All Episodes
Previous Next
July 3, 2025 - Jim Fetzer
01:02:24
Real Deal SPECIAL (2 July 2025): Bill Binney & Katherine Horton: UNDER ATTACK!
| Copy link to current segment

Time Text
Yeah.
This is Jim Petzer with another real deal special interview with a couple I can now refer to as Bill and Kate the Shrew, because she was characterized as a figure in Shakespeare's play, well known, for having apparently spoken too much.
Today we're going to be hearing more from Bill Benny of NSA fame.
And of course, we're talking about Dr. Catherine Horton, who has led the crusade in the courts against targeted individuals where the two of them are perhaps the most prominent today or being subjected to this kind of torture.
Catherine, before we turn to Bill and everything he wants to report, would you want to give us an update about the kind of experience to which you and he are being subjected?
Yeah, so what is ongoing is really life.
So two things.
We are being assaulted with directed energy weapons and a new type of modern stealth weapons, which are called pulsed energy projectiles.
So as I'm sitting in this office, there are loud impact sounds every time I come in here in the ceiling on objects around me, sometimes really just feet away from my head.
And these are very loud impact sounds that seem to impact in the ceiling and the walls from a bus.
So it's coming from a drone.
Now, a shot like that, when you hear just how loud these impact sounds are, a shot like that to the head is instantly lead-liberally.
So my life is being threatened continually.
Meanwhile, Bill is being tortured quite intensely, including today, as he's trying to give this presentation with the non-consensual chip implants that were put into his leg by the Maryland hospital that amputated his lower legs.
So he's being algorithmically pain tortured and the pain goes from a mild dull ache all the way to absolutely excruciating, right?
I mean, we can.
Yeah, pretty much.
It can get pretty bad at times.
Yeah, it's really extreme torture.
Sometimes they pain shock him in his left leg, then right leg, and alternate left, right, left, right.
So we have many, many instances that we've video recorded where we can prove that this is not natural pain.
It's being algorithmically done and so on.
So this is going on in the background.
But one big news I wanted to announce is that Bill and I will try to make contact with the Secret Service again over the next two or three weeks.
We will be going to DC to try to talk to the Secret Service director, Sean Curran, about what he needs to know to protect his President Trump and the other protectees regarding directed energy weapons and all the neural weapons as well.
And to try to hand in information about the assassination attempts in the past that have now become very relevant with James Comey announcing the next one with his little seashell skit.
So all this is very relevant.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Seven, give me a break.
Yeah.
That was some natural, it's so unofficial.
I could not believe it.
Yeah.
But what is worrying, though, is that I've personally found evidence that indicates that the FBI was involved at Butler.
I mean, you know, all the dodgy stuff about Ryan Bruce is known and the other guy, Wim Miller, or whatever he was called, they had multiple passports.
Ryan Bruce was a CIA mercenary recruiter in Afghanistan for Ukraine.
So there are all these ties to CIA and the FBI.
So when the former FBI director announces the next assassination attempt, no matter how ridiculous, unfortunately it has to be taken seriously.
So that's where we stand.
We'll be going.
Hopefully this time we can actually get through to Sean Curran, Director Sean Curran, because I've been bounced by the lower ranks three times in a row.
But that's it from us.
So we'll be at it that way.
By my count, there have been a dozen attempts on Trump, one of which involved using a drone at Mar-a-Lago to fire into his bedroom.
And had they not changed the glass to bulletproof the week before, he wouldn't be with us today.
Now, the worrying thing exactly about that, that I have read about that.
Now, if they use the type of drones they have on us, they are visually camouflaged.
So really, to the naked eye, they are invisible.
But yet our spectrum analysis show that something is emitting a signal that does a figure eight above our house.
So, you know, it's a fixed-wing drone.
And then if they fire a pulsed energy projectile, bulletproof glass might not actually impede it.
So certain frequencies go straight through.
So if they repeat the same thing with a pulsed energy projectile, the U.S. Air Force Lockheed Martin, that is, one known to be involved in these attacks on victims.
Well, you know, nobody would see the drone coming unless there's continuous spectrum analysis monitoring.
They mean it's not energy everywhere.
Bullets, as it were, just can be just as fatal as real bullets.
Yes, absolutely.
Yeah.
Well, I wish you too.
Well, I've been so concerned for a long time about your safety and security.
Having interviewed you before when you were under attack and you're using, you know, sheets of metal to protect yourself, well, we could hear the impact.
I mean, it was just astonishing, Catherine, what you are having to endure.
And now for you and Bill to be going through this, it's just grossly just and an atrocity.
Yeah.
I mean, Pete HeckSetter is now in charge.
Trump is the commander-in-chief.
They can reign these people in very quickly.
They can be threatened.
I mean, all these people have, you know, children.
Some of them have mortgages, the lower ranks, you know, there's ways to go after them.
They do live here.
The drones land in the U.S. They fly over the U.S. Everybody can be ferreted out.
They're U.S. military drones, don't you suspect?
I mean, that would be my inference.
Yeah, yeah.
And Lockheed Martin is also known to be involved.
Lockheed Martin's offices can be raided.
Their assets can be stripped.
You know, they can be charged terrific and total damages.
To control it if the government is so disposed.
I just worry that the government is on the right side because our government is so often on the wrong.
It's very troubling, very troubling.
But I guess today Bill wanted to bring some positive news how all these people can be found much more efficiently.
And the domineering shrew will shut up today and it's all going to be about big data analysis.
Bill, it's just wonderful to have this opportunity to speak with you again.
Got a lot on your mind.
Well, yeah, and part of the part of the whole idea is that the government and its different databases already has all the data necessary to do and discover everything basically in the world.
The problem is there's so much of that data, they can't get through it to find it.
That's the real problem.
Super abundant.
So they got to have search algorithms that enable them to find and often it's key words, right?
Well, that's what they're using now, but that's not effective.
What that does is that gives you an avalanche of material to look at and you can't find it.
I mean, assassination.
Okay.
The people use the word assassination under all kinds of contexts, you know, and most of them are dribble, you know, 99% or more.
So I get it.
Tell us more how you would improve this situation.
It goes back to, you know, the metadata, really, because that's how I devised it back in the 1990s to do.
And it goes even back to the original training and work in the Soviet military problem, you know, where you worked out networks that were things that worked together.
So you work out networks equivalent to social media, social networks, you know, the same kind of thing showing structure or people who were involved in a related activity or could be subsetted into different activities, but you could isolate them by their connectivity in terms of communications or bank transfers or anything like that.
You could pull them all together.
So in other words, and this exists, this was done automatically by the software I left them in 2001.
Automatically pulled together.
Now, the question is, do you really want to go get it?
If you do, the data is already there.
And it'll build, all you have to do is tag it and say, give me this net or this relationship, this social network, and give me the timeline of its activity for whatever period of time you want to look at.
And it'll give you a timeline of all the transactional relationships that are going on in that community.
And if there's any content with that, which there is plenty of it, you can point to it and say, I want to read this one.
I want to see what this one says.
I want to see what they're saying here.
You know?
You're talking about an electronic sociogram, you know, where they talk about relation between individuals who's talking with whom, how frequently.
And you're telling me, you worked this out in 2001.
So for two decades, they've had this and they're not using it.
Well, they, whatever, see, they don't have the way to smartly select the networks to look at or how to.
And they made one fundamental mistake that I told them not to do.
This was back with Obama and his big, big data initiative.
I said, you cannot, you only look within two hops away from or two degrees of separation in this social networking of a bad guy to see anything that's suspicious.
That's the zone of suspicion.
But to go through the second hop, you never go through a government agency or department or a business.
Because if you do, you scoop in totally unrelated people.
And I knew that that's what they were keying on when Obama didn't say that because the NSA was happy with that.
Why?
Because think of, okay, one example.
Your first hop is to Google.
All right.
How many people then have a hop directly to Google?
And they're then included as a second hop.
So that means virtually everybody on the planet.
Billions, yes.
That's why NSA was happy about it.
That was their key.
So they were happy.
That meant they could do anything they wanted.
Yeah, it gives them free reign and with no constraints if that is the program they're adopting.
But they're going to use it selectively.
They're going to use your subroutine within to actually accomplish their goals, don't you imagine?
They did that.
I've already figured out they did that with the IR using the IRS because the IRS has direct access to this too.
They used the IRS back when I can't remember her name was targeting Tea Party groups and religious groups trying to get 501c3 status and then do some political activity as well.
Well, that's how I remember one person was being interrogated by somebody, one of the committees in Congress, and they had said that the IRS had asked them, what is their relationship with a specific person?
And they gave a name.
Do you mean the Tea Party leader, the gun lady?
The person being interviewed by the IRS.
The IRS asked them, what is your relationship with this specific person who was in the Tea Party?
Oh.
The person who was in the Tea Party.
But the point is, not, well, is there a relationship, but how did the IRS know that she had a relationship?
Well, the way they did it is because they're part of the SOD Special Operations Division of the Department of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and they have access directly into the NSA database where they have this entire network where everybody can look in and see who you are, who you're talking to, who you're communicating, emails, who you email, short message, who you send money to, all of that.
Just a moment.
So for the average jokes that they understand, are you telling us that the people in the IRS have access, unsupervised access to the NSA database and can look up everybody's emails going back to 2001?
Through the IC Reach program.
Through the IC Reach program.
so people need to take that in.
So, the IRS, it's not just NSA and SBI, but the IRS and factor in the sort of people who are hired to work for the IRS, maybe not the smartest buttons, maybe not the most, you know, the people of highest integrity, maybe, maybe they're not very well bettered.
They can read anybody's email in the world, not just everybody in the US, but in the world going back to 2001.
Is that correct?
Full content?
Yep, that's possible.
I mean, access to the database.
Yeah.
I mean, that's the reason.
Yeah, go ahead.
Well, that's the reason the FBI got admonished for having 250,000 violations of the FISA law because they went into that database 250,000 times.
And I think that's probably only about a tenth of what they did.
So, you know, over 250,000 times they violated the use of that database.
And it's only because NSA uses Executive Order 1233, Section 23C, which says you can basically say if you're going, it's legitimate for them to go after a trunk line, could be a 10 gigabit line, you know, like 64 fibers in one line and capture on that if you're looking for a criminal or like an international drug dealer or something like that.
And then they capture the whole line and they can search it, okay?
And it says they can do that.
Well, that's a direct violation of the Constitution because they're pulling in data on U.S. citizens that isn't allowed under a warrant that was not warranted.
And they use it then through the FBI, the CIA, DHS, basically almost all of the intelligence agencies use that database directly through using the IC REACH program.
And Bill, I'm willing to venture that the vast majority of the purposes were political.
They weren't legitimate.
They weren't.
That's what I say too, because originally this was called a Cheney blood oath.
In other words, Cheney was running this thing.
And of course, he was the guy who wanted to know all about his political opponent.
And so his database gave him everybody.
Very nasty.
Can the domineering shrew ask a question here?
So that's two questions, actually, follow-up question.
Number one, apart from the IRS, is there any other kind of non-intelligence agency sort of agency that can access everybody's emails and contents?
Non-US, you mean?
Well, actually, yeah.
Yes.
The five eyes.
The five eyes also use that.
The five eyes can access it as well.
Five eyes, and I'll bet there's that six eye known as Israel, the Mosa.
I guarantee you.
Right, but it's also five eyes plus because the BND can do it.
Well, they have, I'm sure they subset it, like they have certain limitations on access to that by country.
They probably do it by country.
Limitations.
If you're really close, you can see everything.
The less close you are, the less you get to see, but you get to see what is relevant to your issue.
Because I'm going somewhere with this.
So people need to realize that not just the thousands and thousands, 38,000 people work in the FBI, a huge chunk of them can access the IC REACH program.
Then there's the CIA.
Then there's the IRS.
Then there are foreign countries in the five eyes.
So the British Crown can access everybody's emails, which includes Donald Trump, by the way, and his signal chats.
So you don't need to leave the signal chats.
Thousands of people, including low-level moron muggles in the IRS, can read his signal chat.
You're basically telling me that Five Eyes in Israel sees all of our emails.
They have access to everything about every American.
They know every damn thing they could possibly want to know about all of us.
Yes.
In fact, they have access not just to every American, everybody in the world, because Bill just said the NSA.
For the American audience, bringing home the point.
Yeah, Bill, please continue.
Well, I was going to say the point is that the IC REACH program is the interrogation program that gets you the most access in the data.
Okay.
The X key score is the one that others use.
Like Germany.
Germany.
There's like nine, at least nine other countries that are involved in this program that I could see or from open source, I get an idea.
Japan, Germany, Denmark, you know, probably Sweden.
Am I right in assuming that IC reach is not being supervised?
You once told me that.
No, it's not.
You mean oversight.
Oversight, yeah.
There is the only oversight that happens is oversight of NSA analysts.
NSA analysts.
So FBI analysts and IRS agents are not, there's no oversight.
There's only overlook, right?
No, they don't even.
Let me offer an illustration.
I'll bring home a point.
It seems to me that therefore this technique could be used to identify child pornography rings.
I mean, these child pornographers, they swap their photos and their videos and maybe the children they're molesting.
That means this gives them the information to blackmail huge numbers of figures across this, but they all have it.
They all have it.
So how does this work, Mill?
Who gets precedence?
Is there a pecking order?
Does Mossad get to go first?
And then CIA?
I know the answer to that.
Yes, there is a pecking order.
And I can also tell you that British intelligence is above CIA.
Yes, there is a pecking order.
Who's blackmailing you?
Is Mossad not above MI6, MI5?
Is Mossad not at the top?
I do not know the pecking order now.
Yeah, no, there is the pecking order.
And you can track the pecking order by their covert symbols, the actual, you know, because everything is signed Crown Corporation.
So the Crown, the CIA is really the Crown in America.
That's a better acronym for them.
But the headquarters of that branch, I mean, the British branch is in London.
So MI6 has complete superiority.
In fact, there's an interview with Sir John Scarlett, former chief of MI6.
He was chief of MI6 at the time he gave the interview, I believe.
And he said that MI6 is one of those few intelligence agencies in the world that can conduct operations anywhere in the world.
So they sit above all the other intelligence agencies.
What about the FSB and the Mossad?
It seemed to me the two of them are super superior too.
Am I wrong?
No, the FSB is also a Masonic organization.
And in fact, Vladimir Putin and Sir John Scarlett have been working in the past together.
From what I'm aware of, MI6 whistleblowers have said that at some point in time during the Cold War, there was a plan to infiltrate Putin out of Russia.
And Sir John Scarlett was involved in that.
So the two are very closely linked.
You know, it goes back decades during the Cold War.
So the Cold War is really a lie.
It's just one big Masonic business plan.
That's the best to think about it.
It seems to me if everyone knows everything about everyone, we also know everything about the Israelis or are they out of touch?
They have so much security that we can't penetrate.
Bill, can this program access everything that goes on in Israel as well, including Mossad?
I would think so, yes.
Because it's a matter of the entire switching network that's infiltrated.
They have over embedded in either hardware software or both.
This was back 10 years ago.
They had over 50,000 implants in the network worldwide.
Not only are the prospects for blackmail extortion and the like boundless, but the voyeurism, the peeping, the scintillation of spying on anyone you want.
It's rather stunning.
So if they want to know who Brittany Spears is betting today, they can zoom right in.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Especially if she has a TV in her room.
Or a computer or something.
Madonna will do anything if it's not on film.
Yeah, yeah.
But the way to think about, you know, when they say if you have nothing to hide, you've got nothing to fear.
From a systems analysis point of view, that's the wrong way to analyze the system.
A better way is to say what different types of business plans can you generate with these capabilities.
And then you figure out you have one very low return business plan of finding criminals.
And then you have an endless number of business plans based on blackmail, you know, voyeurism, sexual stuff.
And that's a gift that keeps on giving.
So then it becomes a monetary trade-off of I'm going to give up those business plans that are worth hundreds of billions of dollars versus one that doesn't have very many returns, like finding a bunch of terrorists that you're running yourselves, maybe, as the cabal.
So people wouldn't know why an agency might want to take them out.
I mean, they got all their medical records too, see?
So if they induce a heart attack, somebody's inconvenient, they know exactly how to set it up.
But it appears so do all the other intel agencies.
This is kind of wild, Bill.
This is wild.
Well, I mean, there are ways to fix it.
Tell them.
That's part of what we want to tell them when we go up to DP.
Yeah, yeah.
Maybe you'd want to spell it out here and now because I do.
To a certain degree, I do.
I do, Jim.
You know, the point, and I used an example.
This one is getting into, going to get into the cash, I think.
Yeah.
It's a when I did some work for the Customs and Border Protection Agency looking at imports and exports and smuggling.
We found back in 2006, we found companies that were selling parts to different Iranian companies in Dubai, outside of Iran, but they were Iranian companies.
Each of them were buying different parts to make up the IEDs.
But the way you found it is if you they all had the same postal box number or phone number or address, and they'd have multiple company names selling multiple things.
They were on the web.
That's where they advertise themselves.
But if you looked at them, I call that by shared attributes.
If you looked at them by shared attributes, you could see that they're doing something they're trying to hide by having multiple names and yet be the same company.
So if you looked at the aggregate input of all of them, there are like eight of them in one sequence, each buying different components of the IED and then transferring them up to Afghanistan and Iraq, killing our people.
So that would be PDP.
We're on the wrong side of history.
You know, we should have been in Afghanistan or I know.
That was crazy anyway.
Yeah.
But I mean, I'm talking about the technique.
The technique is the key.
So this shared attribute technique, I just shared as an example of some of the things they could be doing.
But when I proposed this to CBP back in 2006, I said from the sample I looked at, I had this, I got this off Google.
We used Google to do this, by the way, at home.
In our home and using Google, we figured this out, okay?
And I took it into CBP and this, the Bureau of Industrial Security, they picked it up and added to it that stuff to all their warnings, you know.
And it just exploded because on that one issue.
And then we also found out that once they discovered, the Iranians, once they discovered that we figured out who was doing the buy from the IND parts, they changed the names of all the companies.
When they did that, our shared attribute picked it out right away.
Here it is.
They changed to these names.
And we tried to get that into them.
And nobody, the BISC never put it out.
They never put the new names out.
I understand why.
It's crazy.
And then, I mean, even worse than that, though, I did a sample of look into the import-export database because I had a subcontract with working for the CDP.
And I could do this.
I looked into their database, took a sample of it, and found the same material there.
And from that, I then estimated the size of their database and how much, if we had this program running on the entire, you know, how many millions of companies worldwide in their database, if we had it running there, we could figure out all of the smuggling of all kinds of things worldwide.
And my estimate was that with the first run of the program, we would get approximately 40,000 targets to target and importing and exporting.
That was from the first run of it.
Just one run, one day, bam, you have 40,000 targets.
So it tells you what to look at, what containers are coming in.
It's astonishing reduction from virtually infinitely many to 40,000.
I mean, that's really astounding.
Yes.
And you know what they told me?
They said, we only had two analysts and they said, we're not going to do this.
You are kidding.
And I said, how many port inspectors do you have?
They're the ones going to be looking at it.
You're going to tell them what to look at.
You're going to say, go into that container, look in the box in there, and look at that container and that address material and inspect it.
And you're going to tell how many thousand of them do you have, all the ports of entry.
You use them as your base to do the search.
This is a problem of incompetence at higher levels.
Is it though?
I think Jenny is going to have a question because it's football.
Either that or it's Grafola.
It's more than Graphola.
I think it's an internationally coordinated problem.
And if a program, and if you want to continue this whole illusion that the Afghanistan war and, for example, also the war against ISIS cannot be won, you have to keep going.
You have to have IEDs and say, look, our soldiers are being killed.
And oh my God, they are so powerful.
If you come along and just unmask every corrupt bastard in the world on Monday morning, you can't run this Masonic shit show anymore.
For example, proof of evidence, right?
When Trump asked his generals against ISIS, how long will it take you to get rid of ISIS?
They said three weeks.
They did it.
No, no.
That was Rajan Kane.
Rajan Kane said that when President Trump was in the Middle East talking to him.
But he wasn't, it was the joint chiefs that were telling him it would take months or years to do it.
Yeah, exactly.
But when he asked him, Kane would ask, when he asked somebody who knew something, you know, he said, three weeks.
But also, I don't think that this could be...
He did it in two.
He did it in two.
Yeah.
It was, it was, you know, but my point being, if I may just finish this, the point is that in every level, every area of society, there are breaks being put on on people who can actually do stuff.
There were huge breaks put on you.
You were not meant to just, what, uncover the whole drug trade across the U.S. and all the pedophiles across the US in a week.
You know, it has to be slowed down so that cash patel science can work.
Clearly, these are embedded sabotage agents.
I mean, they're deliberately to make sure it doesn't happen.
I mean, some of them identify.
You didn't have to identify them right off the bat and get them the hell out of the way.
That can also be done with his program.
There isn't a thing that you couldn't mention that couldn't be done by using this approach.
Nothing.
I mean, everything is possible.
Yeah, but you've got to get the corruption, the spies out of the higher levels of government if it's going to succeed, because otherwise they're going to sabotage and sabotage and delay and delay.
Look what you've encountered.
There's no good reason why this couldn't have been a blazing success since 2001.
Yeah, almost 20 years ago.
It's in dry dog.
Yeah.
Well, bargode.
Yeah.
Yeah.
But I think it's because a lot of them, the other thing I ran into initially when I tried to get this program running, the thin thread program or the back end.
And now, see, when let me explain the SARC, the SIGIN Automation Research Center, which I was the co-founder of, and Ed Boomis came in and took over John Taggart's part.
John was the co-founder with me of that SIGINT Automation Research Center.
When Ed came in, we were going to be looking at the World Wide Web and communications in the world, really.
Because I was at the time, I was the technical director of the geopolitical military analysis of the world and reporting.
So at that point, Ed took over and he was going to look at the front end to do the sessionizing to try to capture.
A phone network wasn't that much of a problem because everything there was pretty open because we had communication with like 30 telecommunications companies, something like that.
But Ed, the real problem was sessionizing, putting back to packetized communications in the World Wide Web and reconstructing what was being sent that way.
And that was done over the fibernets or fiber lines at 155 megabits a line.
And they're coming across on 64 fiber lines, so 64 times 155 megabits.
So that's a lot of data, and it's a hard thing to do.
But we succeeded in that in late 97 and early 1998, we had it operating at three different sites 24 hours a day, and we had a test run of it.
So that was when we gave a copy to our friends at that eyebling, a site we used to have in Germany.
We don't have that anymore.
And they put it on and they said, gee, this is really such a great processing system processing the data up front.
It captures what's on the line and can recessionize it, put it back together.
So you can see what it was, you know, reconstruct emails and things of that nature.
And they thought it was so great.
They said, we're going to put it on the whole site, which they did.
But the problem was they didn't change the selection routine algorithm selecting things.
They just went by the dictionary, select a bunch of words with phrases, you know, that they were using.
Well, that got virtually everything on the line that was session on.
So it all came back to NSA.
And they did it late on a Friday night.
And then by Saturday morning, we got called in to shut the thing down because it was about to crash the entire input system of NSA because there was so much damn data.
Well, then that they realized that and then they outsourced that to two guys from Stanford.
I think I told you about it one time, brother.
And these guys created Google.
That was a month after we did that demonstration.
But the point was that that allowed us to capture, now we had the ability to get everything in the world in 1998.
But for the average listener, I would like to emphasize that your model was not collecting every private person's private conversation so that it becomes a blackmail factory.
And that's where we get into how we can fix it.
What has to be fixed?
So to stop the NSA from becoming a blackmail factory and, for example, to stop having Trump's and his Secretary of Defense's signal chat being read by not just the intelligence community that tried to kill Trump multiple times, but also the five eyes, the Crown, and the Crown's bodies.
So to stop that.
I think I read it in the Gateway Pundit, Catherine.
I think I read it in the Gateway Pundit.
I mean, it got around, you know, is that right?
Yeah.
So, but in order to prevent all that and to protect President Trump and his children and grandchildren, it has to revert back to how the NSA was originally designed to work and to uphold the U.S. Constitution and the European privacy rights.
So the original design, and you can explain it, was that the data was not taken in unless it was a known target.
There were three techniques we were using.
I called them deductive, inductive, and abductive.
Deductive was very simple.
That's Professor Fetzer's expertise.
There you go.
Right.
Okay.
Then you'll connect right with this, okay?
Look at the smile.
All right, here.
Okay, here's my deductive one.
You're looking at communications, either machines transferring money from account to account, or somebody calling phone to phone, or email to email, or text to text, whatever.
You have a relationship.
A has a relationship with B. And then you assemble all the relationships.
But you don't just index them A to B. You also index them B to A. If you have A to B, then you index also index B from A so that you only search one column and sort it that way.
So you get everybody together.
You pull any one of them.
You get all their talk, all their communication, all their connection.
But you only have to sort one field.
Okay, it makes it, that's a computer thing that makes it simpler.
And that's the deductive approach.
Saying, okay, I'm going to look at the two degrees of separation again.
The first degree is a real target.
The second degree is the zone of suspicion.
That defines the zone of suspicion.
People who are there who are not known to be participants in an illegal or criminal or violent activities, you don't know that they are part of it.
So you encrypt their attribute.
All their attributes are encrypted.
So even NSA analysts can't tell who they are until you prove that they're part of that activity.
Now, this is also valid under the FISA laws, the old FISA laws under 1978 law.
You had SAST attack.
If you had a bad guy talking to somebody, you could actually copy that stuff and look at it.
And I just said, well, one degree further on is all you can look, but there are certain restrictions on that too that make it a meaningful selection, okay?
But it limits what you look at.
So you're not looking at tens of billions of relationships in the world.
You're looking at maybe a few thousand or a few tens of thousands.
And so that's the deductive one.
Now, the inductive one simply is like a property.
It's an attribute you have, like you're using a cell phone or a satellite phone in the mountains of Bora Bora or in the jungles of Peru.
Well, that's an attribute that you are evidencing that makes you highly suspicious of being a terrorist or a drug dealer.
So you have a justification for looking at this sorted out.
If you are, you're included in the target list.
If you aren't, you're not.
So, but that's the other thing.
And things like people going on the web, looking at websites that are advocating tedophilia or bomb making or terrorism or things of that nature.
You know, those kinds of properties also you would look at as an inductive thing and saying, maybe you're in the process of getting radicalized and going to kill somebody or something like that, or you have intentions of smuggling dope or whatever.
But by doing that, you are presenting evidence that makes you suspicious and justified and probable cause, I would say.
And the third thing is abductive, which is Basically, I call it cluster matching.
You know, it's like clusters of things that are of communities in the relationships that are focused in certain areas of the world or connecting certain areas of the world that are known for given like certain countries predominantly.
Clusters are falling into countries that are involved in the ones primarily involved in terrorism or in dope smuggling or, you know, money laundering, like the banks and so on off the coast here.
May I summarize it for the average student?
Because I bet you, knowing my own students at Oxford, you lost everybody with the inductive, deductive, and abductive, apart from Professor Fetzer, who was just having a field day.
Just look at her smile.
Bill's use in that field is slightly different than mine would be in teaching courses in logic for 35 years.
But I mean, I think that's excellent.
I'm fascinated.
That's just what I call them.
I call them.
Yeah, no, that's good.
I don't have a problem with that.
Catherine, give me the clip-down version.
Yeah, so the clip-down version, what the average person needs to know, the average mother and father, right, is that the current system is really a blackmail factory.
So your husband might be a lawyer who is just doing whatever he does.
And then maybe at some point, he maybe wants to assist Trump or his legal firm gets hired.
Well, they will go back through the entire history of your husband going back to 2001 and see if there anything that can even be misconstrued to blackmail him.
And this applies to every single human being on planet Earth.
So, you know, they can go back to your college days.
They can go back to your school days.
They don't care.
So depending on your age, they can go back to 2001 and find anything.
And it might not be actual proof.
It could be something that can be just made to sound like something else, like you did something wrong, like you had an affair.
You didn't, but if it looks like it, right?
So it is a huge blackmail factory.
If we want to remove that, and if we want to remove all those funnily behaving judges, for example, in the Supreme Court and in the lower courts, right, that for some odd reason always go up against Trump, well, there's a lot of blackmail going around right now.
If we want to eliminate this huge problem of NSA, the original design that Bill had was number one, data that's not relevant to a terrorist in first order is not taken in.
It just goes by on the fiber line.
It's not recorded.
So nobody has the data to weaponize it years down the line to start with.
This was the original design.
The current design is everything gets stored forever at places like Bluffdale in Utah and other places around the world.
So that's the number one.
We get rid of Bluffdale.
We keep very limited data and everybody else's data, content, phone calls and emails are never stored and recorded because also it is unconstitutional.
It is illegal.
NSA is currently operating as a criminal organization that's violating Americans' rights and the constitution here, but also is violating Europeans' privacy rights.
Interesting footnote here, when Bill and I talked on our own show about bad eibling that everybody who's actually followed the Edward Snowden revelations knows about in Germany, that bad eibling, bad eibling is a listening station, nothing that Bill said was novel or controversial, certainly not classified.
Yet when we spoke about it, your mention of bad eibling was distorted and sabotaged in the YouTube broadcast when I re-watched it again.
Why?
It's because you just revealed that the BND is violating laws in Germany and in the European Union.
Bad, bad, bad stuff.
They are criminally liable because anybody with two brain cells to rub together knows, oh, hang on a second, maybe all this blackmail going around in Germany and industrial espionage might just be BND employees.
Yes, it is, right?
So anyway, my point is to revert back, the average Joe needs to understand that the constitutionally valid way to operate NSA, the only one is you, number one, you don't take in data at all if it's not a terrorist.
Number two, what you do take in and it's not a terrorist because it might be the terrorist uncle or cousin you have to check out is encrypted, right?
So that not even NSA analysts can decrypt it.
And only when you can prove probable cause can you get a court order for this limited set to decrypt it.
And only then can NSA people actually find out.
Or anybody else, if they have access to it, find out what it is.
Very much to the point.
Now, keeping everything means you don't know what's relevant, what isn't.
So you got that problem you began with.
It's not a solution.
It's a compounding because you're taking up massive data.
It's expensive and it's meaningless.
Yeah, but well, it did two things for the contractors around the government and also the agency NSA.
It made them lots of money.
It took a lot of money to buy all this and all this collection equipment, you know, hundreds of sites around the world, you know.
And it takes a heck of a lot of people.
You build your empire that way.
But here's the real point that they don't, I mean, even the idiots that are doing it don't realize what they've done.
What they've done is they've captured and stored all the evidence of their criminality.
Oh, yeah.
That's very good, Bill.
Yes, yes, yes.
Now, before we purge that data, purge it, there are purges, there's an easy way to purge it using the deductive, adductive, and inductive approach.
Okay?
See, I was thinking about three points.
Relevance on the one hand.
Second, authority.
Who's in a position to do?
And third, most important, integrity.
If you got the authority, even if they got the relevance, but they don't have the integrity, I mean, it's going to be backward.
It's going to work, blowback, there's going to be all kinds of problems.
So, as I see it, you got to use a technique to ensure integrity at the highest levels who are implementing before they are allowed to pursue it.
Or alternatively, this is what I've been advocating.
Anybody building a system, and I was talking to mathematicians at Cambridge and computer science people in different universities, you build in planning for evil at the top.
In other words, you put software in there that's going to do something once they start doing bad things.
Yeah.
And it just exposes them all.
Or what do you got to do?
Yeah.
The equivalent of self-scrutiny.
Anyone involved in the process has to be subject to the same search routines to exonerate themselves or incriminate and sort them out.
I mean, it's got to be.
That's right.
Because you could use these, which is one of the things we were planning on doing back in the 1990s was to use this program as like a training, a routine to figure what kind of training we should be giving the analysts.
For example, we were watching an analyst and he was doing certain techniques or he tried doing certain queries, but he was missing aspects of the problem that might, if he took a different query or different approach, might make it better.
We might recommend he take some training to open his eyes to a different option and a different way of looking at things, you know?
So it has many applications, not just not all of them are bad, but the problem is you have to plans for this evil creeping into the system.
Yeah, you got to have a system that's resistant to corruption.
Well, the formal way.
It's got to be self-certain.
There's got to be a way of self-certifying of the users of the system that they're not defeating the system and its objectives.
And the actual field, this goes back to systems analysis.
This is what I was trying to bring to the world in 2016.
Everything we're talking about, the corruption of systems, is a known phenomenon and it's called deep capture.
And there are set ways and processes to recover a system out of deep capture and cleanse it from all these corrupt people and ensure a mechanism that is resilient against deep capture.
One can use these mechanisms.
This is actually one of the things we want to talk to both Director Sean Curran and President Trump about, because the elections have been captured.
Many things have been captured.
The Pentagon has been captured and is laundering and actually hard.
The Housing and Urban Development Fund has been laundering trillions of dollars of the books into a black budget of the military.
But there's ways to set up all these government agencies such that they are resilient against the capture going forward after these plans to corrupt people.
I bet you you could cut the budget in half or more, and you could find trillions upon trillions that have been misallocated or misappropriated, whatever.
I mean, this is a fantastic tool.
I think there are two aspects here.
Catherine knows all these modes of corruption, though that can contribute to, you know, the factors you're going to use to sort out who's doing things they shouldn't be doing.
But your technique could be obliged to target an individual system to identify exactly who's running.
Also, Epstein's ring, worldwide, everything.
Diddy, Diddy, Diddy just got off.
He was like the West Coast version, you know, Black Eye Hollywood versus Epstein, New York's, socialites, man oh man, did they cover all the bases?
And I'm not sure that Diddy was most sod as was Epstein.
I don't have any real doubt.
So those guys really know how to exploit human failings.
But you know, this system, looking at all the data they've already got, should be able to tell you if they were or were not part of all of that.
Yeah, yeah, I think that's right, Bill, because you got that fast talk about data.
This is secure.
Yep.
That makes it a gold mine.
I mean, for example, the first, this came out with, I think, the first exposure of this Edward Snowden material that he pulled and like it was a Pfizer order to Verizon to turn over all of the communications of their customers to NSA.
And the request was coming from the FBI.
Why?
Because the FBI handles internally and the US and NSA is the master of managing the data for everybody, all of the agencies of the government, as well as internationally, other government agencies from other governments.
So the request was from the FBI to turn over, to the Verizon, to turn over all their data to NSA.
And I figured out from the serialization how many companies were involved with this bulk transfer of data at the time.
This is 2013.
And it turned out by the serialization that there should be something like 80 different companies involved in bulk transfer of data.
Now, the mixtures of banks and communications companies, you know, all kinds of stock exchange, things like that.
So it'd be all 80 of them.
I could figure that out from the serial number, from one serial number.
Why?
Because I know the first company in line is AT ⁇ T. The second one is Verizon.
So the serial number listed was 82-13.
In other words, the 82nd one, 82nd one of the first quarter of 13, I think it was.
But at any rate, the point is, if you took them that way and they issued these every three months, every 90 days, so every quarter got an issue.
So they'd serialize one up starting the first of the year, right?
For the first quarter and keep going the next quarter and so on.
So if it was number two in the first position, number two in the second, you could figure out which one and how many there are, which is the way I did it.
Yes.
So, but the point is, still, you want to get all the bad guys out of the system as much as you can.
So, you don't want to destroy.
Yeah, you don't want to purge the data initially.
You want to go through and map them all out, then get them, and then you purge them.
And then from then on, that's the selection routine of the data up front.
And you don't take in this massive amount of data.
You don't need a Bluffdale.
I mean, Bluffdale, I mean, they could run that system there from that collection system based on the properties we're talking about, deductive, abductive approach.
That could handle a thousand years of data.
But here's the problem.
Because you don't take in so much.
Here is the problem, gentlemen.
The real issue is that your thin thread program that does all this, uncovering all this criminality for the world in a week, plus $3 million from design to implementation and deployment.
$3 million.
Palantir sold a polished turd to the Danish police for $10 million, Dutch, sorry, the Dutch police for $10 million that by the testimony of the Dutch police themselves was a piece of shit.
It didn't do anything.
Now, I have evidence that it's a piece of shit.
Every single Palantir package that was sold, because nowhere around the world where they sell this crap, do they actually clear up crime?
Do they have a money-back guarantee?
Do they have a money-back guarantee?
Of course, no, but see, we were approaching them to try to get them to do the right thing in the Netherlands because we were trying to form a company up there to do business there.
But the Dutch intelligence got word of it, and NSA got word of it, and that took care of that.
They eventually got us terminated.
But the whole idea was that they looked at us as the latest version of a snake oil sales.
Come in and trying to sell them.
They looked at you as integrity, and they have authority, but they don't have integrity.
And you have integrity, but you don't have authority.
They did not want you to do.
You were authorized.
Unfortunately, unfortunately, the current trend is that Palantir, so President Trump has been sold a massive polished third with Palantir.
It's already done.
It's already done.
And it's going to be a worthless piece of shit because it has never produced any seminal, groundbreaking progress anywhere in the world where it was used.
Now, the second problem is that currently NSA is set up as a blackmail and surveillance slavery machine and sex trafficking, a medical trafficking machine of the world population.
That is a huge business that they do not want to give up.
So they now brought in AI and this Stargate AI funded to the tune of 10 CIAs at 500 billion will be used to run over everybody's medical file.
Trump inadvertently already blurted it out on day two in office that the medical files will be looked at by AI.
He doesn't know enough science to understand that that is the medical trafficking and weapon catching of his own children and grandchildren he's talking about.
He has no clue.
But that's exactly what they're going to use.
They're going to build on what they have with Valentia and AI, and it will not solve terrorism.
It will proliferate terrorism.
Yes, yes, it will.
And it'll make them a lot of money, which is their bottom line.
They don't give a shit about the success of the program.
All they care is the shackles.
Yes.
I learned that quite early in my experience trying to do, I started doing contracts at NSA because nobody was doing what I needed to have done.
So I started running contracts for low ones, you know, million here, a million there.
But, you know, and I realized right away, at first, I thought the vision statement for all these companies working with NSA was aim low and missed because they always fail.
Okay.
So, but that really wasn't it.
It came to me after one of the vice presidents from one of the companies said that with this program coming up, Trailblazer was, we can milk this program for 15 years.
Milk?
He actually said that to other contractors and they told him.
Trailblazer was the mass surveillance program, the illegal unconstitutional mass surveillance program.
For those who don't know, right?
Because not everybody knows the project names.
Yeah, it has a counterpart in the military industrial complex by producing substandard equipment.
So you get a maintenance contract that over the years doubles or triples your profit.
They deliberately went out.
Don't do that.
The Russians don't have that profit motive.
They need equipment and they get it at a rock bottom price.
But that gave me the real clue of what their real vision statement was.
And it was, keep the problem going so the money keeps flowing.
Yes.
Yes.
That's it.
I think Trump needs to need to cut this.
If Trump really wants to save taxpayers money, the military industrial complex needs to be cut.
It's not strength.
And Trump doesn't even know about this targeting program, which is coming his way.
It's being rolled out to enslave his children and grandchildren, just like they enslave the former technical director of NSA and a former research fellow from Oxford.
So they started with vulnerable people, but they're going after millionaires.
And soon enough, the daughters and granddaughters.
You and Bill are under attack.
And it's because you represent a threat of the kind we're discussing here.
Because he's got integrity.
He doesn't have the authority.
They got the authority, but they don't have the...
You are a threat.
I wish I saw a solution.
But you are a threat because you want to bring integrity to the system and they don't Want it well.
The real and the other problem they have that we don't is we know how to make it work, yeah.
They don't because there's so many pitfalls in here, like the one on no two degrees a second can't go through certain things.
Yeah, those kind of properties are uh all through the entire system, every step of the way.
Intelligence and athletic abilities, and then those are not common properties in government.
No, that's right.
I guess that's why you also have to putting it out there without fear of talente copying it, because even if they have this information from the video today, they do not have the competence to actually overcome the devil in the details.
I have no problem talking about what needs to happen.
I just don't talk about how to do it.
Yeah, because they can't do it.
You guys are wonderful.
This has been absolutely sensational.
And I'm just overjoyed.
And I can't wait for our next interview, but I want to tell you this has been spectacular.
Spectacular.
To give you, Jim, to give you one more point that really tells you how the system viewed what I was proposing.
Back in 1992, I had proposed to do the analysis of the network logs, which are the logs of activity across the network that everybody's, every time they hit a carriage return or an instruction, it gets logged.
So you could track what everybody's doing.
That was a part of the thin thread program too, in the back end.
So that's pretty elementary, doesn't it?
Yeah.
But the point is, we were proposing this.
I called the program well-grounded, okay?
Just that was the name I picked.
Well-grounded.
I was solid base.
This is make real decisions, you know, from real facts, because it's all there.
And including all the money transfers for all the different contracts and all that, too.
And so this fairly high manager in NSA, we were proposing this to, we had to go through them to get it approved.
He said, you mean to tell me Congress can come in here then and look at all the programs we have, how much money we're spending on, which one are succeeding and which are failing?
I said, sure, they can do that.
He said, you are never going to do this program.
And that's what he said.
Look at it.
That tells you they don't want anybody to know what they're doing with money and contracts.
Closing the door, they're slamming it shut.
Exactly.
And now they're adding a lot of bolts and locks.
You guys are wonderful.
I'm just thrilled.
And I worry about your safety.
And you're coping like mad.
One thing I tell you, though, Jim, after we're over here talking, I haven't had any pain at all since I've been in here talking to you.
Excellent.
Excellent, Bill.
I'm thrilled.
Because I was having it before I came in.
Catherine was worried about that.
It's got a lot to do with concentration, you know, and ideas.
And when your mind is at work and you guys have been going like a house afire.
You're going to put this on the web.
And I'm sure they didn't want anybody seeing it.
Yeah.
Well, it's going.
Gonna be there.
Well, no.
I mean, they didn't want to show the pain that can be caused.
Yeah.
But also, I think they wanted to hear what you've got to say because they're hoping to volunteer can be tuned, you know.
Keep the problem going and the money flowing.
Thank you both once again.
Absolutely sensational stuff.
And I look forward to our next conversation.
All right.
Thanks.
▲
Export Selection