Nov. 20, 2025 - Epoch Times
04:56
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| Time | Text |
|---|---|
| The way it works is our phones and the apps on them are subsidized by advertising information, which exists in databases that advertisers can purchase, but anyone can purchase it. | |
| And the main thing that is obtainable is your location all of the time. | |
| But not just your location, the other people you co-locate with. | |
| So who you're at home with, who you're at work with, who you go to the gym with, who you might have another hobby with. | |
| All of this information is easily discernible to create what are called patterns of life. | |
| And the details of our lives are really discoverable first from our location, but then also what we look at on our phones, what sites we visit, what apps we have on our phone, things like this. | |
| So advertisers are able to put together, think of it like a three-dimensional topographical map of the relationships of the people in the country, where they go, and also what they do on their phones in many cases. | |
| So it's very easy to discern, for example, if the government or the CCP or anyone wanted to find out, hey, show me the folks in the country who go to this particular denomination. | |
| That is immediately discernible. | |
| Show me the people who go to gun shops, immediately discernible. | |
| Show me the people who go to crypto conventions, immediately discernible. | |
| And that's just groups. | |
| You can also use the same data to locate individuals and say, oh, okay, I happen to know that a person works here and their kid goes to school here. | |
| You can buy cell phone data from an area, apply those two location filters, and follow that phone around in real time to determine where they sleep, who else sleeps in the house. | |
| It's pretty shocking. | |
| And basically you're saying you can kind of triangulate the individual level data is not available, right? | |
| Like, how can you kind of triangulate discernible? | |
| If you recall, Dinesh D'Souza made a really interesting documentary about the 2020 election and individual phones that were going from Dropboxes to NGOs. | |
| It's the same technology. | |
| So the way it works is you buy for an advertising campaign, you buy the smartphone location data for a whole area, and then you can apply filters. | |
| You can say, okay, here's all the phones from Washington, D.C. Show me the phones. | |
| So I have millions of phones. | |
| Show me the phones that have gone to 101 Constitution Avenue and this Equinox gym that I happen to know Jan goes to. | |
| Okay, there's 100 phones. | |
| Interesting. | |
| Now, I've heard him mention that he really likes this one pub. | |
| Show me any of these hundred phones that have been to that pub. | |
| Oh, there's only one. | |
| Now I found the IMEI or the identifier of that phone. | |
| And I can use that IMEI against any other location data, any other location of smartphone data. | |
| So I can say, all right, did that phone also go to Hong Kong? | |
| Great. | |
| Where was it in Hong Kong? | |
| So now I've got your pattern of life in D.C. and another place you may have gone. | |
| It's incredible. | |
| And then, you know, all sorts of things you might not want people to know about. | |
| Let's say you went, I don't know, maybe you had a top secret meeting with someone. | |
| Right. | |
| Yes, this is a big issue. | |
| So all of our government agents, operators, private people in private business are facing this problem. | |
| Where you go is easily discoverable from advertising data from smartphones. | |
| And this is just publicly available? | |
| It's publicly available. | |
| It's purchasable. | |
| We have a friend named Mike Yagley. | |
| He's the primary subject of Means of Control, Byron Tao's great book that really lifted the curtain on this. | |
| And Mike sort of became famous because he purchased data and showed the head of the DOD, here's the home addresses of an entire Delta team. | |
| So he purchased some advertising data, used some open source information, and got the home addresses of some of our most secret people. | |
| So yeah, this is purchasable. | |
| And what's, I think, very important is not only is it purchasable, it is not protected with Fourth Amendment protections. | |
| So the government does not require warrants to access this. | |
| So this is important. | |
| If the government wants to track your location from the cell phone carrier and say, hey, AT ⁇ T, show me where Jan is all the time. | |
| They need a warrant to get AT ⁇ T to give that over. | |
| Unless, of course, it's 2021 and AT ⁇ T wants to give the information over to the Justice Department. | |
| But normally it would require a warrant. | |
| This information, this advertising information, falls under a legal distinction called third-party doctrine. | |
| This was established in the Warren Court in the 70s. | |
| And it basically says that when a customer hands over data willingly to a third party, it loses Fourth Amendment protections. | |
| This was originally applied to banking data and phone company data, some metadata that was in those accounts, but now it's applied to all the app data, all the advertising data coming from our apps. | |
| So this whole pipeline I just described to you, which allows us to be discoverable as individuals and also to be profiled in groups, who's Christian, who's Muslim, who's, you know, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. | |
| All of this is not Fourth Amendment protected. | |
| So yes, anyone can do it. | |
| Criminals can do it. | |
| Private investigators can do it. | |
| Advertisers can do it. | |
| The CCP can do it. |
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