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Jan. 27, 2022 - Doug Collins Podcast
01:01:22
The Battle for Ukraine
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Today, on this podcast, we're diving into a deep subject.
One is of a lot of concern.
Anatole even is going to talk about the Ukraine, the Russia situation.
We take a deep dive into this.
This is not a It's not by any means a windshield tour.
This is going to be a deep dive into the whole geopolitical atmosphere of the Ukraine, Russia, its implications of the Soviet Union.
What is America's role?
What is Western Europe's role?
Anatole gives some very interesting insights into the discussion here.
This is not simply an easy situation, either for, frankly, the Russians or the Western allies as well.
Also for the people of the Ukraine who are sitting in a very interesting spot, and you'll hear about this on the podcast in just a few minutes.
But I wanted to keep you up to date about what's going on and everything that is happening in our podcast world, but also in the world itself.
And these podcasts these days are giving you the information you need to be an informed voice if you go out into the world.
So thanks for being a part of the Doug Collins Podcast family, and let's talk about the Ukraine.
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As I said, the world is right now on the brink of a major crisis in Ukraine with Russia and the European allies, of course, the United States being a part.
Anatole Levin is with me today to talk about that, an expert in this area.
And we're just going to have a long discussion because I'm getting a lot of questions from you on the podcast and from questions that I have on why, number one, Ukraine is important to us, why this is a serious situation and what we can do about it.
So this is going to be a great time again for learning today.
Look forward to this discussion.
Anatole, thank you for being with me today.
Hello.
Hey there.
Well, first off, let's explain sort of your background, how this became part of your basic expertise area, and then we can dig on into more of what we're seeing every day right now in the Ukraine.
Well, I used to be a British journalist, and I was a journalist for the London Times newspaper.
Well, I went there when it was still the Soviet Union at the start of 1990. And I spent seven years in the former Soviet Union for the Times from 1990 to 1996. And during that time, I made several trips to Ukraine, to all the different parts of Ukraine.
And I actually wrote a book on the Ukrainian-Russian relationship called Um, which you can still get on Amazon, um, which is called Ukraine and Russia of fraternal rivalry.
So that's, um, the, um, the, the, the basis of my expertise.
Well, it's interesting.
Listen, I mean, I want to explore that because I always, you know, in addition to the topic we've got going on, you were a journalist.
What was it like?
And I think, because I think people need to understand in your book, I think you, this fraternal rival is something that we need to understand the history getting us to this moment.
Um, you were there then before, um, Really, a lot of the breakup happening and going through that.
Explain what it was like being a reporter in the former Soviet Union.
Well, you know, I was much younger then.
I had a wonderful time.
I'm not sure I'd cope so well these days because bits of it were extremely uncomfortable.
I always say anything I know about international relations, I know from sleeping with Henry Kissinger's book on diplomacy as a pillow on Ukrainian railways.
And food was very, very short.
Fortunately, I had assistants who would forage for me because otherwise I would have starved.
It was fascinating, of course.
It was the most wonderful time and place to be a journalist.
It was also, well, parts of it were very inspiring.
You know, I covered the Baltic independence movements, which had some very, you know, moving things.
And emotional moments, partly because my father's family comes from that part of the world.
But parts of it were also very depressing and sad because, of course, in the 1990s, the lives of ordinary people had been, in many ways, fairly economically grim.
You know, in the last years of the Soviet Union, but after the Soviet collapse, you know, you had this situation in which a few people got monstrously rich.
But a lot of ordinary people in Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere suffered terribly.
Especially the old.
And that was sad to see and has left, unfortunately, a legacy of, well, the suffering and chaos of the 1990s partly explains the support for Vladimir Putin to this day.
But the other thing you see is that I came to the former Soviet Union from South Asia, where I had worked first as a student, then as a freelance journalist, and then I was Times correspondent in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
For me, I always saw the collapse of the Soviet Union in part as resembling the collapse of previous European empires.
And all of these subsequent ethnic conflicts that erupted, wars over territory, over borders, over identity, this is very like what one saw in the wake of the end of the French Empire, the British Empire, even the Turkish Empire.
So I wasn't, I have to say, particularly surprised by that.
Of course, it was very sad to see the suffering in those wars and also the hatreds that came up.
But to be perfectly honest, for somebody who's covered the India-Pakistan relationship, Ethno-religious relations in South Asia, the Sri Lankan civil war, etc., etc.
It is what you expect when empires collapse.
All the rivalries and bitternesses that they have either suppressed or, on the other hand, have manipulated burst out into the open.
And I think what we're seeing in Ukraine is partly a delayed action.
The result of the Soviet imperial collapse and the disputes and rivalries that emerged.
Of course, the thing that makes it more important and dangerous is that this involves Russia, whereas several of the others were basically just local conflict.
Well, let's dive into that just a little bit deeper because just recently there was reports, and again, a lot of propaganda reports, a lot of, you know, of course, propping up in Russia with Putin and his memories, if you would, his recollections of those days that you just spoke of, those late 80s, early 90s days in which there was a lot of chaos, a lot of confusion, a lot of suffering, added to the breakup.
Many got rich, many did not.
And Putin was talking about his own, quote, struggles during that time.
A lot has been said about Putin wanting to regain what would, in his mind, be the old glory of the Soviet Union.
Afghanistan, you just came out of that part of Asia back into Russia.
How much do you, do you believe that to be a true statement coming out from Putin?
Or do you believe that is more the mythological built around Putin and his desires now?
Well, I think Putin certainly wants to see a stronger Russia and a more respected Russia on the world stage.
You know, I think he regards that as, you know, well, partly he identifies completely with Russia or identifies Russia with him.
But he also no doubt regards it as his duty.
By the way, of course, this isn't just Putin.
You know, Russia has a blob, just as America has a blob.
You know, the American blob is dedicated to American global primacy.
If you don't believe in that, you're not in the blob, you are soon ejected from the blob.
And, you know, the Russian establishment believes in, you know, Russia being a great power on the world stage.
And certainly the Russian blob, led by Putin, Also believes that in a Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine, which is to say that Russia must exclude hostile or potentially hostile alliances, you know, from its immediate neighborhood, especially Ukraine, which is the biggest country in its immediate neighborhood.
But that's not quite the same thing as believing that you can, you know, recreate the Soviet Union.
Because, you know, even countries like Kazakhstan, you know, Which have always been, you know, closer to Russia.
And, you know, Russia has had greater influence.
There's been no attempt actually to incorporate them into Russia or to turn them into, you know, military vassals of Russia.
Russia is undoubtedly looking for a sphere of influence, but it's not looking to recreate the Soviet Union.
Putin, it's actually quite a common Russian proverb that Putin quoted on that.
He said, anyone who doesn't regret the end of the Soviet Union You know, many Russians feel that and actually a good many people in other republics as well because, you know, it was secure and safe and it was a great power and, you know, since then there has been all this, you know, chaos and confusion and wars and poverty.
But, he said, anyone who doesn't regret the end of the Soviet Union has no heart.
Anyone who thinks it can be recreated has no brain.
Those were his words.
So, you know, Putin is well aware that you cannot recreate the Soviet superpower.
That's beyond...
Any Russian capacity.
In looking at it now, as you see the situation developing, and I think you bring a very unique perspective, covering the Southeast Asia issues in the Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, which by itself, India, Pakistan could be another whole podcast of the discussion there, just in and of itself.
As it goes, In what you view today and this discussion, you wrote a book about this, what makes the Ukraine, because this has been festering now for a number of years, it's not brand new, this conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
We've seen it with Crimea, we've seen it with some of the other issues here have been building.
Why Ukraine?
Why Russia in this instance?
And where do we see it going?
Well, when I, you know, compare this issue to the Monroe Doctrine, that's accurate as far as, you know, strategy goes.
But Ukraine is much more important to Russia than that because of history.
You know, the Russians consider that the origins of their own state, Rus, go back to Kiev in, you know, 1200 years ago.
Of course, one can say that Ukrainians also trace their own state to that.
But Ukraine and Russia were one country for very long periods of history.
On the one hand, you have a huge Russian minority in Ukraine, 20% or so.
About a third of the population speaks Russian as its first language.
As a Brit, I often say that for Russia, Ukraine is like a combination of Scotland and Ireland for England, which is to say that on the one hand, there were terrible periods of oppression, especially under Soviet rule, just as in Ireland.
Including famine, of course, you know, Irish famine, Ukrainian famine.
But on the other hand, as with Scotland, there were very, you know, Ukrainians...
Great Ukrainian writers like Gogol in Ukrainian wrote in Russian.
The great Ukrainian filmmakers like Bondachuk who made the Soviet War and Peace was Ukrainian.
And so there's very, very close cultural links and there was a strong tradition in part of Ukraine of Feeling Ukrainian, just like Scots feeling Scottish, but identifying with the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union.
In other parts of Ukraine, Western and Central Ukraine, there was much stronger Ukrainian ethnic nationalism and desire for separation from Russia.
So, Ukraine has been, since independence, a very divided society.
Until 2014, the balance between pro- and anti-Russian parties only shifted by about 3% from one election to another.
The centre ground was very, very narrow.
And especially, of course, the Russian-speaking areas of the East and South, and most especially the Donbas and Crimea, voted absolutely overwhelmingly for pro-Russian parties and strongly opposed an ethnic and ethnolinguistic version of Ukrainian nationalism, which they regarded as a threat to their own local Russian-speaking identities.
So it's not just about strategy.
There are also these deep historical and emotional links between Russia and some Ukrainians.
Of course, other Ukrainians want to do everything to get away from Russia.
And I think that a core...
The problem now is that, and of course, Russian behavior, especially since 2014, has really driven this process along.
But Ukrainian nationalism, as defined by the Ukrainian state, has really defined itself now in an anti-Russian way and against the Russian language and Russian culture in Ukraine.
In other words, in a very narrow ethnic nationalist way.
And that, of course, has really, you know, made some people in eastern and southern Ukraine even more hostile to Kiev.
But it has also made Russia afraid that if this process goes on for a generation, that in fact the entire historical relationship between Ukraine and Russia will be destroyed.
So this is the other element in why, you know, The Putin administration decided finally that it must essentially threaten war to limit this process.
So that's, you know, where we are now.
Okay, I want to get to that threat here in just a minute, but a curious question came up because we saw this, and I would love if you would sort of back this to the Baltic independence, and you said that you'd covered a great deal with emotion in that.
We saw a driving of the younger generations being more, you know, nationalistic into their own country, away from the old Soviet Union into the new, or even Russia now.
Do you sense, is there an age divide in the Ukraine right now that divided the West and the Central from the South and the speaking, or was it...
Or is it still just basically where you are in relation to Russia in that regard?
Is it more geographical or do you sense an age issue or a new generation issue in that?
I think it's both.
I mean, undoubtedly, younger people.
But look at the revolution in Ukraine in 2014. It's very much a youth revolution and young people who wanted to join the West.
But on the other hand, if you Look at interviews and opinion polls certainly in the Donbas and Crimea.
You find lots of young people there who continue to identify very strongly with Russia and to oppose Ukrainian ethnic nationalism.
One of the tensions you see is That, you know, if you look at before 2014, since then things have got difficult because, you know, obviously Ukrainian parties have been banned, Ukrainian nationalist parties have been banned in the Russian-controlled areas.
Pro-Russian parties have been banned in the rest of Ukraine.
So it's much more difficult to find out just what a majority of the population thinks.
But certainly until 2014, it was rather striking.
You had huge majorities, including in the Russian-speaking areas, who wanted to join the European Union.
Because, you know, that means, I mean, look, to be blunt, apart from anything else, the ability to go and work in London, like the Poles and, you know, And others and Lithuanians.
I had my hair cut in London.
Two days ago by a Lithuanian hairdresser.
But on the other hand, and this by the way was completely underreported in the West, but you had every opinion poll showing big Ukrainian majorities, two thirds or more, opposing NATO membership.
The reason for that was that they thought that the NATO membership would lead them into a conflict with Russia, which they really did not want.
So they wanted somehow To have the best of both worlds, join the West while remaining friendly with Russia.
Well, of course, since 2014, that has become, that option has gone.
But I think the point is that there's a very confused picture now in Ukraine.
You know, people can be simultaneously in favor of joining the West, hostile to Russia, but also hostile to Ukrainian ethnic nationalism.
Some of which, you know, has some pretty ugly aspects, I have to say.
I think one thing, though, that the huge majority of the population really do not want, and that's a Russian invasion.
You know, nobody wants the Russian army in there, at least only very small minorities.
Do you sense, from your knowledge of the time earlier on and then covering it and watching it now, what you just described seems to be almost a bipolar effect, and I say, of you wanting, of course, as everyone does, the good of being a part of a free economic system in which you're free to travel, go to the rest of the European Union and have that.
But also, it seems to be very, and I say this from an American standpoint, a very European thought, we want all the benefits, but we don't want the conflict.
And is that a viable discussion in Ukraine right now?
Do they see that in some ways those are, especially dealing with Russia, is something that's sort of hard to hold in both hands given the desires of the West and the desires of Russia?
Well, yes.
I mean, I have deep sympathy for the Ukrainians, but I have to say that I think in many ways they're on a hide into nowhere.
But that isn't just because of Russia.
It's also because, you know, from a European Union point of view, you know, aspects of expansion to Eastern Europe, which looked like such a tremendous, you know, triumph, In the 1990s and early 2000s, look much less triumphant now.
You have a growth of chauvinist authoritarian nationalism in Poland and Hungary, which is causing tremendous problems for the whole business of common universal European standards.
But also, especially in Romania and Bulgaria, they have proved a tremendous disappointment when it comes to economic reform and above all, anti-corruption.
These remain extremely corrupt in many ways, still post-communist states.
Well, the point is, you see, it's not just that as the Biden administration and NATO and NATO's European allies have made absolutely clear.
It's not just that when we are not going to fight to defend Ukraine, we're not going to send troops to defend Ukraine.
But it's also, you know, if you talk candidly in private with European officials or politicians from Western Europe, there is absolutely no appetite to bring Ukraine into the European Union in any foreseeable future, because they see Ukraine essentially as a giant combination of the corruption of the Balkans with the ethnic chauvinism and authoritarianism of Poland.
As well, of course, as all the problems with Russia that would cause.
So you see, the problem is that fully joining the West is not actually on the table now, and may not be on the table again in future.
I mean, look, who can save for the further future?
But at the moment, it just isn't.
So the Ukrainians But of course, this has all been presented by the Ukrainian government as, you know, in terms of Russian pressure, Russian threats, Russian blackmail.
And of course, there's a strong element in that.
But unfortunately, there are also, you know, other things involved here.
And a point I've made several times is that, you know, when it comes to, you know, democratization, free market economic reform, Being in NATO and the European Union is not in itself necessary or essential.
Because if you look at Austria and Finland during the Cold War, and they were both neutral by treaty, Austria was neutral because it was on those terms that Soviet and British and American occupying troops pulled out.
But Finland and Austria both developed as very successful free market democracies during the Cold War.
I travelled to both of them in the 1980s and they were Excellent places to live.
No observable difference from countries that were in the European Union and NATO. Whereas I think what we're seeing now is that being in the European Union and NATO, if you're Romania or Bulgaria or Slovakia, doesn't actually necessarily bring about successful democratization and economic reform.
In other words, if you don't have it in you, To succeed as a free market democracy without being in the European Union and NATO, you're probably not going to succeed if you're in the European Union and NATO either.
So in the end, it comes down to the ability of the Ukrainian state to reform itself.
That's interesting.
I mean, I'm very fascinated by what you just said there and looking at that because the way you sort of frame that is something I think that the world right now with all the discussion of basically the brink of war kind of issue is taking Ukraine as a...
If we could, as a scientific study or as a study, by itself, and what you've just laid out is very interesting to me, probably to a lot of my listeners today, is that the Ukraine itself, because we have seen, frankly, from the United States side, Ukraine has been involved in issues here in the United States, through political issues, other things.
That's the way most people fashion the Ukraine, and we're not going to get into that, but it does efface how people see the Ukraine as being a footnote of history through Biden and Trump and other things.
And then also this from the old what I'll call old view of the Russia still in many minds of Americans still being the old Soviet Union and the aggressiveness here.
But taking the Ukraine as a whole just by itself what you've just described is they're sort of on an island by themselves in a sense by not having fully developed economies fully developed you know systems that have put them in a position of isolation Yet with a lot of eyes on what may happen to them.
Is that a fair assessment?
Yes, I think that's absolutely right.
I think that they are in a way stranded, but in a situation where they have attracted all this geopolitical attention, that frankly, they would be much better spared.
I said in my book, which came out 22 years ago now, and by the way, I think obviously Russia has made some Terrible actions and mistakes and crimes as well.
But that the entire effort to force Ukraine to choose between the West and Russia, whether initiated by Moscow, as it partly was, or initiated by us, which it partly was, but that was bound to end in disaster.
That Ukraine is a country which, not just because of its geopolitical position, but because of its internal nature, cannot choose without being...
You know, torn apart in the process.
I'm sorry, go ahead.
Well, no, but I was also going to just repeat, you know...
There's something a bit weird about this whole discussion now in the West, because, you know, on the one hand, we're saying that, oh, we have to keep the door open for Ukrainian membership of NATO. But we've made absolutely clear that we're not going to fight to defend Ukraine.
But also, you know, if the Russians are going to threaten Ukraine, Then, you know, to have the ability to defend Ukraine as a member of NATO, you'd have to move a Cold War-style American army, you know, the kind of American army that was stationed in Germany during the Cold War, to Ukraine.
You know, you'd be talking about moving a quarter of a million men and a large part of the U.S. Air Force to Ukraine.
Well, nobody is thinking about that in the Pentagon.
And, I mean, apart from, you know, all the other reasons, it can be summed up, the reason why not can be summed up in one word, China.
You know, if America is going to do that.
And as for, you know, I say this with due shame as a European, but the idea that, you know, NATO's European members are going to fight or increase their military budgets and their militaries to defend Ukraine is just, you know, we know what they're like.
We know their records.
Never going to happen.
I mean, Britain might want to, because Britain has this sort of rather, I would say, strange idea of itself on the world stage.
But, you know, the entire British army, the whole British army, can now mobilize just two brigades.
Two brigades for active service.
To get more, you have to call up the territorials, you have to pull all your tanks out of mothballs, at which point their turrets fall off and you find that their engines have seized up.
And nobody is talking about recreating the British Army of the Rhine and now calling it the British Army of the Denierpa.
To defend Ukraine.
That is no part of anyone's calculation.
So what are we, you know, what is our plan?
What are we actually thinking about here, if we are thinking?
Well, you just brought up, this discussion is getting more and more fascinating.
And to me, as we look at this, I want to move into a different area and come back.
But you've almost described a Ukraine as the child of two parents, in a way.
And the way that you described that was, in essence, there's an internal longing for both.
You have the Russian side, you have the Western side, you have this move, and it's really, I'm choosing, you know, and I'm being very, not flippant here, but very just, you know, casual in saying they're choosing mom or dad in this, and there's really not a choice in this.
But you've also brought up something that I want to explore for a second, and it is, what do you do with Ukraine?
Framing it as of this minute, this morning in January, we're sitting with a large mass of troops on a border.
You cannot maintain that much troops on a border for a long period of time.
You just can't.
They either got to move or they got to be withdrawn.
So we're there.
You've now have the American position, which has been, frankly, very muddled.
From last week, we had the President of the United States say that, you know, and then try to correct a minor incursion.
What would a minor incursion look like?
Would that be Crimea?
Would that be, you know, how are we looking at it?
And then you basically have given a green light, many in the United States have thought, and they have come to the Ukrainian side.
But you've just brought up an interesting perspective that I want to explore more.
What is the general feeling in London, in Paris, in Munich, in Germany, in these other...
I know that Denmark and others have sort of rallied a little bit.
What is their perspective of this?
Are they scared?
Or is it a...
So what?
Well, I mean, the political establishments, and especially the security establishments, you know, who are, after all, still very much shaped by the Cold War, are, of course, extremely anti-Russian and are professionally worried about Russia.
Although, in my view, Russia presents no threat of a direct attack on NATO, partly because that would be so hideously Reckless, but also because it would bring absolutely no benefit to Russia.
I mean, how could Russia hope to rule Poland?
It's ridiculous.
As far as the mass of the population is concerned, Well, there was a headline in the Financial Times a number of years ago which I think really summed it up.
It said about an opinion poll, European publics fear Russian energy pressure was the title and the subtitle was refuse to pay higher prices for gas.
In other words, there may be a certain public will to defy Russia until the moment comes, which I pray it won't, but the demand is to basically cut off Russian gas.
Which accounts for a huge chunk, of course, of European energy production.
When it comes to be that siding with Ukraine requires a tripling of your electricity bill and possibly long periods of shutdown of electricity, we'll have to see how much European will.
For this, you know, remains.
But I think, you know, the main thing to emphasize is that nobody is planning to fight.
Nobody is even suggesting fighting.
Nobody is carrying out the military reforms and increases that would be necessary if anybody were thinking that we might have to fight Russia at any point in the next 10 years.
So there is a kind of, you know, theatrical I think we're good to go.
You know, we ought to be calling up hundreds of thousands of men.
We ought to be, you know, never mind bringing up European military budget's share of GDP to 2%.
We ought to be bringing them up to 5%.
Nothing of the sort is happening.
So, you know, there's a lot of play-acting about this.
What I hope is that the Russians are also play-acting with the threats of invasion.
Yeah, well, you just led to the next obvious question here.
And that is, if a calculated world leader, not, you know, we're just saying as Putin has shown himself to be, okay, he's got to be weighing these odds.
He's got to be looking at this, knowing that he probably would not be...
confronted with military might.
Whatever he would be confronted with would be whatever most of the Europeans or the Americans would give to whatever is left of the Ukrainian forces.
But then there is that other aspect of that Western civilization, Western Europe, America, others have, and that is in the economic side.
And that is the other key to this.
From what you're seeing, from what you're sensing from colleagues and others, is the Ukraine that important to him to make this statement, given the fact that it may not be a military response that he sees, as you've well said, but it may be a very detrimental economic backlash that comes.
Well, for that reason, I don't think that Putin and the Russian government have made up their mind for war.
And, you know, that has been the analysis of US intelligence as well, that, you know, they're still thinking about it.
And yes, I mean, economic damage would be severe.
And also, undoubtedly, Europe might not be able to do without Russian gas in the short term.
But undoubtedly, it would give a colossal push to European moves to move away from Russian gas over a longer period of time.
I mean, that would take, of course, a lot of effort and a lot of money.
Because you'd have to build up ports for bringing in liquid natural gas.
You'd have to pay much higher prices.
You'd have to do it from America.
But it could be done.
You see, the result of that would be to push Russia completely into the arms of China.
And China would then emerge as well as Russia's only major energy buyer.
Well, I mean, A, that is a geopolitical fate that a lot of Russians are very afraid of.
They don't talk about it, but they are behind the scenes.
But also, of course, that would put China in the position of a buyer's market.
China could start dictating the price of gas.
Well, that's not what Russia wants either.
So there are very good reasons for Putin to hesitate.
What worries me is that, you know, the Russian government has pitched its demands so high and so categorically that it would be very difficult, I think, for it now to back down.
Without being able to present some kind of success or victory.
Not everything that it wants.
I think it's genuinely trying to negotiate, but Putin needs to be able to show the Russian people some kind of success.
So, as with all negotiations of this kind, this is largely about Finding both sides a way of reaching a reasonable compromise without losing face, without being humiliated.
And that goes for us, of course.
Obviously, we can't simply give in to Russian demands.
But, you know, I think that if we can find a way of helping If we want Putin and the Russians to back away from this, we should pursue this.
Because that is the very essence of diplomacy.
And also, I might say differently, if I thought we were ready to fight, but we're not ready to fight.
And if you're not ready to fight, you better talk, right?
Yeah, exactly.
Well, this brings a question.
And I think we've had, as we continue this conversation, it brings back something that jumped in my mind as you were talking about this.
And that is the outcome.
What is the outcome?
And, you know, at one moment you start the conversation, you sort of think you have the answer.
And as we've been talking, the question that keeps coming to my mind is, what is...
As you said, end it for Putin.
What is a win?
Why pick on Ukraine now?
Why pick the country?
Why take this on?
Maybe for those in America and even Western Europe who may not understand, there has to be more than just The expansionist, the Monroe Doctrine, as you said, what is in it for them?
Because just simply to take over land in which it would be very difficult to govern in many ways, resembling a very different version of Afghanistan or other places, what's in it?
I mean, Putin has to have a reason that he could articulate for saying, this is our national interest beyond nationalistic pride.
What would it be?
Yeah, I mean, the first is simply to prevent a potentially hostile alliance from moving up to Russia's borders.
And I think what alarmed the Russians, as Putin has openly said, and Russian officials, was this idea that without, because of US arms supplies and training the Ukrainian army and because of NATO exercises in the Black Sea, that without Joining NATO, Ukraine could become a major non-NATO ally of the United States and could essentially be in NATO with everything but names.
So they're determined to stop that.
The other thing, I think, is these moves of the Ukrainian state, especially over the past year, to try to really reduce the role of the Russian language and Russian culture.
In Ukraine, to ban it in higher education, to ban it in service industries, to ban it in, you know, official communications.
Now, which, by the way, is very much what the Baltic states did after being invited to join NATO and the European Union.
Now, in Ukraine, a lot of this is, in many parts of Ukraine, this is purely theoretical.
But as I say, it certainly does give the Russians the idea that, you know, there is an attempt to destroy Russia's historical role in Ukraine, which they are determined to prevent.
My own view of the solution Would be, you know, Ukrainian neutrality, in fact, if not in name, which actually, to a considerable extent, you have, since it's not going to join NATO and the European Union.
But, you know, a form of neutrality that would leave, that would also, I mean, the point about the Austrian treaty, it didn't just ban Austria joining NATO and the European Union, it also banned Austria from being drawn into You know, the Warsaw Pact or Comic-Con.
So, I mean, any agreement on Ukrainian neutrality would have to be completely reciprocal.
In other words, you can't join NATO, but you also cannot join a Russian-led alliance, you know, the Eurasian Union.
And then Ukraine left free to try to develop in a Western-style free market democracy on the model of Austria or Finland.
That's what I would like to see as the way out.
It is interesting.
And it's also still the issues of, from a military perspective, as you said, not having someone right on your border, but also the port access in the Black Sea.
You have other issues there as well.
If I could just add something on that, you know, NATO membership for Ukraine, I mean, now the Russians have occupied Crimea, so this is never going to happen.
But, you know, until they occupied Crimea, NATO membership for Ukraine implied that Ukraine, backed by NATO, would tell the Russians to leave the base of Sevastopol, you know, which is a base of immense...
Not just strategic importance, but also emotional importance.
You know, that, for Russia, Sevastopol is like a combination of Pearl Harbor and the Alamo.
And I really do not think, however democratic the vote might be in some parallel universe in Hawaii or Texas, southern Texas, that America would take kindly to being told to withdraw from those two places, especially as part of a process involving the expansion of China.
Something tells me that that process would not work out well, and it hasn't worked out well in the case of Russia.
I understand it.
Well, let's bring that, but before I get back, you brought it up and I want to take on this tack because this has started to come up in the last few days here in the United States and others, and that is this discussion of the China variable here.
And...
Many playing the way that the Biden administration is playing it now, that they're playing Putin into Xi's sphere of influence.
If you look at this, the third party not participating is the actual winner here.
With China's influence in Southeast Asia, it's continuing aggressiveness to Taiwan and to other places.
Where do you see two who inherently are not allies, but being thrown into a position in which they could have to have a different relationship than they do now, possibly with China holding a little bit more of the advantage?
Well, I think China, if God forbid, you know, it comes to this and there is a Russian invasion and massive Western sanctions, I think China will have a huge advantage now over Russia.
And China's energy security, both, you know, Physical security and in terms of price will be hugely increased.
That doesn't mean that China is going to offer to fight for Russia.
It isn't any more than Russia is going to offer to fight for Taiwan.
But certainly, I mean, The way things are going.
People have been warning about this for many, many years.
You know, the expansion of NATO, the threat to what Russians have defined as their vital national interests, was bound to push Russia closer to China.
And given that, you know, in many ways, I mean, obviously the Biden administration, but in some respects, even since, you know, the pivot to Asia in 2011 by the Obama administration, you know, the American establishment has defined China as the by far the the American establishment has defined China as the by far the biggest I mean, for obvious reasons.
The Russian economy is what?
An eighth of the American economy?
Something like that, you know.
Russia is not a global threat to American primacy.
China is.
And, you know, pushing those two countries together, you know, does seem to violate that absolutely, you know, fundamental rule of realist foreign policy, which is that you divide your enemies instead of uniting them, which, of course, is what Nixon and Kissinger did in the 1970s, when they turned China Against the USSR. Of course, in historical retrospect, that may turn out to have been a dreadful, dreadful mistake, but it certainly looked sensible in the context of the Cold War.
It did.
Well, and I think this is an interesting, you know, juxtaposition.
I was on a very early interview here in the United States earlier this morning at Local, and it was this discussion of why should, you know, because there's a lot of discussion now about 8,000 troops being prepared readiness from American standpoint to possibly go to the Ukraine.
I would, I just don't see that.
Not to Ukraine.
To NATO. To the Baltic.
Yes.
But even going period.
And in this idea of discussion, I mean, you're just coming out of a very botched Afghanistan withdrawal in the United States view.
Many and most of the world, for that matter, if you look at Western European capitals and you listen to the comments, just the haphazardness of Afghanistan, very fresh, 13 lost lives.
I mean, there's a lot of things here.
Do you feel like that Putin and Russia, if hit Now, with a taste of what would happen if they invaded from an economic standpoint, do you see that affecting what they do?
Do you think they would stand down?
Do you think they would work more toward upending the Kyiv government?
Where do you see this playing out?
Because all sides right now are looking at a damnable position, if you would, in many ways.
What do you see if there was a pushback from the West To say, look, I'm going to give you a taste of what you're asking for here.
And if you don't back off, this is what it's going to look like.
Do you think that's a credible way to look at what many are calling the bully on the stage?
Well, I mean, I have to say, you know, I agree with Anthony Blinken there.
I mean, the risk about this is that you basically use up all your ammunition in advance.
You know, you shoot your bolt as far as sanctions are concerned.
And if Russia, and Russia then essentially thinks that it has nothing To lose.
The other problem is, of course, that as we know, once you impose sanctions, it is damnably difficult to lift them again.
Whereas, obviously, if you're trying to get Russia to do things, you also have to say, okay, and if you do what we want, we'll lift the sanctions again.
But I think the Russian analysis will be once the sanctions are there, They're going to stay there because then they will be linked to, you know, Russian occupation of Crimea, which Russia is never going to give up.
And my fear is that that would then be the signal for Russia to say, okay, we have nothing to lose.
We might as well, you know, go the whole hog.
So no, I mean, I think that we have to threaten Russia with massive sanctions in the event of a Russian invasion.
But I think we need to keep those, you know, in hand.
As a weapon.
Because also, of course, when it comes to the Russian annexation of Crimea and what Russia has done in the Donbas, the West has sanctions in place and those have in fact been intensified.
But since the latest crisis erupted, there was a cyber attack, of course, probably a pretty minor one.
I mean, Russia has assembled all these troops on the border, but it hasn't actually done anything.
You know, these troops have not crossed the border into Ukraine.
They haven't attacked.
They are sitting there.
On Russian territory, you know, they are within Russia.
So that, so far, there isn't actually the legal excuse for imposing more sanctions, which of course there would be if Russia invades.
So I think we have to be very, very cautious about that.
You know, you keep your big club in hand, because, you know, if you use it, and it doesn't work, You have nothing more in hand.
But also I think that, you know, the Russian government knows very well the economic damage that it will suffer if it invades Ukraine.
And, you know, there's no need to remind them of that.
They know it.
If they do invade Ukraine, they will do it having decided that they are prepared to accept that damage.
As we're sort of wrapping in this, because I want to wrap all this into this discussion, do you think that, let's say...
Russia, Putin makes the calculated risk that we're going to send troops in.
I think that's a, you know, I'm not even going to put a percentage on it.
I think it's a very real possibility.
I think they're weighing that.
Will you see, from your experience, I know that there'll be an American response.
Do you see a unified Western European response as far as economic sanctions?
Or will they be, as we've seen in the past, a splitting of some of the Western European countries thinking that they could, you know, ride both sides of the issue, so to speak.
Well, I think the split will come simply over gas.
The breaking point will be when we're basically telling the Germans and others that you can't buy gas.
Russian gas anymore, or you can't pay for it and therefore the Russians won't deliver it.
And the German government then looks at what the effects of that would be on the German economy and on their own popularity ratings.
And I don't know.
Maybe.
Well, at least, this is where I think, you know, Biden's remarks about a limited incursion, they may have been, you know, it may have been a mistake to say them publicly.
But in themselves, they were perfectly sensible, because I think that would be a key difference.
If Russia, you know, basically just tried to take the rest of the Donbass from Ukraine, I think it would be very difficult to get the Germans and others to go along.
You know, with a complete, you know, shutdown of Russian gas.
Of course, if there were a full-scale invasion, you know, in other words, Russia really tries to take half the country, that would be a different matter.
But that's also a reason, of course, as Biden said, you know, not to use up all your economic, because one possible scenario is Russia, you know, drives Ukraine out of the rest of the Donbass, a couple of towns there, and then stops and says, look, we've shown what we can do now.
Let's talk again about what we want.
If the West then, you know, imposes what's been called a nuclear option, you know, expelling Russia from swift bank payment system, and so Russia says, fine, well, then, you know, we have nothing more to lose, we'll go all the way, not all the way to Kiev, but, you know, basically take all the Russian speaking areas of Ukraine and then offer to, you know, to, again, to negotiate and reunite Ukraine.
But now, on the basis of autonomy, not just for the Donbass, but for all the Russian speaking areas of Ukraine, so a federal Ukraine, plus neutrality.
I don't think Russia is going to annex any more territory, but I think it will, if they do invade, they will hold more territory and then try to bargain with it, is, I think, the most likely scenario.
But, as I say, I don't think that they have yet decided to do that.
I think the negotiating process is still real, and there is still a real possibility that we can get a compromise.
Are we...
I won't ask you do you think that Russia will do a partial invasion, total invasion, however you want to look at it.
I'm not going to ask that question.
I think we've sort of looked at all angles.
But one thing I will ask, do you see this as playing out...
Could Putin be playing a long game here because he knows he can just keep his troops on Soviet soil, having minor skirmishes in certain areas, but keep them where they're at.
Keep this negotiation playing out until there is a weariness, if you would, Among Western European allies, the Americans and others, is that a possibility as well that this is not, you know, everybody wants to hype it up as saying, oh, well, this week we're going to see an invasion.
And the reality is we could still be dealing with this two to three to four weeks down the road.
Yeah, I think that's a real possibility.
And of course, I mean, the point is the Russian army is there in Russia, which borders on Ukraine.
So, you know, the Russian army is always going to be there.
But I think it'd be difficult to keep the, you know, the troops out there in tents indefinitely.
You know, equipment decays, the troops get fed up, you know.
So he can do that for a considerable time, but not forever.
If someone is still in the military, yes, you do not want to be on deployment for a long period of time with nothing to do, that is for sure.
One quick thing, and I want...
It's not fun.
Believe me.
One of the things I do want to turn this to, because a lot of Americans have never traveled to Eastern Europe.
I have had the ability to travel to certain areas, Prague, many of the countries in that area.
On a lighter note, to sort of end the podcast, It is a very ancient, and I say that in historical terms, it's a very beautiful, it is a very unique part of the world.
How much better if we could find a semblance of stability in those regions?
I think the world would be better off from a perspective of travel and tourism and life because the very heart of civilizations, many of which spawn from that area.
Oh, I entirely agree.
And I love much of Eastern Europe.
You know, as I say, I lived in the Baltic states.
I'm deeply attached to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and, you know, to the former Habsburg lands in Central Europe.
And I would also like to say that, you know, the problem about Ukraine is precisely that we're making a commitment that we're sort of suggesting or...
Hinting at a commitment that we won't honour.
But don't get me wrong, you know, we, America, Britain, all the NATO allies, you know, we have undertaken a formal treaty obligation, Biden called it a sacred obligation, I agree with that, to defend NATO members.
You know, the Baltic States, Poland, the Czech Republic, and so forth.
Now, we have to honour that, that I passionately believe in.
You know, we are In honour bound to defend these countries.
But very fortunately, I don't think that Russia is actually threatening to attack them.
But if it did, if it did, then we would have to fight.
There should be no question about that whatsoever.
You know, no question of will we fight?
Will we not fight?
No.
For NATO members, we have to fight if they're attacked.
This has been fascinating, and I think it provides a very interesting outlook on the different aspects of what's going on in the Ukraine, the different choices, the sort of Solomonic choices that both Russia, Putin is having to weigh, also the Western allies in America is having to weigh.
You've provided a great insight to that.
But I'll have to also say I would love to get you back on because I have always been fascinated by the India-Pakistan Thank
you for inviting me.
Bye bye.
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