CSPAN - Washington Journal Matthew Kroenig

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Jan. 2, 2026 12:14-13:01 - CSPAN

46:55

Washington Journal Matthew Kroenig

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Speaker	Time	Text
unidentified		The government at all?
		No, not at all.
		And we never have.
		What a disappointment to Elon Musk.
		I'm sure he liked to doge to you.
barack obama ▲ ● ▼		Thanks for having me.
barack obama ▲ ● ▼		Love C-SPAN.
unidentified		Appreciate the opportunity to come out.
glenn ivey ▲ ● ▼		You know, I wish we could have a thousand C-SPANs across the media spectrum.
glenn ivey ▲ ● ▼		Unfortunately, we don't.
unidentified		I think C-SPAN is a huge, huge asset to America.
sean spicer ▲ ● ▼		Not just the coverage that we get of both chambers on one and two, but programs like Washington Journal that allow policymakers, lawmakers, personalities to come on and have this question time during Washington Journal.
unidentified		So it's a huge benefit.
		I hope that all these streaming services carry C-SPAN as well because it's an important service to the American people.
		I'm actually thrilled that this time in Washington Journal, I'm getting a lot of really substantive questions from across the political aisle.
		Our country would be a better place if every American just watched one hour a week.
		They could pick one, two, or three.
		Just one hour a week, and we'd all be a much better country.
		So thank you for your service.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Our first guest of the morning, Matthew Krabig of the Atlantic Council.
		He's their strategy and security vice president and senior director.
		Thanks for joining us.
		Happy New Year to you.
unidentified		Happy New Year.
unidentified		It's a pleasure to be back.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		In a broad year, what are the big challenges facing the president this year in foreign policy that he maybe started to experience in the first year?
unidentified		Yes, well, you know, a year ago, we didn't know what to expect.
		There were people saying this was going to be an isolationist administration.
		And I think that's not what we saw in 2025.
		It was actively engaged foreign policy in every major region of the world.
		And I think that will continue in 2026.
		The Ukraine negotiations, negotiations in Gaza, protest in Iran, action against Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, efforts to negotiate with China.
		So I think there will be plenty on President Trump's plate in terms of foreign policy in 2026.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		When you talk about that shift in approach, what do you think drives that?
unidentified		Well, you know, I think the president has been consistent, but this time he's got a different set of advisors.
		And we see different camps within the Republican Party and within the administration vying for influence.
		And so you do have some of the traditional kind of Reaganite internationalists, but you also have some who are more skeptical of U.S. global engagement.
		And we've seen the battles within the administration play out and influence policy, most notably in Ukraine, but also over Iran's nuclear program and elsewhere.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Is this the idea that some in the Republican Party would say, why are we engaging in in the first place?
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Or others say, well, others say this is a direct interest of the United States, there's that tension there?
unidentified		Yes, and I think to some degree it's generational.
		You know, for people my age or your age, we think of America's involvement in the world as winning World War II, winning the Cold War.
		I think for younger generations of Americans, they think of American global engagement as failed wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a global financial crisis, COVID.
		You know, why are we engaging at all?
		Why don't we just come home?
		So I do think that an engaged United States has been good for the world and for American citizens over the past 80 years.
		But there are those who are more skeptical, and we're seeing those fights playing out, not just in the Republican Party, but also in the Democratic Party.
		You have those who are more pro-U.S. engagement in the world and those who are more skeptical and want to focus on issues at home.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		You've hinted at it, but when it comes to the Atlantic Council, your own personal take, what philosophy do you hold to generally?
unidentified		Yes, well, I have a new book coming out called Force for Good, How America and Power Makes the World Safer, Richer, and Freer.
		And so that's basically my view that after World War II, the United States was left as the most powerful country in the world.
		Its leaders looked back at the devastation of the first half of the 20th century and said, we don't want to do that again.
		We don't want to return to world wars and depression.
		And so they worked alongside their allies to build the international system we've had for the past 80 years based on strong alliances in Europe and Asia, extended American nuclear deterrence, trying to promote free and fair trade and democracy and human rights.
		And the world is safer, richer, and freer because of it.
		Zero great power wars in 80 years.
		Standards of living in the United States and around the world are now five times higher than they were before the beginning of the American era.
		And after World War II, there were only about 12 democratic countries on earth.
		Today, there are almost 100.
		So the world is safer, richer, and freer because of American engagement.
		And so I think the United States needs to stay engaged, but it has to do that smartly.
		It's not always more everywhere.
		And so how can the United States best pursue a smart but engaged foreign policy?
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		You've served under former President Bush, former President Obama, in the Trump administration.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		How does that shape your approach to current events when it comes to foreign policy?
unidentified		Well, having that real world experience, of course, is helpful.
		And I do think a lesson for me is that there is more of a bipartisan consensus in foreign policy, even still today, than I think many people understand, because often the media rightly focuses on the debates and the controversies.
		But there are underlying pillars where there still is broad bipartisan support, support for the NATO alliance, support for strong alliances with Japan, Australia, and Korea and Asia, support for a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent, and so on.
		So that gives me some optimism that the United States can still chart an overall consistent strategic course, even as we have these debates within parties and between them.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Matt Kraming is our guest.
		He'll join us and talk to you about foreign policy.
		If you have questions for him, 202-748-8000 for Democrats, 202-748-8001 for Republicans, and Independence 202-748-8002.
		You can text us your thoughts at 202-748-8003.
		Mr. Krainig, in the last couple of days in the news, the holidays may not have focused upon it so much, but events going on in Iran.
		Can you explain about these protests?
		What exactly is going on?
		What's driving it?
unidentified		Well, this is an issue I've thought a lot about over the decades.
		My first job in government was working on the Iran file and the intelligence community in 2004.
		I was back working on Iran at the Pentagon about a decade later, and I wrote a book on Iran in 2014.
		And the Iranian population is increasingly upset with the Iranian regime.
		This theocratic regime is mismanaging Iran's economy.
		The international sanctions are also further hurting the economy.
		And so you have these widespread protests over economic conditions.
		And these are not totally new.
		We've seen protests over the years, 2009, there was this big green movement, other protests.
		And the sad reality has been that the Iranian regime is willing to kill to stay in power.
		And the Iranian people haven't been willing to rise up in large enough numbers and die in large enough numbers to take power.
		So unfortunately, my prediction is that's how this is going to play out.
		We've already seen the regime start a crackdown, has killed some protesters, has put others in jail.
		And so I think we will see a violent crackdown and probably the end of this current round of protests.
		But this has been a long simmering issue and I think is not going to go away anytime soon.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		On that front, the president himself posting on Truth Social today saying this, if Iran shoots shots and violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue.
		We are locked and loaded and ready to go.
		Thank you for your attention to this matter.
		The president, when the president says stuff like this in relation to what's going on, what does that tell you?
		What do you think of that response?
unidentified		Well, this is unusually strong language from a U.S. president.
		We have seen presidents in the past criticize the regime, support the protesters, but they've used sanctions or other tools.
		This sounds like a threat to intervene militarily.
		And the president does have some credibility in this regard, having just struck Iran's nuclear facilities last year.
		And there has been discussion about possibly Israel or the United States conducting a strike on Iran as it reconstitutes its missile program.
		And so we'll have to see.
		But I guess I would not be surprised if President Trump does authorize the U.S. military or Israel to strike Iran's missile facilities that they're trying to rebuild in response to a violent crackdown against these protesters.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Do protests like these, even though maybe they're economic in nature, do they influence other things like what Iran does eventually with missile programs, what it does for how it treats other parts of the world?
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Is there an ability to influence or sway or is it strictly stay when it comes to just the protests about economics?
unidentified		Well, the regime is fearful for its own survival, and part of the reason it does violently crack down.
		It doesn't want to collapse.
		And this is the primary goal of many autocratic regimes.
		Regime survival is number one.
		But then number two, Iran has had this foreign policy of supporting an axis of resistance, a group of terrorist and proxy groups, and investing in higher-end asymmetric capabilities, ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
		And so it seems like even though they've been weakened over the past year, that this two-part strategy really hasn't changed of repression at home and pursuing these destabilizing asymmetric capabilities internationally.
		And we do see that Iran has been able to walk and chew gum and do both of these things at the same time.
		And so even as it is repressing its population, it is investing again in its missile program.
		And likely in the future, we'll try to reconstitute its nuclear program as well.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		This is Matt Krainig of Atlantic Council giving us his thoughts this morning.
		We'll hear from Dave.
		Dave joins us from New York, Independent Line.
		You're on with our guest, Dave.
		Go ahead.
unidentified		Hey, good morning.
		Happy New Year.
		I just, I see the American foreign policy.
		We're going to talk about it right now.
		Are we looking at, is everything we do basically trying to contain China?
		I mean, is everything, you look at the, like Greenland, for instance, they want to block the Polish Silk Road into Europe.
		Even this thing with Russia with pushing NATO up into Russia's border, now you have Russia tied up, which is Iran's, one of Iran's biggest allies.
		Anyway, let me just end it there.
		I'll ask you, is everything we're doing, are we trying to block China?
		Is this like the new continental system in the past?
		And will it work?
		All right, pause.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Dave in New York.
unidentified		Yeah, thank you.
		Well, I do think that China is the biggest challenge the United States is facing and maybe has ever faced just because it's so much more capable than past rivals, even Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.
		And so in Trump's first term, he declared great power competition with China as the foremost challenge facing the United States.
		That was continued in the Biden administration.
		And the Trump administration just came out with a new national security strategy that kind of downplayed the description of the China threat.
		But then if you look at the policies recommended, many of them, you're right, are all about containing China.
		It talks about maintaining a favorable balance of power in Asia.
		That's about China.
		It talks about preventing hostile powers from dominating important regions.
		It talks about winning the economic and technology competitions.
		It talks about countering hostile and malign influence in the Western Hemisphere.
		So those are all about countering China.
		I think not everything is about China.
		There are other things going on in Gaza and with trade.
		But it probably is the single most organizing, most important organizing principle for U.S. foreign policy today, countering China.
		So that's roughly correct.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		And Mr. Crane, while we're on the topic, it was a couple of days ago that China had a series of military operations centering around Taiwan.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		What do you think about this latest activity?
unidentified		Yes, well, this is concerning because China has said that it wants to take Taiwan, that it would prefer to do that peacefully, but it is keeping the military option on the table.
		Xi, the Chinese leader, has asked his military to give him the ability to invade by 2027.
		So I guess the good news for 2026 is he doesn't think he's there yet, but they think they're getting close.
		And so if China were to attack Taiwan, this could lead to a major U.S.-China war.
		And I think what we've seen over the past few days are essentially a dress rehearsal that China is conducting these military exercises, practicing for a potential blockade or invasion, and also just part of its daily pressure campaign against Taiwan's government.
		Because I think Beijing's real hope is that Taiwan will just give in under the pressure.
		And so, yeah, we've seen this military pressure, but it's combined with economic, diplomatic, and a lot of other types of pressure as well.
		So it is concerning.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Even the response from the State Department reads, China's military activities and rhetoric towards Taiwan and others in the region increase tensions unnecessarily.
		We urge Beijing to exercise restraint, cease its military pressure against Taiwan, and instead engage in meaningful dialogue.
		That's the response.
		Is that a strong enough response for the situation, or should there have been more?
unidentified		Well, I think that is a good response.
		And, you know, Teddy Roosevelt talked about speaking softly and carrying a big stick.
		And so the Pentagon is going about creating the big stick right now.
		Admiral Paparo is the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
		He has a concept he calls Hellscape of basically creating a lot of unmanned systems that would be able to destroy a Chinese invasion fleet.
		You see the Pentagon focusing of, well, just coming back to the national security strategy I mentioned, it talked about the Western Hemisphere as a top priority region, but had Indo-Pacific number two.
		So I do think a lot of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, Exim Bank are really focused on the China threat.
		So I think we are doing enough, but it is concerning.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Here's Richard.
		He's in Georgia.
		Democrats line.
unidentified		Hi.
		Good morning, Pedro.
		Good morning, Washington General.
		My concern about the Trump administration policy towards Ukraine is outrageous, being a veteran.
		And do you think that also with Trump allowing NVIDIA to sell the computer chip to China?
		could come back to bite us later because the Chinese do believe in mass numbers, that they're building their navy, that we don't have a navy number-wise as big as China's that could hurt us if China does attack Taiwan.
		They got more naval ships.
		We don't.
		They got more people to serve in their Navy.
		We don't.
		But overall, it seemed like to me the administration doesn't know what they're doing in foreign policy.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Okay, Richard, they're in Georgia.
unidentified		Well, thanks, Richard.
		I think there were kind of three issues there.
		So first on Ukraine, I do think that the president has learned in office on this issue.
		I think he came in believing that it was going to be easy.
		I think over the past year, he's learned that it is more difficult than he thought.
		I think he's learned that it is Putin that's the challenge, not Zelensky or Europe, and that getting Putin to negotiate in good faith is going to require more pressure.
		So I think there's been some positive developments there.
		We can return to those.
		On exporting the NVIDIA chips, there is a debate among experts on this.
		And so one view is that we need to divide these chips to China because we need to win the technology race.
		The other view is that part of winning the technology race is not just having the best technology, but it's having others use our technology and that we would rather have China dependent on us than vice versa.
		And so that was the logic that went out in terms of exporting those chips.
		And then on China having more ships than us, you're right, that's a problem.
		And the Trump administration does have a major shipbuilding effort underway.
		But I would say when it comes to an invasion of Taiwan, it's not just about countering the ships.
		As you know, as a veteran, you have to think about the contingency.
		And so the biggest concern would be a Chinese amphibious invasion.
		And so to counter that, the United States doesn't necessarily need more ships than China.
		We in Taiwan and our other allies just need enough munitions and drones and other things to sink those ships, the invasion fleet, before it can get to the island.
		And so I think that's where a lot of the focus is now as well, investing in drones and anti-ship missiles and other munitions that could deny a Chinese invasion.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		We have a viewer from Canada giving us a call.
		This is Roderick.
		Roderick, good morning.
unidentified		Good morning.
		Happy New Year from Vancouver, Canada.
		Thank you for having me on.
		I'd like to comment on China and Ukraine.
		And I hope that you can give me a little bit of time to make a little bit of an explanation before I pose the question regarding both subjects.
		And just before I even do that, I would like to say we appreciate in Canada the United States' presence and when it's doing good around the world, but we also very much do not appreciate when the United States is cultivating and instigating wars and conflicts.
		And the first question I'd like to have Your guests consider, as I add to the question, is, how does the United States leadership expect that there will be any way of ensuring peace and stability and the economic trading system in the world to continue stably as long as the United States continues being unable, or probably better said unwilling,
		to collaborate with the world's two other biggest, most powerful countries, China and Russia?
		Let me qualify the China issue.
		Instead of poking China in the eye by sailing your Navy's warships and getting to my country's Canada's warships between Taiwan and China regularly, which drives the Chinese leadership crazy, the United States could simply and very safely and with no risk to anybody merely commit to China that you will no longer sail your warships between Taiwan and China's mainland.
		You don't do that, so it instigates conflict and an adversarial relationship, ensuring that China, among other ways, will never consider collaborating with the huge problems in North Korea, Iran, Israel being attacked by Muslims onto Ukraine.
		The Ukraine conflict is directly a result of NATO expansion.
		To end that conflict would merely require the United States guaranteeing Russia's security, not so much Ukraine, but Russia's security, as was Russia's demand before it invaded Ukraine in 2021, December.
		If the United States was prepared to reset the relationship with Russia so that Ukraine became again a neutral country, there would be no need for this war to continue.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		We'll leave it there for our guests.
		Thank you for the call, though.
		Thank you for the questions.
		Mr. Kravig.
unidentified		Yes, well, thanks for sharing your perspective on both issues, but I do see it differently.
		I think the United States and its allies, including Canada, are essentially status quo powers.
		We're happy with the world essentially the way it is.
		Russia and China are so-called revisionist powers.
		Xi and Putin both say explicitly that they're willing to use force to remake their security architecture in the region to conquer peaceful neighbors.
		And so we see Russia launching this full-scale invasion against Ukraine, and we see Xi threatening to invade Taiwan.
		And so you're right that a U.S. military presence, NATO in Europe, and warships in the Indo-Pacific, anger those dictators.
		But the reason it angers them is because it stops them from engaging in aggression against their vulnerable neighbors.
		And so I just really disagree with the premise.
		I think a strong NATO and a strong military presence deters conflicts in those regions.
		And if we withdrew that, it would just open up highways for aggression for these dangerous dictators.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		When it came to Ukraine Crane, you asked the question about NATO expansion and ensuring that.
unidentified		Yes.
		And so just to elaborate on what I was saying before, Putin has been very clear that he sees the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century, that he wants to recreate the Russian Empire.
		We've seen him use military force against every country on his border that's not in NATO, against Georgia, against Ukraine, has essentially turned Belarus into a puppet state and so on.
		And so, yes, he doesn't like NATO expansion because NATO expansion stops him from dominating his neighbors and recreating the Russian Empire.
		I think we've seen objectively that NATO expansion has led to peace.
		Every country that's been brought into NATO has been safe from Russian attack, like Estonia, for example.
		And countries that have been left outside have been exposed to Russian attack.
		So I think the problem was not too much NATO expansion, but not enough.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Mr. Krainik, the New York Times highlights it's year four when it comes to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		In this year four, what do you think has to happen in order for a major shift in current hostilities to happen?
unidentified		Yes.
		Well, you know, at the beginning, I think the idea that Ukraine could take back all of its territory was a good goal.
		But I think what we've seen now is that the battle lines have really solidified.
		I think new technology like drones is making it hard for forces to take territory on the battlefield.
		And so unfortunately, I think some kind of ceasefire along the current lines and a peace agreement that would preserve most of Ukraine is about the best that we can do.
		And that's what the Trump administration has been trying to negotiate.
		The major challenge is Putin.
		Putin doesn't want that deal because he doesn't just want territory in eastern Ukraine.
		As I was saying before, he wants to control Ukraine, either through physical occupation or by having a friendly puppet government in Kiev.
		And Putin thinks he's winning on the battlefield.
		And it may be hard for us to imagine because he's losing so many men and it's so slow.
		But he sees the trend line in his favor.
		And so getting to peace then is going to require changing Putin's mind and making him believe that he can't win on the battlefield.
		And this is the best he can do.
		And so I think that is going to require more support to Ukraine so that Ukraine can continue to hold the lines, but also more pressure on Putin.
		And I think part of the reason we've seen more serious diplomacy for Moscow in recent months was that in the fall, the Trump administration sanctioned some Russian energy giants, and that was starting to affect Putin's pocketbook and make him think about negotiations.
		But we're not quite there yet.
		I think it is going to require more pressure on Putin before he's really willing to agree to any kind of ceasefire or peace.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		We saw President Zelensky at the White House or the Var-a-Lago over the holidays in one of those discussions centered around security agreements with the Ukrainian president wanting 30, 40, 50 years maybe.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		What does that look like, security agreements?
unidentified		And should the United States consider it well, that's an important question because getting a lasting peace would really have two parts.
		First is getting the initial ceasefire, which is what I was focusing on.
		But then you're right, once you get there, how do you make sure that Putin just doesn't reattack again?
		And so you need to make sure that Ukraine and its allies can deter a further Russian attack.
		And so some kind of security guarantee from the United States should do that.
		Putin doesn't want a direct war with the United States.
		There was initially talk about NATO membership for Ukraine.
		And in fact, NATO has promised Ukraine that it would eventually join the alliance.
		That seems to be off the table for now.
		And so now we're focused on these bilateral Ukraine-U.S. security guarantees.
		And we have seen that work in other regions.
		The United States has a bilateral security treaty with Japan, bilateral security treaty with Korea, Australia, and others.
		And so a bilateral security guarantee between the United States and Ukraine could work just like it does in Ukraine or in Japan.
		Putin would know that any attack against Ukraine could lead to a war with the United States, and that would deter him.
		And so it does seem now that there's a discussion over how long would this security guarantee last.
		Apparently, Trump has promised a 15-year guarantee.
		You're right, that Zelensky is pushing for longer.
		I guess from my point of view, I think any guarantee, even 15 years, would be a major step forward.
		And after 10 or 15 years, the United States could always decide to renew.
		So if we could get Russia to agree to any American guarantee as part of a ceasefire, I think that would start to lay the foundation for a more stable peace in Ukraine.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		The Atlantic Council's Matt Kraming joining us for this discussion.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Mark in Georgia, Independent Line, you're next.
unidentified		Yes, thank you.
		Good morning, Matthew.
		I've read recently that what this administration actually wants to do is shift our foreign policy from that of global peacekeeper to hegemon of the Western Hemisphere.
		I think the President's rhetoric towards Greenland and Canada and our actions, military actions against Venezuela, would support that shift in strategy.
		I invite your comments.
		Well, I think it's not either or, but both.
		And I think you're right that we have seen more of a focus on the Western Hemisphere.
		The national security strategy talks about the Western Hemisphere as the priority theater for the United States.
		And, you know, there are many foreign policy experts for a while who've been saying, well, why don't we focus more on the Western Hemisphere?
		It is our own neighborhood.
		And there are challenges in the region, narco-trafficking, irregular immigration, Chinese and Russian presence in the Arctic and elsewhere.
		And so I think focusing more on the Western hemisphere does make sense, but we don't want it to be at the exclusion of other regions.
		And again, the national security strategy did talk about Indo-Pacific as the number two region.
		We see President Trump actively engaged diplomatically in Ukraine and Gaza.
		So I don't see it as either or.
		I think we can do more in the Western Hemisphere, even as we maintain engagement in other regions.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		That national security strategy you wrote about, and in part you said this.
		The NSS airs, however, by disavowing the pragmatic promotion of democracy and human rights.
		Can you elaborate on that?
unidentified		Yes.
		Well, many of the responses to the national security strategy were critical.
		Overall, I thought it was a good document for many reasons, and we can return to that.
		But I think one of the weaknesses was that it essentially disavowed the promotion of democracy and human rights.
		And I understand where that's coming from.
		I think after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that were sold in part on democracy promotion, there are many in the United States and the Trump administration who say, you know, we shouldn't be spreading democracy at the barrel of a gun.
		But there are a lot of other ways that the United States has promoted democracy over the years, including through examples.
		And I think that's a strength of the United States, that we are the good guys.
		We stand for freedom and human rights.
		Putin and she and the others don't.
		And we've seen that our best friends in the world are other democracies.
		And so I think having a world with like-minded democracies that respect the human rights of their own people, that are more cooperative internationally, is ultimately in the U.S. interest.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		This is Rob, Rob, on our Line for Democrats in New York.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Hello.
unidentified		Hello.
		Yeah, I believe that we're dealing with a very simple-minded president.
		He has looked in the past, looked at Teddy Roosevelt as his mentor in a certain sense.
		And we know that these oil tankers were going to Cuba.
		And we know that Venezuela is propping up Cuba at all times.
		And we are looking to actually that pad regime change in Venezuela.
		And we do want to get Cuba out less communists.
		We'll take over Cuba as well.
		The point being here is that he is a simple-minded person that is talking to the dictators.
		He looks at himself as a dictator in a certain sense.
		And he will say to Putin, you could have Ukraine.
		He's made up deals that don't really favor Ukraine.
		He's looked at China and with Taiwan and hasn't done anything or in a sense, really protect them, where Japan is really upset or really kind of doesn't feel safe anymore.
		I think he's allowing that to happen so he could take over the Western hemisphere, as you mentioned earlier.
		And that is the real thing that he wants.
		He wants to build up the United States presence in Cuba, get the Saudi Arabian money in there, make Kavanaugh back to be the 50s Cuba.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Let's leave it there for our guests to answer.
unidentified		Yes, well, thank you for that.
		And I partially agree and partially disagree.
		I do think in the Western hemisphere that there are a number of factors pushing this focus.
		And, you know, Marco Rubio, our Secretary of State, his parents left Cuba.
		And he's been focused on anti-American communist dictators in the region for a while.
		And so I think it's no secret that he would prefer to see a different government in Venezuela and a different government in Cuba.
		President Trump has said that Maduro must go.
		And if we just look back at some successful U.S. foreign policy presidents, Reagan and George H.W. Bush both used military force in the Western Hemisphere to install more pro-American governments in Granada and Panama.
		That worked well.
		So my view is if we could get a better government in Venezuela and in Cuba that respected the human rights of their people and that were more cooperative, that would be a major foreign policy success.
		So we'll have to see what happens there.
		In Ukraine and in Asia, I somewhat disagree.
		There are others like you who have said that Trump has this sphere of influence type thinking.
		I'm going to dominate the Western hemisphere.
		I'll let Putin dominate Europe.
		But if you actually look at the negotiations, I think that's not true.
		The Trump administration has drawn lines in its negotiations with Putin.
		If the United States were willing to say, okay, Putin, you can have all of Ukraine, maybe Putin would agree to that.
		But the United States hasn't been saying that.
		It's been saying, you know, only the territory you control.
		Currently, it's insisting on these security guarantees.
		So I do think that President Trump, again, is focusing more on the Western Hemisphere, but doesn't want to abandon other regions.
		I think he likes being a globally engaged leader involved in all of these hotspots around the world.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Mr. Kradig, a viewer text us this morning asking about your thoughts about the possibility of a full-scale invasion, as he describes it, of Venezuela this year.
unidentified		Yeah, I think that's unlikely.
		President Trump has been proud of himself.
		He talks about how he's a peacemaker.
		He has this doctrine of peace through strength.
		And as I read it, it is a focus on peace, but not peace through appeasement.
		It's peace through strength.
		And so I think we've seen that Trump is willing to use military force in kind of short, sharp, decisive ways, like the strikes against Iran's nuclear program in the 12-day war.
		But he's also been very skeptical of long-drawn-out military occupations with no clear end in sight.
		He's been critical of the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and elsewhere.
		And so I could imagine Trump using force in Venezuela, but more like a commando raid or strikes against certain facilities.
		Very hard for me to imagine Trump authorizing a full-scale invasion of Venezuela.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		We saw what was going on with the boats.
		We saw last week about the dock that was hit by the United States.
		What do you think about those approaches?
		Ultimately, what do you think those achieve?
unidentified		Well, you know, I think that Trump's strategy, and it hasn't been articulated, so we're all reading the tea leaves here, but it does seem like the purpose is a pressure campaign to try to force Maduro to leave voluntarily, to hope that he'll say, this is getting dangerous.
		Maybe I'm better off if I go into exile in Russia or something like that.
		So I think that's what we're seeing so far.
		And if that doesn't work, the United States does have options to take it up a notch with more strikes directly against the mainland.
		Some have speculated that maybe Trump would authorize some kind of strike or raid to capture Maduro directly.
		So I think that's the goal is to stop the flow of narcotics into the United States from Venezuela, but ultimately to pressure Maduro to step down and hope that you get a transition to a better government.
		And I would point out that the Venezuelan people have voted Maduro out.
		He lost an election in a landslide last year.
		And if you look at public opinion polling in Latin America, there is majority support for U.S. military action to remove Maduro.
		So he's worn out his welcome both in Venezuela and in the region.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Let's hear from Jim and Maryland, Republican line.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Hello.
unidentified		Oh, hello.
		Good morning.
		I think I have the solution to the battle in Ukraine.
		You said before that NATO is off the table, but I don't understand why we don't offer that to Ukraine.
		First of all, if we gave that to NATO, Russia would not invade.
		And I think you could make a peace treaty on the fact that Russia could keep the land that they have and they could never invade again because Ukraine would be a part of NATO.
		There's other countries that are smaller than Ukraine that are part of NATO.
		They don't even have any military.
		So Ukraine is a country that I think would qualify.
		Why do you think that they're not giving them a chance to be a NATO NATO?
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Jim and Marilyn, thanks.
unidentified		Well, it's a good point.
		And I essentially agree with you that if Ukraine were in NATO, it's extremely unlikely that Russia would attack, again, because Putin doesn't want a war with NATO and with the United States.
		And, you know, in the 2008 Bucharest-NATO summit, the alliance promised Ukraine that it would join someday.
		And so the alliance kind of left Ukraine in this gray zone that made it vulnerable to attack.
		I think the reason we're not doing that, though, does have to do more with domestic politics.
		And it is bipartisan.
		The Biden administration was also reluctant to take major steps toward bringing Ukraine into NATO.
		And so I think there's this sense, rightly or wrongly, that the American people are kind of tired of foreign military engagements after Iraq and Afghanistan.
		You know, expanding U.S. military commitments by bringing other countries into NATO, especially a country that's currently at war with a major nuclear power, is just too difficult.
		And so I do think that's off the table for now.
		But over the long term, I do think solidifying Ukraine as a member of the Western Alliance would lead to a more peaceful Europe.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Let's hear from Mike.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Mike in Virginia, Democrats line.
unidentified		Good morning.
		I'm going to be all over the place.
		I don't know why we look at China as an enemy of the United States.
		It's an economic competitor to the United States, but we want to dominate everybody.
		Taiwan is only 100 miles away.
		We took Hawaii.
		We took Puerto Rico, thousands of miles away from the United States.
		Taiwan is going to be with China and the Chinese, and we should stop looking at them as an enemy.
		As for Ukraine, promoting democracy, sovereignty, human rights, it's all baloney.
		Look what's happening in Gaza.
		Mr. Natalia killed hundreds of thousands of people, and yet we're talking about democracy and human rights and all that stuff.
		Listen, it's not about Putin or the system.
		It's about Russia's national security.
		And any Russian government is going to stop Ukraine from joining NATO.
		NATO expanded since 1991.
		And this has to stop.
		We are doing it.
		We go to war for companies, for the interests of companies, not for democracy, not for human rights issues.
		And look what's happening in Iraq.
		What happened?
		Look, it's not stable.
		Iran, we took Saddam out.
		They became a very terrorist country sponsoring terrorism all over the Middle East.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		All right, I've got to pause you there only because of interest of time and because you put a lot out there for our guests.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Mr. Kraini, go ahead and address what you wish.
unidentified		Yes, you did cover a lot of grounds.
		Let me take a couple of those.
		First, on why do we see China as an enemy?
		You know, part of the reason is that China sees us as an enemy.
		And President Xi has given many speeches.
		They've been compiled into books.
		But he does see the United States as the biggest threat facing China.
		And China says it wants to dominate the Indo-Pacific.
		It says it wants to break America's alliances in the region.
		And so that would be a bad thing for the people of Japan, of Korea, of Australia, who don't want to be dominated by China, who want that continued American presence.
		And the United States did try to engage China for a quarter century after the end of the Cold War.
		And we hoped that we could make China a so-called responsible stakeholder in the rules-based system.
		But especially under President Xi, they've decided no, they want to challenge the United States.
		And so I think we're reluctantly being forced now to defend ourselves.
		Just final response to your points on democracy and human rights.
		As I mentioned earlier, I'm finishing up this book on U.S. foreign policy over the past 80 years.
		And the United States has almost always prioritized security and economic interest first and democracy and human rights secondary.
		But I think there is still a difference there that the United States, where it has had the opportunity to promote democracy and human rights consistent with its security and economic interests, it has done that.
		And I think that has led to expanded freedom in Europe.
		Remember, there are only a handful of democratic countries in Europe at the end of World War II.
		Now the entire continent is free.
		And also in East Asia, at the beginning of World War, or at the beginning of the Cold War, Japan, Korea, the Philippines were not democracies.
		Now they are because, and Taiwan, and now they are because of U.S. presence and advocacy.
		So I think the United States does have a better record than some might think when it comes to promoting democracy and human rights.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		This is Patrick joining us on our line for Republicans from Georgia.
unidentified		Good morning.
aaron dykes ▲ ● ▼		I have a couple of questions.
		One is if your guest, Mr. Koenig, has information about a program called Gladio that's run by the intelligence services of several different countries.
		And the other question is, what would security guarantees for Russia be, you know, to bring peace in this conflict after we guaranteed that we would not put NATO on its border?
		And then there was the Minsk one and Minsk II before they invaded that the Western countries backing Ukraine broke.
		And then after the invasion, there was an Istanbul agreement that Ukraine signed on all three of these and the Western backers forced them to break that.
		So I was just wondering what do you think the security guarantees for Russia would be in this conflict.
unidentified		Thank you.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Mr. Krainig.
unidentified		Yes.
		Well, first on this GLADIO program, I'm not familiar with it.
		And from the way you described it, it sounds like if I were, that I wouldn't be able to talk about it.
		So sorry, I can't comment on that.
		On security guarantees for Russia, I think it depends on how you define security.
		I think if you define it as most in the United States define it, that Russia can be a free and sovereign country, doesn't need to worry about threats to its sovereignty or territorial integrity.
		Russia has that.
		Nobody's threatened that.
		The problem is that's not what Putin wants.
		Again, Putin wants to conquer his neighbors and create the Russian Empire.
		And so when he talks about security guarantees, he's talking about what are the guarantees that I can continue to conquer my neighbors without outside interference.
		And so that's just a fundamental conflict of interest.
		That's not the world that the United States and our European allies want to live in.
		And so if the guarantees are, what are the guarantees that Putin can conquer Ukraine, then he's not going to get those here.
pedro echevarria ▲ ● ▼		Matthew Kroenig is with the Atlantic Council, AtlanticCouncil.org, the website, if you're interested in seeing the work on various topics of foreign policy.
		Mr. Kroenig, thanks for your time.
		Happy New Year to you.
unidentified		Thank you very much.
		Happy New Year.
		Coming up, a day-long marathon where we look back at some of the key speeches delivered in 2025.
		We start with former President Joe Biden's farewell address at the end of his term, and then President Trump's first speech as the commander-in-chief.
		After that, House leaders from both parties talk about the first day of the 119th Congress.
		All that and more included in today's special programming here on C-SPAN.
jimmy carter ▲ ● ▼		Democracy is always an unfinished creation.
ronald reagan ▲ ● ▼		Democracy is worth dying for.
george h w bush ▲ ● ▼		Democracy belongs to us all.
bill clinton ▲ ● ▼		We are here in the sanctuary of democracy.
george w bush ▲ ● ▼		Great responsibilities fall once again to the great democracies.
barack obama ▲ ● ▼		American democracy is bigger than any one person.
donald j trump ▲ ● ▼		Freedom and democracy must be constantly guarded and protected.
jimmy carter ▲ ● ▼		We are still at our core a democracy.
donald j trump ▲ ● ▼		This is also a massive victory for democracy and for freedom.
unidentified		Today on C-SPAN Ceasefire, former House Speaker Republican California Congressman Kevin McCarthy and former independent West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin come together to preview the year ahead in politics.
unidentified		including the upcoming midterm elections and the political and legislative battles ahead in Washington.

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