Transcriber: nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v2, sat-12l-sm, and large-v3-turbo
Source
Participants
Main
t
trita parsi
12:33
Appearances
j
jason riley
00:32
m
mimi geerges
cspan03:18
steve witkoff
admin01:17
Clips
j
jonathan karl
abc00:07
?
Voice
Speaker
Time
Text
Effort to Elevate Whites and Non-Whites: A Disaster00:02:19
unidentified
at c-span.org.
Sunday night on C-SPAN's Q&A.
Wall Street Journal columnist Jason Riley, author of The Affirmative Action Myth, argues that the racial preference policies of the 1960s and 70s have had an overall negative impact on the success of black Americans.
There are racial differences in America, in our society, cultural differences, ethnic differences.
But when it comes to public policy and how the government treats us, treats the population, no, it should not be picking winners and losers based on race or treating people differently based on race.
So the Quincy Institute is about five, six years old now in Washington.
It's a new think tank.
And it's very different because we favor a foreign policy that is centered on diplomacy and military restraint.
We favor a completely different grand strategy for the United States, one that has far less military interventions abroad and far more focus on how we have to strengthen ourselves at home and the use of diplomacy as the key tenet of foreign policy.
There's both indirect talks, but there's also direct conversations.
It's been less reported in the media.
But bottom line is that they are talking.
They're making some advances.
And the fact that they're talking directly is very, very significant, mindful of the fact that during the entire four years of the Biden administration, they never managed to elevate it to a direct negotiation between the actual negotiators.
So the must-haves on the Iranian side are very clear because, as you know, this is not a new issue.
We've had negotiations before.
The Iranian red lines have been the same.
They absolutely will not give up enrichment on their own soil.
This is a red line that they've had for more than 20 years.
Whenever we have tried to get them to budge on that issue, all that has resulted in is that we don't get a deal, their program further advances, and any reasonable, realistic restraints that we can get on their program ends up getting delayed.
On the American side, it's a little bit less clear because Trump has never negotiated with the Iranians before.
He started off talking about his only red line being no weaponization.
Then a couple of weeks ago, he started talking about that they have to dismantle the program, close their facilities, no enrichment, going back to a position the U.S. has had before and unsuccessfully pursued.
But it doesn't seem clear to me as to whether that actually is the real red line or if it's part of the manner in which Trump tends to negotiate.
A lot of public negotiations, a lot of maximalist positions thrown out publicly, but not necessarily the real red lines at the negotiating table.
It remains to be seen.
I think, however, if Trump does not go back to his original red line, which is no weaponization, and insist on some of these things that we've tried before and doesn't work, he may miss a unique opportunity because I think he actually has the ability to get a better deal than Obama did.
That's not an argument that holds because at the end of the day, yes, they do have a lot of energy, but they're going to run out of that energy one day.
And other countries that have a lot of energy, such as the United States, nevertheless diversifies, uses all kinds of different energy sources.
If you're not dependent on import of energy from abroad, it would be quite foolish for you to allow yourself to become dependent on it.
So I think the Iranians want to make sure that they have this energy domestically so they can export more oil abroad.
And later on, when oil and gases run out, they still have other sources of energy.
So the JCPOA, and I was a strong supporter of it, I still think it was a very good deal, essentially agreed to limitations to the Iranian nuclear program, massive restrictions on how much they could enrich, how much low-enriched uranium they could have on their own soil.
They could not have any medium or high-level enrichment.
They could only enrich to 3.67%.
They could never have more than 300 kilos of low-enriched uranium on their own soil.
You need 1,200 to actually build a bomb.
They had inspections at every level at every stage of their program with IAEA cameras inside of the nuclear program.
In return, the Iranians were promised sanctions relief.
Not all of that actually came through.
The reason why Trump can get a better deal, in my view, is because Trump is willing to put more sanctions relief on the table.
Obama only lifted secondary sanctions.
Those are the sanctions the United States imposes on foreign companies if they go into the Iranian market.
Primary sanctions are the sanctions that the U.S. government imposes on U.S. companies if they go into the Iranian market.
He never lifted the primary sanctions.
So no American company actually managed to get into the Iranian economy except for Boeing, who was written into the deal.
So Trump already back in 2015 when he was complaining about the JCPOA saying that it was a bad deal, saying it was unfair, was pointing to the fact that this deal benefited Russian, Chinese, European companies, but no American companies.
He's willing to put primary sanctions on the table.
He seems to have an attitude in which he views sanctions largely as a punishment of American companies.
If he's willing to put more on the table, he can also ask more of the Iranians.
But there's a difference between asking for more and asking for everything.
There is a sweet spot there, and I think if both sides are reasonable and pragmatic, they can find it.
He does not have much experience in this specific field, certainly doesn't have expertise when it comes to the technical aspects of it.
And this would be a very technical deal, although it seems like he's quickly learning a lot of the details about it.
But he has a couple of qualities that is extremely valuable.
First of all, he is deeply trusted by Trump, and he does not have an agenda of his own.
In the past, in these negotiations, there's been some challenges.
There were efforts during the first Trump administration.
Trump wanted a deal.
The Iranians were willing to explore it towards the end of his presidency.
But the person in between was Mike Pompeo, Secretary Pompeo, who was doing everything he could to sabotage it.
Now, Trump has an envoy that is really following Trump's agenda.
That's very important because it gives him credibility at the negotiating table.
Secondly, precisely because he doesn't have that much of a background, he can be a little bit more creative.
He is more pragmatic and inclined to actually get a deal rather than be stuck in the old dead ends that have existed in this very, very lengthy conflict that has been going on.
So he seems to have the ability to be able to get deals.
Whether the follow-through is there to the extent that it needs to be remains to be seen.
But it's very fascinating to see that in the region, whether it is with the Qataris, whether it is with Iranians or others, he seems to have gained a lot of respect.
He wants to solve this conflict diplomatically and with dialogue.
And he's given all the signals.
He's directly sent letters to the Supreme Leader.
I have been dispatched to deliver that message as well, and I've delivered it.
But on the other hand, we have one very, very clear red line, and that is enrichment.
We cannot allow even 1% of an enrichment capability.
We've delivered a proposal to the Iranians that we think addresses some of this without disrespecting them.
And so that's important.
We want to get to a solution here.
And we think that we will be able to.
But everything begins from our standpoint, John, with a deal that does not include enrichment.
Cannot have that, because enrichment enables weaponization and we will not allow a bomb to to get here.
But short of that, there are all kinds of ways for us to achieve our goals in this negotiation.
We think that we will be meeting sometime this week in Europe and we hope that it will lead to some real positivity, and that's that's that's where we are.
Yes, I think if that ends up being the final position, there's not going to be a deal.
We have plenty of experience more than 20 years of seeing that not working out.
There may be some variations of this.
So there is some talk right now that there may be an international consortium, meaning that enrichment would take place on Iranian soil, but there would be other countries involved in the enrichment activities and present in the facilities.
That may then be able to be presented as a no enrichment only by the Iranians, because they won't be doing it alone.
So there may be some areas of flexibility there.
But if the position is entirely zero enrichment, which is the same position that John Bolton and Mike Pompeo and others pursued, which gave Trump zero wins on this issue, then I don't think we will have a deal and unfortunately, given what Trump has said, it means that there will be a gravitation towards a military confrontation.
Do you think that they would be willing to take a temporary cease to their enrichment activities, to say, you know, stop for one year and we'll give you this much sanction relief?
That was with the Europeans, not with the United States.
This was meant to be a confidence building measure, but once it was tied to the duration of the negotiations, once they stopped enrichment, the Europeans slowed down the negotiations because as long as the negotiations technically, were going on, the Iranians were forced to retain that suspension.
When they broke it in 2005, there was a major crisis.
If the same thing happens this time, this is part of the reason why I think the Iranians are so suspicious of this, that what is supposed to be a temporary halt ends up becoming a permanent halt, because the cost of restarting it is going to be so high.
So I find that unlikely.
Could it end up being a week, two weeks, something like that, perhaps?
But what the administration appears to have thrown out is for there to be a three-year halt, which means for the duration of Trump's presidency.
I find it to be essentially impossible for the Iranians to agree that you talked about sanctions relief for Iran.
So, as part of the sanctions that the United States has imposed on Iran, a lot of Iran's oil revenue is held in foreign banks in other countries in which the Iranians no longer have access to them because the banks are not allowed to release the money to the Iranians.
There were some efforts during the Biden administration in which those monies would be released about six billion dollars but it actually wouldn't go to the Iranians.
They would sit in Qatar, Qatar.
And then whenever the Iranians needed to buy some food or medicine, they would send a list.
The Qataris would check it with the U.S. government, and then the money would be used to purchase that.
But when the actual JCPA was struck, then those monies were released back to the Iranians because it's their money and the sanctions had been lifted.
So this is a very, very concerning situation right now.
During the JCPOA, as long as Iran was in the deal, which they were, as long as the U.S. was in the deal, but Trump pulled out of the deal, the Iranian breakout capability, as we call it, is the amount of time it would take for them from making a decision to build a bomb to having the material for a bomb, not having a bomb, but having the material for a bomb, was a minimum of 12 months.
Today, as a result of Trump pulling out of the deal and the restrictions falling off, the Iranians are somewhere between three and seven days from having, but that's having the material for the bomb.
Having a bomb is a different thing because they have to test it, they have to put it on a vehicle, et cetera, et cetera.
That could probably take another year or two years.
But it means that they're much, much closer and have much more leverage than they did before as a result of us pulling out of the deal, insisting on unrealistic demands such as zero enrichment, which as I said earlier on has only led to their program expanding and the kind of realistic restrictions being delayed.
We'll start with Bob in Greenbush, Michigan, Independent Line.
Good morning.
unidentified
Good morning.
I've seen speculation from experts that Iran is just delaying the talk long enough to get an agreement similar to NATO's Article 5 with Russia, China, and North Korea.
The Chinese, the Russians, are not in the habit of providing that type of Article 5 agreements with anyone in which they actually would go and defend another country.
The Iranians are seeking to make sure that they have as much of an independent capacity to defend themselves rather than relying on some form of a guarantee from another major power.
The Iranians view themselves as a major power.
And as a major power, they don't ask for security guarantees from anyone else.
Well, the Iranians actually don't insist on that because in the JCPOA, they were up to 20%.
And as a result of the JCPOA, they went down to 3.67%, which is the level you need in order to be able to build fuel pads for reactors to produce civilian energy.
In this deal, if there is a deal, they will have to agree to go down to 3.67 again.
And they have not made any indications that they won't agree to that.
What they have made very clear is that they won't go down to zero.
First of all, the amount of funding is so minimal it will not be affected by this.
But the real logical conclusion of that argument is that you have to starve Iran completely to death in order to avoid that.
So that's now how things work.
The way things work is that if you actually have a deal with Iranians, particularly if Trump manages to open up the Iranian economy to American companies, and you have an improvement of relations, then you have leverage to be able to pressure the Iranians to abandon or limit or change many of those different relationships.
Now, something has also happened in the last year, which is that, first of all, Hamas and Iran's relations were never particularly strong to begin with, but that relationship is more or less gone at this point.
As you pointed out, there is no Assad regime left.
Hezbollah is significantly weakened.
The Houthis were never, never an Iranian proxy.
That is absolutely clear.
This is a very independent movement that oftentimes publicly have criticized the Iranians.