CSPAN - European Officials Discuss Russia-Ukraine War
Aired: 2026-02-27
Duration: 57:53


=== Three-Time Pulitzer Winner Discusses (03:49) ===

[00:00:00]  Eastern and Pacific, only on C-SPAN.
[00:00:08]  Watch America's Book Club, C-SPAN's bold original series.
[00:00:12]  Sunday, with our guest three-time Pulitzer Prize winning author, Rick Atkinson, author of In-Depth Revolutionary War and World War II trilogies.
[00:00:22]  and whose other books include The Long Gray Line, Crusade, and In the Company of Soldiers.
[00:00:28]  He joins our host, renowned author and civic leader David Rubinstein.
[00:00:33]  Wasn't one book enough?
[00:00:34]  Because when you say you're going to write a trilogy, if you're tired of the subject here for the first book, you got to write the second and the third.
[00:00:40]  So did you ever think maybe you should have just say, I'm going to do one at a time?
[00:00:43]  I had two small epiphanies.
[00:00:47]  One was that the great events in American history are bottomless.
[00:00:51]  And the other epiphany was that you could tell the story as a triptych.
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[00:01:08]  Watch America's Book Club with Rick Atkinson.
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[00:01:24]  Up next, European officials speaking about their approach to the war between Russia and Ukraine.
[00:01:29]  The discussion touched on how the conflict has evolved in the process of peace talks.
[00:01:34]  It comes as the war enters its fourth year.
[00:01:36]  This was hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations.
[00:01:39]  Good morning,
[00:02:13]  everyone.
[00:02:14]  Good morning.
[00:02:14]  Thanks for coming.
[00:02:15]  Welcome to our Securing Ukraine's Future Symposium.
[00:02:20]  As we enter the fifth year of the war in Ukraine, the stakes have never been higher.
[00:02:25]  At the Munich Security Conference earlier this month, Western intelligence and military officials revealed the latest estimate of Russian casualties, 65,000, over the course of December and January.
[00:02:37]  That's about a thousand casualties a day.
[00:02:41]  But the Russians are not winning this war, which has now lasted longer than the Great Patriotic War and resulted only in Russian control of an incremental 12% of Ukraine's territory since the full-scale invasion.
[00:02:54]  The question, though, that is still very much open is how do we secure a Ukraine that is prosperous, independent, and embedded in the West.
[00:03:06]  More than a year ago, the Council launched this initiative led by senior fellow Paul Stares to take on three major questions.
[00:03:13]  How to achieve peace and secure a just and durable end to the war, how to drive Ukraine's economic reconstruction and recovery, spur growth and rebuild critical infrastructure, and how to strengthen Europe's long-term security framework.
[00:03:27]  And those priorities are now reflected in a series of new policy briefs published by Paul and Liana Fix, Ben Harris, Sam Vogerski, Heidi Kribo-Redecker, and Tom Graham, examining everything from how Europe can manage Russian aggression with less U.S. support to harnessing Ukraine's defense industrial base as an engine for Europe's own economic and security renewal.

=== Mr. President's Cuba Deal (07:24) ===

[00:03:49]  I encourage you all to read these excellent papers.
[00:03:52]  Today's sessions will take up these themes with three panels.
[00:03:56]  Europe's approach to the war in Ukraine, a conversation with Ukrainian Ambassador Olga Stepanishnya, and the U.S. Vision for Ukraine, featuring Senators Shireen and Tillis, a bipartisan representation from this is available to watch online at our website, c-span.org.
[00:04:14]  We are going to leave this here for now for remarks from President Trump made just a short time ago.
[00:04:22]  No, I'm not.
[00:04:23]  I'm not happy with the fact that they're not willing to give us what we have to have.
[00:04:28]  So I'm not thrilled with that.
[00:04:29]  We'll see what happens.
[00:04:30]  We're talking later.
[00:04:33]  We'll have some additional talks today.
[00:04:35]  But, no, I'm not happy with the way they're going.
[00:04:37]  The Press has heard at all about having a bill saying he deposed, and that that sets precedent for you and your family.
[00:04:43]  The President I don't like seeing him deposed.
[00:04:45]  But, you know, they certainly went after me a lot more than that.
[00:04:51]  I don't like it.
[00:04:52]  I don't like Bill Clinton.
[00:04:53]  I like him.
[00:04:55]  I don't like seeing him at the post.
[00:04:56]  The Press. The Press. The Press. The Press. The Press. The Press. The Press. The Press.
[00:05:05]  He's a very innocent guy.
[00:05:06]  He's doing a good job.
[00:05:07]  Mr. President, you said you're coming from Barack, now he's in Iraq.
[00:05:10]  What's your message to the Iraqi leadership?
[00:05:13]  Well, I get along very well with the Iraqi leadership.
[00:05:16]  Thank you.
[00:05:19]  Governor Britton approached on social media that we're planning to steal the 2026 midterm elections.
[00:05:25]  In fact, he says the plan is already underway.
[00:05:27]  How does the problem is going to pick up?
[00:05:29]  Well, he's got to focus on crime in his state.
[00:05:33]  The crime in his state is doing very badly.
[00:05:36]  If we went and took care of it, just like Washington, D.C., we have no crime.
[00:05:42]  Memphis, it's down 82%.
[00:05:46]  Louisiana, you take a look at Louisiana.
[00:05:49]  And what he should really do is focus on crime in his state, because there's too much of it.
[00:05:54]  The Pressure on Iran.
[00:05:57]  Have you made a final decision on Iran?
[00:06:01]  No, I haven't.
[00:06:09]  Well, we haven't made a final decision.
[00:06:11]  We're not exactly happy with the way they're negotiating.
[00:06:15]  They cannot have nuclear weapons.
[00:06:17]  And we're not thrilled with the way they're negotiating.
[00:06:20]  So, we'll see how it all works.
[00:06:29]  The Cuban government is talking with us.
[00:06:33]  They're in a big deal of trouble, as you know.
[00:06:35]  They have no money.
[00:06:36]  They have no anything right now.
[00:06:38]  But they're talking with us.
[00:06:41]  And maybe we'll have a friendly takeover of Cuba.
[00:06:46]  We could very well end up having a friendly takeover of Cuba.
[00:06:50]  But what about the remote service?
[00:06:51]  After many, many years, we've had a lot of years of dealing with Cuba.
[00:06:55]  I've been hearing about Cuba since I'm a little boy, but they're in big trouble.
[00:07:00]  And we could very well, something could, I think, very positive for the people that were expelled or worse from Cuba that live here.
[00:07:10]  You know, we have people living here that want to go back to Cuba, and they're very happy with what's going on.
[00:07:16]  The last news of F-15.
[00:07:21]  The people are being pleased to hear about that.
[00:07:24]  I don't know anything about the F-15, you know.
[00:07:27]  I've been fully exonerated.
[00:07:30]  You've been briefed on for Iran.
[00:07:32]  Is there a risk that right could turn into a long-drawn-out conflict in the Middle East?
[00:07:38]  I guess you could say there's always a risk.
[00:07:40]  You know, when there's war, there's a risk in anything, both good and bad.
[00:07:44]  We've had tremendous luck with myself, Salome, Al-Baghdadi.
[00:07:50]  Everything's worked out, and then we do the Midnight Hammer and so many others.
[00:07:55]  Everything's worked out and we want to keep it that way, but we're going to see.
[00:07:59]  Look, it'd be wonderful if they negotiate really in good conscience, good faith, and conscience, but they are not getting there.
[00:08:10]  So far, Peter, they're not getting there.
[00:08:11]  And I've told you that if you use the military now, that there will be regime teams right away.
[00:08:19]  No, nobody's covering that.
[00:08:22]  You don't know.
[00:08:22]  I mean, nobody knows.
[00:08:24]  There might be and there might not be.
[00:08:28]  It would be nice if we could do it without, but sometimes you have to do it with.
[00:08:32]  We, when you looked at what, look, we have the greatest military anywhere in the world.
[00:08:37]  There's nothing close.
[00:08:38]  I'd love not to use it, but sometimes you have to.
[00:08:41]  Mr. President, Mr. President, to be clear.
[00:08:44]  The President is doing very badly.
[00:08:51]  They're failing.
[00:08:52]  Cuba right now is, to put it mildly, a failing nation.
[00:08:57]  And I've been hearing about Cuba.
[00:08:58]  I said before, since I'm a little boy, I've been hearing about Cuba.
[00:09:02]  And everybody wanted to change it.
[00:09:04]  I can see that happening.
[00:09:05]  Marco Rubio is dealing on it and at a very high level.
[00:09:10]  And, you know, they have no money, they have no oil, they have no food.
[00:09:14]  And it's really, right now, a nation in deep trouble, and they want our help.
[00:09:18]  The President, you're going, Mr. President, Mr. President, you're going, Mr. President.
[00:09:23]  The President is praying, and I love to do this, thank you, and I'm getting to see that war over with.
[00:09:32]  I spoke with President Trump.
[00:09:34]  We'd like to see the war end.
[00:09:36]  And I would like to see that fast.
[00:09:38]  The President, sir, are you the same?
[00:09:41]  It's crazy.
[00:09:43]  To have that war is just absolutely game.
[00:09:47]  Sir, are you?
[00:09:50]  Sir, are you considering a national emergency?
[00:09:58]  There's been reporting that there's an executive order, proposed executive order about this.
[00:10:02]  Are you looking at that?
[00:10:10]  If you have a family member, you can call them a family member of the country, and you can call them a family member, and you can call them a family member,
[00:10:40]  We want to make a deal with pressure, we want to make a deal with the trade.
[00:11:04]  Those were the latest comments from President Trump.
[00:11:07]  We return now to our scheduled programming already in progress.
[00:11:12]  Of course, not a good one.

=== Hope Amid Blockages (15:17) ===

[00:11:14]  I was actually feeling quite good until that news because I think Ambassador Billy can understand that because the Winter Olympics in Beijing had just ended.
[00:11:26]  My government was just two months in office.
[00:11:28]  It was our first big sort of test how to weather that with very serious human rights concerns in China.
[00:11:34]  So I thought also, will this mean our relationship to China?
[00:11:39]  And of course, the Russian joint statement, Chinese joint statement with the famous phrase friendship, without upper limits, no taboos in our forbidden areas in our cooperation came back to mind.
[00:11:50]  We had a China strategy two years later, which was a much more hard-nosed one than the one we had before.
[00:11:56]  And I think without the Russian invasion, we would not have had that one.
[00:12:00]  That's another of the kind of maybe collateral effects.
[00:12:03]  Maybe we get to that later.
[00:12:05]  Many collateral effects that Mr. Putin, with his crazy and irrelegal and brutal attack on Ukraine, has caused.
[00:12:15]  Could we talk a little bit about the way that the narrative has changed in your specific countries?
[00:12:21]  You know, I'm just thinking here in the U.S., the war was certainly top of mind four years ago.
[00:12:25]  Last night when the President gave the State of the Union address, a couple of you were there, heard it in person.
[00:12:30]  It was barely mentioned.
[00:12:32]  There was a UN General Assembly resolution yesterday.
[00:12:35]  The U.S. abstained from that resolution.
[00:12:38]  I've been going to Ukraine regularly.
[00:12:40]  Very quickly to summarize there, the attitude seems to be we're exhausted.
[00:12:45]  It gets harder every year, but we're going to keep fighting and we don't want to settle for an unjust peace.
[00:12:52]  So every country or place has its own slightly different narrative and I'd like to talk about how that has changed.
[00:12:58]  Ambassador Pri, maybe you could start us off.
[00:13:05]  Yes, I'm.
[00:13:08]  Okay, I hope you can hear me now.
[00:13:12]  So I think for us, the very first weeks of the invasion, I think us and many others pretty much just scrambled just to help Ukraine to survive that first wave of attacks and atrocities.
[00:13:37]  But very soon, I would say after Russians withdrew from the vicinity of Kiev, but regrouped to Donbass in the end of March and throughout April 2022,
[00:13:54]  it became very clear that the first hand, the attempt to, Russian attempt to quickly break Ukrainians clearly failed.
[00:14:08]  Secondly, that Russians won't simply abort their plans.
[00:14:15]  And hence, thirdly, it was also very clear that it was going to be a long war.
[00:14:26]  And even before that, it was becoming very clear that the outcome of this war would have a way wider impact than these related to Ukraine.
[00:14:43]  We could just look at the Russian ultimata to NATO and the US in December 2021, or even go back to Putin's speech in Munich in 2007.
[00:14:58]  So very early on in this war, we focused quite quickly on the longer-term picture.
[00:15:09]  And I think we were also among the very first who took long-term commitments to support Ukraine with military aid, but also with civilian reconstruction aid.
[00:15:24]  So and it has pretty much the kind of commitment and the focus on this war has pretty much stayed very similar in Estonia.
[00:15:35]  Because after all, we understand very clearly that Neither the Russian objectives nor the eventual repercussions of this war are only limited to Ukraine.
[00:15:54]  They are not only limited to even NATO's Eastern Flank or Europe, but these impacts will be felt globally.
[00:16:05]  And therefore, we absolutely have stayed the course, have seen the need to, on the one hand, support Ukraine as strongly as we can, but at the same time deny Russians the resources and ability to further escalate this war and draw it out forever as core elements of our collective strategy.
[00:16:35]  Thank you.
[00:16:36]  Ambassador Bedli, what's the conversation like in France?
[00:16:39]  Not just at the official level, but among ordinary French.
[00:16:42]  But I'd like to come back to that because I think from the very beginning we understood that it was the end of an era.
[00:16:48]  And the fact that war was back in Europe was a defining moment.
[00:16:53]  But being in China, it was also interesting to see that we had to convince others far away, including our friends from South America, from Africa, that it was something of a different scale.
[00:17:07]  And from the very beginning, we have seen that Russia was trying to make things complex, what they called the root cause of the conflict and these kind of things.
[00:17:16]  And we have to push back again and again on the things that, okay, it's complex, but it's also very simple.
[00:17:23]  There is an aggressor and there is a victim.
[00:17:25]  And the right thing to do is to support Ukraine.
[00:17:28]  And still today, we have 60% of the French people thinking that way.
[00:17:32]  60%.
[00:17:33]  Ambassador Sorensen, a slight twist to that question.
[00:17:36]  The war has in many ways been stalemated with relatively little movement on the battleground.
[00:17:43]  Are you seeing, either at the official level or among ordinary Danes, an expectation that the war is going to be settled anytime soon, either through diplomatic means or that there will be some breakthrough by one side or the other on the battlefield?
[00:18:00]  Well, we certainly hope so.
[00:18:01]  We very much support the diplomatic discussions, but hope is not a strategy.
[00:18:07]  And I think in the Danish political system, there's not a lot of real assessment that Putin is up for a deal anytime soon.
[00:18:22]  We believe, coming back to what has also been said, that this is a generational question for Europe, for us.
[00:18:29]  I would also just like, because I can repeat what my colleagues have said, but I also think that it has given legitimacy to decisions which would otherwise have not been possible also in domestic politics.
[00:18:43]  We are essentially now, I think, already at 5% of GDP in, depending on how you calculate the last 1.5% that NATO has come up with.
[00:18:52]  And we were at 1.3% just five years back.
[00:18:57]  So a major part of that boost of giving political legitimacy, of course, to raising those defense spending is also because of what has happened in our own neighborhood.
[00:19:07]  And also because we realize that we are for something which is for the long haul.
[00:19:16]  Even if there is a temporary ceasefire in Ukraine, I don't think that the general sense in Denmark, in the political system, in public opinion, is that that means it's then over.
[00:19:31]  We think that our assessment is that Putin has what is essentially almost imperialistic ambitions.
[00:19:38]  So We are looking into a challenge which is long term and that we will have to tackle, certainly together with our European friends and hopefully together with our American friends as well.
[00:19:53]  Martin, I want to talk about something that took place in Germany in December at the Helmut Schmidt University of the German Armed Forces.
[00:20:01]  There was a war game simulating a Russian incursion into Lithuania and it involved former senior German and NATO officials.
[00:20:14]  Russia used the pretext of a humanitarian crisis in Kaliningrad, that little Russian enclave separated from the rest of Russia.
[00:20:25]  As the war game played out, the US didn't invoke Article 5.
[00:20:30]  The Germans were a little indecisive.
[00:20:33]  Can you talk about that and what that said?
[00:20:37]  I know it stirred quite a bit of debate about how well Europe is prepared for potential threats from Russia.
[00:20:45]  Yeah, I think if you talk about public debate and political debate in Germany, I think one change since the invasion, full invasion, has been fundamental, and that is our threat perception.
[00:21:00]  There are always outliers, usually extreme left, extreme right, but I think the realization that Russia is a direct military security threat to Germany has really sunk in.
[00:21:11]  And I think in the coming years, we will see this sinking even further.
[00:21:16]  Just one example, I'm not going to cite the defense expenditure things.
[00:21:19]  That's very well published.
[00:21:20]  The President mentioned it in the State of Union Affairs Union Address yesterday.
[00:21:25]  We're going to increase our armed forces by 40% by 100,000 people within the next few years.
[00:21:32]  This will have a fundamental psychological effect.
[00:21:37]  If you look at our armed forces, our entire political establishment, decision makers, there's been a fundamental change in mindset.
[00:21:45]  Within the wider population, it will take a couple of years, but I'm totally convinced because unfortunately Russia will give us more and more examples that prove that our threat perception is correct.
[00:21:56]  This will change also.
[00:21:57]  We've had six decades of, for obvious historical reasons, of pacifist kind of education in Germany and a pacifist mindset.
[00:22:06]  But you see the reputation of our security establishment, of the armed forces, of the police anyway, is improving.
[00:22:12]  It's going up.
[00:22:13]  So we are on the right trajectory.
[00:22:17]  About war games and sort of scenario assessments, I understand that you always have to also take into account low probability, high-risk scenarios.
[00:22:27]  We all know that.
[00:22:29]  And that's maybe all I have to say about that particular event you mentioned.
[00:22:34]  But I'm absolutely confident.
[00:22:36]  On the other hand, we're a country of free speech.
[00:22:38]  Of course, after four years of war, First World War lasted four years.
[00:22:42]  I looked it up.
[00:22:43]  Three months, 14 days.
[00:22:44]  We might have a war here that's longer than the First World War.
[00:22:47]  There's certain parallels, as we know, it's been analyzed, war of attrition and so on.
[00:22:51]  It's absolutely understandable, and it is right to discuss how can this war be ended.
[00:22:56]  And of course, there's an open debate on that in all our countries, how that can be achieved.
[00:23:02]  But I think that, and partly informed by, partly also influenced by Russian disinformation campaigns, but also not just that.
[00:23:09]  I think it's a legitimate debate.
[00:23:11]  We take up that debate, but I think we're making a very good case that we support Ukraine as long as it takes and with whatever it needs.
[00:23:18]  So I'd like to have all of you help explain to us here in the US.
[00:23:23]  We've seen an administration that says we're not going to aid Ukraine anymore.
[00:23:28]  They have stopped.
[00:23:29]  And Europe has certainly stepped up.
[00:23:31]  It's providing more aid.
[00:23:32]  And yet we also saw on Monday a large loan that was supposed to win approval was blocked by basically by Hungary.
[00:23:41]  Further sanctions were blocked again.
[00:23:43]  So, you know, can you give us a sense?
[00:23:46]  There seems to be a general European stepping up, but there's still these blockages or barriers.
[00:23:56]  Help us understand how this is going.
[00:24:00]  To what extent it's a limited number of players, to what extent the continent is still debating this.
[00:24:06]  Ambassador Pri, please start us off.
[00:24:11]  I think we have to understand that we are currently going through an experiment that has no former president in the history of the EU.
[00:24:26]  And there are hiccups on the way.
[00:24:30]  And there are tough moments.
[00:24:34]  I, for sure, individually, and my government too, we are very disappointed that the Hungarian government decided to escalate some of their domestic problems and some of the issues that they may have had with Kiev to the level where actually the very.
[00:25:04]  essential loan, and as well as the sanctions, have been blocked for now.
[00:25:11]  But I'm sure they'll come around.
[00:25:14]  We'll find a way to go on with that.
[00:25:18]  We absolutely do believe that just as Russians are not only fighting the Ukrainian military on the front lines, but they are actively taking measures to try to break the resilience of Ukrainian people and to deliver them the message that there is no hope out there,
[00:25:43]  that other countries won't support them as much as they will.
[00:25:48]  would need to.
[00:25:49]  We have to prove them wrong.
[00:25:51]  And thus far, there have been many road bumps throughout these four years.
[00:25:59]  But eventually I'm absolutely confident that Ukraine is currently on a, let's say, better ground or stronger ground than they were exactly four years ago.
[00:26:12]  And Europe in general, in terms of its cohesiveness, in terms of its understanding of the nature and the durability of the problem, is also in a better place.
[00:26:26]  So we'll find a way and we'll continue to support Ukraine.

=== Coalition Efforts Against Adversaries (15:37) ===

[00:26:32]  Ambassador Billy?
[00:26:33]  Well, I think so far we have shown that each time that we were a noddle on the way, we managed to turn it on.
[00:26:41]  And I think we will do the same in that case.
[00:26:43]  I think it's fair for the European to take a big part of the support to Ukraine.
[00:26:50]  At the same time, I think that we have also to make the point that what is going on in Ukraine is not only in Europe, but it's observed.
[00:27:00]  Again, coming back from China, I'm quite sure that in Beijing they will draw conclusions of what they will observe in Europe.
[00:27:09]  And I think it's a lesson for all of us.
[00:27:13]  I'll note that in just a few moments, we're going to take some questions, both here in the room and for those who are joining us virtually.
[00:27:19]  So please get your questions ready.
[00:27:21]  But in the final minutes here, I'd like to ask Ambassador Sorensen, Talk to us about security guarantees, because that certainly seems to be, if we are going to reach a resolution in this war, one of the key questions.
[00:27:35]  As specifically as you can, and again, it doesn't exist right now, but what is the nature of the discussion and what would you consider to be legitimate?
[00:27:44]  Well, yeah, first of all, if we ever get into a situation where the security guarantees is, you know, it requires a ceasefire.
[00:27:55]  before we can actually commit to what we are doing within coalition of the willing and so on.
[00:27:59]  The Danish government has already committed up front that we are ready to partake in that.
[00:28:05]  We have actually also taken the further step of going to parliament in advance and get the green light without being able to tell parliament what it is that they are greenlighting in terms of capabilities and footprints.
[00:28:20]  But just to show our friends and allies that we are ready to be part of such an endeavor.
[00:28:29]  And just to be clear, you're talking about sending UB Danish.
[00:28:33]  I don't want to get ahead of ourselves.
[00:28:34]  I understand.
[00:28:35]  Ceasefire, big negotiations.
[00:28:37]  But that's the kind of ideas you're talking about.
[00:28:39]  Yes.
[00:28:40]  But all of this is, of course, being coordinated within the coalition of the willing, security guarantees.
[00:28:46]  But I would like to make a further point here, which is everything we are doing is, of course, essential.
[00:28:52]  It's very important.
[00:28:54]  But we also have to recognize what has happened in Ukraine.
[00:28:58]  Because the long-term future defense of Ukraine will start with what the Ukrainians are capable of themselves.
[00:29:04]  And I think it's just incredibly impressive, both how they have managed to push back on a much larger army, the Russians.
[00:29:12]  You know, when you look at the casualty difference today, it's becoming more and more astounding month by month.
[00:29:18]  The Russians are taking in significantly more casualties than the Ukrainians are.
[00:29:25]  And I think that some of the things that we have done here is actually to be able to homegrow a defense industrial capacity in Ukraine itself.
[00:29:35]  We have introduced a Danish model.
[00:29:37]  We are now on version 2.0 of that, meaning that we are also creating safe havens in our countries to give manufacturing, Ukrainian manufacturing, a safe haven among us.
[00:29:49]  I think it's those kind of creative ideas that we also need to bring into the fore.
[00:29:54]  And then comes, if there is a ceasefire, security guarantees and all of that, coalition of the willing, how we will do that together with our partners.
[00:30:02]  But I think I just really want to make the point of the Ukrainians themselves in this defense.
[00:30:08]  They are the primary long-term future defense when it comes to Russia.
[00:30:13]  Yeah, and Martin, I'd like to do you to pick up on that on my own trips.
[00:30:16]  I see all these, everything from the little garage drone makers to much bigger efforts.
[00:30:21]  Germany, I know, is expanding its own defense capacity in terms of manufacturing, and I believe there's some cooperation with the Ukrainians as well.
[00:30:30]  Could you talk a little bit about that in terms of the specifics of what we're seeing now and what we may see in the years to come?
[00:30:37]  Yeah, on that one, just on the first question, the question you asked, I fully assure what the Estonian ambassador said.
[00:30:44]  Putin achieved a couple of things through Satak.
[00:30:46]  He united Europe.
[00:30:47]  He enlarged NATO.
[00:30:49]  He contributed towards changing our China policy.
[00:30:53]  And there are all kinds of other effects that maybe was not part of the calculus right at the beginning.
[00:30:59]  Cooperation on defense.
[00:31:01]  Also, I have a huge list of what we delivered to Ukraine.
[00:31:04]  I have a very impressive list of also what kind of cooperation projects we have with Ukraine.
[00:31:11]  We have, you name it, drone production coming online, not just with us, but also in Germany.
[00:31:19]  But that's direct cooperation.
[00:31:21]  Drone production.
[00:31:23]  Explain the level of cooperation.
[00:31:26]  We have set up production in Germany.
[00:31:28]  We have huge financial contributions towards acquisition of long-range drones by Ukraine.
[00:31:35]  We have laser AI-assisted systems.
[00:31:39]  By the way, we filled in a lot of the gaps at the beginning of the war.
[00:31:43]  There's this shortage of artillery munitions and so on.
[00:31:47]  And with the actually, it was a huge cooperative European effort.
[00:31:51]  The Czechs did a great job on that.
[00:31:53]  We filled a lot of the gaps, and that's why the conventional sort of advance of the Russians has been halted.
[00:32:01]  And now they're resorting to terror, 55,000 German attacks last year, as the Ukrainian friends tell us, to terrorizing the population.
[00:32:09]  I wonder if they studied military history.
[00:32:11]  Maybe if they have, they've drawn the wrong conclusions.
[00:32:14]  But anyhow, it's defense cooperation production in Germany in Ukraine is massive.
[00:32:21]  It's not just drones, it's air defense, it's all kinds of things.
[00:32:26]  And it's helping us as well to modernize our response and fill in gaps.
[00:32:32]  And as Mr. Froman said at the beginning, this is one of the really strong points where I think I also see a lot of potential for economic recovery.
[00:32:42]  And it's truly win-win.
[00:32:46]  It's absolutely visible.
[00:32:48]  I can vouch for that.
[00:32:49]  Ukraine is a country that wasn't making drones four years ago.
[00:32:52]  They're going to make five million or more in Ukraine now and then have these partnerships as well.
[00:32:57]  And every time I'm there, you see that there's a military defense industry conference going on.
[00:33:04]  I think we will leave it for there, this part of the discussion, and we will open it up to questions now, both here in the room and those joining virtually.
[00:33:15]  Looks like we've got some hands up right here.
[00:33:17]  Yes, sir.
[00:33:20]  Good morning, Christopher Smart from the Our Brothers Group.
[00:33:22]  I just wondered if you could give us some sense of how quickly Ukraine can expect to join the European Union and what sorts of obstacles there will be in that process.
[00:33:34]  Who wants to jump in on that one?
[00:33:37]  Well, I think there is no clear answer yet, but there is a debate about the possibility of a very quick membership.
[00:33:45]  But at the same time, if it's a quick decision, it should be a progressive integration.
[00:33:50]  But I think the debate is still open.
[00:33:57]  Yes?
[00:34:01]  Hi, thank you very much for this discussion.
[00:34:03]  James Siebens, I'm with the Stimson Center.
[00:34:05]  I wanted to ask what the Coalition of the Willing or what NATO is doing to improve deterrence of Russia's air incursions into NATO airspace.
[00:34:18]  what kind of increased cooperation and deployments might be involved well i suspect that's a bit specific but in the coalition of the willing there is an air component And so again, that coalition of the willing is supposed to be after the ceasefire and to deter incursion.
[00:34:45]  So there is three components on sea, air, and land, and of course, over part of it.
[00:34:53]  There is also a lot of cooperation going on.
[00:34:55]  And usually, air defense is a NATO anyway competency.
[00:34:59]  So there is all of an integrated system of civilians.
[00:35:05]  It looks like we have a virtual question.
[00:35:08]  We'll take our next question from Peter Galbraith.
[00:35:13]  Thank you.
[00:35:13]  My question is to Ambassador Sorensen to comment on the connection between Greenland and Ukraine.
[00:35:25]  Specifically, do you think the Trump administration's willingness to cede Ukrainian territory to Russia is related to its belief that it can seize Danish territory?
[00:35:41]  And conversely, do you think the thought of the United States taking Greenland, seizing it or acquiring it, encourages Putin in his belief that he can annex Ukrainian territory?
[00:35:57]  Well, let me limit my Greenland comment on this stage today by referring to the fact that we now have a very constructive dialogue with our American friends to find the right solutions that we all agree.
[00:36:17]  And I think as everybody knows, the Kingdom of Denmark has been exceedingly open to provide whatever asks the United States has.
[00:36:28]  I think we share the threat assessment about who our adversaries are and that we can manage together.
[00:36:36]  And I actually would think, I would also like to say that the decision here in Washington to open up for NATO's role in Arctic security in general is a very important one and one that we have been asking for for quite some time.
[00:36:53]  So the fact that that came out of this moment we had in January, I actually think was a very prudent and constructive decision.
[00:37:04]  Because of course, it should not only be the United States that has to confront our adversaries in the north, in the high north.
[00:37:12]  We do that as an alliance.
[00:37:14]  We have the same adversaries.
[00:37:18]  What I do think is that we have spent too much time and resources on one specific issue where we all had to concentrate and focus on what is the real threat, which is Russia's invasion in Ukraine.
[00:37:32]  So I'm happy that we are now back on that that is the real challenge that we have in the near future.
[00:37:40]  Yes.
[00:37:43]  Hi, Jim Slattery.
[00:37:45]  I'm just curious, what is going on in Europe to directly communicate with the Russian people in an effort to really undermine the people's support for Putin's policies, especially in areas like St. Petersburg and Moscow?
[00:38:04]  Is there anything being done to undermine Putin's support at home?
[00:38:13]  Well, I think in this kind of society, we have to acknowledge that it's very difficult to act and that our embassies are not having exactly the kind of access and usual tools.
[00:38:25]  So I have to confess, I think that our effort can be only modest in a totalitarian state, where we have seen recently also what happened to Mr. Navalny.
[00:38:35]  So it's a huge risk for anyone connecting with us these days.
[00:38:41]  I'd like to bring Ambassador Prekin on this.
[00:38:43]  I know that there were many, there were Russians who went to Estonia.
[00:38:47]  I know some media organizations that were in Russia have moved there.
[00:38:53]  What are you seeing in Estonia that addresses this question in terms of countering the Russian narrative in Estonia by either Russians who've come there or Estonians?
[00:39:08]  Thank you.
[00:39:09]  Yes.
[00:39:11]  There are people, there are organizations, there are efforts to reach the wider Russian audience with the information from abroad, including from Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania.
[00:39:30]  But just as Ambassador Lee mentioned, our ability to reach the Russian audience as much as I would like to say it otherwise, I think is relatively limited, at least the ability to reach them directly in a way that would bring a major societal change.
[00:39:59]  However, the Russian people may have been turned numb in a way, and their political activity or their willingness to speak up on an average day may be very different than what we experience in the West.
[00:40:28]  But even if numbed, they have not been turned into dumbs.
[00:40:34]  So the effect of economic struggles, the effect of thousands of soldiers being killed on the front lines for no effect is something that slowly but surely definitely has its effect on the Russian society.
[00:41:04]  too.
[00:41:05]  Even though very, very limited.
[00:41:07]  Just a very yes, take your point.
[00:41:09]  Just a very brief follow-up though.
[00:41:11]  If a Russian news organization moved to Estonia after the end of the war and were putting their material on the internet, could Russians access that if they wanted to?
[00:41:20]  Is it just that it hasn't hit a large critical mass, but it was available?
[00:41:25]  I've seen some things recently where the Russians are internally cracking down on Telegram, which is very, very popular.
[00:41:32]  But were Russians able to get information from Estonia or other countries in Europe if they wanted it?
[00:41:42]  Initially, mostly yes, but Russia has been cracking down on the information space for years.
[00:41:53]  So it's become increasingly more and more difficult, even the use of VPNs and other techniques or technologies has become very much more difficult and more risky.

=== Patterns Of Ukrainian Refugees (05:40) ===

[00:42:09]  But I think from the very get-go, the problem was that not that large part of the society was really hungry for information from outside, but they were pretty comfortable with whatever they were fed by the Russian state television generals.
[00:42:38]  Yes, right here.
[00:42:43]  Thank you all, Alan Goodman from the Institute of International Education.
[00:42:48]  There's a large Ukrainian diaspora population now in many of your countries.
[00:42:54]  How large and what is their expected stay?
[00:43:05]  Well, we have a very large population of Ukrainians.
[00:43:12]  There's a bit of coming and going, but around about a million came in.
[00:43:19]  They are increasingly the kind of migration within Europe is a bit different.
[00:43:24]  In our case, we often have like families, the wives or mothers or grandmothers and the children, not so many men, even though that setup seems to suggest that a lot of them will not be employed.
[00:43:42]  We got a 30 to 35 percent employment rate by now, despite the fact that a lot of them are families.
[00:43:50]  And they are very there is a political debate in the entire kind of along the entire spectrum of how long to support Ukraine.
[00:44:00]  And there are, of course, voices that say how much does this cost us.
[00:44:04]  But they are actually a really well integrated and not problematic group of mostly refugees.
[00:44:16]  They blend in very well.
[00:44:18]  I lived in Berlin last eight years and it's not really a big problem for us at the moment.
[00:44:26]  And I'm confident that we'll stay that way.
[00:44:29]  And a lot of them, of course, want to go back to Ukraine as soon as they can to participate once there is peace.
[00:44:37]  Yeah, well, I just wanted to say some of the same patterns.
[00:44:40]  I simply don't remember the numbers.
[00:44:42]  There was a spike immediately, and I think the numbers have fallen somewhat.
[00:44:49]  Many of, especially the women, are integrated in the service sectors.
[00:44:53]  And they're actually doing, as I understand, very well.
[00:44:58]  Obviously, some will then abstain, but there is also a desire from some to go back when they are the parts of Ukraine where they originated from makes that possible.
[00:45:08]  But I think it's politically, there's a huge support across the political spectrum for both supporting those that have arrived and also, if necessary, to check even further.
[00:45:23]  First, there's the same about 150 at the very beginning, fast track for installation, huge support, family welcoming people.
[00:45:31]  And on the future, it will really depend also on the condition in Ukraine and the ability of Ukraine to welcome them back.
[00:45:39]  But some will obviously, after some years, wish to stay.
[00:45:47]  On Estonia.
[00:45:49]  Go ahead, Emaser.
[00:45:51]  Yes, Estonia has been one of the largest recipients proportionally to our own population of Ukrainian war refugees.
[00:46:03]  So the patterns are pretty similar with other countries that we receive a lot of refugees in the early months of the war.
[00:46:19]  But some of them have returned, some of them have moved to other countries where their other family members are.
[00:46:27]  But generally speaking, we've seen close to four or five percent of our population at one point being the Ukrainian poor refugees.
[00:46:42]  They've been granted the social benefits, the access to education and healthcare that also other residents of our country enjoy.
[00:47:00]  But they've been very eager in terms of being good residents and integrating to the labor market, starting schools and so on and so forth.
[00:47:17]  In terms of future, I think we also have to be honest about the fact that the longer the war actually lasts, the slimmer are the chances of these people finding their proper way back to Ukraine,
[00:47:38]  even though I think still a very large proportion of them are interesting in re-establishing their life in Ukraine.

=== Strategic Partnerships And European Pillar (10:04) ===

[00:47:49]  Yes, Mike.
[00:47:50]  Mike Froman, Council of Foreign Relations.
[00:47:53]  How do you interpret Secretary Rubio's speech in Munich with regard to the U.S. commitment to Europe and to NATO?
[00:48:01]  Everything okay, back to normal?
[00:48:04]  And as you think about Europe's role in NATO and in securing Ukraine's future, what does strategic autonomy mean to you?
[00:48:13]  It's a question for the German question.
[00:48:15]  The first one, yes, the second one.
[00:48:18]  No, no, but I mean, also that European role in NATO, that's also, of course, a hugely important point for us.
[00:48:26]  I mean, on NATO, just one, what we want to strengthen the European pillar in NATO, we've done, so we will continue to do so with the burden sharing that we have agreed to.
[00:48:37]  We are not just on track with the 5% contribution like GDP to military expenditure, not only on track.
[00:48:44]  We want to achieve that in 29, not in 2035.
[00:48:48]  So I think on that front, we are doing okay.
[00:48:54]  The Munich speech was a diplomatic masterstroke by the Secretary of State.
[00:49:01]  Because he obviously said so himself.
[00:49:04]  He is there to represent, to explain the policy of the President.
[00:49:09]  That's what he did.
[00:49:10]  It was a welcome to have this strong commitment to co-op the transit transit cooperation, defense cooperation, and so on.
[00:49:18]  We welcomed that, but we did not expect him to deviate from the policies of this administration.
[00:49:24]  He didn't do that, but he delivered it in a masterful way.
[00:49:28]  And I have to just draw my hat to that achievement.
[00:49:35]  It really is a big achievement.
[00:49:37]  Sorry to say this so frankly here.
[00:49:39]  Well, not sorry to say, but I just honestly want to say that being a diplomat myself, a much less important one, I just have to say this was masterly.
[00:49:50]  Maybe on complimentary note, it's kind of paradox, but it's probably one of the fields where we feel closer from the administration because we do acknowledge that Europeans have to step up, have to do more, to take more responsibility and strategic autonomy for us.
[00:50:09]  I've been always being what is it to be an ally?
[00:50:13]  Is it to consume security or is it a partnership in security?
[00:50:17]  And to be a partner in security, you have to bring things on the table.
[00:50:21]  And so that part we are comfortable with.
[00:50:23]  I think we have to, sometime in this administration, I think we get even more understanding that to have a real partner, you need that partner to have also an industrial basis to be able to fill the gap because these days there is a queue everywhere for some strategic weapons and we need the production in Germany, in Europe, all over Europe to be able to provide that security.
[00:50:51]  So we are comfortable with the idea that we should be partner, but of course partners should have a say.
[00:51:01]  Ambassador, if you want to.
[00:51:02]  I just wanted to make that additional point.
[00:51:04]  I was in Munich myself and I agree with everything my colleagues are saying.
[00:51:12]  So just say that if there was a lot of focus on what the Americans, be it the Secretary of State, said in Munich this year, because everybody was wanting to see how did that contrast or how similar was it to what was said one year back.
[00:51:31]  I actually think that the more interesting thing was to notice how the Europeans then reacted to that.
[00:51:37]  You know, all the headlines was how did Marco Rubio communicate the tone, masterpiece, I agree, the way, but nothing was really taken away from what the Trump policies are.
[00:51:50]  But I think going into my French colleagues' points about what does that mean for Europe?
[00:51:56]  And clearly, you know, you can see that this is a conversation that is clearly taking place now in Europe with different tones and angles and so on.
[00:52:05]  So I was more interested in how the different European leaders were responding to what has transpired over the last 14 months.
[00:52:14]  Yes, question mark.
[00:52:18]  Bill Courtney with Riant.
[00:52:21]  Ukraine has very large majority support in the United States, but now the United States is no longer funding military and economic assistance to Ukraine.
[00:52:32]  Europe has really commendably stepped up.
[00:52:36]  Do you have the domestic political support in Europe, if this war lasts some time, to continue the high level of support for Ukraine that Europe is now providing?
[00:52:50]  I can start on this one.
[00:52:51]  I'll say that I think per capita, we are the highest per capita donor to Ukraine.
[00:52:59]  And this is not about who is the highest and so on.
[00:53:01]  But so far, every package, as we call it in Denmark, that has been delivered has had full support in the Danish parliament by all parties.
[00:53:12]  And percentage-wise, there's a very, very large support to continuing the military.
[00:53:22]  economic support that is needed for for Ukraine.
[00:53:27]  So I think, certainly for for us, there is this commitment and we have touched on some of the other issues which are more complicated.
[00:53:37]  What do we do with European Union now?
[00:53:40]  There's a general support for for doing this, but the tech, the devil is also in the detail.
[00:53:46]  How do we do this in practice?
[00:53:48]  It's technical.
[00:53:49]  There are also the question about other countries who have actually been in the line for longer, but I think when it comes to the specific question about the continuous support to Ukraine, we are in.
[00:54:04]  Ambassador Prikias, you want to add something?
[00:54:08]  Thank you, I am very much on the same page with with, with Jasper on that.
[00:54:16]  In in Estonia the, there is a long-term commitment taken that that enjoys the support across the party lines.
[00:54:25]  Regarding the, regarding the long-term military assistance to Ukraine.
[00:54:32]  We've we've publicly stated that for the, for the years to come, Estonia will support, at least, at least at the level of 0.25% of our, our GDP, the military assistance to Ukraine.
[00:54:48]  Just to put this into perspective, in the, In the US context, adjusted to US GDP, that would be around 80 billion dollars per year.
[00:55:03]  But the contributions to so-called Pearl, NATO Pearl initiative, have come on top of that.
[00:55:12]  So there is a long-term support to assisting Ukraine.
[00:55:18]  And I'd like to make it again very clear here that this is not only about solidarity and sympathy for Ukrainian people, but this is big because of our clear assessment that the outcome of this war will define the rules of the game for at least a generation, if not generations.
[00:55:46]  And we believe that this is not just about the security in Europe, but America also has clear security interests involved there.
[00:55:58]  Thank you.
[00:56:00]  I'll be very brief.
[00:56:01]  First of all, the short answer to your question is no.
[00:56:06]  Just two more points.
[00:56:07]  What the Scandinavians, the Baltic states, and the Poles and others have done in terms of their GDP is absolutely amazing.
[00:56:16]  I mean, we are, since last year, the biggest bilateral donor, but in terms of what it means for a budget, a national budget, that just shows our resolve.
[00:56:25]  About the United States, I would like to say two things.
[00:56:28]  First of all, the oil sanctions against Lukov and Rosneft were fundamental to increased pressure on Russia.
[00:56:36]  Russia has had an almost 50% decline in revenue from oil this year, beginning of this year, compared to the beginning of last year.
[00:56:43]  And that also shows we Europeans have a few things yet to do.
[00:56:47]  And the last point, American military support has been continued and it's been absolutely crucial.
[00:56:55]  It's absolutely crucial in air defense.
[00:56:57]  It's crucial in intelligence sharing.
[00:57:00]  So yes, there's been a financial shift.
[00:57:03]  No, not calling that into, it's not causing a big, that one is not causing a big stir in Germany, but the Americans are in and they are absolutely needed.
[00:57:13]  I think on support, it's still very broad.
[00:57:17]  And I also agree that we have to step up on maritime services, the ghost fleet, because that's really where we have the most leverage on the resource of Russia to finance the war.
[00:57:31]  But I think Russia is also aware that after four years, there is debates, and we have seen a kind of hybrid war from Russia on our social networks.
[00:57:41]  To leave this to take you live outside the deposition of former President Bill Clinton as part of the investigation into convicted Sex offender Jeffrey Epstein.
[00:57:50]  The majority had an hour.
[00:57:50]  The Democrats who were the majority had an hour.