Speaker | Time | Text |
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Gentlemen, an emergency briefing of the Secret Service announcing failure for the Trump assassinations. | ||
This is just announced. | ||
They are live right now. | ||
Here we go to the Secret Service headquarters in Washington, D.C. Let's do this. | ||
Good afternoon, everyone. | ||
Here we go. | ||
So in today's hyperdynamic threat environment, the mission of the Secret Service is clear. | ||
We cannot afford to fail. | ||
After reviewing the planning event details and coordination with partner agencies regarding the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump on July 13th, our mission assurance review is nearing its completion. | ||
As I've said, this was a failure on the part of the United States Secret Service. | ||
It's important that we hold ourselves accountable for the failures of July 13th and that we use the lessons learned To make sure that we do not have another failure like this again. | ||
The findings of the Mission Assurance Review have prompted the Secret Service to move into the accountability phase of this process. | ||
The Office of Professional Responsibility and the Office of Integrity are reviewing the findings. | ||
And as a result of these failures, what has become clear to me is we need a shift in paradigm in how we conduct our protective operations. | ||
As was demonstrated on Sunday, In West Palm Beach, the threat level is evolving and requires this paradigm shift. | ||
But here are some of the findings from this Mission Assurance Review. | ||
With respect to command and control of the site in Butler, Pennsylvania, the Secret Service has the main responsibility of building the site plan. | ||
We cannot abdicate or defer our responsibilities to others. | ||
Advance team personnel have an obligation to ensure that each site The Secret Service did not give clear guidance or direction to our local law enforcement partners. | ||
There were communication deficiencies between law enforcement personnel at the site. | ||
For example, the Secret Service did not co-locate its security room with local law enforcement. | ||
There was an over-reliance on mobile devices. | ||
Resulting in information being siloed. | ||
For example, at approximately 1810 local time, Secret Service informed personnel that local police were addressing an issue at the 3 o 'clock of the outer perimeter. | ||
At approximately 1810 local time, via phone call, the Secret Service security room calls the countersniper response agent reporting an individual on the roof of the AGR building. | ||
That vital piece of information was not relayed over the Secret Service radio network. | ||
At approximately 18.10 and 54 seconds, verified through body camera footage of local law enforcement, officers confront the assailant on the roof of the AGR building. | ||
At 18.1105, by a phone call, the site agent calls the assistant site agent to find out what exactly is going on at the 3 o 'clock. | ||
And during that call, shots ring out. | ||
At 1811.32, verified through body camera footage, the first series of shots are fired by the assailant. | ||
At 1811.36, again verified through body camera footage, a second series of shots are fired by the assailant. | ||
At 1811.47, through body camera footage, Secret Service counter snipers neutralized the threat. | ||
With respect to diligence, line of sight issues were acknowledged, but not properly mitigated. | ||
Issues were encountered the day of the visit with respect to line of sight concerns, but they were not escalated to supervisors. | ||
While some members of the advance team were very diligent, there was complacency on the part of others that led to a breach of security protocols. | ||
With respect to accountability, the Mission Assurance Review has identified deficiencies in the advanced planning and its implementation by Secret Service personnel. | ||
These employees will be held accountable, and this agency has among the most robust table of penalties in the entirety of the federal government. | ||
And these penalties will be administered according to our disciplinary process. | ||
Due to federal regulations, I cannot get into personnel matters. | ||
As they are proceeding. | ||
With respect to a paradigm shift, we're at a pivotal moment in the history of the Secret Service and at a pivotal moment in the history of our country. | ||
And I've directed that the Secret Service embark on a significant paradigm shift that will redefine how we conduct protective operations. | ||
What occurred on Sunday demonstrates that the threat environment in which the Secret Service operates is tremendous and under constant threat. | ||
And we've been in this heightened and increasingly dynamic threat environment since July 13th. | ||
This reality has necessitated that we significantly increase our protective footprint, and we've already begun to do so following the events of July 13th. | ||
This increased operational tempo requires additional resources to not only account for costs being incurred today, but ensure that we have the tools, the technology, and personnel needed To meet these new requirements and execute our mission going forward. | ||
The paradigm shift will be a driving force to move the Secret Service from a state of reaction to a state of readiness. | ||
And the vision is for the Secret Service to be more agile, with the ability to escalate protection to the highest levels for numerous protectees for undetermined periods of time. | ||
But in order to do this, we need additional personnel, technical assets, and equipment for the sustainment of immediate protection. | ||
And future needs. | ||
Our personnel have been in a state of hypervigilance following July 13th. | ||
We are certainly working our people hard, and I've used this term publicly, redlining. | ||
This cannot be about working our people harder. | ||
So with respect to changes, the workforce, the American public, they can expect changes in our processes for advances. | ||
There will be an increased use of technology, not only to assist in communications, but also situational awareness when we're doing our protective mission. | ||
There will be organizational changes. | ||
For example, I've already directed the creation of an applied research and development section to field new technologies, leverage the research of other government agencies, and calibrate our technical security assets to stay ahead of threat vectors. | ||
This will be an iterative process, meaning it will be constantly evaluated, validated, updated, and evolving. | ||
We cannot be stagnant. | ||
And we must be weaned off the reliance of partners within DHS to assist us during high operational times. | ||
The Secret Service should be self-reliant outside of national special security events. | ||
However, we recognize that we will always need assistance From our partners within the Department of Homeland Security and our partners at the Department of Defense. | ||
And I want to take this moment now also to thank our workforce. | ||
I want to conclude by thanking the men and women of the Secret Service who are working tirelessly. | ||
This summer, we experienced an unprecedented operational tempo for our agency. | ||
Within a 45-day period, the Secret Service successfully implemented our operational security planning at three national special security events, the NATO Summit, the Republican National Convention, We successfully protected both the presidential debate in Philadelphia and multiple protective visits commemorating the anniversary of the September 11th attacks. | ||
All of this took place while protecting major party candidates on the campaign trail. | ||
This high operational tempo continues as the Secret Service prepares. | ||
For the United Nations General Assembly next week, where we expect to protect more than 140 visiting world leaders and heads of state. | ||
I am proud of all that we've accomplished in a very difficult and tumultuous time for the agency. | ||
And I recognize and thank the men and women of the Secret Service and their families for continuing to make great sacrifices in support of our enduring mission. | ||
And with that, I will take questions. | ||
unidentified
|
Hello, tell me about everything you're doing. | |
Director, given all of the attention Wow. | ||
Sir, given all the attention and scrutiny related to these events, do you believe your highest level protectees will now need to campaign differently in how they organize their events and in how they live their daily lives? | ||
Things like trips to golf courses or recreational time. | ||
Will they have to live differently in order to be safe? | ||
Well, ultimately, Kelly, this is the responsibility of the Secret Service to make sure that we provide. | ||
We want them to make sure that they can live their lives with some type of normalcy, but they must do so with us providing the highest levels of protection, which we have been doing since July 13th. | ||
And so it's ultimately our responsibility to make sure that wherever our protectees go, we are creating a safe environment. | ||
And that comes back to us being able to use Our methodologies, to use our redundancies, our systems that we have in place to create those secure environments. | ||
So since July 13th, we have been securing successfully outdoor events. | ||
And what you're seeing is an increased use of assets, increased use of ballistic glass. | ||
So we certainly make sure that when they are out there in an outdoor venue. | ||
That we are using our protective methodologies to create that safe environment. | ||
unidentified
|
Thank you for taking the time. | |
Could you just go into a bit more detail about the conversations you had with Trump campaign staff about the selection of the Butler site? | ||
That Secret Service agents saw it as a challenge and staff wanted to have the rally there. | ||
Did the staff go against your recommendation? | ||
Can you speak to exactly what was said and what the outcome was? | ||
So, listen, the staff chooses a site and ultimately it's on the Secret Service to secure it. | ||
So when the site was selected, the advance team went about identifying areas of concern. | ||
The AGR building was one of those hazards that was identified. | ||
But let me just be clear, Maria. | ||
Ultimately, it is the Secret Service's responsibility to secure a site. | ||
We certainly have conversations, and it doesn't matter whether it's a campaign staff or a White House staff. | ||
We have conversations, and we have very good working relationships with those staffs. | ||
But ultimately, it is the Secret Service's responsibility to secure a site. | ||
unidentified
|
Director, thank you. | |
Based on your review and analysis, what is the reason, what's the best explanation for why there was not law enforcement personnel covering the roof, physically on the roof itself, or making sure someone could not get on top of the roof? | ||
And the follow-up question would be, how disappointed are you in what you described as deficiencies in diligence? | ||
Sure. | ||
So ultimately, Pierre, we have to be very direct and clear when we're talking to our state and local counterparts. | ||
With respect to Butler, I think what the Mission Assurance Review has identified is that there was that lack of clarity. | ||
I can tell you since July 13th, when I've been out on the road and I've watched field offices and I gave guidance upon becoming the acting director to the field, we have to be very clear when we're talking to our state and local partners. | ||
We value those relationships with them. | ||
We need them to be assisting us and be shoulder to shoulder with us. | ||
And it appears that there was that lack of clarity with respect to Butler. | ||
And go again with your follow-up here. | ||
unidentified
|
There was a lack of clarity that that was the period for the time. | |
There was a discussion about how the roof was going to be secured, and I think what it came back to is we should have challenged how that mechanism was being implemented, meaning we should have been more direct. | ||
We cannot be overly deferential to state and local law enforcement. | ||
Ultimately, it's our responsibility, and so we just have to be very clear when we're asking them for support. | ||
They want to help us, and what we found is that in this... | ||
In the Mission Assurance interviews, it became apparent that in comparison to prior visits to that area, there was one prior visit in 2020 that there was a lack of assertion with respect to what exactly state and locals would have to require or would be required to support that advance. | ||
unidentified
|
What the hell? | |
Dude, just blame local law enforcement again. | ||
Well, I'm not going to get into employee disciplinary matters, but what I can tell you is the men and women of the Secret Service are dedicated professionals. | ||
And so while July 13th is a failure, we're not proud of it, but we certainly have been rising to this moment. | ||
The men and women in the field are rising to this moment. | ||
They are working tirelessly to make sure that the people we protect are safe. | ||
And so I will never be disappointed in our folks. | ||
I am proud of this agency. | ||
I am proud of our people. | ||
unidentified
|
Hi, thanks so much for doing this. | |
On the question of the AGR buildings, is there a process that's standard for the day of the event that somebody from the Secret Service looks around and makes sure all of the assets are where they are? | ||
And since the roof of the AGR building was such a glaring omission, why didn't anybody raise that issue at the time? | ||
Or secondly, in the security room, look and say, I don't see any local police in here. | ||
How are we going to hear them? | ||
Right. | ||
And I think that was a failure to challenge our assumptions. | ||
The assumption that local police... | ||
We're going to have more of a presence in that AGR building. | ||
Getting back to your question, there is that diligence that has to be done by the side agents to make sure that, hey, all of the assets are in place. | ||
And so there was an assumption that they had it covered, but there clearly was not that follow-up to make sure. | ||
unidentified
|
But is there a process that you look around, like a punch list, and check it off? | |
It is part of the principles of our advance and our protective methodology. | ||
unidentified
|
Okay. | |
And secondly, just to follow up on the campaign question, you said it's ultimately the Secret Service's responsibility. | ||
So when there's a disagreement between the campaign and the Secret Service on a security issue, who has the last word? | ||
So it's not about disagreement. | ||
It's about a negotiation. | ||
They certainly don't want any harm to come to their principle. | ||
And so they respect us. | ||
And so usually what it boils down to is escalating it up to a supervisor and a senior staff level. | ||
What I can tell you is that if there were discrepancies, and there were, regarding how the site was supposed to have been secured, how supervisors were briefed, and supervisors reported in their mission assurance interviews that they envisioned Thank | ||
unidentified
|
you, sir. | |
I have two questions that are related. | ||
The first is looking forward. | ||
The House just voted within the last couple of hours unanimously from those that were president in the chamber to give presidential candidates the exact same Secret Service protection as sitting presidents. | ||
My first question is, can you handle that? | ||
We've been doing that since July 13th, David. | ||
unidentified
|
So what is the purpose of the bill? | |
I don't know. | ||
You'd have to ask members of Congress that. | ||
What I can tell you is that when I say the highest levels of Secret Service protection, the former president is getting tactical assets. | ||
He's getting everything that the current president has with respect to Secret Service assets. | ||
unidentified
|
And that was my second question. | |
Can you explain that former President Trump is getting the same protection as President Biden and Vice President Harris? | ||
Because a lot of... | ||
Members of Congress on Capitol Hill are skeptical about that. | ||
There's a lot of talks saying clearly he didn't have the same protection because if he did, the golf course would have been secure in West Palm Beach. | ||
Can you tell people what's going on with that? | ||
So with respect to West Palm Beach, what I can tell you without getting into our TTPs, our techniques, our tactics, our procedures, what I can tell you is that on that day, there were counter-sniper elements that were present with the former president. | ||
On the golf course, in proximity. | ||
There was an entire counter-assault team that was there, in proximity. | ||
There was also a jump team, in proximity. | ||
The advance agent, who was part of the first element, whose goal was to sweep ahead, did his job. | ||
That young man is a very young agent, early in his career. | ||
His vigilance, his reaction, is exactly how we trained and exactly what we want our personnel to do. | ||
He identified a threat, an individual with a long gun. | ||
And he made swift decisions and took a swift action to be able to mitigate that. | ||
No shot was fired at the former president. | ||
The former president was not exposed to where he was on the golf course. | ||
And what I've said, and I said this Monday, that the procedures work. | ||
The redundancies work. | ||
So that high level of protection is working. | ||
unidentified
|
Oh, my God. | |
Thank you very much for doing this. | ||
Two questions, just one on West Palm Beach. | ||
The busy public road that is adjacent to that sixth hole where the suspect was hiding is a well-known blind spot on that specific golf course. | ||
Why did no one within the U.S. Secret Service sweep behind that fence line for threats? | ||
They were sweeping ahead, Nicole. | ||
So what I just explained is that that element, that lead element, was going ahead sweeping. | ||
unidentified
|
But was there anyone behind the fence where the road was sweeping there to see if anyone was in the bushes? | |
Having been there and seen the vantage point, whether they were on the public side or the private side, the bottom line is the individual was detected. | ||
unidentified
|
On Butler, you testified before Congress that all assets requested for the Butler rally by Trump's detail were approved. | |
But there are Secret Service assets that may have prevented the tragedy on July 13th, most notably a counter-assault advance team that would have surveyed the site ahead of time or enhanced counter-drone protection that might have prevented the tragedy. | ||
Were those specific assets requested by Trump's detail? | ||
If they were, were they denied? | ||
And if they weren't, why weren't they requested? | ||
So the counter assault team had an element that was there that had embedded with local law enforcement. | ||
So we had tactical elements in place. | ||
The counter assault team leader that day had been in direct contact. | ||
unidentified
|
But just to be clear, did the Trump detail ask for any additional resources that were denied by the Secret Service? | |
So based on the asset, based on the information I have right now, the asset request, all of those assets that were asked for were were approved. | ||
And so what we're looking at now is were there any additional ones that came in through other channels? | ||
So but what I can tell you, based on the information I have now, the assets were approved. | ||
unidentified
|
I've got a phone to see you. | |
Thank you. | ||
Thank you. | ||
Two questions. | ||
When we're talking about Florida and the idea that this was the Secret Service working as it should, Does this mean that no security will change for Trump when he goes golfing again? | ||
Well, I think what we try to do, Holmes, after every incident, we look at it. | ||
What could we have done better? | ||
We look at everything. | ||
And it doesn't matter whether there's a critical incident that occurs. | ||
So we are looking and we're reevaluating to look at, do we need? | ||
I've had conversations with Sheriff Bradshaw in Palm Beach County. | ||
And so I will leave it to the local field office to carry on those conversations. | ||
About making changes. | ||
That's where I'll leave that. | ||
unidentified
|
And then on Butler, if we can drill down on the specific timeline a little bit. | |
At 608, we know that a local radio call went out that a man was on the roof. | ||
Now, my understanding is that the state police were in a separate area with locals and their job was to communicate any local chatter to the Secret Service. | ||
Why was that 608 radio call not communicated to Secret Service or was it? | ||
By the state police. | ||
So the information I have is that we had a member of the Pennsylvania State Police in our security room, and that's what spurs that phone call to the countersniper response agent at 1810. | ||
unidentified
|
And so the state police never communicated a local radio call at 608? | |
What I'm saying is that the personnel that was in the security room passed that information, and that triggers the 1810 phone call. | ||
unidentified
|
Okay. | |
Go to Rebecca Beach with the health. | ||
Hi. | ||
I know Congress has sounded a little resistant lately in terms of what it might do for funding for the Secret Service. | ||
Given the sort of paradigm shift that you've laid out today, I'm curious what you'll be looking for from Congress and sort of what you're seeking from lawmakers to carry that out. | ||
We've been briefing. | ||
We've been providing information. | ||
Right now, I do think that Congress has questions. | ||
We're responding to those questions and providing them information. | ||
But at the end of the day, I think everybody wants a strong Secret Service, and that's what I'm working towards. | ||
That's what members are working towards. | ||
And so we'll continue to have those conversations. | ||
We'll go to Claudia with Univision. | ||
unidentified
|
Hi, thank you so much for doing this. | |
Republicans in Congress, they want the same level of security than the president for the candidates. | ||
How realistic is really that? | ||
Can you be more specific on that? | ||
I know you Can a candidate have the same level of security of a sitting president? | ||
And also, what changes are we expecting in the security area where most of the incidents happened? | ||
So how I approach that, Claudia, is this. | ||
The way the Secret Service is structured, the President of the United States has the highest level of protection of any world leader, period, the end. | ||
The number of assets that the Secret Service provides and the Department of Defense provides is at the highest levels. | ||
Those same highest levels with respect to the Secret Service are being provided to the former president's detail. | ||
And so when it comes to maintaining this, where we are at right now is we have finite resources. | ||
The way we are structured with some of our classified assets, with some of our personnel, And with some of our programs that are definitely designed to support the president and vice president. | ||
We've now expanded that to include the former president. | ||
And so while we can do this, it is certainly, we are burning through a lot of assets and resources. | ||
And that's the argument that we've been trying to show. | ||
This isn't some pie in the sky trying to say, hey, we want this now. | ||
We are not capitalizing on a crisis. | ||
We are showing the math. | ||
We have finite resources and we are stretching those resources to their maximum right now, which is going to require us to replace these assets. | ||
It's going to require us to also adjust, to look at this and evaluate that if we have to do this again or do it because of some other situation that we have no other control of, we have to be able to sustain that for an indefinite period of time. | ||
And so I am hopeful and I am certainly engaged in these discussions. | ||
And I feel like at the end, we will get there because we have no other choice. | ||
unidentified
|
What changes are you going to make outside of the secure area? | |
That zone where everything happens? | ||
The outer perimeter. | ||
So I think that's where we have to be very direct and clear with our state and local partners as to what we're asking of them. | ||
unidentified
|
Thank you. | |
Thank you, Acting Director. | ||
I've got two questions. | ||
The first, it's our understanding it takes anywhere from four to ten years for an agent to go through the training that rises them up to a presidential detail level. | ||
You've described a manpower issue. | ||
Given that, do you think that training timeframe might change so you can expedite getting more officers to a presidential detail, should you need that? | ||
So we're not going to drop standards, Joe. | ||
We have not dropped standards. | ||
You do need to develop those agents. | ||
When agents start, you cannot put them on the highest level of protecting and protectee. | ||
When they graduate from our training facility, they go to a field. | ||
They do advances. | ||
They do criminal investigations. | ||
The importance of having that, what we call phase one. | ||
That's where those agents that are doing federal investigations, that are interfacing with local law enforcement, those are skills that they learn, analytic skills, how to conduct a federal investigation, how to interact with a U.S. attorney, how to interact with a state or local agency. | ||
And all the while they're doing that, they're also popping in and out doing protection, whether they're doing it in New York City for a United Nations General Assembly, or they're doing it in advance for a visiting head of state or world leader that comes into their field office district. | ||
That's where they cultivate and sharpen those skills, and it will take them up until probably four years. | ||
Ideally, that sweet spot is between the fourth and fifth year where we send them off to a permanent detail. | ||
That's where we are getting to as far as the career path. | ||
And so it's critically important that we make sure that we still develop people. | ||
Being on the presidential protective division or the vice presidential detail, it is a very, very high-pressure situation. | ||
It requires a lot of maturity. | ||
It requires decision-making, analytic skills, and the ability to problem solve. | ||
And it takes time to develop those skills, even though we've put you through training. | ||
The more seasoning you have in the field, the better off you're going to be as far as being a protection agent. | ||
unidentified
|
So then how do you address the manpower issue quickly? | |
So right now, we've had robust hiring. | ||
This year, by the time we close out the fiscal year, we're going to hire more than 400 special agents this year. | ||
Right now, it looks like we're going to have a net gain in the hundreds, triple-digit net gains, something that we have not seen in a little while. | ||
I can tell you that applications right now are at an all-time high for applicants seeking employment with the United States Secret Service. | ||
So I do believe that we are going to meet this. | ||
We have no choice. | ||
We have the 2028 Summer Olympics ahead of us in Los Angeles. | ||
The Secret Service will be responsible for the security planning of that. | ||
That is going to require a tremendous amount of personnel, tremendous amount of resources, and a tremendous amount of collaboration with state and local and other federal partners. | ||
We are going to get there. | ||
We are getting there now. | ||
We have filled all of our training classes going into this next fiscal year. | ||
So we're getting there. | ||
We have turned the corner. | ||
We're showing those metrics to Congress. | ||
And I think that's the question that they've had, and we are going to show them that we can deliver on this. | ||
unidentified
|
And just second question is, former President Trump has said that he is going to the Alabama-Georgia football game this weekend. | |
Are those kinds of events particularly concerning, given he could be around tens, if not hundreds of thousands of people? | ||
So I'm not going to comment on protecting schedules. | ||
What I'll tell you is that each event is complex and each advance is different. | ||
And those advanced teams, they know what they have to do to make a secure environment for our protectees. | ||
unidentified
|
Thank you for doing this. | |
You said we were now moving into the accountability phase of this Butler investigation. | ||
You did not want to discuss names of who might be punished, so to speak. | ||
But can you give us more detail, at least maybe how many people would face punishment or repercussions for what happened in Butler? | ||
At what levels of the organization those people represent? | ||
And what level of punishment, again, they may face. | ||
So, again, I can't comment on this. | ||
This is a personnel matter that is still pending. | ||
What I will tell you is that I have not asked for anybody to retire. | ||
That was not. | ||
I know some of that was reported. | ||
That is false. | ||
And with respect to the disciplinary process, it will be handled in accordance with our table of penalties. | ||
That will be led by the Office of Integrity in coordination with our Office of Professional Responsibility. | ||
unidentified
|
And then one follow-up as well. | |
So no one's being fired. | ||
unidentified
|
Making things more robust, more agents in the field, this type of thing. | |
This is not the first presidential election you guys have had to secure. | ||
So why weren't all those moves put in place prior to this year's election? | ||
So the former president has had robust security around him since he left office. | ||
more robust than prior former presidents. | ||
unidentified
|
Thank you. | |
Thank you, Acting Director Rowe, Jackson Richmond, Epoch Times. | ||
Has security been adjusted or increased following the Florida attempted assassination attempt? | ||
After all, according to Congressman Matt Gaetz, a DHS official has warned that there are five assassination teams targeting former President Trump. | ||
The official warned that there isn't enough protection to deal with that level of threat. | ||
Are you aware of this assessment, and what is the Secret Service doing to respond? | ||
So I will tell you, as I mentioned earlier, we, of course, are evaluating coming out of West Palm Beach and we're having those conversations with state and locals. | ||
I'm not going to talk about unnamed sourcing or the report you mentioned. | ||
I'm not familiar with that. | ||
unidentified
|
And local law enforcement doesn't have the same training that Secret Service agents do. | |
Will the Secret Service be training local law enforcement ahead of events as to prevent another butler? | ||
So right now we're actually having some very good discussions with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center about developing a curriculum to assist our state and local partners. | ||
And what I'll say is some of the things that we've been talking about, our state and local partners, and I know people have said they're not trained like the Secret Service. | ||
Men and women of law enforcement protect their communities every day. | ||
They understand how to handle a crisis situation. | ||
They understand how to respond to a violent felony in progress. | ||
They know what their jobs are. | ||
We certainly, when we ask them and enlist their assistance, we're relying on them. | ||
So I think it's important that we always try to give back to them, whether it's through training or forensic support or investigative support. | ||
And so one of the things that we're contemplating now is partnering with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to develop not only a law enforcement guide, But also develop a training curriculum through FLETC with a cadre of Secret Service personnel to be able to train them in the principles of advance. | ||
And that will only help them when dignitaries come to their district or perhaps if they're protecting a mayor or a locally elected official. | ||
So we're all about giving back to them. | ||
Next month, we're going to unveil a guide on how to come up with a multidisciplinary threat assessment team that's going to be led by our National Threat Assessment Center. | ||
So we are very, very in tune with what our state and local partners, how they support us, and we are constantly evaluating what we can do to not only bolster those relationships, but give back to them. | ||
unidentified
|
Thank you. | |
I guess I would just ask... | ||
Guys, I don't know. | ||
You guys have really covered it. | ||
I'm sorry. | ||
I'm going to give my questions. | ||
You only get one. | ||
unidentified
|
Thank you. | |
Rebecca would be associated with that. | ||
I'm going to go back to the line of sight issues and the roof issues. | ||
Can you just lay out very clearly who was responsible for security on those roofs? | ||
Was it the locals? | ||
What was the plan? | ||
And how did it fail? | ||
And then also, secondly, you keep talking about a paradigm shift, but what does that mean? | ||
Can you kind of detail what you mean by that? | ||
So with respect to the AGR building, and that's where you're going for, right? | ||
When we construct a site, not only are we worried about who can get into a site, but also who can look into that site. | ||
So there should have been clear direction about what we needed done at the AGR building. | ||
That was discussed during the advance. | ||
But I think there was a lack of follow-through based on the information I have now and what I'm seeing. | ||
There should have been better follow-through in some aspects of that, about access control to that property, about access control to the collateral property of the AGR building. | ||
And so it was about not giving the state and locals clearer direction on what we needed done. | ||
With respect to the paradigm shift, this is about looking at the organization holistically. | ||
For example, the communications issue. | ||
Communications were problematic. | ||
And I think where I'm looking at is we need to have communications that are more closely aligned to the operations. | ||
And so coming out of July 13th, what I've seen and the direction I gave is we have to be very efficient with where we're putting our security rooms. | ||
Recently, I was on a visit where, again, similar to Butler, where there was a unified command post. | ||
Just as there was in Butler, there was one at this location. | ||
Where not only did you have emergency services and so far as fire life safety. | ||
But you had emergency management officials. | ||
You had the highway patrol and the state police in that room. | ||
You had local law enforcement in that room. | ||
You had secret service agents in that room monitoring frequencies and listening to what was going on on those state and local networks. | ||
In addition to that, the locals were flying a drone in proximity to the site. | ||
That drone feed was being beamed into that unified command post and our agents had total domain awareness about what was going on. | ||
Also, they had traffic cams. | ||
They were able to pipe in those traffic cams into that unified command post. | ||
That is the model by which our field, they have taken this to heart, and those special agents in the field are now having those conversations, and they are directing exactly what we need, and they're posting our people exactly where we need to be so that when our protectees are in a site, we have total awareness of what's going on around us, and we have total awareness of what's being communicated on those local networks. | ||
unidentified
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And if I could just follow up with one question. | |
Down in West Palm Beach, on the evening of the attempted assassination down there, the local chief, I believe it was Bradshaw, had said that during when Trump was president, there would have been a lot more security around the perimeter, but basically now the Secret Service does the best that they can. | ||
But you've said that he has got the highest levels of security now. | ||
I mean, can you compare and contrast? | ||
Is it the same now as he would have been getting while he was the sitting president? | ||
So what I'll say is the former president has the highest levels of Secret Service protection, and I think the sheriff actually went back and clarified his statement, so I would point you to that. | ||
unidentified
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I believe he did that on Monday. | |
Thank you, Director. | ||
I wanted to ask about Sunday's incident as well. | ||
Is it your view? | ||
I know you've talked about the procedures working as intended. | ||
Is it your view that there wasn't any type of security lapse that allowed that armed individual to get within a few hundred yards of the former president? | ||
Well, I can tell you, as we're looking at it from an after-action report, looking at reviewing that. | ||
But what I think it goes to show is that that's why we have tripwires. | ||
That's why we have systems out there. | ||
That's why we have redundancies built into our protective model. | ||
And that's what was demonstrated on Sunday. | ||
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And in terms of the report, I mean, what specifically will be different on the ground now? | |
For instance, are you, you know, mandating that command posts have both Secret Service and local law enforcement in them? | ||
Will law enforcement have to communicate on the same frequencies? | ||
Are there any sort of practical changes that you've made that are in effect, you know, based on the report? | ||
Yeah, so security room location, right? | ||
Being where local law enforcement is, right? | ||
The broad use of technical security assets, ballistic glass. | ||
Leveraging partnerships with the Department of Defense to be able to move materials, move personnel across the country in support of a nominee. | ||
So those are things that we've been doing post July 14th. | ||
And those are things that are going to probably be in existence in perpetuity moving forward. | ||
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I had a. | |
I also had a question about Florida. | ||
Can you say whether there's any indication that this suspect might have surveilled golf courses anytime before Sunday or what led him to choose that day to be there for maybe 12 hours? | ||
So it's an active investigation, so I would refer you to the FBI for that. | ||
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And can you say anything more about golf courses are sprawling open places? | |
Anything that would be publicly visible that you could say, here is how we are beefing up protection when a protectee is on a golf course? | ||
So again, what I've said, and I'll continue to do this, and I have to be very mindful of our techniques, our tactics, and our procedures. | ||
It is probably not good to continuously not only talk about Secret Service procedures, because we're telegraphing to adversaries. | ||
We're telegraphing to people who probably would intend to do harm to our protectees. | ||
But what I will tell you is that our model, our protective model, consists of multiple layers and redundancies. | ||
The outer, the middle, the inner, those are the layers. | ||
And then we have redundancies built into that. | ||
And so with respect to golf courses or any open venue, we apply those methodologies. | ||
unidentified
|
Ellen Gilmer with Bloomberg will be next. | |
Thanks, Action Director. | ||
With regard to your conversation, Your conversations on Capitol Hill. | ||
Can you talk about, for resources, do you need to have a specific dollar amount included in an upcoming CR to make things work, or would the anomaly language that the administration had previously requested, is that something you can live with? | ||
I'm not going to get into specifics because we're having those conversations, and out of respect for the confidentiality of those discussions, I'm not going to disclose a number. | ||
What I'll tell you is that we've... | ||
We've made several presentations. | ||
We're working at the staff level, and we're having those conversations, and they're ongoing. | ||
unidentified
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And related to that, you mentioned earlier you want Secret Service to wean itself from relying on other components of DHS in its protective mission. | |
Is that contingent on getting those additional resources, either right now or at some point in the appropriations process? | ||
Well, I don't want to rule out that we'll never have to enlist the assistance of others through requests for assistance, and we do those memorandums. | ||
And we did that back for several presidential campaign cycles. | ||
But I think the importance here is we have to be able to, at a moment's notice, surge people to where they need to go. | ||
And if we're going to be having to mitigate, and that's what we do. | ||
We're in the risk mitigation business. | ||
We are not in the risk elimination business. | ||
And so we have to be able to have the personnel, the assets. | ||
And be able to spread those out for an indefinite period of time in the event that another situation, a geopolitical conflict, or some other tension requires us to do so. | ||
unidentified
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You've addressed the golf course incident in great detail, but I just want to ask, are you fully satisfied with The way the Secret Service managed the Florida incident on the golf course, or would you change anything? | |
Can you answer the question that way? | ||
I'd say based on the information I have right now, I say that that situation was managed according to our training. | ||
As soon as our agent discovered the individual, took swift action and took steps to neutralize that threat. | ||
Immediately upon doing so, He communicated over the radio. | ||
There was a communication of shots fired, which immediately, not only did our personnel assign to the close protection of the former president hear the shots, they immediately went into action. | ||
The counter assault team went into action. | ||
The counter snipers went into action. | ||
Supervisors and shift personnel immediately evacuated the president, took the most expedient route to where he needed to shelter in place. | ||
He had ballistic protection around him. | ||
They sheltered in place until they could determine, was this just the first wave of an attack? | ||
Immediately, local law enforcement assets responded to the scene. | ||
Local tactical assets that were partnered with their counter-assault team were also present, immediately responded. | ||
And so that barrier, those layers of protection, those redundancies, the redundancy was the agent that first discovered, followed by another set of agents that also set up That middle perimeter around the shift that was evacuating. | ||
And so in the case of West Palm Beach, based on the information I have now, and again, we will review it, it appears that those agents, those supervisors, made swift decisions and made correct decisions. | ||
unidentified
|
Hi, Acting Director. | |
I want to drill down on this issue of resources. | ||
You sent a letter to Senator Murphy and to Senator Britt on September 5th, and it became public. | ||
And it said in the letter you wrote, we do not believe that the security failures of July 13th, 2024 was the result of a lack of resources. | ||
I'm hearing you talk over and over again. | ||
And it says here at the bottom of this press release you guys have today, the agency must increase its protective requirements. | ||
How do you square those two things? | ||
How do you ask Congress for more money when you yourself have determined that what happened on January or July 13th was not a lack of resources? | ||
So how I square that is as follows. | ||
Following July 13th, We immediately took steps to elevate the vice president, the former president, to the highest levels of Secret Service protection. | ||
We also took steps to elevate the protection of Senator Vance and eventually Governor Walz to high levels of Secret Service protection. | ||
And what I was talking about earlier is the way we are structured. | ||
And I go back to this. | ||
The president of the United States is the most highly protected individual on the face of the world. | ||
That is how the Secret Service is built. | ||
That is what we are primarily focused on. | ||
And then once you have those assets and resources, they are also committed to the vice president. | ||
So how I square this is as follows. | ||
Following July 13th, when now we are, because of this hyperdynamic threat and the operational environment at which we find ourselves in, we only have so much of those assets to go around. | ||
And so while we are providing them to the former president, we are providing them to the president, to the vice president, to other protectees. | ||
And so at this point, what I'm telling Congress is we can do this and we will do this, but there has to be a replacement. | ||
There has to be life cycle replacement on this. | ||
There has to be, if we're going to be called upon to do this again or do this now, because the threat is not weaning. | ||
The threat is not going to evaporate anytime soon. | ||
And so we have to be prepared for this. | ||
And that is the argument that we have been making, and we have certainly made some inroads, and we're having these productive conversations with the Hill. | ||
unidentified
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Can I just ask you also, will the Secret Service have the resources to protect the Capitol on January 6th? | |
I know that's now been designated. | ||
The agency will be leading the protective services detail for that day. | ||
You're describing protecting all these different people right now. | ||
How will January 6th play out? | ||
So the January 6th proceedings were designated a national special security event. | ||
We are the lead security planner for that. | ||
But again, we have great partnerships with all the law enforcement agencies in Washington, D.C., and most notably the U.S. Capitol Police, which are our partners when we do the State of the Union or when we do any event at the Capitol that rises to a national special security event, like the State of the Union or a state funeral. | ||
unidentified
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So you feel confident you will have the personnel, technical assets, and equipment you need for that day? | |
We will have what we need. | ||
Director, last question. | ||
unidentified
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It's going to go to the pool. | |
We'll talk. | ||
Do you think that by Congress legislating the protective detail regulations, do you think that is helpful in terms of being able to staff up or staff down the agency when you need? | ||
So I have not done an analysis of the legislation. | ||
I assume it's pretty direct. | ||
But look, as I stated, I'm sure Congress wants to make sure that the Secret Service is strong. | ||
I don't know the intentions behind this piece of legislation. | ||
But what I'll just point back to, coming out of Butler, coming out of July 13th, we've been providing the highest levels of Secret Service protection to the former president. | ||
unidentified
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Thank you. | |
All right. | ||
Thank you, everyone. | ||
Okay, so that was complete garbage and trash. | ||
And we apologize for one programming error, which is something that actually wrecked a couple of reporters who weren't planning on this. | ||
Here's Susan Crabtree, who's featured multiple times, reporting on the Secret Service. | ||
She's the best Secret Service reporter in the country right now, reporting on the failures of the Secret Service. | ||
And she's saying, because this was such a late announcement, they announced they would be going live with a press conference in less than an hour. | ||
Nobody knew about this. | ||
We had ended our show and everything. | ||
Nobody knew about this. | ||
And they decided... | ||
To send it out, and here we have Suvis and Crabtree saying announcement at 1pm press conference. | ||
They didn't want real reporters in there asking real questions. | ||
And you know what? | ||
They didn't get any real answers. | ||
What went wrong in Butler? | ||
We don't know. | ||
What went wrong in Palm Beach? | ||
We don't know. | ||
Did you know the shooter? | ||
We don't know. | ||
Why wasn't there drones being used? | ||
We don't know. | ||
Why did you let a guy shoot Trump on the closest building to where Trump was speaking? | ||
Oh, the local cops. | ||
Still blaming, man. | ||
This jackass. | ||
Still blaming. | ||
Susan Crabtree, furious. | ||
She's an excellent reporter. | ||
Announces 1 p.m. press conference reporters like me who are just hearing about it. | ||
I have to scramble over there without knowing whether I can get into the building. | ||
She couldn't because she didn't get in. | ||
She didn't ask a question. | ||
Is this on purpose? | ||
Most definitely, yes. | ||
I have no doubt that other reporters were informed well ahead of time and given personal limitations. | ||
Just for the record, I was not one of them. | ||
I have a cell phone and I'm on all their contact and media listservs. | ||
So they were keeping good reporters out, Susan Crabtree, reporting for real clear politics, not a small outlet, a very big and prominent outlet. | ||
This is on the heels of the House passing unanimously a vote to increase presidential security for all candidates. | ||
This was the slide of the day that Director Rowe used, showing that at 6.10, the Secret Service radio informed personnel that local police would be addressing an issue. | ||
Just an issue. | ||
Not a madman with a gun pointing it at Trump. | ||
Just an issue at 3 o 'clock. | ||
U.S. Secret Service security room. | ||
Counter-sniper response special agent. | ||
That doesn't even make any sense. | ||
Body camera footage. | ||
Officers confront shooter in the AGR building. | ||
So you have officers confronting shooter right here. | ||
A minute later. | ||
This is how bad their comms are. | ||
So less than a minute later. | ||
54 seconds later. | ||
You have an officer confronting the actual gunman? | ||
The gunman was lurking around for hours. | ||
This is why we call him Lunkhead. | ||
Idiot. | ||
1812. | ||
I'm sorry. | ||
So it's 6.11 p.m. | ||
Sight agent to assistant special sight agent. | ||
unidentified
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Oh, okay. | |
All the sight agents are calling each other. | ||
There's a guy with a gun. | ||
Get the effing president off the stage. | ||
What is wrong? | ||
Listening to this made me so angry. | ||
It's why I mute myself. | ||
When we're listening to this, I'll scream. | ||
I'll scream. | ||
Then you have the first series of shots fired. | ||
First series of shots fired. | ||
Second series of shots fired. | ||
Here at 6-11. | ||
And then the counter-sniper engages a full, so look at this, a full nearly 20 seconds after the first shots fired. | ||
The shot happens 20 seconds. | ||
The guy had 20 seconds to fire. | ||
There was no communication. | ||
Timeline of events. | ||
This isn't a timeline of events, dumbass. | ||
We've studied this, sir. | ||
In all due respect, we've studied this. | ||
We have snipers on the ground who are telling us that they flagged this guy hours ahead of time. | ||
This guy was flagged at 4 o 'clock. | ||
He started firing at 6 o 'clock. | ||
He was lurking around the rangefinder. | ||
He tried to get into the Trump event. | ||
He was turned away. | ||
This individual, Thomas Cruise was his name. | ||
Just walking around with a rangefinder is enough to get you arrested. | ||
Why didn't the Secret Service arrest him? | ||
You arrest him. | ||
You hold him for questioning. | ||
You let the event happen. | ||
That's what you do. | ||
He's telling us that the first sign of this guy, this is a lie. | ||
This entire thing is a lie. | ||
This is why I mute myself during these live press conferences because I'll scream. | ||
This entire thing is a lie. | ||
And this is why they kept out real reporters. | ||
They kept the real reporters out of there so that they could lie with a timeline of this. | ||
This timeline is a lie. | ||
They didn't just find 610. | ||
This is not the first time that they found out about the gunman. | ||
You can see the gunman lurking around on the building. | ||
You can see footage of the guy wandering around the building on top of the AGR building. | ||
And then they're going to blame it? | ||
This is a jackass. | ||
He blames it on the local police? | ||
Key question. | ||
Acting Secret Service Director Rowe is asked if they know how the assassin suspect, Ryan Ralph, knew Trump would be golfing that day. | ||
He didn't answer it. | ||
Why weren't you using drones? | ||
He didn't answer it. | ||
I thought the paradigm shift happened after the first assassination attempt. | ||
Nothing? | ||
Okay, got it. | ||
You know what this was? | ||
I'll tell you what this was. | ||
This was him realizing that his ass is grass after this. | ||
He realizes that Trump's going to win, and he's trying to save his job. | ||
This is what's going on here. | ||
This dude realizes that Trump's going to win. | ||
Listen, no matter who's president, this guy should be fired. | ||
He's trying to save his job. | ||
There's now been two assassination attempts. | ||
Who knows how many more there are. | ||
By the way, there was a question about Matt Gaetz's reporting that there are roving assassin teams. | ||
We covered it on the program this morning. | ||
And he didn't answer it. | ||
He didn't say anything. | ||
Didn't even answer it. | ||
This guy's trying. | ||
This is him desperately trying to save his job. | ||
This is only happening because there was a second assassination attempt. | ||
This is only happening because now there's like maybe criminal liabilities. | ||
Oh, did you hear this? | ||
Oh, we're going to... | ||
We found people who are responsible and they're going to be punished. | ||
Big and dangerous. | ||
Big punishment. | ||
We're going to make 30. They're very sad. | ||
They're very punished. | ||
Oh, really? | ||
So what exactly is that punishment? | ||
Give us our names. | ||
We can't do that. | ||
It's a personnel matter. | ||
It's a personal matter. | ||
No, it's not. | ||
Dude took off a piece of Trump's ear. | ||
That's now all of our business. | ||
What are the names of the people? | ||
What's happening to them? | ||
Are they going to be criminally charged? | ||
They should be. | ||
Acting Secret Service Director Ronald Rowe admits that there were planning deficiencies before the Trump assassination attempts. | ||
Employees will be held accountable. | ||
Rowe's delayed response causes the second Trump assassination. | ||
This was very interesting across the social media. | ||
This is what's being... | ||
So, the fact that this guy... | ||
Didn't come out the week that Butler, Pennsylvania happened and give this press conference. | ||
Why? | ||
Why is it now? | ||
Two months later. | ||
We're like 70 days. | ||
70 days. | ||
Why? | ||
This jackass voluntarily or involuntarily not taking definitive action? | ||
leads to Donald Trump's second assassination attempt. | ||
They're actively putting the president's life in danger. | ||
Acting Secret Service Director Rowe does not directly answer when he's asked why no agents checked the spot at Trump's golf course in West Palm Beach. | ||
Given the spot had been known vulnerabilities, he says the bottom line is the individual was detected. | ||
unidentified
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Ha! | |
Ooh. | ||
You know, it's the same setup, right? | ||
You know, it's the exact same setup? | ||
You know, it's the same setup? | ||
And West Palm Beach? | ||
Can we get that Jesse Waters clip loaded up? | ||
Really important. | ||
Since we're live again, we didn't know. | ||
We had a conversation with my producers after we stopped our first live. | ||
They come in and they're like, the Secret Service just announced they're going live with us. | ||
So this is the situation where we might as well just cover some quick news here. | ||
President Trump, if you vote illegally, you're going to jail. | ||
This was posted by Speaker Mike Johnson. | ||
That's a really good thing. | ||
Good. | ||
Good for you. | ||
What does voting illegally look like? | ||
Well, Joe Biden, who looks like a reanimated court fan, he actually looks like Crypt Keeper. | ||
Tales of the Crypt. | ||
Look at this. | ||
This is Joe Biden right now. | ||
Joe Biden has now thrown the entire White House over to Joe Biden. | ||
He's holding his first cabinet meeting, and the entire cabinet meeting was done by Joe Biden. | ||
And this is really unbelievable. | ||
I'm going to turn it over to Jill for any comments she has. | ||
Joe turns over the entire presidency to Jill Biden. | ||
Nobody voted for Jill Biden. | ||
Look at this. | ||
This is insanity. | ||
There's no way. | ||
Inbox. | ||
Biden's honorary legislation folders have Jill Biden's signature on them. | ||
Jill Biden's signature. | ||
That's Jill Biden's signature. | ||
President of the United States. | ||
Seal. | ||
Seal of the President of the United States. | ||
Jill Biden. | ||
Who's actually president? | ||
They do some type of, like, dark witchcraft and make Jill Biden president. | ||
They do some type of... | ||
They do some type of like crazy... | ||
Who made Joe Biden president? | ||
They do some ceremony at the White House and suddenly Joe Biden becomes president? | ||
Here's Joe Biden turning over the entire government to Jill Biden live on TV. | ||
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|
Talked about the fact that sometimes the White House, in her words, surprises you. | |
And for somebody who has worked on women's health issues for her whole career, frankly, as a teacher, but also as the second lady and now as the first lady, she said one of the things that struck her the most was the inequities in medical research, funding for medical research for women. | ||
So this is an... | ||
Shut up. | ||
So it's like Pyongyang. | ||
Like, look at this. | ||
They're all clapping for Jill Biden. | ||
This is incredible. | ||
Here's the moment. | ||
unidentified
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This is the first time. | |
Oh. | ||
Something got glitched out in this clip. | ||
That's okay. | ||
That's okay. | ||
We'll get it reloaded. | ||
Joe Biden turning it over to Jill looking decrepit. | ||
Other breaking news, ladies and gentlemen, since it never stops. | ||
And we thank you for subscribing. | ||
We thank you for... | ||
We'll never stop. | ||
We thank you for subscribing. | ||
Thank you for supporting our channel. | ||
Here it is. | ||
None other than Mark Milley himself. | ||
Remember Joint Chief of Staff, Mark Milley? | ||
Mark Milley himself saying, Donald Trump told us to use the National Guard, soldiers, active duty soldiers, whatever you have to, to make sure it's a secure and safe event. | ||
All of the January 6th narrative is now a complete scam. | ||
All of the January 6th narrative, a complete scam. | ||
This according to the U.S. House of Representatives. | ||
This is the oversight report right here. | ||
U.S. House. | ||
Breaking. | ||
Transcripts reveal that President Trump did not, in fact, a correction, did in fact notify top Pentagon officials desired National Guard deployment on January 6th. | ||
General Mark Milley, Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff. | ||
On January 3rd, 2021, President says, hey, look at this. | ||
There's going to be a large amount of protesters here on January 6th. | ||
Make sure we have sufficient National Guard soldiers. | ||
Make sure it's a safe event. | ||
President Trump, hey, I don't care if you use Guard soldiers. | ||
Whatever soldiers, whatever you have to do, make sure it's safe. | ||
Everything's a fraud. | ||
This is incredible. | ||
All of January 6th was just proven to be a fraud, which is proven to be completely and totally fraudulent. | ||
Boys, make sure we have this built out. | ||
This is insanity. | ||
There it is. | ||
Here's the actual documentation. | ||
I know it's too small to read, but this is from House Oversights. | ||
General Mark Milley himself. | ||
What happened then? | ||
So did General Mark Milley? | ||
General Mark Milley did not station any soldiers there. | ||
Soldiers there. | ||
General Mark Milley disobeyed. | ||
He deserves to be in Guantanamo Bay. | ||
Full court-martial, military, drag him in. | ||
Mark Milley disobeyed orders. | ||
Orders from President Trump. | ||
And allowed for January 6th. | ||
Some of the smartest people that come on our show, like Mike Benz, Mike Benz, said Mark Milley is actually the bad guy. | ||
Mark Milley is actually the bad guy. | ||
Nancy Pelosi, she's too dumb to pull off a heist like this. | ||
This is actually Mark Milley. | ||
Mark Milley is the person who disobeyed President Trump. | ||
That is breaking news right now. | ||
It's wild. | ||
Here we go. | ||
Back to the Secret Service. | ||
Senator Josh Hawley. | ||
And boys, can we end in our documentary? | ||
Why not? | ||
Yeah, why not? | ||
Josh Hawley, whistleblower, new whistleblower in the Secret Service in Florida assassination attempts. | ||
Senator Josh Hawley sent a letter to the U.S. Secret Service Acting Director Ronald Rowe, the guy you just heard, lying, lying on camera. | ||
We know he's just told verifiable lies, who locked out real reporters from his briefing, detailing new whistleblower allegations, got Secret Service failures, secure Trump's golf course. | ||
Here we go. | ||
What does the whistleblower say? | ||
A whistleblower with direct knowledge of Secret Service protection of former President Trump's golf course in West Palm Beach, an individual who has in fact protected Donald Trump at the very location, alleges that there were known vulnerabilities in the fence surrounding the course and that they allowed them to carry on and for Trump to keep playing the course. | ||
As a result, the whistleblower alleges that it has been Secret Service protocol to post up agents at these vulnerable spots. | ||
Obviously, this did not happen on September 15th. | ||
Instead, a gunman was permitted to remain there along or near the fence line. | ||
For 12 hours. | ||
Here we go. | ||
So here's Ronald Rowe talking about his paradigm shift. | ||
unidentified
|
Yeah. | |
Shift it up your you-know-where. | ||
This is what a paradigm shift looks like. | ||
Trump had made it to the sixth green. | ||
This would have been Ruth's line of sight. | ||
That's an even easier shot than what Thomas Crooks had in Butler. | ||
Here's exactly what Ryan Ruth did. | ||
Watch this. | ||
unidentified
|
This is likely where the suspect parked his car and he went into the bushes right there. | |
I'm approaching where the suspect went into the bushes. | ||
This is the actual site right here. | ||
This is the actual area where the suspect entered the bushes. | ||
This is the area, exact spot where the suspect. | ||
Bag was found with the rifle, you right onto the golf course. | ||
There's a flag right there. | ||
Secret Service knew about this gaping hole, did nothing. | ||
Did nothing. | ||
And then lied to you and to me. | ||
Here's the proof of their lies. | ||
They are lying to you. | ||
This is the slide that he put up today. | ||
This slide is not consistent with what law enforcement have said about Thomas Crooks and his activities. | ||
The Secret Service is lying. | ||
But this is all a panicked attack because this guy knows he's cooked. | ||
He knows he's totally toast. | ||
He knows he's the first guy fired, and they're probably going to do their own massive investigation in the Secret Service. | ||
He knows that now the calls on our program is that there's either a mole in the Secret Service that allowed this to happen, that they are actively, wantonly wishing for threats to materialize against Donald Trump by not posting up guards. | ||
All you need to do is put an armed officer right there. | ||
Just like on January 6th, all you had to do was have a couple of National Guard dudes standing there. | ||
No, man, you're not going to step to the National Guard, guys. | ||
No, you're not going to step up to the... | ||
It's a lot... | ||
It's much different if you're like a guy, Thomas Crooks, or if you're this absolute lunatic, Ryan Ralph. | ||
These guys, these are not tough guys. | ||
You've seen photos of them? | ||
These are limp-wristed, soy boys, brain-broken, MKUltra. | ||
I don't know what the hell they are, but if you put up a cop with a firearm, if you put up a secret service agent with a firearm, hey, what are you doing? | ||
Stop right there. | ||
You end it. | ||
You stop the assassination attempt before it begins. | ||
They aren't putting these people in specific locations for a reason, and we need to find that out. | ||
And Raul Rowe knows his ass is brass. | ||
He knows that Donald Trump gets in there. | ||
This is a defensive briefing right here. | ||
It's a defensive briefing. | ||
He knows when Trump gets in there, he's cooked. | ||
He's cooked. | ||
And then it probably is going to be him getting grilled. | ||
It's probably going to be him. | ||
With some type of criminal charges, and they should be criminal charges, I'm going to say it. | ||
I haven't said it in a long time, and I'm going to say it. | ||
Corey Compritor's family is suing the Secret Service. | ||
Their lawyers are investigating right now. | ||
I will fund, I will help fund whatever that lawsuit is. | ||
They should go after all of these people for civil damages as to what these agencies did. | ||
They lost their father. | ||
The community lost a great firefighter. | ||
Cory Comfort was a hero. | ||
We should act in memory of him. | ||
President Trump ate a bullet on stage for us in what was meant to be an on-air execution. | ||
If you need any other evidence as to why you should vote for President Trump, well, vote for the guy who's going to take a bullet for this country. | ||
The end. | ||
That's it. | ||
We did a documentary on Butler. | ||
I wish that I could say it's out of date! | ||
We did this documentary a week after. | ||
A week after, killer clients get in the studio. | ||
We all went up. | ||
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We all went up, filmed it. | |
Eric, the whole team, we went up, got on a plane, went there with members of Congress. | ||
To my knowledge, we're the only people that's even done a single documentary. | ||
I haven't seen any documentaries on NBC, CBS, ABC. | ||
I've seen nothing. | ||
I've seen nothing. | ||
We're the only people that did the documentary. | ||
I wish I could say that it doesn't stand up. | ||
I wish I could say that it doesn't stand up and we've learned so much more information. | ||
And so now all of our questions we had months ago are moot, but they're not. | ||
They're the same damn questions. | ||
This, man, I've lived in D.C. for 15 years. | ||
Part of the reason why I wish I was still there is so that I could go to press conferences like that and ask questions. | ||
Maybe we'll, well, thanks to your guys' support, maybe we'll be able to hire reporters in Washington, D.C. to actually do this. | ||
Now that's the next step of this company, getting reporters credentialed in Washington, D.C. to go ask questions. | ||
Here's the questions we had. | ||
Here's our documentary. | ||
This is what Ronald Rowe should have to answer for. | ||
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. | ||
Thank you for watching. | ||
We deeply, deeply care about you and having a safe country, a peaceful country, and a great country. | ||
Here's the documentary. | ||
Heart racing. | ||
The assassin holds his breath and looks down the scope at President Trump. | ||
People scream he's got a gun as police officers surround the building. | ||
But no one has stopped him. | ||
Just a football field away from the president. | ||
Counter snipers see the threat but have not engaged. | ||
The trigger is pulled. | ||
A bullet rips through Trump's ear. | ||
Blood splatters Trump's MAGA hat and pours down the side of his face into his hands. | ||
Several more bullets riddle the stage. | ||
Counter sniper teams engage and miss. | ||
Then, hit. | ||
Trump rises in defiance, fist in the air. | ||
Fight! | ||
Twenty seconds in Pennsylvania will change America forever. | ||
Yet the government has told us nothing. | ||
In fact, the Secret Service has lied to the American people multiple times about that day. | ||
We needed answers, so our team traveled to Butler, Pennsylvania, the assassination site. | ||
What we found is worse than you can possibly imagine. | ||
This is the Trump Kill Box. | ||
Our first stop in this investigation was Washington, D.C., to pick up two experts in counter-sniper operations and tactical threat engagement, who also happen to have constitutional oversight of the Secret Service. | ||
Congressman Eli Crane is a qualified lead sniper for his SEAL Team 3 platoon. | ||
Congressman Corey Mills ran counter-sniper operations, serving in the Army 82nd Airborne Division and the State Department. | ||
Both men have been shot at in war zones and shot back successfully. | ||
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I want to get the facts. | |
I want to be a bipartisan full investigation. | ||
But I don't want this to be one of those where we over classify so the American people don't have the transparency. | ||
Yeah. | ||
Because they deserve to see this to be able to, one, have confidence that it wasn't something that was an inside job or it wasn't something that was just negligence or it wasn't dereliction of duty, but that they actually can say, I know that my president... | ||
Future residents are actually going to be protected and safe whenever death threats and other types of risks are there. | ||
And here's how it happened and what we're going to do to prevent it in the future. | ||
When you get out on that site, if you have even an iota of training on security, long-distance shooting, and you get on that property, I mean, you see a water tower that covers the entire premises, basically, you start asking yourself, Why the hell wasn't anybody up on that water tower? | ||
So that's what we intend to do with this video. | ||
To establish from an expert perspective, what are the questions, right? | ||
How many answers will we get? | ||
I'm not sure. | ||
We're not going there with subpoena power and law enforcement to kick in doors. | ||
But we can go look and see and ask questions. | ||
So these are the questions that I want to sort of open the table up for. | ||
What are the biggest gaps or holes that you men see right now? | ||
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Definitely, I want to know why there wasn't counter snipers on the tower. | |
Take the call to send the shooters or the security team outside of that second story window that had clear coverage over the shooter. | ||
I also want to know where this young 20-year-old kid with no military experience got his training because I'm hearing he had advanced explosives. | ||
I mean, at the end of the day, we've got to figure out how a 20-year-old kid acting alone by himself got within 150 yards. | ||
It's one of the most powerful. | ||
One of the most loved, but also one of the most hated individuals on the entire planet. | ||
I have only been here 10 seconds. | ||
I am blown away by the fact that there is no law enforcement. | ||
There's no government investigators. | ||
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There's no Secret Service. | |
Nothing's cordoned off. | ||
Nobody seems to have any, like, specific interest in investigating anything. | ||
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Where the... | |
You'd assume there'd be a crime scene of the century, right? | ||
Nope. | ||
While on the ground, we are going to investigate five fatal security failures that created the conditions for Trump to get shot. | ||
Rooftop, kill zones. | ||
Security, dead zones. | ||
Overwatch, the sniper's nest. | ||
And communications, collapse. | ||
All of these elements combine into what the military calls a killbox. | ||
A killbox is a three-dimensional target area designed to facilitate maximum likelihood of a casualty event. | ||
On July 13th... | ||
Trump was in the kill box. | ||
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This is shockingly close. | |
Officer on the roof would have prevented this entirely. | ||
The first location to investigate was the Secret Service sniper's nest atop the red barns behind Trump. | ||
The assassin, Thomas Crooks, was an obvious person of interest to law enforcement. | ||
He was denied entry to the Trump event by Secret Service and had been flagged by local police for skulking around the AGR manufacturing building with a rangefinder 90 minutes before the shooting. | ||
He accessed the roof by climbing up on an air conditioning unit and traversing the interconnected rooftops with a backpack. | ||
His movements were slow, lumbering, and obvious to anyone with a line of sight. | ||
Crooks even pointed a gun at police officers and rallygoers alike who were filming him from the ground. | ||
Police had completely surrounded Crooks by the time he was in position to fire on Trump. | ||
New footage recently released shows crooks atop the roofline of the building three whole minutes before firing shots. | ||
You can see his head and torso and firearm. | ||
The snipers atop the Red Barn location had clear line of sight to engage the shooter, but did not fire until Trump had been shot. | ||
We climbed up onto the Red Barn sniper nest position to see what those snipers saw that day. | ||
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You had one guy here who's got a slightly elevated position. | |
People in those windows, which could see the backside of those buildings, it would have 100% coverage if you're communicating. | ||
So if we were in the sniper position, as we saw, with the tripod right here, you see dents, right? | ||
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Right. | |
So this must be very close to where they were, and you don't see the same dents. | ||
So if you're looking at this shot, what were they looking for? | ||
What was the hesitation? | ||
What would you expect to have happened? | ||
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I haven't seen video of critics taking a shot, but I'm assuming based on how he was wisely low crawling up the roof that he probably took his shot from a prone position. | |
So you might be looking at a profile that's, I don't know, maybe six. | ||
10, 12 inches high. | ||
Got it. | ||
And if one of those guys was on high magnification, one of the snipers, it's hard to find anything on high magnification, so he might have had to dial his scope back out. | ||
Just so he could find him. | ||
Oh, there he is. | ||
I'm coming in. | ||
Crack. | ||
It took a full 20 seconds to neutralize the target. | ||
Why? | ||
The answer is... | ||
Bone chilling. | ||
According to local SWAT teams, there was simply no communication with the Secret Service. | ||
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We were supposed to get a face-to-face briefing with the Secret Service snipers. | |
That never happened, and we had no communication with the Secret Service. | ||
The Secret Service skipped the security briefings and site visits. | ||
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You had no communication with the Secret Service. | |
At all on that Saturday. | ||
The snipers on the roof had no idea what was going on, what the commotion in the building was about, and local law enforcement had no way to contact them directly. | ||
They had no intelligence and were in the dark. | ||
And that is why they were fatally slow to react. | ||
Neither the Secret Service counter sniper teams, nor members of the former president's security detail had any knowledge that there was a man on the roof of the AGR building This is completely suicidal. | ||
If the agents protecting the president can't share intelligence about a threat to the president's life, it guarantees failure of the mission by design. | ||
The agents we spoke with say they've never seen a setup like this, and it gets much, much worse. | ||
How was Crooks allowed to get so close to the president in the first place? | ||
How was he allowed to fire eight shots? | ||
We investigated his sniper nest to find out. | ||
The exact location where Crooks fired his weapon is easy to find, because once you are on the rooftop, it is still stained with his blood. | ||
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Yes, this is it right here. | |
This is it right here. | ||
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You can see the blood trail that comes down. | |
Got it. | ||
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Got it. | |
So they're right where Trump was. | ||
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Right. | |
They're where Trump was right there. | ||
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As your basic training boot camp soldier, that they make twice this distance shot to pass boot camp with iron sights. | |
Not with a red dot, not with a scope. | ||
With any magnification or any type of a, you know, red dot sight, it's that much easier of a shot. | ||
So, level 1 to 10 difficulty shot from right here. | ||
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For one of us, exceptionally easy. | |
We crawled on our hands and knees into Crooks' exact assassin's position. | ||
This is precisely what Crooks would have seen as he fired the rounds at President Trump. | ||
This is what Trump would have seen had he looked at the roofline of the AGR building. | ||
This is how close the killer was to President Trump. | ||
The Red Barn is not the only sniper position at the rally. | ||
The Secret Service is responsible for stationing all protective teams for the president. | ||
Local and state law enforcement officers go where they're told and do what they're told. | ||
A local SWAT sniper team was stationed on the second floor of the AGR building with perfect overwatch of the roof. | ||
The snipers in this location could have and should have easily been able to engage Crooks before he ever came close to scope sight of Trump. | ||
The acting director of the Secret Service says he does not know what happened in this location, but we do. | ||
Who was stationed up there? | ||
And did they see the shooter? | ||
Why weren't they engaging? | ||
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Once there was a suspicious individual reported, one of them came down, left the room that they were conducting Overwatch in, went down to... | |
I think walk around the perimeter, see if he could find him. | ||
Tried to come back in the building. | ||
The key card wasn't working. | ||
And so he called the other guy that was up in the room. | ||
The other guy left his post to come down and let him in. | ||
We're being told that that's when the shots were taken. | ||
So it's just the worst possible timing for a local SWAT team or sniper team. | ||
So Crooks was able to crawl across a rooftop and fire on President Trump while this fully equipped sniper's nest with perfect view... | ||
The assassin's position was left totally unmanned. | ||
This humiliating error happened because Secret Service did not have command, control, and communication with local teams. | ||
The assassin would have been easily identified and tracked with modern Overwatch capabilities, yet drone technology was not used by the Secret Service and was turned down when locals offered. | ||
This is why Crooks was hard to follow on the ground and on the rooftop. | ||
But even without drones, the shooter could have easily been neutralized by correctly positioned sniper teams. | ||
The water tower in Butler is a point of great controversy, not because there was a shooter there, but because there wasn't. | ||
Why was there no sniper team positioned as Overwatch on the highest point in the entire county during the Trump rally? | ||
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Anybody even get up in that water tower to check lines of sight, angle? | |
Again, look around you guys. | ||
It is the highest point on this entire observation point on this entire property. | ||
Did anybody even get up and do a sight survey on that water tower? | ||
Our drone footage of the water tower shows what a perfect location this would be for Overwatch. | ||
This simple graphic shows how easy it would have been for a sniper positioned on the water tower to have tracked... | ||
Engaged and neutralized crooks before he ever got a shot off on President Trump. | ||
A security dead zone is an area at an event where the general public can enter and exit without ever being screened by security. | ||
Did you know that there was a three-acre security dead zone 80 yards away from President Trump with clear line of sight to the stage? | ||
That conveniently happened to be right in front of the AGR manufacturing building. | ||
The chaos that this security dead zone created allowed for Thomas Crooks to scope out the building with a rangefinder and eventually climb up to his sniper's nest and shoot President Trump. | ||
So anyone carrying any bag or anything could have walked right up to this fence line? | ||
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Yeah, they were all in it. | |
And if you look at where that orange flag is on the ground, I mean, that's essentially... | ||
The stage area. | ||
Any person, let's just assume that person is a paramilitary-trained individual with terrorist connections who walked across our southern border. | ||
Just for worst-case scenario, any group or anyone could have walked right up to this fence line and been how far away from the president? | ||
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Roughly from here. | |
What do you got? | ||
100 yards. | ||
You've got a backpack with a concealed collapsible. | ||
That you set down, unzip, and pull from here, you're 100 yards. | ||
And what's to stop 15 men from doing that? | ||
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Nothing. | |
At the same time? | ||
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That they could have parked on the side of the road, walked that back path by the water tower, and come straight to this point, and you're 100 yards without even having ever touched security element. | |
There are plenty of people who are willing to die to take a shot at the president, no matter who the president is. | ||
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That's right. | |
President Trump's particularly high target, high-value target. | ||
Right. | ||
There's no doubt that there would be 15 men with terrorist associations in the country right now. | ||
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Well, I think that if you look at the 400-plus who's crossed our open borders on the non-terrorist watch list, I think that it's very self-evident that we all know that they're here. | |
It's just a matter of if and when. | ||
It's critically important to remember that no matter how bad the events of this assassination attempt were, because of the failures of the Secret Service, they could have been much, much worse. | ||
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This is the FBI flag where President Trump was standing. | |
And was shot. | ||
That's the spot right there. | ||
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Guys, there's a kill box is what it is. | |
There's a kill box. | ||
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And according to all of our sources, these roofs over here and the roof over there, none of that had any security on it. | |
There were open rooftops in every direction. | ||
Professional snipers can hit targets at 2,000 yards. | ||
There are seven unsecure rooftops in full line of sight to Trump in that range. | ||
I'm no security expert, but I look around and if somebody was able to crawl up on that rooftop, there are rooftops in every direction. | ||
This does not seem like a wise place to have ever approved of a rally. | ||
Am I wrong? | ||
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It seems like there's a lot of structures that are, you know, very threatening. | |
To the president in this spot, these buildings take up like his rear, his 180. | ||
And so what we're looking at most of our threats are, you know, these buildings out in here. | ||
And most of them are well within the distance that a trained shooter would be able to execute. | ||
Standing right up here and looking at this congressman for the first time, seeing it again with fresh eyes. | ||
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Would you have... | |
Would you have authorized the president give a speech? | ||
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Sometimes in units like that, whether military or law enforcement, you're told, "This is what we're doing. | |
Make the best of it." This is why it's so important as well to have a security team. | ||
Who's willing to push back and say, sir, we don't have enough available resources and assets to secure certain areas. | ||
That's where that prioritization of where would I basically, you have to almost put yourself into the mind of someone who would try and make this and say, where would I be? | ||
What would I do? | ||
If a trained professional sniper had decided to kill Trump that day, God forbid. | ||
We have established beyond a reasonable doubt that President Trump was intentionally put into the kill box on July 13th. | ||
So who's responsible for this fatal security plan? | ||
Who cut the communication lines? | ||
Who kept Trump on stage? | ||
And who will be held criminally liable for these deadly decisions? | ||
We have so many questions after our investigation of the assassination site, but one thing is crystal clear. | ||
There are forces that wanted President Trump dead. | ||
The obscene security failures created the conditions for a live TV execution. | ||
These failures are unforgivable and have inspired regular Americans to ask questions like this. | ||
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Was there a stand-down order, Ms. Cheadle? | |
Was there a conspiracy to kill President Trump? | ||
The head of the Secret Service resigned in disgrace after this question. | ||
But her replacement continues the same failed policies that sent a bullet through Trump's head. | ||
Not one federal government employee responsible for the assassination attempt on Trump's life has been fired. | ||
Gross incompetence is indistinguishable from malevolence. | ||
Enough stupid people making decisions together will get innocent Americans hurt or killed. | ||
Whistleblowers inside the Secret Service have warned of another Trump assassination in 30 days or before the election. | ||
How long till the next Trump kill box? | ||
We demand accountability and criminal charges for those responsible. | ||
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Pray for President Donald Trump before it's too late. | |
The biggest ships in the sea, all owned by the oldest kings. | ||
And their dying legacy, media deal release. | ||
So will the Benny show come to mind? | ||
The salt from lives for fun. | ||
Feed the gold and bring the gun. | ||
We sail for number one Soon will the penny show We'll come to mine the salt from lids for fun. | ||
Leave the gold and bring the gun. | ||
We sail for number one. | ||
The biggest ships in the sea. |