March 26, 2025 - Bannon's War Room
01:01:27
Participants
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| Speaker | Time | Text |
|---|---|---|
| Administration officials involved who are among the highest ranking in the U.S. government insist no classified information was shared. | ||
| Moments ago, a follow-up. | ||
| Goldberg posted a follow-up piece entitled, Here are the attack plans that Trump's advisers shared on Signal. | ||
| He writes in part this, the statements by Hegseth, Gabbard, Ratcliffe, and Trump, combined with the assertions made by numerous administration officials that we are lying about the context of the signal texts, have led us to believe that people should see the texts in order to reach their own conclusions. | ||
| And then laid out in this latest piece, which broke just now in The Atlantic, Jonathan Lemire. | ||
| Everyone can see the text for themselves. | ||
| Yeah, the screenshots of the text are included in this piece that Jeffrey Goldberg and Shane Harris just posted on the Atlantic's website. | ||
| We'll go through a little bit of it now. | ||
| The White House, as you just mentioned, has insisted time and again, two things. | ||
| That nothing in here was classified, and that no war plans were included. | ||
| Well, as Jeffrey and Shane write, take a look for yourself. | ||
| I'll read a little bit of it here. | ||
| These are texts from Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of Defense, talking about... | ||
| 11.44 Eastern, that day. | ||
| Weather is favorable. | ||
| Just confirmed with CENTCOM, we are a go for mission launch. | ||
| 12.15, text in this chat, F-18's launch declares this the first strike package. | ||
| At 1.45, talks about how the trigger-based strike window begins. | ||
| Target terrorists. | ||
| Is at known location. | ||
| Here we are here. | ||
| Second strike at 1536. | ||
| More to follow. | ||
| We're currently clean on OPSEC. | ||
| Of course, Secretary of Defense declares they're clean and OPSEC in a text chain read by the editor of The Atlantic, who is inadvertently added to that group. | ||
| And we'll note, a short time later, we have further updates from Michael Waltz, the National Security Advisor, who talks about how the target has been hit, declaring positive identifications. | ||
| So these are, would seem to me, the very definition of attack plans. | ||
| And I've already talked to a former Pentagon official who says, reading these screenshots hurriedly, of course, everything in here matters. | ||
| And as you say, you're allowing readers to decide for themselves what they mean. | ||
| But just walk us through some of the texts you saw there from particularly the Secretary of Defense and then later the National Security Advisor about the operation that day in Yemen. | ||
|
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Right. Look, the key thing here is, this is an interesting one you have up on the screen. | |
| This is Mike Waltz in a commercial messaging app providing real-time intelligence updates about the consequences of an American attack. | ||
| Obviously, there's a challenge here for secrecy because if you know this, the question then arises, how do they know this? | ||
| And what kind of assets do they have, technical or human assets, that would know that? | ||
| But the core of this chain is the statement, is the long text issued by Pete Hegstaff two hours before the first bombs fell in Yemen. | ||
| Everybody can find it on the Atlantic website now. | ||
| And when she goes hour by hour, sometimes minute by minute, here's what's going to happen. | ||
| And the thing that really struck me, as I'm, again... | ||
| We're reading this on my phone in a Safeway parking lot. | ||
| The thing that really struck me is that he's telling me and others that an attack hasn't even begun yet, but the planes are launching in 31 minutes. | ||
| You know, imagine this text went to someone else. | ||
| I mean, if that's not secret, classified information... | ||
| About, or the most sensitive kind of government information in the world, I don't know what is. | ||
| I mean, if Carolyn Levitt is arguing that it's not a war because Congress didn't declare war on Yemen, okay, fine. | ||
| She wants to play a semantic game. | ||
| But this is operational details about a forthcoming attack on an enemy that has anti-aircraft capabilities. | ||
| They've allegedly shot down our drones before. | ||
| So why you would tell anyone in the world on a messaging app... | ||
| That American pilots are about to fly into a, sorry for the expression, war zone. | ||
| That's an interesting question. | ||
| I'm curious, what are your thoughts about the fact that Secretary of State Rubio was on this chain, this signal chain, when he probably knows more about Okay, | ||
| we're going to bust into this. | ||
| We're going to go to the House Intelligence Committee. | ||
| This is live. | ||
| The entire intelligence crew yesterday is there. | ||
| Let's go live to House Intelligence. | ||
|
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And after four years of a catastrophic open border policy and limited and in many cases no vetting, we have seen an explosion of illegal migrants crossing our border since 2021. | |
| In fiscal year 2024, 516 were identified to be known or suspected terrorists, 106 of whom tried to sneak into our country between ports of entry. | ||
| And these are just the ones we caught of the nearly 3 million encounters recorded by Customs and Border Protection. | ||
| We've also seen an ISIS-affiliated human smuggling network bringing more than 400 migrants into the United States, and this occurs through networks associated with cartels and gangs from Sinaloa to CJ&G, who present an unacceptable risk to the security of the American people. | ||
| In the midst of such threats, many have understandably lost trust in the intelligence community. | ||
| One reason I'm particularly concerned about is the pattern of lapses I've seen in analytic integrity and objectivity in some of the assessments provided by the IC in the last few years. | ||
| From President Trump-Russia collusion fiasco to the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic to anomalous health incidents, there have been numerous instances of the IC suppressing certain reporting using substandard reporting to support a pre-decided thesis and failure or refusal to consider plausible alternative analyses. | ||
| That, combined with many other examples of weaponized government results in a situation where the United States is facing very real threats, while many of our citizens lack trust. | ||
| And those they empower to inform on are counter these threats. | ||
| Look, I've been honored to serve our country for many years now, first as an Explosive Ordinance Disposal Technician in the Army, now as a representative for the 1st District of Arkansas and chairman of this committee. | ||
| In my time here, I've traveled the world and met with countless IC employees, from everyday Americans doing challenging and often dangerous work of intelligence to agency directors like yourselves. | ||
| The vast majority of those people are honest, hardworking, patriotic Americans that silently and without accolades do difficult jobs, often in austere places, sacrificing time with their families and in some cases putting themselves in danger, all in order to serve the United States. | ||
| These silent warriors deserve our gratitude and our respect. | ||
| They do not deserve to have their reputations besmirched by poor leadership. | ||
| Unfortunately, in recent years, we've seen instances of politicized, self-serving, dishonest leaders sustaining the reputation of our institutions and patriots by abusing the powers and sacred trust given to them by the American people. | ||
| We have some real work to do. | ||
| You and your roles as leaders of prestigious organizations and us as members of this committee charged with conducting honest and rigorous oversight must ensure that our institutions work for the American people. | ||
| Those that don't uphold the stringent standards of integrity that the American people expect and deserve must be held accountable. | ||
| In the instances where trust is breached, those involved must be held accountable. | ||
| This will help rebuild the trust between the American people and those that serve them in the intelligence community. | ||
| Today we need you to be candid about the threats facing the United States. | ||
| I have deep concerns that many threats have been downplayed. | ||
| Okay, that's the chairman right there, Crawford. | ||
| He's going through a basic opening. | ||
| They're going to go to Himes in a second. | ||
| We're going to pick it up. | ||
| Jack Posobiec is with me. | ||
| Jack, let me bring you quickly. | ||
| We opened with the reporter from The Atlantic who dropped the receipts this morning. | ||
| Oh, hang on. | ||
| Let's go to Himes right now. | ||
| This is a Democrat. | ||
| This is going to be pretty volatile today. | ||
| Let's hear it. | ||
|
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... | |
| the American people to hear directly from the senior leadership of the intelligence community about the threats that our nation faces. | ||
| I read the unclassified report, and I found a lot of continuity in the IC's assessment about critical threats to our national security compared to last year's assessment. | ||
| The IC continues to see threats from our principal adversaries, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. | ||
| I must say, though, that after these last two months, I'm worried that the call may be coming from inside the House. | ||
| This report calls Russia, and I quote, an enduring potential threat to U.S. power, presence, and global interests. | ||
| But as far as I can tell, we're now on Team Kremlin. | ||
| We vote with them and against our allies in the United Nations. | ||
| We humiliate President Zelensky in the Oval Office. | ||
| The President's chief Russian negotiator, Steve Witkoff, is repeating Russian talking points and participating... | ||
| On a madcap signal chat about an attack on Yemen while inside Russia. | ||
| USAID is gone. | ||
| And with it, all American soft power. | ||
| If I had time, I would ask the generals at this table about what it means to our national security to give up our soft power. | ||
| We're no longer helping struggling nations in Africa. | ||
| China, or worse, terrorists are filling the vacuum. | ||
| I wonder how many of those African countries will be named in next year's threat assessment. | ||
| Thanks to Doge, the men we paid to guard the most vicious ISIS terrorists in the world in Syria walked off the job. | ||
| Do you think we'll see their names in this document next year? | ||
| Elon Musk fired the people who maintain our nuclear weapons. | ||
| Does that feel like a threat to you? | ||
| Apparently all of this mayhem is cheered by the President of the United States and by 20-somethings with laptops and nicknames like big balls. | ||
| But I've been doing this for a long time, and I know that Moscow and Beijing and Tehran and Pyongyang cannot believe their luck. | ||
| Now we come to learn that people in the most dangerous and sensitive jobs on the planet put extremely specific pre-decisional discussions about a military attack on Signal, Which could be intercepted by the Russians and the Chinese. | ||
| Everyone here knows that the Russians or the Chinese could have gotten all of that information. | ||
| And they could have passed it on to the Houthis, who easily could have repositioned weapons and altered their plans to knock down planes or sink ships. | ||
| I think that it's by the awesome grace of God that we are not mourning dead pilots right now. | ||
| The two general officers sitting at the table and the people who work for all of you know that if they had set up and participated in the signal chat, they would be gone. | ||
| And they know that there's only one response to a mistake of this magnitude. | ||
| You apologize, you own it, and you stop everything until you can figure out what went wrong and how it might not ever happen again. | ||
| But that's not what happened. | ||
| The Secretary of Defense responded with a brutal attack on the reporter who did not ask to be on the signal chain. | ||
| Yesterday, our former colleague Mike Waltz did the same in the White House and then went on Fox to call Jeff Goldberg a loser. | ||
| What do you think the people who work for you are seeing and learning from that? | ||
| Now, except for that last part, Almost all of the mayhem slowly eroding our safety, our standing, and our security in the world has largely happened outside the IC. | ||
| If you had a part in that, and I suspect you did, I thank you. | ||
| I'll say it now and I'll say it again every time we see each other over the next couple of years. | ||
| You must protect the thousands of patriots who go to work every day under you to keep us safe. | ||
| You need to go to work every day thinking about their morale, their well-being, and their protection. | ||
| I've done intelligence oversight for more than a decade. | ||
| It's my job to ask you the tough questions and maybe even make you uncomfortable. | ||
| John, I don't ever walk through your lobby and look at those 140 stars on the wall without choking up over the fact that men and women far better than I will give their lives to keep us safe. | ||
| There's about a dozen people in this room who know all their stories, and you know and I know that many of the men and women who have stars on that wall died because of bad decisions or poor judgment by their leaders. | ||
| We've all worked together before, and in recent events notwithstanding, we need you to succeed. | ||
| Your people and our safety requires you to succeed. | ||
| I really hope you do. | ||
| But let me say now that if some over-caffeinated 20-year-old succeeds in firing your linguists or your mathematicians or your paramilitary officers, if you shut down some unit because Steve Bannon or Seb Gorka doesn't like it, America will be less safe and people will get hurt. | ||
| and I and this committee and history will be very unkind. | ||
| Yield back, Mr. | ||
| Chair. Chairman. | ||
| The House Intelligence ejects at the frame here. | ||
| This morning they dropped the receipts as we knew they were. | ||
| That's why yesterday's hearing was so, you know, I think it went in the wrong direction. | ||
| It was too chatty. | ||
| They should have hunkered down. | ||
| Put in perspective what we saw this morning from the Atlantic Magazine, the strike package, the information, and what does that mean for this hearing today? | ||
| Well, Steve, let's not bury the lead here either, because he just name-dropped Steve Bannon. | ||
| He's talking about the War Room audience. | ||
| Those guys saw this show yesterday. | ||
| They saw everything that went through here. | ||
| They're terrified of this audience. | ||
| They know that the War Room posse is the force that needs to be reckoned with in Washington, D.C. That's who's battering down the doors figuratively when it comes to all of this. | ||
| Those are the people that they're out watching and say, wait a minute, Bannon and Posto. | ||
| These guys were talking yesterday about how this is an operation. | ||
| And then, boom, here comes the drip, drip, drip of, oh, we've got, you know, this information that came out, which we told you about, which you said, and then you were chatty. | ||
| By the way, Steve, we were the ones on the program yesterday saying, stop giving the information. | ||
| Just take the hard lines like Lieutenant Colonel Tulsi Gabbard, the DNI did yesterday. | ||
| Don't get caught up in this syntax. | ||
| Don't get caught up in the semantic games. | ||
| And now the semantic games are coming out more and more because you knew that we said this. | ||
| We said Goldberg probably has more. | ||
| He's going to try to catch them in a perjury trap. | ||
| He's going to drop more tomorrow. | ||
| And then he's going to say, oh, look, they lied because the thing they said yesterday doesn't match what I saw in the chat. | ||
| And that's when he was on with Tim Miller. | ||
| And we talked about this in the five o'clock show. | ||
| And, oh, I can't I can't release those extra texts. | ||
| I can't do it. | ||
| What are you, my lawyer, Tim? | ||
| What are you, my lawyer? | ||
| I'm not going to. | ||
| And, of course, he was because he was planning to do it all along the next day. | ||
| That was the point of the operation. | ||
| Now Judge Botheberg comes in. | ||
| Judge Boesberg coming in. | ||
| That's moving the artillery into the firing line. | ||
| This has become the route. | ||
| Look, the Democrats were demoralized. | ||
| They were demoralized. | ||
| They were defeated. | ||
| The media was defeated. | ||
| And now, all of a sudden, they have a rally. | ||
| There's a civil suit that just got filed against Pete Hegseth about this entire thing. | ||
| They randomly selected the judge in Washington, D.C., and it's Judge Boesberg. | ||
| We told you this is a pincer move between the deep state and the judicial insurrection. | ||
| Now, Boesburg is the connective link. | ||
| We told you, wait until it gets in the court. | ||
| They're already trying to get it to court. | ||
| Boesburg's taken on. | ||
| They're going to have, I think, an emergency hearing this afternoon or tomorrow on this, Jack. | ||
| This is a pincer move against the Trump administration. | ||
| That's what they have to hunker down today. | ||
| They're doing the opening statements, but we're going to get into the question. | ||
| We'll handle the Democrats. | ||
| Given the information, Jack, That you saw, let's call it balls and strikes. | ||
| The information that you saw, and assume right now it's correct, I'm sure it's already been verified, on the information that was on the text, was that information classified into your perspective as a naval intelligence officer? | ||
| Well, you know, if you put it this way, if I was in the intel community, I wouldn't be sharing that information over open comms. | ||
| Operational stuff that I've always seen has always been at the secret level. | ||
| I've never done work with operational information like that. | ||
| That would be on a Genser server or on anything unclassified, anything open source. | ||
| Now, obviously, the Secretary of Defense has some original classification authority for those operations, and so he has the ability to declassify various things if he wants to. | ||
| And so the issue here, Steve, is for the average person at home watching this, trying to figure out what's going on, they're going to say, That looks like information that I wouldn't want to see up on Twitter, Telegram, or anywhere else. | ||
| Why? Because the average American does actually care about... | ||
| The MAGA soldiers, the MAGA troops that are out there, the sailors, the pilots, etc. | ||
| And by the way, these guys, these Democrats, they don't care. | ||
| These are the guys who got the 13 killed at Abbey Gate and Joe Biden couldn't even show up without staring at his watch the whole time and claimed that it didn't happen and all the rest of it completely sold them out. | ||
| They don't care. | ||
| They don't care at all. | ||
| This is a drama act. | ||
| What you're seeing is theater kids. | ||
| This is the theater kid occupied government. | ||
| And you got the congressman up there. | ||
| Oh, I'm so sad. | ||
| I'm so tired. | ||
| He's going for his Oscar. | ||
| I guess he heard that Snow White collapsed at the box office. | ||
| So he's thinking he can get up there for Best Actress, maybe. | ||
| But the idea that they have any care whatsoever for this, it's a joke and it always has been. | ||
| We're going to lose you, so what should the audience look for today when we go back to the questions and answers? | ||
| Are they going to try to chop people up twice as much as yesterday because they're going to put up on the screen actually what the carrier battle group, what the strike pilots were doing at a specific time? | ||
| In fact, I think they're going to claim it happened 30 or 31 minutes before the actual launch from the carrier battle group. | ||
| What should people look for today? | ||
| Right, and I'll talk operational. | ||
| We've talked about this before, Steve. | ||
| The Iranians have given the Houthis, and there's been reports of these standoff drones that have the ability to hover, essentially hover in midair, waiting for the jets to come by, and then they have a booster rocket on them that would fire. | ||
| And so they're going to get into all of this. | ||
| They're going to explain the operational capabilities of the Houthis. | ||
| They're going to get into the Red Sea. | ||
| You're going to see that Opintel. | ||
| Obviously, the carriers can't really maneuver because it's so tight of a space, especially if they're in that slock of the Strait of Babel and Deb. | ||
| And so you're going to get into all of that. | ||
| But what I want you to also look at is look at the contours of the operation as it moves. | ||
| Big Tapper, MSNBC, Intel committees, Natasha Bertrand. | ||
| This is an Intel op against the Trump administration the same way that Russiagate was. | ||
| Where was Russiagate born? | ||
| It started in the committees, and then it moved where? | ||
| Into the courts. | ||
| That's what you're going to look for. | ||
| So from the administration, I want to see, are we going to get more interviews on Fox News? | ||
| Are we going to see more of these sit-downs? | ||
| Or are we going to get the hard line of Tulsi Gabbard? | ||
| Hunker down. | ||
| Hard line. | ||
| Hard line. | ||
| Jack, I will check with you by phone. | ||
|
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And by the way, that's what Obama would do. | |
| Obama would say, we've addressed this and taken care of it. | ||
| Barack Obama would not admit anything, and everybody would move on. | ||
| So just do what Obama would do. | ||
| Go to the Met. | ||
| You would go to the mattresses, which we'll have to do today. | ||
| Okay, Jack, we'll check you. | ||
| We'll grab you by phone as you travel back to D.C. Appreciate it. | ||
| Thanks, everybody. | ||
| The White House. | ||
| Jack, pass over. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
| I'm going to go back to the hearing. | ||
| MTG is also on a Doge Oversight Committee. | ||
| She's lighting up PBS. | ||
| We're going to cut into that, too. | ||
| Let's go back to the committee. | ||
| We're going to dip in and out. | ||
| We'll try to do it commercial-free as much as possible this morning. | ||
| We'll thank REV. Let's go live to the hearing. | ||
| Advancing its cyber capabilities for sophisticated operations aimed at stealing sensitive U.S. government and private sector information and pre-positioning additional asymmetric attack options that may be deployed in a conflict. | ||
| China's cyber activities have been linked to multiple high-profile breaches, including last year's massive compromise of U.S. telecom infrastructure, commonly referred to as Salt Typhoon. | ||
| Beijing currently dominates global markets and strategically important supply chains, for example, with the mining and processing of several critical minerals. | ||
| In December, China imposed an export ban to the United States on gallium, germanium, and antimony, all of which are important to the production of semiconductors and our defense technologies. | ||
| This was in direct response to U.S. export controls on chips designed to broadly limit PRC access China also aims to compete in other critical global industries, including AI, legacy semiconductor chip production, biomanufacturing and genetic sequencing, and medical and pharmaceutical supply production. | ||
| Russia's nuclear and conventional military capabilities, along with its demonstrated economic and military resilience, make it a formidable competitor. | ||
| Moscow has more nuclear weapons than any other nation. | ||
| It could inflict catastrophic damage on the United States and the world in the event of a major war that Russian leaders feared put them and their regime at serious risk. | ||
| In late 2024, Russia announced updates to its public nuclear doctrine, expanding the conditions under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. | ||
| Russia is building a more modern and survivable nuclear force designed to circumvent U.S. missile defense through reliable retaliatory strike potential. | ||
| It intends to deter the U.S. by holding the U.S. homeland at risk and by having the capabilities to threaten nuclear war in a conflict. | ||
| Russia's developed advanced cyber capabilities and has attempted to pre-position access to U.S. critical infrastructure for asymmetric options and make it a persistent cyber threat. | ||
| Russia's cyber activities have been linked to multiple high-profile breaches, including the 2023 hack of Microsoft. | ||
| Russia's also fielding new capabilities in anti-satellite weapons meant to degrade U.S. and allied space infrastructure. | ||
| Among Russia's most concerning developments is a new satellite intended to carry a nuclear weapon as an anti-satellite weapon, violating long-standing international law against such activity and putting the U.S. and global economy at risk. | ||
| Iran continues to seek to expand its influence in the Middle East. | ||
| Despite the degradation to its proxies and defenses during the Gaza conflict, Iran has developed and maintains ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs, including systems capable of striking U.S. targets and allies in the region. | ||
| They've shown a willingness to use these weapons, including during a 2020 attack on U.S. forces in Iraq and in attacks against Israel in April and October 2024. | ||
| Iran's cyber operations and capabilities also present a serious threat to US networks and data. | ||
| The IC continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khomeini has not authorized the nuclear weapons program that he suspended in 2003. | ||
| We continue to monitor closely if Tehran decides to reauthorize its nuclear weapons program. | ||
| In the past year, we've seen an erosion of a decades-long taboo in Iran on discussing nuclear weapons in public, likely emboldening nuclear weapons advocates within Iran's decision-making apparatus. | ||
| Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is at its highest levels and is unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons. | ||
| Iran will likely continue efforts to counter Israel and press for US military withdrawal from the region. | ||
| By aiding, arming, and helping to reconstitute its loose consortium of like-minded terrorist actors, which it refers to as its axis of resistance. | ||
| Although weakened, this collection of actors still presents a wide range of threats, including to Israel's population and U.S. forces deployed in Iraq and Syria, as well as U.S. and international military and commercial shipping and transit. | ||
| North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is pursuing stronger strategic and conventional capabilities that can target U.S. forces and allies in the region, as well as the U.S. homeland, to bolster North Korea's leverage and stature, defend its regime, and achieve at least tacit recognition as a nuclear weapons power. | ||
| Kim's recently cemented strategic partnership with Russia supports these goals by providing him with greater financial, military, and diplomatic support, reducing its reliance on China, and providing North Korean forces and weapons systems with warfighting | ||
| Kim views his strategic weapons advances, its deepening ties with Russia, and its economic durability as strengthening his negotiating position against Washington's demands for denuclearization and lessening Kim's need for sanctions relief. | ||
| and Since 2022, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have grown closer. | ||
| Removing the accelerant of the war in Ukraine is unlikely to revert these bilateral relationships to a pre-war 2021 baseline, leaving room for new strategic priorities and world events to create new incentives or challenges to their expanded cooperation. | ||
| Russia has been a catalyst for much of this expansion, driven heavily by the support it has needed for its war against Ukraine, including protection from U.S. and Western sanctions. | ||
| In addition to exchange of military and other resource capabilities with North Korea, Russia has relied more heavily on China's financial and defense industry backing and has increased combined military exercises with China. | ||
| With Iran, Russia has also expanded financial ties to mitigate sanctions. | ||
| Iran has become a critical military supplier to Russia, especially of UAVs, in exchange for Russian technical support for Iranian weapons, intelligence, and advanced cyber capabilities. | ||
| The threats that we see to U.S. national security are both complex and multifaceted. | ||
| In closing, I want to address briefly the signal chat issue that I know many of you are concerned about. | ||
| The President and National Security Advisor Waltz held a press conference yesterday with a clear message. | ||
| It was a mistake that a reporter was inadvertently added to a signal chat with high-level national security principles, having a policy discussion... | ||
| The National Security Advisor has taken full responsibility for this, and the National Security Council is conducting an in-depth review along with technical experts working to determine how this reporter was inadvertently added to this chat. | ||
| The conversation was candid and sensitive. | ||
| But as the President and National Security Advisors stated, no classified information was shared. | ||
| There were no sources, methods, locations, or war plans that were shared. | ||
| This was a standard update to the National Security Cabinet that was provided alongside updates that were given to foreign partners in the region. | ||
| The Signal Message app comes pre-installed on government devices. | ||
| In December of 2024, CISA stated, quote, we strongly urge highly targeted individuals to immediately review and apply best practices provided in the guidance to protect mobile communications, including consistent use of end-to-end encryption. | ||
| And they named Signal as an app as an example of such an end-to-end encrypted messaging app. | ||
| Ideally, these conversations occur in person. | ||
| However, at times, fast-moving coordination of an unclassified nature is necessary. | ||
| Where in-person conversation is not an option. | ||
| I'm also aware that a lawsuit was filed yesterday on this issue. | ||
| As a result of that pending litigation, I'm limited in my ability to comment further on that specific case. | ||
| My Office of General Counsel will be in close contact with the Department of Justice on this matter. | ||
| The most important thing to the American people, and to all of us, Is the success of this military operation against terrorists who have been and continue to attack American service members was extremely successful, thanks to the leadership of President Trump and the actions of our brave men and women in uniform. | ||
| As the heads of the American People's Intelligence Community, we will continue to provide the President, you in Congress, and our warfighters with timely, unbiased, relevant intelligence. | ||
| To keep our country secure, free, prosperous, and at peace. | ||
| Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | ||
|
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Thank you, Director Gabbard. | |
| We now turn to member questions. | ||
| I'll recognize myself for five minutes. | ||
| I want to talk about, before I get into the threats, I want to talk about something we've talked about in this committee and in this setting before. | ||
| We've had IC agency leaders commit to complying with our document requests but not follow through. | ||
| I don't know if this is due to direction from previous administration or middle management obstruction, but I find it... | ||
| You can split screen it. | ||
| Okay, we're going to be calling a lot of audibles. | ||
| MTG is over also grilling PBS. | ||
| She's on the Doja Oversight Committee. | ||
| Right there, here's the news. | ||
| Tulsi Gabbard, I don't know, double down, triple down, makes the case for the Signal app. | ||
| She did say at the time, she broke some news there, her legal counsel is in touch with the Department of Justice. | ||
| One of the things we warned about yesterday and why we felt it was very important to make sure that this thing did not merge with the radical judges over at Washington, D.C. What they want to do is put the administration in a vice grip. | ||
| Or have an anvil and a hammer. | ||
| Think of the radical judges, particularly in the D.C. court, led by Boesburg, the district court, which he's the head judge of the district court, not the appellate, the district court. | ||
| You've seen how radical he's been. | ||
| The administration had to invoke the State Secrets Act on the deportation of the... | ||
| And by the way, let me know when we go back to the Democrat. | ||
| I'm going to produce live here. | ||
| As soon as we go back, we want these Democrats. | ||
| We want to hear the snarky questions they're asking our intelligence community, the intelligence heads. | ||
| We're going to go back to Radcliffe in a moment. | ||
| It doesn't mean he said that they filed a suit last night, civil suit. | ||
| It's supposed to be totally random how the judge is supposed to put it in and just spin a wheel, random. | ||
| Boesburg gets the call. | ||
| And they're going to go in for an emergency hearing this afternoon tomorrow. | ||
| It's a total setup. | ||
| It's a total setup. | ||
| Bozberg, who's in the middle now, we're at an appellate court to even get him removed, right? | ||
| He has... | ||
| The commander-in-chief of the United States has had to invoke the State Secrets Act because he wants to get details of a military operation to remove criminal terrorists from the United States, of which two-thirds of the American people back... | ||
| Back to President, back to Commander-in-Chief. | ||
| By a two-to-one margin right now in Rasmussen polling, people support the fact of trying to impeach that judge, which Mike Davis and War Room have strongly recommended to the Judiciary Committee. | ||
| And by the way, if you're on your Bill Blaster today, or Article 3, make sure you go to Judiciary Committee, Judiciary, head by Jim Jordan, and hey, want to step up the volume on this. | ||
| Big League. | ||
| Let's go back to the committee right now and hear what's going on. | ||
| I'm going to dip in and out. | ||
| The continued competition, encroachment, and investments that are occurring in the Western Hemisphere have rapidly increased and continue to pose a threat both to our economic interests and to our security. | ||
| Every day there are new reports of further attempts. | ||
| One just recently that came up yesterday with investments that are being made in the southeast part of the United States. | ||
| Again, I'll go into this further in a closed setting, but the intelligence assessments that we are receiving are being shared with senior cabinet officials. | ||
| Department of Energy, Commerce, Treasury, those who are working alongside us to not only monitor but to determine the best policies that will protect our interests. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Thank you. | |
| I want to turn to Director Patel real quick in the time that I have left. | ||
| If you can flesh this out for me just a little bit. | ||
| You indicated something that caught my attention in the proceeding yesterday, and that was your involvement with the Judicial Drug Task Force that you partner with at the state level and how that has yielded positive results with regard to cartel activity. | ||
| Can you put a little finer point on that to describe those partnerships in the 53 seconds we have remaining? | ||
| Yeah, I'll try to be brief. | ||
| Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, thanks for having us, Ranking Member. | ||
| Priorities at the FBI have been to partner with state and local law enforcement in ways that we have not done so before, particularly on information sharing, and it's a two-way street. | ||
| And in order for us to effectuate drug seizures and narcotics interdictions in the 50 states, we treat them as all border states, because that's what's happening. | ||
| We have an American citizen die of a drug overdose every seven minutes. | ||
| That is wildly out of control and unacceptable. | ||
| But the FBI cannot do that mandate and secure the American people from Washington, D.C. So we're putting resources in the field. | ||
| We were working with our partners at the state and local level, and we are seeing immediate results, as we are seeing in Arkansas, as I outlined yesterday, with hundreds of arrests, thousands of pounds of narcotics seized, dozens of weapons, and multiple indictments. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Thank you, Director. | |
| Thank you, Mr. Chairman. | ||
| If there's something I care as much about as the national security of the United States, it's the powers and prerogatives of this Congress and its oversight duties. | ||
| So I want to spend a minute or so on yesterday's testimony in front of the Senate and direct these questions in particular to Director Patel and Director Gabbard. | ||
| Yesterday, Senator Heinrich asked, did this conversation, referring to the signal chat, include information on weapons, packages, targets, or timing? | ||
| Director Patel, you said, not that I'm aware of. | ||
| Director Gabbard, you said, same answer. | ||
| The signal chat included the following update, forward-looking update from the Secretary of Defense. | ||
| Time now, 11.44 Eastern Time, weather is favorable. | ||
| Just confirmed with CENTCOM, we are go for mission launch. | ||
| 12.15 Eastern Time, F-18 launch, first strike package. | ||
| 13.45, trigger-based F-18, first strike window starts. | ||
| Target terrorist is at his known location, so should be on time. | ||
| Also, strike drones launch, MQ-9s. | ||
| 14.10, more F-18s launch, second strike package. | ||
| Do either of the directors want to reflect on their testimony yesterday in the context of what I just read? | ||
| Sure. One, I was not on that signal chat. | ||
| Two, I have not reviewed it. | ||
| And three, as you just indicated, that was made public this morning. | ||
|
unidentified
|
But, Director, you didn't prior to yesterday, you were on the signal chat, correct? | |
| No. Okay, but did you review the material on the signal chat? | ||
| No, I wasn't on it. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Director Gabbard? | |
| Yes, Ranking Member. | ||
| My answer yesterday was based on my recollection or the lack thereof on the details that were posted there. | ||
| I was not, and what was shared today reflects the fact that I was not directly involved with that part of the signal chat and replied at the end reflecting the effects, the very brief effects that the National Security Advisor had shared. | ||
|
unidentified
|
So it's your testimony that... | |
| Less than two weeks ago, you were on a signal chat that had all of this information about F-18s and MQ-9 Reapers and targets on strike, and you in that two-week period simply forgot that that was there. | ||
| That's your testimony? | ||
| My testimony is I did not recall the exact details of what was included there. | ||
|
unidentified
|
That was not your testimony. | |
| Your testimony was that you were not aware of anything related to weapons packages, targets, and timing. | ||
| As the testimony yesterday continued on, there were further questions related to that where I acknowledged that there was conversation about weapons, and I don't remember the exact wording that I used, but I did not recall the specific details that were included. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Director Gabbard, we've... | |
| You've reasserted that there was no classified information. | ||
| I think we can all agree that that information shouldn't have been out there. | ||
| But let me ask you this. | ||
| Are you familiar with the ODNI's classification guidance? | ||
| I'm familiar with it. | ||
|
unidentified
|
I've actually got a copy right here. | |
| If I read you a part of that guidance, I wonder if you could tell me what the level of classification indicated is. | ||
| I'm reading from your classification guidance. | ||
| Criteria is information providing indication or advance warning that the U.S. or its allies are preparing an attack. | ||
| Do you recall what your own guidance would suggest that that be classified? | ||
| I don't have the specifics in front of me, but it would point to what was shared would fall under the DOD's classification system. | ||
| And the Secretary of Defense's authority to determine what is classified and what is not. | ||
|
unidentified
|
I guess you don't have it, but information providing, and this is the ODNI guidance, information providing indication or advance warning that the U.S. or its allies are preparing an attack should be classified as top secret. | |
| Do you disagree with that? | ||
| I don't disagree with that. | ||
| I just point out that the DOD classification guidance is... | ||
| Separate from the ODNI's classification guidance. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Do you think it would be materially different? | |
| Ultimately, the Secretary of Defense holds the authority to classify or declassify. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Do you think it's likely that DOD guidance is materially different from what I just read? | |
| I haven't reviewed the DOD guidance, so I can't comment. | ||
|
unidentified
|
I haven't reviewed the DOD guidance. | |
| Director Gabbard, A lot of this suggests sort of a lack of sobriety. | ||
| When there's punch emojis and fire emojis, it's a lack of sobriety. | ||
| I don't mean that literally. | ||
| But I have one last question for you, because I think people really listen to what you have to say. | ||
| You, on March 15th, as DNI, retweeted a post from Ian Miles Chong, who is listed on RT, that's Russia Today's website, as, quote, a political and cultural commentator. | ||
| who has contributed content to RT since at least 2022. | ||
| Director Gabbert, do you think that it's responsible for you as head of the intelligence community and the principal's presidential intelligence advisor to retweet posts from individuals affiliated with Russian state media? | ||
| That retweet came from my personal account, and I would have to go back to look at the substance of the tweet. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Can I, just so that we don't have a lack of confusion amongst our allies and enemies and us, can I act perhaps that you not think that you should be saying one thing on your personal account and you say officially? | |
| I maintain my First Amendment rights to be able to express my own personal views on different issues. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Thank you. | |
| I yield back, Mr. Chairman. | ||
| The gentleman yields and I recognize the distinguished Vice Chairman, General Kelly. | ||
| Yeah, I now, for the first 30 seconds, Mr. Ratcliffe, or Director Ratcliffe, formerly known as Texas, from this Mississippi guy, I'd like to give you 30 seconds if you have anything to respond to what Ms. Gabbard just, Director Gabbard, I'm sorry, just said. | ||
| Well, Mississippi, it's good to see you again, and I appreciate the opportunity. | ||
| You know, there's so much talk about this. | ||
| Atlantic article and about things that were said and that could have happened instead of a focus on what did happen. | ||
| So my responsibility as CIA director, one of its responsibilities is to kill terrorists. | ||
| And that's exactly what I did along with President Trump's excellent national security team. | ||
| That's what we should be focused on. | ||
| With regard to that article, I also would appreciate the opportunity... | ||
| To relay the fact that yesterday I spent four hours answering questions from senators as a result of that article that were intimating that I transmitted classified information because there were hidden messages. | ||
| Those messages were revealed today and revealed that I did not transmit classified information and that the reporter, who I don't know, I think intentionally intended it to indicate that. | ||
| That reporter also indicated That I had released the name of an undercover CIA operative in that signal chat. | ||
| In fact, I had released the name of my chief of staff, who is not operating undercover. | ||
| That was deliberately false and misleading, and I appreciate the opportunity to reflect that my answers haven't changed. | ||
| I used an appropriate channel to communicate sensitive information. | ||
| It was permissible to do so. | ||
| I didn't transfer any classified information. | ||
| And at the end of the day, what is most important is that the mission was a remarkable success, is what everyone should be focused on here, because that's what did happen, not what possibly could have happened. | ||
| Thank you, Director Ratcliffe. | ||
| Director Patel, thank you for the great job that you've done. | ||
| So, first of all... | ||
| Your coordination and trying to comply with the letter that was sent last year and the year before asking for the baseball shooting of which what I got was basically what happened on the field and I was there so I don't need to know that. | ||
| Although no one from the FBI ever talked to me about what happened. | ||
| They talked to people who were not there. | ||
| But I appreciate your commitment to getting us the full unredacted report or the redactions are to protect. | ||
| Innocent people who are not part of the process, not the people who made decisions to classify that as suicide by cop, as opposed to an assassination attempt of many members of Congress, of which I was one. | ||
| Thank you for your commitment, Director Patel, because I know that you will give us... | ||
| What we have asked for so that we can put this to rest, Mr. Winstrup, myself, and several others. | ||
| Can I get your commitment to do that, Director Patel? | ||
| In fact, I just got an update, Mr. Vice Chairman, for my team. | ||
| You'll have all of those materials to you and your committee by the close of business today or at the latest tomorrow morning. | ||
|
unidentified
|
And just really quickly, Director Ratcliffe, and I don't want to go over time. | |
| I think it's so important for everybody to have their time. | ||
| Can you tell me the impact that DOGE has had? | ||
| And causing you to fire people you shouldn't have fired or released people who are instruments of national security are no longer there. | ||
| Tell me if you've had any impact specifically that DOGE has caused you to lose someone who was necessary for national security. | ||
| Given the fact that as of this date... | ||
| No one from Doge has been on the CIA campus, and I've had no direct communication with Doge other than conversations with Elon Musk at cabinet meetings. | ||
| I would say the impact is zero. | ||
| Director Patel? | ||
| I'm in a similar situation. | ||
| We do work with Doge on government efficiencies, but I have not seen any negative impacts at the FBI. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Thank you very much. | |
| And Director Gabbard, it's good to see you again, too. | ||
| You know, I think we were freshmen together, you and I and Director Ratcliffe, and I'm here and you guys are there. | ||
| Have you seen any impact across the whole IC that DOGE has caused things that you can't respond to? | ||
| Thank you, Congressman. | ||
| It's great to see you all again here. | ||
| The answer is no. | ||
| Similar with Director Ratcliffe, DOGE has not been at ODNI. | ||
| The President understands the essential national security mission that we have, and we are going through our own internal assessments to ensure we're achieving the effects in an efficient way that is responsible to the American taxpayer. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Yield back, Mr. Chairman. | |
| Gentleman yields. | ||
| Mr. Carson. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Thank you, Chairman, to the witnesses, many of whom I've worked with in the past. | |
| It appears that this year's report omitted any discussion of trends. | ||
| National concerns like global health security, infectious diseases, and the role of conflict, violence, and political instability play as drivers of migration. | ||
| Coupled with the administration's cuts to USAID and other international assistance, particularly health and humanitarian assistance, won't these reductions and eliminations increase regional instability and volatility in areas already at high risk for threats? | ||
| Was the IC consulted at all in the decisions to eliminate such critical funding, and why weren't these risks included in this year's report? | ||
| Thank you for the question, Congressman. | ||
| MTG's hearing. | ||
| Get a taste of her putting PBS under the doge watch. | ||
| Let's go to that, and we'll come back to intelligence. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Compliance with the FCC's inquiry, and we'll continue to cooperate. | |
| I remind you you're under oath and violations of the Communications Act comes with a fine up to $10,000 and possibly up to a year in prison. | ||
| Does PBS air for for-profit commercials, Ms. Kerger? | ||
|
unidentified
|
We are underwriting announcements, and we believe we are in full compliance with the FCC, and we look forward to delivering the material required in this part of this investigation. | |
| We look forward to that, too. | ||
| I'm assuming both of you are concerned about this, and that's why you brought so many attorneys with you today. | ||
| Ms. Kerger, using taxpayer subsidies, PBS-funded independent lens to make documentaries for part of your programming in 2016, real boy. | ||
| was aired about a trans teen navigating adolescent sobriety. | ||
| And the ramification of his gender identity. | ||
| In 2022, the same series aired Our League, in which a trans woman comes to her old school Ohio bowling league in a story about transition. | ||
| Then in 2024, Erases Trees was aired telling a story of how in Palm Springs, a black neighborhood fights to remove a divisive wall of trees. | ||
| Do you think PBS finds needs to fund ridiculous material such as this, that the tax... | ||
|
unidentified
|
These are documentary films that are point of view pieces that are part of our primetime schedule for adults. | |
| And parents and adults don't trust that type of programming. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Thank you. | |
| Thank you, Madam Chair. | ||
| I ask a unanimous consent to enter into the record this letter from 72 public radio stations serving rural communities across the country. | ||
| Where they emphasize how important federal funding is to the ability to provide vital public safety information. | ||
| Without objection, so ordered. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Okay. I also have a similar letter from Georgia, from the Georgia PBS NPR station also asking for consideration for federal funding. | |
| Without objection, so ordered. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Thank you. | |
| Ms. Kerger and Ms. Marr, can we talk a little bit about The educational service you provide for children of low-income families and how that is received and the trust that you've generated among families in that situation. | ||
| Yes, a significant part of our broadcast day is devoted to programming for children. | ||
| We focus on preschool. | ||
| That goes back to the legacy of Fred Rogers, who believed that media could be a tool to help to instruct children as well as a tool of entertainment. | ||
| Our programming is focused on core skills that kids need to develop before they enter school in math. | ||
| And in learning numbers and in learning letters so that kids that don't have the opportunity to be in a formal pre-K program have a chance to walk into school for the first time on equal footing with kids that have more opportunity. | ||
| And that's the heart of what we think about in the programming that we develop for kids. | ||
| I know you've done some, well, independent groups have done assessments on On trust, the trust factor that parents have on PBS Kids, which is one of your most popular services. | ||
| Can you talk about that? | ||
| Where did you come in in terms of the comparison to other stations? | ||
| Yeah, we are the most trusted media brand. | ||
| In fact, Parents Magazine this week just ran the results of a study that was done on Daniel Tiger's neighborhood, actually looking at 16-year-olds that remember some of the basic skills they learned as small children. | ||
| And what we're focused on is to make sure, again, that every child has the opportunity to learn and be excited about the world around them when they enter a school for the first time, and to give them those core basic skills that we can see they carry forward. | ||
| Ms. Maher, I'd like you to focus on the work that public media is doing in relation to public safety communications. | ||
| How important is this function of public broadcast media, particularly, I'm talking about the most rural, most remote communities in this country? | ||
| Thank you so much, Congressman. | ||
| We are part of the National Next Generation Warning System for which we've received a significant investment over the course of the last few years, and many thanks to Congress for supporting that appropriation. | ||
| Our stations are busy implementing that across the nation. | ||
| We also are part of the statewide emergency plans for more than 20 states. | ||
| You'll see the importance and value of public radio in particular. | ||
| Okay, here we go. | ||
| We're going to go back to Intel. | ||
| Two things are happening at the same time here today. | ||
| There is a hearing in which MTG is running to defund PBS and make PBS defend all this transgender and basically Marxist cultural ideology they put into little kids' heads. | ||
| And PBS not doing a very good job. | ||
| MTG on the attack there. | ||
| She's chairing that subcommittee back at the House Intelligence. | ||
| Tulsi Gabbard tripling down, Ratcliffe doubling down, going back to the testimony yesterday, said what they said was 100% accurate. | ||
| There's going to be, I'm sure, some fireworks from these Democratic congressmen as they try to chop block President Trump's intelligence team. | ||
| Big news is that the courts are getting involved. | ||
| Boesburg is taking on a civil suit against Pete Hegseth. | ||
| He's put himself right in the middle of this, as we said he would. | ||
| They're going to use the federal courts as the anvil. | ||
| The deep state's going to be the hammer. | ||
| That's what President Trump and his team are up against. | ||
| Also, Wobbly Rhinos, Wicker of South Carolina, has said that he's going to initiate a Senate Armed Services. | ||
| With probably the most recent one, in terms of 702 query reviews, we only have about 200 left when it comes to U.S. persons, and we will promulgate those findings to you. | ||
| Today, of all the U.S. persons queried in the 702 databases, there's only been one instance of negligent conduct. | ||
| We have already implemented limited access to those who actually know how to use the FISA process in 702, and we have implemented a direct reporting structure to the Office of Director and the Deputy Director to make sure that anyone... | ||
| Anyone, whether it's intentional or unintentional, abuses the 702 query system is brought to our attention immediately, and we will take that on for action directly. | ||
| And in terms of piggybacking off Director Ratcliffe's... | ||
| The public defender in me realizes the importance of constitutional due process more than anyone. | ||
| The staffer in me from the House Intelligence Committee may be the only person who has worked more on FISA reform and exposing FISA abuse than modern congressional history. | ||
| And the terrorism prosecutor in me and the JSOC civilian in me tells me that we cannot do away with 702 or FISA Title I and Title III, but we can work with you and your committee to make it better. | ||
| I don't know all those ideas. | ||
| I don't have all those answers, but you have my commitment that we will use it appropriately. | ||
| Thank you, Director. | ||
| I yield back. | ||
|
unidentified
|
The gentleman yields. | |
| Mr. Castro. | ||
| Thank you, Chairman. | ||
| Tulsi, you and I came into the Congress together in 2013. | ||
| And, Cash, you and I, I was serving on the Intelligence Committee when you worked on the Intelligence Committee. | ||
| And, John, you and I are both from Texas, and we both served together on the Intelligence Committee. | ||
| Y'all, the idea that this information, if it was presented to our committee, would not be classified, y'all know, is a lie. | ||
| That's ridiculous. | ||
| I've seen things much less sensitive be presented to us with high classification. | ||
| And to say that it isn't is a lie to the country. | ||
| I want to ask the generals now. | ||
| The NSA is principally in charge of intercepting things like signals intelligence from other countries. | ||
| General, I want to ask you, if your organization, your agency, intercepted something like this from Russia, Representative, we would be classifying based off of our sources and methods. | ||
|
unidentified
|
So those would be the things that, in terms of how we process, how we would be able to obtain the information, and how we'd report it, we would classify based off of our source and method. | |
| So if you knew that the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Advisor of Russia or China and the... | ||
| The head of the foreign ministry and all of the folks who are associated with that signal chain, if you intercepted that information, General, would you consider it classified? | ||
|
unidentified
|
So it would be classified based off of our collection. | |
| So the NSA would classify it? | ||
|
unidentified
|
Based off of the protection of our own source and method, not necessarily based off the content, but how we collected that information. | |
| But it would be classified. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Well, we certainly wouldn't be collecting on a U.S. person conversation. | |
| No, I understand. | ||
| I'm saying if you did your job and collected it from the Russian Foreign Ministry and the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of Defense and the President's Chief Advisor, there is no way, no way, having sat on this committee for nine years, That somebody would come in with that information and give us something that says, unclassified, you can walk out of this room with this information and give it to whomever you want. | ||
| You know, with all respect, you and I worked on the committee at the same time. | ||
| Tulsi, you and I came in together. | ||
| I've never had an issue of beef with you. | ||
| John, you and I are both from Texas. | ||
| Y'all know that's a lie. | ||
| It's a lie to the country. | ||
| I want to ask about the Alien Enemies Act really quick, while I have time. | ||
| The President has used the Alien Enemies Act, a wartime authority last used to detain German and Japanese nationals during World War II, to summarily deport people accused of being members of the Venezuelan gang, Tren de Agua. | ||
| To invoke this law, the President must demonstrate that the United States is under invasion by a foreign nation or government. | ||
| They have alleged that we are under invasion by the Venezuelan government. | ||
| The idea that we are at war with Venezuela would come as a surprise to most Americans. | ||
| The unclassified version of the annual threat assessment the intelligence community just released makes no mention of any invasion or war that we are fighting with the nation of Venezuela. | ||
| You would think our nation being at war would merit at least a small reference in this threat assessment. | ||
| And Director Ratcliffe, does the intelligence community assess that we are currently at war or being invaded by the nation of Venezuela? | ||
|
unidentified
|
We have no assessment that says that. | |
| Thank you. | ||
| In invoking the law, the President alleged that Trenda Agua is, quote, undertaking hostile actions against the U.S. at the direction, clandestine or otherwise, of the Maduro regime in Venezuela. | ||
| Director Gabbert, does the intelligence community assess that the Venezuelan government is directing Trenda Agua's hostile actions against the United States? | ||
| There are varied assessments that came from different intelligence community elements. | ||
| I'll defer to Director Patel to speak specifically to the FBI assessment. | ||
| But let me ask you, so you're saying there are conflicting assessments that have come from the IC? | ||
| That's correct. | ||
| Okay. Thank you. | ||
| We'll take it up in closed session. | ||
| All right. | ||
| You know, your threat assessment makes issue of highlights fentanyl trafficking as a top threat to the United States, yet support for law enforcement cooperation with Mexico has been put on hold. | ||
| And there has been a threat of invasion to Mexico by the United States. | ||
| You assess that Russia's advanced cyber capabilities make it a persistent counterintelligence cyber threat, yet the administration shut down the unit at the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Agency tasked with stopping Russian cyber attacks. | ||
| There are so many other ways that the actions of this administration have contradicted this threat assessment, and the administration is making the world and the United States more dangerous. |
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