Sargon of Akkad - Carl Benjamin - #EUref： The Sovereignty Argument for #Brexit

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June 21, 2016 - Sargon of Akkad - Carl Benjamin

19:27

#EUref： The Sovereignty Argument for #Brexit

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	For some reason there are many people who think the European Union is not trying to become a sovereign state, and I find that a very bizarre perspective to hold if you just take a look at the European Union.
	As it stands now, the EU has a legislative body, the EU Commission, a parliament, which is the EU Parliament, a common border, which is the Schengen Area, a single currency in the Euro, a judiciary in the European Court of Justice, a central bank in the European Central Bank, a national anthem which is owed to joy by Beethoven, and a national flag.
	These are the trappings of statehood that the European Union currently possesses, and we already know of more that are coming down the pipeline.
	For example, a single treasury in what could be called the Euro Area Treasury.
	On the website of the European Central Bank, there is an article by Benoit Kerr, member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, that is a proposition for the future of the Euro area.
	Kerr argues that to strengthen the economic and monetary union would increase its resilience to economic shocks, advocating for political stability to reduce uncertainty to enable crisis resolution to be more easy.
	He argues that the time has come to initiate a new economic convergence process, thus relaunching the convergence efforts that each Euro area country agreed to prior to adopting the single currency.
	After its adoption, these efforts dwindled and, before the crisis, we saw a divergence in terms of inflation levels, unit labour costs, current account balances, and levels of GDP per capita.
	The abrupt adjustment necessitated by the crisis showed the economic and social cost of this divergence.
	Political convergence is a necessary condition for economic convergence, as it implies making economic and fiscal policy a shared competence in the same manner as policies relating to the internal market.
	The economic convergence process could include a timeline and clearly defined milestones, and would ultimately bring about deeper integration in the fiscal sphere and the creation of shared fiscal tools.
	The management of these tools, including the European Stability Mechanism, could be entrusted to a Euro area treasury that is accountable to the European Parliament.
	The progress of European integration has increased interdependence between member states, but we still haven't drawn all the necessary conclusions and European politicians still don't have the tools that would allow them to respond to the expectations placed on them.
	The shortcoming feeds popular frustration with European policies, sometimes to the point where they question European integration itself.
	There is nothing inevitable about the status quo, but to move forward, we need to redefine a common project.
	It will take many years to implement this project, it is all the more urgent to start defining it.
	A single centralised treasury would certainly be another trapping of statehood, and I'm very much reminded when the Delian League, headed by the Athenians, decided to make the decision to move the treasury of the League from the Isle of Delos to Athens itself.
	At this point, the Delian League is usually referred to as the Athenian Empire.
	After this point, the Delian League ceases to become a confederacy for self-defence, and instead becomes an Athenian imperial project, with members being unable to leave and compelled to pay tribute.
	And this tribute would, of course, be used to maintain the military power of the quote-unquote League, now run almost exclusively through Athens, with the mandate of remaining strong to fend off the Persians, even though the Persians were no longer the problem.
	The problem was in fact, the Delian League had become the Athenian Empire.
	This was of course a problem for the members of the League, but it was also a problem for the very people the Athenians had just stood shoulder to shoulder with to defend Greece from the Persians.
	It was a problem for the Spartans, the most powerful state in Greece.
	Thucydides states outright at the beginning of his history of the Peloponnesian War that what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.
	Now the situations are of course not exactly the same, but I do think there are significant parallels that it's worth considering, especially when there are very powerful and influential people within the EU who are openly calling for a European army.
	The current president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, has been calling for an EU army for years.
	Apparently the European Union needs its own army to address the problem that it is not, quote, taken entirely seriously as an international force, the President of the European Commission has said.
	He says that such a move would help the EU to persuade Russia that it was serious about defending its values in the face of the threat posed by Moscow.
	Juncker, who has been a long-standing advocate of an EU army, said getting member states combined militarily would make spending more efficient and would encourage further European integration.
	He is a powerful man and this is what he asks for constantly.
	A European army would be the final and most important step on the road to nationhood for the European Union, as at this point it would be able to enforce its will on member states, whether they like it or not.
	And there are already plans for this army that have been drawn up.
	The plans for a European army were drafted over a period of 18 months by the EU's foreign policy chief and were naturally kept secret from voters to be released the day after the British referendum on EU membership.
	And of course this was done in secret because in the climate of the referendum people are scared it could have a negative effect on the British vote.
	And I am not surprised when the plans foresee the development of new European military and operational structures including a headquarters.
	And these proposals are widely supported just as a popular idea.
	British MEP Daniel Hannan puts it this way.
	A clear majority of MEPs is in favour of the European army and a clear majority in the Council.
	It's currently not going to be available.
	Britain has already vetoed this idea in 2011 and there are concerns that a loophole could allow nine states to group together and bypass opponents.
	So our veto would be useless.
	This is why Field Marshal Lord Guthrie has switched his vote from stay in the EU to leave.
	In February this year he signed a letter released by Downing Street saying that the UK was stronger in the EU at time of grave challenges, but thinks this is a mistake and wants to now vote leave because it will be better for defence.
	Saying that having a European army would be a disaster.
	He specifically calls it a vanity project and says that a European army could damage NATO.
	It's expensive, it's an unnecessary duplication to have it.
	He says there's a feeling that those backing the European army are doing it for political reasons rather than military ones.
	They want to be able to boast, look, we've got a European army.
	That's dangerous.
	And he's right.
	There is historical precedent for this.
	Not only is it deeply provocative to other great powers, but it also is strangely reminiscent of the Marian reforms.
	Roman statesman Gaius Marius initiated his series of military reforms in 107 BC.
	Before then, the Roman Republic had strict requirements on who could become a soldier.
	Each man had to be a tax-paying citizen, he had to own a certain value of property, and he had to supply his own armaments.
	These rules had put natural limits on the size of the Roman army, but it had also determined where the loyalty of the army lay as well.
	The loyalty of each man was to the Republic, because each man was a stakeholder in the success of the republic.
	However, Italy was facing a massive barbarian invasion by the Cimbri and the Teutones and various other smaller allied Germanic tribes, and they had suffered some catastrophic defeats at the hands of these barbarians.
	To fight off these barbarian invasions, it became necessary to enroll able-bodied men regardless of their property or citizenship.
	But now the loyalty of the soldiers had shifted.
	They did not have a direct incentive to support the state.
	They had a direct incentive to support the individual general who was paying them.
	Before the Marian reforms, it was inconceivable to the Romans that a Roman army would march on Rome for political purposes.
	After the Marian reforms, it became inevitable.
	After Marius first marched on Rome, it was Sulla, and after Sulla it was Pompey, and after Pompey it was Caesar, and after Caesar it was Augustus, and that is the end of the Roman Republic and the beginning of the Principate, what we now call the Roman Empire.
	This effect is also shown in the Peloponnesian War.
	After Athens became the Athenian Empire, it ended up going to war with Sparta.
	The Spartan Admiral Lysander decided to go to the Persian prince, a man named Cyrus, and ask him for money so he could pay his sailors one penny more a day in order to encourage them to defect from the Athenian fleet and come over to him.
	This of course worked because the mercenaries were not fighting for the Athenian national interest.
	They were fighting for their pay.
	A European superstate does not have a demos.
	There is no national identity or investment in the state of Europe that they can recruit soldiery from.
	Anyone that they hire is going to be hired effectively as a mercenary.
	Even though the situations are not exactly the same, the incentives being offered are, and we will get the same results.
	The only thing missing would be the infrastructure of a state, something that you would plan and codify and formalize, which, of course, already exists.
	Earlier this year, it was revealed that plans have already been drawn up for a European superstate.
	Plans for a United States of Europe have been drawn up by leading EU politicians, undermining David Cameron's claim that Britain will not be sucked into a European superstate.
	A document signed last September in Rome by the speakers of the national parliaments in Germany, France, Italy and Luxembourg calls for the creation of a full-blown federal union of states.
	The paper says that concrete proposals to deepen EU integration will be drawn up at a meeting in Luxembourg next month, raising the prospect of a new row about powers leaching to Brussels ahead of the referendum on June 23rd.
	The joint declaration states, We are convinced that new impetus must be given to European integration.
	We believe that more, not less, or to the internal market and to agricultural policy.
	It should include all matters pertaining to the European ideal, social and cultural affairs as well as foreign security and defence policy.
	The current moment offers an opportunity to move forward with European political integration, which could lead to a federal union of states.
	This has always been the zeitgeist of European politicians.
	For example, Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, says, US have one currency, one central bank and one government.
	Europe has one currency, one central bank, and 17 governments.
	It cannot go on like this.
	This is the popular opinion amongst European politicians.
	They will vote for this.
	And Britain has in the past voted against and vetoed this, and they have loopholes to get around it.
	We will eventually become a part of the European superstate if we stay.
	This is inevitable.
	It's going to happen and if you think it's not, you are naive.
	You are mistaken.
	It is going to happen.
	If you still harbour the, well, no, no, this sounds, this sounds too much.
	No, get that out of your head.
	This is the future.
	So the question is, is it a good idea to be part of this European superstate or not?
	The answer to that question is dependent on whether you think democracy is important or not.
	And the man who designed the Euro thinks that the EU superstate would have no democratic legitimacy.
	Professor Otmar Issing, the former chief economist at the European Central Bank and architect of the Euro, said the EU policymakers would not dare put their plans to transfer budgetary sovereignty to Brussels before electorates allow a vote on them, as they would fail at the first hurdle.
	Speaking of the European Commission's five presidents report, in which it lays out plans to shore up the foundations of the Euro, Mr Issing said it was a step towards creating a fiscal union without democratic legitimacy.
	People have decided for a policy that is different to what is needed for monetary union.
	This strikes at the core of democracy.
	Professor Issing, a towering figure in the pre-EMU Bundesbank and the European Central Bank's first chief economist, said control of budgets must for now be left to national governments and sovereign parliaments that are genuinely answerable to their own peoples.
	Political union cannot be obtained in the European Union by the back door.
	It is a violation of the principle of no taxation without representation and represents a wrong and dangerous approach.
	Might be wondering why this man would be saying that the EU would lack democratic legitimacy when you vote for people who go and sit in the European Parliament.
	This is because the EU Parliament does not have the same power as national parliaments.
	It is the European Commission, a body of politicians who are not elected by popular vote, that proposes initiatives and laws.
	The Parliament and Council review proposals by the Commission and propose amendments.
	If they cannot agree upon the amendments, a second reading takes place.
	In the second reading, the Parliament and Council can again propose amendments.
	Parliament has the power to block the proposed legislation if it can't agree with the Council.
	Citizens, businesses and organisations can participate in the consultation procedure, but they can't propose anything themselves.
	Neither can national parliaments do anything but formally express their reservations if they feel it would be better to deal with an issue at a national level rather than an EU level.
	What this means is, the public from the constituent nations of the EU cannot elect the people who write the laws.
	In the British Parliament, and I presume every other European Parliament, the public elect the people who propose and repeal legislation.
	In the European Parliament, this is done by people the public did not elect.
	That is why this is not a democratic system.
	The public does not have any kind of democratic control over the European Commission, and the people they elect to go and talk to the Commission have no power to produce legislation that could reform it.
	So when people say, well, we can change things from the inside, they are wrong.
	And British MPs are the ones who lose the most in the European Parliament.
	At least according to a professor of political science at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Senior Fellow of the UK in a Changing Europe.
	As time has gone on, British MEPs have been increasingly on the losing side of decisions made in the European Parliament.
	Between 2004 and 2009, British MEPs were on the winning side of about 80% of decisions made.
	Since 2009, that has dropped to about 65% of decisions made.
	And this is in a climate where the average is about 85% because many of the votes are highly consensual.
	But British MPs are less likely to be on the winning side than MEPs from any other member state.
	This divide is not one of nationality but of ideology.
	The ideological fault line is, of course, how pro-Europe you are.
	For example, very pro-Europe MEPs from, say, the Liberal Democrats are very regularly on the winning side of these votes.
	And even reasonably pro-EU parties like Labour are quite far down the list.
	Then you have the UK Greens, the UK Conservatives, and finally at the very bottom, the UK Independence Party.
	These parties are regularly outvoted in the European Parliament.
	Overall, European Parliament voting records suggest that the UK is in a weak position in this branch of the EU's legislative system.
	And these are the people we elect.
	Most British MEPs do not sit in the groups that dominate the European Parliament agenda.
	And even when they do sit in these groups, such as the Conservatives and EPP42009 and Labour and SED, British MPs are often opposed to the majority positions of these groups.
	As a result, British MEPs often find themselves on the losing side in key votes.
	These will include a national army, a treasury, and a superstate.
	When the European Commission proposes this legislation.
	There is simply no mechanism for Britain to resist these things when the time comes.
	Unless we leave the EU now.
	Andrew Lillico, a doctor of economics with a list of credentials as long as my arm, thinks that after 2020, all EU members will have to adopt the Euro.
	Political union in the Eurozone is an economic existential necessity, not a renegotiable ambition.
	He says for the Eurozone and EU to survive at all, deeper political integration, including Eurozone-level tax and spending decisions and democratic mechanisms to oversee them plus reduced control over tax and spending decisions for member states are an existential necessity.
	And from what I've seen, I think he's correct.
	However, I don't think we're going to get the democratic mechanisms he would like to see.
	He says when the Euro was first agreed, the UK and Denmark opted out, but at that stage that only meant that they were not joining at the start.
	There was never intended to be any long-term form of EU membership that did not include Euro membership.
	The UK did not say never to begin with, and all new EU members since the Euro began in 1999 have had to commit to joining.
	Indeed, by 2020, all but five member states of the EU are due to be Euro members, and Poland is likely to join by then as well.
	Leaving just the UK, Denmark, Sweden, and Bulgaria outside.
	This all means that the current debates about whether the UK will have a referendum and how folk will vote is of only passing significance.
	What counts fundamentally as to whether the UK stays in the EU after about 2020 is whether there are any non-Euro members of the EU at all, given the existential economic necessity of the Eurozone forming into a deeper political union.
	At present, that seems highly unlikely.
	And I completely agree.
	Everything seems to be pushing in the direction of a single European superstate with a single universal currency.
	The core question at the very heart of the British referendum to leave the European Union is do you want Britain and its member states to be independent and self-governing nations that are capable of controlling their own destinies?

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