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July 10, 1998 - Bill Cooper
59:03
Affidavit & Jurisdiction Challenge #2
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and the broken dreams of the people of the sea.
The end.
You're listening once again to the Hour of the Time.
the the evening you're listening once again to the power of the
time on william cooper
both of you listen to yesterday's broadcast
discovered and awful lot of facts in the world that you were not aware of
And I'm going to tell you right now, unless you get off your lazy butts and go look these things up, you're never going to know whether I'm telling you the truth or not, even though I cite the documentation, I cite the sources, I tell you exactly where to go and look.
Most of you will never do it.
That's a shame.
That's why you don't know your butts from a hole in the ground, you don't know where you're going, you don't know why the nation's off track, you don't even know what's happening in your hometown, your county, much less the state capitol or Washington, D.C.
What you're going to hear today is part two of a Notice, Contract, Declaration of Citizenship, Affidavit, Demand, and Jurisdiction Challenge.
If you're listening to this broadcast, each and every one in this series, you have been served.
This notice, contract, declaration of citizenship, affidavit, demand and jurisdiction challenge addresses federal jurisdiction, federal authority, jurisdiction and authority of federal agents, The Constitutionality and Lawful Character of the Income Tax and the Internal Revenue Service and other agencies of the United States Government, including but not limited to the Department of the Treasury and legal application of the Internal Revenue Code.
It will be construed to comply with provisions necessary to establish presumed fact under the federal rules of civil procedure and attending state rules should interested parties fail to rebut within twenty calendar days any given allegation or matter of law addressed herein.
The position will be construed as adequate to meet requirements of judicial notice, thus preserving fundamental law.
Matters addressed herein, if not rebutted within twenty calendar days, will be construed to have general application as presumed fact in the law.
In federal criminal prosecutions involving jurisdictional-type crimes, the government must prove the existence of federal jurisdiction by showing U.S.
ownership of the place where the crime was committed and state cession of jurisdiction.
If the government contends for the power to criminally prosecute for an alleged offense committed outside its jurisdiction, it must prove an extraterritorial application of the statute in question, as well as a constitutional foundation supporting the same.
Absent this showing, no federal prosecution can be commenced for offenses committed outside its jurisdiction.
Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven.
Higgins v. Levine, Supra, Note 3.
No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction.
Standard v. Olson, 74, Supreme Court, 768.
It has also been held that jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown and will not be presumed.
Special Indemnity Fund versus Pruitt 205 F2d 306 201 Oklahoma Supreme Court 308.
Yesterday we left off at item number...
I'm going to back up just a little bit so that there's a little overlap so that someone just tuning in will not be left with no idea what's going on or being said here.
Don't go away.
Make sure you have pen and paper by your side.
I will return after this very brief pause.
That there are only four things that can possibly be the subject matter of any tax, whether it's local, state, or federal.
1.
People, which is decapitation, or head and pole tax.
It's a direct tax.
2.
Property by reason of ownership.
That's real and personal property taxes, which is also a direct tax. 3.
Revenue, taxable activities, such as the manufacture, sale, or distribution of alcohol, tobacco, or firearms.
An indirect tax.
4.
A grant of privilege.
A grant of privilege.
For example, state-registered corporate charters.
Granting permission to do business is a privilege by the state's definition and is also an indirect tax.
That taxes on the first two types, direct taxes, are called direct taxes, while the third and fourth types, the indirect taxes, are known as indirect taxes.
This definition is not derived from what the taxes popularly or formally named, nor from how the taxes measure.
This definition can only come from its subject. 69 That there has never been a head tax since the Constitution was instituted because capitation taxes are expressly forbidden by Article 1, Section 9, Paragraph 4.
This type of tax is outlawed at all levels.
That while property taxes are legal in nearly all state and local jurisdictions, they are not legal on the federal level.
That the federal government must restrict itself to the indirect class of taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.
The income tax is, therefore, not a tax on income as such.
It is an excise tax with respect to certain activities and privileges which is measured by reference to the income which they produce.
The income is not the subject of the tax.
It is the basis for determining the amount of tax.
That's from the House Congressional Record, March 27, 1943, page 2580.
70.
That the courts have clearly established that the misleadingly named income tax is an excise
tax and therefore is an indirect tax.
The Supreme Court case Russell v. United States, 369, United States Supreme Court, 749 at 765, 1962, states that
taxable income can only be derived from revenue taxable activities. Statements alleging some sort of taxable
activity must be made in order to support the legal conclusion that the accused
had taxable income, etc., or the indictment is invalid and the court does not have authority to hold a trial.
71.
That the Supreme Court's unanimous rulings in the following cases have never been reversed or overturned.
Bruchaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company 240 United States Supreme Court.
Stanton versus Baltic Mining Company, 240, United States Supreme Court, 103.
And Flint versus Stone Tracy Company, 220, United States Supreme Court, 107.
The court in Bruchever and Stanton held that the Sixteenth Amendment, the income tax amendment so called, as correctly interpreted and the income tax itself, when correctly applied, are constitutional because they are restricted to indirect taxes.
When incorrectly interpreted and incorrectly applied as a capitation or head tax applied to every person's income, it is unconstitutional. 72 That in Flint the court held that indirect taxes are never upon any kind of property, money or otherwise, but only upon particular activities in which the resulting income is used to measure the tax on the taxable activity.
Income taxes are only named such because the income connected with the activity is used as the standard or yardstick by which the tax upon the activity is measured.
Under the Internal Revenue Code, an activity must be taxable for revenue purposes as opposed to strictly regulatory purposes.
Excise taxes are taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale, or consumption of commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations, and upon corporate privileges.
Cooley Constitutional Limitations, 7th edition, page 680, as cited in Flint, Supra 151.
The Constitutional Limitations, 7th edition, page 680, as cited in Flint, Supra 151.
73. That facts regarding the exercise of a revenue taxable privilege or activity must exist in order to support the
legal position of the person who had taxable income or was obligated to pay or
was required by law to file tax returns or is even to be considered a taxpayer.
74.
That there is a distinct class officially recognized as non-taxpayers who are not subject to the jurisdiction of internal revenue statutes.
Jurisdiction is essentially the authority conferred by Congress to decide a given type of case one way or another.
That's from Higgins v. Levine, 415, United States Supreme Court, 533, 1974.
Quote, Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven.
Higgins v. Levine, Supra, Note 3.
No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction.
Standard v. Olsen, 74, U.S.
Supreme Court, 768.
It has also been held that jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown and will not be presumed.
Special Indemnity Fund v. Pruitt, 205, F.
Capital F, 2, small d, 306, 201, Oklahoma Supreme Court, 308.
75.
That the Internal Revenue Service, in order to define a fiant and or a fiant's lawful
wife as a taxpayer, must assert jurisdiction which a fiant refutes.
The Internal Revenue Service must prove that a fiant falls under its jurisdictional influence. 76 That should the Internal Revenue Service violate a client's and a client's lawful rights under color of law, and with the complicity of the courts forcing jurisdiction upon a client, they still cannot prevail.
First, because of the lack of implementing regulations.
Second, because a client is not engaged in any revenue taxable activities.
And third, through the emphatic assertion of a client's correct and proper legal status. 77 That in law, the legal definition is the only authoritative one.
About eighty court decisions and treasury decisions have used the terms includes and including in a restrictive sense, meaning that when they are used, the terms denote only those items that follow it.
Further, Black's Law Dictionary, the handbook of legal definition, defines include as follows.
Latin, in claudere, to shut in, or keep within, to confine within, hold as an enclosure, take in, attain, shut up, contain, enclose, comprise, comprehend, embrace, involve.
Term may, according to context, express an enlargement and have the meaning of, and or, in addition to, or merely specify a particular thing already included within general words theretofore used, including within statute, is interpreted as a word of enlargement or of illustrative application as well as a word of limitation."
"Premier Products Company v. Cameron, 240, Oregon Supreme Court 123, 400, Capital P, period, 2, small d, 227, 228.
78.
That Black's Law Dictionary says when the term include is used, it expands to take in all of the items that are listed, but only those items and no others.
The importance of this limiting sense of the term is apparent when you look at many of the Internal Revenue Code definitions.
For instance, in section 7701, small a, 9.
United States.
The term United States, when used in a geographic sense, includes only the states and the District of Columbia.
Sheeple would interpret that to mean that it includes the 50 states of the Union. 79.
that in the very next definition the code defines the term state, and it is not what you think it means.
Section 7701, small a, 10.
State.
The term state shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out the provisions of this title.
Based on the legal definition of the term, include, then state means only the District of Columbia.
If we substitute this in the definition of United States, then the code is limited in its jurisdiction to only the District of Columbia, the exact jurisdiction which the Constitution for the United States of America limits the federal government to.
That to show that the Internal Revenue Service knows precisely what it's saying, and is very specific in its application of these definitions, the Code follows form when it defines State, United States, and Citizen in Chapter 21, Federal Insurance Contributions Act, or FICA, F-I-C-A.
I C A. Section 3121 e State, United States and Citizen. For the purposes of this chapter,
State.
The term state includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.
2.
United States.
The term United States, when used in the geographic sense, includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.
The Internal Revenue Service insists the code is absolutely correct, so this is exactly what it must mean.
Therefore, the provisions of Title 26 apply only to the District of Columbia and the Federal Territories, exactly as the jurisdiction of the Federal Government is defined in the Supreme Law of the Land, the Constitution for the United States of America.
How could you possibly think that it could be any different?
81 THAT THE CODE DEFINES EMPLOYER IN CHAPTER 24 COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AT SOURCE ON WAGES SECTION 3401 D EMPLOYER FOR PURPOSES OF THIS CHAPTER, THE TERM EMPLOYER MEANS THE PERSON FOR WHOM AN INDIVIDUAL PERFORMS OR PERFORMED ANY SERVICE OF WHATEVER NATURE AS THE EMPLOYEE OF SUCH PERSON.
82, that if you have an employee, then you are an employer.
There is a conspicuous absence of the term include in this definition.
Section 3401, small c, employee.
For purposes of this chapter, the term employee, now listen very carefully sheeple, includes an officer, employee, are elected official of the United States, a state, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing.
The term employee also includes the officer of a corporation.
Did you hear anything there about the guy that sweeps out the Circle K?
No, and you never will.
83 That to be an employee you must work for the government or be an officer of a corporation.
The term include shows up here, and again, if we substitute this idea into the definition of employer, a company is most likely not ever an employer because none of the people working for companies are employees of the government or officers of any corporation.
Section 7701 small a 3 Corporation The term corporation includes associations, joint stock companies, and insurance companies.
84.
That further investigation shows that the corporation must be formed in, be doing business in, are receiving income from the District of Columbia, or be classified as a foreign corporation.
Those who are not incorporated are covered in the Code as well.
Listen very carefully to this.
You may believe that you're engaged in a trade or that you operate a business, but the definition in the Internal Revenue Code says no such thing.
Section 7701 small a. Trade or business.
The term trade or business includes the performance of the functions of a public office. 85 that the courts have drawn a distinct line between income and wages.
Income, within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and the Revenue Act, means gain, and in such connection, gain means profit.
Proceeding from property, severed from capital, however invested are employed and coming in, Received or drawn by the taxpayer for his separate use, benefit, and disposal.
86.
That income is neither a wage nor compensation for any type of labor.
Stapler versus United States, 21, capital F, Sup.
737 at 739.
Quote, There is a clear distinction between profit and wages, or a compensation for labor.
Compensation for labor, wages, cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law.
The word profit, as ordinarily used, means the gain made upon any business or investment, a different thing altogether from the mere compensation for labor."
Oliver v. Halsted, 86, S.E.
Rep.
2, N.D.
S.E. Rep. 2nd 85 e 9 1955.
85, e.
Quote, Whatever may constitute income, therefore, must have the essential feature of gain to
the recipient.
If there is not gain, there is not income.
Congress has taxed income, not compensation."
Connor v. United States 303 F. Supp.
303 F. Sup. 1187. 1969 87. That each time a company and or its executives
turns over employee money to the Internal Revenue Service under a notice of levy,
They are unwittingly aiding and abetting the Internal Revenue Service in the performance of an illegal act.
To understand why we need to look to the code provisions relating to levy and restraint, specifically subchapter capital D, Seizure of property for collection of taxes under Section 6331, Levy and Distraint, is the following.
Section 6331, small a. Authority of Secretary.
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within ten days after the notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax, and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy.
By levy upon all property and rights to property, except such property as is exempt under Section 6334, belonging to such person, are on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such a tax.
Section 6331 Small a continued authority of secretary
Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer employee or elected official of the United States
the District of Columbia or any agency or instrumentality of the United States or District of
Columbia by serving a notice of levy on the employer as defined in
401 small d of such officer employee or elected official
88 That when we take the time to look closely at this power, we see from the first part of it that the Secretary's power is delimited and confined to those who are liable to pay any tax and upon whose property exists a lien.
A lien can only be ordered by a court after due process has been completed, giving the accused the opportunity to meet the accuser in court.
And that, with the Internal Revenue Service, has never, ever happened.
They serve notices of lien.
There is never a lien.
There has never been due process.
There is never a ruling of any court or judge of any kind.
It is unlawful.
It is a scam.
And when your local sheriff or law enforcement officials participate in levying the so-called
notice of lien against the property of the accused, they are all participating in an
illegal, unlawful scam against the citizens of this nation.
As further evidence of the limited power of the Secretary to issue notices of levy, the second part of section 6331 small a is clearly aimed at government employees and is actually the only part of the section that even mentions the filing of a notice.
Since the Internal Revenue Service adamantly asserts that the Code is completely correct in its script, a fiant can only conclude that the power to issue a notice of levy applies only to government employees and, therefore, as a foreign corporation.
By Code definition, no one else is charged with any responsibility for the perfection of such overextended, misapplied powers and bogus jurisdictional claims.
As in our intercourse with our fellow men, certain principles of morality are assumed to exist, without which society would be impossible.
So certain inherent rights lie at the foundation of all action, and upon a recognition of them alone can free institutions be maintained.
These inherent rights have never been more happily expressed than in the Declaration of Independence.
That evangel of liberty to the people.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that is, so plain that their truth is recognized upon their mere statement, that all men are endowed, not by edicts of emperors, or decrees of Parliament, or acts of Congress, but by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that is, rights which cannot be bartered away, or given away, are taken away, except in punishment of crime, and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
And to secure these, not grant them, but to secure them, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
Among these unalienable rights, as proclaimed in that great document, is the right of men to pursue their happiness.
by which is meant the right to pursue any lawful business or vocation in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may increase their prosperity or develop their faculties so as to give them their highest enjoyment.
The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits which are innocious in themselves, and have been followed in all communities from time immemorial, must, therefore, be free in this country to all alike, upon the same conditions.
The right to pursue them, without let or hindrance, except that which is applied to all persons of the same age, sex, and condition, is a distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States, and an essential element of that freedom which they claim The right to pursue them without let or hindrance except that which is applied to all persons of the same age, sex, and condition is a distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States and an essential element of that freedom which they claim as their birthright.
The property which every man has is his own labor.
It is, as it is, the original foundation of all other So it is the most sacred and inviolable.
The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of the most sacred property."
Butcher's Union Company v. Crescent City Company, 111, United States Supreme Court, 746.
That ruling was made in 1883.
89.
That in two other cases the Supreme Court said, quote, Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property, partaking of the nature of each, is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property.
Chief among such contracts is that of personal employment, by which labor and others' services are exchanged for money or other forms of property."
Coppedge v. Kansas, 236, U.S.
Supreme Court, 1 at 14, 1915.
Cambridge v. Kansas, 236, United States Supreme Court, 1 at 14, 1915.
End quote.
Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, as generally admitted, and
has generally admitted, and that no other person can rightfully deprive him of those
that no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits and appropriate them against
fruits and appropriate them against his will."
his will.
End quote.
Envelope 23, United States Supreme Court, 66 at 120.
The United States Supreme Court, 66 at 1.20.
The United States Supreme Court.
I'm William Cooper.
Ninety.
90.
That in 1913, four years after Congress first introduced the Income Tax Amendment, Philander Knox, a Pittsburgh attorney and then Secretary of State, declared the Sixteenth Amendment duly ratified despite the protests and subsequent research which reveals proof to the contrary.
Congress intended that somebody should pay a tax.
Congress has the constitutional authority to tax, but only through specific types of taxes severely limited by the restraints enumerated in the Constitution for the United States of America, which is the supreme law of the land, regardless of what you, the sheeple, may have heard.
Ninety-one.
Since Congress and the courts have defined it as an excise tax, a client has no argument with the tax itself and does not protest against the income tax.
However, It is one thing to protest a tax and another thing entirely to protest extortion committed under the guise, pretext, sham, or subterfuge of the unlawful, unconstitutional misapplication of the revenue laws against a client who is neither subject to nor liable for such indirect taxes.
This type of extortion is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment Due Process of Law Clause and the Extortion Clause of the Internal Revenue Code in Section 7214.
92 That the affiant and affiant's lawful wife are not tax protesters.
That affiant and affiant's lawful wife are protesting against the unconstitutional and unlawful misapplication of the revenue laws and are not protesting the tax itself in its proper and lawful application as an excise tax levied upon those made liable who are engaged in taxable activities and privileges deriving gross income from the specific sources named by the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury.
Ninety-three.
That the Internal Revenue Service was not created by Congress.
It is not an organization found under the Department of the Treasury in Title 31 United States Code with the other agencies of Treasury.
One of the organizations known as the Internal Revenue Service was created as a trust in the Philippines.
the Bureau of Internal Revenue Trust Fund No. 1, Philippines Special Fund, 31, United
States Code at 1321, under the Department of Finance and Justice.
Another trust fund, Trust Fund No. 62, Puerto Rico Special Fund, was created for internal
revenue.
Title 26, United States Code, Internal Revenue Code, specifically defines the jurisdiction
under which it is effective as only pertaining to the District of Columbia and its territories
and possessions.
94 94
94.
That an agency's failure to publish any document, regardless of how named by the agency which is designed to implement or prescribe law, is a rule which is void and unenforceable.
95 that within an agency instructions may be promulgated and distributed to agency officers and employees informing them as to the manner and method of implementing and enforcing any particular law.
If by chance these instructions likewise meet the definition of a rule as defined by section 551 and if the same be substantive As prescribed by Section 552, they must be published in the Federal Register.
Several cases have found such instructions to agency employees void for non-publication.
The case authority clearly shows that instructions given to agency personnel which command the
performance of an act by a member of the public are which limit entitlement to statutory benefits
are subject to the publication requirement.
If such rules found in agency instructions to agency personnel must be published, then
likewise similar instructions given directly by the agency to the public must also be published
on the grounds that the same similarly are rules.
96.
That it is essential for a federal employee to possess delegated authority to perform any particular act.
The absence of delegated authority means that the act in question was beyond the scope of the employee's duties and therefore unlawful.
The necessity for a federal employee to have delegated authority to act not only is shown in the above cases, it also manifests itself in cases under the Federal Tort Claim Act, herein called FTCA.
28 United States Code, section 1346, small b. Under this law, the United States is liable for torts committed by its employees, if so committed within the scope of their employment.
If the act in question was not committed in the scope of employment, the employee is liable and the United States is not.
A variety of cases deciding F.T.C.A.
claims show instances where the United States is held not liable for its employees' torts.
In Paley v. United States 125 F.S.
725 F. Sup. 768 D. Maryland, Supreme Court, 1954, a soldier detailed as a military funeral
768 D.M.
escort was driving his own car to a funeral and was involved in an accident.
Since the soldier lacked express orders to do so, his tort was held to be outside the scope of his employment, and the United States was not liable.
In Jones v. The F.B.I.
139 F.S.
3842 D.M.
1956, it was alleged that certain F.B.I.
agents had stolen or converted property belonging to the plaintiff.
The court held that if such were true, the agents were not acting within the scope of their office or employment, and the United States could not be liable in tort.
In James v. United States 467 F2d 832 4th Circuit, 1972, a reservist was involved in a car accident on his return from an annual fields training exercise.
Since this travel was not within the scope of his employment, the government was held not liable for damages.
In another accident case involving an Army truck, White v. Hardy 678 There was substantial evidence that Sgt.
485, 487, Fourth Circuit, 1982, the driver was found to have no authority to drive the
truck when the accident happened. Thus his acts were beyond the scope of his employment
and the United States was not liable.
There was substantial evidence that Sergeant Hardy was not given the requisite express
authority to use the government vehicle involved in the collision."
In Hughes v. United States, 662, F2d219, Fourth Circuit, 1981, the United States was held
not liable for child molestation committed by one of its employees, a postal worker.
In Trarese v. Summons 755 F.2d.1081, Fourth Circuit, 1985, the United States withheld
not liable for the wrongful death of one serviceman committed by another.
And in Thigpen v. United States 800 F.2d.393, 393, Fourth Circuit, 1986, the court held the government not liable under the F.T.C.A.
for the sexual assault of some girls by one of its employees.
Cases from other jurisdictions also demonstrate that for an act to be within the government employee's scope of employment, it must have been authorized by a regulation or some other written document.
For example, in MITRE v. United States 322 F.2d193 6th Circuit 1963, a Federal Tort Claims
Act claim was being asserted against the United States for damages arising from an accident
involving a drunken Air Force serviceman.
To define the serviceman's authority, written regulations were consulted to determine whether the act of driving the government's car was authorized.
Finding that the regulations did not permit use of the vehicle on this occasion, the serviceman was found not to be acting within the scope of his employment.
In Vettis v. United States, 635 F.2 d.
635 F. to small d. 1144, 5th Circuit, 1981, a soldier drove a truck off a military base
without authority and was involved in an accident. His act was held to be beyond his authority,
and thus the United States was not liable in tort.
In Turner v. United States, 595, F.
595, F. Sup. 708, W. D. Louisiana, 1984, a recruiter conducted an unclothed physical
examination of some potential female enlistees, which caused them to sue under the FTCA. In
finding that there were no regulations either permitting or requiring such examinations,
the United States was found not liable. See also Doggett v.
United States, 858, F. 2d 555, 9th Cir. 1988, and Lutz v. United States, 685, F. 2d
1178, 9th Cir. 1982.
And I'll see you next time.
Thus, those cases adequately demonstrate that a government employee must have, must have, must have some specific delegated authority based upon statutes, regulations, or delegation orders, in order to be authorized to act in the premises.
The absence of such authority, when challenged, therefore requires a holding that the employee's acts were unauthorized and thus beyond the scope of his employment.
97.
That a plain reading of 26 CFR section 7608 reveals that the section itself conveys authority to nobody other than the Secretary.
The Secretary, in turn, must authorize agents, and this calls for the issuance of delegation orders.
Under the repealed Regulation 301.7608-1, it is obvious that some type of authority had been conveyed to the Commissioner, but here even he had to issue delegation orders appointing agents.
Thus, to follow the flow of authority, Under Section 7608, it is essential to consult Treasury Department orders and Commissioners' delegation orders.
In 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act was adopted, and the same required federal agencies to publish in the Federal Register statements of their central and field organizational structures, as well as the methods by which their functions were channeled, that's delegation orders.
See 5 United States Code, Section 552.
It is acknowledged by both Treasury and Internal Revenue Service that these items must be so published.
C-31, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 1.3, small a, and 26, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 601.702, small a. In fact, it is acknowledged that anything concerning or affecting the American public must be published.
In 1953, Revenue Ruling 2, that's 1953-1, CB 484, was issued, and it required all divisions or units of the Internal Revenue Service to publish in the Federal Register any item of concern to the public.
This was more clearly expressed in Revision Process 55-1, 1955-2, CB 897, as follows,
quote, "'It shall be the policy to publish for public information
all statements of practice and procedure issued primarily for internal use, and hence
appearing in internal management documents which affect rights or duties of taxpayers or
other members of the public under the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes,' end quote.
Thank you.
That which is expressed above currently manifests itself within 26 Code of Federal Regulations section 601.601 small d to small b which reads as follows quote a revenue procedure is a statement of procedure that affects the rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of the public under the code and related statutes or information that Although not necessarily affecting the rights and duties of the public, should be a matter of public knowledge."
Now before commencing with a review of modern treasury decision or treasury directives orders, it might perhaps be useful to examine older delegation orders, that's TDOs, Treasury Delegation Orders.
It might perhaps be useful to examine older delegation orders and TDOs issued before and during the time of the 1939 Code. By doing so, it may be seen how authority
from the President and Secretary has been delegated. For example, Executive Order 6166,
dated June 10, 1933, stated as follows,
Quote, All functions now exercised by the Bureau of Prohibition of
the Department of Justice with respect to the granting of permits under the National
Prohibition Laws are transferred to the Division of Internal Revenue in the Treasury
Department.
The Bureaus of Internal Revenue and of Industrial Alcohol of the Treasury Department are consolidated in a Division of Internal Revenue, at the head of which shall be a Commissioner of Internal Revenue."
Executive Order No.
6639, dated March 10, 1934, stated as follows, 1.a.
The Bureau of Industrial Alcohol and the Office of Commissioner of Industrial Alcohol are abolished, and the authority, rights, privileges, powers, and duties conferred in imposed by law upon the Commissioner of Industrial Alcohol are transferred to, and shall be held, exercised, and performed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and his assistants, agents and inspectors under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury."
And CDO No.
and TDO number 143 dated December 6, 1951 provided as follows,
quote, By virtue of the authority vested in me as Secretary of the
Treasury by Reorganization Plan number 26
26 of 1950, there are hereby transferred to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the functions and duties now performed by collectors of internal revenue in connection with tobacco and other taxes imposed under Chapter 15 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Quote, The functions and duties herein transferred to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may, At his discretion, be delegated to subordinates in the Bureau of Internal Revenue Service in such manner as the Commissioner shall from time to time direct."
Thus, each delegation order must be examined to determine the authority conveyed therein.
In 1949, Congress enacted a law authorizing the President to reorganize the Executive Department's C-63 statutes Chapter 226, codified at 5 United States Code, Section 901, et sec.
Pursuant to this authority, the President promulgated Reorganization Plan No.
26 of 1950, 15 Federal Regulations, 4935, 64 Statutes, 1280, which restructured the entire Treasury Department via the following, quote, There are hereby transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury all functions of all other officers of the Department of
the Treasury, and all functions of all agencies and employees of such Department."
By this reorganization plan, all statutory and delegated authority of anyone in the Treasury
Department was immediately divested and placed into the hands of the Secretary.
reorganization plan number one.
1 of 1952, 17 Federal Regulations 2243, 16, excuse me, that's 66 Statutes 823, reorganized the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the name of which was changed to the Internal Revenue Service the following year by the stroke of a pen.
See, Treasury Delegation 6038-1953-2, CB-443 Based upon the above reorganization plans, on March 15, 1952, the Secretary issued TDO No.
150, which authorized the continued performance of functions by Treasury officers and agents until changed by subsequent order.
This order established a series of later orders.
All of which deal with and concern administration of the Internal Revenue Laws.
A separate file lists the TDOs issued since the reorganization plan, which are in 150 series.
Citation as to where each order is published is also provided.
A review of these TDOs disclosed that most of them concern only organizational changes made to the Internal Revenue Service.
Insofar as authority granted pursuant to Section 7608 is concerned, of those which were published, only TDO No.
150-42 could possibly embody the criminal enforcement powers to which Section 7608 relates.
It is also possible that one of the unpublished orders delegated this authority, because the Commissioner and Secretary in the past promulgated Regulation 301 point seventy six oh eight dash one, it is assumed for
purposes of this memo that some type of delegation under section seventy six oh eight was granted by the Secretary
to the Commissioner.
Now based upon this assumption, the process of determining what agent has been delegated section seventy six oh eight
authority thus requires examination of all published CDOs issued by the Commissioner.
A list enumerating every published CDO from nineteen fifty four to the present is contained in a separate file.
By review of these various CDOs, it is possible to trace the authority which is the subject of Section 7608, the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service, and we will expose that fraud tomorrow.
Good night, ladies and gentlemen, and God bless each and every single one of you.
I said tomorrow, ladies and gentlemen, make that Monday.
Monday at the same time.
Don't miss the next episode of the Hour of the Times.
the very last voice of freedom in America.
♪♪♪ ♪♪♪
Ladies and gentlemen, this episode of the Hour of the Time will be rerun in the Round Valley of Arizona tonight at 8 p.m.
If you know someone who would be interested in this material, make sure that they are at their radio at 101.1 FM.
Eager.
Once again, this episode of the Hour of the Time will be rerun tonight at 8pm in the New York Times.
in the Round Valley of Arizona.
If you know someone who would be interested in this material, make sure they are by their radio listening to 101.1 FM Eager tonight at 8 p.m.
We now return you to our regularly scheduled programming, All Oldies Most of the Time.
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