| Speaker | Time | Text |
|---|---|---|
|
unidentified
|
Bringing two leaders from opposite sides of the aisle into a dialogue, ceasefire on the network that doesn't take sides, Fridays at 7 and 10 p.m. Eastern and Pacific, only on C-SPAN. | |
| next a preview of the twenty twenty six midterm elections with political editors and analysts on the impact of latino voters redistricting and the trump administration's deployment of national guard troops to u s cities National Journal in Washington, D.C., hosted this event. | ||
| Great. | ||
| What a great crowd. | ||
| Good evening, everyone, and welcome. | ||
| I'm Emily Aktruzandi, Chief Revenue Officer of National Journal membership, and it's wonderful to see so many of our members and friends here tonight. | ||
| We're gathering at a pivotal moment in Washington. | ||
| With the 2026 midterms just a year away, the pace of politics is already accelerating. | ||
| And of course, we're meeting under the shadow of a government shutdown. | ||
| It's a stark reminder of how quickly dynamics here can change and how those shifts ripple across industries, organizations, and communities. | ||
| And at National Journal, our mission is to help our members cut through that noise. | ||
| Whether through our reporting, tools, custom content offerings, or conversations like this one, we're here to equip you with the insights and context you need to navigate uncertainty and anticipate what's next. | ||
| So tonight, as part of that commitment, we're fortunate to be joined by three incredible political voices. | ||
| Ron Brownstein, senior political analyst with CNN, Jeff Dufour, National Journal's editor-in-chief, and Kirk Beto, editor of The Hotline, who will help us unpack the forces already shaping the road to 2026. | ||
| We'll spend about 30 to 35 minutes in discussion, followed by QA. | ||
| So I encourage you to be thinking of questions you'd like to raise. | ||
| We'll have someone come around with a microphone. | ||
| And we're also delighted that C-SPAN is broadcasting live, which means we'll be able to share this conversation well beyond this room. | ||
| So thank you again for being here. | ||
| Thank you for engagement with National Journal. | ||
| And please join me in welcoming our panelists. | ||
| And Jeff, I'll let you take it from here. | ||
| Thank you. Thanks. | ||
| As Emily said, we're going to talk a lot about 2026. | ||
| We'll get into 2028 a little bit. | ||
| And I think just as a little teaser or an appetizer, we'll talk about the Virginia, New Jersey elections that are going to take place next month. | ||
| But before that, as a big picture table setter, I wanted to ask the two of you this question. | ||
| We are as evenly divided a country as I've seen. | ||
| I've been covering politics for 25 plus years, far and away, the closest House of Representatives we've ever had, voting for the presidential as narrow as can be. | ||
| Yet, paradoxically, that has not created stability. | ||
| It's actually created instability and volatility. | ||
| Why? | ||
| Yeah. | ||
| Well, first of all, great to be here. | ||
| You know, to your point about covering politics for 25 years, Emily, did not mention I am a National Journal alum. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Yes. | |
| And my first thing at National Journal involved covering the Reagan White House. | ||
| So that was a while ago. | ||
| And in fact, we are living through what I would, I think, I think you can fairly describe as the longest period in American history where neither party has been able to establish a durable advantage over the other. | ||
| That's a big statement, but I think there are a lot of different measures that can show you that. | ||
| The last three houses, the margin has been 10 seats or less. | ||
| That's never happened before in American history. | ||
| The last five times a president went into a midterm with unified control of government, voters revoked it. | ||
| That's never happened in American history. | ||
| Since 1980, we haven't gone eight years where neither party has been able to control the Senate for more than eight consecutive years. | ||
| And that's never happened in American history. | ||
| And by the way, on the unified control, the asterisk, when people are wondering about 2002, Republicans had unified control after 2000, but lost it in 2001. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Jim Jefferts. | |
| Right. | ||
| So they didn't go into 2002 with unified control. | ||
| I mean, the key is that when voters have seen one party as clearly the dominant, you know, as the ones driving the boat, steering the boat in Washington, they have revoked it. | ||
| Last president who defended unified control for a midterm was Jimmy Carter in 78, and that was really only because we were in the era of the one party South that still provided an insurmountable hold on. | ||
| So you add it all up. | ||
| Only 18 of the last 58 years has one party sustained control of the House, the Senate, and the President. | ||
| And, you know, we are living in that world. | ||
| That world is so encompassing to us that it doesn't seem unusual. | ||
| But it is an incredible departure from the previous, the heart of the 20th century. | ||
| If you look from 1896 to 1968, the heart of the 20th century, one party or the other had unified control for 58 of those 72 years, as opposed to 18 of the last 56. | ||
| I mean, you're not imagining it. | ||
| Your jobs are harder than it was for people who had them 15, 20, 30 years ago, because they could build a relationship that they knew was going to be there. | ||
| Now, the volatility is kind of a mountain. | ||
| I mean, it's an irremovable part of the landscape. | ||
| And as a final point, so we are in all of these ways closely, more closely divided than at almost any point in our history, but we are also deeply divided. | ||
| The gap, I mean, when I started covering politics, literally, it was not far from the days when Richard Russell and Hubert Humphrey were both Democrats and Jacob Javits and Jesse Helms were both Republicans. | ||
| The parties have sorted out enormously. | ||
| So we have this situation where the shifts in control are more frequent really than at any point. | ||
| The only thing like it is the last two decades of the 19th century. | ||
| But basically, the shifts in control are more frequent over a longer period than we've ever experienced. | ||
| And each time you get a shift in control, as the last year has really demonstrated, you get a radical reversal of policy. | ||
| You get whiplash. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Yeah. | |
| Right? | ||
| So closely divided and deeply divided is a recipe for a very trigger, you know, hair-trigger country where nothing is stable and everything seems at stake all the time. | ||
|
unidentified
|
I'll throw another statistic at you, which is we are now six, we are at six change elections in a row where Senate, House, or presidency has changed hands each of the last six cycles. | |
| We're going to talk about this in a minute. | ||
| We may be steamrolling toward a seventh in a row. | ||
| But Kirk, I want to let you get in here and offer your thoughts on this kind of dynamic that we're seeing. | ||
| As someone who's been alive for 25 plus years, not necessarily covering politics. | ||
| You see this change all the time here. | ||
| The change is the constant now. | ||
| Like you said, Jeff, we've had the past six elections. | ||
| The House, the Senate, or the White House have changed hands. | ||
| And that's a product of the self-sorting round that you were talking about. | ||
| But we're also at the tail end of about 30 years of pretty aggressive gerrymandering here from both parties. | ||
| Now, it's gotten much more intense the last three months or so. | ||
| But what we're seeing is a shrinking House battlefield. | ||
| We're seeing a shrinking Senate battlefield, a shrinking presidential battlefield as well, where the blue wall states, those seven swing states as well, have remained constant throughout the last three presidential cycles, almost unprecedented. | ||
| Now, right now, as we're getting ready to gear up for 2026, the House battlefield is extremely, extremely small. | ||
| You know, Democrats just need to flip three seats to take control of the House, maybe more, depending on how this gerrymandering cycle kits out here. | ||
| And there's only about 18 or so toss-up seats by the Cook political report. | ||
| You know, 10 are held by Democrats, nine are held by Republicans. | ||
| And that's because you see a lot of decline in split-ticket voting. | ||
| There's only 16 seats right now represented by one member of a party where that district went to the opposite party at the presidential level. | ||
| 13 Democrats are in seats that Trump carried, and there are three Republican seats that Harris carried. | ||
| It's very partisan. | ||
| It's very much you put your jersey on here, and you don't really think you just go right down the line here. | ||
| You know, to your point, you know how many split-ticket districts there were after Ronald Reagan's re-election in 1984? | ||
| There were 190. | ||
| Now there were 16, right? | ||
| After both of Nixon's victories and after both of Reagan's victories, Democrats still held half of the Senate seats in the states that voted for each of them both times. | ||
| Today, if you look at the there are 25 states that voted three times for Trump, I call them the Trump 25. | ||
| Do you know how many Senate seats Democrats have in those 25 states? | ||
| They have zero. | ||
| They had eight as recently as 2017. | ||
| So we've gone from a situation where I think it was in the Reagan case, I think there were 12 states that voted twice for Reagan and had two Democratic senators in 1985. | ||
| The whole thing is more parliamentary, right? | ||
| Where voters is, as Kirk said, I mean, they're looking less at the name on the back of the jersey than the color on the front of the jersey. | ||
| And so the ability of an individual to sail up against the current based on their unique characteristics. | ||
| I mean, we're down to Susan Collins. | ||
| I mean, you know, if Republicans hold all 50 Senate seats in the 25 states that voted three times for Trump, Democrats hold almost all the states' seats in the states that voted against him three times. | ||
| But there are only 19 of those states. | ||
| They hold all of them against Collins, and they might get that one. | ||
| It might be, we could come out of this election with a complete, you know, where the only seats that go against the most recent presidential are in the states that flip the six states that have flipped under Trump. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Structurally, Democrats are almost at a point where they have to sweep the purple states in order to have a Senate majority. | |
| They have to. | ||
| I mean, you can't give away 50 Senate seats on a routine basis. | ||
| You know, at that point, you have to win little, as you say, everything else and the presidency. | ||
|
unidentified
|
So we got 51. | |
| Right. | ||
| I mean, can you put anything on that list in play? | ||
| North Carolina, clearly, trying. | ||
| After that, it's Iowa, Ohio, and Texas. | ||
| So that's kind of the leap. | ||
| It's a pretty narrow path. | ||
| But look, the reverse, you know, the Republicans obviously have a bigger upside. | ||
| But Democrats now have 10 of the 12 seats in the states that flipped at any point in the three Trump elections. | ||
| Well, and even as this battlefield is getting smaller, just one last point on this and why this is so divided right now. | ||
| Even as this battlefield for control of Congress gets smaller, it gets much, much more expensive. | ||
| At Impact, the nonpartisan research firm estimates that this election alone, over $10 billion are going to be spent on advertisements. | ||
| At least four Senate races are expected to cost $500 million on air alone. | ||
| We really should have just gone in on a TV station in Georgia like before all this. | ||
| So those toss-up seats we talked about, there should cost around $47 million on ads in those 18 seats alone for a House race. | ||
| So even as the battlefield is getting smaller, it's getting exponentially more expensive and exponentially more partisan ads on TV. | ||
| It literally would be cheaper for the campaigns to buy every swing voter a TV. | ||
| Absolutely. | ||
| Well, Elon Musk might try that still. | ||
| Yeah, you're right. | ||
| He could. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Well, let's talk about the House then. | |
| I'm going to set it up this way. | ||
| I saw a study from the London School of Economics this week. | ||
| The scholars, the professors, said presidential approval and voters' feelings about the economy going into the election are paramount, far and away, the two most important factors. | ||
| And once they plug those factors into their algorithm, they said they would expect Democrats to pick up 28 seats without the factor, without factoring in gerrymandering. | ||
| So I'm going to ask a two-part question. | ||
| Do you accept the premise that those two factors, economy and presidential approval, outweigh everything else? | ||
| And what are your thoughts about the number 28? | ||
| First, I'll say yes. | ||
| I think those are the two most important factors here. | ||
| The kitchen table issues and presidential approval are traditionally the metrics that we look at going into a midterm. | ||
| And the 28 number is interesting because 28 seats is the number of seats on average that the party in power in the White House loses in a midterm. | ||
| That was true from about the 1930s until 2018. | ||
| In 2018, during Trump's first midterm, Democrats netted about 41 seats. | ||
| But in every election since then, the sea change in the House, the net change, has diminished exponentially. | ||
| In 2020, Democrats lost 13 seats. | ||
| 2022, they lost nine seats in the majority. | ||
| 2024, Republicans had a net loss of only a single seat. | ||
| Going into 2026, Democrats need to net three seats as we sit here right now. | ||
| I think it's going to rebound and there's going to be a net change of more than one, but that's still so narrow. | ||
| The swings are getting so much smaller. | ||
| So in addition to redistricting, the other reason why the battlefield is shrinking is because there has been this profound demographic sorting out, right? | ||
| So, you know, in 1994, when Clinton passed the assault weapon ban, there were 77 House Democrats who voted against it. | ||
| 77 House Democrats voted against it. | ||
| Like, how many of those districts are still represented by a Democrat today? | ||
| It's probably, you know, five or less. | ||
| Essentially, in 94, but especially in 2010, 2010 especially, you saw the collapse of Democrats in heavily white, heavily blue-collar districts. | ||
| The blue dog Democrats were largely hunted to extinction in 2010. | ||
| We used to do a thing at National Journal called the Four Quadrants of Congress, in which we divided all the seats based on whether their education level, their white education level, and their white population was above or below the national average. | ||
| And if you look at the fourth quadrant, the low diversity, low education districts, that's where Republicans have just obliterated the Democrats from the 90s and even the 2000s. | ||
| 2018 was the bookend to that. | ||
| 2018 was the bookend to 2010 because you saw the John Kasichs and what were called the gypsy moth in the 80s, the Republicans in the suburban districts outside, even below the Mason-Dixon line, largely eliminated. | ||
| I think of the Barbara Comstock, for example. | ||
| Yeah. | ||
| Of the 41 seats, I think 30 that the Democrats gained had more college graduates than the national average. | ||
| So, you know, basically, you've seen each side largely consolidate its demographic its hold on the seats that demographically fit into their coalition, which just doesn't leave that many outliers to go after. | ||
| I mean, there are, you know, Don Bacon's seat you can go after. | ||
| There are a lot of college graduates. | ||
| Or Tom Kaine Jr., there are a lot of college graduates. | ||
| And I guess Jared Golden, there are a lot of non-college whites that you can go after. | ||
| There just aren't that many of those seats on either side anymore, which leaves you in this very small kind of playing field back and forth. | ||
| But it also means that each coalition is just much more homogenous than it used to be. | ||
| I mean, like, you know, if you look at the Affordable Care Act or the Waxman-Markey cap and trade bill, I mean, dozens of Democrats voted against that. | ||
| Now, just the whole thing is just more parliamentary, not only just partisan loyalty, but just kind of the fundamental demographic realities of the districts. | ||
|
unidentified
|
The single biggest predictor of Republican success, or at least Trump's success right now, low population density. | |
| Yeah. | ||
| Rural. | ||
|
unidentified
|
That is far and away the best predictor. | |
| Richard Florida, who used to be part of the whole general thing here with City Lab, I think in 2016 and 2020 did kind of a density line and showed, but to their point, I mean, I agree with Kirk. | ||
| I mean, the presidential approval is the single most important factor in a midterm. | ||
| It really is a referendum on the president, I think above all. | ||
| Now, maybe the highly negative image Democrats are facing is going to affect that, but I will just point out that in the fall of 2010, before Republicans gained, had the biggest House gain for either party since 1938, in polling that fall, the image of the Democratic Party per se was better than the image of the Republican Party. | ||
| And it really didn't save them. | ||
| You know, like if people want to cast a vote against the president and his agenda, saying the other side is worse just doesn't really hasn't historically carried that much. | ||
| I think the bigger limiting factor on Democrats are what we're both talking about. | ||
| It's just there are just very few mismatched seats to go after. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Speaking of swing seats, I want to go back to the NJ archives for a little bit. | |
| The blue wall. | ||
| Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, we hear about it all the time. | ||
| Fun fact, it was the man to my left in National Journal who coined the term blue wall. | ||
| Blue Wall first existed in National Journal? | ||
|
unidentified
|
Yep. | |
| There's a big headline. | ||
|
unidentified
|
The blue wall. | |
| So I want to ask two things. | ||
| Has the nature of the blue wall changed, which is to say, is it still a wall for the Democrats since Trump swept it twice? | ||
| And what have you seen in terms of the way the wall functions or doesn't function in a midterm environment? | ||
| Yeah. | ||
| So it's interesting that you phrase it that way because the meaning of the blue wall has evolved or I would say mutated over time. | ||
| The original blue wall, the point of the story, which was written in January 2009, was at that point there were 18 states that had voted Democratic in each of the previous five presidential elections, which was the most states the party had won over five consecutive elections since the formation of the modern party system in 1828. | ||
| Ultimately, all 18 of those states voted Democratic again in 2012. | ||
| So they won him six straight times. | ||
| In 2016, Trump dislodged Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, or as Tad Devine, the Democratic consultant, calls them, me paw we, because they're basically one state. | ||
| Trump dislodged all three of them from my conception of the blue wall, and then the dislodged part kind of became the blue wall, right? | ||
| As kind of the center, the centerpiece of presidential politics. | ||
| First of all, these states vote together. | ||
| The three of them vote together a lot. | ||
| I think I did a story about this. | ||
| I'm going to get this right. | ||
| I think only since 1900, Pennsylvania and Michigan, and possibly since Michigan came into the Union, Pennsylvania and Michigan has diverged like two times. | ||
| Like Hoover, I think they diverged once in Roosevelt and then Carter and Ford. | ||
| Like they vote the same way, like always. | ||
| Wisconsin goes its own way a little more often, like Dukakis won Wisconsin when Bush won the other two. | ||
|
unidentified
|
I think since 92, they've gone the same. | |
| Same way every time. | ||
| Every time. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Yeah, yeah. | |
| So 88 was the last time there was any divergence. | ||
| And, you know, and the reason is that they have a lot of similarities. | ||
| They have a lot of working class white voters. | ||
| They have a lot of a mix between urban and rural. | ||
| They've had big manufacturing populations. | ||
| They have diverged more. | ||
| I mean, Pennsylvania is now demographically different than the other two. | ||
| The non-college white share of the vote is further down there, down about 44%, and has more college-educated voters in the suburbs of Philly, which is what allowed Democrats to... | ||
| And in general, the general story of midterms is that they're a little older, a little whiter, and a little more college-educated than the presidential. | ||
| That's very consistent. | ||
| And in the olden days, in the before times, that benefited Democrats because they relied so heavily on younger and non-white voters and Republicans were winning most college graduates. | ||
| Like in the 2010 midterm, Republicans won white college graduates by like 20 points. | ||
| It's like that wasn't that long ago. | ||
| It's hard to imagine that. | ||
| But now, you know, Democrats in the Trump era are winning at least narrow majorities among college whites, more in states like Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. | ||
| So I would say, Kirk, your opinion on it too, I mean, I would say those states are slightly more Democratic in an off-year than in a presidential year because the mix between the non-college whites who are trending Republican and the college whites who are trending Democratic tilts a little toward the college side. | ||
| Right, that diploma divide you're talking about, I think, is the biggest piece here, especially for the recent Democratic success in midterm elections and in the off-year elections that we've seen so far here. | ||
| And the blue wall in a midterm, because it is not a presidential one, the only voter group that Harris didn't lose as much ground with was older, whiter, wealthier, college-educated voters. | ||
| Those are the ones who come out into these special elections, into these off-year elections. | ||
| And in fact, in the 42 or so special elections so far this year, state legislature and congressional level, the Democrats on the ticket are outperforming the top of the ticket, so how Harris performed there, by an average of 15 points so far. | ||
| There's a lot of enthusiasm to turn out, at least on the Democratic side right now. | ||
| And if that special election performance is any indication, then I think it is at least a little bit of a favorable tailwind for Democrats. | ||
| You know, the striking thing about the Trump era is that even though he has generated enormous turnout among the working class whites, they are still shrinking as a share of the electorate because their share of the voter pool is going down so much. | ||
| So like even though turnout is up, you know, turnout is the numerator, right? | ||
| The denominator is how many of them there are. | ||
| And So we've seen whatever data source you use, they differ on the absolute level a little, but whether it's Catalyst, AP Vote Cast, Exit Polls, or the census, they basically still have non-college whites shrinking about two points as a share of the electorate every four years going back to the 70s. | ||
| Sometimes three, sometimes four, sometimes one. | ||
| It was about two points. | ||
| Catalyst, AP vote cast, and the census all say it was about two points even in 24, two points less. | ||
| The census has it down to 38%. | ||
| The other ones are a little over 40. | ||
| So Trump, you know, Trump navigated his way out of this cul-de-sac by improving among non-college non-whites, blue-collar, minority men primarily, but also a massive swing toward them. | ||
|
unidentified
|
What's that? | |
| Just a massive swing towards them. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Right. | |
| And so, like, we are going to get like a good sense of that in Jersey. | ||
| And that's going to be really important for them in these blue wall states to hold that because college whites are going to be at least as negative on Trump in 26 as they were in 18, I bet. | ||
| And so they are really going to need these blue-collar non-whites to offset that. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Why don't we jump on that right now, Kirk? | |
| How predictive do you think Virginia and New Jersey will be? | ||
| And what specific areas of Virginia and New Jersey are you looking for for any sort of predictive value there? | ||
| Well, traditionally, these off-year elections, especially after a presidential election, are a referendum on the party in power in the White House. | ||
| You saw that in 2021 in Virginia and New Jersey. | ||
| Now, what's interesting this time around is New Jersey swung pretty heavily toward Trump this last election. | ||
| So it's going to be, to your point, Ron, a great litmus test for how Democrats can perform with these Hispanic voters. | ||
| And specifically in New Jersey, I'm going to be looking at all the counties that are in New Jersey 9. | ||
| That's the old Bill Pascrell district. | ||
| It's now represented by a Democrat, Nellie Poe. | ||
| That is one of the districts that swung the hardest from Biden in 2020 to Trump in 2024. | ||
| In fact, it was a Biden plus 19 or so district in 2020. | ||
| It was a Trump plus one district then in 2024. | ||
| And those counties are going to be Bergen, Hudson, and Passaic County. | ||
| Those are the ones with large Hispanic populations expanding. | ||
| Those are the ones I'm going to be watching to see how Mikey Sherrill performs in there, the Democratic nominee. | ||
| You know, so the general trend is that midterms are less correlated, I think, than their midterms have always been imperfectly correlated to the presidential. | ||
| They're probably even more disassociated now because in this era of high turnout, you are getting so many more low-propensity voters in the presidential that it's just, you know, you're not really comparing the same thing. | ||
| But the Virginia, New Jersey stuff is pretty well correlated to the midterm, I think, and does give you some pretty good clues to the midterm, if not always to four years from now. | ||
| And I think one of the reasons why you didn't see as much of a Republican performance from 22 after a really strong performance in 21 in those off-year elections was the Roe v. Wade over time. | ||
| Right. | ||
| The abortion ruling. | ||
| You know, if you look at, if you look, so if you're asking what to look at in New Jersey and Virginia, I mean, it really is two buckets. | ||
| It's in 2017, the Republicans faced enormous deficits in the white-collar suburbs. | ||
| Fairfax, Loudoun, Prince William, less white-collar, Alexandria, Arlington. | ||
| I think Northam won them by about 250,000 votes, more than double what McAuliffe did four years earlier. | ||
| And that carried through to 18, carried through to 20. | ||
| Biden won those four jurisdictions by 450,000 votes. | ||
| And the same outside the suburbs of Philadelphia. | ||
| And as I said, in the 18 House races, three quarters of the seats Democrats won and more college graduates than average. | ||
| In 21, Democratic performance slipped in those areas, and you saw the kind of gains in the Latino and minority areas of both states that carried through to 24, with Kirk's absolutely right. | ||
| 22 was kind of interrupted. | ||
| It was election interruptus with the Roe v. Wade decision. | ||
| But what you saw in 21, the decline in those white-collar places, Harris in 24, you know, she didn't collapse in those places, but she just kind of dipped. | ||
| You know, Oakland County, Michigan, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, all those kind of places weren't quite as good as they were for Biden in 2020. | ||
| So those are the two things I will be watching. | ||
| I think he's absolutely right. | ||
| You got to watch the, can Republicans replicate what Trump did among non-white voters, especially in New Jersey? | ||
| And then, two, can they avoid the 2017 collapse in the white-collar suburbs? | ||
| Bergen is worth watching on that front, too. | ||
| It's a majority college graduate, Fairfax, Loudon. | ||
| I mean, I remember doing an interview with David Pluff after the 24 election, and I asked him when he kind of knew it was going south, and he just said, Louden. | ||
| So. | ||
| That's one of the first ones to report, too. | ||
| Yeah, that's a really nice. | ||
| You know, and you're right, because she wasn't getting, you know, given what was happening among minority voters in central cities, slight, you know, a dip, a real movement for Trump. | ||
| And then given the rural thing for Trump, like the only way to win was to do even better than Biden in those white-collar suburbs in the middle, and she wasn't matching him, right? | ||
|
unidentified
|
Okay. | |
| There's been an elephant in the room. | ||
| We've alluded to it a couple times, but the elephant is called redistricting. | ||
| Kirk, and I will say Kirk and the hotline team have done as good a work on redistricting as anybody. | ||
| There's a tab on our site. | ||
| Click it. | ||
| You can see all their coverage. | ||
| Leaving aside for a second the possible implications of the Supreme Court arguments today, give me the redistricting state of play right now. | ||
| How long do I have? | ||
|
unidentified
|
Not that long. | |
| I just want to say again, on National Journal, we do have a whole section of our website now that's just dedicated to redistricting news because it's just been that flood of information. | ||
| I really want to give a special shout out to James Downs, our House correspondent, who's doing incredible work out there. | ||
| He's doing God's work on it. | ||
| What we're looking at right now is grand scheme of things. |