Nov. 17, 2025 - Judging Freedom - Judge Andrew Napolitano
28:05
Alastair Crooke : Russians Believe Europe Wants War
|
Time
Text
Hi, everyone.
Judge Andrew Napolitano here for Judging Freedom.
Today is Tuesday, November 18th, 2025.
Aleister Crook will be with us in just a moment on why he understands after spending some time in Moscow, Russia believes Europe wants war.
But first this.
History tells us every market eventually falls.
Currencies collapse.
And look at where we are now.
38 trillion in national debt.
Stocks at record highs defying gravity.
So what happens next?
Groceries, gas, housing, everything's going up.
And this dollar, it buys less every day.
When the system breaks, your stocks won't save you and your dollars won't either.
But one thing will, gold.
I've said it on my show for years.
Gold survives collapse.
Central bankers know this and billionaires know it.
That's why they're buying more.
Is it too late to buy or is it just the right time?
Call my friends at Lear Capital to find out.
Ask questions.
Get the free information.
There's no pressure.
And that's why I buy my gold and silver from Lear.
And right now, you can get up to $20,000 in bonus metals with a qualified purchase.
Call 800-511-4620 or go to LearjudgeNap.com today.
Before we, Alistair, welcome here.
Before we start, I just want to let everyone watching and listening to us know that because of the outage at Cloud Fair, we are currently not being shown on Twitter slash X. If you have friends that regularly watch us on Twitter slash X as opposed to YouTube, you might want to tell them they can catch us live on YouTube.
And of course, the interview with Aleister Crook will be posted as soon as we finish it.
So Alistair, welcome here.
Why do you understand that the Russians believe that Europe wants war with them?
You'll have to separate this question.
It's a very nuanced question, and it's not a very simple one.
But why wouldn't they?
I mean, just yesterday, the German defense minister, Boris Pestorius, came out and he said, clearly, war with Russia is going to happen in 2028 or next year.
And we have to build and prepare for war.
All of the Europeans are shouting about war, war, and we need to have a war.
But what I mean about nuanced is the sort of sense that, first of all, I mean, you have to ask yourself the question.
I mean, is this just grandstanding?
Is this just bluster by desperate Europeans, if you like, to hide their own disastrous position?
Or is it something real?
Or finally, could it become and create and gain the momentum that it does become something serious?
I remember when I was dealing with Afghanistan all those years ago, the war then, the Afghan war against Russia, Soviet Union, I mean, it became a sort of a Hollywood project.
It had a momentum that was unstoppable.
It just went on.
It was a sort of epic Hollywood production.
And so these things can get out of control, become self-reinforcing and get out of control.
Because personally, this is subjective, but as I look at it, I mean, Europe doesn't have the money to go to war with Russia.
Britain is broke.
France is broke.
Germany is in financial difficulties.
Europe is fiscally constrained.
When they talk about 700 billion to be spent or 800 billion on the rearm Europe project, I mean, it's debt, new debt that they're proposing.
And, you know, this requires, are all member states going to sign up to this or are some not?
the issue of defense um policy the issue of weapons is not the preserve of von der leyen and the um the the the presidency there it is the concern of the council and the member states the sovereign member states have to and that is something that they have to get the support of their their their problems So is it realistic?
I mean, this is what you have to look at.
And this is something I talked actually with the Iranians because the previous foreign minister, Abd al-Assyan, who was killed in that helicopter crash, always said, how do you define that fine balance between deterrence and diplomacy?
It's quite difficult to draw the correct line because if you do too much deterrence, you might invite attack, aggression against you.
Alternatively, if you're too weak, you might invite an attack because you're seen to be weak.
Too much diplomacy or too much deterrence, both can pose a disadvantage.
And what is very visible across Europe is the world, the threat of war against Russia this year, next year.
Europe doesn't have the manpower.
It doesn't have, if you like, the weapons.
The armories are virtually empty.
It doesn't have, if you like, it's not trained for the type of warshare that is taking place.
They wouldn't be able to possibly sustain the casualties.
So what does this mean?
And this is what I call, you know, you have to do due diligence about what's happening in Europe, because you have to ask, so are they really talking about going to war?
Or is this something like Pearl Harbor, that there will be some attack that will take place, you know, in the Baltics, an aircraft, a Russian aircraft down or a ship attacked or something like this, which is intended to bring the United States into a conflict with Russia, but it's not intended because they can't,
for Europeans to do the attack.
But it's still, as I say, naused, because The second question is, okay, you decide perhaps there isn't the means, perhaps there isn't the resources to put the war, but what kind of deterrence?
Do you have to have nuclear element to it to deter?
Because it is true that Russia has lost deterrence.
Europeans are not frightened, it seems, so frightened of war.
But they seem, you know, you say, oh, well, tomahawks fly, then there'll be, you know, immediate nuclear response or something like that.
You can say that, but that will take you to big war.
So what is the sort of level of deterrence and what is necessary, if you like, to still deter without starting you on the path to big war?
So these are big questions that have to be addressed here in Russia, and they're compounded.
They're compounded, first of all, by the sense that no one, Trump, you know, Putin called him capricious a little time ago.
Well, it's got beyond capricious.
I mean, he's, you know, he's quite wacky now.
I mean, we don't know from one moment to another.
I mean, nor can anyone really predict what is going to come next from Trump.
So that sort of sense obviously makes outsiders more guarded about the future.
How you're painting a picture of a Europe very weak and even dangerous and incapable of defending itself.
What does this mean?
If worse came to worse, the US would have to come in?
I don't believe the US would ever come again.
They've had enough of getting engaged in European wars and entanglements.
I don't think so.
I don't think the Pearl Harbor scenario, Churchill pulling America into the war, I don't think that's possible at all.
But they might think it's possible.
That's what has to be calculated.
I mean, when I talk about Russia needs to do the due diligence, I mean, this is the due diligence to think about, you know, what it happens.
They also have to think, I mean, I would imagine they would have to think about the fact that supposing there's a financial crisis in America or in Europe, because we seem to be at the edge of a volcano one way or another.
Would that make life even, would that make the United States more erratic, more aggressive, or more willing to make concessions and come to some sort of understanding with Russia?
Well, my money would be on the latter.
It would, you know, there would be anger and the desire for diversions, and that would mean a sort of, rather a sort of lashing out to divert from a financial crisis, which might cause all sorts of internal political problems.
But it's the same problem in Europe.
I mean, we have a completely bifurcated economy, what I call the cornucopia of sort of ever-progressing monetary gains from the stock market for the 10%, and for the sort of the rest of society, a sort of slow degradation of their standard of living, getting closer and closer to the sort of paycheck to paycheck month by month status.
So all of these things have to go into that question.
How do you deter by what measure?
And will it be effective in these sort of uncertain conditions in Europe and the United States?
Wow.
How much longer do you think the war in Ukraine will go on and the Europeans will continue to, I guess, borrow money to pay for American arms?
And secondly, will they steal Russian government deposits in European banks?
Well, they're desperate to do the latter.
They're desperate to, I mean, there's a huge momentum to steal, you know, 140 billion to keep the Ukraine conflict ticking over or going.
But they really don't, I mean, the situation is that Europe doesn't really have any alternative because it knows it can't raise by individual states providing the money.
They won't do it.
I mean, some will do it, but other states won't.
It needs a majority decision to raise money in that way.
So the easy way is to steal the money.
But to steal the money will create huge legal problems and huge risk problems for the Euro.
To do that, I mean, first of all, Belgium will open itself to legal action, even outside Belgium.
It could happen in Hong Kong or some other part where Euroclear has an offices.
And my understanding is Euroclear has something like 40 trillion of central bank deposits on hold with it.
What would happen to those 40 trillion of deposits if they stole the 140 billion from Russia?
I mean, this would be, I mean, and what would happen to Belgium?
I mean, because the Belgian government might find itself liable.
I mean, the government as a state would find itself liable for much of this money.
So it's by no means clear that in the end, I mean, they've put it off now till December.
There will be a European heads of government meeting in December, finally to try and persuade the Belgians that somehow Europe will guarantee them and you can go safely, we can take your money and use it to prop up.
The second part of your question about Ukraine, personally, I think that the whole, we're thinking it in the wrong way now, by which I mean, you know, what's happening on the battlefield, of course, is now much clearer and predictable in many ways.
However, what is not predictable is what is happening inside the Ukrainian politics and society in response to what is happening on the battlefield?
Because ultimately, this is going to be, I've often said, you know, what's going to happen in Ukraine is like going bankrupt.
You go along in this slowly, slowly, slowly, and then very fast.
And then there is a sort of a complete and sudden cascade.
And sentiment, I think, can change quite dramatically against, you know, the embezzlement, the corruption evidence as has been shown for those all around Zelensky.
I mean, he's really affected the population.
But how much?
Are they ready to take on the hardliners in Kiev?
I mean, don't forget, you know, when I say we, I'm talking about the Europeans, but particularly the British, put the people into power after Maidan, but they'd started that in 49 because these were the old stay-behind structures that existed of hardline anti- of course, Soviets at that time, but anti-Russian feeling.
Ukrainians were part of the stay-behind project.
And so some of these people, much later, put into government, put into politics, but increasingly into intelligence, into security, into the military command, so that there could never be a compromise with Russia.
They were put in there to block a compromise with Russia.
Now, what happens to those people?
Will the Ukrainians deal with this themselves?
Might there be some action by Ukrainians saying, you know, finally, you know, this is over.
It's too late.
It's gone.
We've got to do something.
And these people, but it'll be not easy.
It might turn into something very bloody.
But, you know, if you looked at it from the outside, I mean, you know, there are not many alternatives.
Either those people have to go one way, or shall we say another, or, I mean, you have to find people that can take over, that are capable of diplomacy.
And, you know, they have to be able to talk to each other.
I don't think they can settle everything.
I'm not a believer that there's a political solution.
In the present situation, I don't believe a political solution is even possible without a paradigm change, a big paradigm change altogether.
But then the only thing is possible is to agree boundaries.
You stay within this boundary.
You don't go to NATO.
You don't do this or something.
Stay within this boundary.
We can keep to our boundaries.
Now, I think that is possible, but it wouldn't be possible to do it with the hardliners.
I mean, you know, they've been in this mode of thinking since the 1930s, or if not earlier.
I mean, they're not going to change overnight.
So this is another question that has, when we're talking about deterrence and all of this, how do you manage and how do you deal with this in such a way that you facilitate not only the military victory, but the political situation that follows it?
Let me switch to Gaza and the United Nations.
Were you surprised at the abstentions in the Security Council by Russia and China over the Witkoff, Jared Kushner, Donald Trump, so-called ceasefire, Board of Peace, Tony Blair nonsense that now appears as if it's coming?
Well, I mean, personally, I would have preferred them to veto it, China and Russia.
But I have to acknowledge, I mean, all of the Arab states supported the project.
I mean, the Sunni Arab, the Gulf states, all of them supported this.
So it would have been difficult for Russia and China to go completely against the Arab consensus, I think.
But the second thing I would say is I imagine, it is my imagination that in Moscow here, it will probably be thought, look, phase two, phase three of this project are going nowhere.
There's no acceptance by these Arab states.
They're quite happy to sign on to the project in an abstract form, but they're even reluctant to send troops.
They're reluctant to get involved with it in any serious way.
So why don't we let it go ahead and let it die of its own inevitable dynamics and that it won't go anywhere.
And I think they can be pretty convinced that it won't.
And indeed, even in Israel, the dissensions about it are profound and deep.
So good luck if Mr. Trump has now made himself the president of Gaza.
I mean, we can all, all we can do is say, well, good luck with that boy.
I want to go back to Europe and Russia, if I could, since you just spent nearly a week in Moscow and you had the privilege of addressing some rather significant people in Russian government politics, culture, military intelligence and society.
Are you able to put your finger on a collective pulse if there is such a thing?
What do they think of Donald Trump?
You know, it would be easy to say that they, you know, dismiss him or something.
No, I think Russians as a whole try and understand people deeply.
And I think they have a better hold on understanding Trump than many in Europe who either have, you know, follow this, you know, the syndrome that they have of, you know, a complete derangement about Trump, or they're avid supporters of him.
And I would think that people here are looking, you know, he is unpredictable and becoming more unpredictable.
That makes everyone uneasy, very uneasy, because they would like predictability, at least the modicum of predictability, and that doesn't seem to be much in evidence.
So I think they are concerned how this will, you know, that this could easily again, you know, if something, some, if there was, I mean, what is likely to happen from the Europeans?
A false flag, a decapitation strike, some sort of assassination attempt.
I mean, there is reports of an assassination attempt even today and yesterday in Moscow.
I mean, not against Putin or anything, but against a leading figure.
So, I mean, I don't know it's true.
I mean, I haven't seen it confirmed.
But I mean, there is a sense that Europe can do something stupid, do something to provoke false flag, attack on a nuclear, you know, in Zaporizhian nuclear power plant to try and pull America away from its reluctance to get involved in another European conflict and to pull it in.
So I think they have a fairly good idea.
However, I mean, the lesson from Trump is clear.
I mean, that apart from what I'm saying is they try to understand people's psychology very deeply.
But apart from that, they understand that it cannot, anything said by Trump cannot be taken as meaning his capability of doing it.
They understand that he does not have agency in this to he can say things, but he does not have agency to implement them or to carry them through all the political ability, not only just to implement in a formalized way, but an agreement would need to be implemented.
And what they have seen is no beginnings, no effort to start implementing an agreement.
And the other thing to say is here we are, you know, after a long period of time, there are no real channels of communication.
All the track two things are dead, of gone.
Yes, there are one or two people, you know, who you can probably talk to and Russians can talk to, but they don't have either the legitimacy or the weight in Washington to bring about a shift in political thinking.
You've got to have someone who has, you know, the standing as well as the understanding, but the weight and legitimacy to, if you like, to come and say, no, we've got this wrong or you've got this wrong.
And that people will say, okay, we have to listen and hear what he's saying.
But at the moment, you know, everyone, so I don't believe, as I said, there's any prospect for a political solution at the moment, even if there is a meeting in Hungary or not.
I mean, I don't think there will be probably, but I don't think, I mean, it won't lead to anything because, you know, it's much more complex and there is no sign that the White House has thought through the question of how a political, the next stage of a political outcome would be handled, how it would be.
So Sergei Lavrov and Marco Rubio do not speak with each other regularly.
If you drive not far from where you are now to the U.S. Embassy, which is a monstrosity, it's probably still 95 or 98% empty.
Yeah.
No, there's nothing.
There is nothing, you know, there's a formalized.
And, you know, that was all untrue in a way, you know, that, oh, you know, they were so horrified, Rubio was so horrified with, you know, the outrageous piece of paper that was submitted by Lavrov to him.
It wasn't.
It was just setting out precisely the things that have been repeated time and time again since the 14th of June 23 when Putin laid out the conditions to move to a political solution.
And just to be, you know, to repeat about it again, this is not about territory.
Russia wants to have a security understanding that is comprehensive for the whole of European security, to have, if you like, boundaries and understandings between, if you like, a Central Asian, a Eurasian security architecture and a NATO security architecture, which would be much smaller than it is now.
Aster Kruk, thank you, my dear friend.
I know it's very late where you are.
Thank you for staying up, giving us your time, always being faithful to the viewers of this program, no matter where on the planet you may be.
We'll look forward to chatting with you early next week.
Thank you so much.
All the best.
Thank you.
Safe travels to you.
Coming up later today at one this afternoon, a new guest, Sheriff David Hathaway, the sheriff of Santa Cruz County, Arizona, but a 30-year veteran of the Drug Enforcement Administration.