So who within our government granted authorization to allow for foreign nationals to participate?
	I mean, this is something that would have required, I imagine, right, authorization at the highest levels of the United States government.
	Yeah.
	So in that interview in 2016, I asked that same exact question, like who the approval authority for this was?
	I was very curious.
	And I raised all the red flags that I, you know, have been raising here, I raised with Insight Global as well.
	Told them all about what this was and red flags I discovered, et cetera.
	And I also asked them, can you, or do you know who the approval authority for this is?
	Do you have the documentation and paperwork?
	And they were like, oh, we don't have this yet.
	They kept assuring me they would let me know, and they didn't, you know, up until I came back in 2020.
	But that was a question that was heavy with me, was who the hell signed off on this from 2016 until 2020 or so.
	2020 is when I came, well, I was reached, had somebody from Inside Global reach out to me and asking me if I would want to come on the team as the principal software developer, streamlining the escort process, going into KQL or Kusto query language, similar to SQL, doing a whole bunch of stuff, coming up with custom apps, PTO, et cetera, you name it.
	But when I came on board and was doing the onboarding, then I got to see who the approval authority was.
	And it was Barack Obama's name and signature on all of it.
	He was the person that authorized everything, all of it, across the board.
	Nobody else, just him.
	And what year did he authorize this?
	So the agreements, and there's a number of them.
	They stretch between 2014 and 2016.
	I'm assuming that there was probably additional agreements made with other companies, an extension of this agreement with Microsoft, because it's known that Amazon has also got their own escort team, secured escort team doing the same thing.
	Don't know if they got personnel working out of China, but they are escorting in uncleared personnel.
	And then there's other companies like Oracle, where somebody came out on one of the comments and said, I know of at least two escorts working for Oracle doing the same thing.
	So those agreements were probably also signed off on by Obama while he was in office.
	Yeah.
	I think all of this was done right before he got out too, or, you know, during the last few years of his administration, he signed off on this.
	Like I said, too, I've been trying to.
	Yeah, I want to get into who you reported this to because, you know, the Department of Defense, obviously you have the Secretary, but you also have other people who work at the Department of Defense.
	And I know that, you know, even though this went across and this, you know, this spans across all of the various agencies within our federal government, what I'm wondering is, you know, as a member of the Navy, you probably just followed your chain of command.
	And then when you exhausted your chain of command, you probably contacted the Intel agencies.
	I mean, I know you have from our own conversations and what we've discussed.
	And so I want to know who at the Department of Defense specifically you informed about this and whether or not you ever received any kind of communication back.
	And I want to know when you contacted them, how often you contacted them.
	And if you don't mind, you know, just kind of briefly running through a summary of who all you have contacted about this and whether you, you know, received a response.
	You don't have to get into, you know, too much detail, but I think it's important if we name some names because some people are going to say, well, you know, maybe he just didn't bring it to the proper, you know, the attention of the proper people or the people in charge.
	And you can't just post about this stuff online or talk to people and expect it to go anywhere.
	Well, I want to know which channels of communication you sent this to and what their response was.
	Yeah, absolutely.
	So was it about 2023?
	There was a number of different emails coming.
	And at the time, I was with the Air Force Reserves.
	But there was emails coming through talking about war with China by 2025.
	General Minihan, who was the commander for AM Mobility Command, said, go to the range, shoot for the head, prepare, prepare, you know, etc.
	So I responded with my commander and let her know about the situation with this and went forward and reported that to her commander and then that person's commander and et cetera, all the way up to General Minihan.
	And me and General Minihan had actually been working together at the time.
	I was one of the bothered warrior trolls on his team helping out with coming up with ideas and solutions to help out the Air Force and etc.
	All volunteer based and all my own personal time.
	Brought this to his attention.
	He acknowledged it, said he's tracking and banging the drum and kind of went from there.
	I also reported this to another MAGCOM commander, major command commander, General Bauerfiend over at AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command.
	And then also reached out to U.S. Cybercom Commander, former General Hawk.
	And I think you probably know a little bit about that guy.
	But reached out to me.
	I only got him fired.
	And I hope the media is listening now because they harassed me for weeks on end and they still harass me to this day.
	And during the Armed Services Committee the other day, several members of Congress were talking shit about me saying that Laura Loomer shouldn't have the influence that she has.
	And General Hogg was an outstanding patriot who represented his country in an apolitical manner.
	And there's no reason why the NSA director, General Hogg, should have been relieved from his position.
	And it's like, actually, there are many reasons.
	And this is what I was trying to explain to people is that when Joe Biden appointed people to serve in his administration, he appointed people who were either one, blindly loyal to him, two, severely anti-Trump to the point where it was like a derangement syndrome.
	Three, right, you either compromised, you have a Trump derangement syndrome, or you are completely sold out to China or some kind of foreign interest.
	We've seen how the Biden administration was completely infiltrated by China.
	We know about their business dealings with China.
	We know about Hunter Biden.
	We know about the fact that Joe Biden allowed for an Iranian spy ring to operate inside of the United States State Department.
	We know that Maher Battar, who is a Palestinian national who has an affinity for students for justice in Palestine and pro-Hamas and pro-Hebollah activities and essentially, you could argue, is an agent for the Muslim Brotherhood, was put in one of the most senior intel Positions overseeing our national intelligence.
	Working with the National Security Council.
	So, and it's my understanding that to this day, Maher Batar, who many people have argued is responsible for October 7th, still has a security clearance, still has a security clearance where he's working with Senator, now Senator Adam Schiff.
	So just let that sink in, if you will, right?
	And so when people say to me, oh, well, you know, aside from not being loyal to Trump, what were some of the, you know, what were some of the reasons why General Hogg was disqualified in your opinion from serving as NSA director?
	Well, okay, it's arguably the most important intel agency in our country.
	We saw how it was weaponized to spy on Donald Trump and abuse the FISA courts and spy on President Trump's allies and to carry out a witch hunt and falsely accuse in coordination and collusion with foreign intelligence agencies and phony dossiers that were padded with and included fabricated information from foreign intel officials.
	Yeah, I think it's probably a pretty bad idea to have a Biden loyalist overseeing the NSA under a Trump administration, given the fact that Biden's litmus test was orange man bad, right?
	I think that we can all agree.
	And for those of you listening now, right, you brought this, you brought this to General Hogg in what year, right?
	Because we are now in 2025 when he just got fired.
	And you're telling me that you brought a Chinese espionage plot to him and raised awareness with all the receipts, documenting the fact that the Chinese Communist Party had a backdoor channel straight into our most classified information and our cyber systems at the Pentagon and every other agency within our country, which would include the NSA.
	And what was his response to you?
	And when did you do this?
	So I think by the time I reached out to him, it was 2024, I think.
	And I CC'd General Manahan and General Bowernfend on the email threat and whatnot.
	And one thing I should probably call had to cover my own butt too here is that this isn't just like military chain of command reporting as a service member.
	This is also independent civilian reporting as well.
	And it's actually been kind of stressed on me to report as a civilian and not as a service member.
	And it's due to a misconception of a lot of service members because I've spoken with the Navy JAG and they've told me that, no, you do report on both channels as a reservist.
	Like even if you're off duty, you're not on active status or orders or anything else.
	If you come across something that affects mission readiness or security, you need to report to both channels, civilian and military.
	So that's what I was doing.
	But getting back to Hawk, yeah, when I emailed him, I got an immediate phone call from somebody in his office.
	I'm thinking one of his OSI people or Air Force OSI, confirming who I was, establishing my identity, et cetera, et cetera.
	Once they did, you know, they said, well, we'll be back in touch.
	We're going to set up a meeting with you and him, right, General Hawk.
	So a couple weeks went by, didn't get a phone call, followed up, talked to his former secretary and some other folks.
	They said, oh, yeah, let's get you a meeting and everything else.
	Another couple weeks went by, followed up again.
	And then I had Air Force Detachment 333, or OSI Detachment, which works directly for the U.S. Cybercom Commander and whatnot, and have one of their agents reach out to me and said, yeah, it's been requested not to contact General Hawk anymore or his office.
	Like, we want to put you in touch with the proper people or whatever.
	We're going to find out what's going on.
	Wow, so the NSA director essentially told you to bug off and not to contact his office anymore when you were trying to alert him to the fact that the Chinese had access to all of our cyber systems,
	essentially, because who knows if any of these, and I'm sure it probably has happened, who knows how many of these Chinese foreign national tech support operatives via Microsoft have installed a malicious code onto the computers or spyware onto the computers of Intel officials or defense officials or, you know, people working at the Secret Service and people working at the Treasury.
	Okay.
	I mean, this just, this is really damning.
	This is very damning.
	So hopefully all those people listening, all the people listening who constantly want to defend General Hogg as some, you know, outstanding patriot who did the best he could to defend his country.
	Yeah, I think you should probably reevaluate your stance on that.
	I think he should actually be brought in for hearings on this, you know, answering for it.
	My own personal interactions and whatnot with him in his office is like, yeah, I didn't care for him too much at all.
	But I digress.
	But after that, it took about three weeks for Air Force OSI 333 to reach back out to me and give me a couple of leads.
	They were like, oh, maybe report this to Air Force OSI.
	And then they were like, oh, we see you're switching over from the Navy.
	I'm sorry, from the Air Force to the Navy.
	Let's put you in contact with NCIS.
	And then they were like, oh, wait, wait, wait.
	We actually recommend the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.
	So I was like, okay.
	Do you have some contacts?
	Can you open a case for me?
	Establish that communication.
	They were like, oh, no, we don't know anybody.
	I'm like, all right.
	So I reached out on my own, was calling around for about a week, trying to get a hold of local offices and other stuff.
	And then finally, I came across the tip line for the OIG for DCSA.
	Extremely responsive.
	You know, they're probably my favorite IG office just because they're so on the ball, you know, responsive and getting things done.
	They looked into it, did a preliminary for about three weeks or so, came back and said, well, we don't have jurisdiction or purview over this.
	We believe that the DODIG does.
	We're going to refer that over to them and actually open a case on your behalf.
	So I was very thankful and said, great, thank you.
	DODIG looked it over, sent me back an automated response and said, we've looked over all the things you provided.
	This is Definitely reason for concern.
	This caused serious damage and everything else.
	And we feel that the DOD CIO is the best office to investigate this for us, for the IG.
	So it was sent over to the DOD CIO at that point.
	This is after the former DOD CIO retired and you had an acting one in there.
	So I waited another week or two, didn't hear back, filed a number for the DOD CIO, called up their office and talked to, oh, what was it, Laura Stockwell, I believe?
	I'm a DOD CIO for people who don't know Katie Arrington, correct?
	She is currently the acting DOD CIO with Kristen Davies being the DOD CIO select, who's not in there yet, but she's the person that's slated to come in there.
	And so with the DOD CIO, it's an extremely important role.
	It's probably the most important cyber role in our country because that individual runs the whole show for our defense, for everything.
	They set the vision, the direction, they make the mandates.
	They are the senior most cyber advisor to the Secretary of Defense and to the Commander-in-Chief.
	It's a very important position.
	But getting back to that, so I was working with the DOD CIO chief of staff for COS, and she did not want me to tell her anything about this case.
	She was like, yeah, send me over the ticket number and I'll have my people look into it.
	So she opened up a DISA OIG investigation and it spoke with those guys.
	And explain to people watching what DISA is.
	So it stands for the Defense Information Systems Agency.
	They set a lot of policies, guidelines, and other things for the Department of Defense, but also other agencies and departments, I believe.
	So they're kind of the gatekeepers.
	They make sure everything is done properly.
	You know, them and kind of a few other agencies too, but predominantly it's DISA that controls stuff.
	So I was handed over to the IG office for DISA to investigate this.
	And that was just a whole bunch of nonsense, really.
	I got on the phone with the investigator.
	He was working from home for one, which is just pretty unprofessional, I think.
	And a number of things were said during the call.
	I'm actually waiting on a FOIA request to come back where I can discuss things or get emails and whatnot back to verbatim be able to discuss this.
	But from memory, which is important legally, things that were said during the conversation, the biggest one was that he kept asserting that the United States and China are allies and that this was all perfectly normal and authorized.
	And he repeatedly make this assertion during the interview, which was about two hours.
	And repeat the name of the individual who kept on saying that the United States and China were allies?
	I don't know if I can say the name, though.
	You know, not publicly.
	Definitely I can tell government personnel.
	What was the position at least?
	Can you say that?
	He was an investigator.
	That was his position.
	At the DOD?
	For DISA OIG, or the Office of Inspector General.
	Did you ever file any kind of complaint with the FBI or contact the FBI to report this?
	Oh, yeah, constantly.
	I think that was kind of like the sole place I was reporting to, sending in like e-forms, emails, phones, calls, even faxes.
	I was thinking, hey, maybe faxes can get through.
	You know, those don't just disappear.
	But I did that all throughout basically the reporting process up until about 2023 where I really got supercharged and started reaching up the DOD chain of command and whatnot.
	Yeah, there's probably dozens, if not hundreds, of emails and other things I've sent to FBI.
	Wow.
	And did you ever get a response?
	Never.
	Shocking.
	I mean, it's really honestly shocking that this has been going on for 10 years and you spent four years and then two of those years supercharged aggressively trying to report this and bring it up the chain of command.
	You contacted the FBI.
	Nobody got back to you.
	You went to Katie Arrington.
	You went to all of these people, including the NSA director and the esteemed NSA director that they're all up in arms about.
	Man, he's such a patriot.
	Allowing China to have backdoor access into our agencies and our cyber control systems.
	Yes, what a patriot he is, right?
	So obviously.
	I'm sorry, getting back to kind of the deflection kicking the can thing.
	You know, after DISA, so a big thing to point out too, is that DISA on August 28th, I believe, could be 29th, they closed the case and said they didn't feel they were the right avenue for redress, meaning they didn't feel the right office to correct this or do something about it.
	This is after deposing four whistleblowers in total, all the senior management for the escort team, all confirming this is going on.
	Reports, evidence, everything else I'd sent over, right?
	So they conducted all this, and on that date, they closed the case and said they'd send it up to this a leadership, right?
	It's good to point out that exact same date was the last day of a three-day trip that Jake Sullivan, the former national security advisor for the White House, made a trip to China to meet with President Xi and discuss cybersecurity, amongst other things.
	And the last time that a White House National Security Advisor had traveled to China was back during Obama's administration.
	So it was almost a fact that these two events happen on the same day, no damn way.
	That's impossible.
	No, it's not a coincidence at all.
	No way.
	I mean, it sounds like there were people who were in these leadership positions and senior positions who were intentionally trying to stonewall you and tell, they couldn't directly tell you, oh, we're not going to address this because then it would become a scandal given the fact that people know that China is not our friend.
	And China, it's kind of laughable that Obama and Joe Biden implemented cybersecurity pacts with Xi Jinping, knowing that the Chinese don't respect cybersecurity pacts with the United States.
	I mean, right before President Trump took office, they hacked into Janet Yellen's email, right?
	So, I mean, look, they clearly don't respect cybersecurity agreements at all.
	But from my analysis of this, and I think that the most concerning thing that I get from all of this is that there's a serious obstruction of communication that is taking place.
	There is a serious black hole in the chain of command, whether it's deliberate and malicious or whether it's a bunch of unqualified people who are just totally checked out for lunch.
	And I don't know, they're just there to collect a paycheck.
	They don't give a shit about our country.
	Maybe these people don't give a shit about cybersecurity and they don't give a shit about national security.
	It's one or the other, right?
	Or maybe, maybe it's both, right?
	Maybe it's both.
	But it's unacceptable.
	Yeah.
	Yeah.
	And it brings up a good point, too, because after DISA, you know, kicked the can, closed the case, same day as that event with Chi happened, whatever, reached back out to the CEO or the chief of staff for the CIO office.
	And they said, oh, no, we're very much still investigating this.
	We're still looking into it and everything else.
	Immediately after that phone call with her, I got an automated reply from the DODIG with her name on it showing she just closed the case.
	Right.
	So right after this phone call, we're still actively looking into this and everything else and click, you know, right after the call.
	So I tried calling back.
	No response.
	Could not get a hold of her or anybody else.
	That was with Katie, with Katie Arrington?
	Oh, no.
	So that was with the chief of staff, the former one.
	I believe her name is Laura Stockholm or something like that.
	Lauren?
	Lauren Stockwell, Stockwell, I believe.
	I have to look at it again.
	The former chief of staff for who?
	Oh, for the DOD CIO.
	Okay.
	So she was.
	So Katie Arrington's chief of staff.
	Oh, no.
	So she didn't work for Katie.
	She worked for the former acting.
	No, you said DOD CIO.
	So I was just assuming that it was Katie Arrington.
	Yeah, this is back in 2024.
	So this is back before elections and before Katie came in, you know, under Trump.
	But so I tried reaching out to the office all the way up to the elections, basically, couldn't get through.
	After the elections and after inauguration day, I think on the 21st or something like that, I reached back out to the DOD CIO office, learned that the chief of staff, the person that was kicking the can, everything else, was actually sent home on administrative leave.
	Her bios page, everything else on that site was taken down.
	So all indicators was she was getting the boot for whatever reason.
	So I talked to the military advisor for that office and spoke with him.
	And I don't have the name up at the moment, but spoke with him.
	He said he would check into it.
	Circled back with him a couple weeks later.
	He said that he did look into it, did reopen the case.
	So he did confirm the case was closed.
	And then he was instructed by somebody within the DOD CIO office to forward it to the DODIG for a thorough review.
	I tried following up for months after that point, seeing, hey, I've got additional evidence.
	I've got more things I've discovered since originally opening this.
	Can I get like a DOD safe link or some other way to upload these documents?
	Can you connect me with the DOD IG, et cetera?
	None of that.
	No response.
	So finally, it was like, I think Katie Arrington just took over as the acting DOD CIO for about maybe a week or two.
	I reached out to her, got in direct communication, and she said, oh, wow.
	And she was like, I will directly handle this.
	I will directly look into this.
	She'll take the lead, etc.
	And give us a timeline of when this happened.
	When did you contact?
	When did she say this to you?
	I think this was around April or May of this year.
	So 2025.
	It was like shortly after she came in as the acting DOD CIO.
	And did she ever handle it?
	I'm guessing no, since this is still ongoing.
	Yeah, I mean, yes and no.
	So, you know, she gave me her email address to send things to, you know, not, I couldn't send all of these things through an email because it's just, you know, probably gigabytes of data or whatever.
	But then she ended up handing it over to the DOD Chief Information Security Officer.
	So she did not handle it herself, from what I can tell, handed it over to the CISO.
	Now, what's important to note is that person is a Biden holdover.
	You know, most of that office is.
	And that chief information security officer immediately.
	Who's the Biden holdover?
	Because as you know, as you know, I've been very focused on identifying Biden holdovers within our national security apparatus.
	So who is this individual and what is their name?
	So it's David McKeown.
	And I'm sorry if he's watching and I misspelled his name or mispronounced.
	How do you spell his last name?
	I think it's M-C-K-E-O-W-N.
	And his position?
	So he is the chief information security officer for the Department of Defense.
	Thank you.
	Wow.
	So he started reaching right out to references of mine Because I provided about four reference letters from former commanding officers because it was going through Navy officer boards, Sterling recommendations, everything else.
	So he's like, oh, well, let me call these people, right?
	And a few of them called me.
	One of them in particular was very troubled by the call, called me immediately afterwards.
	And he let me know that initially when Mr. McKeon, or I'll just say the CISO called him, he was telling him, oh, I'm fully vetted in the case, fully acclimated, know all the details, all the investigation, blah, blah, blah, right?
	Knew it all.
	Claimed this.
	And then immediately started asking the person, like, why didn't Schiller use his chain of command?
	Right?
	That would have been evident if he read all the details and evidence and everything else that I did use the chain of command.
	So right there, either he lied about being fully vetted and acclimated to this issue, or he made a false statement and was trying to defame me.
	I don't know.
	But either way, right there, lie number one.
	Lie number two, he was telling the individual on the phone, I believe Mr. Schiller is confused and mistaken and doesn't understand the difference between civilian azure and government azure.
	And this was David McKeon who said this to you?
	Right.
	Wow.
	The chief information security officer.
	Looks like he's got to go.
	I mean, this is what I'm talking about.
	All these Biden obstructionists.
	And this is the problem, right?
	If we know that the Biden administration is sold out to China, we know that they are compromised by China.
	That's just a given, right?
	Investigations have shown this countless time over and over again.
	Books have been written about this.
	We've had countless congressional investigations into this.
	It is a fact that the Biden family, the Biden crime family, the Biden administration, okay, and this extends to Obama because essentially this was Obama's third term, is compromised by China.
	Why does the Trump Department of Defense have Biden holdovers serving in these very important roles that our entire national security is hinging on?
	I mean, you want to, you followed your chain of command and now you're being belittled by a guy by the name of David McKeon, who is a chief information security officer who has not been fired yet, even though there's probably a million people out there in the world who are just as qualified or if not even more qualified.
	Sounds like maybe you should take his job.
	Who knows?
	Maybe they should appoint you to something.
	But for them to talk down to you when you clearly know more about the situation than they do after they stonewall you for four years and then to act like you are confused and to gaslight you into thinking that you don't actually know what you're talking about, these people should be fired.
	And look, I don't work for the Trump administration and I don't have that authority, but if I did have that type of authority, I would fire them.
	And I think that Pete Hegseth, if he's watching this, he should fire these individuals.
	He should fire these individuals who stonewalled you this long.
	And they should have taken this information directly to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.
	This is a matter that, in my opinion, and I'm not in the military, I've never served, but you don't have to be a rocket scientist to know the national security implications of your adversary having a backdoor channel to your cyber network infrastructure across all government agencies, right?
	You do not need to have served or be a, you know, cybersecurity specialist or analyst to understand the implications of this.
	It is criminal.
	It is criminal that this has been stonewalled and that this was never brought to the attention of Defense Secretary Pete Hagseth.
	And I know Pete and the fact of the matter is that he's a busy guy.
	It's hard to get a hold of him, obviously.
	But the fact that they tried to belittle you instead of trying to work with you to address this is, in my opinion, worthy of not just firing, but there should be an investigation.
	They should have a congressional investigation into this to see who was complicit, who knew what, who knew what when, and why this was not ever resolved.
	Yeah, absolutely.
	And, you know, kind of covering all that too, you know, lie number two, which I was mentioning, where he was saying I was confused, et cetera, again, he got caught in the lie because if he had reviewed the depositions or the clarification interviews, they called them, with the other four people, or all four people with the, you know, multiple hours this went on, he would have known everybody was referencing government azure.
	So either he did not know the case and was not familiar with it and did not know all the details, or he made that assessment, you know, statement purposefully.
	I don't know which one, you know, but either way, he was lying.
	So either got caught in one lie or another twice.
	But as far as reporting efforts too, so after that nonsense happened, I let Katie Arrington know what Mr. McKeown just did.
	I let her know exactly what he did and what was reported back to me.
	She apologized to me and said, oh, I'm very sorry, you know, like sincerely.
	I was in on the internet, you know, with him calling these people.
	I didn't hear these things, but I'm going to talk with him directly and handle this.
	Then she handed me over to the general counsel for the DOD.
	And this is like basically the legal team advisors, et cetera, to Hagseth.
	So I reached, you know, one of these people reached out to me, said, hey, we're going to be back in contact.
	I tried reaching out and following up with this person for like a week or two.
	Didn't get any response out of that person.
	So I reached out to Mr. Young, Charles Young, I believe, but he is the DOD general counsel.
	And he didn't contact me right back, but he had his top military, senior military advisor contact me back.
	And they said, oh, we're going to look into this, everything else.
	You know, thank you for bringing this attention, et cetera.
	Let's see what we can do here, right?
	I continued with the email thread that was going on.
	And this is, again, this independent civilian reporting at this point.
	But email thread.
	And I also started including the SEC Nav Engine Rooms distro, which is for the Secretary of Defense, all of his office, and also to the Secretary of Defense's distro.
	And during all of this, emailing back and forth between Mr. Young, the general counsel, et cetera, et cetera, also including Kahady Arrington and a lot of other folks, I got back read receipts because I'm always good about that, requesting read receipts on anything so I can get the acknowledgement things have been read.
	And one of them came back from Hegseth's senior military advisor or what's it called?
	Assistant, I believe, actually.
	So this is General Lariv, I believe.
	So he's the 8th Army General out of Korea, selected by Hegseth to come in and be his assistant.
	He's the one that's working with him, travels with him, does everything else with him.
	So he sent me back a read receipt.
	And it was interesting because backtracking a little bit, I think it was back right after Hegseth got in and some other things.
	It was discussed that Lariv, and I'm sorry if I got the name wrong, was going to be his appointed person.
	So I reached out to him while he was still the 8th Army commander and let him know about the situation twice.
	So this was much earlier in the year.
	Sent me read receipts back then too.
	Never reached back out.
	And I was asking him, like, please get this information over to Hegseth, you know, et cetera.
	I don't think he ever did.
	And he sent me back additional REIT receipts after he was in that position of being the SecDev senior assistant.
	Again, read receipts, but no response.
	So there are a number of people within Hegseth's own office, the office of the Secretary of Defense, that to my knowledge have not reported this to him.
	And I've repeatedly asked.
	Well, we're going to be, I will text this episode directly to Pete Hegseth because I have his number.
	And I've known Pete Hagseth for 10 years.
	So I'm going to be sending this episode directly to Pete Hagseth.
	So Pete Hagseth is going to see this.
	So we're going to make sure that Pete Hagseth sees this.
	And I also know the Navy Secretary.
	And I know the Navy Secretary's chief of staff.
	So we're going to make sure that they are all informed about this so that you don't have to deal with this internal gatekeeping that has, you know, served to completely block this information out.
	And this is why I wanted you to come on because it's important that people hear this.
	This is the first interview.
	This is the exclusive interview.
	The first interview that you've done since this information has come out.
	It has still not garnered the attention that it deserves.
	And I wanted to grant you the full extent of this show episode tonight, the full two hours to talk about this and to explain this.
	Because now everybody's questions have been answered.
	Well, who did you talk to, right?
	And did you inform the proper channels, right?
	Yes, you have exhausted all channels of communication over the last four years.
	And ultimately now this rests in the hands of Defense Secretary Pete Hexeth to either meet with you or assign somebody to meet with you for a briefing or to address this with Microsoft.
	I want to continue and I want to, in the next segment, I want to address the additional concerns that arise and are presented with Microsoft's relationship with China.
	And then I want to conclude the episode with some calls to action for people watching so that people who are watching this and outraged can contact their representatives or contact the DOD and push for some type of a congressional inquiry or congressional investigation.
	But we need to take a quick commercial break.
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	All right, Tom?
	So, in conclusion, as we wrap this episode up, I want to talk about the additional national security concerns that are presented by Microsoft's relationship with China.
	And I want to then conclude with just kind of an overview.
	And I'm going to be posting about this, and I'm going to be writing a report about this on my website as well.
	So I know it's a lot of information, and people are probably like sitting here thinking, oh my God, this is so much.
	How am I going to get all this information remember?
	And what am I going to say to my representative?
	And how am I going to address this?
	I'm going to be publishing a synopsis of this interview and a synopsis of the breach, right?
	I already have the synopsis, the synopsis here in preparation for my interview with Tom Schiller.
	And I'm going to make it public.
	I'm going to make this document public so that everybody who lives in the United States who is concerned about this breach can understand just the basic talking points and the basic gist of what has happened.
	Because I know we've covered a lot of ground tonight.
	Essentially, Microsoft has allowed for foreign nationals, including Chinese engineers, to manage U.S. government cloud systems, beginning with authorizations from the Obama administration signed off by Barack Hussein Obama himself.
	These same individuals operated with full administrative privileges and no U.S. security clearances, while so-called escort teams, as you've described them, in the United States had no technical authority or visibility and really no real understanding of code and malicious code.
	The support model allowed real-time remote access to classified systems by foreign actors who developed and ran proprietary scripts on government servers.
	It's a big issue.
	And as you've claimed on this interview, since 2016, you have repeatedly reported this breach to officials in Congress, the Pentagon, intelligence agencies, Department of Defense, and you have been completely ignored.
	You even went to the FBI and you have not received a single reply from our intelligence agencies.
	And what we can assess from your brave whistleblower work and what we can assess from this interview tonight is that the Department of Defense and agencies like the FBI and the NSA, and thank God, President Trump fired General Hogg, praise the Lord.
	They were all aware.
	They were all aware of this information and they refused to take action.
	They refused to take action.
	That is not up for debate.
	We are not going to have a debate.
	We are not going to wonder, speculate whether or not they were made aware.
	They were made aware.
	You even had direct conversations with General Hogg.
	And I'm sure you have the receipts to prove this.
	You have the documentation.
	And you are in my conversations with you in the time that I've known you.
	You're a very detail-oriented person and you keep the receipts.
	So there's no running from this.
	These people are not going to be able to deny that you never contacted them because you have saved all of your electronic communications and you have all of your correspondences.
	You even recorded a phone call you had with one of these Chinese, with one of these Chinese tech tech workers or somebody else recorded the phone call and you were able to obtain access to it.
	And we have that video, right?
	From my understanding, it was somebody else who was engaged with one of these Microsoft Azure tech support workers based out of China, where they got the tech support worker to actually confirm that they are based out of China operating off-hours tech support for the Department of Defense.
	And so let's go ahead and play that clip because it is very shocking.
	And we're not just making this up.
	This isn't a conspiracy.
	Tom knows what he's talking about.
	You know, it's funny because this takes a lot of time to process this information.
	It is very technical information.
	And I can imagine these government employees who work nine to five, they just don't really want to have to think more than they actually have to to collect a paycheck.
	So this actually requires analysis and reviewing documents and reviewing videos and looking at emails and looking at correspondences that have been ongoing for the last 10 years in our country and the last four years since you've started aggressively trying to get some accountability on this matter.
	So let's go ahead and play this.
	This was a video that was posted by somebody at the Department of Defense who reached out to Microsoft for technical support and they had an interaction with one of Microsoft Government Azure's Chinese agents.
	So go ahead and take a listen.
	Yes, so I understand.
	So your name is Frida and you're with Microsoft and you're located where again?
	Yeah, my name is Frida and I work from Microsoft and I'm located in China.
	Okay, got it.
	And so for somebody in the U.S. defense industry, you're telling me that after hours, the only place we can call for support is in China?
	If you want to use the callback, you can just open the ticket in your working time and that will be U.S. support.
	Okay.
	All right.
	Thank you very much.
	YouTube, Pepper.
	So her name is probably definitely not Frida.
	That might be her Microsoft Azure name, but I highly doubt her name is actually Frida.
	Never heard a Chinese name Frida.
	Well, if you look at the ticket, she's kind of got up there, too, or he's got up.
	Her last name's Yu, or YU.
	So maybe?
	I've never heard the name Frida myself.
	I've never heard a Chinese person with the name Frida, right?
	So who knows?
	I don't know.
	Maybe.
	Perhaps.
	It's interesting because that individual, I forget his name at the moment, but he's actually a procurement director in the Pentagon for the DOD.
	And he's having a call for China for support with his Microsoft account.
	And he's tried tagging people on LinkedIn, you know, a few of the different, I think the former DOD CIO, he's tried tagging, and I think he's tried whistleblowing, you know, but I don't think he's gotten any attention whatsoever.
	So it's interesting.
	So are you worried that you're going to face any kind of professional ramification as a result of going public?
	I mean, I hope that Pete Hagseth and I know that he's an honorable guy.
	I'm sure he's going to have your back on this.
	And I'm sure the Navy Secretary would have your back.
	But how are you protecting yourself right now?
	I know there are whistleblower protections.
	And have you contacted an attorney yet?
	Do you have any type of plan in place to protect yourself as a whistleblower?
	Because this is the first time you're really going public with this information outside of your private communications in this exclusive interview regarding what you have uncovered.
	And obviously the ProPublica report never would have come out had it not been for you and all of the information that you have turned over.
	And at the time that you brought this information to me, you had told me that ProPublica was already working on a story.
	Right.
	And so, you know, as a journalist, right, it's kind of like, well, you know, yes, I've had access to this information, but we agreed that we would wait for the ProPublica report to come out.
	Right.
	And now it has created an offshoot of other articles, nearly not enough media attention than it's, you know, that it's deserved.
	It deserves, this honestly should be.
	The media right now is completely obsessed with Jeffrey Epstein.
	And I'm not saying that we shouldn't talk about Jeffrey Epstein, but this is what the media should be running stories about cover to cover and asking the White House for comment on.
	Right.
	And Epstein, that's another conversation, but this is the type of information that should be broadcasted and aired all over the mainstream media.
	And so given the fact that ProPublica had already been speaking with you about this matter and they had already been investing their resources into the story, I didn't want to interfere in their report because you had said that they had been successful in contacting some defense officials.
	And I, you know, didn't want to disrupt their ability to get people on the comments or their own investigation because really I've known about this since I think you first reached out to me in April.
	And so.
	In April after my Oval Office meeting with the president.
	And so people will say, well, why didn't you release this information?
	Well, because this is an ongoing journalistic investigation.
	And we decided that at first we didn't even know if we should put this information out in the public.
	We were hoping that Katie Arrington would reply to Tom in May.
	We were hoping that with Pete Hagseth's confirmation that this would quietly be resolved so that we didn't have to alert an adversary to the fact that we are now aware that they have access and they're possibly and they probably are spying on us through the access that they have via the Microsoft government Azure system.
	Because it could have created a lot of national security risks had this been released prior to the proper channels being alerted to it.
	But Tom and I, just for full transparency for those watching, we agreed that once the ProPublica investigation was complete and they published their article, that I would have him on my show to, like as soon as the article came out.
	And it literally just came out the other day.
	So I would have him on the show for a full-length interview.
	And I agreed that I would distribute this content and, you know, inform the proper channels.
	And that's what needs to happen.
	And it's a shame that you should be, you should be getting contacted, in my opinion, by every single news agency.
	They should want to have you on to talk about this.
	I hope that you receive full protection as a whistleblower.
	I hope that Pete Hegseth meets with you and that you're able to personally brief him.
	I hope the Navy Secretary meets with you.
	And I hope that your concerns are finally taken seriously and that we can get some type of congressional action on this and that it can get resolved.
	And I don't think that this is going to go away anytime soon.
	Microsoft can't just hide behind their computer screens and say that they're not going to provide any type of comment.
	They're probably going to lawyer up because I imagine that upon further review, who knows?
	Who knows how long Microsoft is going to continue to keep their lucrative contract?
	And it is lucrative, but to the tune of how much is this contract with the federal government and Microsoft, do we have a price point on that contract?
	Yeah, I think it's in the kind of the preach report where I was kind of going over laws, violations, other stuff.
	But I think it came out to about $30 billion they've made off the United States government since 2015.
	That doesn't include other things.
	That's a lot of money.
	So they're making $30 billion off of having an estimated $30 billion from your assessment off of their contract, Microsoft's contract with the United States government.
	And so what is Microsoft doing with that money?
	Well, they're doing a lot of things, right?
	One of the things that they're doing is they're funding Chinese university students to learn cloud computing and AI.
	And when this whole H-1B visa crisis erupted in DC, when it turned into a big fight, when we saw Elon Musk fighting with me and others, you know, right before the new year around Christmas time over H-1Bs, I know like Microsoft got a lot of heat because they had announced that they were investing a ton of money into teaching Indians, right?
	Teaching Indians how to do, you know, AI.
	And they were investing a ton of money, if you recall what I'm talking about.
	And I wish I had the report in front of me, but it was like an astronomical amount of money.
	And I remember because I know somebody who works at Microsoft and I sent it to them and I said, this is why people hate big tech.
	You guys have so much money.
	And why don't you invest this amount of money into teaching American students how to how to develop AI and invest in cloud computing for American students?
	Why are you only investing in Indians and Chinese?
	And they said, you know what, you have a point.
	And this is somebody who has direct communication with the president of Microsoft, right?
	So I'm going to send them this interview too.
	I'm not going to use their name because I don't want to burn them.
	But I'm going to send this to them too.
	And hopefully Microsoft can give a more forceful, more forceful statement about this because this is very bad.
	Additionally, they have joint AI ventures with the Chinese government and CCP-linked companies.
	So it's nice, right?
	They get to make $30 billion off of their contract with the United States government, and then they go invest it into the CCP and invest it into Chinese students who are all going to be loyal to the CCP.
	Additionally, the Chinese nationals that Microsoft employs, they have a history of climbing up the ladder at Microsoft and then jumping ship to work for the CCP.
	So Microsoft has, there's been several cases of Microsoft providing funding for the training of Chinese nationals to learn these skills in cloud computing and AI and all types of advanced coding.
	And they get their training, just like we see here in the U.S., they get their training at American universities and they learn our ways and they study in laboratories here, many of those laboratories where you have to have a clearance.
	And then they go and they defect and they go back to China and they give all the information to the CCP.
	So that's a problem.
	So on that too, it's interesting.
	Level five, or I'm sorry, IL 5 or inherent threat.
	When that was authorized in January 2017 for Microsoft Azure government and Office 365, at the same time, the Microsoft executive vice president, Kui Liu, who led the division in charge of Office, Bing, and Skype, left Microsoft to go work for Chinese companies tied with the CCP.
	So it's like, yeah, we'll give you IL-5 clearance.
	Same time, the guy that developed the things they're being cleared for is going off to go tell the CCP how to break into it or whatever else.
	Who knows?
	But there's been tons of instances, even just last year.
	You know, you had Congressman Jimenez really grill into the president of Microsoft and asking, why are you in China?
	You know, with the inherent threat of this, blah, blah, blah.
	And it was right after that grilling that you had like most of the senior AI leadership and developers and engineers in Microsoft jump ship to go to China to start up a normal company to help China and AI and other stuff.
	You know, but it's just crazy.
	And then Microsoft, like you said, is partnered with the CCP on a number of things.
	They're actually partnered with ByteDance and TikTok developing AI.
	They're building AI for our adversary.
	At the same time, they're trying to make us build our AI to combat them.
	It's like, oh, you got to build more AI because your enemies got AI.
	They're the ones providing the damn AI to our enemies to begin with.
	So it's like creating the issue.
	They're creating what needs to be done here.
	So all of Trump's workings, dealings with, was it Stargate and all this other stuff going on with AI, Microsoft, OpenAI, et cetera, get out of it.
	Get the hell away from it.
	Get away from Microsoft.
	Get away from this nonsense.
	And honestly, you know, I've went over damages incurred or whatever by the United States government and the Department of Defense.
	And I've calculated it comes out to about $2.21 trillion in damages.
	And that's with R ⁇ D that's been stolen.
	That's had to be new R ⁇ D programs stood up to combat this or in response to this.
	Infrastructure that's been damaged, policies that had to be done.
	There's a lot of things that are involved here.
	But the total number, after you account for a false statement act or false bat, is treble damages, which comes out to triple.
	So all in all, if the full letter of the law is executed and if, and I'm saying if Microsoft violated these laws, it's not saying they did, but everything is indicating that they did, you know, they should be nationalized.
	You know, they should be taken over and turned into basically a U.S. government company at this point for what they've done.
	At the very least, they shouldn't be in charge of our data or our services any longer.
	You know, that needs to end.
	Yeah, I mean, it's pretty evident that their current system, this Microsoft government duure, has left pretty much every single sensitive U.S. cyber infrastructure system exposed to foreign interference and foreign sabotage, mostly from China, under the guise of a commercial partnership between a private company and a government, right?
	The United States government.
	So that's a massive problem.
	It's pretty evident as well that not only is there a massive communication issue going on and there's a lot of gatekeeping, but also too, the oversight mechanisms have completely failed.
	There is absolutely no oversight Whatsoever.
	And so there needs to be an investigation too into how these oversight mechanisms are either being completely ignored, they've been completely abandoned, or they're intentionally being pushed aside for the sake of committing espionage.
	So definitely needs to be investigated and huge problem.
	And we're going to be pushing out this information.
	Is there anything else that you wanted to add before we conclude?
	Sure.
	Yeah, just, you know, side note, you know, while I've been combating this and not just, you know, with the Department of Defense and other agencies, you know, I've taken this up and personally briefed a number of Congress members and senators.
	You know, I could name names, but it would probably take quite a while.
	Talked with Susie Wiles over the phone about this too, the chief of staff for the White House.
	So there's a lot of folks involved.
	Elon Musk, he's been fully briefed on this by partners of his in Texas and whatnot.
	I've been included on the email threads.
	So he's involved too.
	There's a lot of stuff.
	You know, this could take forever.
	But while I've been doing all this, you know, when the transition team was being stood up and everything else, me and Linda McMahon connected, connected with a number of people that were part of the transition team.
	I had a good relationship with the campaign team.
	One thing I put in for was to come in as the new DOD CIO.
	Now, specifically, because I didn't trust anybody there to get the job done.
	I didn't trust them to set the right vision, to bring us back to a pre-Obama era model to get stuff back in-house.
	So I put a package together and did submit for that.
	So it's been trying.
	But like you said, there's a whole bunch of Biden holdovers.
	And I've had on good authority from campaign team members and transition team members that we've got literally thousands of people that are patriotic, that are ready to help out, ready to jump in, and they haven't been interviewed, reached out to nothing.
	Meanwhile, you still got a full assortment of Biden holdovers in there.
	So it's crazy.
	There's no reason for it.
	Well, your actions are heroic, and you're an American patriot for what you've done.
	And I really hope that you receive the recognition that you deserve for documenting this over the last four years of your life.
	And I know what it's like to be subjected to gatekeeping and to have your investigations ignored for years, trust me, which is why I definitely sympathize with you and I can resonate with you and probably why we have a lot in common because, you know,
	it's very difficult being a truth seeker, but also it's very difficult being ahead of the curve and noticing things when other people either refuse to notice and they want to close their eyes because they don't want to believe what they're seeing in front of their eyes, or they think it's just easier to completely ignore it and pretend like they were never made aware of the situation because they don't know how to address the situation or because they don't want to address the situation.
	And this cannot be allowed to go on any longer, especially as China continues their campaign of aggression against the United States and also as they continue their campaign of aggression towards Taiwan.
	And especially as our adversaries join forces to carry out their ultimate goal of multipolarity at the expense of the United States government.
	This is a massive national security threat.
	And shame on General Hog and shame on all of these officials at the Department of Defense who ignored you and pretended like they had, you know, no solution, right?
	Or pretended like they never received your email correspondence or they just completely ghosted you after you were going out of your time.
	It's not like anybody's paying you overtime the countless hours.
	I mean, this is the kind of work that people get paid big bucks to do, right?
	They're private security contractors.
	This is the type of work that certain cyber defense companies get paid millions of dollars a year in contracts with mega corporations or with governments to manage their cybersecurity.
	And so the fact that you're doing this for free just because you care about your country and you care about the United States government is very admirable.
	It's very patriotic.
	And I'm going to be following this situation closely.
	As I said, you have my word that I'm going to be sending this to Defense Secretary Hegset.
	I am going to send this to the Navy Secretary, John Fallon.
	I'm going to send this to his chief of staff.
	And I will personally be preparing a report and sending this over to the White House as well, because this is truly an abomination.
	And hopefully Microsoft is jagged before a congressional hearing, not just for talking points and sound bites, but for an actual investigation that is hopefully going to get us some answers.
	Because as we have seen, China is not our friend.
	They've been incredibly hostile towards the current Trump administration.
	And essentially, they could completely kneecap our entire federal government.
	They could completely kneecap our entire electrical grid if they truly wanted to.
	And it's kind of scary to think that hostile CCP actors could essentially hack and disable our entire infrastructure across the government.
	And I imagine that all of our emergency systems and all of our emergency alert systems are tied into the same database because I imagine that they're not like cross-polluting platforms.
	They're probably keeping one platform for, you know, technological cyber consistency, right?
	So, I mean, what were to happen if somebody were to install some form of malware to completely disable the entire federal government for an extended period of time?
	What would that do to our economy?
	What would that do in the middle of a national security crisis, like a terrorist attack or some kind of natural disaster or some type of pandemic, right?
	As we saw with China during the COVID era?
	Excuse me.
	Just something that people should be thinking about.
	Something that people should be thinking about because, I mean, it's absolutely terrifying when you think that they have access.
	And when you know, I mean, this is not even thinking, this is not even a conspiracy.
	This is not a speculation.
	You have the receipts and you have clearly proven that they have access to every single agency within the United States government.
	And that should terrify everybody.
	That should be a number one priority.
	I'm surprised that, you know, our top security officials aren't having an emergency meeting to address this in the situation room.
	It is that severe.
	Yeah.
	And many, you know, people have kind of described the situation or scenario with China have in this access where they can commit what's known as like a cyber 9-11 or cyber Pearl Harbor attack.
	There's movies that have been based on this, this theory and books and other stuff.
	But yeah, what could potentially happen right now, like as soon as you go live with this even, they might decide, oh, they're about to take her toy away and they might just strike.
	I don't know.
	But it is that serious.
	You know, this needs to get shut the fuck down, you know?
	Absolutely.
	And hopefully this interview will lead to that happening.
	Tom, where do people follow you if they want to get in touch with you?
	I know that you're a very professional person.
	You're in the Navy.
	You're not trying to really cause a ruckus.
	I know that you've expressed to me your desire to have discretion.
	But if people want to reach out to you, let's say they want to interview you or people want to get in touch with you, how can they reach you?
	Oh, absolutely.
	I think email would be best.
	And it's tomtom.schiller, S-C-H-I-L-L-E-R at nextdefense.us.
	Reach out to me that way and love to hear from you.
	Wonderful.
	Well, hopefully you get a lot of inquiries from reporters who want to have you on to discuss this.
	I think it's very important.
	And I really appreciate all the time and effort that you've put into it.
	It's very admirable.
	And I'm going to do the best I can to make sure that the proper channels get access to this information.
	I really appreciate it.
	Appreciate everything you've done.
	Renee over at Republica and also Kyle Reyes, who's the owner of Law Enforcement Stadium, put out an article last year covering the same issue.
	So I'm really thankful that we've got some good patriots and people that are just that concerned and want to get stuff done.
	Absolutely.
	Well, thanks so much for coming on my show, Tom.
	I really appreciate it.
	Well, thank you.
	Thank you.
	Have a good night.
	You too.
	Before we close out tonight, I want to take a moment to thank the sponsor of tonight's episode of Lumer Unleashed, Kirk Elliott Precious Metals.
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	That was a pretty heavy interview.
	I hope that it was informative for all of you.
	I hope that it was educational, but it's honestly shocking.
	It's honestly shocking how infiltrated we are by bad foreign actors, especially by the CCP here in our country.
	This is a massive national security crisis, and this is the first time Tom Schiller has ever gone public.
	In a video interview, he agreed to give me the exclusive interview, and I promised that I would do everything in my power to make sure that this information in this interview is delivered to the proper authorities and the proper officials within the United States government, within the Department of Defense, and within the White House.
	And to all of you watching tonight, that's my commitment to you as well.
	This needs to end.
	The fact that this has been ongoing as a result of the administration of Barack Hussein Obama for the last 10 years is absolutely unacceptable and it needs to end.
	If you enjoyed tonight's episode of Loomer Unleashed, please be sure that you're following me on rumble.com slash Laura Loomer.
	You can click the green follow button.
	Be sure that you're always following me.
	Download the Rumble app, enable notifications on your phone so that you never miss an episode of Loomer Unleashed.
	And also be sure that you're following me on X at Laura Loomer and also on X at Loomer Unleashed.
	I'm going to be clipping this interview and posting the clips.
	I'm sure they're going to go very viral.
	I'm going to tag all of the appropriate officials within the Trump administration and within the Department of Defense.
	And then I'm going to send it to them directly because they need to see this information.
	And I will be doing that throughout the entire weekend so that we can kick off next week with an explosive news cycle.
	And hopefully Tom Schiller gets the coverage that he deserves for his very brave whistleblower report.
	If you're a whistleblower and you have a story to tell and you have government corruption or a government scandal or a national security threat that you would also like to expose, you can also contact me by visiting my website, loomered.com.
	Again, that's loomered.com.
	And you can message me on the tip section.
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	And you can see that I have a tip line there.
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	And you can also get your story out to the public.
	If you don't want to use the tip line, you can also contact me on Signal or you can DM me on X. My DMs are open.
	You can also DM the Lumer Unleashed account.
	And if you prefer to speak on Signal, I will give you my signal if you DM me on my personal Twitter account.
	With that, thank you so much for tuning in to tonight's episode of Loomer Unleashed.
	Have a wonderful weekend and I will see you next week for another episode of Loomer Unleashed.
	Have a great night.
	There is a young female journalist, conservative journalist by the name of Laura Loomer.
	If America's men acted like Laura Loomer, our problems will be fixed in about five minutes.
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