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May 12, 2025 04:38-06:09 - CSPAN
01:30:31
Discussion on U.S.-Iran Relations
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In a conversation with the school's dean, William Traynor.
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Coming up next, a discussion with foreign policy researchers on the impact of relations between the U.S. and Iran on the Gulf states and Israel, Russia, and China.
This was hosted by the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C.
It runs just under an hour and a half.
Good morning, everyone.
My name is John Hoffman.
I'm a research fellow here in Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.
And on behalf of the Institute, I'd like to welcome everyone here in the audience and watching at home.
Today, we have an all-star lineup of speakers joining us to discuss a critical topic at an even more critical time.
Before we get started, if everybody could please mute their cell phones, and we will be taking questions from the audience, both online and in person.
Online audience, you can join the conversation and submit questions directly on the event webpage, Facebook, YouTube, and on X, formerly Twitter.
On to today's topic, U.S.-Iran tensions and the prospects of a deal or war between Washington and Tehran.
First, a few opening remarks to frame the discussion.
Iran and the United States are currently on a collision course with relatively few off-ramps.
Since Donald Trump scrapped the joint comprehensive plan of action, the JCPOA Accords sealed in 2015, Iran has accelerated its production of near-weapons-grade uranium.
Tehran has gone from a uranium enrichment level of 3.67%, as stipulated by the JCPOA, to 60%.
90% is needed for a nuclear weapon, which means Tehran is closer today to a nuclear weapon than any point in the country's history.
Negotiations between the United States and Iran are currently underway to try and defuse tensions over Tehran's nuclear program in a peaceful manner.
But complicating negotiations are contradicting messages coming from Washington and Tehran, and also pressure from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who seeks to capitalize on what he views as Iran's vulnerability after a series of losses over the past 19 months following Hamas's terrorist attack on October 7th, 2023, and the ensuing war in Gaza.
The ongoing negotiations may be the last chance at solving the crisis diplomatically.
To address this topic, I'd like to introduce our speakers.
They all have very impressive resumes, so if I read everything, we'd be here all day.
But for today's purposes, moving from my right to left, we have Danny Setronowitz, a research fellow in the Iran program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel.
Danny served 25 years in a variety of positions for the Israeli Defense Intelligence, including as head of the Iran branch in the research and analysis division.
Next, we have Nagar Murtazavi, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute.
She is an expert in all things Iran, has an extensive publication portfolio, and has received numerous awards and recognition for her work, including Forbes' Inspirational Woman Award and the National Security and Foreign Affairs Leader Award by the Center for International Studies.
Nagar is also the host of the Iran podcast.
Last but finally, not least, of course, is Gregory Brew, a senior analyst on the Iran Energy and Climate Resources Program at the Eurasia Group.
Greg is a historian by trade, we won't hold that against him, and has published profusely on Iran, oil, and U.S. foreign policy.
He is the author of the book Petroleum and Progress in Iran, published by Cambridge University, and co-author of The Struggle for Iran, published by the University of North Carolina.
We are honored to have all three of you with us today.
Two of you from out of town, and Nagor is local.
So the first question goes to Danny.
If you could explain how it is we got to this point.
What has happened since the JCPOA was scrapped in 2018?
How has the last 19 months accelerated tensions between Iran, Israel, and the United States?
And what's at stake here, not just for Iran, Israel, and the U.S., but for the broader Middle East.
Well, thanks, John, for inviting me to speak in this important panel and part of a really esteemed colleague that I have on my right.
I want to say that for me it's like a deja vu all over again.
I was the head of the nuclear desk at the Israel Defense Intelligence when they had a JCPOA.
So for me it's like repeating back because we are standing maybe in front of a JCPOA 2.0.
But I want to say beforehand that we are in a very important pivotal moment.
I know there are a lot of things running, are happening, but we have to say that if the negotiation will succeed or definitely not succeed, then escalation is imminent.
So in that regard, I think that we're in a very important stage and the next few weeks will be important for not only for the Iranian nuclear program, but also for the Iranian regime, but also to the Middle East as a whole.
That's just to give the framework where we are right now.
In terms of what happened since 2015, I think it's important to say that first, just recap of the JCPOA.
Again, it's a deal that has its advantages and disadvantages.
I think it significantly rolled back the Iranian nuclear program.
The Iranians actually implemented the agreement itself.
But since then, we see major problems that will have to be addressed in this negotiation.
But I think that before we touch a little bit about the technology side, I think that it's important to say that people tend to forget that even after President Trump exited from the JCPOA, he tried to return back to an agreement.
Back then, he tried to negotiate with Arif, actually invited him to the White House.
And why it's so important?
Because I think we have to remember that for the U.S., the first choice of every administration was negotiation, was not the strike.
Yes, we are in a stage now that President Trump is threatening Iran, but we have to remember that the first and foremost, the option to choose is actually or to seek is actually reaching a political solution.
And that is extremely important because we discuss later on probably about the Israeli policy in that regard.
And for Israel, it's vice versa.
It's everything but an agreement.
Since the agreement, of course, again, U.S. exited the agreement, actually, the Iranian side was very hesitant in the beginning to actually break the glass ceiling in the enrichment.
But certain events that occurred in the Iranian nuclear program and of course inattention within Iran and the weakness of Wuhani after Trump left the agreement led to unprecedented advancement of the Iranian enrichment part.
Where we are right now is actually very alarming.
The Iranians are on the verge of reaching to 90%.
They're not doing so not because they cannot, actually because they are afraid or worried politically that if they will reach, that actually will signal to Israel, to the US that the program is not a civilian one.
But they can do that tomorrow if they want.
They use highly advanced centrifuges.
If we go back to the 2015, we had IR1s, very, I won't say stupid model, but very basic model of enrichment.
And now they're highly advanced in that regard.
They have IR6, maybe soon to be IR8s.
They, of course, accumulated a lot of enriched uranium, including 60%, hundreds of kilos of that.
They still, again, not breaking the threshold in terms of 90%.
But when you're checking where they are right now, they actually are a threshold country in terms of the enrichment itself.
And that lead us to where we are right now.
So the tension definitely, when you see where we stand right now, the tension is high.
First and foremost, because of the fact that unlike previous administration, this administration actually threatened to attack the program itself without being in the last resort momentum.
Meaning that the previous administration, the Baron administration, talked about, will attack Iran if it will be a last resort.
Now Trump's saying to the Iranians, I'm going to attack the program if there's not going to be an agreement.
And that is important.
Adding to the fact that there is, of course, unprecedented presence, military predators of the American side in the region, including two carriers and the bombers in Diego-Gossia.
Again, first and foremost, probably for the Houthis attack, but definitely the Iranians see that and understand it.
That created a lot of tension in the region in terms of the fact that the Iranians understand that they need to start negotiating.
And as we said, the first choice for the U.S. is, of course, negotiating with Iran.
So actually, the side were pushed to the run of negotiations.
I have to say, there's a discussion on how the Iranians are weak, and we probably discuss that later on in the Israel issue.
But I say that the Iranians have definitely grown weaker since the 7th of October, definitely what happened with Hezbollah and the 26th of October Israeli attack, the results of it.
But they're not a weak country.
So if there were not going to be an agreement, then escalation might be imminent.
I think that the Iranians, as we know, coming into the negotiations, seek to return back to the characteristics of the JCPOA, meaning that they are willing to limit the Iranian nuclear program in terms of significant economical relief, meaning lifting the sanctions.
They are not be willing to do two major things that we have to say.
They are not going to dismantle the agreement, sorry, the program whatsoever, because for them, enrichment is much more than just enriching uranium, saving the ability to maybe to reach a bomb in the future or building to the Iranian deterrence.
For them, it's a pillar of the regime.
This is one aspect, and of course, embedding other issues connected to the enrichment itself, meaning that they're not willing to discuss no restriction on the missile program, definitely not on the proxy side.
So I'll finishing by saying that, like I said at the beginning, we are in a pivotal moment.
The program is highly advanced.
I think, we'll probably discuss that later on, there is a chance to have what we call a good agreement in terms of rolling back the Iranian nuclear program because Iranians are back against the corner politically, economically, militarily.
But I think if the choice for the Iranians will be to cross the red lines or to expose them to attack, they're willing to take the risk of an attack.
They don't want to, of course.
So this is why I think we are in a very crucial moment these days.
No, thank you.
And what you mentioned earlier about the Israeli perspective and the ramifications of the strike on October 26th, we will certainly get to that.
I want to go out of order for a second here to Greg.
I know you've been following the ongoing negotiations very closely.
There have been a lot of updates even just this weekend.
What's the current status of negotiations?
What are American requests?
How are the divisions within the administration and Washington more generally impacting these negotiations and the demands that are being presented to Tehran?
Sure thing.
Well, first of all, thank you so much, John and Cato Institute, for having me here.
It's a pleasure to join this esteemed panel.
And I'm going to build off of a lot of what Danny laid out, as he did in such great detail, and address this question, the current state of negotiations, as you mentioned, but also come back to this issue of urgency, this sense that we are at a crucial point, as Danny mentioned, that we could be looking at a crucial period of a few weeks perhaps, or at the very least a few months, that could determine whether we're on a path to a deal or potentially on the path to escalation.
You know, very often when working in the Iran space, one has to depend, one has to rely on reading tea leaves, taking comments, discourse coming out of the regime, coming out of Khamenei and other leaders, and trying to determine what policy could be.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is not always an open book.
You have to do a certain amount of sieving through the data.
And there's been a little bit of that on the U.S. side as well, as we've seen, I would say several months of somewhat contradictory, somewhat confusing commentary coming from various members of the Trump administration.
And it really comes down to, there's been a great deal of coverage on the different factions, the different disagreements within the administration when it comes to Iran policy.
And I would break them down into two crucial debates, one of which happened early in the administration and the other which is currently ongoing.
The first debate came early, and I would say it was around the issue of whether to pursue a deal with Iran or whether to pursue military escalation.
And we do know that there were members of the administration with support from Israel, as Danny mentioned, this is Israel's first preference, that a deal with Iran was not possible, that it was too close to reaching nuclear weaponization threshold, that it was weak given the damage that it suffered last year, both to its air defenses, but also to, I would say more importantly, its regional proxy network, the degradation of Hezbollah, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, the damage done to both Hamas and the Houthis,
that this created a window of opportunity that should be seized, and that the way to seize that opportunity was not through negotiations, which the argument was would be lengthy, would potentially drag on for months and wouldn't produce an agreement, but rather that military escalation was the appropriate course of action.
We know that the argument around that issue was resolved in the other direction, right?
That it was determined within the administration that, no, there was scope for negotiations.
President Trump made the announcement, surprisingly, while seated next to Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, that there were going to be direct talks with Iran following the exchange of letters between the United States and Iran.
And I think it's become clear over time that the president's preference is for diplomacy.
As Danny mentioned, there have been numerous explicit threats that military force will be used against Iran if there is not a deal.
I think the president has been fairly clear about that.
There's the positioning of military assets in the region, B2 stealth bombers in Diego Garcia, two aircraft carriers stationed in the region, ongoing air operations against the Houthis, and a degree of coordination, albeit not without friction, with Israel over the possibility of a military operation against Iran.
But the preference of this administration has been for diplomacy.
So the first debate was resolved in favor of talks.
The new debate is over what a deal should or could look like.
And we know that there are two fairly vocal factions within the Trump administration.
One is expressing the desire for a much tougher deal, one that goes much further than the JCPOA.
The deal in its shape is somewhat inchoate, but it essentially resolves that Iran must dismantle all of its nuclear facilities, right?
Not only facilities that potentially serve a dual purpose for a weaponization program, which Iran claims that it does not have and which the U.S. intelligence community also determines that it is not currently working on a nuclear weapon, but that under a new agreement, Iran would have to dismantle those facilities, but would also have to dismantle any facilities to support a nuclear program in any form.
That is the so-called Libya-style agreement, harkening back to the 2003 deal that was struck with Libya, where Muammar Gaddafi dismantled his nuclear program.
And we all know how that turned out.
On the other side, our advocates for, I would say, a more flexible approach to diplomacy.
Now, we still don't know exactly how flexible these advocates are and precisely what kind of deal they would be comfortable with.
The President himself gave an interview over the weekend where he suggested that his preference was dismantling.
But then he immediately followed up by saying, I would be open to Iran having a civilian nuclear program.
The one element, and the president has been surprisingly disciplined on his messaging, the one element that he has invoked time and again is that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon, which it does not have and which it does not currently want, according to the US intelligence community.
But that if a deal was struck, it would fall somewhere between Iran not having a weapon and Iran dismantling its entire program.
And now we get into the nitty-gritty that Danny mentioned, details regarding levels of enrichment, details regarding how many centrifuges it can possess, all of which was tackled to some extent by the original JCPOA.
But the JCPOA itself in its present form would be, I would say, inadequate to address the advancements that Iran has made, the new elements that it has worked on.
A deal that covers that degree of detail would require much more lengthy negotiations.
But putting that aside, it still remains somewhat unclear precisely what advocates for a more flexible deal are looking for from Iran.
Whether it would include the capacity to enrich uranium domestically, as the JCPOA allowed, whether it would fall under what Secretary of State Marco Rubio has laid out, some scheme where Iran retains its program but imports uranium, or whether it would be some combination of factors.
A few elements that I would point to is that I believe the president and the administration is under a certain degree of pressure to reach a deal that is demonstrably stronger than the JCPOA, which of course the President himself pulled out of and has called the worst deal in history.
Now, President Trump has, I would say, a somewhat flexible relationship with reality.
And any deal that the United States reaches with Iran could very well be characterized as stronger than the JCPOA, if perhaps not in fact, than in the messaging.
But that would be a tough sell, given that there are still, I would say, vocal elements of the Republican Party and vocal members of the Trump administration, and of course Israel, who would blanch at a deal that does not reach and go further than the original 2015 deal.
Finally, a final point to address on the question of urgency.
There is this sense that we are at a critical moment, that there is only a few weeks, perhaps, to make substantive progress on negotiations.
And that urgency is coming from a few sources.
First, it's coming from the President.
Trump has made it clear that he wants a deal soon.
He has given a two-month deadline.
Nobody knows precisely when that started or how long it will last or whether it will even be two months.
I think it's pretty clear that the administration wants a deal soon in order to advance with the rest of its regional agenda.
So that's one element of urgency.
Second element of urgency, the pressure coming from Israel and from elements within the administration that this window of opportunity where Iran is weak will close, that it will eventually rebuild its air defenses, that it could even rebuild its regional position.
I'm somewhat skeptical of that point, but there is an argument that this is a moment where U.S. leverage over Iran is more significant than it perhaps could be in six to ten months.
There is another element of urgency which comes from the so-called snapback deadline.
We can get into the technical details of that if we like, but it essentially regards sanctions that need to be implemented by October, the formal expiration of the JCPOA.
This creates a fairly narrow window of negotiations.
And then finally, the threats from Iran that which have been now expressed over the course of the last year that it could, I don't think this is likely, but that it could give up on diplomacy and advance with weaponization sooner rather than later.
These are all creating, these are all compelling the administration, and I would say Iran as well, to move with haste to conclude at least some progress on negotiations.
I'll close by saying that we all need to be cautious when we express optimism about the course of negotiations.
It took two years to conclude the JCPOA.
Addressing Danny's point regarding deja vu, this issue has been a long, has been around for the better part of two decades.
There have been numerous stop-start attempts at forging a diplomatic agreement between Iran and the United States.
The JCPOA was a success, but there have been far more failures.
And I think we need to be conscious of the obstacles to reaching even a smaller deal, given the suspicion and the mistrust which continue to predominate on both sides.
Both sides, I believe, at this moment want to address this issue diplomatically, but that has been true in the past, and the efforts have ended in failure.
No, I think this issue of contradicting messages coming from the administration is really important because we've seen everything from total dismantlement to a return to 3.67%, like was stipulated under the JCPOA.
But I think it was reported over this weekend that the deal that's coming together is somewhat similar to the JCPOA, but maybe it has a 25-year sunset clause, you know, these slight tweaks, and we can get into whether this would be able to be presented as a win for President Trump.
But Toun Agore, I want to ask what's happening internally inside Iran.
If you can give us an overview, like there are divisions on the American side, what are the divisions within the regime?
What are the perceptions among the Iranian people of a deal?
And what sort of deal, realistically, is Tehran more likely to accept than not?
Sure.
Thank you so much to you, Cato, for hosting.
It's great to be here with both of you.
I would just build on what both Danny and Greg said, which I agree with, I would say, just like the American side, or at least the president, because there are divisions within the U.S. administration, the Iranian side seems eager to resolve this issue diplomatically.
I would say they have been consistently eager.
And just to take a step back, not to too many years ago, but just to the previous Trump administration, this is a president who, after the United States agreed on a deal, which was called the JCPOA, and Iran was abiding by the deal, according to reports by the U.S. State Department, a new party, a new president from a new party, the opposing party, comes in, doesn't like the deal, pulls the U.S. out of the deal while Iran was abiding.
And I agree with Danny that in a strange way, it looks like President Trump wants a deal with Iran, he wants diplomacy, but the method that he tried to approach it was just very confusing from the Iranian side.
So he pulls out of that deal, then he says he wants a new deal.
There was a period within the first term that he did kind of express.
He said he would love to meet the Iranian leaders.
They're lovely people.
He invited Java Zarif to the White House.
This is after he also tried to meet the Iranian president at the UN in New York with the mediation of the UK, the French.
But nevertheless, fast forward to 2020, which then he went around and assassinated the top Iranian general, Qasam Salaimani.
So that escalated the whole situation to a different level, essentially brought the two countries to the brink of war.
The Iranians responded by shooting missiles for the first time from their own soil into a U.S. base in Iraq, the Al-Assad base.
And then fortunately, that episode ended.
Both sides kind of de-escalated, and it didn't turn into a lot war.
Now that same president is back.
This is a president who pulled out of an existing deal that the United States had signed.
For all it matters from the Iranian side, it doesn't matter who the president was.
This was a deal they signed with the P5 plus one in the United States, which was one of the parties.
This is a president who assassinated their top general, the top Iranian general, essentially showed that he's willing to or brought the two countries to the brink of war and essentially is willing to go to war.
But at the same time, I think that the mixed signals coming from the president himself and then also the administration, this is looking from the Iranian side, is that he also seems very eager in diplomacy and in reaching a deal with Iran.
And I absolutely agree with Greg.
Doesn't matter what the deal is.
I think President Trump is capable of presenting it as a better deal to his base.
And this actually makes it more of a golden sort of opportunity, I think, for the Iranians that this is a president, a Republican, who will be able to sell this deal to a Republican base in the U.S., which no Democrat could.
So when you have a Democratic president, let's say Barack Obama, that turns into a Democratic deal, and the Republicans were all opposed to it, part of the Democratic Party even.
But if a Republican, essentially a Nixon to China situation, if a Republican can make a deal, assuming that the Democrats won't oppose peace or diplomacy, then that gives it a more sustainable or a longer lifetime in the U.S., which is something the Iranian side is also considering.
They're seeing it, and they've been talking about this for years.
In Iran, there have been these theories for years that if, on the off-chance, we can make a deal with the Republicans or with the hardliners, with the right wing, then that's going to be more sustainable.
And this seems to be the chance.
This is that off-chance of a Republican president who wants a deal with Iran and who will be able to sort of make it more sustainable.
These are all ifs, though, if the negotiations succeed, if a deal is reached.
As far as the divisions within Iran, so this is the view from Tehran, as everyone is seeing the U.S., but they also see the mixed signals, and we see a response to that also in the form of mixed signals coming from Iran.
So initially, they showed interest in diplomacy in their public messaging all the way to the highest offices.
And then came U.S. sanctions.
So when this administration came into power, President Trump had been talking about diplomacy throughout the campaign trail.
He was actually pretty consistent on messaging.
He keeps saying, or kept saying until this last weekend's interview that they just can't have nuclear weapons.
He wants a deal.
wants diplomacy, a nuclear peace deal, he called it.
Then later he called it a verifiable nuclear deal.
But the line has been pretty consistent that they just can't have nuclear weapons.
And that's something that's within the acceptable parameters for Tehran.
They want to keep their nuclear program.
They definitely want to keep enriching, as Danny was saying.
That's not something they're going to give up.
It's been a red line for them since the beginning of all of these going back to the bushiers.
And they keep saying that their state policies, that they don't want to weaponize their program.
And this is not just by the Iranians, it's also U.S. intelligence, Western intelligence, has approved that the program is not a weaponized program.
So if that is the parameter, if we listen to just the president, this is something that's acceptable from Tehran.
Having a nuclear deal, whatever the details are, the forms of shapes, as long as they can keep some form of some level of enrichment, as long as they can keep some level of the stockpiles that they have already enriched.
I think the details of that are negotiable and that they can continue this nuclear program for civilian purposes, which has been a pillar and also a source of really pride for the country.
Now, the mixed signals coming from Washington has also resulted in mixed signals and response from Iran, from the Supreme Leader suggesting that negotiations with the U.S. would be futile, with other senior hardliners trying to push alternative lines that, oh, if negotiations fail, then potentially we can weaponize this program.
It's something that we're hearing Iranian officials say more vocally.
And also the fact that they're ready for escalation and potential conflict.
And I agree with Danny.
I think, yes, Iran is in a weak state.
The entirety of that access with their allies, the so-called axis of resistance, Iran's allies in the form of Hezbollah, the Houthis, fall of Assad in Syria, even Iraqi militias.
All of that network has inflicted a lot of pain, but has also taken big, major hits in the past two years.
So the Iranians understand that, that in the battlefield, they have been weakened.
And the flip side of that is that the diplomats have been emboldened in the country.
So this is a plus for diplomacy.
And at the same time, I think the flip side of that is that they're signaling that they're potentially ready to, as they frame it, defend themselves.
So if does come a military strike from the U.S. or from Israel, the signal is that we're ready to defend and potentially we're ready to escalate.
So this is the military line that we're hearing from Tehran, that their understanding is that if they escalate, if they hit back harder once they're hit, then that could sort of result in a similar situation that we saw in 2020 after the assassination of Salaimani and potentially and into taking an offer and maybe not going to all out war or going to all out war.
But I think the red lines have been as they were in keeping the civilian program, keeping some level of enrichment, keeping some amount of the stockpile.
And if that doesn't come out of the negotiations, potentially being ready for escalation and the military side, which again is not the first option.
I think the first option for Tehran is diplomacy, is a diplomatic resolution.
They seem pretty serious.
Abbas Arakchi, the foreign minister, has been going to negotiations pretty seriously, although indirectly or directly.
And I think, again, that the signal is that they have been able to move beyond the first term of the Trump administration and sort of deal with this new chapter of Donald Trump, but then at the same time, taking the mixed signal seriously.
You had national security advisor, former national security advisor Mike Walsh, essentially contradicting what the president was saying.
You recently, we recently heard Secretary of State Rubio also introducing new elements into what the Iranians essentially would see at red lines.
So these are complications.
The last round of talks, the third round of talks, so the first two rounds were going well.
Steve Witkoff, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, was received pretty well by the Iranians.
The Iranian reporting from the Iranian side says that the Iranians were actually pretty surprised at what he brought to the table as far as what President Trump wants, even his demeanor, the respect, and all of that seemed pretty new, very surprising, well received.
But the third round, when for the first time they started discussing technical and more details of a deal, sort of hit a bump in the road.
And now we know the scheduled fourth round was postponed.
So waiting for that to see.
But overall, I would say there's less of that mixed signals now coming from Tehran.
We see more of a sort of unified and unison line for diplomacy, but at the same time, the red lines are pretty clear.
And that's why I just want to add this one last point.
That's why I don't think it's possible for a deal to look too much different from the JCPOA.
You know, it's the same nuclear program.
It's the same science.
It's the same tech.
And it's the same red lines kind of by both sides.
So essentially, this deal is going to look very similar to the JCPOA with different dates, maybe different amounts and whatever.
But there aren't so many ways of making it look very different.
But again, I think President Trump himself essentially would be capable of presenting this as the kind of deal that he wants.
And then, of course, he's eyeing the big prize.
I can't not mention this, which is the Nobel Peace.
And I think having a legacy in foreign policy of reaching some form of peace, you know, the three main files in Gaza, Iran, and Ukraine, I would say at least one of them is what is, or potentially all of them, is what is seen as sort of that step to the big prize.
Yes, we all know he wants that award quite badly.
He said it many times.
No, no, no.
He wants it.
Back to Danny.
So what is the Israeli perspective on negotiations?
How is Netanyahu, in particular, approaching the negotiations and the prospects of war or a deal between Tehran and Washington?
Given Netanyahu's long-standing support for military action against Iran dating back to the 90s, coupled with the new incentives of the past 19 months, do you think Netanyahu would go it alone on a strike without explicit approval or the knowledge of the United States?
Yeah, well, I think that I will say that I feel very lucky to analyze Iran and not Israel policy.
Fair enough.
If someone will can explain to you what my government is doing, I will be grateful.
But I'll try to, if we're looking back at the Israel strategy towards Iran, I think that we have to say it wasn't a great success.
Netanyahu can claim victory after victory, but it's a multiple of operational achievements that didn't give any strategic gains in that regard.
And If we recap, you know, in 2003 the Iranian decided to forego the military route to dismantle Ahmad and project and forgo to the civilian side.
It was mainly because of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, Iraq, not connected to Israel.
And what Israel tried since is actually to push hard against the Iranian enrichment capabilities.
Israel already took a lot of responsibilities for cladic side operations that it did in multiple events.
But as we can see now, we actually pushed the Iranians forward instead of stopping them.
Where we are right now is actually a testimony to the Israeli failure in stopping the Iranian enrichment.
The Iranians are on the verge of 90% enrichment.
And if you told me that 10 years ago, I would say, no, not in a million years.
But at the end of the day, the Iranians gradually able to bypass any technological barrier or any obstacle that Israel throwed to them and finding themselves on the verge of reaching to 90%.
Actually, I'm not sure the problem is that I'm not sure that Israel is really learning the lesson of that.
So we have to acknowledge that we weren't successful.
But where we stand right now is obviously Netanyahu that is saying my place is history is Churchill preventing the new Nazis from having a nuclear bomb.
I think that for him it's a golden moment.
This is why I think that the situation now between Israel and the U.S. are quite, I think there will be a tension in the relationship.
Because of the fact that Netanyahu see that the road to Tehran is open in terms of there is no Hezbollah that can threaten Israel.
26th of October attack was important in terms of hitting hard of the Iranian ability to manufacture missiles but also the strategic self-esteem defense.
So in all regards, we just need to press the button or order the planes to lift.
And for Netanyahu it's important to say that the nuclear issue is not the most important one.
The most important one at the end of the day is toppling the regime.
Netanyahu had said that numerous times, mentioning that, pursuing that.
And I think that for him, even go back to the days of President Obama, the issue of pressuring Iran economically for the U.S. was bringing the Iranian to the table for a nuclear deal.
This is what happened in the SCPOA.
For Israel, the notion is pressing them in order to topple the regime.
And that is why I think that Netanyahu finds himself in a problematic situation, because I really think that he thought, we see that from his own declarations, that on the second term of Trump, there will be a golden opportunity given how Iran is weak, as he portrayed that, and the seriousness of the U.S. president to solve this issue, that U.S. will back Israel in attack or maybe another important element will join in to this kind of attack.
I'm sure that Netanyahu preferred that as well.
So where we stand right now is the fact that I think that Netanyahu was caught by surprise when he had a call with President Trump and he was in Hungary telling him, come to Washington, surprisingly saying that they initiated negotiations.
And I think that there is a problem in terms of how Netanyahu sees the fulfillment of what will happen in the future, because for Netanyahu, if agreement will be signed or agreed between the U.S. and Iran, it's a major blow because it's not Biden or Obama's administration.
The ability of Netanyahu to do something politically in the U.S. against this agreement is limited, given its dependence regarding President Trump.
And we can see their relationship.
It's obvious.
So turning back to your question, I think that, again, my suggestion is that Israel won't do anything to jeopardize the risk of an agreement because I don't think that President Trump will be forgiving.
And we can see what happened to Mike Waltz and the leak by that regard.
And I think Israel, and I wrote that just Last week in the Israeli media, that Israel needs to be very careful not to be in the mix in the discussion between the MAGA people and the Hawks regarding Iran.
Because people say, and I've been here in Washington for the last week, people are saying that Israel is really trying to push the US to attack Iran.
And we should be very careful in that regard.
I think the major problem that I have in the Israeli policy, a lot of problems with that, but I think two major ones.
One, that we don't have an opposition in Israel to the policy that Netanyahu offers regarding Iran.
And we see Lapid, Gans, bypassing from the right, calling for attacking oil fields in Iran.
And of course, it's politics, but everything is politics in Israel, unfortunately.
But the thing is that if there will be an agreement, then Israel will get an agreement that will be forced on her, will not be intervening in the agreement itself.
So it might find itself in a bad agreement, given the fact that I think that the Iranians have the upper hand in negotiations.
Araki, Ravanchi, Zarif, Ivanin, the UN, they all have experience.
I think they are, I think, again, Witkov, I think, probably a good person, but it's a complex thing.
So I think Israel needs to help him to achieve a good agreement.
Israel, I know the long-standing issues that if we'll go for a negotiation, then everybody will jump in, whatever.
But think of the risk of countering an agreement or having the reality of an agreement without having the ability to influence on it.
So we're seeing now that Netanyahu calling for the Libyan model, it's not calling for an escalation.
So where we stand right now, I think that Netanyahu is in a huge problem in terms of what's happening right now.
There is a negotiation.
Israel is not influencing the negotiation.
But I think, again, we shouldn't.
And Israel waits to see what will happen.
If the negotiation will collapse, and like my colleague said, it can happen.
The fact that both sides want an agreement doesn't say anything about the fact that we find ourselves in an agreement, there are a lot of mistrust.
We'll see what will happen.
But if the negotiation will collapse, then probably we'll see Netanyahu pushing the U.S. side to see at least backing Israel in an attack.
But if not, then Netanyahu will find himself in a problematic situation from a political standpoint in terms of what people say in Israel about him, you know, saying, I will prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon and now we have an agreement.
But also in terms of what to do next, it will actually seal the deal in terms of Netanyahu way of thinking regarding toppling the regime.
So again, last but not least in that regard, I think that Netanyahu tried to say all the time that I'm aligned with President Trump about everything regarding Iran, but my sense is if negotiation will move forward and we'll be on a brick-on agreement or even a temporary one, then there will be problems in that relationship.
And again, but turning back to what I said at the beginning, we have to be very cautious from the Israeli side not to intervene in that because given the fact that I mentioned earlier, Trump wants a deal, Israel cannot try to undermine his willingness in that aspect because if he's so, then, as I mentioned, it won't be that forgiving.
So we'll see how things will develop.
We have to remember, we have also the issue with the Houthis, what happened a couple of days ago, and Netanyahu threatening Iran.
Again, I don't know how things will develop, but I'll finish with that sentence.
If in the past Israel was a part of a coalition against an agreement, we had the Saudis, we have the Emiratis, maybe a couple of European countries, now Israel is all alone.
As I see it, the Saudis want an agreement, the Emiratis want an agreement, and we are the sole ones that are calling for an attack.
And that is a major thing that we have to take into consideration when discussing the Israeli stand.
And again, we'll see how things will develop.
But for now, I think that Atani are feeling a little bit under pressure in terms of the developing story of the nuclear negotiation between Iran and the U.S.
No, I want to hone in on that part about Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others.
Negar, where are the Gulf states on negotiations between Washington and Tehran?
They weren't fans of JCPOA.
They've urged military action in the past, but this time seems quite different.
What are these differences and what explains this about face and policy?
Absolutely.
I agree with Danny.
Back in the Obama era, the JCPO negotiations, the Persian Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia, UAE, the rest of them, were major part of essentially this coalition, opponents of diplomacy with Iran, actively lobbied against it, at least behind the scenes, together with Israel.
And there was a serious sort of, and also a big power here in the U.S., the opposing party, to the diplomacy.
And we saw, for example, back then, Prime Minister Nassan Yahoo sort of was invited to the U.S. Congress or self-invited or was invited by the opposing party without even knowledge of the U.S. president.
This is under the presidency of Barack Obama to speak against this diplomacy and the deal with Iran.
And the Saudis and the Emaratis were part of that opposition, that coalition.
This time around, they're not.
Iran and Saudi had an agreement, a detente reached a few years ago that still stands.
They've been able to sort of mend relations and continue building on that.
And we see the Gulf countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, essentially leading as a force for diplomacy, wanting negotiations to succeed.
And I think that's the sort of one policy that Iran has seriously pursued in the region to sort of realign its relationship with some of the neighbors.
And I think the other sort of new element that we're seeing from, and not just Gulf countries, just last week the foreign minister of Iraq was in town and he was echoing the same, that the neighboring countries don't want war because the flames will reach these Iran's neighbors as well.
So an attack on Iran would essentially lead to another endless, disastrous war in the Middle East, but it's not going to remain in Iran.
And this is a message that Iranians have been sending to some of the neighbors.
There's been a lot of back and forth with the countries across the water, in the Gulf countries.
We know, for example, in the case of Iraq, if we go back to the last or that one time under President Trump of the military back and forth between Iran and the US, the assassination of Qasem Soleimani happened at Baghdad International Airport on Iraqi soil.
And Iran's response also into the U.S. base in al-Assad was on Iraqi soil.
Essentially, Iraq was the battlefield for the U.S. and Iran having military back and forths.
So it's no surprise.
The Iraqis don't want this sort of flame of the war reaching them.
The Gulf countries are really worried for investment, for their long-term plannings of the future.
None of that, a war essentially is good for nobody in the region, except for, as Danny is saying, now we see one main sort of opponent voice, vocal voice against the deal, which is Benjamin Netanyahu.
So I think the Gulf countries.
And then the other element I would add is that the Gulf countries, Saudis mainly, are seen as very important by this administration, by this president, by his family, the circles around him, and sort of the investments that the Gulf countries can bring.
the wealth, the future relationship, not just today for U.S. economy, but even beyond the presidency.
They were important in the first administration of Donald Trump, and they seem as important in the second administration.
It's no surprise.
He took his first trip back in his first term.
He took his first trip essentially to Saudi Arabia this time around.
He's also traveling to Saudi Arabia.
So these are very important countries.
They're not marginal in the view of this administration.
And so I think that's a very big realignment that's happening.
The Iranians understand that.
They have tried hard to keep sort of that detente and agreement with Saudi Arabia.
And they've been working on it, sending also a double message to their neighbors that, you know, we want to continue this good relationship.
But then at the same time, if we're attacked, let's say if the U.S. wants to attack Iran, it potentially has to happen from one of the U.S. bases, from one of these countries in Iran's neighboring.
And so one of the messages that Tehran has been sending pretty publicly, but also privately, to these neighbors, is that if an attack on us, a military attack on us, happens from any of these bases at your countries, the retaliation is also going to come for your country.
And so I think that message has been received, has been taken very seriously.
But overall, it's not just Iran retallying on one of these neighbors, but also the fact that war would essentially escalate and have severe impacts on everyone else in the region.
So yeah, I think that's sort of the new dynamic that we're seeing in the region as far as in the Gulf, that would say, is very different from the JCPOA area.
No, I think that the Gulf part is critical, especially given the extent of ties between this administration and Saudi Arabia in particular, be it investments, arms sales, which if fulfilled would be record levels.
I want to turn now to Greg.
Let's zoom out for a minute and look at non-Middle Eastern and non-U.S. perspectives.
Where are Russia and China on negotiations, and how is this different from 2015?
Iran has been involved, for example, in supplying Russia with drones for the war in Ukraine.
China has served regularly as an outlet for Tehran to skirt U.S. sanctions.
But both were supportive of the JCPOA.
Are they supportive of negotiations today?
So I think broadly speaking, yes.
Both Russia and China support the idea of a diplomatic solution to the crisis over Iran's nuclear program.
I don't think that's really in doubt.
Both are much more closely connected to Iran than they were in 2015, Russia to a significant extent.
But I think the really critical question when we're thinking about Russia and China's role in this is not necessarily their relationship with Iran.
It is their relationship with the United States.
I think a crucial difference between these rounds of negotiations, this deal, whatever it may end up being, and the JCPOA is that this is, I would say, 95% a bilateral accord between the United States and Iran.
Other actors are looking in from the outside.
They're involved in back channels.
The European states retain the snapback authority through the old deal.
They're sort of managing that part of the file.
But when it comes to whether or not we'll see an agreement, it will largely come through bilateral negotiations between the Trump administration and Iran's government.
Where Russia and China fit in to a potential deal, Russia could very well play a pretty significant role, as it did under the JCPOA, a technical role in managing the likely reduction in Iran's uranium stockpile, the potential dismantling or moving of components of Iran's nuclear program, either within or outside the country.
Russia was involved in that element of the JCPOA.
Russia provides nuclear expertise, a degree of support that the Iranians will accept that doesn't come under the remit of U.S. power or the IAEA.
But to my original point, Russia's relationship with the United States matters more to Vladimir Putin than his relationship with Iran.
So leveraging the Iran issue within the broader portfolio of what Russia is looking to get from the United States when it comes to Ukraine, when it comes to sanctions relief, when it comes to broader geostrategic issues, that matters a great deal.
And Russia's relationship with the U.S. is far different than it was in 2015, given that we've seen war in Ukraine, we've seen Russia's isolation internationally, we've seen Russia develop a much different relationship with domestic politics within the United States.
All of these are critical changes that impact Russia's role in managing the Iran issue.
But I think it does come back to the fact that Iran looks to Russia for strategic support.
Russia is a strategic partner of Iran.
I still wouldn't go quite as far as to say that they are allies.
There is still suspicion, there is still friction.
But they have signed a comprehensive strategic partnership that, on the Iranian side, heavily emphasized economic issues.
And if there is a deal, then I think we can see scope for Russia embracing more of an economic role in Iran if there is scope for sanctions relief.
That goes also to the China element, China's relationship with this issue.
China has been relatively aloof from matters of Middle East geopolitics since October 7th.
I think to a degree that has surprised some, right?
Before the crisis of October 7th, there was a great deal of concern, speculation perhaps that China was becoming more involved in the region, that it was seeking to supplant the United States.
What we have seen from China subsequently has been a much more cautious approach to regional geopolitics.
And I think the Iran issue is a part of that.
Beijing offers diplomatic support to Iran, support within the UN Security Council.
They are meeting with the Iranians and the Russians in a trilateral format to coordinate on issues surrounding the nuclear program.
And I do think that, as with Russia, if there is a deal that brings sanctions relief to Iran, then that will be an invitation for China to embrace a more active role in forging economic ties and potentially investing or expanding trade with Iran if the threat of sanctions relief or if the threat of sanctions are reduced.
Essentially, playing the role that the Europeans were meant to play of the original JCPOA.
I think it will be China and I think the Gulf states as well in this potential deal that will be providing economic relief to Iran.
But from China's point of view, it's critical that a crisis does not emerge to the point where you see military escalation, because Iran matters to China somewhat.
Access to Persian Gulf oil matters enormously to China, economically, strategically, politically.
And if October 7th and the subsequent crises or exchanges between Iran and Israel proved that Iran has some capacity to strike Israel through its missiles and drones, then September 2019 illustrated in vivid detail the degree to which Iran can strike energy targets in the Persian Gulf.
The attack on Abkhaz, the Saudi oil processing facility in September 2019, is probably one of the most important events that has occurred in the Middle East for the last decade.
It is the reason, one of the primary reasons why MBS shifted his strategic position on Iran.
If Iran cannot strike Israel with a great degree of effectiveness from 1,200 kilometers away, the major oil facilities and fields in Saudi Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE are only a handful of kilometers away.
And not only the attack in Abkhaz, but the years of strikes that the Ukrainians have managed to carry out against Russian energy facilities has also demonstrated the effectiveness of these weapons against energy infrastructure.
Again, going back to the examples of the April and October strikes, Iran chose military targets to strike when it retaliated against Israel in April and October of last year.
Refineries, oil storage facilities, power plants, and processing facilities are not hardened to military attacks.
And so if Israel is vulnerable to some extent, Gulf facilities are vulnerable to a far greater extent.
And this would infect not only the security of the Gulf states, but the energy security of China, which imports the bulk of its crude oil from the Persian Gulf.
So I would say those issues, relationships with the United States and the continued stability of the energy flows through the Persian Gulf, matter more to China than its relationship with Tehran.
No, I think that's a critical point.
And what I'd like to do now is pose two questions to the overall group, and then we'll move to Q ⁇ A.
The first question, and this is for all three of you, feel free to chime in.
The first question is something I myself and some of my other colleagues at Cato have addressed.
Within Washington, it seems as if there's really two debates going on here.
One is about nuclear non-proliferation and the best way to advance this, and the other is about regime change within Iran.
Many who view Iran as the chief problem within the region view any policy short of regime change as a form of appeasement, if you will.
To what extent, in your opinion, all three of you, do these two debates bleed together?
And how does this complicate negotiations?
We've seen it with divisions within the administration, but I really want to get your take on this, any of you.
I'll say that first, just to complete the previous discussion, I'll say one important thing about Saudi Arabia, that I think it can play an important role in the future negotiation 2015.
They can invest in Iran.
They can ease the tension in Iran in terms of, you know, they have a lot of mistrust regarding the U.S., even if the agreement will be signed or agreed.
And they can give the goodies to the Iranians in terms of investing or even in terms of the nuclear side, building some sort of nuclear oil bank or something like that that will be connected to all Gulf states.
So Saudi can play an important role.
And it's before, and regarding Israel mentioned earlier, I think the Saudis for Trump are more important than Israel right now.
They can offer him achievement in the foreign policy that he's lacking right now.
So definitely the visit to Syria will be important.
And I think that for Israel, in Israel, I think the lack of understanding how normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel can really threaten Iran.
But for Israel, this ship has long sailed because the current Israeli government preferred to continue the war in Gaza rather than stop the war and interacting with the Saudis regarding normalization.
So that's completely daddy part.
I just want to tackle again the important question that you ask, John.
And I think that people tend to think that it's our regime change or agreement.
I think the ability to topple this from the outside is very, very limited.
You know, it's not that the maximum pressure and other things, but this regime has resilience, definitely under Khamenei.
They're suffering.
They have multiple problems.
I think this regime is an all-time low in terms of where you stand right now.
But I don't think that's actually equal toppling the regime.
I don't see the appetite, even the population is against the regime itself.
Again, the regime is very strong in terms of its own domestic security apparatus, so I don't think that will happen.
So I think it's the choice between agreement and escalation that probably leads to a regional war, but I don't think it will threaten the regime in any case.
I think that agreement definitely has its advantages, the disadvantages, we have to say that lifting sanctions will increase the legitimacy of the Iranian regime, will definitely strengthen him economically.
We have to say that the economical problem in Iran not only connected to sanctions, but also RGC involvement and other things that, so definitely there won't be like a rehabilitation of the economy, but definitely it will encourage the economy.
So definitely in that aspect, agreement that will hopefully will roll back significantly the Iranian for and the ability to reach a bomb, the price will strengthen the regime.
We have to say that.
But non-agreement doesn't say that we're able to topple the regime.
It will say that we final self-inescalation.
Nobody will know what will happen.
We have to say that.
We know probably how we'll start, but all other assumptions, how this escalation will end are just speculating, gasimating in all so many ways.
We don't know.
So we'll find ourselves in escalation.
It might be a regional war.
It might be Iranian deciding to rush to Obama.
I don't know.
But the toppling of the regime, I think, is very far-fetched from where we are right now.
No war plan survives first contact.
Anybody else?
I agree with Danny.
I mean, there is a problem, a legitimacy crisis that the Islamic Republic is dealing with internally.
We see the protests and the opposition, but that hasn't really translated into an existential crisis.
A legitimacy crisis, meaning you don't like your governance and how things are done, doesn't necessarily always translate into, let's say, a Syria model.
Because I've seen that comparison being made.
I think it's very false.
Eight years of civil war in Syria and where Assad was standing is nowhere comparable to where Iran is.
As far as regime change by the U.S., I've seen that model being said or pushed without really explanation.
How exactly is that going to happen?
Does it mean boots on the ground?
Is it a full-on invasion by the U.S.?
Because that's something that the U.S. has the hard power to do.
We saw Afghanistan, we saw Iraq.
But how did that turn out?
20 years of essentially endless wars.
First of all, there's no appetite in the U.S.
I don't think the American people care or want to do another 20-year endless war in the Middle East to topple a regime.
And for example, see how Afghanistan turned out after 20 years, had to return the key to the Taliban and leave.
So the result is also not guaranteed to be something better for both the Iranian people or the West as far as being a state or a government that's more friendly to some of the neighbors or the West.
The threat of civil war and what comes after sort of that kind of an invasion or regime change.
These are all very serious questions that I haven't been answered when that issue of regime change is thrown.
Oh, it's an unpopular regime.
It needs to change.
You know, not a lot of people disagree with the unpopularity aspect, but how exactly is that going to change?
And what's the 20, 30, 40 year trajectory is something that's not being very much discussed in details.
And I think part of that is deliberate because there isn't much appetite or interest in the U.S., but also in Iran.
So in Iran, for example, you see this legitimacy crisis and the opposition, but when it comes to a big issue like a foreign threat, a war and military attack, we see a rallying around the flag aspect within the population.
At the end of the day, if you're an Iranian and this is part of the network of the people that I'm in touch with, the civil society ordinary people, if you're living there and the choice is to have your houses bombed potentially in a military strike, it's not something that a lot of people want as far as a future for themselves, their family, their children.
Yes, we do hear sort of desperate commentary or analysis, but I would say that's a minority.
The majority is not interested in a military or a war or that form of a regime change solution, which brings us to why the Iranians, I would say, and polls have shown in the public sentiment, are supportive of diplomacy, of the potential sanctions relief that would come or can come from these negotiations.
So yeah, I don't know how that formula for regime change is going to unfold.
I haven't heard a really viable one from those who suggest it, but of course, yes, it's unpopular.
They're dealing with a legitimacy crisis.
The economy is in bad shape politically.
The country's foreign policy, regional policy has a lot of opposition and criticism inside.
The civil society has been weakened.
I also want to add this, that years of sanctions and tension, military tension has in fact strengthened the more hardline aspects of the regime, the elements of the regime, the more militaristic, the unelected bodies, sort of the core of the hard power, and has resulted in weakening the civil society, the agents for change, the agents for pushing for better governance and democratization and all of that.
But yeah, no, I don't see a sort of a viable solution and also a good trajectory or a bright future coming from that regime change model.
I'll make just a few points.
First, I think the discussion often ends up confusing more often than not, because, again, to what Danny and Negaro were saying, what are you talking about when you're talking about regime change?
Operations to topple the regime and replace it with a new government?
That's going to be extremely difficult to do without a ground offensive that the United States leads.
And there doesn't seem to be any scope for that under any administration.
And also, what is your goal?
If the goal of policy is to prevent a proliferation crisis in the Middle East, that's something to strive towards.
And it's also something that, you know, as much as it creates a sense of distress and concern, the threat of military force is part of the United States negotiating tactics, right?
Do this or we will bomb you has been hovering over the nuclear issue for years, right?
Trump is being much more explicit about it.
But it does enter into the element of the United States is trying to get a deal with Iran, the creation of a credible military threat, is a potential factor in shifting the Iranians towards a deal that the United States can accept because the leadership, the regime, is conscious of this threat to its position.
But if you're talking about operations to make the Islamic Republic of Iran go away, then I have lots of questions.
The chief one being, why do you think that would do anything to address the issue of proliferation?
Why would a new government, let's assume that it's some kind of vaguely pro-Western government that's backed by some kind of pro-democracy movement but also has strong ties to the military because it would need that in order to maintain a secure hold of power inside Iran.
That government, having just been put in power by a combination of international forces, would be conscious of its security and would see a nuclear weapon as a useful means of maintaining that security and its shaky hold on power.
Another question that needs to be raised whenever we're discussing this issue is the fact that pursuing nuclear power and also a nuclear hedge is an idea that predates the Islamic Republic, right?
By a considerable margin.
A student of history like myself is very well aware that the Shah of Iran was very interested in nuclear power during the 1970s, both for domestic political reasons and economic reasons, but also in order to have a potential source of added security in the event that his relationship with the United States became more problematic.
And then finally, this question of like how would Iran or Iranians respond to efforts at instigating regime change, this is also counterproductive if your goal is preventing a proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
The most thoughtful arguments I have seen that are pro-military force have to be very careful in saying whatever use of military force against Iran's nuclear program that is carried out, it has to be clearly conveyed that this is not meant to target the security of the regime or the survival of the regime.
Because if it does, then the regime instantly has an interest in developing a nuclear deterrent.
And you have not solved your problem, you have made your problem far worse.
So pursuing regime change in Iran and pursuing a pathway that will not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region appear to be contradictory.
No, I would completely agree.
One last question to the group, and then we will move to audience questions.
There's been a lot of talk about the degradation of Iran's axis of resistance, if you will.
But one question that I had was if military action is taken against Tehran, I think we would certainly see, and if they perceive it as an effort to overthrow the regime, they would certainly make a sprint towards the bomb.
But what I want to ask is these groups that have often served as its forward defense in the region, they are very battered.
We've seen that over the past 19 months.
But what kind of retaliation could we still see from Tehran, whether it be against U.S. troops in the region?
Nagor already mentioned, the Iranians have said if it launches from bases based in the Gulf, they will view that as an attack from them.
And obviously the flow of oil out of the region is critical.
But on this last part, what could we expect in terms of retaliation?
And then if successful, if negotiations are successful, how could this lead towards a broader de-escalation of tensions in the region in efforts to reach a ceasefire in Gaza?
I'll start by saying that, again, when you're looking at what we call the access of resistance, it suffered a severe blow since the 7th of October.
And I'm mainly talking about Hezbollah.
You know, when discussing about how Israeli saw its enemies in the region, definitely Hezbollah was first place, even above the Iranian capabilities.
Because theoretically speaking, Hezbollah had the ability to hit Israel when it heard the most in terms of strategic sites.
And after the war, now maybe it still has its capabilities or probably most of it diminished, but is not willing to go the extra mile against Israel.
We can see that even these days when Israel is really attacking Indahiya and Beirut and Hezbollah is not retaliating.
So in that aspect, the main problem that Iran has that Hezbollah is not a player in any future friction between Israel and Iran.
And for Israel, one of the reasons that Etanell is saying it's a golden moment is because Hezbollah is so weak.
So we have to take the chance now before it's gaining a lot of strength and use that to our benefit.
So the fact there is no Hezbollah, and even more than that, the fact that Assad regime was toppled and the Iranians have no ability to rebuild Hezbollah, or it was very hard for them to do so, it's a major blow to the Iranians' push in the region and its ability to deter Israel and the US to attack it.
So that we have to take consideration.
The Houthis are annoying, they are problematic, but they are not a strategic threat.
And I have to say that given the last discussion and statement, the Iranians have no ability to force them to stop the shooting against the state of Israel.
So that aspect is long gone.
So if we find ourselves in direct friction, even the Shiite militias in Iraq are under considerable restraints in terms of the pressure coming from the Iranian government, Iraqi government.
We saw that also in the hype of the events between Israel and the Shiite militias, when actually they prefer to stop the launching of rockets and missiles and UVs against Israel because they're afraid from Israeli attack.
So I think that Iran will be in direct confrontation with Israel if it will find a direct confrontation with Israel.
It won't have any other aid, except for the Houthis, that we all know it's limited.
So this is a major blow for the Iranian way of thinking.
And I think they have to, this is why the rethinking about all the statements about what you're going to do on the new capabilities draws or connected also to the fact that Iran feeling exposed.
If a deal will be reached, I don't think it will have any influence on the I don't think the Iranians will be willing to discuss it.
They're all day saying that it's not us controlling the proxies, it's their own thing.
So I don't think they will see that suddenly the Iranians trying to discuss or thinking to discuss these issues.
So I don't think there will be any influence on that.
And that's important note to say that the agreement, assuming that we'll be on the nuclear side, does not end the issue of the Iran malign activities and supported proxies forced buildup.
It will still continue.
We have to take that also into consideration because it will deal with the nuclear issue but not other issues.
Yes, there is a question of how much money will be allocated from the easing of sanctions to those proxies, assuming this sum.
But the problem that Iran has now is much more than just the money because with no Hezbollah as the spearheading of these activities in the region, with no ability to strengthen or to rebuild its capitalist because Assad was toppled, and Jolani is really against Iranian involvement in Syria, then the Iranians are in a very hard time right now and they have to think hard and clear, A, how they are strengthening their own capabilities, missiles, but also they have maybe the Sohoi 35 deal with the Russians.
There is the issue of the nuclear side that being discussed openly, and probably maybe thinking about going to other places, challenging Israel from different places.
And for example, we see the Iranian involvement in Sudan these days.
So that's all in all.
So I think at the end of the day, it will be strictly nuclear and the implications on the proxies and on the access of resistance will be marginal in a way.
Either of you like to weigh in before.
I'll just add, I think the Axis that coalition has taken major hits, yes, and Hezbollah.
Although Hezbollah has taken hits in the past and they were able to regroup and sort of come back, losing Hassan Asrullah and senior leadership is a major blow, but I don't know if this is essentially the end of Hezbollah.
It's just a weak point, a low point for Hezbollah.
But I think what this sort of blow to the entirety of that coalition has done is an escalation from the Iranian side.
Was what was seen as sort of Iran's strategic depth or their forward defense in the form of the network of allies.
When it came to direct confrontation with Israel, the Iranians did the back and forth themselves.
So essentially, they stepped up or they escalated to the point of saying, you know, the strategic defense or the death won't be enough.
And the back and forth that we saw the two times between Iran and Israel both happened, both they essentially did it from their own soil and with their own capabilities.
And this is, I think, a signal of both essentially trying to portray or show that they are capable and also willing, which was very important.
Before that, it wasn't really clear if Iran is willing to hit Israel from its soil directly.
And I think this brought the two sides essentially to the next level of escalation.
And this is part of what they're signaling: that if a military strike happens, they're just going to escalate on top of that next level that they've reached.
Yeah, just a few things to build off of.
I mean, I think we're right in thinking in their local, more national context, these groups are all going to continue to exist and likely be important.
Hezbollah has been greatly weakened, but it is likely to continue to exist within Lebanon, exerting an influence over Lebanese politics.
It's not going to vanish.
Even Hamas, right?
Hamas is still present in Gaza.
And it's going to, even if Israel proceeds with what apparently is going to be its strategy of occupying the territory and continuing to expand the war inside the territory, Hamas is likely going to continue to survive for a prolonged period of time, as insurgencies in those forms often do.
The Houthis in Yemen are also not going anywhere, right?
There has been some debate or some speculation that there may be a new ground offensive, but without considerable Gulf and U.S. support, it doesn't look as though Yemeni forces are capable of dislodging the Houthis from their position.
Also, in the context of Iran, I mean, the axis of resistance or the resistance front plays a pretty important role in ideology, propaganda, messaging, right?
Particularly from Khamenei and from the position of the Supreme Leader.
And I don't think that's going to go away.
They're not going to abandon the idea of maintaining this front against Israeli and U.S. imperialism or continuing to manage the community of Shia minorities throughout the region.
I think as a strategic tool for Iran, the resistance front is gone.
I think the defense and depth that it provided has been eliminated.
I think the deterrence that it provided has been eliminated, as evidenced by the Israeli strike in October, and as evidenced by the considerable Israeli confidence that they can strike Iran at will without incurring significant losses.
If that is now the case, then the strategic worth of the axis of resistance has been in large part nullified, not completely eliminated, but has been nullified.
And you've seen that change play out on the Iranian side.
The Iranians are now putting a lot more emphasis on their domestic military capabilities, their missile arsenals, their conventional military forces inside the territory, inside national territory.
We've seen new military drills to emphasize counter-terrorism units, which we now know may in part be inspired by the fact that Israel is considering commando raids against the nuclear facilities, right?
So that is now the emphasis of Iran's strategic posture, not the support of groups throughout the region.
But I think it does need to be noted that I don't think we're going to see an end to Iran's foreign policy in that regard.
It has shifted in focus to emphasize the domestic capabilities.
But the idea of the resistance front is not going to disappear overnight.
No, thank you.
I would like to now move to questions.
If you could please speak clearly into the microphone so everybody can hear.
James and Ben will be coming around.
The first hand I saw was you back there, sir, in the light blue suit.
Thank you, it's been a great panel.
So the panel has alluded to hawkish factions in Congress from both parties.
And so I guess my question would be, do you see the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act posing a significant obstacle to any future agreement as far as approving it and implementing it?
I can take that one.
No, you're right.
I think Congress is going to be active, as active as it can be, and the activities are going to lean towards the more hawkish side.
I think what gives the President a great deal of flexibility is that most of the sanctions that have been implemented have come through executive authority and executive orders.
So drawing them back, which is really what this is, right?
It's sanctions relief in exchange for measures from the Iranian side to rein in their nuclear program.
If that's the substance of whatever deal is struck, then Congress has very little role to play, right?
Congress can continue to pass legislation mandating tough sanctions on Iran.
I also, you know, the Iranians have a certain degree of hope for this.
I don't think we're going to see primary sanctions relief in this deal.
The United States is not going to start flooding Iran with investment.
Maybe Trump gives himself a waiver so that he can build a hotel in Tehran.
But beyond that, I don't think we're going to see a great deal of movement in that regard.
But what the Iranians are interested in is something that Trump can deliver.
And what Trump wants to see is something that the Iranians can do.
And Congress is going to make noise.
But I would actually be a little hesitant to say that they're going to make a ton of noise.
If this is a priority for the president, then Congress will back him.
So long as Congress remains under Republican control.
If the House flips and the Democrats are in control, I think we could very well see more express opposition, which will look very interesting if the deal ends up looking a lot like the JCPOA, which many Democrats supported when it was passed under Obama.
yes sir right here thanks mark fitzpatrick from the international institute for strategic studies My question, I'd like to probe the assessment that Iran really wants a deal, the answer to which will affect how much Trump can get out of a deal if he can make it better than the Obama deal.
If they really want, if Iran really wants it, then he can get more.
He can get something in missiles, maybe.
He can get maybe an end to arms to Houthis, stopping hostage taking, whatever.
But does Iran really want a deal?
In the last four years, Iran didn't want a deal.
They had a deal for the taking, and they consistently proved incapable of taking it.
I understand they're in a window of vulnerability now, but that will end.
They're reconstituting their air defenses and their missile production.
So maybe they're just going to play us out, as they have done so often.
Is that a possibility?
Greg, you're shaking your head, yes.
I'm conscious of talking too much.
That's why I'm so wary about drawing too many conclusions about the state of negotiations right now.
I think the Iranians have very clear red lines about what they're willing to give up, missiles being one of them.
They're not going to negotiate over ballistic missiles.
There may be a handshake agreement saying, like, okay, we won't build anything with a range greater than 2,000 kilometers, you know, the Supreme Leader's so-called ceiling.
Maybe that will fly, maybe that won't.
On enrichment, they'll demand enrichment.
They'll demand the ability to maintain a stockpile of some size, and they will negotiate for the best deal that they can get.
And if the United States doesn't meet those terms, then we're not going to get a deal.
So I think that remains the case, right?
They have red lines and they have needs that have to be met.
And The gap between what the United States needs to see and what Iran, the regime needs to retain has been consistently wide enough that there hasn't been a deal.
Their choice to walk away from a deal in 2022 was a colossal error, I think.
And I think if you ask them, maybe not if you asked Sham Hani or some of those who may have been responsible, if you asked them, they would admit that they messed up.
But I will ask other members of the panel to weigh in.
I'll just quickly say, because I did say they want, I think they want a deal, meaning a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue, but they have the red lines.
So considering the parameters, and that's why I said I don't think a deal is possibly going to look much different than the JCPOA, which is what they had agreed to before.
I don't think they're going to sort of go way beyond what we saw agreeing.
Although they understand that the name JCPOA doesn't fly well in Washington in the White House these days, so they're trying to stay away from it.
In fact, saying that they've moved on from JCPOA and it's not going to be a JCPOA 2.0.
But as far as what is going to be agreed, sort of generally, and also the red lines, I don't think has changed that much, which, you know, if the President, if Donald Trump is able of somehow presenting this as something that's very different than the JCPOA or much better, I think that would be the chance for it to survive in Washington.
Yeah, I agree.
I think that the Iranians first and foremost want a deal to, again, they need to leave the sanctions, but they have their own red lines.
I think there is a possibility to reach a good deal in terms of pushing them further away from reaching to 90%.
We can correct the mistakes that happened in JCPOA, mainly in terms of the sunset clauses, but also in terms of the advanced enrichment capabilities that the Iranian has.
But if no deal will occur in the next couple of weeks or months, the Iranians find it very important to continue the negotiations because it's crucial for them because no negotiation means snapback will be implemented.
They will have to leave the NPT, as they said, and that will open the door, the venue, to other elements to use maybe kinetic solutions to the program itself.
So definitely, deal is first and foremost for them in their own conditions, meaning they have the red lines.
If they won't cross the red line, I think in terms of especially not the missiles and dismantling, it won't happen.
But assuming they will have a deal like that, and I think that they're trying to really correlate their actions with what the president wants.
President saying we don't want a nuclear run or nuclear weapons, they are saying that.
Even they are adopting even the MAGA way of just writing the tweets, you know, just to see what Harak She is, how he's riding the capital letters.
They're just correlating with the President.
I think they understand that if they will, they believe that he will understand it better, and that will make a deal.
But if no deal, negotiation will have to continue.
With negotiations, there's no easily strike, no snapback.
So that's, I think, their priorities right now.
You, sir, over there.
Thank you, JP Hogan.
I wrote about politics.
We had the Iraq war.
The Iraq people got a new constitution.
What is there to learn from that constitution as we're approaching our 250th?
Is our partisan divide here should have been there too as far as Republic can see it as a religious liberty protection?
So I'm just wondering, there must be a lot to learn for Iran on how the development in Iraq with the new constitution worked out.
Anybody want to take that?
I think just broadly on that, I think what we often hear in trying to tie this to Iran is in the regime change debate, there's this idea that the United States can come in, create some sort of new constitution, rewrite the Iranian political system, so have you.
But I would, as I think all three here have mentioned, this is really putting the cart before the horse.
The idea of externally instigated regime change within Iran is very far-fetched.
And even getting to the idea of reformatting the constitution or thinking of what an alternative political system could be inside Tehran is really putting the cart before the horse.
I'll say something about the regime change in Iran.
People tend to look at it in people who march on the streets and will topple the regime like we had it in 79 against the Shah.
But I think that a change can happen from within.
I think definitely when Khamenei will die, it will be a change in a way because he's such a dominant player in terms of building the political infrastructure and platform of how we see Iran even today.
So definitely we'll see that as a change.
But the change can start from within.
And I think that you see how Khamenei related to the previous JCPA to understand how he was fearing that the JCPOA will be a platform for the U.S. West ideas to trickle down into the minds and souls of the Iranian youth.
And why I'm mentioning that right now?
Because again, there is a chance that assuming there will be an agreement, that this agreement, and if there will be, I don't know if there'll be U.S. investment, but if Iran will a little bit gradually will open up for foreign investment, then Khamenei will find it very hard to stop that from happening.
So I'm not saying that the agreement will lead to regime change, but I think that opening Iran in terms of using the agreement, again, we cannot work with Iran after the agreement, assuming it happened to reduce their activity in the Middle East and so forth.
It's not going to happen like the Obama administration thought.
But maybe using these activities, an openness of Iran, that will challenge the hardcore way of thinking in Iran.
I think this is something that could have happened.
So if people think that escalation might bring to regime change, that I think we all agree it's not.
Maybe an agreement, again, I don't know if it will bring a regime change, but definitely it can help trickle down more Western ideas to the Iranian public.
On that, I think we are going to conclude it there with 50 seconds remaining.
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