Kash's Corner - Kash’s Corner: How Biden’s ‘Off-Limits’ List for Russian Cyberattacks Will Backfire

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Nov. 10, 2021 - Kash's Corner

28:58

Kash’s Corner: How Biden’s ‘Off-Limits’ List for Russian Cyberattacks Will Backfire

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	Hey everybody, welcome back to Cassius Corner.
	Jan, what are we talking about today?
	Today we're going to be talking about the U.S.-Russia relationship.
	You know, something that of course has been on a lot of people's mind with President Biden and President Putin basically meeting in Geneva and all sorts of interesting issues surrounding that.
	But listen, before we talk about that, let's start with what prior to this meeting, what was the state of U.S.-Russia relations?
	So if you recall, obviously America lived through the Russia Gate hoax.
	That didn't help U.S.-Russia relations to begin with.
	And then President Trump took a tough stance, rightly so, on Russia, and that caused diplomatic relations to be reduced in each country.
	So in America, the U.S. government closed a number of Russian facilities, their version of State Department facilities.
	And likewise, in Moscow, lots of our diplomats were sent home, actually almost all of them.
	So it's very difficult to engage in diplomatic relations when that is sort of the landscape.
	But that's what it's been like for the last couple of years.
	And I would say it's been like that because of Russian action and aggression against the United States and not anything we've done to them.
	Well, so I'm remembering a State Department, I think in April, I guess, statement, right, talking about, you know, identifying the SolarWinds hack.
	I mean, the SolarWinds hack, I know, arguably one of the most serious hacks in U.S. history, I would guess.
	Maybe, I don't know, actually, can you maybe remind us of what happened?
	Well, yeah, so basically the SolarWinds hack was a critical infrastructure hack of our cyber capabilities for some of our largest government agencies.
	And they were able to infiltrate through a back door access to emails and records and information that was sensitive.
	And it wasn't just a small amount of information.
	The reason that the SolarWinds hack was so incredible is because of the size and volume of data that our foes were able to get from that hack.
	And we're still repairing and sifting through to look at the exact damage and how we can prevent it.
	Well, and another thing I remember was mentioned, and there's been a bit of press on this, very interesting press on this since, is these, you know, Russians allegedly paying for bounties on U.S. soldiers, right?
	Yeah.
	So that was something Rick Rennell and I were running DNI at the time for President Trump.
	And this, not surprisingly, the mainstream media started receiving classified information and got the story intentionally incorrect to attack President Trump's administration and what we were trying to do.
	We knew all the intelligence.
	We briefed the president.
	We briefed the heads of his cabinet.
	And we knew that there was no Russian bounty gate as it would become to know.
	But for one year, the media ran with that.
	And if you fast forward to today, or actually maybe a month or so ago, the U.S. government and the media finally admitted that they got it wrong.
	And here's the worst part about that.
	We didn't get it wrong.
	We in the IC, when we were running the DNI, got it right.
	And we notified per proper procedure cabinet members, intelligence officials, the president, Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, because that's the job.
	That's what you're supposed to do.
	But the media didn't want us to run with that actual narrative.
	So it's just another example of how the national security interests of America are hurt when the media want to run not on the facts and just an agenda that they have.
	So the other thing that was mentioned by the State Department back in April was the Russian election interference.
	And of course this was one thing that was often, I noticed, sort of conflated with collusion sometimes as if they were the same thing.
	But what about that?
	What's the state of that activity?
	Well look, it's no surprise or classified piece of information that our adversaries interfere in our elections.
	What we try to do as the U.S. government is to reduce that or minimize that to where it's so negligible that it doesn't impact the actual outcome of the elections.
	And if you recall, based on all the reports that came out of Congress from the 2016 cycle, they did not have any noticeable impact on the actual vote tabulations for our elections.
	So that's a win for us.
	And fast forward to this last election cycle, that was another concern that we had, the same concern I should say that we had, was to prevent any foreign adversary from actually interfering with our election so that it changes the voter calculus.
	And I think we were successful again in minimizing that because you can't completely reduce it, but you can minimize it so it's so negligible that it doesn't impact the democratic process.
	So there's also, I remember reading not too long ago about there was this kind of, well, alleged sonic weapon attack by a pretty high level, from what I understand, CIA official being, you know, basically having these extremely weird symptoms that we've seen in Cuba and some other places.
	This was near the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
	So what about this kind of thing?
	So unfortunately, this is something that has been going on for a few years and it was something that I worked on when I was on the House Intelligence Committee and we took very seriously because these attacks do happen around the world as you mentioned in places like Cuba.
	It's been reported.
	And they significantly cripple the physical health of our officers who are serving overseas.
	And I'll just generally say so much so that some of them have had to been retired early because they cannot perform the duties that they signed up to do.
	So it's a big problem, Jan.
	It's not a small one, and I wish more people would pay attention to it, especially if other outfits like the Russians are doing it to us in Russia.
	It doesn't cost them a lot of money to do.
	It's pretty easy to do, unfortunately, and the damage is significant on those servicemen members that we have overseas.
	So I hope we can find a way to end those sorts of attacks.
	The other piece that I recently saw was industrial espionage.
	I saw just not a few days ago.
	This was a case that I think has been running since 2013.
	I don't know why so long, but basically a Russian national was basically selling top secret night vision equipment and stuff to the United States.
	Yeah, look, industrial espionage.
	I mean, pick your country, China, Iran, Russia, whoever.
	They've been doing that for decades, and it's going to continue, unfortunately.
	And we have to do a better job at neutralizing those types of threats when we can.
	But that's your basic tradecraft for a foreign adversary trying to attack American interests.
	Well, so, you know, the situation is, you know, you put all these things together, you know, massive hack, industrial espionage.
	I mean, there's a whole litany, and of course, many things I didn't mention just now.
	But, you know, it doesn't seem to be a very good relationship at the moment.
	I don't think so.
	And by their own admission, you know, I think President Putin has made it pretty clear that he's going to put Russia first.
	And if the U.S. suffers because of that, his past actions, whether he admits that he's participated in election fraud or the Russia hoax or Bounty Gate or what have you, his past actions and the intel that we have collected show that he just doesn't care about hurting the United States national security interest.
	And that is a significant matter for concern.
	So he called these meetings constructive.
	I believe that's the point.
	I mean, you know, once a GRU agent, always a GRU agent, right?
	He's playing to the international stage.
	He's trying to become the diplomat of the arena while behind the scenes, you know, being the sort of Hannibal Lecter of the intelligence world.
	There were also, you know, another issue, of course, is nuclear proliferation and so forth.
	And apparently, you know, following these meetings, the U.S. will go back to talking with Russia about the nuclear, the state of the nuclear arsenals.
	Yeah, the new START program or the New STAR Treaty.
	Look, I'm all for engaging diplomatically if we can reduce and eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons globally.
	It's a great policy position to take.
	But if it's backed by nothing other than empty rhetoric, it is hurtful to the United States.
	Because look, having worked on our side of the nuclear arsenal and having had access to what others can do to us, us being the United States, I have great concerns that some of those adversaries are saying what they need to say on the media front and doing something else.
	So hopefully that position will actually have some bite behind it.
	Well, and so, you know, a big, big thing that came out of these talks, you know, and this is kind of speaks to what you were saying a bit earlier, that we're kind of, I guess every country expects foreign adversaries to be, you know, I guess attacking in different ways, testing in different ways.
	In this case, President Biden seemed to draw a red line, basically identifying those 16 kind of key industries that are kind of off limits.
	If you cross this, then there will be repercussions.
	So, you know, it's just, I think a lot of people might be curious about this type of approach.
	What do you think?
	So from a substantive national security position, I couldn't disagree more fundamentally, and here's why.
	If Russia or China or Iran or what have you are collecting against the United States interest and the commander-in-chief of the United States hands them a list, basically a roadmap to say, please don't attack these 16 critical infrastructure nodes.
	If they weren't attacking them before, they're sure going to be attacking them now.
	My other problem with a list like that is that list, while the president can do whatever he wants, he's a commander-in-chief regarding classified information, that list is created and populated as a result of interagency work based on classified intelligence so that the American government knows how to perform its capabilities at a time of crisis.
	That is the whole purpose of that list.
	That's why we safeguard it and hold it close to us so our adversaries don't know where to attack or how to attack it.
	And we as the United States government then direct out our collection apparatus to say, we need to be protecting our electrical grid.
	We need to be protecting our nuclear arsenal and what have you and so on.
	And so I don't agree with that approach because it's not like Vladimir Putin's going to keep that list to himself.
	He's probably going to give it to the Iranians and the Chinese and probably put it up on russiagazetta.gov or whatever.
	And that's not helpful from a national security perspective for the United States.
	So this list isn't readily available as we speak?
	It is now because Joe Biden said, here you go.
	But we didn't disclose that list during my tenure under President Trump.
	And quite honestly, I don't think President Obama, when I was serving under him, disclosed a list like that ever.
	And that's the right move from a national security geostrategic position.
	Our adversaries shouldn't have a roadmap into how America secures its citizens.
	And furthermore, they shouldn't have a roadmap into how we defend ourselves in a time of crisis.
	And that's the purpose of those infrastructure nodes.
	So, I mean, the other question that I've seen referenced is, you know, does that mean that the other areas are fair game?
	Well, and that's a good point that I've heard other people talk about.
	Those 16 are probably some of the most important, but that's not to say there aren't other areas.
	And I'll just give you two quick examples.
	Everything we do in space and everything we do in underwater, sub-oceanic, are extremely sensitive capabilities.
	It's not classified that America and Russia and China operate in space and underwater.
	But what we do there and who we do it against and how we do it is extremely sensitive information.
	So they're already onto us in those other areas and have been for years as we are with them.
	That's not classified.
	But it impacts our ability to function in those regions or realms when you're doling out lists because they will pull off.
	Here's an example.
	Say they were targeting our missile defense systems, right?
	But Joe Biden hands them as president a list that doesn't have our missile defense systems.
	They'll pull it off and go target our energy infrastructure nodes and our electrical grid stations because they were first on the list.
	That's not helpful for our national security interest.
	Well, and so, I mean, in general, right, it seems like diplomatic relations are thawing.
	The Russian ambassador recently arrived back in the U.S. I believe the U.S. ambassador has also gone to Russia as we speak.
	So what's next here?
	I'm not sure.
	And look, from the outset, I've said having good diplomatic relations with your biggest rival is a good thing because it allows us to operate in a hard environment like Russia, right?
	We don't have great capabilities if our people and personnel aren't there.
	So I'm all for that and putting our folks back there.
	But we also have to take a vigilant approach.
	If they cross the line again, then we have to be prepared to reduce those diplomatic relations and expel them again, knowing that they will retaliate and expel us.
	And I think that's the appropriate pragmatic approach to this scenario.
	Where it goes from here, I'm not really sure.
	I don't think we're in a position to restore full diplomatic relations and have everything reopened just yet because I believe President Putin owes us some answers on many things, not just Bounty Gate or Russia Gate or the election infrastructure, but most recently the colonial pipeline attack.
	And also Nord Stream 2.
	Thank you.
	That, I think, is something that no one's talking about and is one of the biggest national security threats that has happened under President Biden's watch.
	So, you know, I definitely want to talk about Nord Stream 2 here.
	But so your position is that Russia is the biggest adversary of the U.S.?
	So I would say Russia, China, Russia, China, China, Russia, China, Russia.
	It's kind of a close 1-2-1-2 that flips back and forth depending on what specific threat you're talking about.
	But globally speaking, there are top two adversaries all day long.
	Well, so why is Nord Stream 2 so significant in your mind?
	And maybe actually before we go there, why don't you tell us what Nord Stream 2 is?
	Sure.
	So the Russian government, through their communist system, funded this huge pipeline for Germany to power the biggest country in Europe.
	And when Rick Rinnell's ambassador, Secretary Mnuchin and Larry Kudlow were working on this, they saw this as a national security threat because of the intelligence we collected on it.
	To have our biggest adversaries, or one of our biggest adversaries, power the largest economic powerhouse in Europe would cost America's national security interest.
	And what President Trump did based on our intelligence collection was he sanctioned Nord Stream 2.
	He sanctioned the Russian company that was in charge of building it and sanctioned the officials that were tied to it and effectively shut down its construction.
	Fast forward to the Biden administration, two weeks ago, three weeks ago, Joe Biden lifted those sanctions against the Russian officials and the Russian company charged with building Nord Stream II.
	And now that pipeline is going to be completed and Russia will be powering Germany and the rest of Europe through that pipeline at the expense of America's national security interests.
	Well of course Germany is one of the most influential countries in the European Union but maybe kind of to spell it out what is the national security threat exactly?
	So when you build a pipeline like that you're not just providing energy into Europe through an adversary.
	That is a number one security threat because we would want someone we trust to provide our biggest partner in Europe arguably or one of arguably with so much energy.
	Two they are building an entire infrastructure that goes from Russia into Germany and throughout Europe.
	That infrastructure is going to be used to collect against American interests and for the benefit of Russian interests.
	And that we cannot allow.
	Plus, the Russians are going to get unbelievably wealthy from the economic gains that Germany is going to have to pay them for the cost of this pipeline and the energy.
	So I think those three things are significant national security interests that impact America and our allies in Europe.
	No, two quick thoughts.
	I guess, first of all, what are Germany's other options for natural gas?
	Us.
	You know, we could come in and build them something, partner with other nations.
	There's always, I'm not an energy expert per se, but I have worked enough in the field to know that we don't have to get it from Russia.
	So, and they could do that if they wanted to, but I also think that's a sign of the relations that Germany has right now with other countries, vis-à-vis the U.S., that they're willing to go with Russia, I think, should lower their rank in our view, the U.S. view as to how big of a partner they really are with us.
	Yeah, I know a couple of years ago I had Polish Secretary of State Anders on the show talking about concerns about this particular relationship.
	Well, so, and to speaking to your other concern, like the sort of the plugging in, Russia sort of plugging into Germany directly through this infrastructure.
	Can I just say one more thing on that?
	Sorry.
	So from a DOD standpoint, right, Germany has the largest contingent of U.S. troops positioned in Germany 365 days a year anywhere in the world.
	Do you know what that costs the American taxpayer?
	We prop up 4% of Germany's GDP with our basing alone and manning infrastructure in Germany.
	So what President Trump was saying was, we don't mind giving you all of this money and manning and security, but what are we getting in return?
	What you're getting in return is you're saying, hi, Russia, you go ahead and make billions off of us at the detriment of the United States.
	And I agree with President Trump's position that we should reduce our troop structure and our manning posture in Germany.
	We don't need to be there in that large of a volume anymore.
	And I'm talking tens and tens of thousands of troops and service members are there.
	And we pay the German government 4% of their GDP.
	It's astounding.
	I didn't realize that.
	I was talking about this sort of the plugging in of the Russian infrastructure into German infrastructure directly.
	And so there's kind of an analogous situation where a Chinese billionaire, XPLA, kind of thing, bought 200 square miles of land in Texas and built a giant wind farm in a place where there isn't a lot of wind with ostensibly one of the national security issues which was identified was those windmills plugging in directly into the Texas grid.
	And in fact, they're actually stopping that.
	There's legislation that's been passed now to stop that.
	So that's quite interesting that you mentioned this.
	No, that's great.
	And I remember working on that, that specific project, because of the concerns you raised.
	We didn't want the Chinese government or the Chinese government via a cutout to have a plug-and-play system with one of our nation's biggest states and biggest users of electricity because it allows them access to our system.
	And I hope Congress does ban that.
	Yeah.
	So everything we just talked about, we have to talk about NATO.
	Oh, yeah, okay.
	Right?
	Yeah.
	So NATO, you know, there's a lot of people that are saying NATO's outdated, not needed anymore.
	I mean, I've seen that type of commentary all over the place lately.
	So I think from a policy position, NATO is and can be very useful.
	I think from an economic position, NATO has been sucking the U.S. dry for too many years.
	So I believe there's an appropriate balance that can be struck.
	And I do agree with the getting all the other European nations and our allies to 2% of their GDP.
	I mean, going back to Germany, Germany pays less than 1% of it to NATO.
	And they're Europe's biggest economy.
	That just doesn't make any sense, especially after the amount of security and infrastructure we, the United States, provide them in the form of our military.
	But I do think NATO, as an alliance, has an excellent use for America's national security interests.
	Right now, it just costs us too much.
	Well, and so, I mean, this is kind of, I guess, beyond the scope of our discussion today.
	But one suggestion was to kind of redirect NATO's focus to the Pacific.
	Oh, wow.
	I hadn't thought about that.
	I would be open to that because some of our biggest threats are now in the Indo-Pacific theater.
	And so, yeah, that's actually a good idea.
	So with respect to these 16 key U.S. infrastructures, so what could the U.S. do in response if these are indeed cyber-attacked?
	Well, it would seem that President Biden gave this list as sort of a red line, like you, President Putin, and the Russian Federation cannot touch these 16 sectors.
	From that standpoint, that's good if there's backing to it, as I said earlier.
	And if they would cross it, I would think that they would immediately go over the top with sanctions for the Russian Federation, for individuals, for companies, for anyone involved in those sorts of attack.
	You'd probably have a reversal in the thawing of diplomatic relations.
	That's always your number two after sanctions.
	And then you'd want to have the Russian Federation pay an economic price, and that would be in the form of tariffs and sort of hurt their economy.
	This is the same strategy that President Trump took against China when they hurt our national security interest.
	And so I would hope that that red line has that kind of backing behind it.
	But I guess, you know, we'll just have to wait and see.
	There are sanctions actually being rolled out.
	You know, as we speak, in fact, the Russian ambassador is being exactly around Navalny.
	And the Russian ambassador is saying this isn't, I can't remember exactly, this isn't what I was expecting or this isn't what we were expecting so soon after the meetings.
	So that's interesting.
	So having worked on sanctions at the White House and having run some of those procedures, those take time.
	So it's not like the Biden administration went to the meeting and rolled out and said, we're going to sanction these folks.
	Those have been in the works for months because that's how long it takes the U.S. interagency to get the requisite amount of intelligence to sanction individuals.
	We have to meet the legal threshold.
	We can't just wave a wand and have the president sign it and say, you're sanctioned.
	It has to meet certain thresholds at the Treasury Department, at the Justice Department, and at the intelligence community.
	So they've had those in the works.
	I guess they've always told me there's no such thing as a coincidence in U.S. government, and I would imagine that that's been in the plan.
	And I'm okay with more sanctions on Russia.
	I've always been okay with that because they have not been abiding by the U.S. diplomatic norms that we would want them to.
	So, and I understand there's still actually Americans imprisoned in Russia at the moment.
	Yeah, and I think that's the biggest tragedy of all.
	Trevor Reid and Paul Whelan are two former Marines who have been, I believe, and we did under the Trump administration, wrongfully in prison in Russia under extended prison sentences.
	And when I was handling the hostage portfolio for President Trump, we made that a priority to return Americans home.
	And I think the Biden administration needs to do the exact same thing.
	I don't know if their names were mentioned in the talks with Putin.
	I don't know where we are, but returning Americans has to be a priority, and it is a national security interest for Americans.
	And unless that happens, we cannot give the Russians more avenues to impact American national security interests like the Biden administration has done with Nord Stream II.
	We need our former service members home with their families.
	Well, okay, so at this point with respect to Russia, what are your recommendations aside from continuing with sanctions, as you mentioned earlier, and making sure that the red lines are adhered to?
	What are your recommendations, vis-à-vis Russia?
	Sure, I mean, as a national security guy, I would say the number one recommendation would be to continue and re-emphasize a focus on intelligence collection against all things Russia, whether we do it here in the U.S. or through our allies in Europe or in Russia itself or from space or wherever.
	That has to drive our decision-making process on how we treat the Russian Federation.
	So the White House sets the priorities for intelligence collection, period, based upon the recommendations of the intelligence community and how the geostrategic outlook looks at any given time.
	If they don't make it a priority, then instead of looking at Russia, we might be looking at white supremacy and DOD, which seems to be a top priority for this administration that I disagree with.
	So you can't collect on everything.
	Everything cannot be a number one target.
	Only certain things can be, and that would be where I start, because everything is driven from the intelligence collection standpoint.
	Fascinating.
	So you're saying basically intelligence collection on China, intelligence collection on Russia.
	And then once you harness or harvest that intelligence, right, you can say, okay, we know they're doing all these things wrong.
	We need to sanction these companies, these individuals.
	This is how you legally and lawfully cripple their economy.
	Because unlike Russia and China, the U.S. operates under a system of laws and ethics.
	We can't just break them because we want to punish our adversaries.
	We have to meet the requirements that the legislature has put out.
	And I agree with that.
	But you can't do that without the collection emphasis that we need.
	And once you do that, then you issue those sanctions.
	Then you look at tariffs and trade imbalances.
	Then you look at how our defense department assists these governments.
	What sales are we giving them?
	What products are we giving Russia and China from the military perspective?
	And should we curb that or full stop that?
	So those are multiple things we can do with the Russians and the Chinese, and we should be looking at them.
	So any thoughts on the alleged intelligence provided by the alleged high-level Chinese defector, allegedly with DNI?
	You know, that's...
	Oh, sorry, sorry, the Defense Intelligence Agency, yes.
	So look, it's not classified that, you know, people defect, and we want big-level defectors, and they want big-level defectors, right?
	It's happened in our history.
	And I hope that this defector is real and that he is providing this high-level intelligence that the media is saying he can provide.
	I don't have any access to it anymore, so I don't know the current situation, but that's the type of intelligence collection I was referring to that helps the United States national security apparatus and how we make decisions to protect ourselves.
	And so I got my fingers crossed that he's a real guy.

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