All Episodes
March 13, 2025 15:25-16:31 - CSPAN
01:05:57
Officials Testify on U.S. Navy Shipbuilding
Participants
Appearances
c
clay higgins
rep/r 03:44
r
richard blumenthal
sen/d 00:43
r
rob wittman
rep/r 01:57
r
ronny jackson
rep/r 02:13
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Speaker Time Text
richard blumenthal
Transparent, but it's opening its files to Elon Musk so that he can rummage through them, harvest personal, confidential, private information, including potentially health care information.
And this bill would stop it.
It would give veterans rights against that kind of invasion and intrusive conduct and abuse of power.
And, you know, we know for sure Elon Musk has never worn any uniform.
Donald Trump thinks veterans are suckers.
That's the mentality of this administration.
That's the disrespect it has for veterans.
And that's why this legislation is necessary.
Thanks, everyone.
unidentified
You've been watching live coverage.
We return now to our scheduled program.
We join it in progress.
Three elements that ISS are contributing to the Navy's challenges in designing, building, crewing, and maintaining ships.
First, the Navy treats its force-level goals for various ship types as more precise and durable than they really are, and then chases those subject-to-change goals by continually tinkering with ship procurement profiles, leading to production inefficiencies and industrial-based challenges.
Second, the Navy is sub-optimizing ship design efforts at the individual ship level instead of optimizing them at the fleet-wide level.
In other words, the Navy is building a fleet without truly designing a fleet, leading to challenges throughout the ship design, build, crew, and maintain lifecycle from trying to manage an assemblage of individually developed, bespoke ship designs.
And third, the Navy is developing shipbuilding programs without adequately taking into account the features of the U.S. society that will be called upon to design, build, crew, and maintain those ships.
A possible alternative approach for the Navy, which might be referred to as a potential new American naval system, could include the following five elements.
First, make more comprehensive use of Federated shipbuilding in which ship modules are built at facilities other than the final assembly yards so as to gain access to regional labor markets that are not significantly involved in Navy shipbuilding.
Second, move the Navy toward a more comprehensive and systematic kit of parts approach in which standard components go into standard systems that are installed on ships with standard internal features.
Third, focus ship design more on reducing the labor hours needed to build the ship following the South Korean approach to design for producibility.
Fourth, move toward continuous production, which I'll outline in a moment.
And fifth, employ upfront fleet design, meaning the use of a generalized fleet design framework that incorporates the four things I just mentioned and the vetting of proposed shipbuilding programs in relation to that framework.
That part about continuous production, which I just mentioned, could include, first, using multi-year contracting where cost-effective.
Second, managing changes in ship force levels not through changes in procurement profiles, but instead through end-of-service life decisions following Japan's approach for its submarine force.
Third, moving to condition-based minimal loss procurement transitions in ship classes.
And fourth, characterizing the future fleet in terms of steady procurement rates, adopting what can be called a production-centered or rate-centered approach to the future fleet.
This would be a new way to think about the future fleet and how to get there.
This potential new American naval system is by no means the only option for addressing the Navy's challenges in designing, building, crewing, and maintaining ships, and it wouldn't solve all those challenges.
As Ms. Oakley mentioned, continuing the Navy's current approach, however, is likely to lead to a continuation of these challenges.
Chairman Kelly, Ranking Member Courtney, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I'll be pleased to respond to any questions the subcommittee may have.
Thank all our witnesses.
I now recognize myself for five minutes.
Dr. Seidel, I'm worried about the mixed demand signals that we send to industry with constant fluctuation in our 30-year shipbuilding plans.
How can we send clear demand signals to industry so that they are able to invest in their own workforce and technical capacity?
And also, a separate question: how is the Department of the Navy working on GAO's recommendations as well as improving the culture of procurement?
Thank you, Chairman Kelly.
I appreciate the question and thanks for the time last week, too.
I've had a chance to get down to your neck of the woods and visit with Ingalls and see what they are doing in that arena.
And I think it gets to the first question that is around how do we ensure that we keep a constant flow of product through our shipyards.
I do think it's critical, and it's not lost on me, that that organization has the DDGs and the amphibs.
We've done some multi-ship procurements to make sure that they are staying fed well.
And as a result, there's consistency in approach.
And I think certainly in the amphibs, it's one of the success stories that we have where ships are being delivered on time and on budget.
So it strikes us to think about how we handle that holistically for the rest of our shipbuilders to make sure that that is happening writ large.
I think a part of it is being a little more directive in that workload.
I think we do understand which yards can do which work, which platforms are best suited for that, and we need to be thoughtful in doing that to keep the whole enterprise fed well so that they can manage their workforce, their hiring, and retention issues.
So my commitment to you is to work with our partners back in the Pentagon to make sure we try to do that well for you.
To your point about GAO recommendations, I've had conversations with Ms. Oakley before.
I agree with much of what she has said.
I think there's real opportunity space there.
And quite frankly, I think sometimes we spend a lot of our time communicating via reports back and forth to each other as opposed to working closely together to get after it.
And so my commitment to her and her team is that we'll lean into that and get after some of those recommendations because, quite frankly, they resonate with me on a lot of different fronts.
And just I want to know, you know, we're the greatest maritime nation in the history of the world, and we are still that, and there's no reason we can't continue to be that.
But it takes doing things not the same old way, but it takes taking a hard look at ourselves and getting better.
Ms. Oakley, the GAO has identified several opportunities for the Navy to modernize its practices to support timely and predictable outcomes for the Constellation-class frigate and other future programs.
Which of your recommendations relating to design and procurement remain outstanding?
We have several recommendations, both specifically directed at the frigate program and then also about the broader design approach that the Navy uses that remain open.
Specifically with regard to the frigate, we recommended that they take a look at developing the basic and functional design of the ship before beginning construction, at least of the second ship, since the first ship is already underway.
That remains open, and we know that the Navy and the builder are doing significant work now to really mature that design.
And it's that key that commercial shipbuilders follow in maturing that design so that they know when they start bending metal, they start construction, that they're going to get what they expect to get when they are going to get it.
And so those are really some of the key recommendations that we've made to Frigate, but also writ large with regard to their design performance.
The other thing that I would mention is really leveraging technology to be able to exercise the design earlier on to understand the implication of changes, specs, requirements that creep, and what those implications could be on the design of the ship so that that's all worked out before you begin construction of the ship and then are in the business of doing rework and having to fix things that you realize can't work.
Thank you.
And as noted, I'm yielding back my time and I will hold everyone.
I will adhere to the five-minute row today.
So, Mr. Courtney, you are recognized for five minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Labs, I want to thank you for focusing on workforce in terms of the moment that we are in right now, because there is just no question that if you Matt Sermon over at the Navy points to a fact that at the end of the Cold War, sorry, 35 percent of the American workforce was in workforce, was in manufacturing.
You know, you fast forward to 2025, it's less than 15 percent.
So, you know, when you sort of look back at how we built 5,000 ships in World War II and were able to turn on the industrial base so quickly, I mean, again, you actually had a workforce that was primed, whether it was commercial shipbuilding or auto manufacturing, to basically, you know, shift into that type of production.
So, you know, clearly with a 15 percent workforce, we're a bigger country, but still, you know, that's a hill that we have to climb.
In terms of making metal trades more attractive, again, in Groton in 2023, they hired 5,300 workers between Groton and Quonset Point.
That's bigger than World War II numbers, if you go back historically.
As part of that process, there was a metal trades collective bargaining agreement that was negotiated that actually gave a boost to wages.
Over the lifetime, it was about 25, 30 percent increase in pay and protected benefits as well.
They have over 80 percent retention.
It's, you know, again, sort of defies all the conventional wisdom about the fact that people are flushing out after they're getting hired.
We passed wage improvement language in the submarine supplemental in December when we, again, gave a boost to the submarine account that is there.
The SAWS proposal, and again, for some of the new members, it's the shipyard accountability and workforce supply proposal that the Navy has developed, would actually turbocharge that wage improvement opportunity.
And I know that's something the White House is looking at in terms of their executive order.
We've got to make the differential between working in a shipyard in the metal trades better, significantly better, than working in retail, which is what it existed during the Cold War.
So maybe you could just sort of comment on that in terms of just how you incentivize people to go into the trades.
Thank you, Mr. Courtney, for that question.
And I quite agree with pretty much everything that you have said.
I am not an economist by training, but I work in an organization chocked full of economists.
And every time I have this conversation with people at my place, they say, well, why don't we just pay these workers more?
And I think ultimately that is going to be a key part of the answer here.
And you are absolutely right.
I have been fortunate enough to visit various shipyards, and you could see the differential.
It was not that great.
You could drive by a subway that would advertise $18 an hour plus benefits, and the shipyards were paying $20 or $21 an hour.
But shipyard work is hot, it is cold, it is dirty, it is unpleasant.
So, in my view, the differential between retail or even other manufacturing sectors in the areas that surround the shipyard has got to be much, much greater than it currently is.
And it is not just wages, though I think wages is important, especially for the entry-level workers, but it is other things, improving the quality of life, to doing what you can to sort of make that process in the yards easier for them, improving benefits of various kinds.
Affordability of housing has become a big challenge at some of these yards.
One of the things, the effects of COVID, was that a lot of people in cities went to sort of buy a waterfront property, which is where shipyards are, because they could work remotely from there.
So you have places like Bath, Maine, which is expensive, property is as expensive as it is in Northern Virginia, a fact that when I learned up there, it sort of shocked me.
So anything that sort of goes this down the path of increasing the wages for the skilled laborers that we have in these shipyards, I think is something worth considering and discussing.
SAWS is one mechanism to do it.
It is not the only mechanism that can be done, but it is certainly, I think we are on the right path because to me, when I look at where were we in those earlier years when we were producing ships faster, and where are we now, the big issue to me is labor.
And Dr. Seidel, really quick, I mean, obviously we have got to make this workforce actually do better.
And there is good news.
I mean, they handle virtual technology and digital technology, which is now hopefully going to help improve things.
But again, the job training, we have to get that right mixture, not too hot, not too cold, in terms of the immersion into the metal trades, welding electricians.
And I know the Navy is definitely pushing to get that type of model through.
I apologize.
I guess I'm about to run out of time, so I yield back.
But maybe we can get an answer for the record later.
If you can get us an answer for the record, maybe it will come up, dear and other.
I now recognize Mr. Whitman.
rob wittman
Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank our witnesses.
Ms. Oakley, you brought it out, I think, very succinctly and clearly.
The names have changed, but the song remains the same.
It has been the same for the last two decades.
We know what we need to do.
We just can't seem to find a way to get it done.
We see issues with workforce.
That's a continuing theme.
We see an issue with design maturity, design completeness.
We see an issue with maintaining the ships that we allegedly are supposed to be building.
And we look at ASABO, operational availability go down.
I mean, all these things are mind-bogglingly simple, yet we can't seem to get to a place to address them.
And Dr. Seidel and Mr. O'Rourke and Ms. Oakley, I want to begin with you.
Give me your perspective.
You spoke a little bit about this.
You know, we talk about workforce, yet we have a maintenance industry that has roller coaster rides where lots of ships in the yard and then the ships disappear.
We lay people off with the same skills that we need in the build yards.
And yet we don't seem to want to integrate those two enterprises which use the same skill sets.
We also, too, look at how do we make sure that we are getting designs complete.
We know when we go to the yard, like Constellation class, it's going to be 85 percent complete.
Uncertainty goes out the door, and yet we change that, and now it's only 15 percent complete in design.
We know what it takes to successfully entertain and execute these enterprises, yet we keep going back to the same place.
Tell me, tell me, how do we make meaningful changes that will last and that will be transformational to what needs to happen both in the shipbuilding and ship maintenance industry?
Because you can't separate the two.
They both have to happen the same way.
Dr. Seid, I'll begin with you, then go to Ms. Oakley and then Mr. O'Rourke.
unidentified
Thank you for that question, sir, and appreciate being here today to talk about this.
Listen, I think, first, importantly, the work that this committee has done supporting us with the maritime industrial base funds, previously the submarine industrial base funds, is a big part of what we are doing.
We stood up the direct reporting program manager office for the maritime industrial base, the DERPA MIB, last September.
This body has given us over $4 billion just in the last two years that gets at these issues.
We are putting that money on the workforce hiring and retention issues.
We are putting it on supply chain network issues.
We are driving modernization and advanced manufacturing into the yards.
You know, I will say this workforce piece, this atrophy of that sector, in my opinion, is fundamental to everything that we are talking about.
We really have to find a way.
I often say back when I worked in the private sector, we were paying $330,000 minimum wage, and we were paying $13 an hour for manufacturing labor, 3 or 4x.
Today it is 1.2, 1.3x.
We are trying to get after that.
And I think, you know, I'll be quick here because I know we want other folks to be able to talk, but just in the workforce piece, we stood up buildsubmarines.com.
We've had over 3 million hits on that since its inception, led to 2.5 million applications, 9,700 employees hired for the submarine industrial base in 23, a 40 percent improvement, another 10K in 24.
Real metrics, real progress.
We're going to see that play out on the back end of this to drive production, but there's goodness happening.
rob wittman
I want to make sure I get to Ms. Oakley, Mr. O'Rourke.
Ms. Oakley?
unidentified
I'll be real quick.
You hit the nail on the head with regard to the overlap between the repair and shipbuilding workforces and the industrial base.
And that's why our recent report on the shipbuilding and ship repair industrial base recommended that the Navy put forth a strategy for how they're going to invest in both of these industrial bases to ensure that they're both going to be positioned to not only deliver the ships that we need, but also maintain and sustain those ships for our fleet.
And then, secondly, I think one important thing to note about design is that the Navy's own design workforce in-house has significantly atrophied as well.
And I think that that's part of the problem that you're seeing with regard to reviewing the design progress and really understanding how much, how mature these designs are before we're making these critical decisions.
And I know they're focused on improving that as well.
And I think that's a good approach.
rob wittman
Thank you.
Mr. O'Rourke?
unidentified
I'll make four quick points.
First, of the various options in my testimony, the one that has the most promise for achieving results the soonest is the one that Dr. Labs has focused on, which is increasing wages.
Second, the design issue on the frigate program is another workforce issue because once you abandoned the parent design strategy, you threw that into the hands of the ship design community to redesign the ship.
Well, we have a shortage of ship designers in this country, naval architects and marine engineers.
So that's another workforce issue.
And again, that's a wages issue because these are engineers that could take engineering jobs in other parts of the economy.
rob wittman
Mr. O'Rourke, And in deference to the Chairman, I want to take your additional two suggestions for the record.
unidentified
Mr. Chairman, I yielded to the- Please, if you will provide those.
I now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross.
Thank you, Chairman, and the witnesses for being here today.
I'm entering my second decade on this subcommittee.
And as Mr. Whitman just said, reoccurring issues, death by a thousand cuts.
We are not talking about anything new today, maybe outside of the labor issue that we weren't talking about 10 years ago.
It's all there.
In most major yards, you have commercial, military.
Some are combined, some aren't.
We have large and small ones, which we see here.
And then you build and repair, going after what Rob Whitman talked about.
The idea that we have lost our industrial base comes down to one issue.
We offshored it.
The commercial side is gone if it wasn't for the Jones Act.
Jones Act said we have to have that industrial base, but it has not been enough.
In the Philadelphia yard right across the river from my district, we have seen where Honway has come in, looking to immediately look to double what they are doing because they are doing very different than the old acreage yard.
And then what they are doing is looking across the river, quite frankly, to my district, to look at the newest and heaviest roll-on, roll-off port with plenty of room to build what they are talking about.
But it still comes down to each of you said labor.
The idea that we can't attract that next generation is a relatively simple thing to fix.
I come from the building trades.
We don't have any problem hiring electricians.
You know why?
Because we pay them well.
You talked about what you used to pay them and what you pay them now.
And then you look at the leadership of those yards, what they were paid years ago.
They went different ways.
This is the simplest thing to fix.
Give the workers value that we care about what they do and pay them the right amount of money.
It really is that simple.
You can get the people if you treat them well and you pay them well and diversify that workforce.
So let me go down the line here, starting with you, Dr. Seidel.
Labor issues.
Do you agree with the wage issue as being number one?
If not, please tell me what the number one issue with labor is.
Thank you, sir.
No, I absolutely believe that the labor issue is the number one.
And if you just think about what it means, if you took the extreme case and we were paying 3 or 4x, people would absolutely show up in droves to work in this environment.
It is a very purpose-driven life, supporting the Navy.
They'd be all about it.
Thank you, Dr. Leb.
Mr. Norcross, as my opening statement indicated, I completely agree.
That is why I focused on it.
Ms. Oakley?
I completely agree and want to let you know that we have ongoing work looking at the shipbuilding trades workforce where we are hopefully going to get into more details on what can be done.
Mr. O'Rourke.
I see wages as one of the two chief issues and the other is geographic distribution of the work.
Federated shipbuilding can allow us to tap into regional labor markets across the country that are not already tapped out for their potential to generate people who would be interested in shipbuilding.
So wages and geographic distribution.
So Mr. Chairman, all four agree.
All four agree.
Pay the people what they're worth and you can get them done on time.
I yield back.
Mr. Norcross, if it was up to me, I would pay them.
I now recognize for five minutes Dr. Desjarlay of Tennessee.
Thank you, Chairman.
Ms. Oakley, last September, GAO issued a report outlining the challenges facing the Columbia-class submarine program.
As you know, the timely delivery of these submarines is critical for the Nation's nuclear deterrence posture.
Yet the first submarine is projected to be delivered over a year late and hundreds of millions of dollars over budget.
Can you provide a brief overview of the most pressing challenges affecting this platform?
And your report includes recommendation for immediate reforms that the Navy should undertake, but is there any specific action that you believe Congress should take as well?
Thanks for that question.
Yeah, we have been looking at the Columbia Class program since 2017, and we have been identifying issues that were going to be challenging risks for this program all along.
Specifically, right now, the biggest challenges that they are facing are with material availability and workforce shortages.
And not just workforce shortages, also workforce capacity.
So when you are trying to build up a workforce so significantly to be able to do the work that you need done, you experience the issue called green labor, where it just takes a lot longer for those folks to do things, and it also requires a lot more detailed information to be provided to them.
And I think that's been one of the biggest struggles that that program has dealt with at this point in time.
I think the one thing that I would also say is that we have made various recommendations to the Columbia Class program over the years to really do a critical assessment of the risks that are facing that program to ensure that everybody has a good understanding of what it is actually going to cost and how long it is actually going to take.
And I think some of those risks are coming to roost now that they haven't critically assessed.
One final thing I'll mention is that Columbia Class and Virginia Class are so interrelated.
And any issues on Columbia class are going to rightly affect Virginia class because of the shared builders and the shared industrial base.
We have been recommending since 2022 that the Navy get the builders to update their integrated enterprise plan, which would identify the resources needed across the programs to be able to execute these programs at that 2 plus 1 rate.
And they have yet to update it since 2019.
So I think that's one clear recommendation that I would call to your attention.
Thank you.
Your report also noted that the Navy has received billions in supplier development funding, yet there is little evidence that these investments have led to measurable improvements.
What information should the Navy be collecting to assess the effectiveness of these programs?
Yeah, absolutely.
I want to be clear that it is going to take time to see results, right?
You know, this is a long-term effort that is going to be required.
But the problem is it is a short-term challenge.
We are facing near-peer threats like we haven't faced before.
And so what our concern is, is that the Navy hasn't positioned itself to know whether or not the investments that it's making in the submarine industrial base are indeed paying off.
They can tell you if a piece of equipment was bought or if workforce was hired or whatever the case, but really understanding is that moving us in the right direction in terms of the outputs that we need to be able to meet our goals.
That's where we are pushing the Navy to develop those outcome-based metrics that they are going to be tracking.
And we hope they do it.
Because honestly, we can't get five years down the road dumping billions of dollars into this and realize that our investments didn't pay off.
They have to be successful.
Would it be helpful if this committee considered introducing reporting requirements on supplier investment effectiveness to improve transparency and accountability?
I think any support that this committee can give to the Navy's action in this regard would be important.
Okay.
Are there any specific supplier component types that have consistently caused problems?
If so, what steps should be taken to strengthen the supplier base as a whole?
It ranges.
You know, there's a number of issues.
Forging is one of the biggest challenges.
And, you know, the Navy is really doing a good job of trying to target what those key issues are in terms of the bottlenecks by identifying critical suppliers.
And also, I would like to call out that the Navy is taking some steps to try and address some of these supplier-based issues through the use of technology and additive manufacturing.
And I think that those are very promising approaches.
That if the committee were to provide support in terms of encouraging the Navy to continue down that path to address some of these challenges, it would be a good thing.
Okay.
Thank you all for your testimony today, Mr. Chairman.
I yield my time, and Mr. Whitman is back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Maine, an important member of this subcommittee, Mr. Golden.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. O'Rourke, in your testimony, or written testimony anyway, you talked about a shipbuilding lessons learned process at GDBIW, one of two yards building destroyers.
So, up in BIW for years, a lot of the workers carried around their own version of lessons learned in a little notebook that they use out on the job.
So, I'm curious if you could elaborate on how you envision these lessons learned centers operating.
Is this a place where shipbuilders can go to learn the lessons from the perspective of the Navy, or is it the other way around?
Is it both?
And if I could just tip my hat a little bit in one direction, what other ways could the Navy not just utilize the skills of shipbuilders but also their wisdom and knowledge of how to go about doing it?
Yeah, as I indicated in my statement, although the term that is often used is lessons learned, I have observed many occasions over the years where the Navy appears to not really have learned the lesson but simply note it and then eventually forget it, only to have it be rediscovered the hard way years later by practitioners that come after them.
And so, as a consequence of making that observation, one option that can arise would be to create a Navy Shipbuilding Lessons Learned Center.
And I first presented that option before this committee 10 or 11 years ago in testimony.
So, this is nothing new.
That lessons learned center can be as simple as a physical, meaning a shelf collection of past experiences that have been written down from prior programs, or it could be the electronic version of that sort of thing today, computer files.
It could be both.
It can be made available to practitioners within the Navy.
It could be made available to people within the industry.
I don't see why you couldn't make it available to anybody or everybody who might stand to benefit from it.
I don't see the option as being that complicated.
It's just a matter of deciding that you want to do that.
We have lessons learned centers for battlefield lessons and how to fight wars.
This would be an analog within the production sphere.
Thank you.
Shifting gears a little bit, Ms. Oakley, the Marine Corps is unable to maintain their USC Title 10 requirements because of the amphib ship availability, which is in at full capacity, mostly due to maintenance restraints.
I say This is because you've talked about this quite a bit in recent months on a podcast and your reports and in written testimony.
So, how do we go about fixing this issue, or is the problem simply that 31 minimum amphib ships isn't going to be enough?
Yeah, I think our report on the amphibious ships really highlights a key challenge in some of these major modernization and maintenance periods that go on that do directly affect the availability and readiness of the fleet.
And the amphibs are no difference.
With half of the amphib fleet being in unsatisfactory condition, it makes it very difficult to imagine that the Marine Corps' requirements are going to be able to be met in the coming years because it also relies on increasing the pace of acquisition of the amphibs, which, given the challenges that we are talking about today with regard to the industrial base and being able to support that, I am not certain is very realistic.
Thank you.
I think I want to point out, too, that for years the signal from the Navy to destroy your yards was get to three ships per year.
Then they suddenly came out with just a 9 plus 1 multi-year procurement.
I think we are kind of on pace maybe to go beyond that, which will drive up costs.
What do you have to say about that, Mr. O'Rourke, and what other platforms might benefit from a multi-year procurement that currently doesn't have one?
Yeah, the Navy has used multi-year procurement with the destroyers since the mid-90s, if I recall right.
And almost all of the Virginia-class submarines, all but three of them, have been done under multi-year contracting of one form or another.
It is an optional element of what I refer to in my testimony as the broader effort toward continuous production.
It's the one that is most well recognized, people are most familiar with because we have been doing it for such a long time.
And it is something that can be applied to other shipbuilding programs if policymakers agree that that would be cost-effective.
This committee and the Congress as a whole has a long history of providing approvals for various shipbuilding programs to use these contracting forms over the years.
It is a way of providing stability and compliance.
We're going to leave this, take you live outside the White House for remarks by the Commerce Secretary.
As such, Ontario.
I'm going to have a meeting and then I'll talk to you later.
What's your goal for those meetings, Secretary Lutnick?
Just a moment there with the Commerce Secretary.
We'll take you back now to the hearing on shipbuilding.
And most importantly, so much ship repair and shipbuilding people.
So listening to you all, it's a lot.
It's a lot.
I wish it was a little more positive direction, but I think there are some important lessons for Congress to learn.
We can't keep doing what we're doing, I think is the bottom line.
And it is encouraging to have the President of the United States stand up to stay the union and talk about prioritizing shipbuilding.
The fact that we have now a new office of shipbuilding, these are all steps in the right direction.
But I think we're going to need to see some big overarching changes.
And what does that look like?
I mean, the ideas you've talked about today between the technology, we can build unmanned aircraft using robotics.
Why can't we do better with especially ship components?
I mean, the design aspect.
I have a son who studied naval architecture at the Naval Academy.
I know it was one of the few schools that they actually have that degree.
So what can we do to incentivize kids just to go to the design piece?
The labor challenges, it's hard for me to listen to you all talk about.
I sat on the Recruitment Retention Quality of Life Task Force that we did from this committee last year where we looked at all of those things for our active duty side.
We improved the pay and compensation.
We improved the housing.
We improve child care, the health care, the spouse employment.
It's the same issues that you all are talking about.
We took 29 amendments that came out of the Senate to the tune of $5 billion that we're making sure in this year's continuing resolution that we're passing that we're going to hopefully pass today because it's so meaningful to us, that work that we did, because we cannot keep this all-volunteer force without those quality of life changes for active duty.
But the same can be said not just for shipbuilding and ship repair, but for our MSC task as well.
And we know that with our Navy, we can't do the job that we need to do without our military sealift command, which is also important in my district.
We've had the opportunity to visit.
But we can incorporate these changes across the board.
You know, it's interesting that the geographic issue, you know, living along the coastline is historically expensive.
I can speak to that from Hampton Roads area.
But can we build components in places like the Midwest?
I know we're doing it in Virginia and Danville.
We've got a great center, but when we take people out of Danville, where they're from and move them, you know, to other parts where there may be shipbuilding, it's a harder transition.
So what does that modular component look like and that build?
I think there's ways that we can do things.
But I want to talk specifically, and we printed this poster about the Military Sealift Command.
And there are so many ships that we can be building that are not warships.
I understand building the warships domestically and what that looks like and our challenges that we're going to work through.
But on the MSC side, for example, we used to have eight AOEs.
We're down to two.
We're down to two of these.
If we don't have ships and food and supplies, we can't keep the fleet at sea.
So I'm really focused, and I think we're leaving these guys kind of out of the equation sometimes.
But how can we do better on this side of the House?
Is it something I know a few of you have spoken about, the South Koreans specifically and involving some of our allied partners?
But what does that look like?
Is it a place we need to pursue that we need to use, think outside the box and be using our allied partners, especially when it comes to this MSC type fleet or I can't do it all domestically, so what can I do?
Because I want them as soon as I can get them.
But are there any of you that you can speak to, especially the use of allied partners for things like military sea lift command?
If it's all right, I'll take an answer to that question.
Again, I'm not in the business of making recommendations, but I would sort of answer this question this way, is that if you believe you need a larger fleet and you need to recapitalize both the warship fleets as well as the military sealift command, then I think that, and given that the capacity of current shipbuilding yards is full, looking at the question of our allies being able to supply some of these types of ships is something that is worth considering.
There's all kinds of advantages and disadvantages of bringing the allies and partners into the shipbuilding portfolio, whether domestic or overseas.
But in December, President Trump made a suggestion along those lines in an interview with the press, and it seems like the public would benefit from that.
The Japanese and the Koreans in particular build outstanding ships that fall into the military sealift command portfolio.
If you're talking about robo ships and cargo ships and things like that, some of the more specialized ships under the military sea lift command might still be better built in American yards, but it is at least worth having that public debate and having that conversation about whether others need to be brought into it, not only for Navy, but also Coast Guard and icebreakers.
That would be another place to sort of have that conversation as well.
I agree.
Do any of any of you others have thoughts on that?
Well, in my eight seconds, I'll just say committed to working with MERA AD and ensuring that we prioritize military sealift command and the build of those ships.
I think rising tide raises all boats, and certainly the commercial sector getting stronger is going to help us too in what we are doing in the defense sector.
So all committed.
Thank you.
I think it warrants a further discussion, but thank you so much for your opinion.
I yield back.
I now recognize the gentleman from the UP, Mr. Bergman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Being a Marine, I am not going to waste your time, our time, or anybody else's time.
So any one of you or all of you can offer the comment if you choose.
Does the Navy currently have the capability to put, pun intended, the necessary rudder into this big ship called shipbuilding, ship repair, ship design?
Is the Navy currently structured to actually be able to do that?
Yes or no?
You don't have to give me why they're not just yes or no?
No.
No, okay.
Anybody else?
Anybody going to offer a yes?
Okay.
So let's move on from that then.
Somebody said commercial shipbuilding still exists because of the Jones Act.
I heard that within the last 24 hours.
Anybody want to comment on that?
As you well know, Congressman, there is very little commercial shipbuilding done in American shipyards today.
To the extent that there is some commercial shipbuilding that does occur, it does seem to me that it is mostly Jones Act ships, which is building ships for intra-United States trade between one U.S. port and another U.S. port.
So that is simply the current description of where we are today.
Okay.
Thank you.
Mr. O'Rourke, you cited the South Korean model, and we just talked about it in the last questioning.
Could you name one or two things that the South Korean model exhibits, utilizes, that maybe you think we should adopt?
I think the Navy certainly has the opportunity to adopt those practices that the South Koreans follow that I mentioned in my testimony.
In fact, I became aware of them via a conference of two professional societies that relate to Marine Engineers, and they were speaking mostly to Navy people.
And it was their view that those practices should be imported into the Navy's own practices.
So right from the outset, the whole reason for my awareness of South Korea's practices in that regard came from professional conferences where people working in the field were telling that to the Navy.
Okay.
So my understanding of what you said was some professionals who were attending a conference referenced the South Korean model as a positive.
Are there any other countries that would come close to the South Korean model or something else that we could learn from or partner with or however you want to call it?
Yes, the other country you could learn from is Japan.
Japan and South Korea are often mentioned almost side by side when people talk about best practices on a world standard in shipbuilding.
And there are two things that you could learn from the Japanese.
One, which you can also learn from the South Korean, is how to manage shipyard operations more efficiently in terms of training new workers and staying on top of and managing the material flow through the shipyard.
And secondly, you could learn from Japan the model of keeping the procurement rate steady even as force size changes by managing it at the back end through end-of-life decisions, not through upfront procurement rate tinkering.
Okay.
Are there any other countries, are there any other countries anywhere else in the world, any part of the world that I mean, right now we are focused kind of on one part of the world here?
South Korea and Japan.
Are there any other parts of the world that may not be as quite the top tier, but definitely would be you could look at the European yards as well.
Japan and South Korea are in competition with China.
So they are trying to hold on to their market share against the Chinese shipbuilding.
And so they are laser focused on making their own operations.
Not as competitive issues as possible.
A long time ago, there was Ford, GM, and Chrysler all in Detroit area competing for the future of the market now.
This is a different example of that?
It is, because right now those three countries, China, South Korea and Japan, account for more than 90 percent of the world commercial shipbuilding market.
China is like 40 to 50 percent, and then South Korea, 30, more or less, and Japan, 20.
I want to give Dr. Seidel and that's why there's a lot of second.
Can Dr. Seidel give me a quick answer?
10 seconds.
Yeah, I just wanted to say you moved fast on that first question about are we structured to do the right thing?
In my opinion, we can and are, and there's improvements that can be made, right?
So I think it can happen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Thank you.
I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Dr. Jackson.
ronny jackson
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Most of my questions have actually been addressed.
I'm just going to ask you one real quick question.
I apologize if this was already addressed before I came into the room, but I just wondering, with regards to some of the innovative technology that is out there nowadays, production line automation, artificial intelligence, robotics, could this deliver additional capacity?
I mean, I know it can, and efficiency in shipbuilding.
How aggressive are we being on this front?
And I had another question, and I'm not saying that this is the primary reason by any means, because my colleagues on the left have pointed this out a few times to me when I brought this up.
But what role does organized labor play in this as well?
Because it seems like when you have a lot of these hardworking blue-collar jobs like shipbuilding, there's organized labor has a big part in this, and they really push back sometimes on automation.
And I think what has been mentioned is like, look, if we can make things more efficient, we can expand the production and there's more work for you.
You can keep the same number of people, just employ them in different areas.
But it seems like there's a lot of pushback.
I mean, sometimes organized labor doesn't believe that.
They don't buy that argument.
And when it comes to things like automating the gate at the entrance to the shipyard, they don't want to automate that because that's someone's job.
So are we overcoming that?
Is this the future of shipbuilding is some of the stuff I mentioned?
And are we working with organized labor to come up with ways to do that and still employ people?
unidentified
Yeah, so I'll take that question.
Listen, we are spending a lot of effort on modernization of the yards, trying to drive in advanced manufacturing techniques.
We are also working with our supply chain network.
The MIB monies that we talked about are going toward those efforts.
We have right now quickly over 700 projects with 300 different suppliers across 33 states.
And there is an 11 percent improvement in performance for them that are undertaking those.
From an advanced manufacturing technology perspective, especially an additive, we'll do an SSGN availability here shortly that will have 33 additively manufactured parts and would have never couldn't have been sourced any other way, and some of them will be sub-safe.
So I think we are driving those kinds of capabilities into our yards and our supply chain network.
I haven't heard that the organized labor piece is a problem at this point, and I honestly don't expect it will be, even though I respect what you said.
As a guy who used to work with UAW a lot too, I've watched us automate yards in the automotive sector or automate plants, and there's always some work and some initial pushback, but we typically get through that, and I expect we can as well in the maritime industrial base.
Okay.
ronny jackson
I appreciate that.
And before I just have two minutes left, I was going to give you guys the opportunity, the ones that didn't get to answer Ms. Kiggin's question while I go, because one of my questions also was about our ability to allow some of our allies to help us, not only shipbuilding, with the maintenance and stuff.
I know when I was over in Australia recently talking about AUKUS, there were plans to build some shipyards and stuff over there, and so that it could basically help us.
I know that I would prefer that we do everything here in the United States, obviously, but we can all see the writing on the wall that that's a long time coming before we get to where we need to be.
Is this a way to help us get there faster?
They would provide intermediate maintenance capability, things of that nature.
If we're fighting over in the Indo-Pacific, I think it's a national security asset as well.
unidentified
Listen, the AUKUS partnership, obviously very important to us, and we're doing everything in our power to support the 1 plus 2 and 1 plus 2.33 to get there.
I think it does help us, and having strong relationships in that trilateral agreement, certainly very critical.
I'll yield so other folks can have a chance.
I would just make one comment: there's kind of a delicate balance that has to happen with the industrial base in terms of keeping the yards that you have existing healthy and inserting new yards into the industrial base.
It becomes a little bit of a balance that has to be made because of the fluctuations in the flow through ship programs through these yards.
You know, any one bad year could result in laying off employees in some of our existing yards.
And so I think a real holistic look at what the solutions are to be able to shore up that industrial base and ensure we have a vibrant commercial shipbuilding industry that then supplements and augments our naval shipbuilding industry is, I think, a key area, should be a key area of focus going forward.
ronny jackson
Thank you, ma'am.
And it looks like I'm out of time, so I'll just leave it there and I'll yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
unidentified
I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
clay higgins
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, I think we recognize the significance of today's hearing.
We have to tackle this thing.
The United States shipbuilding industry has the capacity to meet a nation's maritime needs, yet we've seen in modern history, we've seen a disturbing trend of inconsistent government contracting, excessive program engineering, design changes that are endless, lack of long-term commitment that when all combined,
it prevents shipbuilders, especially smaller shipbuilders, which have historically carried a great burden of our requirements of our nation to float a Navy that's indomitable around the world.
We need our smaller shipbuilders across the country to be vibrant and successful.
But we have baked in a formula that makes it quite difficult for them to perform.
And investments in like workforce expansion and infrastructure for these smaller shipyards requires a solid long-term commitment with their government partners when they're building vessels.
so that they can be healthy and vibrant and have the strong workforce with time on the job and the appropriate infrastructure and modernization to perform on the next contract.
So the revitalization of our shipbuilding industry could very well determine the outcome of our next conflict.
So we have a heavy responsibility here to pay attention to it.
And I would like to direct my first question more if I have time, but Ms. Oakley, given the strategic importance of strengthening our domestic shipbuilding base,
which is a common theme here today, what do you see as the primary obstacle regarding what I refer to as the baked into the formula coming from the Navy and DOD regarding constant design changes and a moving target for our shipbuilding industry?
Could you address that, please?
unidentified
Yeah, I think there's a couple of things.
In my opening, I mentioned that the Navy often puts forward optimistic business cases, right?
So the best case scenario in terms of the cost and schedule estimates, given the risks that are apparent on these programs, everyone knew that this was going to be a challenge to build up, for example, for the Columbia-class program, the Virginia-class, maintaining both of those at the same time.
But we didn't act on that information soon enough to be able to respond.
And so I think that really critically examining.
clay higgins
You said soon enough, but you're describing years.
unidentified
Yeah.
clay higgins
Past, correct?
unidentified
Yeah.
clay higgins
Yes, ma'am.
Please continue.
unidentified
So I think one of the biggest challenges with regard to what we've seen in Navy shipbuilding over the years in respects to design is that not enough work is done up front to be able to know what we're signing on the dotted line for.
clay higgins
Agreed.
How would you, if I can ship, because I'm respectful of your time and the ticking clock here regarding American yards and shipbuilding and how the Out of Jones Act plugs in there,
would you address the consequences of overdependence from an American perspective and a national security and indeed a world security perspective for America's the danger of overdependence on foreign shipyards and how that plugs into the Jones Act, for instance, in the icebreaker realm, I think the ships should be made in America.
Would you address that topic, please, Ms. Oakley?
unidentified
I think there's always a challenge with regard to leveraging our allies and leveraging foreign shipyards for things that are critical to our own warfighting efforts.
And I think there has to be a real understanding of what the impacts of that are when making those decisions, also balanced with what can our industrial base realistically provide us.
And I think that that's part of the problem right now is that we're hoping that this industrial base can be mobilized to be able to meet our needs and grow our fleet to 380 wars.
clay higgins
Would you agree that on to identify a category of vessels as, say, crucial vessels, would you agree generally that American treasures should be invested in American shipyards and the building of crucial vessels?
unidentified
I mean, I would say that the Navy would agree with you.
I don't know that I necessarily have a position on that.
clay higgins
Thank you, Madam, for an honest answer.
Mr. Chairman, I yield.
unidentified
I now recognize the gentleman from Guam, who is such an important member of this subcommittee and also has a very strategic region of the world, which he represents, Mr. Morgan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today to discuss, as you mentioned, this critical shipbuilding need.
And Guam is a key strategic asset in the Indo-Pacific and playing a crucial role in defending our Nation.
Its location makes it an important logistical hub for moving personnel and supplies to support our presence in the region.
Our nation faces challenges across the defense industry base, particularly with shipyards and shipbuilding.
The ship repair facility in Guam was closed in 1997 during the BRAC process.
But the equipment was left behind and still there today.
With the increasing threats in Indo-Pacific, we must focus on improving our readiness.
This means having the right infrastructure to support our Navy ships and submarines, which are essential for deterrence and protection in the region.
As we prepare for future conflicts, it is vital to maximize all available resource to enhance ship maintenance and repair capabilities.
We cannot overlook Guam's potential to provide the support needed to keep our military assets ready and operational in this key region.
So my question for Mr. Rourke.
You mentioned that poor planning, scheduling, and funding are the main challenges affecting the timely completion of ship maintenance and repairs.
Do you believe having ship repair capabilities in Guam could help mitigate the scheduling issues by cutting down the return time from Hawaii to the mainland?
I know that the Navy is interested in improving its ability to perform ship maintenance in the Indo-Pacific region, and that extends even to a Navy interest in wanting to understand what foreign shipyards can do in terms of battle damage repair during time of conflict.
If the Navy is interested in that, then it would make sense for the Navy to be interested in making sure that they are taking advantage of the opportunity that Guam presents for ship repair, both on a day-to-day basis and again for battle damage repair during time of conflict.
Thank you.
And as my colleague mentioned, Guam is USA.
We can trust U.S. soil, our ship repair folks over there as well.
So thank you for your answer.
This question is for Dr. Chadeau.
Your testimony highlighted the importance of expanding and modernizing key production and repair facilities for our nation's security.
Given Guam's strategic location, what efforts are being made to reauthorize the lease for the Guam shipyard repair facility to enhance capabilities in the Indo-Pacific?
Sir, thank you.
Obviously, a very critical spot for us because of everything going on in that region.
We are having those discussions right now around where we are trying to do our ship repair and ship maintenance.
I concur with everything Mr. O'Rourke said also.
And my commitment to you is to continue to have that discussion to try and get to a good solution that helps all of us and improves our tactical advantage there.
I appreciate that.
And also, along with your constant fight to let them know that we are there, we are ready to serve.
And Guam is USA, so let's help out one another.
Sir, I appreciate that a lot.
I mean it.
Appreciate it.
And one more question for you, please.
How can the Federal Government leverage partnership with local workforce development programs to address the shortage of skilled workers in the defense industry base to meet production demands?
Yeah, I think we are doing a lot of those things, both local regions and nationally.
We stood up the accelerated training facility for defense manufacturing in Danville.
We have six regional pipelines and one national pipeline, all part of the SIB and MIB monies that you have also graciously funded us for.
So we are putting that to good use to get after trades and labor for the yards and think we are having good effect there.
I think it still then goes back to the attrition issues and what are we doing with wages to make sure that our retention, once we get them, allows us to keep them so that we make the inroads that we need.
But we are after that.
I appreciate that.
We have a lot of young kids anxious to help our nation and get that good education.
So with your support, we can help fund that.
So I appreciate it.
Thank you to the panels.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Thank you.
I now recognize a little bit out of order my good friend, the ranking member, Mr. Courtney, for five minutes of questions, upon which I will close after.
Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Ms. Oakley, I just wanted to go back to your comments regarding requirements and design completion before construction, which I could not agree with you more.
But in terms of the Columbia program, because it was sort of in the mix there, when Columbia cut its first steal, it was 87 percent design complete, which and I'm old enough to remember the Ohio-class submarine program, which it's replacing.
It was less than 20 percent at that time.
A lot of land-based testing has been done for the propulsors before it even got near the submarine for assembly that's there.
And I think, again, that reduced a lot of risk during the process.
It's late right now, no question about it.
There are two reasons.
Number one, two primary reasons, the power turbine generator is late coming from Sunnydale.
Northrop Grumman, it's a new technology, first of its time.
I mean, it's going to take a while, but they can't sort of build the rest of the submarine and then have to cut it open to insert that.
They have to wait for it.
And the bow is late from Newport News.
Again, there's a Tiger team that is down there working in terms of trying to get that.
But in terms of, you know, really a program where the requirements and design was done upfront, I mean, honestly, Admiral Popano, I think, did an outstanding job in terms of just relentlessly pushing that sort of sequence as that program was going into place.
Dr. Seidel, in terms of the requirements issue, again, GAO is right about the fact that this has been whether Frigate and some of the other LCS just was changing what seemed like every hearing SeaPower held over the years.
The vessel contract manager that I mentioned in opening remarks, where we used a commercial model for the maritime training ships, which can be converted into a sealift vessel at time of emergency.
I mean, it worked.
And it seems like we have had Navy personnel come visit the Philly shipyard to see it for themselves.
Again, it just feels like we've got to go more with the Navy in terms of just getting them to let go, maybe even some of the less exquisite vessels to just sort of follow what the commercial industry is doing so that we can speed things up.
I mean, I was wondering if you could comment on that.
Yeah, two things.
One, to the point about design, and we've had a lot of discussion about that today.
I feel like for success in this arena, it's rigor and discipline in requirements, then design, and production.
Because if you're rigorous about all three, then things flow.
You don't get out of sequence material.
You don't have those kind of issues.
I think we have an insatiable demand, appetite for capabilities at times for good reason.
We are the finest Navy ever assembled because we have capabilities that outpace our adversaries.
And so when we come to those crossroads, we always struggle to say, stop.
We've already snapped a chalk line.
We need to stay with the design we have so that it's more producible for our industry partners.
So I think we know what to do to make that better.
We've got to be rigorous and disciplined in doing it.
To your point about MERAD and the vessel construction manager, I've taken several briefs on that now.
I concur with you.
It looks like they've been very successful, control some of the little R requirements compared to the big R requirements and have led to some decreased costs there that I think looks good.
So I intend to go meet with them and have some real discussion.
I think there's some opportunity in our space to take that model and use it for some of the work that we're doing.
And my commitment is to lean in and work to try to do that.
I mean, that's great to hear.
And anything we can do to push that along for sure.
Ms. Oakley, again, I was glad to hear that you now are going to be focusing on workforce training as part of a project that's there.
I really encourage you to come up to Groton and see the manufacturing pipeline.
Again, that reason why they hit that 5,300 higher number, it was 4,000 last year, and having such great retention is because of the design of the curriculum.
Okay, and it's something now that I think other regions are starting to emulate because if it's too short, then people are going to flush out once they see the reality of a shipyard.
If it's too long, it's just too long.
We need it faster.
So again, I hope you'll take up my invitation.
We have definitely been there and we will be back.
Great.
Thank you.
I yield back.
Well, I can't let him do that.
You need to come to Pascagoula and see how it's really done and how it's done right.
And has been for a long, long time.
But with that being said, I thank all of you witnesses so much for being here today.
You've added a great contribution.
This was a great hearing, and it's a great hearing because of the great witnesses we have.
Thank you.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
With government funding set to expire Friday at midnight Eastern, the Senate has been working on a temporary spending bill to avoid a shutdown, while a longer-term solution is negotiated between House and Senate Republicans.
The short-term measure will require 60 votes to clear a procedural hurdle before any final vote.
Senate Democratic Leader Schumer this week said that Republicans do not have the votes and is calling for a scaled-back, one-month fix.
Senate Majority Leader Thun responded, posting, it's time for Democrats to fish or cut bait.
Democrats need to decide if they're going to support this funding legislation or if they're going to shut down the government.
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