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Jan. 15, 2025 15:06-15:52 - CSPAN
45:58
State Dept. Spokesperson Holds Briefing
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p
pedro echevarria
cspan 00:42
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Speaker Time Text
unidentified
Yeah, we will stand to see a vigorous, vigorous engagement in this incoming administration, especially in contrast to the outgoing administration.
pedro echevarria
We've heard the president talk about tariffs as it told us to do things like reduce the amount of fentanyl that comes in the country and other things.
Is that the proper use of a tariff?
unidentified
Well, you know, fentanyl product, that's especially if we would become dependent on that revenue, that's an unstable source of revenue.
I can't see a tariff being a good application there on fentanyl.
pedro echevarria
But he uses it as a means to say if we put these against the country, the country responds, or at least can reduce the amount of fentanyl, then the tariff achieves its purpose.
unidentified
Do you think that's a reasonable measure?
That can be the case.
Again, I think we need to be careful and not become over-reliant on tariff revenue that is probably not very stable.
pedro echevarria
This is Adrian Smith joining us, Representative Republican from Nebraska.
He's the chair of the trade subcommittee for the Ways and Means Committee.
And if you want to ask him questions about trade and tariffs and other related issues, 202748-8000 for Democrats, 202-748-8001 for Republicans, 202748-8002 for independents.
And if you want to text us, 202748-8000-1000.
unidentified
We'll leave our recorded program here.
You can finish watching it on our website, c-span.org.
We take you now to the State Department for a briefing.
This is live coverage.
There have been events that have led, you know, there have been times where we have been close to getting a ceasefire agreement and events have led to a delay in negotiations.
And sometimes even events that we don't object to.
For example, after the killing of Yahya Sinwar, something that the United States very much supported, that delayed negotiations for weeks, well over a month, because Hamas was not in any position to make decisions.
They didn't have a governance structure set up.
They didn't have a way to decide on how to deal with ceasefire proposals.
You've had other incidents where at various times the parties pushed new proposals onto the table that led to things.
So there have been some things that have been kind of just the back and forth of negotiations.
Sometimes there have been larger events in the region.
But I think the fundamental thing that has shifted, two things that have fundamentally shifted, one really on each side.
So on the Hamas side, as I said in response to Matt's earlier question, they very much have realized over the past few months that there was no hope of getting a broader regional war.
And I can tell you at various times when we thought we were close to an agreement, there have been events that I think rekindled that hope inside Hamas's leadership that they would get that war.
So for example, when you saw the direct exchange of fire between Israel and Iran, something that was unprecedented, we saw Hamas pull back from the negotiations because in our judgment they thought this may be the time that we get the outbreak of war and so we don't have to agree to a ceasefire.
When you saw the escalation of hostilities in September and October between Israel and Hezbollah, Hamas at the same time was pulling back a little bit from the negotiations, I think, to wait and see how that conflict played out and see whether that was actually in their interest.
So that's what you had on the Hamas side.
On the Israeli side, over time, you've seen them meet their overall strategic objectives.
And so once they had killed Yahya Sinwar, that really realized the last strategic objective they had because they had already decimated Hamas's military leadership.
And so the conversation that we have been having with them is: without a ceasefire agreement, you are going to be in a version of Groundhog Day, where you go back in every day to fight Hamas militants, and you kill a certain number of militants, some of them low-level, and those militants are replaced by others.
You heard the Secretary say in a speech yesterday that we assessed that Hamas has now recruited nearly as many militants as Israel has killed since October 7th.
So this becomes a bit of a never-ending problem for Israel.
And so I think they ultimately made the judgment that the only way, as we have been telling them, for them to get their hostages home and actually achieve lasting security that suits their purposes was to sign up for this agreement as well.
Just to pursue that, I mean, throughout this, over recent months, the Secretary of himself has Israeli said that the holdout is Hamas.
I mean, now that it's not over and done, but now that it's at this point in the Abbas Reasons is on its way out.
Is that still the stance that Hamas was the hold that ultimately obviously the Israeli government has very messy coalition politics and the far-right parties there?
Hamas has far and away been the chief obstacle to concluding this agreement.
And that's been true, especially since August or so.
Now, there have been times that Israel has introduced new conditions and new proposals that have made it more difficult to get an agreement.
Just as Hamas at times has introduced new conditions and new proposals that made it difficult to get to an agreement.
But that fundamentally is what a negotiation looks like.
You expect parties in a negotiation to put forward proposals.
And people can debate whether sometimes one side or the other overplayed their hand.
There certainly have been times that we went to the government of Israel and said, you know, we think that you are pushing too hard and we want you to back down.
But I will say, really for the past five, six months or so, it has been Hamas that at first was unwilling to negotiate and then for a while unable to negotiate.
So after this period in August when we thought we were getting really close, we thought we were getting really close to a deal in July and then in August, we saw Hamas around that point just decide that they weren't going to negotiate off of their position anymore.
They had a position and they weren't going to budge.
They weren't going to move at all.
And we were still at the table.
Israel was still willing to be at the table.
Hamas wasn't.
And that continued for some period of time.
And then you had this period of time where Hamas, because of the death of Sinoar, wasn't able to really make decisions and could have conversations but couldn't negotiate in any kind of meaningful way.
So when you hear us say that Hamas has been the prime obstacle to accepting the deal, that is very much what we have meant.
It has very much been accurate.
Just one briefly before I pass on.
You mentioned this a redban for Israel, of course, will be no future Hamas governance in Gaza.
I mean, Hamas agreeing to this.
Do you think that effectively they've recognized this, that they've recognized they have no political future in Gaza?
You know, I wouldn't want to speak for them at all, obviously.
But I think when you look at opinion across the region, it is not just a conclusion of the Israeli government that Hamas has disqualified itself from leadership.
Disqualified is not the right word.
Obviously, the Israeli government would have never thought Hamas should run Israel in the first place, but that Hamas can play no role at all in the future of Gaza.
We hear that from countries across the region, that you cannot have a terrorist organization that is committed to the destruction of Israel, that has launched this horrific conflict that has resulted in the death of more than 45,000 Palestinians, has massively increased the chance of full-out regional war, which we got very close to on a number of occasions and we were able to prevent through some pretty intense diplomatic efforts.
I think none of the parties who we have talked to about contributing financial support, about contributing security support to Gaza, are in any way going to be willing to step up and do that if they see either a future where Gaza is dominated by Israel or if it's dominated by Hamas.
Thanks, Matt, echoing everyone's thanks for doing your job here.
I like the way you said that.
Thank you for doing your job.
Thank you for doing your job.
Yeah, good.
Biden said Americans would be coming out in the first phase.
Do you have any details on who and how many?
You know, I don't want to get to it from here.
As you know, there are seven Americans who remain in hospital, who remain held hostage inside Gaza, four who are alive, three who are unfortunately deceased.
We will have that information coming in the, or available in the coming days, but I want to make sure we are able to have the conversations we need to have with all those families about those details before I talk about them publicly.
But we will make that available in the comments.
And it's still the presumption that those three are alive.
When was the last time there was any update on their conditions or whereabouts within Gaza?
There is still the presumption that they are alive.
We have various amounts.
We have differing levels of information with each of those.
But that's information we communicate about with the families, and I don't want to speak to that public.
And then on the humanitarian surge, how is that going to be distributed?
What is the assessment on the level of destruction just on the infrastructure within Gaza?
How do you intend to get that level of aid in?
Will there be any reconstruction component to assist with the aid distribution?
So the reconstruction is not something that happens in phase one.
That will happen later in phase two and phase three of this plan.
Phase one is really just a stabilization and recovery before you can even get to reconstruction.
But the aid will be distributed through our humanitarian partners, largely the UN agencies that are there on the ground and other nonprofit, non-governmental organizations who are working with.
That aid infrastructure has been destroyed is our understanding.
So how do you intend to be able to distribute that?
There are, so that's true, but there are still warehouses that exist in Gaza that are functioning now.
Some of them, some of the warehouses that exist haven't been destroyed, but aid organizations haven't been able to get to them because of the security situation.
We think they'll be able to turn those warehouses back on.
We believe they'll be able to surge the number of trucks that go in and the number of trucks that move around.
For the specifics of that, I would, of course, defer to the aid organizations who are expert in how to do this.
But in all of our conversations with them, they are confident that they will be able to massively increase the amount of humanitarian assistance that gets in once this ceasefire is implemented.
And then the last question, do you anticipate any travel now that this ceasefire agreement has been announced?
By the Secretary?
No, I do not.
No, I do not.
You know, we still have five days, so I can't rule anything out, but no, I do not as I stand here at 3.15 on Wednesday.
Daphne.
I just want to echo everyone.
I'm saying there's a chance, Matt.
I'm saying there's a chance.
But I do not anticipate it, but there's always a chance.
Thank you for taking our questions every day.
Very much appreciate it.
To follow up on the aid, you mentioned some of the challenges, and we've heard that critical details of the aid surge are still to be worked out and were due to be discussed in Cairo on Thursday.
Will the U.S. be part of those conversations?
We will be a part of those conversations.
I don't have an update on who will be attending, but we very much have been a part of the humanitarian assistance efforts from the beginning of this effort and will continue to be.
And then security arrangements for the delivery of aid is one of the most difficult issues.
Are there security arrangements that are already agreed for this surge of aid, or does that still need to be worked out?
There are broad agreements that we have worked out with some of the humanitarian partners.
There are details that we still have to work out.
And of course, Some of this will happen as the aid organizations have more freedom and flexibility to move around Gaza in a way that they haven't been able to in the past 15 months, where they will be able to, you know, I think things will look, you know, a week or 10 days from now, will look very different than they have over the past 15 months, just based on the situation inside Gaza.
So I'm sure that there are things that they have looked at that they have planned that they'll need to adapt once they're able to move around more freely inside Gaza.
Can you say which parts have been agreed?
No, I can't get into that level of detail from here.
Is there anything you would like to see in terms of the security arrangements?
We want to see that, just speaking broadly, we want to see that humanitarian workers are protected.
We want to see that they can go about their jobs free from harm, free from violence, that they are not put in harm's way either by members of Hamas who will still be inside Gaza and who still, of course, have access to weapons inside Gaza or by gangs and looting that we have seen be an impediment to the delivery of assistance over the past few months.
But with the specifics of that, those are conversations we'll be having directly with the humanitarian groups.
Thank you, Matt.
It's been an extraordinary year and four years, and I think it's been pretty full on since the year 2016, actually.
But congratulations to making it to the end of your run.
I wanted to ask this again.
We've been asking about the incidents of Israel's activities in Gaza that are being investigated by people in this building.
Are you confident that the conclusions of some of these incidents will reach the light of day moving forwards to the next administration?
Is there anything that this building is doing to shore up to make sure that those conclusions come to light?
So we continue to work to reach definitive answers with respect to a number of the incidents that we are looking at.
But I can tell you that the obligation that the State Department has to investigate potential violations of international humanitarian law through the use of U.S. weapons are not obligations that expire on January 20th.
They're obligations that carry over from this administration to the next administration.
So we would fully expect that the next administration would carry out its duties under the law.
There are a number of potential incidents that we have been looking at.
You've seen us issue a report where we went into detail how we are looking at these, the fact that we do believe it's reasonable to assess that there have been instances in which Israel has violated international humanitarian law or its commitments under Israeli law.
But we have a number of incidents that we're looking at.
And if those aren't finished between now and Monday, there are obligations that continue on into the next administration.
And on that report that you mentioned, you're talking about the NSM there.
Is it your hope that U.S. officials and also indeed foreign journalists will at some point be allowed to go back into Gaza and be able to provide evidence and information that was perhaps lacking when putting that report together?
Certainly.
We have wanted foreign journalists to be able to get into Gaza already.
That has been long our position that journalists should be able to operate inside Gaza.
I know it's dangerous.
I know it puts journalists at risk, but we have heard journalists say they want to face that risk and go in and bring the truth to light.
And we support their efforts to do so.
But certainly we would want them to do so.
And I can't speak to when it comes to the position of U.S. personnel.
I don't think I should speak to that given that it's going to be a, you know, I don't want to speak for the next administration.
The ceasefire goes into effect on Sunday.
The new administration takes office on Monday, so I don't think I should try to speak for them.
But certainly, I can say on behalf of this administration, we would want to be able to do anything we could to gather facts about potential violations of international humanitarian law.
And last question on what the Secretary laid out about the day after plan.
Do you have any more specifics about who or if there are any parties that are willing to step forwards and help with the de-radicalization in Gaza?
Or are you just hoping that's something that will become clear if this succeeds?
So we have had conversations with a number of our partners in the region about that.
I don't think the countries are any secret because the Secretary has talked about his work on the day after as he's traveled around the region and met with these partners.
I don't want to, there are different partners that have spoken about different aspects they'd be willing to contribute at different phases of this process.
So I don't want to speak to them publicly, largely because the plan that the Secretary laid out, we found got broad support, but there were still details that needed to be agreed.
And it was always our assumption that if we got to phase one, it was during phase one of the agreement that you could really force agreement on the day after plan because it takes bringing about a ceasefire to focus the mind on what comes next and to drive agreement on what comes next.
And so we were really looking for this opportunity to drive real agreement on turning those broad strokes into implementable plans.
So what we're going to do, as the Secretary said yesterday, is take those plans and turn it over to the incoming administration.
We've already had conversations with them about them.
It is our hope that they will pick them up and run with it.
But of course, those will be decisions for them to make.
And if they don't, I do believe that there are countries in the region who are going to want to step up, who are not going to want Gaza to be a source of continued suffering and pain and instability to the broader region.
Saeed.
Thank you.
I want to thank you for your time at the podium and for every time calling on me.
I never felt that I'm entitled to it.
So I sincerely thank you for calling on me all the time.
Of course, Said.
And I'm enjoying our exchange.
It's been a tough couple of years, so to speak, in terms of topics that we have discussed.
Let me ask you about, of course, the ceasefire.
Now, it goes into effect on Sunday.
That's four days from today.
Is there anything that could stop the Israelis from bombing places in Gaza?
Look, the ceasefire doesn't go in effect until it's effective.
That's not just a feature of this ceasefire.
It's a feature of every ceasefire that's ever been negotiated.
There's a day in which they come into effect.
And until then, there's nothing to stop either of the parties from continuing the war up until the time that the ceasefire is implemented.
But we have seen in the past, we have witnessed in the past, Matt, you know, because there have been so many episodes like this or wars like this.
We've seen the Israelis go at it until the very last second.
Do you expect them to go at it until the very last second?
I'm not going to speak for what they may or may not do.
We want to see this ceasefire implemented, and that's what we're focused on.
Because as I said in my opening remarks, it does have the chance to finally bring enduring peace and stability, not just to Gaza and to Israel, but to the broader region.
Now, looking back, you know, do you feel that this administration or this State Department has done everything it could to bring this thing to an end, to stop the suffering, to stop the killing of Palestinian children, men and women, and so on?
Do you feel that there was a time that you could have probably pushed down, put your foot down, so to speak, the foot of the United States of America?
Yes, I absolutely do.
And Saeed, I think that do we believe that we've done everything that we can?
Yes, I absolutely do.
And Saeed, I think one of the things that we have always been focused on in trying to get a ceasefire over the line is not just to get a ceasefire for a ceasefire's sake, but to get a ceasefire that would be enduring.
We don't want to see a ceasefire that breaks down in two weeks or four weeks or even a year.
We want to see a ceasefire that sets the stage for lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
And so it was important that we get that kind of ceasefire.
And that's what we have put our efforts from day one into achieving.
It is also important, Said, when you look at our overall policy that we prevent the region from really tipping into all-out war.
And when you look at the things that we laid out from day one, and this really goes back, you look at the things that the Secretary said the day after October 7th at the objectives that we were going to try to achieve.
It was important that we continue to show that we are committed to the defense of Israel so that its enemies across the region did not see this as a moment of division and a moment of weakness when they could attack Israel and really plunge the region into the type of war that, as awful, as horrible as Gaza has been, would have extended that pain and suffering from Gaza into places all across the region.
So that has also been another chief objective of our policy.
But you know, Matt, you know, when all is said and done, you know, the real cause of all these conflicts, all these wars that happen from time to time, is the fact that the Palestinians continue to suffer.
They have been displaced for 76 years or more, 78 years.
So there was a great deal of talk, rhetoric, about a Palestinian state, about, you know, finally the Palestinians living in dignity.
I think it was this administration or this Secretary of State that talked about the need for a Palestinian to live in dignity and to have the same opportunities as Israelis and so on.
What have you done to bring this about, to make it real, to set the road for this to, you know, at one point to come about?
Let me start by addressing something you said in the run-up to your question about the suffering of the Palestinian people.
One of the things that really has marked this conflict, let me just, let me put it this way.
If you looked at the speech that the parents of Hirsch Goldberg gave back last August, I think it was at the Democratic National Convention, where they spoke about how there is a surplus of suffering across the Middle East.
It's absolutely true.
We have seen Palestinians suffer long before October 7th, and of course have seen them bear the brunt of this conflict.
Palestinian civilians who did not start this conflict but have suffered the brunt of it.
We've seen the hostages bear tremendous pain and suffering and their families.
We, of course, the 1,200 people who were killed on October 7th inside Israel.
As Hirsch Goldberg's parents have said, there has been a surplus of suffering.
And we do fundamentally believe that the failure to realize the aspirations of the Palestinian people is one of the main drivers of instability in the region and one of the main drivers of suffering.
And so I would urge you, Saeed, to look at the speech that the Secretary gave yesterday where he talked about exactly what we have done and to unlock a political path forward for the Palestinian future.
There are three stages that we see that are important to get to finally realizing a Palestinian state.
One is a ceasefire, and we got there today.
Two is a day after plan that starts to rebuild Gaza.
And three is a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia, which provides Israel, hopefully, don't know if they'll agree to it, but actually provides Israel the incentives to agree to a Palestinian state.
And we have put a lot of work into developing those plans and building support for those plans.
And we are ready to hand those plans off to the incoming administration.
Now, agreement on those will require tough choices.
And I know everyone likes to point at the government of Israel, and it will absolutely require tough choices by the government of Israel.
It will also require tough choices by the Palestinian Authority, which needs to make real reforms if it wants to win the support of its people, and it wants to win financial and diplomatic and other backing by countries in the region.
So there are a lot of tough choices that people in the region are going to have to make to realize that vision of a Palestinian state.
But we have done what we can to make those choices possible, and now it's up to leaders in the region to decide whether they want to take them or not.
Two quick points.
One on UNRWA.
UNRWA is slated to be banned from operating at the end of this month.
Now, I know that this administration has decided not to fund UNRWA about a year ago until investigations are completed and so on.
I believe that they have been completed.
Are you worried that once UNRWA is banned from operating, that access of aid and so on and help that you've talked about so much will actually be hindered a great deal?
So we are concerned about that, and it's why we called for the restoration of funding.
You've left one important thing out of the sort of TikTok there site, which is that we are now under a statutory ban by Congress from funding UNRWA.
So we don't have the ability to turn funding to UNRWA back on.
But we have called for that ban to be lifted so we could provide funding to UNRWA if we determined that they had appropriately implemented the reforms that are so important.
Now, in terms of what happens going forward, so I can't speak, of course, for what the United States will do because I'm cognizant of the sand shifting through the hourglass here.
But UNRWA can continue to exist with funding from other countries, and I would expect that it will continue to exist with funding from other countries.
And the United States can continue to fund humanitarian assistance to this Palestinian people through other organizations that are working inside of Gaza and throughout the broader region.
Even after the United States suspended its funding for UNRWA back, I believe it was in the spring of last year, we have continued to be the chief funder of any country in the world for humanitarian needs for the Palestinian people.
And we have done it through sources other than UNRWA.
And there's nothing that prevents the United States from doing that going forward.
And finally, you mentioned the Palestinian Authority.
Do you see any role for the Palestinian Authority?
Are you in touch with them?
Yeah, we do see a role for the Palestinian Authority going forward.
The Secretary mentioned that in his speech yesterday.
We believe there are important reforms that the PA needs to make.
But we do see a role for the Palestinian Authority in the governance of a united, reunited Gaza and the West Bank.
Sorry.
Sands shifting through the Arabs.
Yeah, Gaza.
I was about to say something about the ticking clock.
I do apologize for being a little saccharine there, Matt.
I was listening to the ticking clock.
I don't know why that came out of my mouth.
Go ahead.
Apologize, man.
There you go.
Any bit of sentiment mentality in the briefing room, you're there to please days of our lives in the moment or something when you are up.
No, I did not.
My mom was at work.
Go ahead.
Thank you.
Yeah.
Like my colleague said, doing this job for 20 months, day in and day off.
It's not easy.
Obviously that you're asking questions.
Let me go back to the very first question I asked you 20 months ago, which is about designating Russia as SST.
You guys just removed Cuba from the list.
It's an awful spot.
Why not doing it?
We have not decided, we've not determined that that is the most effective way to achieve the policy goals that we have when it comes to Russia.
And when you look at the number of sanctions that we have imposed on Russia, including sanctions that we have announced just in the past week that we are already seeing bite.
If you look at the story that Bloomberg ran in the last 24 hours about a number of Russian tankers who were unable to dock in China right now to unload their oil, it's because of the sanctions that we have put into place.
And that's just the latest amount of tranche of sanctions.
So if you look at the combined regime that we have put into place, sanctions and export controls, we determined that that would have more of an impact than a state sponsor of terrorism designation without what we hear from humanitarian organizations, which I know is something that your questions never grapple with, which is the harmful effect that such a designation could have on their ability to work in the region.
Going back to today's sanctions, it has two parts.
One is you are targeting evasion effect.
And the secondly, you're also re-designating, re-sanctioning by using a different law this time, which is Executive Action Order 13226, which I believe gives extra power to Congress to block any attempt to ease if the next administration attempts to result.
Is that the reason why you are doing what you're doing today?
We thought it was appropriate to move our sanctions regime under this new authority to ensure that Congress has full visibility both on our sanctions and any contemplated any contemplation of removing them.
How concerned are you that next administration will immaturely leave them?
I'm not going to speak to what the next administration may or may not do.
They'll have to make their own decisions.
We believe that the sanctions we have put in place have been effective in harming Russia's economy, in curbing to some extent its ability to fund its war machine, and we hope that they'll stay in place.
But those are decisions for the next administration.
Can move to Georgia if possible.
There are some concerns about the US.
One more and then I've got to go around the room because I've probably had an hour already and I've got to get some more.
Some concerning events going on and recently they are conducting violent attacks on opposition members.
Just yesterday, opposition leader was attacked in reaction to the latest developments.
Look, we continue to have great concerns about actions by the government in Georgia to crack down on its own population to move, to retrench from the democratic path that they have been on, as well as the path towards greater Euro-Atlantic integration.
That's why you've seen us implement new sanctions targeting members of the Georgian government.
It's why you've seen us suspend assistance that we were set to provide to the government of Georgia and it's why you've seen us suspend our overall strategic relationship with them.
Thank you, Matt.
Echo and everybody's comments.
Thanks.
Thank you for everything.
Always.
Will the U.S. will, we know that the agreement yesterday, or the Cuban government talked about the 553 political prisoners and people that will be released.
The United States, of course, made the announcement for President Biden and the three actions that he's taking.
Will any of these people that are going to be released, some of them political prisoners, human rights defenders, will come to the United States like they did, for example, with the Nicaragua prisoners?
And will they be able to and eventually receive political asylum here?
And if so, that will be part of what the Catholic Church was able to present to the Cuban government.
So I can't speak to decisions that those people may or may not make about wanting to leave Cuba and come to either the United States or another country.
And when it comes to questions about whether they would be granted asylum or entry through another means, I would defer to the Department of Homeland Security on that question.
Yeah, Janny.
Thank you.
Thank you, Matt.
Thank you for your hard work for us.
I wish you good luck in your future.
Thank you.
Stay healthy and be happy.
Thank you.
I have observed questions on South Korea.
This is not happy news.
South Korea's President Yun was arrested yesterday by the high-ranking public officers crime investigation office, executed the arrest warrant for President Yun in an illegal rather than a legal manner.
And the South Korean citizens are very disappointed in this action.
Do you think the execution of this illegal arrest warrant violated the rule of law?
So I'm not going to speak to a question about how South Korean law is interpreted.
That is fundamentally a question for the South Korean courts, and we think all of these questions ought to be answered and in accordance with South Korea's constitution and the rule of law.
I can tell you that I was just in South Korea with Secretary Blinken last week.
We met with the acting president, we met with the foreign minister, we met with the Speaker of the National Assembly, and I can tell you that one of the things that we saw firsthand in Korea was the country's democratic resilience at work.
And I think you heard the Secretary speak to this.
You know, every country at times faces tests to its democracy.
We have faced very real tests to our democracy here in the United States.
We've faced direct assaults on our democracy here in the United States.
And what's important is how a country responds to those tests of its democracy.
And what we have seen is South Korea respond to those tests in a way that illustrates the strength of its democratic foundation.
What do you think the Biden administration has been successful in its diplomatic and security relations with South Korea?
And what do you think is the most regrettable?
And if there is one thing you would like to recommend to incoming administration, what would it be?
So I think when it comes to Korea, the Secretary identified at the President's direction very early on that his primary objective needed to be to rebuild and restore some of our democratic or some of our alliances and partnerships that really had been frayed in the four years before we took office and set about a diplomatic campaign to do just that.
His first trip was to South Korea and Japan.
And over the course of this administration, you have seen us bring together South Korea and Japan in a way that I don't think very many people thought possible and it is a great foundation for security in the Indo-Pacific.
And if there was anything I would commend to the next administration, it's to take that trilateral partnership and to build on it.
Go ahead.
Thank you, Matt, for your work and for taking our questions every day.
I wanted to quickly follow up on Camilla's question regarding Israel's assessments of Israel's conduct.
In addition to the ongoing assessments at the State Department, there have been many investigations you urge the trial to conduct, such as the case of Aisha Nerezge.
What will happen to these investigations?
And Aisha Nerezgegi's family was here last month demanding justice and answers.
Will you be able to provide them with answers they were looking for before January 20th?
So I don't know the answer to the question because it fundamentally depends on Israel finalizing the results of its investigation.
But the obligation to deliver justice for an American citizen, the obligation to provide answers to an American citizen, that's also not one that expires on January 20th.
The incoming administration will have the same obligation to speak up for American citizens, to try to find answers for the families of American citizens, to try to drive changes to protect American citizens overseas.
They have that same obligation that we do.
And so, if we don't get the final results of that investigation between now and next Monday, and I can tell you if we do, we will provide that to the family as we committed to do.
But if we don't, I would very much expect that when that investigation is finalized and completed, that it's transmitted to the incoming administration.
And I would certainly hope and expect that they would treat Isner Eggy's family with the same duty of care that we have brought to the situation.
It's a fundamental obligation when it comes to the treatment of American citizens.
Thank you, Matt.
I'm echoing the kind words of my colleagues to appreciate your work.
I know it's very hard to be aware about all the events and having knowledge about events around the world, including my region, Kurdistan region.
So, with that, I'm actually going to go to the next one.
Here we go.
Yeah.
I'm going to ask you two questions about the Kurdistan.
Today, Das Taylor, Victoria Taylor, was in the Kurdistan region and she met with the Kurdish officials, including the Kurdistan president.
So, what's the purpose of this visit and why at this time, what she has discussed with the Kurdistan president?
So, I can tell you that Deputy Assistant Secretary Taylor was there for diplomatic conversations focused on IKR stability and security.
I know, do you have any comments about discussions in the region on forming new governments?
So, we encourage political parties to support an inclusive and timely KRG formation.
The seating of a new government will allow the KRG and the IPK to advance human rights, promote economic development, enhance the IKR's resiliency as part of a secure, stable, and sovereign Iraq.
And lastly, do you have any comments for me over the recent disputes between Irbil and Baghdad on oil and budget issues?
So, we have engaged the government of Iraq and the Kurdistan regional government to reach a durable budget agreement that would facilitate sustained oil production in the Iraqi Kurdistan region.
We have seen the review of the budget amendment this week and urge its speedy adoption.
Thanks so much.
Thank you so much, Matt.
Maximum.
You know, like all my colleagues have said, thank you for the work that you've done over the last few years.
It really is truly appreciated.
And congratulations on the deal today.
I want to circle back to Saeed's first question, which is, as you look back at the last eight months, you put this deal together eight months ago.
Yeah.
You know, as you see perhaps the efficacy of how Trump's team interacted with Israel over the last few days, are there not any, if not regrets, kind of reconsidering where you could have pushed harder?
So that's just not what we've seen, I can tell you, as a party to these negotiations.
And I think it's a fundamental misreading of the situation.
It has not been Israel that has been the intransigent party that has kept us from getting to a deal for many, many months.
That's not to say that Israel agreed to every condition that was put forward by Hamas, the conditions that were put forward by us.
Of course, they haven't.
It's a negotiation, and you wouldn't expect them to.
But it has been Hamas fundamentally that has been unwilling to agree to a deal, really going back to August.
And at times, it was even unwilling to negotiate.
And then, as I said, times they were unable to negotiate because they didn't have a leader in place.
So it is not because of pressure that we have seen brought to bear by any party in the government of Israel the last few days that has gotten us to a deal.
We think it is the fact that Hamas found itself in an incredibly weakened position, that its fighters needed a chance to, they needed a ceasefire, they needed a break in the fighting, and that ultimately, as I said earlier, they saw that no one was coming to their rescue.
They weren't going to get the war that they were hoping to, that led them to finally agree to reach an agreement here.
Now, of course, it has been helpful, as I said, to have the Trump team right there alongside with us to ensure that the commitments that we make on behalf of the United States will be enduring ones, but it is in no way what we have seen that has been pressure brought to bear by their side that has been the decisive, had the decisive impact here.
But excuse me.
Go ahead.
Are you saying that the ceasefire deal is basically just giving Hamas fighters a break?
No, I'm saying what you just said.
I'm saying that that is why certainly they will have a break from the ongoing fighting that they have been involved in.
And we believe that's one of the reasons why they agree.
They've been getting counted for months and months and months.
The far right, right of Netanyahu in Israel, think that this is a bad deal because it does give Hamas a break and a chance to regroup.
Are you saying that that's so it does give them a break and what we are committed to, and you've heard us speak to this before, is ensuring that they cannot regroup.
And we think the key to ensuring that they cannot regroup is that they are replaced by something else.
We believe that it is the perpetuation of fighting that actually leads them to recruit more fighters, as the Secretary said yesterday.
Of course, this gives them a break from the fighting.
That's what happens under a ceasefire.
But we believe that the solution to replacing Hamas is to ultimately find a political path for it for the Palestinian people.
Go ahead.
We'll do.
Go ahead.
Thank you so much.
Go ahead.
Thank you.
Thank you for that.
I'd ask you not to interrupt your colleagues.
Thank you, Matt.
Thank you for your dedication and service.
I lost my voice.
I have the same.
I'm about to have to close the briefing.
I'll try to.
Thank you.
What measure is the U.S. government considering to support and safeguard fundamental rights in Bangladesh, particularly in response to recent threat by reformist student leaders against writers and intellectuals who oppose their views amid raising concern about intimidation and authoritarian tendencies in Bangladesh?
So we have had a long-standing consistent policy when it comes to Bangladesh that we want to see democratic and human rights upheld in the country.
That was our position under the last government.
It remains our position under this government.
Thank you so much.
Last question.
About judicial influence.
What is the U.S. government position on allegation of judicial influence by Dr. Dumas' interim government, including claims that cases against him were released or vacated by the court and he secured tax relief for the next five years for his business like his Grammy Bank?
I don't have any specific reaction to that.
We want to see those matters handled consistent with the rule of law.
And let me stop you there.
I'm going to wrap before either Saeed or one of us continues coughing.
Thank you, Senator Coffin.
I was doing the same, so I'm there with you.
Let me just close, since this is my last briefing, and you've all been so gracious as to thank me with a couple of thank yous of my own.
First of all, I want to thank the team from the spokesperson's office, the press office, and the rest of Global Public Affairs who make this briefing come off every day.
They do a lot of work behind the scenes that is absolutely essential to the functioning of this operation, and I am deeply grateful to it.
Second, to the teams from bureaus across the department who have the unenviable task of briefing me every day before I come out here to take your questions.
To the extent I know anything about what's happening in the world, it is largely because of them, and I will miss the opportunity to work day in and day out so closely with them.
And then finally, I want to thank all of you in the Press Corps who are here in this room and those who aren't here today.
It has been an incredible honor for me to stand here on behalf of the United States every day for the past nearly two years and take your questions.
And it's very easy to get caught up, I think, in the back and forth of this daily briefing and forget just how unusual it actually is.
This daily give and take between government officials in the media, on the record, on camera, for everyone to see, is not something that happens everywhere in the world.
And in many places in the world where it does happen, the reporters who are in the room are not free to ask the questions that they want and certainly aren't free to write the stories that they want to write or would otherwise write about the answers that they get.
It is a source of great American strength that this exchange does occur here.
Those of us in government who make decisions that have huge consequences for the American people and for the world deserve to be challenged on those decisions.
We deserve to be asked hard questions and held to account.
Is that always fun?
No, it isn't.
It sure isn't.
At least not for those of us on this side of the lectern.
But it is essential to the functioning of our democracy.
And it's essential to the functioning of our democracy.
Let me finish.
I've taken many of your questions.
It is essential to the functioning of our democracy, not just because it ensures that the public is informed about the work that their government does, but also so those of us in government can make the best decisions on their behalf.
And I think this is something the press often doesn't understand or doesn't realize maybe.
I can't tell you how many times I've been in a room where we've been working on a really hard decision discussing a big policy choice and I have spoken up and said, you know, I don't know how we're going to go out or I don't know how I'm going to go out and explain that to the press.
It appears to be in contradiction of something we've said in the past or something we've done in the past.
And we have gone back to the drawing board based on that feedback loop to make sure that the decision that we make is one that we can actually stand behind and one that we can defend.
That is a process that produces better results for the American people and it's one that only works because all of you are here to hold our feet to the fire.
So as I exit this podium for the last time, I do so in hopes that this tradition of the State Department spokesperson standing behind this lectern and taking your questions is one that will continue both into the next administration and beyond because our government is better for it, our country is better for it, and the world is better for it.
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