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Welcome back to Washington Journal.
We're joined now by Michael O'Hanlon, Research and Foreign Policy Program Director at the Brookings Institution.
We'll talk about the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria.
Michael, welcome to the program.
Thank you, Mimi.
Nice to be with you.
So give us a context of the origins of the conflict in Syria.
There was, of course, this goes back to 2011 with the Arab Spring and the rebel movement then, but then it had kind of reached a stalemate in recent years.
That's right.
And if anything, the Assad regime, President Bashar al-Assad, who's now defected and escaped to Russia, if anything, he had basically won the war because he reestablished control in most of the country, not all of it, but most.
And so the central corridor where most of the main cities are located in Syria, starting with Aleppo in the north, coming down to Damascus, he pretty much reestablished control of all of that.
The exceptions to that rule were primarily in the northeast, which is largely desert, where our friends, the Kurdish groups, were essentially in control, although that never made Turkey very happy because you may recall Turkey has a Kurdish population as well as the Kurdish insurgent movement.
And so there's been sort of a complex relationship there.
But also in the Northwest, there were remnants of the more extremist Sunni movements, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, but they evolved, they changed their name, and they were centered around a city named Idlib, I-D-L-I-B, to the north of Aleppo.
And so that's where this guy, Al-Jalani, and his group really established a small form of government and control and even military industry of a population of maybe a couple million over a period of years.
And frankly, I didn't really sense the strength that that movement was developing.
I think most people were surprised, even closer watchers of Syria than I may be, by what's just happened and the speed with which it happened.
But that pocket of resistance always existed up in the northwest to complement the Kurdish rebels or movement in the northeast, and then some small movements here and there with tiny pockets of land in the south.
That all came together in the last few weeks as President Assad's traditional supporters, Hezbollah from Lebanon and Iran and Russia, sort of lost their way, lost their ability to help him.
And then his regime sort of just dissolved before our eyes.
So what do we know about the leader of this organization that now is holding Damascus essentially and seems to be leading most of the country?
Hayat Tahrir al-Shem, the leader is named Al-Jalani.
You mentioned him before.
What do we know about him?
Well, we know maybe three big things, and they push and pull in opposite directions.
One is that he's obviously a very effective military leader.
He's managed to pull together a coalition in a way that for 13 previous years, nobody had come close to doing.
Second, he has extremist roots and links to al-Qaeda and ISIS.
But third, he has claimed now to be a moderate in the sense that he will protect and preserve minority rights and women's rights and not go down the path of Sharia law or of these capricious beheadings and other heinous tragedies that ISIS was known for.
And so he's established a form of governance in the north up around that town of Idlib that I mentioned before that seems to back up his claims that he's moderated and that he wants to lead this coalition.
And of course, that claim perhaps is part of what explains his battlefield success because other insurgent groups were willing to cooperate with him in overthrowing the regime rather than to fight each other, which has often been the case in the Syrian civil war.
So we'll see if that continues.
Obviously, this is a big transition point, but we know he's a very effective battlefield leader.
He's a more moderate governor, essentially, or military leader of a governet up in the Idlib region.
And we know that he has extremist roots, but he claims to be moving away from those.
There is that group does have a terrorist designation from the United States.
Do you think it's too soon to lift that?
Do you think that that should stay in place?
And what does that mean if that designation is in place?
My instinct would be to promise now to remove it, provided that we see behavior in these next few days and weeks and months that's consistent with the claim of Al-Jalani that he really has moderated and that he will be an inclusive leader and that he will use violence sparingly and legally.
So if he holds up his end of the bargain or his promises on those issues, then I think we should indeed lift the terrorist designation.
There's no particular reason to think that just because it was correct five years ago, that it's still correct today.
But I think as U.S. government spokesmen and spokeswomen have said up until now, actions speak louder than words.
And so let's see what kind of an arrangement and what kind of monitoring we can establish in an early conversation with whatever new government is now created and make sure that they live up to their promises.
And here's a portion of Secretary of State Blinken's statement on this, and I'll have you respond to it.
It says this, that this transition process should lead to credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance that meets international standards of transparency and accountability.
The Syrian people will decide the future of Syria.
All nations should pledge to support an inclusive and transparent process and refrain from external interference.
The United States will recognize and fully support a future Syria government that results from this process.
We stand prepared to lend all appropriate support to all of Syria's diverse communities and constituencies.
Michael O'Hanlon, that sounds really good, but Secretary Blinken's only going to be in office for a few more weeks.
So what are we expecting from the Trump administration?
Well, it's a good point, but even if Blinken were going to be in office longer, it would be hard to deliver on all those nice words.
They are the right words, I think.
But the idea that we're going to keep our, all of us are going to keep out of Syria and just let Syria resolve this or Syrians resolve this on their own is correct at one level, but they're going to need help rebuilding the country.
And so you're going to have to make a choice.
At what point do you consider a new government inclusive enough and competent enough that it merits our support, maybe even our financial support?
That's a big decision.
And that's not something that these general principles can really make the decision for you.
You have to put the principles out there and then watch what happens in practice.
And secondly, let's all remember how bad of a track record we as Americans have in trying to build democracies out of civil wars.
We've not done a good job with it, whether it be in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan.
And I would underscore one particular warning of something we got wrong in Iraq.
We pushed too soon for early elections, thinking that elections equal democracy equal inclusivity.
It's not true.
Democracy requires protection of minority rights, requires a strong justice system, requires restraint and checks and balances on a ruling party, which ideally should not be based just on sectarian or ethnic identity.
So let's not recreate the mistakes we made in Iraq in 2003, 4,5.
We are talking about the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.
If you'd like to join the conversation with Michael Ohanlon of Brookings Institution, you can call us.
The lines are Republicans 202-748-8001, Democrats 202748-8000, and Independents 202748-8002.
Michael, you mentioned all the other armed groups in Syria still fighting right now.
There's Turkish-backed forces, there's Kurdish forces, there's ISIS and others.
What does this mean for a united Syria going forward?
Are those all those groups are going to have to lay down their arms?
Would they be willing to do that?
Well, I don't know if they should lay down their arms so much as come under the control of a central military and police establishment.
And I think they all need to have some sense that their protection is going to be assured.
So asking them to lay down their arms too soon, just like having early elections too soon, could be counterproductive.
So I think the key here is going to be for Jolani to establish himself as an inclusive leader who's fair to everybody, with the exception, of course, excuse me, with the exception of former Assad regime elements.
Actually, I should be more clear.
I'm not saying they should be unfair towards those groups, but they are going to be punitive.
Those who were decision makers in the Assad government, the people who authorized the barrel bombing of civilian populations during the civil war, the people who authorized the chemical weapons use.
Obviously, the perpetrator, number one, President Assad, is gone and out of the country, but there are still going to be top levels of his political and military leadership who I think need to be put on trial and probably put in jail.
But that needs to be done with some degree of restraint and leniency if you're going to be able to reach out to the groups that did support Assad and together make up at least a third of the population, specifically Christians and Alawites.
Those are the two groups that Assad was most supportive of or that were most supportive of Assad.
You don't want to estrange that entire one-third of the population.
So that's the challenge for Jolani, to bring the different resistance groups together and also find a way to create the right level, if you will, of justice towards the previous regime.
We will take calls, but before I do that, I want to just ask about Israel.
This is the front page of the post.
Israel expands strikes in Syria.
Extensive attacks add to volatility.
And the stated goal is preventing rebel access to weapons.
Syria's military has been completely decimated by Israel at this point.
I think their navy is completely gone.
How do you see this?
They've come under a lot of criticism from Arab neighbors about that saying that this is opportunist and this is a land grab and things like that.
How do you see this?
Well, it depends on which action we're talking about.
I think sinking the Navy was too much.
I think a future Syrian state has a right to a military.
And even though Israel has a right to be nervous based on history, there's no reason to think that this group that just overthrew President Assad is going to want to perpetuate the policies of Assad or of Iran and Hezbollah, because Iran used Syria as a conduit to get weapons to Hezbollah.
Israel should not presume that a future Syrian government is going to do the same thing.
But I have sympathy for Israel wanting to get rid of any chemical weapons it can find and also to patrol and protect the region up north around the Golan Heights, where Israel is concerned about the potential for extremist groups to now take root and have freer hand in perhaps even conducting violence against Israel.
So a temporary occupation of some of those areas, I think, is understandable, and I would not criticize Israel for that.
Let's talk to callers.
Ed is up first in New Jersey, Independent Line.
Good morning, Ed.
Yeah, good morning.
I noticed that the guests made no mention of U.S. forces of approximately 1,000 U.S. forces presence in the northeast region of Syria.
And I believe reports are that they're taking the Syrian oil.
My guess is, my thinking is that one of the reasons that the Assad regime has fallen is because the U.S. is stealing from those people.
Now, Assad is an Alawite, which is kind of a minority group.
So his existence really was pretty much dependent upon his ability to compromise and get support of other groups.
So he faced an uphill climb.
So I think that the fact that he held on as long as he has is pretty commendable.
But basically, I want you to comment on how the United States was kind of played an important role in a demise of Assad.
Yeah, thank you.
Thanks for raising that issue.
You're right.
It's an important one to get on the table.
And you're right, there are close to 1,000 U.S. troops in that northeast part of Syria, largely working with the Kurds.
I don't think U.S. troops are taking the oil.
I think we've been happy to see the Kurds take the oil so that Assad did not get it.
And so that there could be some degree of effective self-governance up in the north and east of the country where Assad's government really had no ability to provide anything for the population.
So I think that's been the nature of the economy.
So I mostly agree with your point about the importance of those U.S. troops, but I don't think they've been stealing from Assad.
They've been allowing the Kurds to confiscate the resources to run that part of the country.
As to whether Assad was such a good inclusive leader, you know, there may have been a day where people thought he was the least bad kind of option for Syria.
And people like John Kerry and Hillary Clinton met with him before the Arab Spring began in 2011 and hoped that he could be a more reform-oriented president.
And, you know, I think he proved that he's not in the way he's governed the country ever since.
Admittedly, when there's a civil war, you're going to fight for your survival, but barrel bombing civilian populations and up to a half million people dead, more than 10 million people displaced, most of them because of the regime, this has been despicable.
And so there's nothing about Assad that merits, I think, any sadness on our part that he's gone.
We should be nervous about what comes next, but he himself turned into a monster.
And the only reason he stayed in power so long was because Hezbollah, as well as Iran and Russia, helped him do so.
It wasn't because he sustained this notion that he was inclusive and benign.
I think Alawites and Christians may have felt that way in relative terms because they feared what a Sunni majority government might do to them.
But now we're going to find out because most of the resistance groups, as I think you know, are Sunni.
And it's going to now be a challenge for them to make sure that coming to power they don't oppress the Alawite and Christian communities.
It's one thing to seek justice vis-a-vis Assad's ringleaders, but it's something else to make sure they're fair to the minority groups that now are going to be at their mercy, so to speak.
And I'll just put on the screen kind of a timeline of U.S. involvement in Syria.
So we get an idea.
This September of 2014 was the first U.S. military intervention in Syria with airstrikes against the Islamic State.
It was late 2015 that the first American ground troops entered Syria.
It was initially 50, grew to about 2,000.
their goal to help Kurdish fighters defeat the Islamic State.
December 2018, Trump announces his intention to withdraw troops from Syria, but the plan softened within a year.
This is actually when Defense Secretary Jim Mattis resigned in protest.
And today, as we mentioned, about 900 troops are still in the country.
Michael Hanlon, what do you see as the United States' top priority militarily in Syria?
Thanks, Mimi.
That's a good timeline.
But if I could, I would add one piece to it, which comes before 2014, which is that we started to look for ways to support opposition groups who were rising up in insurrection against President Assad.
But we were very, very restrained in how we did that.
President Obama thought it might be better to keep American hands largely out of the mess and maybe save our powder, so to speak, for helping consolidate a new Syrian regime.
There was an expectation that Assad would fall because he didn't have a lot of money and he only had minority support within the country.
And so, you know, our role in that early period was, in some ways, in retrospect, counterproductive.
I think we encouraged insurrection.
We promised help to the rebels, but never really delivered.
And that's part of why they stayed in such disarray.
Probably several dozen, at least, rebel groups formed up in those periods and didn't do a very good job coordinating or cooperating with each other.
That's part of why Assad could fend them off.
So in terms of our priorities now, excuse me, number one priority has to be, I think, to prevent Iran from reestablishing connections to Hezbollah in Lebanon, that land bridge.
And right up there with that priority, of course, is making sure that an ISIS or al-Qaeda friendly government does not take hold in Damascus and wind up being extremist in behavior.
You know, if we got another government like the Taliban in Afghanistan, that would be too bad for the people of Syria.
But so far, the Taliban and Afghanistan don't seem intent on cooperating with al-Qaeda and carrying out terrorist strikes against the United States.
And so maybe we've reached a live and let-live relationship with them.
You could imagine even a relatively extremist government in Syria establishing that same kind of understanding with the United States.
But of course, the preference is a moderate, progressive, inclusive, non-Islamist government that allows all faiths, Muslim, Christian, and Sunni, as well as Alawite within the broader Islamic faith, all of them freedom of expression, freedom of religion.
So that's what we have to hope for.
But that's to finish by going back to your question, that's not really a crucial American national security interest.
That's more of a human rights concern, a pro-democracy concern.
The top two security interests are preventing Iran from reestablishing a land bridge to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and then also making sure that an extremist, violent terrorist group does not take sanctuary or take power inside of the new Syria.
John in Fowlerville, Michigan, Independent.
Good morning.
Good morning, Mr. Rohanlin.
How are you?
Fine, thank you.
How about yourself?
Oh, I'm doing good.
Hey, I was wondering, with what's happening in Gaza and Lebanon and Syria, can you tell the American public about the Greater Israel project and how many more people have to die for Israel to achieve their goals?
Well, I think I know where you're coming from.
And, you know, I will say this, that I understand after the unbelievable tragedy of October 7, 2023, why Israel had to take very stern measures.
But I do think Israel has been indiscriminate in its use of large weapons inside of Gaza.
And therefore, I think some of the casualties that have ensued could have been prevented and should have been prevented.
And I would also say, and here you and I may agree even more strongly, that there needs to be a vision for a future Palestinian state.
That's been at the heart of U.S. policy for a generation, going back to the first President Bush, actually going back to 1948 and the creation of Israel.