| Speaker | Time | Text |
|---|---|---|
|
unidentified
|
Funded by these television companies and more, including Cox. | |
| When connection is needed most, Cox is there to help. | ||
| Bringing affordable internet to families in need, new tech to boys and girls clubs, and support to veterans. | ||
| Whenever and wherever it matters most, we'll be there. | ||
| Cox supports C-SPAN as a public service, along with these other television providers, giving you a front-row seat to democracy. | ||
| Earlier this year, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6-3 to limit the scope of nationwide injunctions, thereby allowing President Trump to implement his executive order limiting birthright citizenship. | ||
| Up next, we'll show you a portion of the oral argument with U.S. Solicitor General D. John Sauer. | ||
| This is about half an hour. | ||
| We will hear argument this morning in case 24A884, Trump versus CASA, Incorporated, and the consolidated cases. | ||
| General Sauer. | ||
| Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. | ||
| On January 20th, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14160, protecting the meaning and value of American citizenship. | ||
| This order reflects the original meaning of the 14th Amendment, which guaranteed citizenship to the children of former slaves, not to illegal aliens or temporary visitors. | ||
| Multiple district courts promptly issued nationwide or universal injunctions blocking this order, and a cascade of such universal injunctions followed. | ||
| Since January 20th, district courts have now issued 40 universal injunctions against the federal government, including 35 from the same five judicial districts. | ||
| This is a bipartisan problem that has now spanned the last five presidential administrations. | ||
| Universal injunctions exceed the judicial power granted in Article III, which exists only to address the injury to the complaining party. | ||
| They transgress the traditional bounds of equitable authority, and they create a host of practical problems. | ||
| Such injunctions prevent the percolation of novel and difficult legal questions. | ||
| They encourage rampant forum shopping. | ||
| They require judges to make rushed, high-stakes, low-information decisions. | ||
| They circumvent Rule 23 by offering all the benefits but none of the burdens of class certification. | ||
| They operate asymmetrically, forcing the government to win everywhere while the plaintiffs can win anywhere. | ||
| They invert the ordinary hierarchy of appellate review. | ||
| They create the ongoing risk of conflicting judgments. | ||
| They increase the pressures on this court's emergency docket. | ||
| They create what Justice Powell described as repeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured and representative branches of government. | ||
| And they disrupt the Constitution's careful balancing of the separation of powers. | ||
| I welcome the court's questions. | ||
| General Sauer, these universal injunctions, as you say, have proliferated over the last three decades or so. | ||
| Would you discuss, though, the origins of universal injunctions? | ||
| In particular, I'm interested in sort of historical analogs or the historical pedigree, particularly the Bill of Peace that was proffered by respondents. | ||
| Yes, Justice Thomas, as you, I think, first pointed out in your separate opinion in Trump Against Hawaii, the Bill of Peace is something very distinct from a universal injunction. | ||
| So the Bill of Peace involved a resolution of a small discrete set of claims of a small discrete group. | ||
| And even more fundamentally, it was binding on the members of that class and those represented by the class. | ||
| So it's much more analogous to a modern class action under Rule 23. | ||
| And in fact, as we've argued in other cases and as this court has described in opinions like Ortiz, the Bill of Peace evolved into and is directly developed into, so to speak, the modern class action that has all the same features of a Bill of Peace. | ||
| So in the words of Chief Judge Sutton in the Sixth Circuit, the Bill of Peace was a domesticated animal that looks nothing like the dragon of a universal injustice. | ||
| I'm sorry. | ||
| Here. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Go ahead. | |
| Here, there's a discrete, identified group on one issue. | ||
| Does citizenship mean are you born in the territory of the United States? | ||
| Or does it mean are you loyal to someone else, which is your claim? | ||
| Or are your parents loyal to someone else? | ||
| So that's no different than what happened in a Bill of Peace. | ||
| The United States is bigger, so it extends more broadly, but it's still an identifiable group on a discrete, singular question. | ||
| Your Honor, I'd say three things in response to that. | ||
| First of all, our primary contention is that the citizenship clause related to the children of former slaves, not to illegal aliens who weren't even present as a discrete class at that time. | ||
| But more fundamentally, here, as to the issue of the Bill of Peace, there are critical differences. | ||
| The Bill of Peace was a binding judgment that would bind absent class members. | ||
| Here we have the ACC. | ||
| Well, here, class actions don't bind anyone who opts out. | ||
| So class actions are not like bills of peace. | ||
| I would think that a Rule 23B2 class action, which would be the relevant analog here, would be one that would be binding on absent class members and would not have the same notice and opt-out procedures. | ||
| And more fundamentally, that sort of argument, that there's a commonality here among all the people who purport to be affected by this, is the sort of argument that's made in class certification. | ||
| So can I ask you a question? | ||
| Your theory here is arguing that Article III and principles of equity both prohibit federal courts from issuing universal injunctions. | ||
| Do I have your argument correct? | ||
| We argue both of those. | ||
| You argue both of those. | ||
| If that's true, that means even the Supreme Court doesn't have that power. | ||
| The Supreme Court would have the authority to issue binding precedent nationwide. | ||
| But we couldn't enforce it against universally, is your argument. | ||
| If there was a decision that violated the precedent of the court, then the affected plaintiffs could get a separate judgment. | ||
| And that means you're talking about the hundreds and thousands of people who weren't part of the judgment of the court, they would all have to file individual actions? | ||
| Not necessarily that. | ||
| Or a class action. | ||
| A class action would be a practical thing. | ||
| That makes no sense whatsoever. | ||
| Respectfully, we believe that. | ||
| Well, what was the purpose of the Bill of Peace, if not to settle a legal question finally? | ||
| And if even the Supreme Court doesn't have that right and must invite hundreds of thousands of lawsuits, what are we buying into? | ||
| If a set of claims satisfies the rigorous criteria of Rule 23, Rule 23 is the modern analog of a Bill of Peace. | ||
| We have something very different here. | ||
| No, but we don't, because the argument here is that the President is violating an established, not just one, but by my count, four established Supreme Court precedents. | ||
| We have the Juan Arc case where we said fealty to a foreign sovereign doesn't defeat your entitlement, your parents' fealty to a foreign sovereign, doesn't defeat your entitlement to citizenship as a child. | ||
| We have another case where we said that even if your parents are here illegally, if you're born here, you're a citizen. | ||
| We have yet another case that says even if your parents came here and were stopped at the border, but you were born in our territory, you're still a citizen. | ||
| And we have another case that says, even if your parents secured citizenship illegally, you're still a citizen. | ||
| So as far as I see it, this order violates four Supreme Court precedents. | ||
| And you are claiming that not just the Supreme Court, that both the Supreme Court and no lower court can stop an executive from universally from violating that holding, those holdings by this court. | ||
| We are not claiming that because we're conceding that there could be an inappropriate case. | ||
| Only a class only. | ||
| Can I hear the rest of his answer? | ||
| A Rule 23 class action. | ||
| And then the more fundamental point as to all those Supreme Court decisions you receive. | ||
| So what do we do temporarily? | ||
| Temporarily, the court may issue, the lower courts may issue injunctions that remediate the injuries to the plaintiffs that appear before them. | ||
| Lower courts, inappropriate cases, may certify class activities. | ||
| So when a new president orders that because there's so much gun violence going on in the country, and he comes in and he says, I have the right to take away the guns from everyone, then people, and he sends out the military to seize everyone's guns. | ||
| We and the courts have to sit back and wait until every name plaintiff gets, or every plaintiff whose gun is taken comes into court. | ||
| Inappropriate cases, courts have certified class actions on an emergency basis. | ||
| We found at least four cases in recent years where that was done. | ||
| But more fundamentally, we profoundly disagree with the characterization of the merits. | ||
| This is now fully briefed in the Ninth Circuit in case number 25-807, where we describe how that characterization of the holding of Wong Kim Ark and the other decisions is profoundly incorrect. | ||
| Counsel, could I ask you about a different type of case that has broader impact than on the particular claimant? | ||
| Like a claimant who's alleging that the districting in a particular case has resulted in racial discrimination against him or her based on how the district is drawn. | ||
| Now, a judicial decision about that one plaintiff would implicate the redistricting throughout the whole case. | ||
| So throughout the whole state, how does your theory address that situation? | ||
| That would be what you might call an indivisible remedy, where what the court is doing there by, for example, redrawing the district lines is, as this court said in Gill Against Woodford, the only way to remediate the injury of voting in an unconstitutionally drawn district. | ||
| That is similar to abatement of a public nuisance or, for example, in the school desegregation cases, where remediating the injury to the plaintiff before the court necessarily has collateral consequences to many others. | ||
| Certain environmental cases might have a similar thing. | ||
| For example, you stop the local plant from pouring water pollution into the water. | ||
| That benefits the plaintiff. | ||
| If it happens to benefit a bunch of other people. | ||
| Now, that's very different than what we have in these universal injunctions where it is a divisible remedy. | ||
| I mean, I point to the holding of the District of Massachusetts in this case, looking at the individual plaintiffs. | ||
| That court said, well, obviously, I don't have to give a universal injunction to protect individuals other than the individual plaintiffs. | ||
| They are given complete relief by an injunction that tells federal officials only to treat their children as citizens. | ||
|
unidentified
|
I guess the question is: why does the law require that? | |
| I mean, I appreciate that a court could, in a divisible remedy kind of case, narrow in to the plaintiff, but you seem to be suggesting that Article III or Rule 23 or something requires that. | ||
| And I guess I don't really understand it. | ||
| If I may offer two responses to that, in the Article III context, that is the principle announced in Warth against Selden, announced in Gill against Whitford, and Lewis against Casey, where this court has said again and again: what we do in the Article III context is grant remedy that is tailored to grant remedies that are tailored to remove the injury to the complaining plaintiff. | ||
| Sometimes they have even very broad collateral consequences. | ||
| But in the Article III context, what the court has not done, and every time it's focused on this in National Treasuries Union, Employees Union, in the Perlman. | ||
| But I guess I don't see why then the divisible remedies or indivisible remedies is an argument. | ||
| I mean, if Article III is suggesting that the court has to focus in on the plaintiff only, then it would seem to me that that would be the power requirement across the board. | ||
| I thought Article III was really about limiting the court's power with respect to jurisdiction. | ||
| That we say the court has to determine whether or not there's subject matter jurisdiction over the issue and whether or not there's personal jurisdiction over the defendant. | ||
| And once you have those things, the court can evaluate the merits of the legal issue and issue, especially in equity, appropriate relief. | ||
| Now, I appreciate that there are some prudential concerns that the court considers, but it seems to me that in many, many, many circumstances, we have not required the court to limit their relief to the particular plaintiff as a matter of constitutional Article III requirement. | ||
| I disagree with that, and I'd offer a response both first as to Article III and then as to the scope of equitable authority. | ||
| In the Article III context, this court said in Worth against Selden, for example, that the Article III judicial power exists only to redress the injury to the complaining parties. | ||
| Again, in Gill against Whitford and Lewis against Casey. | ||
| All right, so let me give you a hypothetical. | ||
| So suppose we have a manufacturing plant that unlawfully releases environmental toxins into the air, and we have a plaintiff who lives near the plant, brings a nuisance lawsuit and says they're being harmed by unlawful release. | ||
| Your argument suggests that the judgment for the plaintiff has to narrow in on preventing, to the extent possible, preventing harm to the plaintiff. | ||
| But it seems to me that that's not necessarily the case. | ||
| You suggest with the Chief Justice in response to him that there can be incidental beneficiaries, that the court could say no more toxins if it's unlawful for the defendant to do that, correct? | ||
| Yes, we do. | ||
| So why? | ||
| Why, if your Article III principle is correct? | ||
| Because again, the Article III principle is remedying the injury to the plaintiff or set of plaintiffs, could be many, who are before the court. | ||
| Right. | ||
| That has collateral consequences. | ||
| That could help. | ||
| Let me ask you on that point. | ||
| Would one distinction be who's bound by the judgment? | ||
| Like, I'm wondering whether if the plaintiff needs, you can only, I think Judge Strauss said in the 8th Circuit when addressing this issue, you can't peel off part of the nuisance. | ||
| So the whole thing has to be shut down. | ||
| Could a neighbor sue affirmatively to hold the nuisance maker in contempt if he started to rebegin, you know, begin again the nuisance? | ||
| That's a great point. | ||
| It would not be bounding on those collaterally benefited parties, so to speak. | ||
| I don't want to call them parties because they're not parties before the court. | ||
| And that, of course, highlights one of the deep problems with the U.S. | ||
| But why could you do that, though? | ||
| Well, could you do that now for the universal injunction? | ||
| Could a plaintiff, for example, who has the protection of the universal injunction but was not named in the suit bring a contempt action of the sort I just described? | ||
| They could not do that, but what they could do is run to any of 93 other judicial districts and bring their own lawsuit if they, if they under the under the injunction as it stands, under the injunctions as they stand, could a non-named plaintiff who has the benefit of the universal injunction that's currently in place? | ||
| Could that plaintiff bring a contempt proceeding? | ||
| We would or I guess I shouldn't call them a plaintiff we would dispute that. | ||
| They would have the standing to do that because of it. | ||
|
unidentified
|
It goes to the heart of well no no no, I let's see. | |
| Maybe I'm not being clear. | ||
| Assume the universal injunction is is good like, drop your argument right now as they currently stand. | ||
| Could someone who is not named in the suit but a beneficiary bring a contempt proceeding? | ||
| I think that that is what the respondents would certainly contend. | ||
| Do you concede that the plaintiffs could bring a rule 23, like the individual plaintiffs we? | ||
| We would dispute. | ||
| I mean, we'd have to address the rule 23 issues, kind of all the criteria as well. | ||
|
unidentified
|
But you could you, they could seek it okay, and then lastly done that in Western Washington. | |
| It's just never been briefed because they, like just last question on this point, the states have a different kind of claim for financial harm and they've pointed out that it would be very difficult to remedy that without some sort of broader relief. | ||
| I know you contest their standing. | ||
| I want you to assume that I think they have standing. | ||
| Why wouldn't they be entitled to an injunction of the scope of the one that has currently been entered? | ||
| I would say two reasons. | ||
| First of all, it's not necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs. | ||
| What we offered, for example, in the District Of Massachusetts in the Second or the First Circuit, was an injunction that would enjoin the federal officials and order them to treat the people who would otherwise be covered by the executive order as eligible for the services. | ||
| That resulted in the pocketbook injuries to the states, and there's really no response to that. | ||
| That is, obviously it would fully remediate their injuries and does not require that the injunction to be applied in all other 50 states. | ||
| One state comes in and says, well, people are going to move across state lines. | ||
| Therefore we've got 21 states in this case who don't want this relief. | ||
| Sorry, you've got to impose it on everybody because it has to be uh, has to be offered to this one particular state uh, so that's, that's one response. | ||
| The other response is this notion that the states have to be provided a pre complete relief because of interstate travel and patchwork. | ||
| I think that's very effectively responded to by Chief Judge Sutton's opinion in the Second Circuit, where he says, this is a problem. | ||
| If we adopt this logic, it justifies in universal injunction in every single case, and that can't be the case. | ||
| The Fifth Circuit's recent DACA decision comes to the same conclusion. | ||
| What do you say though, to the suggestion general that, in this particular case, those patchwork problems for frankly, the government as well as for plaintiffs, justify broader relief? | ||
| As to the government again, chief judge Sutton addressed that directly as well when he said that's the federal government's problem, in other words, the federal government. | ||
| For example, in the First Circuit we offered that as a narrower scope of injunction, and the decision was, well, that would cause you too many administrative problems, and I think Chief Judge Sutton directly addresses that when he says that's a problem for the executive branches. | ||
| All right. | ||
| And then, with respect to class certification, your friends on the other side point out that that takes time, And there are, as you've emphasized, hurdles that have to be met to achieve class certification. | ||
| And the argument, of course, is that the injury is immediate and ongoing. | ||
| And as Justice Sotemeyer suggested, might be seriously questioned as to its compliance with this court's precedence. | ||
| Your thoughts? | ||
| I would offer a couple of things in response to that. | ||
| First of all, there are tools for the courts have tools to achieve sort of class-wide universal relief. | ||
| I referred earlier that we found four recent district court decisions where class-wide relief was given a kind of an emergency basis. | ||
| However, more fundamentally than this. | ||
| Do you agree that that's appropriate in certain cases? | ||
| It may be appropriate. | ||
| We do not conceive that it's appropriate in this case, but it may be appropriate in other cases. | ||
| Certainly it's an equitable tool that is consistent with, for example, the grant of equitable authority in the 1789 Judiciary Act, as this court interpreted in the Group of Mexicano decision, and honestly, a line of decisions going all the way back to the early 19th century. | ||
| So there are tools to address emergency situations. | ||
| But more fundamentally than that, it is a feature, not a bug, of Article III that courts grant relief to the people who sue in front of them. | ||
| So the notion that relief has to be given to the whole world because others who have not taken the time to sue are not before the courts is something that results in all these problems. | ||
| Last question. | ||
| Do we need to reach the Article III question? | ||
| I mean, shouldn't we, wouldn't it be wise, even if you were to prevail for the court to reserve that question rather than decide that Congress, for example, could never endow this court with that authority? | ||
| Although that's exactly correct. | ||
| The court does not have to rest on Article III because the court could say, and as we've argued, and as Justice Thomas, a separate opinion in Trump Against Hawaii says, the 1789 Judiciary Act, when it said suits in equity or what the federal courts can do, had nothing like this in mind. | ||
| And then I point to the language in Group of Mexicano, where the court said there what was at issue was a preliminary injunction that froze in likely insolent debtors' assets so that the plaintiff could collect at the end of the case. | ||
| And the court said that's a nuclear weapon in the law, and we're not, that had no analog in 1789 and the practices of the Court of Chancery. | ||
| And if that's a nuclear weapon, I don't know what this is, where repeatedly, 40 times in this administration, we're being enjoined against the entire world. | ||
| I'm just going to ask you to put yourself in a different frame of mind, hard to do, assume something you won't want to assume. | ||
| But the assumption that I want you to make is that on the merits, which of course you did not take to this court, on the merits, you are wrong, that the EO is unlawful. | ||
| And I want to ask you, if we assume that, how do we get to that result on your view of the rules? | ||
| It is very difficult for me to adapt the hypothetical, but I will. | ||
| You know, I think that that's the important question in this case. | ||
| Let's just assume you're dead wrong. | ||
| How do we get to that result? | ||
| Does every single person that is affected by this EO have to bring their own suit? | ||
| Are there alternatives? | ||
| How long does it take? | ||
| How do we get to the result that there is a single rule of citizenship that is not, that is, that is the rule that we've historically applied rather than the rule that the EO would have us do? | ||
| Rule 23 would be one natural path, assuming that a class could be certified, which we might dispute in this particular case. | ||
| Well, you might dispute it. | ||
| And, you know, I mean, I think the question is, is there a class that's just all children of people who have entered illegally? | ||
| You know, is that an appropriate class? | ||
| Can the same thing be done under Rule 23? | ||
| Or are you going to tell me that, no, Rule 23 has lots of requirements and you'll never be able to certify a class like that. | ||
| Rule 23 provides the equitable tools subject to rigorous criteria, appropriately rigorous criteria to obtain that kind of class-wide intervention. | ||
| That suggests to me you're going to be standing up here in the next case saying that Rule 23 is inapt for this circumstance with this number of people, maybe with some questions that are individual, who knows. | ||
| So let's put Rule 23 aside, because I got to tell you, that does not fill me with great confidence. | ||
| How else are we going to get to the right result here, which is on my assumption that the EO is illegal? | ||
| That would be a profoundly wrong result, but I think what I would offer is that very similar to Labrador against Poe, what the court should be engaging here is a balancing of the equitable factors as to the scope of remedial relief, not as to the underlying merits. | ||
| And our contention that this exceeds the traditional scope of equity that's reflected in the 1789 Judiciary Act, we're overwhelmingly likely to succeed on those merits for all the reasons that have stated in our previous. | ||
| I mean, that's a lot of words, and I don't have an answer for if one thinks. | ||
| And, you know, look, there are all kinds of abuses of nationwide injunctions. | ||
| But I think that the question that this case presents is that if one thinks that it's quite clear that the EO is illegal, how does one get to that result in what timeframe on your set of rules without the possibility of a nationwide injunction? | ||
| On this case and on many similar cases, the appropriate way to do it is for there to be multiple lower courts considering it, the appropriate percolation that closes to the lower courts, and then ultimately this court decides the merits in a nationwide binding precedent. | ||
| You have a complete inversion of that through the nationwide injunctions where the districts are. | ||
| But General Saubert, are you really going to answer Justice Kagan by saying there's no way to do this expeditiously? | ||
| Well, I'll refer to my former answers. | ||
| Rule 23 provides the tools to do so, multiple injunctions. | ||
| But you resisted Justice Kagan when she said could the individual plaintiffs form a class? | ||
| That has never been briefed in the court below. | ||
| I do not concede that we wouldn't oppose class certification in this particular case. | ||
| There may be arguments that this case is or is not appropriate for class certification. | ||
| If there were a class appropriate for class certification, you concede that that could resolve the question quickly. | ||
| Yes, absolutely. | ||
| You concede it could resolve the question quickly through precedent. | ||
| Yes, absolutely. | ||
| It could do so. | ||
| I mean, we obviously dispute that. | ||
| So just on that point. | ||
| And it's the court. | ||
| Sorry. | ||
| Sorry. | ||
| Sorry to interrupt. | ||
| Go ahead, please. | ||
|
unidentified
|
All right. | |
| I got a quick one. | ||
| I got a quick one. | ||
| Well, I'm just going to say just on that point. | ||
| So, you know, let's say that we're an individual person, even. | ||
| Let's say it wasn't a class, and goes up and gets a ruling from the Second Circuit that the EO is illegal. | ||
| Does the government commit to not applying its EO in the entire Second Circuit? | ||
| Or does it say, no, we can continue to apply the rule as to everybody else in the Second Circuit? | ||
| I can't say as to this individual case. | ||
| Generally, our practice is to respect circuit precedent within the circuit, but there are certainly a certain amount of time. | ||
| Yes, that is generally your practice. | ||
| And I'm asking whether it would be your practice in this case. | ||
| I can't answer because it would depend on what the lower court decision said. | ||
| So there are circumstances, as I was suggesting, where we think that we want to continue to litigate that in other district courts in the same circuit as well. | ||
| Yeah, so that means it's not even the normal time it takes for everything to get up, you know, through the circuit courts and to the Supreme Court. | ||
| Because even in those circuits that say that the EO is illegal, you're going to be saying, no, you know, we only commit to saying it's illegal to this one guy who brought the suit. | ||
| Article 3 and the court's traditional equitable practices provide a range of tools to address that, including potentially nationwide class action, not a nationwide university. | ||
| A nationwide class action, which you say you're going to oppose when that gets challenged. | ||
|
unidentified
|
We are likely to oppose what's proposed. | |
| Yes, and if it does not meet the rigorous criteria of class certification, the court should not enter that injunctive relief. | ||
| Do you think like how about you're not willing to commit to abiding by the Second Circuit's precedent? | ||
| Suppose that there's a single person who brings a suit, and it gets all the way up to us after three or four or five years. | ||
| And we say, you know, we really do agree with those four precedents that Justice Soda Mayor started with, and your EO is illegal. | ||
| Is that only going to bind the one guy who brought this suit? | ||
| No, that would be a nationwide precedent that the government would respect. | ||
| So finally, once it gets to us after four years, you're going to respect that. | ||
| Yes, and in addition, we may well respect certain white presidents. | ||
| And for four years, there are going to be like an untold number of people who, according to all the law that this court has ever made, ought to be citizens who are not being treated as such. | ||
| And in the meantime, any of those plaintiffs could have come forward and sought, you know, preliminary injunctive relief. | ||
| And they could do so on a class-wide basis. | ||
| There are tools to address this, but the universal injunction, which is issued here three days after the executive order was issued, is not one of those tools. | ||
| Thank you, Council. | ||
|
unidentified
|
And as 2025 comes to an end, President Trump has updated the situation with the National Guard deployment to various cities, posting this: quote: We are removing the National Guard from Chicago, Los Angeles, and Portland, despite the fact that crime has been greatly reduced by having these great patriots in those cities, and only by that fact. | |
| Portland, Los Angeles, and Chicago were gone if it weren't for the federal government stepping in. | ||
| We will come back, perhaps in a much different and stronger form, when crime begins to soar again. | ||
| Only a question of time. | ||
| It is hard to believe that these Democrat mayors and governors, all of whom are greatly incompetent, would want us to leave, especially considering the great progress that has been made. | ||
| C-SPAN's Washington Journal, our live forum inviting you to discuss the latest issues in government, politics, and public policy from Washington and across the country. | ||
| Coming up Thursday morning, we preview the 2026 New Year and discuss political news of the day with John Anthony, conservative host of Detroit's Morning Answer on WDTK The Answer Radio, Laura Bellin, Iowa-based progressive host of KHOI's Capital Week, Mitch Coke, Carolina Journal's senior political analyst, Bobby Cousa of Spectrum News NY1, who will also talk about Zorhan Mamdani's inauguration as New York City Mayor. | ||
| And Lincoln Square Media Executive Director Susan Demas. | ||
| C-SPAN's Washington Journal. | ||
| Join in the conversation live at 7 Eastern Thursday morning on C-SPAN. | ||
| C-SPAN now, our free mobile video app, or online at c-SPAN.org. | ||
| Friday on C-SPAN's Ceasefire. | ||
| At a time when finding common ground matters most in Washington, former House Speaker, Republican California Congressman Kevin McCarthy and former Independent West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin come together to preview the year ahead in politics, including the upcoming midterm elections and the political and legislative battles ahead in Washington. | ||
| They join host Dasha Burns. | ||
| Bridging the Divide in American Politics. | ||
| Watch C-SPIRE, Friday at 7 p.m. and 10 p.m. Eastern and Pacific, only on C-SPAN. | ||
| As Congress returns to Washington in January for the second session of the 119th Congress, high-stakes deadlines loom. | ||
| Lawmakers face a January 30th deadline to fund the government through the end of the fiscal year and avert a shutdown. | ||
| The House is also expected to take up a vote to extend enhanced health care subsidies for another three years, with current provisions set to expire at the end of 2025. | ||
| And all eyes turned to 2026. | ||
| The midterm elections are ahead. | ||
| Every seat in the U.S. House will be decided, including all 435 voting members and five non-voting delegates. | ||
| Many will run in newly redrawn districts, including in states like Texas. | ||
| Voters will also decide 33 U.S. Senate races and 36 governors contests. | ||
| And consequential mayoral elections are on the horizon in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New Orleans, cities where clashes with the Trump administration have shaped national debates. | ||
| And the road to the White House begins to take shape as more potential 2028 presidential contenders hit the campaign trail. | ||
| Follow it all on C-SPAN as Congress returns and the 2026 campaign season ramps up. | ||
| C-SPAN, bringing you democracy unfiltered. | ||
| The Freedom 250 organization held a lighting and projection program on the Washington Monument in Washington, D.C. to mark the nation's 250th birthday year. | ||
| This event runs about 20 minutes. | ||
| America. | ||
| The New World. | ||
| Our nation began not as an idea invented in the minds of men, but as a land discovered. |