April 25, 2024 - The Benny Show - Benny Johnson
03:13:33
| 
| Speaker | Time | Text |
|---|---|---|
|
unidentified
|
You are watching Fox and Friends First on this Thursday morning. | |
| I'm Carly Shimkus. | ||
| Todd is on assignment today, and Brooke Singman is here with everything we're expecting in both cases today. | ||
| Good morning, Brooke. | ||
| Hey, good morning, Carly. | ||
| Yeah, court is back in session today at 9.30 Eastern Time. | ||
| The prosecution's first witness, former National Enquirer publisher David Pecker, is expected to continue his testimony. | ||
| Here's what we know about his testimony so far. | ||
| So he says he worked with former Trump attorney Michael Cohen to bury negative stories about Trump before the 2016 election. | ||
| He also testified... | ||
| He says his company paid that doorman $30,000 for exclusive rights to a story he claimed he had about Trump that that story ultimately was proven to be false. | ||
| Once Pecker had the rights to that story, he never published it. | ||
| But the prosecution still has to prove that the former president was directly involved in these plans. | ||
| Fox News contributor Jonathan Turley says they have no case. | ||
| Listen. | ||
|
unidentified
|
This case is quickly becoming incomprehensible. | |
| I mean, the newest theory that they gave just as the trial was starting is that we have another dead misdemeanor. | ||
| And the misdemeanor is that Trump conspired by promoting his own election unlawfully. | ||
| But they don't explain really where the unlawful part is. | ||
| And we're also still waiting for the judge to decide whether former President Trump violated the gag order that prohibits him from talking about people involved in the case. | ||
| Prosecutors say he violated that order 10 times and they're asking the court to fine him $1,000 per violation and hold him in contempt of court. | ||
|
unidentified
|
We go from New York to Washington, D.C., a big day for the former president at the Supreme Court as well. | |
| Yeah, that's right. | ||
| The Supreme Court is set to hold arguments today on whether former President Trump is immune from prosecution in special counsel Jack Smith's federal election interference case. | ||
| Now, the former president is not able to attend the arguments after the judge in his New York trial ruled he needs to be present in court in Manhattan throughout the criminal trial. | ||
| Trump exclusively telling me yesterday, quote, he thinks he is above The Supreme Court is prohibiting me from going to the presidential immunity hearing where some of the great legal scholars will be arguing the case, the most important case in many years. | ||
| Former Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi slamming the judge for barring Trump from arguments. | ||
| Listen. | ||
| President Trump should be sitting there. | ||
|
unidentified
|
This judge is preventing President Trump from actually respecting the Supreme Court justices. | |
| He's the plaintiff in the case from sitting there in the highest court in the land. | ||
| Arguments in the Supreme Court are set to begin this morning at 10 Eastern Time. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Trial based on insinuation and innuendo. | |
| Nothing substantive offered against Mr. Trump, much less proven. | ||
| I implore you, do not continue with this proceeding. | ||
| End it now. | ||
| Would it surprise you to learn that you have violated the Prime Directive a total of nine times since you took command of the Enterprise? | ||
| I beg your pardon? | ||
| Lieutenant. | ||
| I. I gotta see it again. | ||
| I gotta see it. | ||
| I won't show it to you right now. | ||
| I won't demand it be replayed immediately, like right now. | ||
| But that is a work of art. | ||
| It's a work of art, ladies and gentlemen. | ||
| We're live an hour early today because we are going to bring you the Donald Trump immunity case from the Supreme Court. | ||
| That case will be live in just a moment. | ||
| We have had a... | ||
| Wild morning already. | ||
| Donald Trump at 6 a.m. did a campaign rally in the streets of New York. | ||
| Ooh, and Donald Trump is speaking at the court today, bringing the energy. | ||
| There's a paradigm shift. | ||
| There's an energy shift, and it's going to happen today. | ||
| Prepare yourselves. | ||
| Today is Thursday, April 25th, 2024. | ||
| You're going to witness history with us live as the Supreme Court hears Trump immunity case, which of course is obviously a case that should sit before the Supreme Court in the question of Can the president be prosecuted for acts as president? | ||
| Trump visits union workers on his way to court and Brett Tolman joins the show, one of our favorite, a federal prosecutor who will be able to sound off on all this. | ||
| My name is Benny Johnson and this is The Benny Show. | ||
| We are live! | ||
| And we'll always be live for you. | ||
| We have endeavored as a company to just muscle through and to always bring you the breaking news. | ||
| We do so via Patriot Mobile. | ||
| Patriot Mobile is the company that we trust when we're on the road, when we're traveling, when we're going live, when we're here for breaking news, and we're going to have a lot of it today. | ||
| So strap in and buckle up. | ||
| Patriot Mobile is a Christian conservative wireless company that delivers to you free speech without funding the left. | ||
| Go to PatriotMobile.com slash Benny972Patriot. | ||
| You can call to get free activation today with the offer code Benny. | ||
| 972, Patriot. | ||
| Just make the switch today. | ||
| Speak freely, ladies and gentlemen. | ||
| Okay, so this morning has already been a barn burner. | ||
| Donald Trump on the streets of New York. | ||
| 6 a.m. rally on the streets of New York. | ||
| And again, ladies and gentlemen, we are prepared to bring you the arguments at the Supreme Court when they pop off. | ||
| We're going to bring you these arguments. | ||
| It's Trump's immunity case. | ||
| Obviously so important. | ||
| Does the president have immunity for official acts? | ||
| The obvious answer to that is, of course, yes. | ||
| But the question is, if the libs actually are able to erode all this, do we charge Barack Obama for murder? | ||
| Barack Obama murdered a small American child with a drone strike without a trial. | ||
| Straight up murder. | ||
| Used the American military to murder a child. | ||
| It's a young Muslim boy who was traveling in a car, and he droned him and killed him. | ||
| He was 16 years old. | ||
| Anwar al-Laki was his name. | ||
| Do we charge Barack Obama for murder? | ||
| That's the question. | ||
| If you get rid of immunity, then of course, every president then immediately goes to jail. | ||
| If you get rid of immunity, then that means that every president in American history goes immediately to prison after they're done, or maybe during their tenure as president. | ||
| Effectively, no one will ever run for president again. | ||
| So the Supreme Court's going to hear that case today. | ||
| On the feet of that hearing, building up to it, Donald Trump bringing the energy. | ||
| I think it's going to be a great day for Donald Trump. | ||
| In the streets of New York, Donald Trump at the base of a skyscraper being built, not one of his buildings. | ||
| I mean, it'd be a different thing if it was one of Donald Trump's buildings. | ||
| But this is at a totally separate building. | ||
| It's being funded by who knows what hedge funds, building another tower in New York. | ||
| Donald Trump just shows up. | ||
| Randomly. | ||
| We check the president's schedule every single morning. | ||
| Donald Trump just shows up. | ||
| And here, ladies and gentlemen, Trump shows up and is greeted like a conquering hero. | ||
| Here we go. | ||
| Check this out. | ||
|
unidentified
|
God bless you, Mr President Trump. | |
| So here we have a group of people who are gathering in dark blue Manhattan, who are gathering in a place that Joe Biden won by 75 points. | ||
| And yet they are chanting for Trump. | ||
| And you can see, obviously, in the images and in the reactions to these union workers that they are for Donald Trump. | ||
| The union boss speaking about this, Donald Trump saying, we're going to make a play for New York. | ||
| We're going to do it. | ||
| We're going to actually do rallies in Madison Square Garden. | ||
| We're going to do rallies in the Bronx. | ||
| I've told the team, if Donald Trump does a rally in New York, stop what you're doing and book tickets right now. | ||
| We'll go. | ||
| We'll just go there and go live. | ||
| We'll be wild. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Here's Trump. | |
| Very close in New York, I understand. | ||
| And we're leading in the country by a lot. | ||
| A poll just came out a little while ago, as you saw yesterday, that we're up in every swing state and up by a lot in every swing state. | ||
| So I think we're going to do very well. | ||
| And we're going to make a play for New York. | ||
| They said, I just heard, there was a very good poll that came out. | ||
| Normally, a Democrat will win New York. | ||
| Biden is the worst president in history. | ||
| And we have some very bad people here. | ||
| But we have the greatest people, and they're right behind me. | ||
| And they all want us to run, and we're going to run very hard in New York. | ||
| New York, we have a good chance of winning New York, in my opinion, but we're going to give it a shot. | ||
| I mean, wild, ladies and gentlemen, wild. | ||
| What a world. | ||
| What a world. | ||
| So the union leader at that working site saying that his union voters are voting three to one for Donald Trump as they have cheering Donald Trump in the streets. | ||
| And are obviously, like, surrounding him trying to get selfies. | ||
| They have their hard hats on. | ||
| Working their asses off. | ||
| Trump is a man of the people. | ||
| We've obviously said this time and time again on the show. | ||
| Trump brings people hope. | ||
| Joe Biden brings people depression. | ||
| We'll prove that in just a second. | ||
| Here we go. | ||
| The union leader talking about, hey, he's done a poll of his workers. | ||
| Here's what they have to say. | ||
|
unidentified
|
It was great to see the president come and engaging with the blue-collar worker of New York City. | |
| We basically built New York. | ||
| The union movement has made the middle class. | ||
| And we are a very patriotic union, and we are pro-America. | ||
| So my members right now, I put out a poll in my union. | ||
| President Trump is leading Joe Biden 3-1 on my presidential poll out of my 9,000 members right now. | ||
| We are very tired of the situation with groceries. | ||
| Inflation, gas prices, illegal immigration, crime. | ||
| We're living it every day in New York City. | ||
| It's amazing to see in the background, like the side shot of that, is Donald Trump being hugged by a union member, being hugged by workers. | ||
| This is actually not too far away, knowing New York City, I used to work out of New York City, it's traveled to New York City all the time. | ||
| This is not too far away from where... | ||
| Joe Biden just held a fancy fundraiser. | ||
| Now, Joe Biden, who wouldn't dare walk the streets of New York, wouldn't dare walk outside in a place that he won by 75 points. | ||
| Again, Donald Trump got 12% of the vote in Manhattan, and Joe Biden got 85% of the vote in Manhattan, okay? | ||
| Joe Biden holds a fundraiser at Radio City Music Hall, and... | ||
| What do the streets look like? | ||
| Well, they sure don't look like the streets that Donald Trump just greeted. | ||
| Donald Trump pops out of his car and hugging all these workers, all these workers coming off the job, like hugging Trump. | ||
| Here's what it looked like in the streets of New York when Joe Biden visited. | ||
|
unidentified
|
We'll be right back. | |
| Joe Biden brings people depression. | ||
| Donald Trump brings people hope. | ||
| That's it. | ||
|
unidentified
|
That's the takeaway. | |
| That's it. | ||
| Joe Biden is bringing people depression. | ||
| And that's because Joe Biden, when given a chance to talk with union workers or wear a hard hat, we had the photo of Joe Biden wearing a hard hat backwards. | ||
| Yeah. | ||
| When Joe Biden does these things, he humiliates all of us. | ||
| A reminder. | ||
| That they dropped COVID right after Joe Biden had this interaction with a union worker. | ||
| And it's slightly hard to hear. | ||
| I don't think we have captions on this video, but it's slightly hard to hear. | ||
| But tune in, because what you'll do, what you'll hear is, I'll detail it for you. | ||
| Jerry Wayne, an auto worker out of Detroit, this should be the bread and butter for Joe Biden, gets Joe Biden to point at him, call him a horse's ass. | ||
| Say he is full of S. We try not to swear on this program, but that's what Joe Biden said. | ||
| Joe Biden says he wants to ban AR-14s, right? | ||
| And then Joe Biden challenges him to a fight before saying he doesn't work for him. | ||
| All in the span of 60 seconds. | ||
| All in the span of 60 seconds. | ||
| Here we go. | ||
|
unidentified
|
A gun enthusiast and you are actively trying to diminish your second amendment right and take away our guns. | |
| You're full of sh*t. | ||
| Alright, thank you guys. | ||
| I think I've got a shush. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Josh, I support the Second Amendment. | |
| The Second Amendment, just like right now, if you yell fire, that's not free speech. | ||
| And from the very beginning, I have a shotgun, I have a 20 gauge, a 12 gauge, my son's hunt, guess what? | ||
| You're not allowed to own any weapon. | ||
| I'm not taking your gun away. | ||
| At all. | ||
| You need a hundred rounds. | ||
| I did not say that. | ||
| That's not true. | ||
| I did not say that. | ||
|
unidentified
|
It's a viral video. | |
| It's a viral video like the other ones they're putting out. | ||
| They're simply alive. | ||
| Your voice, you said that you're taking a gun. | ||
|
unidentified
|
He just clarified it. | |
| Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. | ||
| Take your AR-14s. | ||
| Okay, this is not okay. | ||
| Hold on, hold on. | ||
| There's a lot of guys. | ||
|
unidentified
|
You're looking for me, man. | |
| I'm not worried. | ||
| Thank you so much. | ||
| Don't be such a worried guy. | ||
| Hey, hey, hey. | ||
| All right, ladies and gentlemen, that's the last time they let Joe Biden out of the basement. | ||
| I kid you not. | ||
| The week later, they did lockdowns. | ||
| The week later, every person who is working secretly for the deep state, Barack Obama, the super state, well, it started to whisper to Mike Pence, it's time to do lockdown. | ||
| Time to do lockdown. | ||
| Unbelievably remarkable. | ||
| We have news now. | ||
| The producers are telling me that the Supreme Court has begun their conversations. | ||
| Donald Trump commented on the Supreme Court this morning. | ||
| I think we should cut really quickly to Donald Trump's comment on the Supreme Court before we go live to the Supreme Court who are just beginning their opening arguments here, ladies and gentlemen. | ||
| Here's Donald Trump's takeaway, and then we'll... | ||
| Flow very nicely into the live audio from the Supreme Court, the presidential immunity arguments. | ||
| Let's go. | ||
|
unidentified
|
See you. | |
| So, ladies and gentlemen, Donald Trump saying what we have said for a long time, what every legal expert has said, if you don't have immunity, you don't have a president. | ||
| Every president will be charged with crimes against humanity. | ||
| Presidents have to make tough decisions. | ||
| You do agree with them. | ||
| I disagree with them. | ||
| I agree with them. | ||
| You agree with them. | ||
| Doesn't matter. | ||
| Presidents will, every president will be put in the gulag or worse after their term. | ||
| If you get rid of presidential immunity, here is the arguments going on live right now at the Supreme Court. | ||
| Donald Trump's lawyer, John D. Sauer. | ||
| Justice Alito, let's go. | ||
|
unidentified
|
That's correct. | |
| I'm sorry, I understood the court to be asking that. | ||
| No, this would apply in just some possibility. | ||
| I don't know whether it's a good idea or a bad idea or whether it can be derived from the structure of the Constitution or the Vesting Clause or any other source. | ||
| But this would be applied on purely objective grounds when the president invokes an official power in taking the action that is at issue. | ||
| Yes, I believe. | ||
| The reason I think of Blazing Game is because it talks about an objective, context-specific determination to winnow out what's official and what is purely private conduct. | ||
| And again, with a strong degree of deference to what— I'm sorry. | ||
| If I understood Justice Alito, he's suggesting not that. | ||
| He's suggesting whether, even if it is an official act, whether you still grant immunity if that act is not— He can correct me if I'm wrong. | ||
| No, that was the question. | ||
| That, I think, would be a superior rule than the categorical denial that emerged in the trial court here. | ||
| I'm not quite sure why he used the word plausible, because that seems to negate... | ||
| Might as well give absolute if you're saying plausible, because anybody could argue plausibility. | ||
| We don't even require plausible. | ||
| We require reasonable and qualified immunity. | ||
| Well, I mean, one might argue that it isn't plausibly legal to order SEAL Team 6, and I don't want to slander SEAL Team 6, because they're—no, seriously, they're honorable officers, and they are— Bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice not to obey unlawful orders. | ||
| But I think one could say that it's not plausible that that is legal, that that action would be legal. | ||
| And I'm sure you've thought, I've thought of lots of hypotheticals, I'm sure you've thought of lots of hypotheticals where a president could say, I'm using an official power, and yet the president uses it in an absolutely outrageous manner. | ||
| That, if we're an objective determination, may well be an interesting approach to take. | ||
| So, apply it to the allegations here. | ||
| What is plausible about the president insisting in creating a fraudulent slate of electoral candidates? | ||
| Assuming you accept the facts of the complaint on their face, Is that plausible, that that would be within his right to do? | ||
| Absolutely, Your Honor. | ||
| We have the historical precedent we cite in the lower courts of President Grant sending federal troops to Louisiana and Mississippi in 1876 to make sure that the Republican electors got certified in those two cases, which delivered the election to Rutherford B. Hayes. | ||
| The notion that it's completely implausible, I think, just can't be supported based on the face of this indictment. | ||
| Knowing that the slate is fake. | ||
| Knowing that the slate... | ||
| It's fake, that they weren't actually elected, that they weren't certified by the state. | ||
| He knows all those things. | ||
| The indictment itself alleges, I dispute that characterization. | ||
| The indictment affixes the word label to the so-called fraudulent electors. | ||
| It affixes the word fraudulent, but that's a complete mischaracterization. | ||
| On the face of the indictment, it appears that there was no deceit about who had emerged from the relevant state conventions, and this was being done as an alternative basis. | ||
| But I want to address a more... | ||
| Higher level point, a fundamental point, which is that, as Justice Alito's question indicated, there's a whole series of structural checks other than criminal prosecution that are designed to deter these kind of, you know, outlandish scenarios or extraordinarily obviously illegal things. | ||
| And that's been viewed in this court's opinions going all the way back to at least Martin. | ||
| Where do you think the D.C. Circuit went wrong in how it determined what was official versus what's personal? | ||
| Well, I read the opinion below in this particular case as adopting a categorical view. | ||
| It does not matter, is the logic of their opinion, because there is no immunity for official acts, and therefore, you know, that's the end of the story. | ||
| I don't really think they went wrong in Blazing Game in the civil context when they engage in the same determination with respect to what's official and what isn't official there. | ||
| We agree with most of what that opinion says. | ||
| And for some official acts... | ||
| That are not within the Article II exclusive power. | ||
| So official acts, but not within the Article II exclusive power. | ||
| Even for those, I assume you would think that a clear statement has to be required, a clear statement in the statute covering the president if the president's official acts are going to be criminalized. | ||
| Absolutely. | ||
| Obviously, the issue is, you know, at the highest possible level when it comes to the unrestrictable powers, like as in this indictment, the... | ||
| Well, I'm assuming the exclusive powers are walled off and can't be prosecuted before there's a lot of official powers that are not exclusive to the president under his Article 2 authority. | ||
| But for those, I understood you to be saying at a minimum there would need to be a clear statement in the statute referencing the president so that the president's on notice and can conduct himself or herself accordingly. | ||
| That's absolutely correct. | ||
| And that'd be consistent both with Franklin and Public Citizen in cases along series of other clear statements. | ||
| Can I follow up on that? | ||
| Go ahead. | ||
| Go ahead. | ||
| So you concede that private acts don't get immunity. | ||
| We do. | ||
| Okay. | ||
| So in the special counsel's brief on pages 46 and 47, he urges us, even if we were to decide or assume that there was some sort of immunity for official acts, that there were sufficient private acts in the indictment for the case to go back and the trial to begin immediately. | ||
| And I want to know if you agree or disagree about the characterization of these acts as private. | ||
| Petitioner turned to a private attorney, was willing to spread knowingly false claims of election fraud to spearhead his challenges to the election results. | ||
| Private? | ||
| As alleged. | ||
| I mean, we dispute the allegation, but that sounds private to me. | ||
| Sounds private. | ||
| Petitioner conspired with another private attorney who caused the filing in court of a verification signed by petitioner that contained false allegations to support a challenge. | ||
| That also sounds private. | ||
| Three private actors, two attorneys, including those mentioned above, and a political consultant helped implement a plan to submit fraudulent slates of presidential electors to obstruct the certification proceeding, and petitioner and a co-conspirator attorney directed that effort. | ||
| You write it quickly. | ||
| I believe that's private. | ||
| I don't want to... | ||
| So those acts you would not dispute. | ||
| Those were private, and you wouldn't raise a claim that they were official. | ||
| As characterized. | ||
| We would say, Your Honor, if I may, that what we would say as official is things like meeting with the Department of Justice to deliberate about who's going to be the acting attorney general of the United States, communicating with the American public, communicating with Congress about matters of enormous... | ||
| Thank you. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
| Thank you, counsel. | ||
| And what is the consequence in terms of going forward with your... | ||
| If you look at the indictment here, there's a bunch of acts that we think are just clearly official. | ||
| There may be allegations that mostly relate to what the government has described here as private aim or private end, and the court should remand or address itself, but remand for a Brewster-like determination, which is what's official and what's private. | ||
| The official stuff has to be expunged completely from the indictment before the case can go forward, and there has to be a determination. | ||
| Well, if you expunge the official part from the indictment, that's like a one-legged stool, right? | ||
| I mean, giving somebody money isn't bribery unless you get something in exchange. | ||
| And if what you get in exchange is to become the ambassador to a particular country... | ||
| That is official, the appointment that's within the president's prerogatives. | ||
| The unofficial part is I'm going to get a million dollars for it. | ||
| So if you say you have to expunge the official part, how does that go forward? | ||
| This particular indictment where we say virtually all the overt conduct is official, we don't believe it would be able to go forward. | ||
| I mean, there could be a case where it would. | ||
| But if you look at even the government's brief in this case divides up the indictment into things that other than the electors allegations don't really... | ||
| They haven't disputed that they are official acts, but what they do is say, well, we tie it all together by characterizing it as done, and these are the allegations that the court just referred to, by an improper private aim or private end. | ||
| Again, that's their words, and that just runs loggerheads, you know, dead set against this court's case law. | ||
| And you don't look at, when immunity determinations, the improper motivation or purpose. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
| Justice Thomas? | ||
| Mr. Sawyer, in assessing the official acts of a president, do you differentiate between the president acting as president and the president acting as candidate? | ||
| Yes, we do, and we don't dispute, essentially. | ||
| The blazing game discussion of that. | ||
| But of course, that has to be done by objective determinations, not by looking at what was the purpose of what you did this. | ||
| That's the most important point. | ||
| Did you, in this litigation, challenge the appointment of special counsel? | ||
| Not directly. | ||
| We have done so in the Southern District of Florida case, and we totally agree with the analysis provided by Attorney General Meese and Attorney General Mukasey. | ||
| And it points to a very important issue here, because one of their arguments is, of course, that, you know, we should have this presumption of regularity. | ||
| that runs into the reality that we have here, an extraordinary prosecutorial power being exercised by someone who was never nominated by the president or confirmed by the Senate at any time. | ||
| So we agree with that position. | ||
| We hadn't raised it yet in this case when this case went up on appeal. | ||
| Justice Alito? | ||
| When you say that the official act should be expunged from the indictment, that in itself would not achieve very much unless evidence of those official acts were precluded at trial. | ||
| So is that what you're saying, that The prosecution should not be permitted at trial to prove the official acts as part of the conspiracies that are alleged. | ||
| Absolutely, and we think that's just the clear implications of Brewster and Johnson and their discussion in a very analogous context. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
| I'm a little bit confused by that. | ||
| If you have a scheme to defraud or a scheme to accept bribery, There's evidence from which you can infer that scheme, and one of it is that the appointment actually happened. | ||
| It's an official act. | ||
| You wouldn't expunge that as evidence. | ||
| You would instruct the jury that there's no liability for the actual appointment, that the liability is for accepting the bride. | ||
| Similarly here, I don't think the indictment is charging that the obstruction... | ||
| Occurred solely because of conversations with the Justice Department. | ||
| They're saying you look at all of the private acts and you look in the context of some of the public acts and you can infer the intent, the private intent from them. | ||
| So I'm not sure that I understand why your problems couldn't be taken care of at trial. | ||
| With an instruction, if we believe, if the court were to find, I'm not even sure how they could, but if it were to find, that some public acts could not be the basis of criminal liability. | ||
| I think the best thing I can say to that is, and I think this ties into the Chief Justice's question about a one-legged stool, Brewster and Johnson and subsequent cases like Keltowski versus Miner, essentially... | ||
| say that, that this is a one-legged stool problem. | ||
| It will be difficult for some of these prosecutions to proceed, and that is the implications of official immunity, which is dictated in the Constitution here by the Executive Vesting Clause. | ||
| I can continue on in Justice Barrett's vein a little bit and ask you about some of the allegations of the indictment and whether they're official acts or not in your view. | ||
| So the defendant signed a verification affirming false election fraud allegations made on his behalf in a lawsuit filed in his name against the Georgia governor. | ||
| I don't think we've disputed it. | ||
| That's official. | ||
| I'm sorry, that is unofficial. | ||
| That's unofficial. | ||
| Same for the defendant called the chairwoman of the Republican National Committee, asked her to gather electors in targeted states, falsely represented to her that such electors' votes would be used only if ongoing litigation in one of the states changed the results in the defendant's favor. | ||
| We have taken the position that that is official. | ||
| That's official? | ||
| Yes. | ||
| Why would that be official? | ||
| Because the organization of alternate slates of electors is based on, for example, the historical example of President Grant is something that was done pursuant to and ancillary and preparatory to the exercise of the core recommendation clause power. | ||
| Couldn't he have taken this action just in the status of a candidate? | ||
| The fact that he could have done so doesn't demonstrate that he did do so in this case. | ||
| And based on the allegations, we think it's clear he did not, that this was done in an official capacity. | ||
| The defendant asked the Arizona House Speaker to call the legislature into session to hold a hearing based on their claims of election fraud. | ||
| Absolutely an official act. | ||
| For the president to communicate with state officials on a matter of enormous federal interest and concern, attempting to defend the integrity of a federal election, to communicate with state officials and urge them to view what he views as their job under state law and federal law, that's an official act. | ||
| Well, attempting to defend the integrity of the election, I mean, that's the defense. | ||
| The allegation is that he was attempting to overthrow an election. | ||
| Essentially, exactly right. | ||
| And neither allegation of what the purpose is should make a difference as to whether it's immune. | ||
| That is extremely strong precedent from this court. | ||
| Does it strike you as odd that your understanding of immunity goes way beyond what OLC has ever claimed for a former president? | ||
| I view the OLC opinions here as strongly supporting us, because any time a congressional statute basically got anywhere near touching the president's prerogatives, they've said, oh, we're going to interpret the statute narrowly to avoid that. | ||
| Well, that's a different question. | ||
| I mean, what OLC has always said is that sitting presidents get immunity, but former presidents, no. | ||
| Now, there might be... | ||
| A different argument made about whether a statute or whether a statute, as applied to particular conduct, is properly available against the president. | ||
| But that's a very different argument than the immunity claim that you're making here, which OLC has definitively not supported. | ||
| I don't know if I put it that way. | ||
| I don't recall an opinion directly addressing it, but more fundamental to us, Your Honor, is in fact the language of cases like Marbury and statements like made by Benjamin Franklin at the Constitutional Convention, statements of George Washington talking about the... | ||
| Massive risk of factional strife and how that could destroy the republic and erect a new government on the ruins of public liberty. | ||
| That's what we rely on principally here. | ||
| I cite the OLC opinions because, of course, what you see there is a very strong trend that if there's any statute that might trench in any way on the president's prerogatives, which they interpret it to avoid that. | ||
| If a president sells nuclear secrets to a foreign adversary, is that immune? | ||
| That sounds like, similar to the bribery example, likely not immune. | ||
| Now, if it's structured as an official act, he would have to be impeached and convicted first before— What does that mean, if it's structured as an official act? | ||
| Well, I don't know in the hypothetical whether or not that would be an official act. | ||
| You'd probably have to have more details to apply the Blazing Game analysis or even the Fitzgerald analysis that we've been talking about. | ||
| How about if a president orders the military to stage a coup? | ||
| I think that— As the Chief Justice pointed out earlier, where there is a whole series of, you know, sort of guidelines against that, so to speak, like the UCMJ prohibits the military from following a plainfully unlawful act. | ||
| If one adopted Justice Alito's test, that would fall outside. | ||
| Now, if one adopts, for example, the Fitzgerald test that we advance, that might well be an official act, and he would have to be, as I'll say in response to all these kinds of hypotheticals, has to be impeached and convicted before he can be criminally prosecuted. | ||
| But I emphasize to the court... | ||
| Well, he's gone. | ||
| Let's say this president who ordered the military to stage a coup. | ||
| He's no longer president. | ||
| He wasn't impeached. | ||
| He couldn't be impeached. | ||
| But he ordered the military to stage a coup. | ||
| And you're saying that's an official act. | ||
| I think it would depend on the circumstances, whether it was an official act. | ||
| If it were an official act, again, he would have to be impeached. | ||
| What does that mean, depend on the circumstances? | ||
| He was the president. | ||
| He is the commander-in-chief. | ||
| Talks to his generals all the time, and he told the generals, I don't feel like leaving office. | ||
| I want to stage a coup. | ||
| Is that immune? | ||
| If it's an official act, there needs to be impeachment and conviction beforehand because the framers viewed that kind of very low risk. | ||
| If it's an official act, it's impeachment. | ||
| Is it an official act? | ||
| On the way you've described that hypothetical. | ||
| It could well be. | ||
| I just don't know. | ||
| Again, it's a fact-specific context. | ||
| That answer sounds to me as though it's like, yeah, under my test, it's an official act, but that sure sounds bad, doesn't it? | ||
| Well, it certainly sounds very bad, and that's why the framers have a whole series of structural checks that have successfully, for the last 234 years, prevented that very kind of extreme hypothetical. | ||
| And that is the wisdom of the framers. | ||
| What they viewed as the risk that needed to be guarded against was not the notion that the president might escape a criminal prosecution for something sort of very, very unlikely in these unlikely scenarios. | ||
| They viewed much more likely and much more destructive to the republic the risk of factional strife discussed by George Washington. | ||
| The framers did not put an immunity clause into the Constitution. | ||
| They knew how to. | ||
| There were immunity clauses in some state constitutions. | ||
| They knew how to give legislative immunity. | ||
| They didn't provide immunity to the president. | ||
| And, you know, not so surprising, they were reacting against a monarch who claims to be above the law. | ||
| Wasn't the whole point that the president was not a monarch and the president was not supposed to be above the law? | ||
| I would say two things in response to that. | ||
| They did put in immunity clause, and in a sense, they put in the executive vesting clause, which was originally understood to adopt a broad immunity principle that set forth in the very broad language of Marbury against Madison. | ||
| And also, they did discuss and consider... | ||
| What would be the checks on the presidency? | ||
| And they did not say, oh, we need to have criminal prosecution. | ||
| Right there at the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franken says, we don't have that. | ||
| That's not an option. | ||
| Everybody cried out against that as unconstitutional. | ||
| The structural check we're adopting is impeachment. | ||
| And they're very clear on that in pages 64 to 69 of the second volume of Fair End. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
| Justice Gorsuch? | ||
| Just returning to the Chief Justice's hypothetical about the ambassador sale and bribery. | ||
| Congress has a statute that specifically names the president and says he can be criminally prosecuted for bribery, presumably after he leaves office. | ||
| Outside the core areas that Justice Kavanaugh was talking about, when Congress speaks clearly, couldn't a statute like that, Congress provide a statute like that, that would allow All manner of evidence to come in to prove the case. | ||
| I think our position is that would have to be an unofficial act, purely private conduct for that prosecution to go forward. | ||
| All right. | ||
| But outside the core areas of executive power, if there is a clear statement from Congress that something is unlawful and it applies to the president, I'm struggling to see why, in that case, perhaps the evidence could come in. | ||
| The strongest possible case, in our view, is what you've described as kind of the core executive powers, the unrestrictable powers within the meeting of CELA law. | ||
| But again, the holding of, for example, Brewster and Johnson that we've relied on doesn't turn on how central it is of a legislative act. | ||
| It's just as if it's an official act, which here we would say applies basically the outer perimeter test of Fitzgerald against Nixon. | ||
| That doesn't come in. | ||
| What would happen if presidents were under... | ||
| Fear that their successors would criminally prosecute them for their acts in office, whether they're engaged in drones, all the hypotheticals. | ||
| I'm not going to go through them. | ||
| It seems to me like one of the incentives that might be created is for presidents to try to pardon themselves. | ||
| Do you have any thoughts about that? | ||
| That is—I didn't think of that until, Your Honor, acid. | ||
| That is certainly one incentive that might be creative. | ||
| What we think is most important— We've never answered whether a president can do that. | ||
| Happily, it's never been presented to us. | ||
| And if the doctrine of immunity remains in place, that's likely to remain the case. | ||
| For those very issues, as Fitzgerald, I think, very powerfully emphasized, the real concern here is, is there going to be bold and fearless action? | ||
| Is the president going to have to make a controversial decision, whereas political opponents are going to come after him the minute he leaves office? | ||
| Is that going to unduly deter? | ||
| Is that going to dampen the ardor of that president to do what our constitutional structure demands of him or her, which is bold and fearless action in the face of controversy? | ||
| And perhaps if he feels he has to, he'll pardon himself every four years from now on. | ||
| But that, as the court pointed out, wouldn't provide the security because the legality of that is something that's never been addressed. | ||
| Now, one of the checks and balances, in addition to impeachment that you've discussed, is subordinate liability. | ||
| You don't contest that everybody following an unlawful order beneath the president of the United States can be immediately prosecuted, do you? | ||
| I'm sorry, the court is asking whether they could be— If the president gives an unlawful order, call in the troops, all the examples we've heard, every subordinate beneath him faces criminal prosecution, don't they? | ||
| That is what Gouverneur Morris said explicitly at the Constitutional Convention, that his co-agitators could be prosecuted. | ||
| There is an important caveat, because of course there would have to be a statute that would govern that for them to be prosecuted. | ||
| But we've got lots of statutes. | ||
| The criminal law books are replete. | ||
| But, I mean, do you agree? | ||
| Is that one check that's available? | ||
| Absolutely. | ||
| And again, the only caveat that I was making is if that statute was... | ||
| Doing what Marbury says you can't do, which is going after the subordinates to restrict, for example, a core executive function, the Franklin Clear Statement Rule might be triggered, and you might not be able to go after that president. | ||
| So I don't think Congress can say, well, we can't go after the president directly, but we're going to criminalize the way that the president speaks to Congress under the exercise of the Recommendations Clause, and therefore we're going to put in a criminal statute that says if you provide false information to Congress in carrying out the president's recommendation powers, you can be immediately prosecuted. | ||
| That would at least be a very... | ||
| But the fundamental point of drawing that distinction between the president himself and his co-agitators in the word of Gouverneur Morris at the Constitutional Convention is an excellent distinction. | ||
| Justice Kavanaugh? | ||
| Just to follow up on the OLC opinions question, as you read them, and I think I read them, they articulate a clear statement rule as to this court's cases for covering official acts. | ||
| And your point, I think, but I just want to... | ||
| Underscore this is that none of the statutes alleged here or cited here have a clear statement covering the president, therefore meaning that the president can't be charged for any official acts under these statutes. | ||
| That's absolutely correct. | ||
| They're extended way beyond. | ||
| That's separate from the question what's official versus what's personal. | ||
| But for that bucket that is official, there's no clear statement. | ||
| Period. | ||
| That's right. | ||
| And as to purely private conduct, we don't think that clear statement rule would be invoked. | ||
| But as to official acts, these statutes, the ones charged in the indictment, are just way far afield from purporting to criminalize in clear terms the president's official acts. | ||
| And then, just to clarify this, the president's not above the law. | ||
| The president's not a king. | ||
| The founders thought that. | ||
| I think your point in response to that is the president is subject to prosecution for all personal acts, just like every other American for personal acts. | ||
| The question is acts taken in official capacity. | ||
| That's correct. | ||
| And even those, of course, if there was an impeachment conviction, could be prosecuted, in our view. | ||
| And we'd emphasize the whole series of structural checks in addition to that, which deter those and have successfully deterred presidential misfeasants for 234 years. | ||
| Then on the source of immunity... | ||
| It's not explicit in the Constitution, but also executive privilege is not explicit in the Constitution. | ||
| Yet, in United States v. | ||
| Nixon, the Court unanimously said that the Article II executive power in the Constitution encompassed executive privilege, and the same principle presumably would apply to executive immunity being encompassed within that executive power as historically understood. | ||
| That's absolutely correct, and there's a very telling passage in Free Enterprise Fund where this court talked about how there's a letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson at the time of the founding where Madison said, hey, the rest of the removal power, they did not expressly take this away, so the 1789 Congress understood that it was left in place. | ||
| So if the original understanding of the executive vesting clause is broad enough to encompass that, it would have to be expressly taken away, which is the opposite of the presumption that they're advancing here. | ||
| And then lastly, I think you've acknowledged in response to others' questions that some of the acts in the indictment are private, and your view is that some are official. | ||
| Is it your position then that that analysis of which is which should be undertaken in the first instance by the D.C. Circuit or the district court? | ||
| Most likely the district court under the logic of Anderson. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
| Justice Barrett? | ||
| So, Mr. Sauer, you've argued that the impeachment clause suggests or requires impeachment to be a gateway to criminal prosecution, right? | ||
| Yes, I think that's the plain meaning of that second phrase in the clause. | ||
| Okay, so there are many other people who are subject to impeachment, including the nine sitting on this bench, and I don't think anyone has ever suggested that impeachment would have to be the gateway to criminal prosecution for any of the many other officers subject to impeachment. | ||
| So why is the president different when the impeachment clause doesn't say so? | ||
| Someone very important has made the opposite suggestion as to the president himself, which is Solicitor General Bork, which is reaffirmed in the OLC opinions on this, where Solicitor General Bork, in 1973, as to the issue of the vice president, reviewed the historical materials, and he said the sequence is mandatory only as to the president. | ||
| That is DOJ's view of the original understanding of the impeachment judgment clause, which is exactly our position. | ||
| The sequence is mandatory only as to the president. | ||
| Keep in mind that the criminal prosecution of a president What if the criminal conduct isn't discovered until after the president is out of office, so there was no opportunity for impeachment? | ||
| We say the framers assume the risk of under-enforcement by adopting these very structural checks. | ||
| Justice Scalia said in Morrison against Olson, the separation of powers prevents us from righting every wrong, but it does so that we do not lose liberty. | ||
| Okay, and the special counsel makes a point that I think is a pretty compelling one. | ||
| You admit that if the president were successfully impeached, that he could be criminally prosecuted after impeachment, right? | ||
| Assuming the prosecution was for the same conduct of which he was convicted, not impeached. | ||
| He must be convicted. | ||
| That word conviction is right there in the clause. | ||
| Okay, granted. | ||
| But you also say that these criminal statutes, unless they explicitly mention the president, don't apply to him. | ||
| So how can you say that he would be subject to prosecution after impeachment, while at the same time saying that he's exempt from these criminal statutes? | ||
| Well, there are statutes, as they concede, where Congress has purported to do so. | ||
| A few. | ||
| Two or three. | ||
| They haven't done a comprehensive review. | ||
| I think it looks like all they did was text search for president in the 18 U.S. Code. | ||
| Again, under Franklin, that's a very... | ||
| Telling indication that the word president is not in the statute isn't necessarily a magic word requirement, so to speak. | ||
| But more fundamentally than that, more fundamentally than that, they can see there are statutes that exist. | ||
| In addition to that, much impeachment could occur as a result of private conduct. | ||
| So the impeachment judgment clause does do significant work by authorizing the subsequent prosecution of a president there, because what the framers, if you look at what they're discussing in the Constitutional Convention, is principally concerns about private conduct, which, of course, we concede are not immune. | ||
| Okay, so just pick up Justice Kagan's example of a president who orders a coup. | ||
| Let's imagine that he is impeached and convicted for ordering that coup, and let's just accept for the sake of argument your position that that was official conduct. | ||
| You're saying that he couldn't be prosecuted for that even after conviction and an impeachment proceeding if there was not a statute that expressly referenced the president and made it criminal for the president. | ||
| There would have to be a statute that... | ||
| Made a clear statement that Congress purported to regulate the president's conduct. | ||
| Okay, thank you. | ||
| Justice Jackson? | ||
| So I think I now understand better your position. | ||
| In your discussions with Justice Kavanaugh, it became clear that you are saying that for the private acts of a president, there's no immunity, but for the official acts of the president, there is immunity. | ||
| Is that your position? | ||
| I agree with that. | ||
| All right. | ||
| So, one thing that occurs to me is that this sort of difficult mind-drawing problem that we're having with all of these hypotheticals, is this a private act or a public act, is being necessitated by that assumption. | ||
| Because, of course, if official acts didn't get absolute immunity, then it wouldn't matter. | ||
| We wouldn't have to identify which are private and which are public, correct? | ||
| That, in fact, is the approach of the D.C. Circuit. | ||
| There's no determination that needs to be made. | ||
| Right, but I'm just making, so to the extent we're worried about, like, how do we figure out whether it's private or public, we have to understand that we're only doing that because of an underlying assumption that the public acts get immunity. | ||
| So let me explore that assumption. | ||
| Why is it, as a matter of theory, and I'm hoping you can sort of zoom way out here, that the president... | ||
| Would not be required to follow the law when he is performing his official acts. | ||
| Everyone else, everyone else, there are lots of folks who have very high-powered jobs, who make a lot of consequential decisions, and they do so against the backdrop of potential criminal prosecution if they should break the law in that capacity. | ||
| And we understand and we know as a matter of fact. | ||
| That the President of the United States has the best lawyers in the world. | ||
| When he's making a decision, he can consult with pretty much anybody as to whether or not this thing is criminal or not. | ||
| So why would we have a situation in which we would say that the President should be making official acts without any responsibility for following the law? | ||
| I respectfully disagree with that characterization. | ||
| The president absolutely does have responsibility. | ||
| He absolutely is required to follow the law in all of his official acts. | ||
| But the remedy for that is the question, could he be subject to personal vulnerability sent to prison but making a bad decision after he leaves office? | ||
| But other people who have consequential jobs and who are required to follow the law... | ||
| Make those determinations against the backdrop of that same kind of risk. | ||
| So what is it about the president? | ||
| I mean, I've heard you say it's because the president has to be able to act boldly, do, you know, make kind of consequential decisions. | ||
| I mean, sure. | ||
| But again, there are lots of people who have to make life and death kinds of decisions, and yet they still have to follow the law. | ||
| And if they don't, they could be sent to prison, et cetera, et cetera. | ||
| I say two things in response to that, both from Fitzgerald. | ||
| That's the very sort of inference or reasoning that this court rejected in Fitzgerald. | ||
| No, but let me just... | ||
| Fitzgerald was a civil situation in which the president actually was in a different position than other people because of the nature of his job, the high-profile nature, and the fact that he touches so many different things. | ||
| When you're talking about private civil liability, you know, anybody on the street can sue him. | ||
| We could see that the president was sort of different than the ordinary... | ||
| I don't understand how the president stands in any different position with respect to the need to follow the law as he is doing his job than anyone else. | ||
| He is required to follow the law. | ||
| But he's not. | ||
| If there's no threat of criminal prosecution, what prevents the president from just doing whatever he wants? | ||
| All the structural checks that are identified in Fitzgerald and a whole series of this court's cases that go back to Martin v. | ||
| Mott. | ||
| For example, impeachment, oversight by Congress, public oversight. | ||
| There's a long series. | ||
| And Fitzgerald directly addresses this in the civil context. | ||
| I'm not sure that that's much of a backstop. | ||
| And what I'm, I guess, more worried about, you seem to be worried. | ||
| about the president being chilled. | ||
| I think that we would have a really significant opposite problem if the president wasn't chilled. | ||
| Those kinds of powers, the most powerful person in the world, with the greatest amount of authority, could go into office knowing that there would be no potential penalty for committing crimes. | ||
| I'm trying to understand what the disincentive is from turning the Oval Office into the seat of criminal activity in this country. | ||
| I don't think there's any allegation of that in this case. | ||
| And what George Washington said is, what Benjamin Franklin said is, we view the prosecution of a chief executive as something that everybody cried out against as unconstitutional. | ||
| And what George Washington said is, we're worried about factional strife, which will... | ||
| No, let me put this worry on the table. | ||
| If the potential for criminal liability is taken off the table, wouldn't there be a significant risk that future presidents would be emboldened to commit crimes with... | ||
| It's right now the fact that we're having this debate because OLC has said that presidents might be prosecuted. | ||
| Presidents from the beginning of time have understood that that's a possibility. | ||
| That might be what has kept this office from turning into the kind of crime center that I'm envisioning. | ||
| But once we say, no criminal liability, Mr. President, you can do whatever you want, I'm worried that we would have a worse problem. | ||
| Then the problem of the president feeling constrained to follow the law while he's in office. | ||
| I respectfully disagree with that because the regime you've described is the regime we've operated under for 234 years. | ||
| There has not been an expectation based on 234 years of unbroken political... | ||
| All right, let me ask you another question about this clear statement line of questioning. | ||
| First of all, I didn't see you argue that below. | ||
| I don't know. | ||
| I understand that you have that set of in your briefs here, but did you argue before the D.C. Circuit something about a clear statement with respect to statutes? | ||
| Yes. | ||
| In our separately filed motion for motion dismissed based on statutory grounds, we extensively argued not just this clear statement rule, but a whole panel. | ||
| Right, but that's not the question presented in this case. | ||
| The question presented in this case comes out of your motion for immunity. | ||
| So to bring in now an argument that you didn't raise below, it seems to me you forfeited it, no? | ||
| I believe it's fairly included within the question presented. | ||
| Why? | ||
| Especially because the court expanded the question presented from what either of the parties submitted. | ||
| But not to statutory interpretation. | ||
| I mean, that argument goes to statutory avoidance, constitutional avoidance, statutory interpretation. | ||
| You asked for immunity, which is a totally different thing. | ||
| I think they're very closely related, logically. | ||
| The question is, does immunity exist, and to what extent does it? | ||
| And the argument is, immunity at least exists to the extent that it raises a grave constitutional question that triggers the clear statement rule. | ||
| That's a really tight logic. | ||
| But that's totally circular. | ||
| You use that argument to avoid constitutional questions. | ||
| You are asking us a constitutional question here. | ||
| So it doesn't even make sense to talk about clear statement and rule the way that it's come up in the context of an immunity question. | ||
| But let me just, let me ask you this about it. | ||
| One more question. | ||
| Yeah, so what is the argument that the president of the United States, who you say is bound by the law, is not on notice? | ||
| That he has to do his job consistent with the law? | ||
| I mean, to the extent that the clear statement rule comes in at all, it's about the person not being unnoticed. | ||
| So I guess I don't understand why Congress, in every criminal statute, would have to say, and the president is included. | ||
| I thought that was the sort of background understanding, that if they're enacting a generally applicable criminal statute, it applies to the president just like everyone else. | ||
| So what is the clear statement that would have to be made in this context? | ||
| Under Franklin and under Public Citizen, Congress has to speak clearly before it interferes with the president's powers, and we have here an indictment that seeks to criminalize objective conduct that falls within the heartland of core executive authority. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
| Thank you, counsel. | ||
| Mr. Dreben. | ||
| Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. | ||
| This court has never recognized absolute criminal immunity for any public official. | ||
| Petitioner, however, claims that a former president has permanent criminal immunity for his official acts unless he was first impeached and convicted. | ||
| His novel theory would immunize former presidents for criminal liability for bribery, treason, sedition, murder. | ||
| And here, conspiring to use fraud to overturn the results of an election and perpetuate himself in power. | ||
| Such presidential immunity has no foundation in the Constitution. | ||
| The framers knew too well the dangers of a king who could do no wrong. | ||
| They therefore devised a system to check abuses of power, especially the use of official power for private gain. | ||
| Here, the executive branch is enforcing congressional statutes and seeking accountability for petitioners' alleged misuse of official power to subvert democracy. | ||
| That is a compelling public interest. | ||
| In response, petitioner raises concerns about potential abuses, but established legal safeguards provide layers of protections. | ||
| With the Article III courts providing the ultimate check. | ||
| The existing system is a carefully balanced framework. | ||
| It protects the president, but not at the high constitutional cost of blanket criminal immunity. | ||
| That has been the understanding of every president from the framing through Watergate and up to today. | ||
| This court should preserve it. | ||
| I welcome the court's questions. | ||
| Mr. Dreben, does the president have immunity, or are you saying that there's no immunity, presidential immunity, even for official acts? | ||
| Yes, Justice Thomas, but I think that it's important to put in perspective the position that we are offering the court today. | ||
| The president, as the head of the Article II branch, Can assert, as applied, Article 2 objections to criminal laws that interfere with an exclusive power possessed by the president or that prevent the president from accomplishing his constitutionally assigned functions. | ||
| That is the constitutional doctrine that currently governs the separation of powers. | ||
| What Petitioner is asking for is a broad blanket immunity that would protect the president, a former president. | ||
| From any criminal exposure, absent impeachment and conviction, which has never happened in our history, and we submit that is not necessary in order to assure that the president can perform all of the important tasks that the Constitution reposes in him. | ||
| Over in not-so-distant paths, the presidents or certain presidents have engaged in... | ||
| Various activity, coups or operations like Operation Mongoose when I was a teenager, and yet there were no prosecutions. | ||
| Why? | ||
| If what you're saying is right, it would seem that that would have been right for criminal prosecution of someone. | ||
| So, Justice Thomas, I think this is a central question. | ||
| The reason why... | ||
| There have not been prior criminal prosecutions, is that there were not crimes. | ||
| And I want to explain why there are layers of safeguards that assure that former presidents do not have to lightly assume criminal liability for any of their official acts. | ||
| At the outset, there is a statutory construction principle that is applicable here. | ||
| It arises when there is a serious constitutional question about applying a criminal statute to the president's acts. | ||
| It is not, and I'm sure that we will discuss this, that no statute can apply to the president in his official capacity, absent a designation of the president in it. | ||
| But there is a principle that if there is a serious constitutional question, courts will strive to construe the statute so that it does not apply to the president. | ||
| In addition to that, the president, I think has been mentioned earlier, has access to advice from the attorney general, and it would be a due process problem to prosecute a president who received advice from the attorney general that his actions were lawful, absent the kind of collusion or conspiracy that itself represented a criminal violation, which I don't really see as being a realistic option. | ||
| And then if I could say one more thing. | ||
| Because you raised the question about potential overseas taking of life. | ||
| And the Office of Legal Counsel has addressed this quite specifically. | ||
| There is a background principle of criminal law called the public authority exception to liability, and it is read into federal law unless Congress takes specific action to... | ||
| Ousted, which it never has done as far as I am aware. | ||
| And in a case in which the president sought to engage in overseas activity that would result in the taking of life, OLC did not say the Federal murder statute doesn't apply. | ||
| That would be the thrust of my friend's argument on clear statement. | ||
| Instead, OLC went through an extensive analysis on why the public authority defense would prevent it from being considered a violation of law to go after a terrorist, for example. | ||
| The Court of Appeals below, whose decision we're reviewing, said Do you agree with that statement? | ||
| Well, I think it sounds tautologically true, but I want to underscore that the obligation of a president is to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. | ||
| I think it sounds tautologically true as well. | ||
| And that, I think, is the clearest statement of the court's holding, which is why it concerns me. | ||
| As I read it, it says simply, a former president can be prosecuted because he's being prosecuted. | ||
| Well, I would not suggest that that's either the proper approach in this case or certainly not the government's approach. | ||
| A prosecution does, of course, invoke federal criminal law. | ||
| The allegations have to be presented to a grand jury, which votes upon the indictment Well, that's what I mean. | ||
| Shortly after that statement in the court, that court's opinion, that's what they said. | ||
| But there's no reason to worry because the prosecutor will act in good faith, and there's no reason to worry because a grand jury will have returned the indictment. | ||
| Now, you know how easy it is in many cases. | ||
| For a prosecutor to get a grand jury to bring an indictment, and reliance on the good faith of the prosecutor may not be enough in some cases, I'm not suggesting here. | ||
| So if it's tautological, and those are the only protections that the Court of Appeals below gave, and that is no longer your position, you're not defending that position, why shouldn't we either send it back to the Court of Appeals or... | ||
| Issue an opinion making clear that that's not the law. | ||
| Well, I am defending the Court of Appeals' judgment, and I do think that there are layered safeguards that the court can take into account that will ameliorate concerns about unduly chilling presidential conduct. | ||
| That concerns us. | ||
| We are not endorsing a regime that we think would expose former presidents to criminal prosecution in bad faith, for political animus, without adequate evidence. | ||
| A politically driven prosecution would violate the Constitution under Waite versus United States. | ||
| It's not something within the arsenal of prosecutors to do. | ||
| Prosecutors take an oath, the attorney general takes an oath. | ||
| I don't want to overstate Your Honor's concern with potentially relying solely on good faith, but that's an ingredient. | ||
| And then the courts stand ready to adjudicate motions based on selective prosecution, political animus. | ||
| This court relied on disdainment. | ||
| Those very protections in the Vance case just two years ago. | ||
| What concerns me is, as you know, the Court of Appeals did not get into a focused consideration of what acts we're talking about or what documents we're talking about because of its adoption of what you termed, and I agree quite correctly, as a tautological statement. | ||
| Because the fact of prosecution was enuffed. | ||
| Enough to take away any official immunity, the fact of prosecution. | ||
| They had no need to look at what courts normally look at when you're talking about a privilege or immunity question. | ||
| Well, I think I would take issue, Mr. Chief Justice, with the idea of taking away immunity. | ||
| There is no immunity that is in the Constitution unless this court creates it today. | ||
| There certainly is no textual immunity. | ||
| We do not submit that that's the end of the story. | ||
| United States versus Nixon wasn't a textually based case. | ||
| Neither was Nixon versus Fitzgerald. | ||
| We endorse. | ||
| Both of those holdings. | ||
| But what is important is that no public official has ever had the kind of absolute criminal immunity that my friend speaks of, even with respect to the speech or debate clause. | ||
| It's very narrow. | ||
| It's focused on legislative acts. | ||
| It's not focused on everything that a congressman does. | ||
| And it responds to a very specific historical circumstance that basically involved the two other branches potentially harassing That's why it ended up in the Constitution. | ||
| Nothing like that ended up in the Constitution for the presidents. | ||
| And that's because one of the chief concerns of the framers was the risk of presidential misconstruction. | ||
| They labored over this. | ||
| They adopted an impeachment structure that separated removal from office as a political remedy from criminal prosecution. | ||
| This departed from the British model. | ||
| The British model was you get impeached and criminally prosecuted and convicted in the same proceeding. | ||
| The framers did not want that. | ||
| They wanted a political remedy in case a president was engaging in conduct that endangered the nation. | ||
| He could be removed. | ||
| He can't be prosecuted while he's a sitting president. | ||
| That's been the longstanding Justice Department position. | ||
| Mr. Drebin, you dispute the... | ||
| Proposition that a former president has some form of immunity. | ||
| But as I understand your argument, you do recognize that a former president has a form of special protection, namely that statutes that are applicable to everybody must be interpreted differently under some circumstances when they are applied to a former president. | ||
| Isn't that true? | ||
| It is true because, Justice Alito, of the general principle that courts construe statutes to avoid serious constitutional questions, and that has been the longstanding practice of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice. | ||
| All right, so this is more, I think, than just a quarrel about terminology, whether what the former president gets is some form of immunity. | ||
| Or some form of special protection, because it involves this difference, which I'm sure you're very well aware of. | ||
| If it's just a form of special protection, in other words, statutes will be interpreted differently as applied to a former president, then... | ||
| That is something that has to be litigated at trial. | ||
| The former president can make a motion to dismiss and may cite OLC opinions, and the district court may say, well, that's fine. | ||
| I'm not bound by OLC, and I interpret it differently, so let's go to trial. | ||
| And then there has to be a trial, and that may involve Great expense, and it may take up a lot of time, and during the trial, the former president may be unable to engage in other activities that the former president would want to engage in, and then the outcome is dependent on the jury, the instructions to the jury, and how the jury returns a verdict, and then it has to be taken up on appeal. | ||
| So the protection is greatly diluted. | ||
| You take the form if it takes the form that you have proposed. | ||
| Now why is that better? | ||
| It's better because it's more balanced. | ||
| The blanket immunity that Petitioner is arguing for just means that criminal prosecution is off the table unless he says that impeachment and conviction have occurred. | ||
| Those are political remedies that are extremely difficult to achieve in a case where the conduct, misconduct, occurs close to the end of a president's term. | ||
| Congress is unlikely to crank up the machinery to do it. | ||
| And if the impeachment trial has to occur after the president has left office, there's an open question about whether that can happen at all. | ||
| You're arguing against most far-reaching aspects of Mr. Sauer's argument, right? | ||
| That is correct. | ||
| And let me turn then to why... | ||
| Well, what about to unpack it a little more? | ||
| Do you agree that there are some aspects of Article II presidential power that are exclusive and that Congress cannot regulate and therefore cannot criminalize? | ||
| Absolutely. | ||
| Okay. | ||
| For other official acts that the president may take that are not within that exclusive power, assume for the sake of argument, this question, that there's not blanket immunity for those official acts, but that to To preserve the separation of powers, | ||
| to provide fair notice, to make sure Congress has thought about this, that Congress has to speak clearly to Criminalize official acts of the president by a specific reference. | ||
| That seems to be what the OLC opinions suggest. | ||
| I know you have a little bit of a disagreement with that and what this court's cases also suggest. | ||
| So, Justice Kavanaugh, I'd like to take all of those in turn because I don't think this court's cases speak that broadly. | ||
| I definitely don't think that the Office of Legal Counsel opinions stand for this broad proposition that unless the president is specifically named, he's not in the statute. | ||
| And I don't think that that's necessary in order to afford adequate protection for the president's valid Article 2 functions. | ||
| You said unless... | ||
| Sorry to interrupt, but I want to just get this out and you can incorporate it in the answer. | ||
| You said unless there's a serious constitutional question. | ||
| Well, it's a serious constitutional question whether a statute can be applied to the president's official act. | ||
| So wouldn't you always... | ||
| Interpret the statute not to apply to the president, even under your formulation, unless Congress had spoken with some clarity. | ||
| I don't think across the board that a serious constitutional question exists on applying any criminal statute to the president. | ||
| The problem is the vague stat, you know, obstruction and 371 conspiracy to defraud the United States can be used against a lot of presidential activities historically with an... | ||
| Creative prosecutor who wants to go after a president. | ||
| Well, let me try to backtrack a little bit. | ||
| That's what we're talking about historically, is the risk, and going forward, the risk. | ||
| So you can take all of that. | ||
| I think that the question about the risk is very serious, and obviously it is a question that this court has to evaluate. | ||
| For the executive branch, our view is that there is a balanced protection that better serves the interests of the Constitution, that incorporates both accountability and protection for the president. | ||
| And I want to go through the protections that do exist, but perhaps it's worth returning at the outset to the statutory construction question that you raised. | ||
| The Office of Legal Counsel has said the offense of bribery, of course, applies to the president. | ||
| It does not name the president, Justice Gorsuch. | ||
| Section 201 does not specifically name the president. | ||
| I would assume that's personal. | ||
| Well, I think that it's... | ||
| That's what Brewster said. | ||
| Bribery statute 607 says the president. | ||
| I've got it in front of me. | ||
| And so there is that. | ||
| Let me just back up just a second to what was a quick exchange with Justice Kavanaugh that I just want to make sure I understand. | ||
| Did you agree that there are some core functions of the executive that present conduct that Congress cannot criminalize? | ||
| Yes. | ||
| So is that a form? | ||
| I mean, we can call it immunity or you can call it they can't do it, but what's the difference? | ||
| We call it an as-applied Article 2 challenge. | ||
| Okay, okay. | ||
| Can we call it immunity just for shorthand's sake? | ||
| So I think we are kind of narrowing the ground of dispute here. | ||
| It seems to me there is some area you concede that And official acts that Congress cannot criminalize. | ||
| And now we're just talking about the scope. | ||
| Well, I don't think it's a just, but I think it's a very significant gap between any official act and the small core of exclusive official acts. | ||
| I got that, but I want to explore that, okay? | ||
| So, for example, let's say a president leads a mostly peaceful protest sit-in in front of Congress because he objects to A piece of legislation that's going through. | ||
| And it, in fact, delays the proceedings in Congress. | ||
| Now, under 1512C2, that might be corruptly impeding an official proceeding. | ||
| Is that core and therefore immunized, or whatever word, euphemism you want to use for that? | ||
| Or is that not core and therefore prosecutable? | ||
| Without a clear statement that applies to the president. | ||
| It's not core. | ||
| The core kinds of activities that the court has acknowledged are the things that I would run through the Youngstown analysis. | ||
| And it's a pretty small set, but things like the pardon power, the power to recognize foreign nations, the power to veto legislation, the power to make appointments, these are things that the Constitution specifically allocates to the president. | ||
| So a president then could be prosecuted for the conduct I described after he leaves office? | ||
| Probably not, but I want to explain the framework of why I don't think that that would be a prosecution that would be valid. | ||
| First, I think you need to run through all of the sort of normal Categories of analysis. | ||
| Is there a serious constitutional question that's posed by applying that statute to the president? | ||
| If so, then you may well default to it does not apply, at least on that fact. | ||
| I thought you said it. | ||
| That was my question. | ||
| Yes, I understand. | ||
| And you said it fell outside that core, we'll call it immunity for simplicity's sake. | ||
| Yes, I understand. | ||
| But there's a separate category. | ||
| OK, so why couldn't he be prosecuted for leading a civil rights protest in front of the Capitol that delays a vote on a piece of important legislation? | ||
| So I think what you need to do is run through all of the very president-specific protective layers of analysis. | ||
| So one of them is whether the statute would be construed not to apply to his conduct, even if it's not... | ||
| Well, so I don't know. | ||
| We're starting with the layers, I think, of protection. | ||
| And we're now down through whether the statute would be construed to apply to him. | ||
| Then there'd be a question of whether... | ||
| I assume it does. | ||
| I will assume it. | ||
| Then there's a question of whether he has the state of mind necessarily to violate it. | ||
| Assume he does. | ||
| Okay. | ||
| Nobody knows what corrupt intent means. | ||
| We've been around that tree twice already. | ||
| We will probably find out. | ||
| And maybe it means that he knows that he was doing wrong, is what the government told us. | ||
| Right. | ||
| He knows he's doing wrong. | ||
| He knows he shouldn't be up there blocking a congressman from... | ||
| Well, let me get to the next layer then, which is that the president does have access to the attorney general to provide legal advice. | ||
| And regularly gets legal advice from the Attorney General on the lawful scope of the President's activities. | ||
| We can go down two tracks here. | ||
| One is that the Attorney General advises him that as an incident of his Article 2 authority and in carrying out the functions of the presidency, he can lawfully participate in that protest. | ||
| It's kind of the First Amendment analog to the President's official powers, which the court is exploring. | ||
| In other cases. | ||
| Alternatively, the Attorney General could advise him, I'm sorry, Mr. President, there's nothing in the language of this statute that carves you out. | ||
| I don't see a serious constitutional question in it, because you don't have to do that. | ||
| And I would advise you not to violate the criminal law. | ||
| And then he could be prosecuted. | ||
| No. | ||
| No. | ||
| If he gets a negative opinion from the Attorney General, he still couldn't be prosecuted? | ||
| I would assume that most presidents are not going to take a... | ||
| Well, but if he gets one and does it anyway, then he could be prosecuted. | ||
| Well, so then if we are down at that level, I think what we are really asking is whether the President... | ||
| Mr. Treven, can we go back to the bribery statute? | ||
| I, like you, understand that the only thing that is covered by that is the president is barred from soliciting or receiving funds in any room or building in the United States. | ||
| That is correct. | ||
| It's an extremely... | ||
| Official building. | ||
| It's a very limited mention of the president. | ||
| And it really, I think... | ||
| So, as I understand this, there's two very limited provisions mentioning the president as included. | ||
| That's right. | ||
| There's a whole number of provisions that exclude the president, many, many, many more that exclude the president, correct? | ||
| It's a kind of small number on both sides of the fence, Justice. | ||
| Now, Justice Barrett made the point that if we say a president can't be included in a criminal law unless explicitly named, then that would bar the Senate. | ||
| from impeaching him for high crimes or misdemeanor because that means That he's not subject to the law at all, correct? | ||
| So I think... | ||
| That's a tautology you can't escape. | ||
| Justice Sotomayor, what I think that Justice Barrett was saying, and we would agree with it, is that under my friend's position, after impeachment, he could be prosecuted. | ||
| But under his statutory construction approach, there'd be nothing to prosecute him for. | ||
| Exactly. | ||
| That's the point, which is, if he's not covered by the criminal law, he can't be impeached for it. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| Or violating it. | ||
| All right. | ||
| Now, could we go further on this clear statement, Drew? | ||
| The situations, and you mentioned it earlier, in which we have looked to see if the president is covered is contextual, correct? | ||
| Correct. | ||
| And what are the factors that generally we'll look at? | ||
| I'm thinking specifically about whether the APA covers the president. | ||
| Correct. | ||
| And what we did there was analyze what powers were being given in the lawsuit, etc. | ||
| We looked at words, we looked at structure, we looked at separation of powers issues relating to our case law that said you can't direct the president to do anything, and this would have been a subterfuge for that, correct? | ||
| All correct. | ||
| All right. | ||
| So, I don't know why... | ||
| Two of my colleagues, how they would fashion a clear statement rule that would say when the law says any person can't accept the bribe, that that permits the president to do it. | ||
| So I agree, Justice Sotomayor, that the way that this court has interpreted statutes that do carve out the president, Justice Kavanaugh asked about this, was very context-specific. | ||
| The Franklin case basically involved a holding that... | ||
| We are highly unlikely to say that the president is an agency, something that the government said would be a peculiar understanding of agency, when the effect of it would be that we would review the president's decisions under statutes for abuse of discretion, which is a very extraordinary thing to do. | ||
| I think even going back to Marbury, this is perhaps a point on which I agree with my friend, Marbury says discretionary acts of the president are not the kind of thing that the court reviews. | ||
| Could I go back to your brief and going back to what some of my colleagues have asked you? | ||
| There appears to be some narrowing principles to the concept that the president is subject to all criminal laws in all situations. | ||
| Correct. | ||
| I agree that if it affects core powers, then he would not be subject. | ||
| That is correct. | ||
| You're defining core powers as those specified by Article 2. That is essentially correct, yes. | ||
| All right. | ||
| And the only words in the Constitution that have to do with the president and law is that he shall take care that the law be faithfully executed, correct? | ||
| That is right. | ||
| Hard to imagine that a president who breaks the law is faithfully executing the law, correct? | ||
| He has to execute all of the laws. | ||
| All right. | ||
| Well, Mr. Drieben, do you really... | ||
| I mean, the presidents have to make a lot of tough decisions about... | ||
| Enforcing the law, and they have to make decisions about questions that are unsettled, and they have to make decisions based on the information that's available. | ||
| Do you really, did I understand you to say, well, you know, if he makes a mistake, he makes a mistake, he's subject to the criminal laws just like anybody else? | ||
| You don't think he's in a special, a peculiarly precarious position? | ||
| He's in a special position for a number of reasons. | ||
| One is that he has access to legal advice about everything that he does. | ||
| He's under a constitutional obligation. | ||
| He's supposed to be faithful to the laws of the United States and the Constitution of the United States. | ||
| And making a mistake is not what lands you in a criminal prosecution. | ||
| There's been some talk about the statutes that are issued in this case. | ||
| I think they are fairly described as malamense statutes engaging in conspiracies to defraud the United States with respect to one of the most important functions, namely the certification of the next president. | ||
| I want to dispute that particular application of that 371 conspiracy to defraud the United States to the particular facts here. | ||
| But would you not agree that that is a peculiarly open-ended statutory prohibition? | ||
| That fraud under that provision, unlike under most other fraud provisions, doesn't require any impairment of a property interest. | ||
| It's designed to protect the functions of the United States government, and it's difficult to think of a more critical function than the certification of who won the election. | ||
| Yeah, as I said, I'm not discussing the particular facts of this case, but it applies to any fraud that interferes seriously with any government operation, right? | ||
| So what the government needs to show is an intent to impede, interfere, or defeat a lawful government function. | ||
| By deception, and it has to be done with C-enter. | ||
| These are not the kinds of activities that I think any of us would think a president needs to engage in in order to fulfill his Article II duties. | ||
| And particularly in a case like this one, I want to pick up on something that the court said earlier about the distinction between a public official acting to achieve public ends and a public official acting to achieve private ends. | ||
| As applied to this case, the president has no functions with respect to the certification of the winner of the presidential election. | ||
| It seems likely that the framers designed the Constitution that way because at the time of the founding, presidents had no two-term limit. | ||
| They could run again and again and were expected potentially to want to do that. | ||
| So the potential for self-interest would explain why the state... | ||
| They send electors to certify who won those elections and to provide votes. | ||
| And then Congress, in an extraordinary joint session, certifies the vote. | ||
| And the president doesn't have an official role in that proceeding. | ||
| So it's difficult for me to understand how there could be a serious constitutional question about saying you can't use fraud to defeat that function. | ||
| You can't obstruct it through deception. | ||
| You can't deprive millions of voters of their right to have their vote counted for the candidate who they chose. | ||
| Thank you, Counsel. | ||
| Justice Thomas? | ||
| Justice Alito? | ||
| Could we just briefly review the layers of protection that you think exists? | ||
| And I'm going to start with what... | ||
| The D.C. Circuit said. | ||
| So the first layer of protection is that attorneys general and other Justice Department attorneys can be trusted to act in a professional and ethical manner, right? | ||
| Yes. | ||
| How robust is that protection? | ||
| I mean, most of the vast majority of attorneys general and Justice Department Attorneys, and we both served in the Justice Department for a long time, are honorable people, and they take their professional ethical responsibilities seriously. | ||
| But there had been exceptions, right, both among attorneys general and among federal prosecutors. | ||
| There have been rare exceptions, Justice Alito, but when we're talking about layers of protection, I do think this is the starting point. | ||
| And if the court has concerns about the robustness of it, I would suggest looking at the charges in this case. | ||
| Well, I'm going to talk about this in the abstract, because what is before us, of course, does involve this particular case, which is immensely important. | ||
| But whatever we decide is going to apply to all future presidents. | ||
| So, as for Attorneys General, there have been two who were convicted of criminal offenses while in office. | ||
| There were others. | ||
| A Mitchell Palmer's one that comes to mind, who is widely regarded as having abused the power of his office. | ||
| Would you agree with that? | ||
| I would, but they are two officials in a long line of attorneys generals who did not and in departments of justice that are staffed by multiple people who do adhere to their office. | ||
| And Justice Alito, if I could just, the point that I wanted to make about this case does go to the general proposition. | ||
| The allegations about the misuse of the Department of Justice to perpetuate election fraud show exactly how the Department of Justice functions in the way that it is supposed to be. | ||
| Petitioner is alleged to have tried to get the Department of Justice to send fraudulent letters to the states to get them to reverse electoral results. | ||
| Yeah, I understand. | ||
| I understand that, Mr. Dreven. | ||
| But as I said, this case will have effects that go far beyond this particular prosecution. | ||
| So moving on to the second level of protection that the DC Circuit cited, federal grand juries will shield former presidents from unwarranted. | ||
| Well, it affords two levels of protection. | ||
| One is the probable cause finding requires evidence. | ||
| I think some of the fears about groundless prosecutions aren't supported by evidence, and they're not going to get out of the starting game. | ||
| I mean, there's the old saw about indicting a ham sandwich. | ||
| You had a lot of experience in the Justice Department. | ||
| You come across a lot of cases where the U.S. attorney or another federal prosecutor really wanted to indict a case and the grand jury refused to do so. | ||
| There are such cases. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| But I think that the other... | ||
| Every once in a while there's an eclipse, too. | ||
| Well, I think that that's for the most reason is prosecutors have no incentive to bring a case to a grand jury and secure an indictment where they don't have evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. | ||
| It's self-defeating. | ||
| All right, then the third level is that former presidents enjoy all the protections afforded all criminal defendants, right? | ||
| And we've discussed that. | ||
| And that may be true at the end of the day. | ||
| But a lot can happen between the time when an indictment is returned and the time when the former president finally gets vindication, perhaps on appeal. | ||
| Isn't that correct? | ||
| It is correct, Justice Alito, but I think that we should also consider the history of this country. | ||
| As members of the Court have observed, it's baked into the Constitution that any president knows that they are exposed to potential criminal prosecution. | ||
| My friend says after impeachment and conviction, we don't read the impeachment judgment clause that way, but it's common ground that all former presidents have known that they could be indicted and convicted. | ||
| And Watergate... | ||
| The Watergate smoking gun tape involved President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman talking about and then deciding to use the CIA to give a bogus story to the FBI to shut down a criminal investigation. | ||
| Mr. Sauer and others have identified events in the past where presidents have engaged in conduct that might have been. | ||
| Charged as a federal crime. | ||
| And you say, well, no, that's not really true. | ||
| This is page 42 of your brief. | ||
| So what about President Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision to intern Japanese Americans during World War II? | ||
| Couldn't that have been charged under 18 U.S.C. | ||
| 241, conspiracy against civil rights? | ||
| Today, yes, given this court's decision in... | ||
| Trump versus Hawaii, where the court said Korematsu was overruled. | ||
| President Roosevelt made that decision with the advice of his attorney general. | ||
| Is that really true? | ||
| I thought Attorney General Biddle thought that there was really no threat of sabotage, as did J. Edgar Hoover. | ||
| So I think that there is a lot of historical... | ||
| Controversy, but it underscores that that occurred during wartime. | ||
| It implicates a potential commander-in-chief. | ||
| Concerns, concerns about the exigencies of national defense that might provide an as-applied Article 2 challenge at the time. | ||
| I'm not suggesting today. | ||
| But the idea that a decision that was made and ultimately endorsed by this court, perhaps wrongly in the Korematsu case, would support criminal prosecution under 241, which requires under United States v. | ||
| Lanier that the right have been made specific so that there is notice to the president. | ||
| I don't think that would have been satisfying. | ||
| All right. | ||
| Well, we could go through other historical examples. | ||
| I won't do that. | ||
| Let me just touch briefly on a couple of other things. | ||
| One is the relevance of advice of counsel. | ||
| And I wasn't clear what your answer is. | ||
| So if the president gets advice from the attorney general that something is lawful, is that an absolute defense? | ||
| Yes, I think that it is under the principle of entrapment by estoppel. | ||
| This is a due process doctrine that we referred to in our brief, our reply brief in Garland v. | ||
| Cargill, this term at page 19, where we cited authority of this court that if an authorized government representative tells you that what you are about to do is lawful, it would be a root violation of due process to prosecute you for that. | ||
| And won't that give... | ||
| President's an incentive to be sure to pick an attorney general who will reliably tell the president that it is lawful to do whatever the president wants to do if there's any possibly conceivable argument in favor of it. | ||
| So I think the constitutional structure protects against that risk. | ||
| The president nominates the attorney general and the Senate... | ||
| Provides advice and consent. | ||
| And these are the sort of structural checks that have operated for 200 years to prevent the kind of abuses that my friend fears going forward as a result of this once in history prosecution. | ||
| On the question of whether a president has the authority to pardon himself, which came up earlier in the argument, what's the answer to that question? | ||
| I don't believe the Department of Justice has taken a position. | ||
| The only authority that I'm aware of is a member of the Office of Legal Counsel wrote on a memorandum that there is no self-pardon authority. | ||
| As far as I know, the department has not addressed it further, and of course this court had not. | ||
| Well, when you addressed that question before us, are you speaking in your capacity solely as a member of the special counsel's team, or are you speaking on behalf of the Justice Department, which has special institutional responsibilities? | ||
| I am speaking on behalf of the Justice Department. | ||
| We're representing the United States. | ||
| Now, don't you think we need to know the answer, at least to the Justice Department's position, on that issue in order to decide this case? | ||
| Because if a president has the authority to pardon himself before leaving office, and the D.C. Circuit is right that there is no immunity from prosecution, won't the I really doubt that, Justice Alito. | ||
| I mean, it sort of presupposes a regime that we have never had except for President Nixon and as alleged in the indictment here. | ||
| Presidents who are conscious of having engaged in wrongdoing and seeking to shield themselves. | ||
| I think the political consequences of a president who asserted a right of self-pardon that has never been recognized. | ||
| That seems to contradict a bedrock principle of our law that no person shall be the judge in their own case. | ||
| Those are adequate deterrents, I think, so that this kind of dystopian regime is not going to evolve. | ||
| Let me end with just a question about what is required for the functioning of a stable democratic society, which is something that we all want. | ||
| I'm sure you would agree with me that a stable democratic society requires that a candidate who loses an election, even a close one, even a hotly contested one, leave office peacefully if that candidate is the incumbent. | ||
| Of course. | ||
| All right. | ||
| Now, if an incumbent who loses a very close, hotly contested election A real possibility after leaving office is not that the president is going to be able to go off into a peaceful retirement, but that the president may be criminally prosecuted by a bitter political opponent. | ||
| Will that not lead us into a cycle that destabilizes the functioning of our country as a democracy? | ||
| And we can look around the world and find countries where we have seen... | ||
| This process where the loser gets thrown in jail. | ||
| So I think it's exactly the opposite, Justice Alito. | ||
| There are lawful mechanisms to contest the results in an election. | ||
| And outside the record, but I think of public knowledge, Petitioner and his allies filed dozens of electoral challenges. | ||
| And my understanding is lost. | ||
| All but one that was not outcome determinative in any respect. | ||
| There were judges that said in order to sustain substantial claims of fraud that would overturn an election result that's certified by a state, you need evidence, you need proof. | ||
| And none of those things were manifested. | ||
| So there is an appropriate way to challenge things through the courts with evidence. | ||
| If you lose, you accept the results. | ||
| That has been the nation's experience. | ||
| I think the court is well familiar with it. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Justice Sotomayor? | |
| A stable democratic society needs the good faith of its public officials, correct? | ||
| Absolutely. | ||
| And that good faith assumes that they will follow the law? | ||
| Correct. | ||
| Now, putting that aside, there is no fail-safe system of government, meaning we have a judicial system that has... | ||
| Layers and layers and layers of protection for accused defendants in the hopes that the innocent will go free. | ||
| We fail routinely, but we succeed more often than not. | ||
| In the vast majority of cases, the innocent do go free. | ||
| Sometimes they don't, and we have some post-conviction remedies for that. | ||
| But we still fail. | ||
| We've executed innocent people. | ||
| Having said that, Justice Alito went through, step by step, all of the mechanisms that could potentially fail. | ||
| In the end, if it fails completely, it's because we've destroyed our democracy on our own, isn't it? | ||
| It is, Justice Sotomayor, and I also think that there are additional checks in the system. | ||
| Of course, the constitutional framers designed a separated power system in order to limit abuses. | ||
| I think one of the ways in which abuses are limited is accountability under the criminal law for criminal violations. | ||
| But the ultimate check is the goodwill and faith in democracy. | ||
| Crimes that are alleged in this case that are the antithesis of democracy, that subvert it, undermine that. | ||
| An encouragement to believe words that have been somewhat put into suspicion here, that no man is above the law either in his official or private acts. | ||
| I think that is an assumption of the Constitution. | ||
| Mrs. Kagan? | ||
| Mr. Dreamin, I want to... | ||
| Go through your framework and make sure I understand it. | ||
| So first, on the small category of things that you say have absolute protection, that they are core executive functions. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| What are those small categories? | ||
| Pardon power. | ||
| Pardon. | ||
| Veto. | ||
| Veto. | ||
| foreign recognition, appointments. | ||
| Congress cannot say you can't appoint a federal judge who hasn't received a certain diploma, hasn't achieved a certain age. | ||
| There are a few other powers. | ||
| Is Commander-in-Chief? | ||
| On the list, but I want to add to my answer on that, that Congress has substantial authority in the national security realm. | ||
| Congress declares war, it raises armies, it has power over the purse. | ||
| So that may be viewed as not really in that core set of functions, which nobody has any power but the president over. | ||
| Yes, I think that there may be some aspects, like directing troops on the field, in which the president's power is completely unreviewable. | ||
| In the next category, we've left the core set behind, but we're still in the world of official actions, and that's where you say there are That's right. | ||
| So I wanted to give you an opportunity to say, you know, how that would look, how that analysis would look in a given case. | ||
| And in the course of responding to that, You know, I'm sort of thinking of something like the OLC opinion, which says bribery. | ||
| The president can be tried and convicted of bribery, even in the part of the bribery statutes that do not say the president. | ||
| Why is that true? | ||
| That is true because there is no serious constitutional question that the president needs to engage in bribery in order to carry out his constitutional functions. | ||
| And the Office of Legal Counsel pointed out that bribery is enumerated in the impeachment clause. | ||
| So it falls outside of anything that could be viewed as inherent in the need of artificial intelligence. | ||
| Do you think the premise of that OLC opinion was that the bribery was simply not official? | ||
| No. | ||
| Or is the premise that the bribery was official and still the president be prosecuted for. | ||
| I think that bribery is the kind of hybrid that illustrates the abuse of public office for private gain that we think is paradigmatic of the kinds of things that should be not In a bribery case, the public official cannot extract the bribe without the official power to offer as the quid or the pro. | ||
| I guess the quo, actually. | ||
| So it really is a crime that can only be committed by public officials who misuse their power. | ||
| And it was one of the things that was most mistrusted. | ||
| Many of the acts that are charged in this indictment or that would violate federal criminal law similarly involve the misuse of official power for private. | ||
| So if you were to say what the line is in this category, like when it is that the statute should be understood as precluding presidential prosecution, and when it is that the statute should be understood as allowing it, what general principles should guide? | ||
| So the general principles, I think, kind of emerge from looking at what the Office of Legal Counsel has done. | ||
| So, for example, with respect to a federal statute that prohibited appointments to courts of people within certain degrees of consanguinity, the Office of Legal Counsel said this infringes on a very important appointment power of the president, the power to appoint federal judges. | ||
| It cannot be presumed that Congress intended to do that because it would raise a very serious constitutional question. | ||
| The president is out. | ||
| Then there are categories of statutes where the president is in, like, for example, the grassroots lobbying statute. | ||
| The Office of Legal Counsel wrote an opinion about that, and it said for the president or other public officials to go out into the world and to promote their programs... | ||
| That can't be what Congress intended to prohibit. | ||
| What it did intend to prohibit is using federal funds to gin up an artificial grassroots campaign that gave the appearance of emerging from the people, but it was really top-down. | ||
| And the Office of Legal Counsel said the president and officials who carry out the president's mandates... | ||
| Are subject to that statute. | ||
| So that's a more nuanced one. | ||
| And the third example that I will give you is the statute that would permit prosecution for contempt of Congress. | ||
| The Office of Legal Counsel concluded that a good-faith assertion of executive privilege as a reason for not providing information to Congress would preclude prosecution because Congress cannot be deemed to have altered the separation of powers in such a manner. | ||
| OLC probably would have gone on to say if Congress tried to do it, it would be deemed unconstitutional. | ||
| But again, this was a statute that did not specifically name the president. | ||
| There are only two that do that. | ||
| So the entire corpus of federal criminal law, including bribery offenses, sedition, murder, would all be off limits if it were taken to the extent that some of the questions have suggested. | ||
| And for the general principle... | ||
| Does it raise a serious constitutional question? | ||
| And if so, to what extent? | ||
| Can it be carved out individually? | ||
| And there may be some instances where the statutes here could be carved out and a particular act could be found to be protected. | ||
| Or does the statute... | ||
| Across the board, in such a wide range of applications, somewhat analogous to overbreadth analysis, infringe on the president's power so that we're going to say that the president is just out. | ||
| Now, that set of issues, they seem important and may occasionally be difficult. | ||
| They also see him not really before us in the way Justice Jackson suggested earlier. | ||
| Do you think they are before us? | ||
| We should just clear it up. | ||
| Here it is. | ||
| We have a case. | ||
| What else could we do? | ||
| How should we deal with this? | ||
| There are these lingering issues that go beyond the question of whether there's the kind of absolute immunity that the former president is invoking. | ||
| I think the court has discretion to reach that issue, even though... | ||
| Justice Jackson is totally right. | ||
| It was not raised in the district court, and it was not raised in the Court of Appeals. | ||
| And the analysis that I would use to get there is a fusion of a couple of principles. | ||
| One is the court has often resolved threshold questions that are a prerequisite to an intelligent resolution of the question presented. | ||
| So in a case like United States v. | ||
| Grubbs, for example, the court reached out to decide whether anticipatory warrants are valid under the Fourth Amendment before We're turning to the question whether the triggering condition for an anticipatory warrant had to be in the warrant. | ||
| So that's one principle. | ||
| And then a precedent that bears some analogy to this is, Is Vermont Natural Resources Agency versus United States XREL Stevens? | ||
| It was a key TAM case. | ||
| And the first question was whether a state agency was a person within the meaning of the False Claims Act. | ||
| And the second question was whether if the state agency was 11th Amendment immunity kicked in. | ||
| And the court wrote an analysis of why it could reach... | ||
| There are some considerations that cut against this, and I want to be clear that for overall government equities, we are not wild about parties who raise an immunity case that can be presented to a court on an interlocutory appeal and then smuggling in other issues. | ||
| So we would want to guide the court. | ||
| Not to have an expansive approach to that issue. | ||
| But the final thing that I would say about this is part of our submission to this court is that the Article I branch and the Article II branches are aligned in believing that this prosecution is an appropriate way to enforce the law. | ||
| Congress, by making the law, the current executive by deciding to bring it. | ||
| And since a building block of that... | ||
| Okay, I have one last set of questions, which has to do with the official unofficial line. | ||
| And you heard Mr. Sauer's responses to both Justice Barrett's questions and my questions about what he thinks counts as official here and what he thinks counts as unofficial here. | ||
| And I'm just wondering what you took from His responses and also how you would characterize what is official and what is not official. | ||
| So I think Petitioner conceded that there are acts that are not official that are alleged in the indictment, and we agree with him on all of that. | ||
| I think I disagree with him on everything else that he said about what is official and what is not. | ||
| Organizing fraudulent slates of electors, creating false documentation that says, I'm an elector, I was appointed properly. | ||
| I'm going to send a vote off to Congress that reflects that petitioner won rather than the candidate that actually got the most votes and who was ascertained by the governor and whose electors were appointed to cast votes. | ||
| That is not official conduct. | ||
| That is campaign conduct. | ||
| And I think that the D.C. Circuit in the Blassingame case did draw an appropriate distinction. | ||
| A first-term president who's running for re-election can act in the capacity as... | ||
| Office seeker or office holder. | ||
| And when working with private lawyers and a private public relations advisor to gin up fraudulent sleights of electors, that is not any part of a president's job. | ||
| I'm sorry. | ||
| There's an allegation in the indictment that has to do with the removal of a Justice Department official. | ||
| Is that core protected conduct? | ||
| We don't think that that's core protected conduct. | ||
| I don't think that I would characterize that episode quite that way. | ||
| We do agree that the Department of Justice allegations were a use of the president's official power. | ||
| In many ways, we think that aggravates the nature of this offense. | ||
| Seeking as a candidate to oust the lawful winner of the election and have one self-certified. | ||
| And so in the Department of Justice episode, it occurs very late in the election. | ||
| There's alleged in the indictment. | ||
| Any other schemes had failed. | ||
| And at that point, the petitioner is alleged to have tried to pressure the Department of Justice to send false letters to the states. | ||
| Claiming that there were serious election irregularities and that they should investigate who they certified as a president. | ||
| None of this was true. | ||
| The Department of Justice officials all said, this is not true. | ||
| We are not going to do that. | ||
| And at that point, petitioner is alleged to have threatened to remove the Department of Justice officials who were standing by their oath and replace... | ||
| We're not seeking to impose criminal liability on the president for exercising or talking about exercising the appointment and removal power. | ||
| No. | ||
| What we're seeking to impose criminal liability for is a conspiracy to use fraud to subvert the election. | ||
| One means of which was to try to get the Justice Department to be complicit in this. | ||
| The case would have been no different if Petitioner were successful and he had actually exercised the appointment and removal power and had gone through and those fraudulent letters were sent. | ||
| It would have made the scheme more dangerous, but it would not have changed the crime. | ||
| And how do we think about things like conversations with the vice president? | ||
| In other words, things that if you say it that way, it's clear that they would fall under executive privilege. | ||
| But how does that... | ||
| So this is one of the most difficult questions for the Department of Justice, and I want to explain why that is. | ||
| If we are operating under a Fitzgerald versus Nixon lens and looking at this the way that we look at things when there is a private lawsuit filed against the president, we take a very broad view of what the outer perimeter of official presidential action is in order to be... | ||
| as protective of the president against private lawsuits that, as this court explained in Nixon versus Fitzgerald, can be very deleterious to the president's conduct of business. | ||
| So, if we were putting this under a Fitzgerald lens, we would then have to answer to the question, was he acting in the capacity as office seeker? | ||
| Or was he acting in the capacity as office holder? | ||
| And if you run through the indictment, you can find support for those two characterizations. | ||
| And the Department of Justice has not yet had to come to grips with how we would analyze that set of interactions. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
| Justice Gorsuch? | ||
| If you did, though, I just wanted to confirm I thought I heard you thought that the Blazing Game framework was the appropriate one. | ||
| Largely, yes, Justice Gorsuch. | ||
| We agree with the idea of the distinction between office holder and office seeker. | ||
| We also agree that if it's objectively reasonable to view the activities as those of office holder, then the Fitzgerald immunity kicks in. | ||
| I think we would look more at the content of the actual interaction in order to make that determination than Blassingame suggested, at least on the facts of that case, might be appropriate. | ||
| Can you give me an example of what you have in mind? | ||
| I'm just trying to understand what nuance you're suggesting. | ||
| So Blassingame adopted a generally very favorable pro-government framework that we endorse in private civil cases. | ||
| Not here. | ||
| Because we don't think that Fitzgerald applies in the criminal context. | ||
| No, I understand that. | ||
| But putting that aside, the distinction between official act and private office seeker, their test is, you think, good enough for government work? | ||
| On this one, the department hasn't taken a next step since. | ||
| The Blassing Game decision. | ||
| But let me offer a few thoughts that just, of course, I think might clarify it. | ||
| The Blassing Game decision focused on objective contextual indications to try to see whether the president was acting as a campaigner as opposed to an office holder. | ||
| I think that that decision can also be made by looking at what the president actually said. | ||
| And let me illustrate that with an allegation that I think my friend talked briefly. | ||
| In one of the interactions between petitioner and a state official, a petitioner is alleged to have said, all I need you to do is to find me 11,000 votes and change. | ||
| I think if you look at that content, it's pretty clear that petitioner is acting in the capacity as office seeker, not as president. | ||
| And we would look at that content. | ||
| Okay. | ||
| But the test, I'm just focused on the legal test. | ||
| Correct. | ||
| I'm not hearing any objections to it. | ||
| Other than I think that the D.C. Circuit placed more content consideration off limits than I would. | ||
| Okay. | ||
| All right. | ||
| And then I wanted to understand on the core immunity, or whatever word we use, that it seems to me that we're narrowing the ground of dispute here considerably. | ||
| Do we look at motives, the president's motives for his actions? | ||
| I mean, for example, he has lots of war powers, as we've discussed, but he might use them in order to enhance his election, his personal interests. | ||
| Is that a relevant consideration when we're looking at core powers? | ||
| So I am thinking of this more as looking at the... | ||
| objective of the activity as opposed to the kind of subjective motive in the sense that Your Honor is talking about? | ||
| I think that there is a lot of concern about saying an electoral motive to be re-elected as such. | ||
| Every first-term president, everything he does can be seen through the prism, by critics at least, of his personal interest in re-election. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| And so you wouldn't want that. | ||
| I think you would say personal motivations off limits with respect to the core powers. | ||
| Probably, well, with respect to the core powers, we think those are just things that can't be regulated at all, like the pardon power - Right, regardless of motive. | ||
| - Correct. | ||
| - Regardless of motive. | ||
| - That is right. | ||
| - Right, so then we're in the non-core powers where we're fighting over. | ||
| What role do motives play there? | ||
| I mean... | ||
| One could remove an appointee that, well, first of all, is, maybe ask this first, is removing an appointee, a presidential appointee, A core power or a non-core power? | ||
| So here I might need to differentiate between the principal officers that this court, in cases like Myers and Sela Law, has regarded as having a constitutional status of being removable at will from inferior officers where Congress does have some regulatory latitude to impose restrictions on removal. | ||
| Sure. | ||
| Put that aside. | ||
| Yeah, I understand that. | ||
| On that aside, yes, appointing a principal officer is a core power. | ||
| I am not prepared to say that there is no potential criminal regulation to say you can't do it for corrupt purposes, to enrich yourself, for example. | ||
| Well, bribery, all right, but that's what I was wondering. | ||
| Do motives come into the core power analysis or not? | ||
| And now I'm hearing, I thought I heard no, and now I'm hearing maybe. | ||
| I think maybe it might be a little bit more appropriate because it's not involved in this case. | ||
| The department has not had to take a position on exactly how these core powers would be resolved under an as-applied constitutional analysis. | ||
| None is involved in this case. | ||
| And I guess I'm wondering, and I'm not concerned about this case so much as future ones too, but... | ||
| These non-core powers and maybe core powers where a president is acting with, at least in part, a personal interest in getting reelected. | ||
| Everything he does, he wants to get reelected. | ||
| And if you're allowing in motive to color that, I'm wondering how much is left. | ||
| So I would be fine with carving that out and deeming that to be something that's intrinsic in our electoral system. | ||
| We're not talking about applying criminal law to somebody who makes an announcement that this program will be good for the United States and somebody could come along and say, well, you really did it to get reelected. | ||
| Leaving aside whether any of that violates a criminal law, I know that the next question is assume that it does. | ||
| I'm doubtful that it in fact does because I don't think criminal laws generally operate on motives as opposed to objectives and purposes. | ||
| Well, all right, intentions. | ||
| I mean, you can reframe a motive as an intention and intentions as a motive, as you well know, every day of the week. | ||
| So let's put that aside. | ||
| I understand. | ||
| Putting that aside. | ||
| That really, to me, falls in a very different category. | ||
| And it is also... | ||
| So there's some motives or intents that are cognizable and others that aren't. | ||
| I mean, it's awkward, right? | ||
| When we look back at the injunction, back to Marbury in the early cases, you can't enjoin a president. | ||
| Also meant you couldn't hold him in contempt. | ||
| A sitting president. | ||
| For sure. | ||
| For sure. | ||
| Jessica, can I try one more time to clarify? | ||
| Let me just spin this out just a second, right? | ||
| And it didn't matter what the president's motives were. | ||
| We're not going to look behind it. | ||
| And same thing in Nixon. | ||
| We said, gosh, Nixon versus Fitzgerald. | ||
| That's something courts shouldn't get engaged in because presidents have all manner of motives. | ||
| And again, I'm not concerned about this case, but I am concerned about future uses of the criminal law. | ||
| To target political opponents based on accusations about their motives, whether it's re-election or who knows what corrupt means in 1512, right? | ||
| We don't know what that means. | ||
| Maybe we'll find out sometime soon. | ||
| But the dangerousness of accusing your political opponent of having bad motives, and if that's enough to overcome your core powers or any other limits. | ||
| Reactions, thoughts. | ||
| Yeah, so I think that you're raising a very difficult question. | ||
| That's the idea, right? | ||
| That is the idea. | ||
| Testing the limits of both sides' arguments. | ||
| And I'm going to say something that I don't normally say, which is that's really not involved in this case. | ||
| We don't have bad political motive in that sense. | ||
| I understand that. | ||
| I appreciate that. | ||
| But you also appreciate that we're writing a rule for... | ||
| Yes. | ||
| For the ages. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| And I think I would start by looking at the statutes and seeing what restrictions they do place on the president's conduct. | ||
| And for example, It has to be to defeat something that the United States is doing, and it has to be by deception. | ||
| I don't think that that gets us into the realm of motive hunting in the area where We are as concerned, I think, as the court would be about doing something that would undermine the presidency and the executive branch. | ||
| And 1512C2, we may have different views on the clarity and the scope of that statute. | ||
| I think if the court does interpret corruptly as involving a consciousness of wrongdoing and elevates that to consciousness of illegality. | ||
| Then we're in a different realm. | ||
| Wanting to get re-elected is not an illegal motive, and you don't have to worry about prosecuting presidents for that. | ||
| Thank you, Mr. Creep. | ||
| Justice Kavanaugh? | ||
| As you've indicated, this case has huge implications for the presidency, for the future of the presidency, for the future of the country, in my view. | ||
| You've referred to the department a few times as having supported the position. | ||
| Who in the department? | ||
| Is it the president, the attorney general? | ||
| The Solicitor General of the United States. | ||
| Part of the way in which the special counsel functions is as a component of the Department of Justice. | ||
| The regulations envision that we reach out and consult. | ||
| And on a question of this magnitude that involves equities that are far beyond this prosecution is the questions of the court. | ||
| So it's the Solicitor General? | ||
| Yes. | ||
| Okay. | ||
| Second. | ||
| Like Justice Gorsuch, I'm not focused on the here and now of this case. | ||
| I'm very concerned about the future. | ||
| Part of the way in which the special counsel functions is as a component of the Department of Justice. | ||
| The regulations envision that we reach out and consult. | ||
| And on a question of this magnitude that involves equities that are far beyond this prosecution is the questions of the court. | ||
| So it's the Solicitor General? | ||
| Yes. | ||
| Okay. | ||
| Second, like Justice Gorsuch, I'm not... | ||
| Focused on the here and now of this case. | ||
| I'm very concerned about the future. | ||
| And I think one of the court's biggest mistakes was Morrison versus Olson. | ||
| I think that was a terrible decision for the presidency and for the country. | ||
| And not because there were bad people who were independent counsels, but President Reagan's administration, President Bush's administration, President Clinton's administration were really... | ||
| Yes. | ||
| In their view, all three, by the independent counsel structure. | ||
| And what I'm worried about here is that that was kind of, let's relax Article 2 a bit for the needs of the moment. | ||
| And I'm worried about the similar kind of situation applying here. | ||
| That was a prosecutor investigating a president in each of those circumstances, and someone picked from the opposite party, the current president. | ||
| And usually was how it worked. | ||
| And Justice Scalia wrote that the fairness of a process must be judged on the basis of what it permits to happen, not what it produced in a particular case. | ||
| You've emphasized many times regularity in the Department of Justice. | ||
| And he said... | ||
| And I think this applied to the independent counsel system, and it could apply if presidents are routinely subject to investigation going forward. | ||
| One thing is certain, however, it involves investigating and perhaps prosecuting a particular individual. | ||
| Can one imagine a less equitable manner of fulfilling the executive responsibility to investigate and prosecute? | ||
| What would the reaction be if, in an area not covered by the statute, the Justice Department posted a public notice inviting applicants to assist in an investigation and possibly Yes. | ||
| to be sure the investigation must relate to the area of criminal offense specified by the statute. | ||
| But that has often been and nothing prevents it from being very broad. | ||
| I paraphrased at the end because it was referring to the judges. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| That's the concern going forward, is that the system will, when former presidents are subject to prosecution, the history of Morrison v. | ||
| Olson tells us it's not going to stop. | ||
| It's going to cycle back and be used against the current president, or the next president, and the next president, and the next president after that. | ||
| All that, I want you to try to away that concern. | ||
| Why is this not Morrison v. | ||
| Olson redux, if we agree with you? | ||
| First of all, the independent counsel regime did have many structural features that emphasized independence at the expense of accountability. | ||
| We don't have that regime now, but even under that regime, Justice Kavanaugh, I think if you look at Lawrence Walsh's report on Iran-Contra, I think this goes to a very fundamental point for the court to consider. | ||
| Judge Walsh said, I investigated these matters. | ||
| The proof did not nearly come close to establishing criminal violations. | ||
| So we've lived from Watergate through the present, through the independent counsel era with all of its flaws, without these prosecutions having gone off on a runaway train. | ||
| Well, I think President Reagan, President Bush, and President Clinton, whether rightly or wrongly, thought contrary to what you just said. | ||
| I think nobody likes being investigated for a crime, but it didn't result in the kind of vindictive prosecutions that I think Your Honor is raising as a possibility. | ||
| We have a different system now. | ||
| I think there was a consensus throughout Washington that there were flaws in the independent counsel system. | ||
| It lapsed. | ||
| We now are inside the Justice Department with full accountability resting with the Attorney General. | ||
| So the special counsel regulations now don't operate the way that the independent... | ||
| do. | ||
| And this court would have something to say about it, I think, if the independent counsel statute were revived. | ||
| I'm not sure that anybody is in favor of that. | ||
| No, I was just saying this is kind of the mirror image of that as one way someone could perceive it. | ||
| But I take your point about the different structural protections internally. | ||
| And like Justice Scalia said, I do not mean to suggest anything of the sort in the present case. | ||
| I'm not talking about the present case. | ||
| So I'm talking about the future. | ||
| Another point, you said, talked about the criminal statutes. | ||
| It's very easy to characterize presidential actions as false or misleading under vague statutes. | ||
| So President Lyndon Johnson's statements about the Vietnam War say something's false. | ||
| It turns out to be false that he says about the Vietnam War. | ||
| 371 prosecution. | ||
| After he leaves office? | ||
| I think not, but this is an area that I do think that merits some serious and nuanced consideration. | ||
| Statements that are made by a president to the public. | ||
| Are not really coming within the realm of criminal statutes. | ||
| They've never been prosecuted. | ||
| I realize that the court can say, well, what if they were? | ||
| And then I think you get to what I would regard as a hard constitutional question. | ||
| I would probably guide the court away from trying to resolve today, although I do think it's very different from our case and distinguishable in important ways. | ||
| You're dealing here with two branches of government that have a paramount interest in the integrity and freedom of their interactions with each other. | ||
| On the one hand, the president, of course, should be very free to send, usually, his cabinet officials and sub-cabinet officials to testify to Congress to provide them with the information needed to enact legislation and to make national policy. | ||
| And we're very concerned about anything that would trammel that. | ||
| I agree. | ||
| that is intentionally and knowingly false. | ||
| That would pollute the legislative process. | ||
| I think it came up before, President Ford's pardon. | ||
| Very controversial in the moment. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| Hugely unpopular, probably why he lost in'76. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| Now looked upon as one of the Better decisions in presidential history, I think, by most people. | ||
| If he's thinking about, well, if I grant this pardon to Richard Nixon, could I be investigated myself for obstruction of justice on the theory that I'm interfering with the investigation of Richard Nixon? | ||
| So this would fall into that small core area that I mentioned to Justice Kagan and Justice Gorsuch of presidential responsibilities that Congress cannot regulate. | ||
| How about President Obama's drone strikes? | ||
| So the Office of Legal Counsel looked at this very carefully and determined that, number one, the federal murder statute does apply to the executive branch. | ||
| The president wasn't personally carrying out the strike, but the aiding and abetting laws are broad. | ||
| And it determined that a public authority exception that's built into statutes and that applied particularly to the murder statute because it talks about unlawful killing. | ||
| Did not apply to the drone strike. | ||
| So this is actually the way that the system should function. | ||
| The Department of Justice takes criminal law very seriously. | ||
| It runs it through the analysis very carefully with established principles. | ||
| It documents them. | ||
| It explains them. | ||
| And then the president can go forward in accordance with it. | ||
| And there is no risk of prosecution for that course of activity. | ||
| Thank you for your answers. | ||
| Justice Barrett? | ||
| Mr. Dreben, I want to pick up with that public authority defense. | ||
| So I'm looking at the OLC memo that David Barron wrote that you cited in your briefs. | ||
| And he describes the public authority defense citing the model penal code. | ||
| There are a few different definitions, but I'll just highlight this one. | ||
| Justifying conduct which is required or authorized by the law defining the duties or functions of a public officer. | ||
| The law governing the armed services or lawful conduct of war or any other provision of law imposing a public duty. | ||
| That sounds a lot like dividing a line between official and private conduct. | ||
| I think it's narrower, and I recognize it's a defense, not an immunity. | ||
| But when you look at the definition of it, are you acting within? | ||
| The scope of authority conferred by law or discharging a duty conferred by law, I think it's narrower than Blassingame, narrower than Nixon versus Fitzgerald, but that's what it sounds like to me. | ||
| Do you agree or disagree? | ||
| You know, Jessica, I certainly understand the intuition that when you act outside of your lawful authority, you've kind of gone on a frolic and detour, you're no longer carrying it out. | ||
| I don't really think that that quite works for presidential activity. | ||
| The only way that he could have implemented the orders is by exercising his commander-in-chief authority over the armed forces or his authority to supervise the executive branch. | ||
| Those seem like core executive acts to me. | ||
| There is such a... | ||
| I'm not sure that I understand your answer. | ||
| I mean, I was thinking, it seemed to me that in your briefs and today, when you referred to the public authority defense, you said that's one of the built-in protections and why immunity is not necessary. | ||
| Because in some of these instances, when the president takes such actions that, you know, the court's been asking you, might this result in criminal prosecution? | ||
| You say, well, he could raise this public authority defense. | ||
| And so I'm saying, isn't this public authority defense, if raised, doesn't it sound like a defense that says, well, I was authorized by law to discharge this function? | ||
| And therefore, I acted lawfully. | ||
| Therefore, I acted lawfully and not criminally liable. | ||
| Correct. | ||
| Does that involve a look into motives? | ||
| Kind of this gets to what Justice Gorsuch was asking you. | ||
| Could you say, I was acting within the scope of my authority by granting a pardon, removing a cabinet officer? | ||
| But then the public authority defense might not apply because you had a bad motive in doing so? | ||
| No, I don't think so, Jessica. | ||
| I think that it operates based on objective facts disclosed to Counsel. | ||
| Counsel then provides the advice, in this case, the Department of Justice, and it's an objectively valid defense. | ||
| It's a complete defense to prosecution. | ||
| So what would be so bad? | ||
| I mean, one thing that strikes me as different, well, one thing that's obviously different between the public authority defense and immunity is an interlocutory appeal and having it resolved at the outset. | ||
| What would be so... | ||
| It's bad about having a question like that resolved at the threshold, having it be an immunity. | ||
| The same kind of question that could be brought up as a defense later, but have it be brought up at the threshold as an immunity, and then an interlocutory appeal would be available, and it would be a freedom from standing trial. | ||
| But not a get-out-of-jail-free card. | ||
| Yes, I understand that. | ||
| And I think that if the court believed that that was the appropriate way to craft presidential protections, it has the authority to craft procedural rules that implement its Article 2. That said, public authority, we're calling it a defense, but under many statutes, it's actually an exception to liability itself. | ||
| And what you're really talking about is trying the general issue. | ||
| And generally, in criminal cases, even cases that involve First Amendment issues like threat statutes, the jury is the determinant of the facts. | ||
| And I have a little bit of difficulty with the idea of trying. | ||
| I would prefer a regime in which the court... | ||
| altered some of the procedural rules surrounding the president, then a total absolute blanket immunity that takes away the possibility of criminal prosecution, even if it was a core violation of the You think it has to be a jury question? | ||
| And I mean, let's see, I wasn't necessarily proposing actually treating it as a defense that was done at the outset and then subject to interlocutor. | ||
| I mean, it seems to me that some of these Article 2 concerns would be exacerbated by having it go to a jury rather than a judge. | ||
| So I think some of them are. | ||
| Judge questions that could be resolved in the face of the indictment. | ||
| If the Department of Justice ever returned an indictment that said the issuance of this pardon or this series of pardons constituted obstruction of justice. | ||
| I have a little difficulty hypothesizing it, but a motion could be made on the face of the indictment that says Article 2 precludes Congress from regulating these activities. | ||
| The indictment needs to be dismissed. | ||
| And if the court wished to attach to that kind of a rule, interlocutory appeal, then that would be a lesser safeguard than the one that my friend is proposing here. | ||
| Other kinds of defenses, though, really do intersect with the general issue. | ||
| And for those, I have a much greater time seeing how the court could implement that. | ||
| And would there be costs in going to trial? | ||
| Yes. | ||
| There is no perfect system here. | ||
| We are trying to design a system that preserves the effective functioning of the presidency and the accountability of a former president under the rule of law. | ||
| And the perfect system that calibrates all of those values probably has not been devised. | ||
| I think that the system that we have works pretty well. | ||
| Maybe it needs a few ancillary rules. | ||
| It is different from the radical proposal I agree. | ||
| Let me ask you about state prosecutions, because if the president has some kind of immunity that's implicit in Article 2, then that immunity would protect him from state prosecutions as well. | ||
| A lot of the protections that you're talking about are internal protections that the federal government has, protections in the Department of Justice, which obviously are not applicable at the many, many, many, many state and local jurisdictions across the country. | ||
| What do you have to say to that? | ||
| So that raises a supremacy clause issue, and the court would run a supremacy clause analysis that would probably start with basic principles like McCulloch v. | ||
| Maryland. | ||
| The states do not have the authority. | ||
| I think the supremacy clause certainly leaves it within the court's prerogative to determine that the president, unlike all other officials, deserves more of a robust federal defense than what I have just described. | ||
| But it would still be a defense in the states. | ||
| It's one thing to say, well, the president, they're not going to be these prosecutions that are politically motivated, the things that Justice Kavanaugh was referring to that might be the danger of this system, one thing that we have to worry about. | ||
| That might not carry the day, but, you know, that's a concern. | ||
| It's totally different when you take it outside of the Department of Justice. | ||
| And then you throw it out elsewhere. | ||
| The idea across the states, the idea of an immunity, I think, has a lot more purchase if you're talking about something that protects the former president from standing trial and the state and local level. | ||
| So I don't know that you would have to design a system in which the president would have to stand trial at the state and local level, certainly within the court's authority as a matter of supremacy clause law, to find an immunity. | ||
| But we have been... | ||
| We're talking here about some length on the distinction between official acts and private acts. | ||
| That will have to be determined by some sort of a process. | ||
| Any immunity defense that the court announces can still be met by a state assertion that we're prosecuting private conduct. | ||
| you're going to have to have some process. | ||
| I think having some legal process is not a reason to cast aside a nuanced system that actually looks at what protections are necessary as opposed to what would provide the absolute maximum insulation for former presidents, even if We acknowledge that it's highly prophylactic. | ||
| Totally agree, and I wasn't actually contrasting the absolute immunity rule. | ||
| I was saying that if there was some sort of official private, there are consequences about making immunity. | ||
| Okay, and since you bring up the private acts, this is my last question. | ||
| So I had asked Mr. Sauer about on page 46 and 47 of your brief. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| You say even if the court were inclined to recognize some immunity for a former president's official acts, it should remand for trial because the indictment alleges substantial private conduct. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| And you said that the private conduct would be sufficient. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| The special counsel has expressed some concern for speed and wanting to move forward. | ||
| You know, the normal process, what Mr. Sauer asked, would be for us to remand if we decided that there were some official acts of immunity and to let that be sorted out below. | ||
| It is another option for the special counsel to just proceed based on the private conduct and drop the official. | ||
| Well, two things on that, Justice Barrett. | ||
| First of all, there's really an integrated conspiracy here that had different components, as alleged in the indictment. | ||
| Working with private lawyers to achieve the goals of the fraud, and as I said before, We would like to present that as an integrated picture to the jury so that it sees the sequence and the gravity of the conduct and why each step occurred. | ||
| That said, if the court were to say that the fraudulent elector scheme is private, reaching out to state officials as a candidate is private, trying to exploit the violence after January 6th by calling senators. | ||
| And saying please delay the certification proceeding is private campaign activity. | ||
| We still think, contrary to what my friend said, that we could introduce the interactions with the Justice Department, the efforts to pressure the Vice President, for their evidentiary value as showing that... | ||
| defendant's knowledge and intent. | ||
| And we would take a jury instruction that would say, "You may not impose criminal culpability for the actions that he took. | ||
| However, you may consider it insofar as it bears on knowledge and intent." That's the usual rule with protected speech, for example, under Wisconsin versus Mitchell. | ||
| My friend analogizes this to the speech or debate clause, but we don't think the speech or debate clause has any applicability here. | ||
| It's a very explicit constitutional protection. | ||
| That says senators and representatives shall not be questioned in any other place. | ||
| So it carries an evidentiary component that's above and beyond whatever official act immunity he is seeking. | ||
| And the last thing I would say on this is we think that the concerns about the use of evidence of presidential conduct that might otherwise be official and subject to executive privilege is already taken care of by United States v. | ||
| Nixon. | ||
| That balances the president's interests and confidentiality against the need of the... | ||
| We have a judicial system for all available facts to get to the truth. | ||
| And once that has been overcome, we submit that evidence can be used even if culpability can't rest on it. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
| Justice Jackson? | ||
| Just to pick up where Justice Barrett left off, I think I heard you say that even if we decide here something, a rule that's not the rule that you prefer, that is somehow separating out private from official acts and saying that that should apply here, | ||
| there's sufficient All right. | ||
| immunized, even if people agree that some are immunized. | ||
| If there are other acts that aren't, the case would go forward. | ||
| That is right. | ||
| All right. | ||
| Going back to the clear statement argument, I'm struggling with that argument because my understanding was that when a charged criminal statute is read narrowly in the presidential context to not apply to the president, a constitutional question is being avoided so that you're doing that to avoid having to deal with the constitutional question. | ||
| What is the constitutional question that is being avoided in those kinds of situations? | ||
| A serious one? | ||
| This is just an application of this court's ordinary construction of criminal statutes, that if there is an available interpretation that would avoid a serious constitutional question, the court's preference is to... | ||
| Right, and the nature, I guess I'm going at what is... | ||
| My understanding is that what is being avoided in that situation is the question of whether a former president or... | ||
| You know, can be held criminally liable for doing the alleged act that is being asserted in that statute consistent with the Constitution. | ||
| So we look at the statute. | ||
| It's got some elements in it. | ||
| And we are saying, well, geez, if this statute and those elements apply to the president's conduct in this situation, we'd have to... | ||
| Answer the question, can the president be held liable, consistent with the Constitution for that behavior? | ||
| Is that right? | ||
| So the first step in that analysis, I just want to... | ||
| Yes, please. | ||
| Yes, but the first step is, is there ambiguity? | ||
| And these statutes apply to any person. | ||
| They apply to whoever. | ||
| There's no ambiguity in those phrases. | ||
| This court in Nardone v. | ||
| United States... | ||
| Concluded that similar words, any person, apply to government officials? | ||
| All right, well, let's just assume that we, I guess I'm just trying to get at, we're avoiding a constitutional question. | ||
| If we do that in the ordinary case. | ||
| And what's confusing to me about this case is that we're not being asked to avoid the constitutional question. | ||
| In fact, the question of whether or not the president can be held liable, consistent with the Constitution, or does he have immunity, is the question that's being presented to us. | ||
| So I don't understand how the clear statement kind of analysis even works. | ||
| It seems completely tautological to me. | ||
| For us, To hold that presidents cannot be prosecuted under any criminal statute without a clear statement from Congress to avoid the question of whether or not the Constitution allows them to be prosecuted. | ||
| We'd have to have a reason, right? | ||
| I mean, we'd have to have a rationale for applying the clear statement rule. | ||
| I think the court would have to have some rationale that's not evident in either the existing doctrine or the text. | ||
| And just one data point for the court in thinking about how the clear... | ||
| I think if... | ||
| There was such a well-received understanding that presidents are not included in general federal criminal law unless the president is specifically named, which he is not in Section 201. | ||
| Justice Scalia would have thought of that, and some member of the court would have reacted, and none did. | ||
| All right. | ||
| Let me go on to ask about what you take the petitioner's position to be in this. | ||
| Because we've had a lot of talk about drawing the lines. | ||
| Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Gorsuch suggested that we should be thinking about Blassingame and that within the—first, we have private versus official. | ||
| And then within official now, we have something about core acts versus other acts as we try to figure out, you know, at what level the president is going to have immunity. | ||
| But I took— The petitioner's argument in this case not to be inviting us to engage in that kind of analysis. | ||
| I thought he was arguing that all official acts get immunity. | ||
| And so I didn't understand us to be having to drill down on which official acts do. | ||
| And so my question is, why isn't it enough? | ||
| For the purposes of this case, given what the petitioner has argued, to just answer the question of whether all official acts get immunity. | ||
| That is enough, and if the court answers that question... | ||
| I want to make a clarification that I may have left the court with some uncertainty about. | ||
| The official act analysis that my friend is talking about is the Fitzgerald versus Nixon. | ||
| Outer perimeter test, which is extremely protective of the president. | ||
| It's not looking at core versus ancillary. | ||
| It's saying everything the president does is a target for private civil lawsuits. | ||
| That is not a great thing, and therefore they are all cut off. | ||
| That's an absolute immunity kind of concept, right? | ||
| Anything that's official in the outer perimeter is not... | ||
| Subject to liability. | ||
| That is right. | ||
| And so we don't have to then go, well, okay, we have the bucket of official. | ||
| Now let's figure out which within that might be subject to liability. | ||
| Not on the theory of absolute immunity, correct? | ||
| Neither on the... | ||
| Theory of absolute immunity or on our theory. | ||
| On his theory, everything's protected. | ||
| On our theory, there is no immunity. | ||
| But this is where I would draw the distinction. | ||
| There are, as applied, constitutional challenges that you run through the Youngstown framework and this court's customary method of analysis, and you determine whether there's an infringement of Article 2. So what you're saying is, even if we reject the absolute immunity theory, it's not as though the president doesn't have the opportunity to make the kind... | ||
| I think we should not be trying to, in the abstract, set up those boundaries ahead of time as a function of sort of blanket immunity. | ||
| allow each allegation to be brought, and then we would decide in that context. | ||
| Yes, with the additional note that petitioner has never made that argument, and I think it would be up to a district court to decide whether to go that route at this point in the litigation. | ||
| He's put all of his eggs in the absolute immunity basket. | ||
| All right, and if we invite, you know, if we see the question presented as broader than that, and we do say let's engage in the core official versus... | ||
| not core and try to figure out the line. | ||
| Is this the right vehicle to hammer out that test? | ||
| I mean, I'd understood that the most, if not all, but most of the allegations here, there's really no plausible argument that they would fall into core versus not such that they are immune. | ||
| We don't think there are any CORE. | ||
| So if we were going to do this kind of analysis, try to figure out what the line is, we should probably wait for a vehicle that actually presents it in a way that allows us to test the different sides of the standard that we'd be creating, right? | ||
| I don't see any need in this. | ||
| All right. | ||
| The final sort of set of questions that I have have to do with what I do take as a very legitimate concern about prosecutorial abuse, about future presidents being targeted for things that they have done in office. | ||
| I take that concern. | ||
| I think it's a real thing. | ||
| But I wonder... | ||
| Whether some of it might also be mitigated by the fact that existing administrations have a self-interest in protecting the presidency, that they understand that if they go after the former guy, soon they're going to be the former guy, and they will have created precedent that will be problematic. | ||
| So I wonder if... | ||
| You might comment on whether some of the caution from the Justice Department and the prosecutors and whatnot comes from an understanding that they will soon be former presidents as well. | ||
| I think absolutely. | ||
| And I would locate this as a structural argument that's built into the Constitution itself. | ||
| The executive branch, I think, as this court knows, has executive branch interests that it at times asserts in opposition to Congress so that the proper functioning of the president is protected. | ||
| And I believe that that value would be operative and is operative in anything as momentous as charged. | ||
| And I would also say, I think, and ask you to comment on, you know, presidents are concerned about being investigated, evaded, and prosecuted, and it chills, to some extent, their ability to do what they want in office. | ||
| And that's a concern on one side. | ||
| But can you comment on the concern about having a president unbounded while in office, a president who knows that he does not have to ultimately follow the law because there is really nothing more than, say, political accountability in terms of impeachment? | ||
| I mean, we have amicus briefs here from Professor Liederman, for example, who says, you know, a president would not be prohibited by statute from perjuring himself under oath about official matters, from corruptly altering, destroying, or concealing documents to prevent them from being used in an official proceeding, from suborning others to commit perjury, from bribing witnesses or | ||
| He goes on and on and on about the things that a president in office with the knowledge that they have no criminal accountability would do. | ||
| I see that as a concern that is at least equal to the president being so worried about criminal prosecution that he is a little bit limited in his ability to function. | ||
| So can you talk about those competing concerns? | ||
| So, Justice Jackson, I think it would be a sea change to announce a sweeping rule of immunity that no president has had or has needed. | ||
| I think we have also had a perfectly functioning system. | ||
| That has seen occasional episodes of presidential misconduct. | ||
| The Nixon era is the paradigmatic one. | ||
| The indictment in this case alleges another. | ||
| For the most part, I believe that the legal regime and the constitutional regime that we have works and to alter it poses more risks. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
| Thank you, counsel. | ||
| Rebuttal, Mr. Sauer? | ||
| I have nothing further, Your Honor. | ||
| Thank you, counsel. | ||
| Counsel, the case is submitted. | ||
| The Honorable Court is now adjourned until Thursday, the 9th of May at 10 o 'clock. | ||
| I'm ready. | ||
| All right, ladies and gentlemen, here we go. | ||
| We watched it all with the memes. | ||
| Man, they just get off fast. | ||
| Not a joke there, just an observation. | ||
| But holy moly. | ||
| Okay, so three hours of argument. | ||
| Really fascinating and wonderful stuff that has, I think, quite clearly sided in Donald Trump's favor. | ||
| So ultimately, the arguments there are about presidential immunity and to what limits it extends into personal or official actions. | ||
| And into the prosecution of your political rivals. | ||
| And this is the main point, ladies and gentlemen. | ||
| The main point is that, as Justice Kavanaugh expressed, going forward, what's going to stop every single president from targeting the next guy when he leaves office? | ||
| Is there any limiting principle? | ||
| The Joe Biden attorney there, Mr. Dweebin, who was straight out of central casting, It's actually unbelievable. | ||
| Like, the voice of the federal government. | ||
| This guy is the voice and the look of the federal government. | ||
| And it's exactly what you'd think, the federal government. | ||
| It's like, if we did a parody of the federal government, this is exactly what you'd think the federal government would look like. | ||
| Uh, excuse me, yes, uh, everything, everything in the federal government that is great, except for Donald Trump. | ||
| And, uh, we don't like him. | ||
| So, now we have to break every rule because we don't like Trump. | ||
| Yeah, got it. | ||
| Justice Alito used a former case. | ||
| Now, this I was not familiar with. | ||
| Ronald Reagan left office when I was 18 months old. | ||
| So I can say that I'm a Reagan baby, but wasn't super involved in politics at 18 months. | ||
| Apparently, when Ronald Reagan left office, Democrats decided to prosecute him. | ||
| And Justice Alito brings up this attempt. | ||
| Effectively, to push a prosecution of President Reagan. | ||
| The DOJ says, the DOJ dweebin says, it's different now. | ||
| We don't have that regime now. | ||
| Remarkable. | ||
| Remarkable. | ||
| The Biden regime is so much worse than anything we have seen in American history. | ||
| These people are Stalinists. | ||
| If you support what they're doing, you're a Stalinist. | ||
| You're not an American. | ||
| You're not a free person. | ||
| You are a blinded Marxist. | ||
| You believe in the bloody, open, warrantless prosecution of your political enemies? | ||
| And that is effectively what was on display today with Mr. Dweebin, who we were really excited to meme the hell out of. | ||
| And we just were like, I hope you enjoyed it. | ||
| This is why you watch this channel, alright? | ||
| There are many channels out there, so we deeply appreciate you. | ||
| This is why you watch this channel. | ||
| So ladies and gentlemen, let me check in here with my producers. | ||
| And let's see if we can't go directly to our first guest on all of this, which is such an important voice on these issues. | ||
| Somebody who I know, as a matter of fact, has made thousands of arguments in federal court. | ||
| I'm not sure about the Supreme Court, we'll ask. | ||
| Somebody who's served the nigh on three decades as a prosecutor. | ||
| For the federal government and worked at the exact same DOJ as Mr. Dweebin, and who would perhaps bring the best clarity that you could ask for in a moment like this. | ||
| The esteemed former U.S. attorney, president of Right on Crime, Brett Tolman, joins the program now. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Thank you. | |
| Thank you. | ||
| you you Brett, a lot to digest for our little minds here. | ||
| Obviously, we moved to the making of memes and content. | ||
| These people are straight out of central casting. | ||
| If I were to look for an attorney to defend the tyrant and the sort of deeply feline energy of the Biden regime when it comes to going after Donald Trump and using lawfare to destroy your political enemy, it can't get better. | ||
| It can't get better than this solicitor here. | ||
| However, maybe you can clear up two things for us. | ||
| One, did this go well for Donald Trump? | ||
| Two, have you argued before the Supreme Court? | ||
| I don't actually know. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Thanks. | |
| Thanks, Benny, for having me on. | ||
| I'm a member of the Supreme Court. | ||
| I have not argued oral arguments. | ||
| Several cases I've brought and written briefs. | ||
| We never got to oral arguments. | ||
| So hopefully I'll have my chance and my opportunity. | ||
| I have argued multiple cases on the appellate side. | ||
| In several different circuits across the country. | ||
| But look, it is interesting. | ||
| The last exchange was particularly painful listening to the solicitor and Justice Jackson. | ||
| Going back and forth was particularly painful for me because it was not elegant and it was not intellectually sound. | ||
| It was all the makings of platitudes and reasons that you might want to rule a certain way based on the appearance of the case politically, but it was not actually digging into the weaknesses that many of the other justices did dig into. | ||
| What came out of the DC Circuit was literally mock. | ||
| By Justice Roberts. | ||
| And, you know, he's no hardcore conservative, as we know. | ||
| So for him to have taken that opinion and looked at it and said, you know, perhaps one of the more poorly written opinions that he's reviewed is remarkable. | ||
| What I saw sort of at the cusp here, and of course we're no legal experts, but we're taking this, you know, I think the best that you can possibly... | ||
| Approach something like this, and these are really big issues at hand, is from the broader takeaways, which is what is going to stop every president from having to pardon himself every morning that he wakes up, right? | ||
| And to pardon himself moving forward, assuming that the second that power flips even to like a different wing of his own party, his or her own party, you're going to automatically be prosecuted. | ||
| Right? | ||
| Like, so every step that you take is a prosecutable offense. | ||
| They went back to the Gerald Ford pardoning of Richard Nixon. | ||
| Why not prosecute Gerald Ford? | ||
| This is an obstruction of justice. | ||
| What about Lyndon Baines Johnson, who, Kavanaugh went in on this and overtly, like, lied again and again and again to the public about the Vietnam War. | ||
| Got people killed. | ||
| Speaking of being killed, they asked about the, Kavanaugh asked about the Obama drone attack on Anwar al-Awlaki, 16-year-old. | ||
| A 16-year-old United States citizen without due process. | ||
| And it just seems like the limiting principle here is you'll never have anyone want to run for president again because they know for a fact they're going to be prosecuted unless they pardon themselves every single day of their existence as president. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Yeah, I think you hit many on some very key moments. | |
| I mean, there were moments in this where we got a vision of the overarching concern. | ||
| How many justices did you hear? | ||
| Multiple justices actually said, you know, not really focused on this case, but really focused on what could happen if we get this wrong. | ||
| Going down, you know, down the line, these cases that are going to come to us. | ||
| And I thought it very fascinating that Alito brought up this. | ||
| He said to Dreben, Tell me how substantial a protection this is. | ||
| And he cited two things. | ||
| He said, how substantial is the protection that the Justice Department officials will act with integrity and honor and not abuse their power? | ||
| And Driven's response was, oh, it's an incredible protection. | ||
| Incredible protection. | ||
| And yet he's saying that while all of us are watching. | ||
| Just outrageous decisions by DOJ to target people and to exercise their power in incredibly abusive ways that we haven't seen for 30 years in this country. | ||
| So I think about that. | ||
| That he's actually stating that this is an enormous protection. | ||
| And then the second one was he said, how much of a protection is the grand jury? | ||
| And Driven came back. | ||
| It is such a big protection. | ||
| And think about this. | ||
| This is how big it is. | ||
| It's citizens making sure. | ||
| And if they thought that prosecutors weren't bringing, you know, appropriate, didn't have the facts or the law, they would not return an indictment. | ||
| And let me just respond to Driven on that. | ||
| In 25 years in the criminal justice system, The number of no bills, that's when the grand jury comes back and says no indictment, is less than 1%. | ||
| And of those- For your cases or for all cases, Brett? | ||
| All cases across DOJ, less than 1%. | ||
| And then of my cases- I want to give you this personal experience. | ||
| I was a brand new prosecutor. | ||
| I had presented and got indictments on over a thousand cases the first few years I was an assistant ghost attorney. | ||
| And I had one case in which a grand jury no-billed me on one count of a 16-count indictment. | ||
| And I was mocked in the office like horribly. | ||
| For months, because I was the one AUSA that anybody knew of that got a no bill on a one count. | ||
| It was painful. | ||
| So the culture itself defies what Driven was saying. | ||
| The results and the data itself absolutely defies what Driven was saying. | ||
| And in fact, Driven, in my opinion, had an obligation at that moment to say, it is no real check. | ||
| On potential abuse. | ||
| The grand jury is no real check, but they consistently believe the lie that the grand jury and that the honor of the prosecutor will protect anyone from being improperly prosecuted. | ||
| Both of those are a lie. | ||
| Both of those are a lie, and Jack Smith was able to get a conviction against another Republican, a rising Republican star, a guy named Bob McDonald. | ||
| He was the governor of Virginia. | ||
| And he was able to get a big conviction, destroy the guy's career, and the Supreme Court overturned it 9-0. | ||
| The Supreme Court would never... | ||
| 9-0? | ||
| 9-0? | ||
| It was the same guy. | ||
|
unidentified
|
That's right. | |
| And remember, we have historical increases, in my opinion, of the number of cases that are brought where this is the mentality. | ||
| Benny, the mentality used to be... | ||
| I do not want to bring a case that I don't think I have sufficient facts. | ||
| And Ed Meese, when he was Attorney General for Reagan, used to call and congratulate a prosecutor when he learned that he declined to bring a case. | ||
| Because he felt like that was as important as the decision to actually bring one. | ||
| We've changed now, and the mentality among prosecutors, and DOJ is rife with this mentality, and that is, I'll just charge it. | ||
| Even if I don't think I have it, we'll let the jury decide. | ||
| We'll see what happens. | ||
| I'll just charge the case. | ||
| And that's more often than not the justification they use for going forward on a case like Jack Smith did and others. | ||
| I mean, you remember the prosecution of Stevens from Alaska. | ||
| I mean, it ruined people's lives. | ||
| And in the end, we learned there were, you know, misconduct by prosecutors. | ||
| And that is the DOJ that we're fighting back against to try to return them to actually an effective, you know, branch of the government that's not abusing its power. | ||
| Could you please, from, again, a 35... | ||
| 1,000-foot perspective, explaining it to us like we're second graders. | ||
| Give me the strongest arguments in favor of upholding Donald Trump's immunity that you heard today. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Well, there was a lot of discussion about absolute immunity, and everybody sort of agreed that there is no absolute immunity. | |
| You can have a president that might be president, you know, at the time, he's in office, and he goes out and he kills somebody. | ||
| And he does it personally, and there's not an argument that it's within, you know, his official duties. | ||
| But that's not what we're talking about. | ||
| Even though Dreven wanted to suggest that that is what, you know, Trump's lawyers are asking for, it's not the case. | ||
| Everybody concedes that absolute immunity is, you know, the only place that it actually really applies is from a civil lawsuit. | ||
| While he's in office from somebody trying to sue the president over things, there you get closer to absolute immunity. | ||
| Here we're talking about a criminal case, and so the analysis falls to the level of immunity and how much do we extend it and how protected is the president under Article 2, which gives him the basic power of the executive branch. | ||
| So then the question is, where do we parse the line? | ||
| There are unofficial acts that still need to be protected. | ||
| And so that line is very gray. | ||
| It's blurry. | ||
| And that's what the Supreme Court is battling right now, is where are we drawing the line? | ||
| Because if the president is asking for... | ||
| An election is claiming that an election has been fraudulently stolen or that he actually won. | ||
| And then he's asking people to go and review that. | ||
| There's an argument that that's personal and that he's a candidate at that point. | ||
| And can we go after him for his comments and words about that that may have riled people up that went into the Capitol? | ||
| Whereas The Supreme Court is nervous about that because it is not a clear criminal action that occurs like the homicide. | ||
| And so their concern is, do we draw the line so bright and so narrow that we've given way too much protection? | ||
| Or if we don't draw the line, if we draw it too broad, have we basically invited every... | ||
| You know, administration to go after their political opponents. | ||
| And that's why this case is so monumental, is they're going to give us some insight into, you know, how strong do we extend that immunity to those gray areas? | ||
| Such an interesting line of questioning, since you brought up people walking into the U.S. Capitol, right? | ||
| So such an interesting line of questioning. | ||
| I believe it was Alito, but it may have been Gorsuch, saying, what if a president leads a protest? | ||
| Peaceful protest. | ||
| Well, the presidents have done that in the past. | ||
| And that disrupts things, right? | ||
| Certainly very disruptive, right? | ||
| Or to the National Guard troops that Kennedy did, you know, to go integrate colleges in the South, right? | ||
| What if the president leads a peaceful protest? | ||
| What if that disrupts an official proceeding? | ||
| So the president now, 22 years in prison? | ||
| Like, I thought that was such a fascinating... | ||
| And the point that you just brought up is the obvious shades of gray here. | ||
| Clarence Thomas asking about presidents carrying out coups. | ||
| I mean, Clarence Thomas is straight up just like, presidents have carried out coups. | ||
| They have murdered other world leaders. | ||
| They have done regime change. | ||
| He brought up Operation Mongoose. | ||
| Clarence Thomas is straight up being like, you're literally slaughtering. | ||
| You're ordering the slaughter of people and the regime change of people you don't like. | ||
|
unidentified
|
And that's why it all comes back to this. | |
| You notice they mentioned several times. | ||
| It's never been done. | ||
| We don't prosecute presidents. | ||
| They bring up Nixon, but it is an entirely different standard to Nixon. | ||
| And many in the court think that Nixon was decided, you know. | ||
| Poorly. | ||
| And that there are some things that need to be changed in that regard. | ||
| But you'll notice nobody else is prosecuted. | ||
| And that was an important point for several because they're saying to themselves, are we going to try to stray from this powerful protection we give to the head of the executive branch? | ||
| Or are we going to facilitate? | ||
| You know, a change in the future of our country in which we use the power that we have in order to go after our political enemies. | ||
| And I'll just tell you this, Benny, that was sort of hit me very, very profoundly. | ||
| Please. | ||
| When the founders of our Constitution decided, and there was discussion and debate whether or not a president with a felony, a candidate with a felony could run for president, They nearly unanimously decided that they should be allowed. | ||
| And the reason they decided that was because they knew they were giving extraordinary power to the executive branch. | ||
| And they knew that the power to investigate and to prosecute someone, to take away their liberty, was so powerful that it could be wielded abusively. | ||
| And if that was the case, they could foresee that they would go after a political opponent. | ||
| So why would a founding fathers, why would they so importantly decide that they were not going to prevent someone from running for president if he had a conviction, a felony conviction, but at the same time make the protection of the president while he's in office and his conduct, make it so weak that they could be prosecuted easily after they leave. | ||
| That makes no sense whatsoever. | ||
| The only consistency would be is if they wanted to protect the president, they wanted to prevent people from using the power of the prosecution to eliminate an enemy, and the way they backstop that is... | ||
| To not allow, to expand immunity enough to not allow them to go after them after they're in office. | ||
| And that is the only consistent reading of the constitutional immunity and the Article 2 clause that extends this power. | ||
| And I don't care if you don't like Donald Trump and you're very upset and angry at him, you should not be wanting to rule. | ||
| Uh, along the lines of that Dreven is asking us to do, because it is changing that landscape. | ||
| It is, um, denying what the founders foresaw. | ||
| And that was the use of, of prosecution to go after political enemies. | ||
| Brett, weren't all the founders felons? | ||
|
unidentified
|
Right, right. | |
| So many of them. | ||
| And so many of them also represented, you know, felons were lawyers that represented them and they, they understood abuse of power. | ||
| Nobody else did. | ||
| In our filtered and in our now woke culture that we're in now, nobody really believes on the left that government is really that abusive, right? | ||
| They think government is the answer for solving so many of our social issues. | ||
| But in fact, this country is founded on recognizing that government is the exact opposite of a solution. | ||
| To a social problem. | ||
| Can you, without characterizing it further, I suppose, because there's all these great quotes and there's all sort of these very interesting approaches here, obviously, from the Trump lawyer and from Dweeben. | ||
| But for us, I suppose... | ||
| Given that you have done this for three decades and that you know the consequences of the Supreme Court getting it wrong and the current makeup of the Supreme Court, Brett Kavanaugh calls this a monumental decision that will echo throughout the ages, he said. | ||
| Do you think this was a good or a bad day for the team that is defending Donald Trump here? | ||
| Do you think that the Supreme Court will return something that destroys Jack Smith prosecutions or Yeah, it's a great question. | ||
|
unidentified
|
My thought after listening to it, and it's always sort of crystal ball moment, right, trying to predict it, but I do think that it's a good day. | |
| On balance, it is a far better day for Trump's defense team than it was for DOJ. | ||
| And I say that because you also had some expression of concern about what they do by those who are the left-leaning justices. | ||
| And though they may in the end side with DOJ, it's far more likely that you'll get a 6-3 decision in which they reverse the DC Circuit opinion. | ||
| They may send it back for them to make additional findings, which will certainly delay. | ||
| And that's a benefit to Trump's defense team. | ||
| But at best, they also may reverse and may solidify the fact that their concern is about going after a former president. | ||
| In line with, remember what Alito, or sorry, Gorsuch, I believe, it may have been Kavanaugh, no, it was Kavanaugh, I think, said. | ||
| He said, remember, we just recently have a decision in which we said our concern would be to pick the man. | ||
| And then scour the law books to find something we can go after him for. | ||
| And with that mentality, that's a good day for the defense team on balance. | ||
| And I would suggest you're probably going to get a 6-3. | ||
| It could be 5-4, but a 6-3 decision reversed in the D.C. Circuit. | ||
| And then the question will be, do they give them, you know, is it enough to tear down the Jack Smith prosecution? | ||
| That's a possibility. | ||
| I think it's within play. | ||
| There's many that believe that the more likely is to reverse the D.C. Circuit and give them instruction on follow-up that they need to do in order to reach the decision, in which case we might be back in front of the Supreme Court. | ||
| Well, it was very interesting arguments, honestly, to listen to. | ||
| I think that Trump's attorney did a good showing. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Do you notice, Benny, at the end? | |
| You'll notice at the end that he was given an opportunity for rebuttal. | ||
| Yeah. | ||
|
unidentified
|
And he didn't take it. | |
| And the reason why, my guess is, is he didn't think that Draven landed any punches. | ||
| Yeah. | ||
| We'll see what happens. | ||
| I mean, he began his conversation by saying, wait a second. | ||
| Many would view what Joe Biden's doing on the border as illegal right now. | ||
| Based on American law that Joe Biden ratified in the Senate in the 1964 Immigration Act, it is illegal. | ||
| And there's no other way to interpret that. | ||
| And so what's to stop everyone from prosecuting Joe Biden as soon as he's out of office? | ||
| Boom. | ||
|
unidentified
|
There it is. | |
| In fact, and I know there are colleagues of mine that disagree with me on this, but I believe that... | ||
| Conservative prosecutors, they need the facts, of course. | ||
| They should not cut corners, but they need to hit back and hit back hard. | ||
| And there needs to be prosecutions of Democrat leaders. | ||
| You see what happened in Arizona. | ||
| You're seeing what's happening across the country. | ||
| And until prosecutors go after some of these folks and punch them back, they're going to continue to be the bullies that they are. | ||
| Yes. | ||
| Brett, just since you brought it up, it's really important, obviously something that's really concerning, what happened in Arizona last night, because that attorney general, not only is that attorney general won by 200 votes when there was massive machine, admitted machine breakdowns, and a nightmare of an election in Arizona, but also she was on MSNBC a week ago saying, we've got to get Joe Biden elected. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Yes. | |
| I mean, that timeline. | ||
| Seems, like, remarkably corrupt. | ||
| And so, like, one, your take on that, because that sort of hit me out of the blue as it dropped last night at 7pm and hit our team out of the blue. | ||
| And then your overall two-part question, your overall strategy when it comes to Donald Trump taking over in 2024, if you were to advise. | ||
| in order to end this, right? | ||
| Because I don't think anybody wants the tit for tat that's going to leave the whole world blind, right? | ||
| The eye for the eye. | ||
| Like, how do you do this? | ||
| How do you structure this in a way that it doesn't happen again? | ||
| How do you make it hurt? | ||
| I'm a parent. | ||
| How do you spank in a way that you correct the behavior? | ||
|
unidentified
|
Yes, yes. | |
| So, you know, this is my opinion on this, and I'll tell you, you know, I think it will work, but... | ||
| So addressing what happened in Arizona, I think it's outrageous. | ||
| The timing is outrageous. | ||
| But not only that, they've already found, and it has been legitimized by courts, they found that election fraud occurred in Arizona. | ||
| You are going after the lawyers and electors who We're acting in their official capacity who believed that they were making correct decisions. | ||
| You can disagree with that, but applying the law to prosecute them for their, you know, they're exercising their authority based on what they knew at the time. | ||
| And then going after the lawyers is, you know, it's akin to obviously what's happening in Fulton County, Georgia, and the prosecution of the attorneys. | ||
| It's a very ugly, ugly chapter, and it needs to be stopped. | ||
| So you need to have massive funding that's built, a fund that can be dedicated to defend the lawyers. | ||
| I never thought I'd say that, but you do have to defend these lawyers who are willing to go into court, make arguments. | ||
| They're allowed to do that. | ||
| So that's one thing. | ||
| You have to have a $30 to $50 million defense fund that's put up by folks to go out and defend these lawyers. | ||
| Otherwise, you're seeing what happened in Fulton County, where they're just coming in, they're scared, they plead guilty. | ||
| And it sets bad precedent. | ||
| And then Arizona gains confidence and says, we'll go ahead. | ||
| The second thing that you have to do, obviously, if Trump gets in, you get people in positions and they need to be, you know, people that are going to be basing their decisions on the law and the facts. | ||
| But I do think you punch a bully back. | ||
| And then maybe we get to a place where both sides say, okay. | ||
| We'll call a ceasefire and we'll stop going at each other, our political adversaries, as aggressively. | ||
| But having said that, if we do not change the immunity laws on prosecutors, which has developed and become so robust that they are absolutely protected, even when they abuse their positions, | ||
| even when there's findings of misconduct, a judge, a state court judge in a criminal case right now, And a federal court judge in a criminal case right now, neither one of them have any confidence that they can sanction a prosecutor for misconduct. | ||
| So it is not clear. | ||
| The law has not been developed. | ||
| So the immunity and Clarence Thomas talks about this, the immunity, you know, qualified immunity has grown and expanded to such a degree that we cannot hold bad acting prosecutors accountable. | ||
| And people say to me, well, there's the bar. | ||
| You could file a complaint. | ||
| You could bring a civil lawsuit. | ||
| That's totally not true. | ||
| The bars, their ability to hold a prosecutor in check is virtually nothing because they operate under different laws. | ||
| And then the civil lawsuits cannot go forward against prosecutors. | ||
| And they are thrown out routinely in this country. | ||
| So until we do change that qualified immunity, where they have some risk to making a decision like Alvin Bragg or like Fannie Willis, to where they have some personal exposure on this, then we'll continue to have these problems. | ||
| Yeah. | ||
| I mean, the Arizona thing, again, it certainly did shock our team. | ||
| Really makes you wonder, right? | ||
| Like, you doff protest too much. | ||
| There's a really nice line in Shakespeare about this kind of stuff, right? | ||
| And as you said, there's been proven fraud. | ||
| People have gone to jail. | ||
| People have been federally prosecuted for fraud in Arizona in these elections. | ||
| We've covered them. | ||
| We know them by name. | ||
| We've covered the cases. | ||
| This is all factual. | ||
| It's been done by the DOJ. | ||
| So, again, to not just follow the Constitution here. | ||
| Alternate electors, slates of electors. | ||
| A bunch of actors tried to do this in 2016. | ||
| I remember the video, Michael Sheen, right? | ||
| Like Martin Sheen. | ||
|
unidentified
|
In our history, in our history in this country, electors have refused to, they've presented different names and they didn't get prosecuted. | |
| I mean, over 250 years, we've had electors that have gone, you know, wild and rogue, as people might describe it, and they didn't get prosecuted. | ||
| And that's the difference, is the Democrats have been willing to say, it's okay, we'll ignore the law, we don't care if it applies, it's not going to apply to us, and we'll apply a standard that's different, and we're willing to use our office to do it. | ||
| And that is the status right now in our country, and we need better officials in those positions, but we also need more guardrails to rein them in. | ||
| Yeah, Democrats literally put together an alternate slate of electors for Florida in the year 2000 and had to be decided at the Supreme Court, right? | ||
|
unidentified
|
That's right. | |
| Yeah, right? | ||
| Okay, got it? | ||
| Okay, yeah, geez. | ||
| Okay, hey, thank you, Brett. | ||
| Like, right on crime. | ||
| Everybody got to go follow Brett. | ||
| He's the best. | ||
| Make sure that you are supporting him and his work. | ||
| One of the few people who can charge like a herd of stallions through the countryside of the dustbin of the DOJ and some of the corruption there. | ||
| So well done. | ||
| Thank you, Brett. | ||
| Thank you. | ||
|
unidentified
|
Thanks, Benny. | |
| So much, ladies and gentlemen, to cover. | ||
| We will cover it on the show tomorrow. | ||
| There's, like, just so many angles here. | ||
| The producers have made a decision. | ||
| They've just said, listen, we're going to do a full, like, rundown of everything that happened on the program tomorrow, and we are going to ensure that we've got your back, okay? | ||
| That we've got your back. | ||
| So, know that, and... | ||
| You know, I think what Brett Tolman just said, it's been a very, very good day. | ||
| It's been a very, very good day for Donald Trump. | ||
| That's the way that we hear it. | ||
| That's the way that we hear it. | ||
| Every single justice is like, wait a second. | ||
| So your idea is that you're so perfect. | ||
| The Biden regime and the DOJ is so perfect and so non-politicized that we should just let you prosecute every president. | ||
| Got it? | ||
| Yeah. | ||
| No. | ||
| Okay. | ||
| No. | ||
| That is... | ||
| Bad argument, right? | ||
| We'll see what the Supreme Court does. | ||
| This one's going to be very, very interesting. | ||
| Ladies and gentlemen, we have been live for well past three hours now. | ||
| If you wish to support our show and our program in our ability to do this and the team and the memes and everything, we do our best to make it entertaining to bring you the news and information, the good news. | ||
| Please join the Benny Brigade, BennyJohnson.com slash brigade. | ||
| You can keep us going, keep us independent. | ||
| Also, even if you didn't think there was any good news at the Supreme Court, you'd be wrong. | ||
| We have the good news for you on the program. | ||
| Philippians 4, 7, ladies and gentlemen. | ||
| And the peace of God, which surpasses all understanding, will guard your hearts and your minds in Christ Jesus. | ||
| The peace of God, which surpasses all understanding, will guard your hearts and mind in Christ Jesus. | ||
| And it's like an important thing. | ||
| Because... | ||
| You know, like, we just listened to hours of the Supreme Court argue whether Donald Trump should be put in prison, right? | ||
| Like, what a crazy timeline we're living in. | ||
| Could you rewind the clock three years ago? | ||
| Could you even imagine? | ||
| Look at how quickly everything's descended. | ||
| And this is why it's very important to have peace, the peace of God. | ||
| Well, it centers you, carries you through, it allows you to go forward. | ||
| The entire point of all this, the point of this broken world is to break you and to obviously shatter you and make you... | ||
| Make you like the demon-possessed people in the Gospels, right? | ||
| You live among the dead. | ||
| Those are the broken people do. | ||
| And we are not broken people. | ||
| We are living and we are standing upright. | ||
| And we are here for you. | ||
| And we are here to give you hope in our small capacity to do so. | ||
| And if we characterize one thing on this program, it is that there is a truth. | ||
| There is the truth. | ||
| It's not a bunch of truths. | ||
| There's the truth. | ||
| Hopefully the Supreme Court finds it today. | ||
| You can find it through the scriptures. | ||
| You can find it on this program because it's your boy Benny. | ||
| We're going to win. | ||
| All right? | ||
| We'll see you tomorrow. | ||
| Full wrap-up. | ||
| What a day! |
Export Selection