Clif High - U B Classified!

Aug. 25, 2022 - Clif High

27:15

U B Classified!

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	Hello humans, hello humans.
	Today's the 25th of August.
	It's 8 41 a.m. on the road again.
	That's interesting.
	That's where they had the rollover accident last time.
	Ugly bit of stuff there.
	These vaccidents are not nice.
	We've seen a number of them around here.
	Anyway, so I want to talk about classified material.
	And um the effect, the use, and the um uh proliferation of it.
	So classification structures uh have existed, uh secret, top secret, etc.
	Going back into the late 1800s.
	Uh actually we had three categories of secret uh that were like official in the um in the civil war, and then um uh it sort of languished for a long time.
	There was a slight ramp up in um activity related to classified documents, which was very, very few, very few documents at all were restricted.
	Um prior to uh the 1914 period, which of course, you know, makes sense.
	It was the Cazarian Mafia and their Federal Reserve Bank that uh brought in the situation that allowed the secrecy industry to grow.
	And it truly is an industry.
	So you have people that just work at maintaining secrets.
	They don't know what the secrets are, they just are there to protect them, and that's all they do for a living.
	So it's truly an industry, and they're just to provide secrecy services in the form of you know protecting classified documents, etc.
	But classification into secret categories is not necessarily all that meaningful.
	Um so my father was a um what they call a lifer, okay, so he signed up for a uh basically a lifelong contract with the US Army uh 101st uh uh airborne uh infantry, screaming eagles, and um uh throughout his career he served in various different categories.
	So he was a um uh battlefield commission into an officer category.
	Uh so he went from a from a corporal uh up to a first lieutenant in the Korean War because he demonstrated leadership on the battlefield and saved all these guys and got medals and all of that kind of crap, right?
	And uh so from that point on in his military career, he had some he was a field officer then, but then he um went on in to be do various different kinds of tasks, and some of these tasks actually involved dealing with classified material.
	And uh it's weird, okay, because there's all these different grades of classified material, um, some of which you can take home.
	So he used to have uh his uh special study material at the war college in Leavenworth, Kansas.
	Some of that was classified, but it was uh sort of classified in the sense that it was exemplary, right?
	It was an example of a particular kind of classifications that he would have to deal with in his um activities uh in those areas in the military.
	So he was variously a uh field officer, a line officer, uh staff officer, uh did training, um, I did investigative work, uh so he he had these various different categories uh that he worked in.
	And some of the um categories, as I say, uh he had to deal with classified material and some of this stuff he would bring home.
	Um, you know, because he had to, you know, he was in transit, he had to take it with him or whatever, right?
	And so we would have classified material at the house.
	None of which I ever really cared about or looked at.
	Um, it was like, you know, eh, okay, you know, it's uh it's what your dad does, right?
	And it wasn't even an interesting part.
	Uh It was just all paperwork.
	And you know, you do that shit at school, so it's like, oh, you don't want to get involved in any of that.
	But as a result of him having classified material, we would always, and also as a result of his particular categories of work within the U.S. military, uh, within the U.S. Army, and um uh other circumstances, we would get annual uh security inspections of our of our family, right?
	So we would know that, oh hey, you know, for sure all of our phone calls are going to be monitored for the next month.
	Um, and of course, these are you know on uh landline phones, uh, so it was very easy for him to do relatively, you'd pick it up, you'd know they were monitoring because it sounded weird.
	Uh there was a um very definite uh hollowness to the conversation.
	Uh it was very much most people won't understand the reference, but it was very much like a party line.
	There's this um sort of aspect to picking it up, you know there's more than one other uh line connected, you know there's more than one other individual on the uh listening to the conversation because there's a sort of hollow sound, not echoey, but just hollow.
	And you'd hear click-clicks and sometimes buzzes as they were turning on their equipment and so on, you know, tape recorders and stuff.
	Um, because it wasn't automated, there was it wasn't software, it was a human sitting there doing it.
	Anyway, so we would have um this month-long for sure, month-long period where they would uh record all of our conversations and that kind of stuff.
	Now, as kids, I'm sure we were were very uninteresting, you know.
	It's like, oh hey, gonna meet you at the ballpark, you know, that kind of thing, right?
	Uh so the military guy was probably pretty bored with us, but it was interesting to go through that year after year after year.
	And then we also knew that there were um periods of time throughout the year where we would have uh the monitoring going, but we were not being told about it.
	So it was like a surprise inspection, and uh, you know, it was interesting also you'd know that they were doing it because again you could hear the difference in the nature of the phone call.
	Uh most of this stuff took place in uh Europe and on the East Coast.
	Uh my dad did a stint working at the DOD as a liaison for um uh Lyndon Johnson.
	So he was uh we were actually stationed in uh Virginia, but he was uh commuting on a really solid schedule and would be gone for weeks, especially that that year, that was 1968, um, the year of the riots at the Democratic Convention where the socialists and every everybody and the communist attacked the convention and there were riots in Chicago, hell of a situation.
	Anyway, um uh so in 68 he was doing this commuting back and forth a lot, uh dealing with um uh his job as a liaison from DoD to the White House, and also was in charge of specific aspects of security relative to the Democratic Convention that year and the uh and thus dealing with all the riots and stuff.
	Anyway, so uh we had interactions with classified material.
	I've seen classified films, um, I've seen or listened to classified recordings just as an aside because my my dad had to go and listen to him and and I'd hear him in the other room, that kind of thing, right?
	Uh so uh but these were all low-level classifications, and factually, I probably would not have been able to betray a classification as a kid, anyway, because you know, no one would no one would have listened to me, uh, and uh I didn't know anybody to tell.
	So, you know, it wasn't like their security uh leaks or breaks or any of that.
	But uh uh in his work at the um war college uh in obtaining uh his PhD in war stuff, I uh got to uh uh see him go through all the homework and see all this stuff sitting around, and so became very uh familiar with the entire um overall view of the secrecy structure within the US Army relative to itself and
	other um um branches of the service and what they were doing with classified material, etc.
	Uh so you know I've got a pretty good understanding of how it all works, and I have worked with classified material as a result of my jobs as an adult uh doing coding for various different government agencies.
	So I've occasionally had to have um security clearances to handle uh particular material uh especially related to nuclear because I worked for uh as a subcontractor for FERC,
	uh Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, uh, which is um uh one of the top dogs in regulating nuclear stuff, and I had to code a lot of it and um reduce it to uh algorithms and and write software that did things for them and so on.
	So I had to be very familiar with it, so I had to get a uh security clearance to be able to handle the stuff, which was relatively easy because I'd had that prior experience with uh the security stuff, and I've never done anything that would set any flags off for these guys.
	So that's something that you need to understand.
	So in the there's a big difference between how the um classified agencies such as CIA and uh NSA deal with classified material as opposed to how the military does it.
	So in the world in which I grew up, uh someone like uh Phil uh Frodluski would not be allowed to handle um classified material because he's got a conviction for,
	as I understand it, for corruption of a minor, which is close enough to pedophilia that they would know that such an individual, the classified agent uh classified people in the military would know that such a person was a potential uh weak spot for dealing with classified material because they could be bent, right?
	An agent somebody foreign government could come in and bend them because they know of that uh predilection.
	Anyway, so um so all kinds of people would never be allowed to even look at classified material.
	And uh, so that's that's at the military level.
	Now, in the classified agencies, CIA, NSA, they deal with this shit in an entirely different way because they've got a in my opinion, uh very different agenda that they're working relative to the classification, and they will use classified material in very inappropriate hands for specific reasons.
	So, in other words, um the fact that there's classified material on the Hunter Biden laptop tells and the type of classified material it is, which is to say that it is military access codes,
	military intelligence access codes, um uh tell uh suggest to my mind that the Hunter Biden laptop that that Biden was uh that Hunter Biden was was a dupe or was being used by uh or had had enough uh sway anyway that he's um uh been involved in the CIA and the NSA because it was the military
	classification codes and not um CIA access codes or um uh you know any of these uh knock codes or any of those that uh would tend to so he's not betraying CIA secrets or NSA secrets, they're setting uh him up to have been a um uh betrayer of or you know, potentially, uh, of military secrets.
	So anyway, so long and involved, the CIA would do these kinds of things, right?
	They would plant classified material on one of their people, uh, one of their potential assets, and then catch them with the classified material just to be able to blackmail them and uh make them do what they want, or they would put classified material uh on their agents to have that agent uh fuck up and have that classified material leak out to whoever they want to set up one stage further on,
	they'd shit like that all the time.
	That's uh you know, uh major modus operanda for them.
	Anyway, so uh classified material is not quite what everybody thinks if you've got there's kinds of classifications where if you're classified at a particular level, you're allowed and basically if you're in the military, you're allowed to see that level, not necessarily any of the levels below it.
	So above top secret doesn't necessarily mean you get to see the stuff that's classified as top secret, it's all on a need-to-know basis.
	Not so it's not blanket coverage.
	So just because you had uh potentially uh achieved a security classification within the military structure doesn't mean you can just go willy-nilly and look through all this shit.
	The only people that really get to do that are those people that are in charge of documents and the archive stuff, and a lot of times they can't actually look at the documents because the documents themselves arrive to them as sealed packages, and they just deal with sealed packages in a security uh situation, never looking in the material itself.
	Um, some archivists have to go through because they've got to make through make um uh they've got to index it all and get it all prepared for um database access, this sort of thing.
	So they have to go through it and they have to make annotations on what they see so that they can provide search terms that would bring that document up under the appropriate circumstances for whoever it is that's classified that document.
	Then there's the part about the classification that's kind of odd, and that is who can classify documents.
	So the president can unclassify anything or classify anything as um they should choose, right?
	At a whim, really, uh, because it's assumed they always have a good reason for doing uh either.
	That and unclassification is a separate kind of an activity to declassify something, but the classification process is goofy as hell because of who has the ability to do classification.
	So I have been in situations uh TDY or short-term stayovers, like two months here, three months there, where my dad had a had a short-term duty, and we would stay on base and this kind of stuff, and as a kid, you wouldn't necessarily even be checked into school if it's only going to be a month or so.
	Um, and you'd you'd hang around a lot in like the duty rooms and this kind of thing, depending on what the uh the nature of the assignment was.
	But so I've been in situations where I've been able to observe corporals and um E2s through enlisted uh you know, first uh I mean a um private first class basically, uh E2 all the way up through uh into ward officers.
	Now ward officers legitimately could do classification given the nature of their jobs, however, as I say, I've seen a corporal take a document and decide for whatever reason.
	I wasn't privy to the conversation, I didn't know what the guy at the desk uh was told by the fellow standing up there that had brought the document in.
	Uh, but the corporal uh got it out, stamped it, put the classification on it, put the little tags on it, did all of the stuff necessary to put it into its little package, and basically had done 100% of the work that would present that document as a classified document to anybody examining it, and it was not in his uh authority or job duties to do that.
	He was an aide, he was like um uh a secretary to the officer, and that even that officer, I would question whether he had explicit authority to do classification, but you can do it this way in the military because of the way that the organization works.
	If you're a trusted secretary to somebody, you can slip shit in.
	You've got a buddy that's in problem, and you just Classify something, so like the guy gets um uh dui on base, okay.
	So this is a very, very, very serious.
	Getting a DUI in the civilian hands is very serious as well, but having it happen on base is a really big deal, and so uh, you know, so your buddy gets a DUI and uh you go to the buddy in the classification section and he classifies all the documents uh uh around it and says that there was a national security issue involved, and he's like a corporal, right?
	And so he fills out all the paperwork because he's got to do it for his officer anyway.
	The officer all he does is barely look at it and sign it and pass it on up to his supervisor.
	And so the corporal fills all this stuff out.
	Maybe he's got two or three or four or five documents, maybe hundreds the way it goes, and he just slips one in there.
	The officer doesn't even look at it, he just basically signs it, puts it in with the rest of the pile, and passes it on.
	And if he were to even examine it, the corporal could come up with some bullshit story saying, look, the MPs brought this over.
	I don't know what it is, I don't know what national security thing is involved here.
	Maybe the guy, you know, and no one they would always speculate, but no one would know what would happen, why the DUI in some way involved national national security.
	But there you go.
	Now this thing gets in there, the the uh he passes it on up to the captain, uh, the captain signs it, the the captain passes it up to the major, it gets stamped and and um uh double bagged, so to speak, by the major's um uh staff.
	Uh so he might have you know first lieutenants or something handling it, whatever, it doesn't matter, they do it all over again, and so there's uh the next layer added to it, and then by the time it gets up to the colonel who signs it for the archives, it's had uh three of the bags, so to speak, three of these little classification sacks uh that are put around it, and uh it's buried.
	It's you know, you've got to get uh at that point, it's officially classified, and just to figure out that it should never have been classified, you've got to have classification authority to go and look at it, and then maybe you've got to bump it up to somebody to ask to basically say this never should have been classified and should be unclassified.
	But here's the thing it's in no one's interest, nobody, nobody has a job of sitting there and going through documents saying no, this never should have been classified, or this doesn't need to be classified now, or any of that, right?
	That the current times it no longer matters that we had a special design for a horseshoe for for military cavalry in the 1860s, right?
	Uh so we don't have to have these classified uh classified designs for horseshoes.
	Uh, this is an example that is not factual.
	I hope not anymore.
	Anyway, uh so the um uh the point being that there is no job that to whittle down the vast mountains of classified documents, and it's in nobody's interest in the security uh business to give away power to give away uh things that they have to work on,
	so it's a turf issue as well, so there's incentives throughout the entire organization of the military to keep classification going, and uh, you know, there's all the puff uppery where you get all puffed up because oh, I'm you know, I'm handling classified above top secret documents,
	and realistically, um, you know, yes, there are above-top secret documents, and there are real secrets that that military and otherwise that should remain secrets for reasons of national security,
	but likely some fraction uh that is so large as to be near 100%, so it's like 99.999999% of all of the documents that the United States has classified should not be classified.
	Uh they have, for instance, uh the CIA unclassified and showed everybody that they had previously classified this thing called the Adam and Eve story, which is one of these apocalyptic um forecasts for the planet, and it's all bogus, 100% bullshit.
	Uh but they had a classified, so there's all kinds of of bullshit stuff that gets classified as well.
	And the CIA doesn't vet things necessarily before they classify them.
	And as I say, especially the CIA classifies stuff for reasons other than the uh inherent nature of the security of that stuff.
	In other words, they will classify stuff as bait and for all kinds of reasons involving their weird games and scams.
	Under the circumstances, classification in my way, you know, somebody says, Oh, look, this classified document.
	Well, it's like eh, you know, are you just being played?
	What's the deal here?
	So most of the people in the woo stuff that say they have intel and they're talking to classified individuals and all this kind of stuff.
	Well, none of those people are legit, right?
	100% guaranteed, none of them are legit if they're actually talking to somebody outside their head.
	Uh so you know, like some of these guys say, I'm up at 4 30 in the morning and on Intel.
	It's like, okay, fine, you know, so your brain's rattling and and your mind's humming and buzzing, but you're not necessarily really having conversation with anybody.
	In any event, though, none of these people are gonna be legit.
	Those individuals that have classified information are not gonna be spilling classified information because of the many reasons to not do so.
	Those people that are doing it are doing it for a specific agenda.
	It's likely not meaningfully classified information.
	Yes, it may be classified information, they may have a top security tag on it, it may be triple bagged and and registered and archived, but uh is simply not meaningful information, like this Adam and Eve story, right?
	Uh, which is not ever gonna happen.
	It's a weird uh little apocalyptic vision that someone classified for their own purposes that does not in any way uh reflect reality, but it is a classified document, so therefore they can unclassify it or they could leak it or do whatever, and a lot of people in the woo-woo world would get excited and accept it simply because it had been classified, uh, so they use it that way.
	So, anyway, um, all of this is pertinent because of the nuke codes and the other shit and so on that that Trump supposedly had, and they supposedly rated him for, and all of this, right?
	Uh, all of this stuff is gonna get ever so much more interesting over these next few weeks.
	Alright, hang on a second, we've got emergency vehicles here, flashing and shit.
	What's going on?
	Oh, that's right.
	I don't care about that.
	Um anyway, so uh as I say, the next few weeks we're gonna get into the next round of constitutional crises here, and uh, we're gonna get into this uh big examination of classified, what it means to be classified, and so on.
	All of this is gonna ultimately, in my opinion, lead us closer to the discussion of the space aliens and uh that sort of thing, which is gonna open up a giant, giant, giant Earth size, planet size can of worms, anyway.
	Uh so um in September, we'll see the j the juxtaposition here of the classified information coming out stuff as well as the financial stuff um taking that next big leap.
	And so sometime I'm thinking between now and the end of September, we should get this uh uh I don't know, first dribble of the information out about the space aliens and uh UFOs and so on.
	Some of that will be legit, all of it'll be classified, all that'll be declassified in order to expose it, but that does not necessarily vet any of it, does not mean that any of it is actual is is factual, and so under the circumstances,
	just because they're releasing classified information about that says this about a space alien or that about a space alien does not mean that it is factual, doesn't mean it's anything more than uh scam to get you to think and behave a particular way.
	Okay, so that's it, guys.

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